Law and language at the beginning of the new millenium

Territoires intelligents et esprit d’entreprise
Law and language at the beginning of the new millenium
by Joseph-G. Turi
page 3

Littératures nationales et problématique de l’État-nation en
Afrique francophone postcoloniale
par Samba Diop
page 9

A world fellowship: the founding of the International Lyceum Club
for Women Artists and Writers
by Grace Brockington
page 15

What happened to the Brandt Report?
by Mohammed Mesbahi
page 23

Territoires intelligents et esprit d’entreprise
par Marc Luyckx
page 29

Civil society and the uncivil state: land tenure reform in Egypt
by Ray Bush
page 45

******

Association News
Vie associative
page 69
Law and language at the beginning of the new millennium

by Joseph-G. Turi*

Introduction

Major language legislation in the area of language policy is evidence, within certain political contexts, of contacts, conflicts and inequalities among languages used within the same territory. Objectively or apparently, these languages co-exist uneasily in a dominant-dominated relationship, thereby leading to a situation of conflicting linguistic majorities and minorities.

The fundamental goal of all linguistic legislation is to resolve, in one way or another, the linguistic problems arising from those linguistic contacts, conflicts and inequalities, by legally determining and establishing the status and use of the languages in question. Absolute or relative preference is therefore given to the protection, defence or promotion of one or several designated languages through legal language obligations and language rights drawn up to that end.

The Canadian linguistic legislation (the Official Languages Act) is an example of official legislation that applies language obligations and language rights to two designated languages, English and French. Quebec’s linguistic legislation (the Charter of the French Language) is an example of exhaustive legislation that applies, in a different way, language obligations and language rights to French, to a few more or less designated languages and to other languages to the extent that they are not designated.

Increasing legal intervention in language policy gave birth, or recognition, to a new legal science, comparative linguistic law. Comparative linguistic law is the study of language law throughout the world (as well as the language of law and the relation between law and language). To the extent that language, which is the main tool of the law, becomes both the object and the subject of law, linguistic law becomes “metajuridical” law. To the extent that comparative linguistic law recognizes and enshrines linguistic rights, albeit sometimes rather timidly and implicitly, it becomes futuristic law, since it builds on deep historical roots. This in itself is remarkable, since the growing recognition or historical enshrinement, in time and space, of linguistic rights promotes the cultural right to be different, which is a promise of creativity for individuals and families, as well as for societies, nations and the international community.

The intervention of States and Authorities (at all levels, national, regional, local, municipal, etc...) is relatively recent due especially to two relatively recent social phenomena and problems, the democratization of education and the globalization of communications.

Types of linguistic legislation

Linguistic legislation is divided into two categories, depending on its field of application: legislation which deals with the official usage of languages and that which deals with their non-official usage. Needless to say, there are grey areas in this classification.

Linguistic legislation can be divided into four categories, depending on its function: it can be official, institutionalizing, standardizing or liberal. Legislation that fills all these functions is exhaustive linguistic legislation, while other linguistic legislation is non-exhaustive.

“Official linguistic legislation” is legislation intended to make one or more designated, or more or less identifiable, or national languages, official in the domains of legislation, justice, public administration and education, totally or partially, symmetrically or asymmetrically. Depending on the circumstances, one of two principles is applied: linguistic territoriality (basically, the obligation or right to use one or more designated languages within a given territory) or linguistic personality (basically, the obligation or the right to use one’s own language or any language). As such, making one or more designated languages official does not necessarily or automatically entail major legal consequences. By the way, an official language of a State is not necessarily the most spoken language of the country. We have some examples in many countries of Africa and Asia, where the language(s) of the ancient colonizers are still the official(s) languages while they are not the most spoken languages; in other respects, an interesting case in Indonesia, where the official language is Indonesian-Malay while the most spoken language is Javanese.

The legal sense and scope of officializing a language depends on the effective legal treatment accorded to that language (for instance, when the law states that only official texts, or only cer-
tain official texts, are “authentic” so that they prevail, legally, over texts in one or more other languages).

“Institutionalizing linguistic legislation” is legislation which seeks to make one or more designated languages the normal, usual or common languages, in the unofficial domains of labour, communications, culture, commerce and business.

“Standardizing linguistic legislation” is legislation designed to make one or more designated languages respect certain language standards in very specific and clearly defined domains, usually official or highly technical.

“Liberal linguistic legislation” is legislation designed to enshrine legal recognition of language rights implicitly or explicitly, in one way or another. But linguistic law, viewed objectively (as legal rules on language), makes a distinction in linguistic rights, which are subjective so that they belong to any person, between the right to “a” language (the historical right to use one or more designated languages, belonging to majorities or some specific minorities, in various domains, especially in official domains) and the right to “the” language (the universal right to use any language in various domains, particularly in unofficial domains). These linguistic rights, based respectively on the principle of territoriality and the principle of personality, allowing for specific exceptions, are particularly individual, especially for linguistic minorities, about strict legal point of view, but naturally individual and collective about cultural point of view. They are also individual rights for political reasons, since the States are afraid of possible coincidence with the right to self-determination.

The linguistic rights of Aboriginal people, on the contrary, are generally collective ones.

The important but unofficial Barcelona Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, of July 1996, states that linguistic rights are historical and both individual and collective.

**Canadian and comparative linguistic law**

Linguistic legislation never obliges anyone to use one or more languages in absolute terms. The obligation stands only to the extent that a legal act of fact covered by language legislation is or must be accomplished. For example, the obligation to use one or more languages on product labels stands only if there is, in non-linguistic legislation, an obligation to put labels on products.

Moreover, it is the written form (the language as medium) and not the written linguistic content (the language as message) that is usually targeted by legal rules dealing explicitly with language. Both linguistic content and linguistic form can be the object of legislation that generally is not explicitly linguistic, such as the Quebec Civil Code, the Charter of Human Rights, or the Consumer Protection Act.

Generally speaking, linguistic terms and expressions or linguistic concepts (mother tongue, for instance) are the focus of language legislation only to the extent that they are formally understandable, intelligible, translatable, or identifiable, in one way or another, or have some meaning in a given language.

For example, Section 58 of Quebec’s Charter of the French Language stated that, allowing for exceptions, non-official public signs in the must be solely in French (the practical target of this prohibition was the English language). Therefore, if a word is posted and it is understandable in French, it is legally a French word. In this case, the public sign is legal (for instance, “ouvert”). In other respects, if a word is posted and it is not understandable in French, it is not legally a French word only if it has some meaning in another specific language and it is translatable into French. In this case, the public sign is illegal (for instance, “open”). However, this Section has been largely repealed, after the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1988, and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, in 1993, declared that it was incompatible with the freedom of expression.

In principle, linguistic legislation is aimed at the speakers of a language (as consumers or users) rather than at the language itself (as an integral part of the cultural heritage of a nation) unless that legislation states the contrary or is clearly a public policy law. In this case, the application of linguistic norms is sometimes flexible (like in the European *Peeters Case*, of June 18, 1991). A public policy law, on the con-
trary, is any law comprising legal standards so fundamental and essential, individually and collectively, in the interests of the community, that they become imperative or prohibitive in absolute terms so that they cannot be avoided in any way.

Quebec's Court of Appeal in the *Miriam Case* (March 22, 1984), Quebec's High Court in the *Gagnon Case* (December 15, 1986) and the French courts, in a great many decisions, including the *Steiner Case* (Paris Court of Appeal, November 27, 1985), all confirm the essential points in the above. Thus, anything that is linguistically “neutral” is not generally targeted by language legislation, as can be seen, among others, with Section 20 of the Quebec's Regulation respecting the language of commerce and business.

While the presence of a language or the “quantity” of its usage can be the object of exhaustive language legislation, language “quality” or correct usage belongs to the realm of example and persuasion where language usage is unofficial, and to the schools and government where language usage is official.

Legal rules in linguistic matters are less severe than grammatical rules. There are four fundamental reasons for this: firstly, the best laws are those that legislate the least, particularly in the unofficial usage of languages; secondly, language, as an individual and collective way of expression and communication, is an essential cultural phenomenon, in principle difficult to appropriate and define legally; thirdly, legal rules, like socio-linguistic rules, are only applied and applicable if they respect local custom and usage and the behaviour of reasonable people (who are not necessarily linguistic paragons) while grammatical rules are based on the teacher-pupil relationship; fourthly, on the other hand, legal sanctions, criminal sanctions (fines or imprisonment) and civil sanctions (damages, partial or total illegality), being generally harsher than possible language sanctions (low marks, loss of social prestige or loss of clients), legal sanctions in the language field are usually limited to low and symbolic fines or damages.

Since the legal sanctions of a public policy law are formidable (partial or total illegality, for instance), it is preferable not to think of language laws as being exclusively public policy laws, except when their legal context is clearly in favour of such an interpretation, as it could be in the official usage of languages. True, the French *Cour de cassation* declared implicitly, in the *France Quick Case* (October 20, 1986) that French Language legislation was a public policy law. But that did not prevent the *Cour d'appel de Versailles*, in the *France Quick Case* (June 24, 1987) from considering terms such as “spaghetti” and “plum-pudding” to be, for all practical purposes, French terms that is to say to be in keeping with such legislation, because they were “known to the general public”.

The fundamental goal of this legislation, then, is to protect both francophones and the French language. A francophone is anyone whose language of use is French, that is to say, from legal point of view, any person who can speak and understand French, in an ordinary and relatively intelligible manner.

In the *Macdonald Case* (May 1, 1986) and the *Ford Case* (December 15, 1988), the Supreme Court of Canada recognized and enshrined, to all intents and purposes, the distinction between the right to “a” language (principal right, foreseen as such in the Canadian Constitution, explicitly historical owing to the historic background of the country, in the domains of the official usage of languages) and the right to “the” language (accessory right, not explicitly foreseen as such in the Canadian Constitution, being implicitly an integral part of the human rights and fundamental freedoms category, in the domains of the unofficial usage of languages). The Court recognized and enshrined then the main differences between the official and the unofficial usage of languages.

According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the right to “the” language is therefore implicitly an integral part of the explicit fundamental right of freedom of speech. Moreover, in the *Irving Toy Case* (April 27, 1989), the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that artificial persons also held certain language rights.

A relatively complete study carried for the United Nations in 1979, the Capotorti Report, indicates that, although the use of languages other than the official language(s) in the
domains of official usage is restricted or forbidden in various parts of the world, the use of languages in the domains of unofficial usage is generally not restricted or forbidden. We arrived at the same conclusion, in 1977, when we made an analysis of the constitutional clauses of 147 States in the field of languages. Since then, many States, among others Algeria, Malaysia and especially the ones that are born from the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia, have made important and often drastic linguistic legislation. There is at present an inflation of modern linguistic legislation all over the world!

France has made French the official language of Republic. For this reason, the Constitutional Council of France declared on the 15th of June of 1999 that the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is incompatible with the French Constitution! It must be noted that this Charter applies only to historical and individual linguistic rights.

It must be pointed out that for the moment there are not important prohibitive linguistic legislations in the world. We had some bad examples of important prohibitory linguistic legislation in the past in Italy and in Spain, and more recently in Quebec and in Turkey (and also indirectly in Indonesia by permitting only Latin characters in the public signs, therefore prohibiting implicitly Chinese language) especially in the field of unofficial usage of languages, but this kind of linguistic legislation has been totally or partially revoked. Turkey prohibited, in some cases, the use of some languages, languages other than the first official language of each country which recognizes the Republic of Turkey, practically the use of the Kurdish language. The prohibitive measures contravened, prima facie, Section 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of 1966, which recognizes to members of linguistic minorities the right to use their own language. This Turkish law has been therefore revoked. The International Covenant applies, moreover, to individual linguistic rights, no matter if they are historical or not.

In other respects, we have some good examples of legal linguistic tolerance and freedom in many countries like Finland (with 2 official languages and where the Swedish minority is very well protected), South Africa (with eleven official languages and where the right to "the" language is specifically recognized), Canada and Australia (for their policy of multiculturalism for example). It makes us relatively optimistic and still absolutely vigilant about the future of linguistic law.

**Conclusion**

The right to "the" language will become an effective fundamental right, like other human rights, only to the extent that it is explicitly enshrined not simply in higher legal norms, but also in norms with "mandatory" provisions that identify as precisely as possible the holders and the beneficiaries of language rights and language obligations, as well as the legal sanctions that accompany them. Otherwise, the right to "the" language will be but a theoretical fundamental right, like several human rights, proclaimed in norms with "directive" provisions that cover language rights but have no real corresponding sanctions and obligations.

While the law inhabits a grey zone, the right to "the" language (and therefore the right to be culturally different) will only have meaning, legally speaking, if it is enshrined (especially for linguistic minorities), in one way or another (particularly, in the official usage of languages), in norms with mandatory provisions, as the right to "a" language generally is.

As an historical right (that takes into account the historic background of each country), the right to "a" language deserves special treatment in certain political contexts, even if it is not in itself a fundamental right. As a fundamental right (right and freedom to which every person is entitled), the right to "the" language, even if it enshrines the dignity of all languages, cannot be considered an absolute right under all circumstances. A hierarchy exists that must take into account, in ways which are different but not legally discriminatory, the historical and fundamental linguistic imperative of the nations and individuals concerned, including the imperative of re-establishing an acceptable equality between several languages coexisting in a given political context.

It is clear that the States (at all levels) must take into account in an equitable way the lan-
languages spoken by their citizens and inhabitants. But it is also clear that citizens and inhabitants must take into account in an equitable way the official language(s) of their States (at all levels). Equity is the key word to find acceptable solutions in this field.

There are more than 6000 thousands languages and dialects in our world, according to the UNESCO. But 75% of the word population speak 23 “great” languages and each on these languages is spoken by a least 1% of the population, that is 60 millions of persons (by order of quantitative importance, Chinese, Hindi-Urdu, English, Spanish, Arab, Bengali, Portuguese, Russian, Japanese, German, French, Malay, Javanese, Telugu, Tamil, Korean, Vietnamese, Marathi, Turkish, Italian, Thai, Iranian and Goudgerati). Moreover, more than 3000 languages are spoken by only 4% of the word population. The Bible has been translated in more than 2000 thousands languages and dialects. Windows has been translated in more than fifty languages and will be translated in many other languages. There are international, national, regional and local languages and dialects. All languages and dialects are equally dignified. But they are not all equal among them. A natural and sometimes artificial hierarchy is setting up among languages. This is the cultural reality of our world.

Lingua francas (in the past, Latin and French, now English-American, and tomorrow Portuguese-Brazilian maybe)are necessary for minimal international communications, not for deep cultural expression. The most spoken languages in the word are Chinese and Hindi-Urdu, but they are not international languages. More than the 90% of the word population does not speak English, but English is still the most important international language in the word. Actually, the only real “danger” we can indeed see from the lingua francas whose linguistic quality, as lingua francas, is often very poor or strictly technical, especially when they are popular, is that a strong lingua franca could prevent a good teaching and a good learning or third strong languages, as foreign languages. The real danger is not coming from “globalization” but from “localization” as far as localization becomes “ultra-nationalization”.

The recent political trend in favour of linguistic and cultural diversity is interesting if it promotes the right to “the” language. It is not so interesting if it is in favour of the right to “a” language. It is really embarrassing that for the moment some trends of this recent cultural movement want to defend strong languages like, for example, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese Arab and Russian. In reality, the languages that should be protected and promoted above all are the ones that are lesser used (less that a million speakers and in some cases some with a few million speakers) or the ones that are in a real and vulnerable linguistic minority situation.

By ruling, in Section 89 for instance, that “Where this act does not require the use of the official language (French) exclusively, the official language and another language may be used together”, Quebec’s Charter of the French language recognizes and enshrines the right to “a” language and the right to “the” language, by creating an interesting hierarchical solution between them in the field of language policy. The problem was that the “exclusive” use of French was to much important at the enactment of the Charter. It is not any more totally the case now.

The importance of linguistic law, that is the heavy legal intervention of States in the field of languages, shows that the globalization of communications seems so dramatic that it must be controlled by promoting and defending national, regional and local languages and identities, in other words the linguistic and cultural diversity of the world. In this respect, linguistic law is the triumph of “linguistic localization”, that is the realm of linguistic freedom and tolerance.

Let us hope that it will not become the triumph of “linguistic ultra-nationalization”, when nationalisation means in some public territories both the right to “a” language and the realm of linguistic fundamentalism. In this respect, it will create new walls and boundaries and therefore major and new conflicts among nations. To paraphrase Clausewitz, is language becoming a new way to wage war? Let us hope not. Language must not become the new religion of the new Millennium and will not, if we remain vigilant on this matter.
For all these reasons and others, we are relatively satisfied that the natural Tower of Babel is stronger than the artificial and technical globalization of communications. A world without frontiers is still a dream. However, we are relatively worried that the Tower of Babel is not necessarily stronger than the possible and dangerous ultra-nationalisation of languages.
Littératures nationales et problématique de l’État-nation en Afrique francophone postcoloniale

par Samba Diop*

De ses débuts dans les années 1920 jusque vers la fin du siècle dernier, la littérature africaine d’expression française a connu plusieurs appellations; mais, surtout, les romans, récits et poésie produits par des auteurs comme Bakary Diallo, Amadou Mapaté Diagne, Durand Valentin, Paul Hazoumé, René Maran, Leopold Senghor, Birago Diop, Amadou Kouyrouma, Bernard Dadié, Ousmane Sembène, Cheikh Hamidou Kane (pour ne citer que quelques uns) entraient tous dans une nébuleuse et une entité générique et totalisante, englobant tout le continent africain sans tenir compte de ses diversités régionale, ethnique, tribale et linguistique. S’il est vrai que tous ces auteurs ont en commun l’usage de la langue française, il est autant vrai qu’ils sont issus de pays dont les frontières ont été délimitées par la puissance colonisatrice française; ces entités étatiques survivent jusqu’à présent. Dans le cadre de cette étude, les romanciers Ousmane Sembène et Cheikh Hamidou Kane feront l’objet d’un attention particulier.

Le but de cet essai est de voir s’il y a convergence entre, d’un côté, les littératures produites individuellement par les pays africains francophones et l’idée de nation, de l’autre. Ainsi, tiendra-t-on compte des travaux de Renan, de Herder en passant par la ‘communauté imaginaire’ de B. Anderson. En fin de compte, l’idée de ‘nation’ en Afrique noire, telle qu’héritée de la colonisation française, est et, ensuite, les difficultés auxquelles doit faire face la problématique de la construction d’un État moderne si l’on tient compte des allégeries ethniques, tribales et linguistiques. Le but ultime est de montrer la façon dont cette complexité est re-creée à travers l’imaginaire littéraire. En me servant de récits d’écrivains comme Sembène et Kane, une grille de lecture sera établie qui sera à même de rendre plus visibles la cohérence et les différences posées par l’idée de nation ainsi que sa manifestation en Afrique postcoloniale ; nous verrons enfin l’articulation du concept de littérature nationale par rapport aux nouvelles entités étatiques découlant de la décolonisation, à la fin des années 1950.

Genèse et manifestation du concept de nation

Cette étude portera sur l’articulation du concept de ‘nation’ par rapport à la littérature africaine francophone. Il y aura donc deux parties:

1.- la première sera axée sur la définition du concept de nation mais surtout sur la portée, la prévalence et le fonctionnement de ce concept en Afrique contemporaine. Il s’agira donc de retracer les origines de ce concept ainsi que son caractère colonial. Ensuite, il est important de voir en profondeur les différentes phases de métamorphose du concept de nation.

2.- Quand à la deuxième partie de ce paper, je vais faire une analyse textuelle portant sur un certain nombre de récits et voir dans quelle mesure leurs auteurs transposent ou re-creent le concept de nation en se servant de la fiction et de l’imaginaire littéraire.

En commençant avec la définition du concept de nation, dans son ouvrage intitulé Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson trouve que “les concepts de nation, de nationalité et de nationalisme sont très difficiles à définir, sans parler de les analyser.” Mais on peut d’ores et déjà se rendre compte qu’il y a plusieurs variantes du concept national et les plus saillantes étant les versions locale et universelle. Dans le contexte africain, l’adaptation locale sera particulièrement intéressante à prendre en compte. Le philosophe allemand Kant met l’accent sur la continuité du genre humain et de ses institutions sociétales ; selon Kant, “le genre humain est constamment en progrès en ce qui concerne la culture, en tant qu’elle est sa fin naturelle ; on le considère comme progressant également vers le mieux en ce qui concerne la morale de son existence, et que cette progression est sans doute interrompue parfois, mais jamais rompu”. Dans le même ordre d’idées, malgré les diverses perspectives et d’origines le groupe humain procède d’une même racine et c’est plus tard avec l’évolution des idéologies et le développement technique et scientifique prodigieux que les divergences entre les groupes humains vont s’accentuer et que l’accent sera de plus en plus mis sur ce qui divise les hommes plutôt que sur ce qui les unit ; d’ailleurs Herder a bien saisi le sens de cette solidarité humaine en disant, notamment, que

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Associations transnationales

1/2005, 9-14
“plus les recherches font la lumière sur les périodes les plus reculées de l’histoire universelle, ses migrations, ses langues, ses moeurs, ses découvertes et ses traditions, plus chaque nouvelle découverte rend vraisemblable du même coup l’origine unique de l’espèce humaine entière”. Enfin, Ernest Renan, dans son ouvrage Καπμ 1883 intitulé Κόντε καν μια nation ? met face à face les concepts de race et de nation lorsqu’il avance l’idée “qu’autant le principe des nations est juste et légitime, autant celui du droit primordial des races est étrange et plein de danger pour le véritable progrès”. Il faut noter ici l’accent mis sur le concept de nation de la part de l’auteur mais, plus important encore, vers la fin du 19ème siècle, quelqu’un comme Renan se rendait compte de l’obsoléétude du concept racial, bien que des penseurs comme Lévy-Brühl aient tenté de donner à ce concept, cette construction, une certaine respectabilité scientifique.

Concernant l’Afrique noire, c’est surtout la question ethnique et tribale (plutôt que le concept de nation) qui jouit d’une actualité particulière ; comme le concept national, l’ethnie est très complexe et selon Léopold Senghor, “l’ethnicité est une symbiose de l’histoire et de la géographie, de la race et de la culture”. Je reviendrai plus loin sur le concept ethnique dans le cadre de l’analyse d’un certain nombre de romans francophones.

Pour revenir sur le concept de nation, la première évidence qui s’impose est qu’il est d’origine européenne.4 C’est donc par le truchement de la colonisation européenne que ce concept va faire son apparition en Afrique ; d’ailleurs, à propos du Sénégal l’une des plus anciennes colonies françaises d’Afrique, Christian Valantin5 soutient que la nation sénégalaise existait bien avant l’indépendance en 1960, car selon le même auteur, dès 1920, les conditions psychologiques, économiques et politiques étaient réunies pour que le Sénégal accédât à l’indépendance. La remarque de Valantin est intéressante et il est nécessaire de citer en longueur Jean-Pierre Dozon6 qui, dans son ouvrage Frères et sujets, fait la remarque suivante à propos de ce pays :

Le Sénégal faisait figure d’anomalie où s’entremêlaient, en un étouffant imbroglio, les fils de trois histoire.

Celle, assez longue, de la cité créole [Saint-Louis] qui avait finalement débouché sur l’assimilation entraînant dans son sillage les Africains des Quatre Communes ; celle, plus récente, de la colonisation du Sénégal par Faidherbe dont avaient notamment résulté le développement de l’archichef et l’implantation de nouveaux intérêts privés, en même temps qu’un système de souveraineté qui distinguait les territoires côtiers sous administration directe de ceux de l’intérieur où s’appliquait en principe un régime de protectorat [indigénat]; enfin, une histoire, en quelque sorte immédiate, qui venait de faire du Sénégal le haut lieu de la pénétration française en Afrique et du recrutement d’indigènes dans l’administration et les troupes coloniales, et qui entérina cette antériorité en y instaurant le gouvernement général de l’AOF et Dakar en capitale de la Fédération.

Ces remarques de Dozon résument, s’il le fallait, toute la complexité qui est liée à l’implantation de structures étatiques et juridiques en provenance de la Métropole dans les colonies. Ainsi, cette nation sénégalaise (dans l’acception française du terme) à laquelle Valantin fait allusion ne pouvait exister si l’on tient compte de la genèse européenne du concept de nation mais, surtout, on se rend compte que les conditions d’existence de l’idée de nation ne pouvaient nullement se

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concrétiser dans le contexte colonial car, concernant la race, il y a une multitude d’ethnies en Afrique ; pour le territoire, un pays comme le Sénégal était une colonie française (pas indépendante et ne jouissant pas de l’intégrité territoriale qui est propre à un pays souverain) et, enfin, pour la langue, il n’y avait pas de langue unificatrice tels que le français, l’allemand ou l’anglais comme cela s’est passé en Europe ; en Afrique, on est plutôt en présence d’un florilège de langues et de dialectes à base ethnique. Ce qui est curieux quand même est que pendant l’époque précoloniale, avant l’arrivée des Européens, il existait des nations en Afrique (Yoruba, Mandingue, Wolof, Ibo, Hausa, etc.) mais pas selon le modèle européen de race, territoire et de langue unifiée bien que ces nations africaines avaient une langue commune et occupaient des régions bien délimitées ; cependant, le concept de race, comme nous le savons tous, est très obscur et ne repose sur aucune vérité scientifique ; c’est plutôt une construction, une utopie, une vue de l’esprit ; il faut tenir compte des mélange de langues et métissages entre tous les humains en général et les tribus et ethnies africaines pour se rendre compte que la notion de race ne peut nullement s’appliquer dans la définition du concept de nation. À propos, la ville de Saint-Louis du Sénégal était un creuset de métissage, ce qui excluait automatiquement l’idée de l’uniformité et de l’homogénéité.

Avant d’aborder l’époque postcoloniale, il y a une certaine particularité qu’il faut relever : pendant la phase de colonisation, les Français avaient mis en place deux fédérations (Afrique Occidentale Française et Afrique Equatoriale Française, AOF et AEF respectivement). Ces ensembles constituèrent des sortes de parapluies sous lesquels étaient fédérés les territoires (Sénégal, Dahomey, Mauritanie, Guinée, Côte d’Ivoire, Haute Volta, Niger, Togo dans le cas de l’AOF). Un ensemble comme l’AOF était modélisé sur l’exemple français métropolitain d’unification en essayant de minimiser autant que possible l’ethnie et la langue (africaines considérées comme source de régression) tout en mettant l’accent sur l’assimilation et l’acquisition forcée de la langue française, la langue du maître, la langue de la modernité. À l’inverse, avec les indépendances des années 1960, la fédération de l’AOF éclate et apparaissent à sa place les nouvelles nations et républiques. Ainsi, nait progressivement le concept de littérature nationale et on assiste graduellement à la lente mais sûre consolidation des littératures congolaise, sénégalaise, ivoirienne, béninoise, malienne, nigérienne, mauritanienne, camerounaise, guinéenne. D’ailleurs, l’articulation de l’idée de nation pendant l’époque postcoloniale se fait par le truchement de la littérature nationale ; allant dans le même sens, Timothy Brennan 10 estime que “les nations sont des constructions imaginaires dont leur existence s’adopte sur un ensemble de ficelles culturelles dans lesquelles la littérature de fiction joue un rôle décisif”. Dans la section qui va suivre, je vais justement analyser le rôle de l’imaginaire littéraire dans la construction nationale et dans le processus de consolidation de l’idée de nation.

Il est donc aisé de se rendre compte qu’à partir des années 1960, avec l’avènement des indépendances africaines, la problématique de l’État-nation se pose avec acuité ; rappelons que ce concept est hérité de la colonisation française et il est juste de dire que c’est en fait le décalque du modèle français que vont adopter les nouveaux États africains. Une dernière mise au point : On a souvent tendance à regrouper ensemble les concepts de nation, de nationalité et de nationalisme. J’ai cerné ci-dessus les contours du concept de nation en insistant sur ses origines coloniales. Concernant l’Afrique, je dirais que ce sont plutôt les concepts de tribalisme et d’ethnicisme qui sont à l’honneur (je citerai comme exemples la tragédie rwandaise entre Hutus et Tutsis et la tragédie qui se déroule en ce moment même en Côte d’Ivoire, facilitée en cela par le concept d’ivorité, un concept xénophone et factice créé de toutes pièces afin d’exclure une partie de la population du pays de la gestion du pouvoir économique et politique). Cependant, le concept de nationalité est prévalent en Afrique comme d’ailleurs dans toutes les régions du monde ; il est quand même utile de préciser qu’à l’instar du concept de nation, la nationalité tire sa substance de ses origines coloniales. En d’autres termes, c’est le colonisateur français qui a créé les nouvelles nationalités africaines grâce au découpage arbitraire des frontières des pays au cours de la Conférence de Berlin de 1884. Il

9. Et pourtant les philosophes et poètes de la Nègritudes et poètes de la Nègritudes que sont Césaire, Senghor et Damas ont célébré la race noire dans leur poésie mais ils ont surtout mis l’accent sur l’aspect culturel.
va sans dire que le concept de nationalité est sujet à controverse, car comme on le sait, ces frontières courent dans la chair vive des ethnies africaines. Je donnerai un exemple rapide : entre les deux pays que sont le Sénégal et la Gambie, il y a une division très arbitraire causée par les Anglais et les Français car des deux côtés de la frontière les populations entretiennent des liens de parenté et de consanguinité, en plus des langues qu’elles partagent en commun, sans oublier que les deux républiques n’existent que là où il y a la route goudronnée, surtout aux postes-frontières où on peut voir les drapeaux des pays, symboles de leur existence (il faut y ajouter les forces de police et les agents des douanes en uniforme des deux pays) ; en dehors de ces postes-frontières, dans la vaste campagne, la frontière n’existe pas ; les populations et les troupeaux de vaches, de moutons et de chèvres se déplacent comme ils le veulent et en fait se sont déplacés ainsi pendant des millénaires, bien avant l’avènement de la colonisation européen-ne.

Dans la partie qui va suivre, je vais prendre un exemple précis celui du Sénégal et voir dans quelle mesure les concepts de nation et de nationalité sont transposés ou réinventés à travers la littérature et le roman.

Littératures francophones, littératures nationales et concept de nation : l’exemple du Sénégal

Étant donné que le sujet que j’ai choisi de traiter est vaste et qu’il est impossible dans le cadre de ce paper de tout traiter en profondeur, je limiterai mon propos au Sénégal et choisirai les récits et romans qui vont servir à illustrer mes développements portant sur les concepts d’État-nation, de nation et de nationalité par rapport à la littérature. Mes remarques vont porter principalement sur deux écrivains : Ousmane Sembène et Cheikh Hamidou Kane.

Tout d’abord, il faut préciser que les littératures africaines ont connu plusieurs phases d’évolution concernant la nomenclature et l’appellation. On a eu l’expression ‘littératures africaines d’expression française’, ‘littératures africaines en langues européennes’, ainsi que le terme ‘littérature africaine’ tout court. Concernant ce dernier terme, lorsqu’on l’utilise, on fait surtout allusion aux productions littéraires écrites dans les langues européennes tout en ignorant l’abondante production littéraire exprimée dans les langues africaines. Toutes ces appellations sont nées pendant l’époque coloniale et on a continué à les utiliser après la période des indépendances. La nouveauté est donc l’avènement du concept de littérature nationale, un concept qui épuise les contours des nouveaux pays nés après 1960. Cependant, comme nous le verrons plus loin, certains romanciers ne respectent pas la séquence chronologique colonialisme-postcolonialisme et c’est le cas de Sembène. Dans certains de ses romans datant de l’ère postcoloniale, Sembène traite de thèmes et sujets qui s’ancrent dans l’époque coloniale.

Ainsi, certaines œuvres littéraires brouillent la frontière entre époques coloniales et postcoloniales ; Dans Le dernier de l'empire (1981) d'Ousmane Sembène\(^\text{(1)}\), l’auteur montre avec beaucoup de doigté les effets de l'héritage colonial dans un pays comme le Sénégal. Dans le roman, nous sommes en présence d’une élite intellectuelle et politique qui a en charge la lourde responsabilité de diriger un pays africain imaginaire mais qui ressemble somme toute au Sénégal. Ils ont aussi la charge de créer et de piloter l'État-nation, ce dernier englobant en son sein toutes les institutions et symboles qui rendent possible l’existence d’un pays souverain, libre, indépendant et autonome. Le pouvoir ici est considéré comme un gâteau qu’il faut se partager et chacun se positionne pour mieux manœuvrer ; les dirigeants intriguent et se battent entre eux au lieu de s’unir pour mieux construire la nouvelle nation. Cependant, la cause et la nature même du problème se trou-

vent dans l’héritage colonial, il est vrai un héritage mal géré ; mieux, Sembène en fait veut faire voir au lecteur que la rupture épistémologique que devait s’opérer au début des indépendances, cette rupture n’a pas eu lieu ; nul n’est donc étonné de voir que ce sont les mêmes réflexes et les mêmes actions qui avaient cours pendant la période coloniale qui se perpétuent dans la nouvelle nation, la seule différence étant que l’homme blanc est parti et maintenant c’est le Noir, l’Africain qui est confortablement installé dans le fauteuil laissé vacant.

Cependant, dans Le dernier de l’empire, l’auteur insiste sur la nationalité et en faisant cela, il se démarque un peu de son action panafrocaniste ; ainsi, tout au début du roman, nous avons sous-titre le mot ‘roman sénégalais’, faisant ainsi allusion au pays, à la république qu’est le Sénégal. À l’inverse, son autre roman L’Harmattan (1980) se passe plutôt vers la fin des années 1950, à l’époque du référendum organisé en vue de l’indépendance ou non des territoires coloniaux français d’Afrique. Comme je l’ai indiqué plus haut à propos de l’AOF, dans L’Harmattan Sembène parle de la solidarité entre les ressortissants et originaires des territoires de l’AOF, suivant en cela l’idée même de fédérer les Africains avec comme base philosophique et utopique le panafrocanisme ; ainsi, dans L’Harmattan, on se rend compte que le concept panafrocaniste est utilisé comme un moyen fédérateur, comme un encouragement à préserver l’union des Africains (en se servant d’ailleurs d’une structure comme l’ex-AOF mais tout en s’assurant de ne pas la laisser intacte, sous son habit colonial) ; il s’agit donc de créer une sorte de nouvelle AOF mais avec un nouvel habillage, plus africain, plus patriotique et plus sentimental) ; nous sommes donc en présence d’une nouvelle campagne en vue de la mise sur pied d’un vrai panafrocanisme, d’une fédération entre Africains libres, laquelle mettrait l’accent sur ce qui les unit et non pas sur ce qui les divise. Ensuite, sur le plan purement chronologique, aussi bien les événements narrés dans L’Harmattan que la date d’apparition du roman lui-même ne concordent pas car le roman est publié à l’époque postcoloniale alors que les événements ont lieu pendant l’époque coloniale. Est-ce qu’en fait la dichotomie et l’opposition du colonialisme et du postcolonialisme ne sont-elles pas arbitraires ? Est-ce que ces deux concepts (du moins tels qu’ils sont articulés dans les deux romans de l’écrivain sénégalais) sont-ils vérifiables ?

En gros, les deux romans de Sembène que sont L’Harmattan et Le dernier de l’empire constituent des œuvres importantes en vue de la compréhension des concepts de nation, de nationalité et d’État-nation. Mais, surtout si le premier roman L’Harmattan développe des arguments à connotation continentale, au contraire le deuxième (Le dernier de l’empire) se penche plutôt sur un pays spécifique, une entité républicaine nouvelle mais héritée de la colonisation.

L’autre romancier Cheikh Hamidou Kane dans Les gardiens du temple (1995) met en exergue la complexité et les rapports étr invisible qu’entretiennent entre eux les concepts de nation et d’ethnique. Un des personnages de ce roman (un officier de l’armée), nommé Simali, fait la déclaration suivante : “Pour le moment, en fait d’armée, ce que je vois de plus solide c’est notre oasis, et en fait de nation je vois ma tribu”. Le problème de l’allégiance du nouvel homme africain (né avec et après les indépendances) se pose ici : est-on obligé d’abord vis-à-vis de sa tribu (donc de sa langue) et ensuite envers la nation ? La vérité est que la majorité des Africains construisent leur identité, de façons consciente et inconsciente, d’abord à partir d’une base ethno-linguistique car, si nous suivons l’argument de Kane tel qu’il est développé dans Les gardiens du temple, il est de propos de rappeler que la majorité des Africains ont beaucoup de mal à s’identifier dans la nouvelle nation car c’est une nation des élites occidentalisées, corrompues, privilégiées et prédatrices ; ce n’est pas la nation du et pour le peuple. Ainsi, C.H. Kane est en train de dire que l’individu s’identifie d’abord à sa réalité immédiate, celle dans laquelle il est né, c’est-à-dire son ethnie et sa langue, avant de s’ouvrir plus tard à des constructions plus vastes mais aussi plus abstraites que sont l’État, la nation et l’État-nation.

En mettant en relief l’ethnité africaine, l’auteur de Les gardiens du temple ne fait nullement l’éloge de l’ethnocentrisme qui est synonyme de haine de l’Autre et d’exclusion ; Kane ne fait que constater une réalité qui est là, présente et la toucher du doigt ; il faut donc différencier entre ethnique et ethnocentrisme. Kane parle de...
la tribu des Diallobé, un thème qui est présent dans son roman antérieur *L'aventure ambiguë*. Kane s'intéresse toujours à la tension entre l'Occident et l'Afrique. À travers les dialogues entre trois personnages (Farba, Salif et Thierno) du roman *Les gardiens du temple*, le narrateur projette une vision du monde et une cosmogonie qui sont très différentes selon qu'on est en présence du monde africain ou du monde européen. Au cours de ces entretiens tripartites, sont mises en exergue la violence et l'agressivité qui accompagnent l'œuvre de domestication de la nature intentée par l'homme blanc, donc le rationalisme et la quête scientifique qui sont intrinsèques à la vision européenne du monde. À l'opposé, on a la quête métaphysique, religieuse, spirituelle et mystique des Diallobé et, selon leur *weltanschauung*, la nature est l'alliée de l'homme, elle rend la vie possible sur terre, aussi bien la vie humaine, végétale, qu'animale ; il n'est donc pas question de domestiquer cette nature mais plutôt de vivre en symbiose et en harmonie avec elle. Il va sans dire que ces visions du monde différenciées influent sur les institutions sociales, politiques et économiques et, de façon plus générale, sur la construction d'un État moderne. En sous-texte, Kane met en avant l'idée que la nation et l'État-nation que veulent construire les Africains de son roman sont faussés au départ à cause de l'héritage colonial et du tribalisme ; en cela il rejoint la thèse de Sembène dans *Le dernier de l'empire*.

Si on compare les romans de Sembène et de Kane du point de vue esthétique, on se rend compte que la relation que ces auteurs entretiennent avec la langue française n'est pas la même. Dans les romans de Sembène, on y trouve beaucoup d'expressions tirées de la langue wolof ; l'auteur s'adonne énormément à la juxtaposition, mettant côte à côte les deux langues et créant par ce biais un certain bilinguisme ; en plus il s'adonne à la traduction directe et littérale, en donnant l'équivalent en français du mot tiré de la langue africaine. À l'inverse, Kane ne juxtapose pas les langues française et africaine ; il s'exerce plutôt à traduire une certaine sensibilité africaine mais en restant dans le cadre strict de la langue française ; Kane s'évertue aussi à rendre à la fois un esprit et un état d'esprit sans pour autant faire appel à la juxtaposition, à la traduction directe ou à la translittération. De façon schématique, on peut dire que si Kane tire la substance de sa pensée à partir de la langue africaine (qui constitue le socle de la culture de l'auteur), il tient quand même cette dernière à distance et ainsi privilégie la langue française.

En conclusion, on peut dire sans risque de se tromper qu'il n'y a pas adéquation entre, d'un côté, le concept de nation et l'imaginaire littéraire comme on l'a démontré plus haut. Il faut trouver les raisons de cet état de fait dans l'héritage colonial, c'est-à-dire que nous sommes en présence d'un concept chargé d'histoire et d'ambiguïté. Ensuite, un auteur comme Sembène a tenté de faire coïncider la nationalité et la littérature par le biais de la fiction. Quant à Cheikh Hamidou Kane, dans son roman *Les gardiens du temple*, il met l'accent sur l'ethnicité. En fin de compte, les deux romanciers tentent de mettre en évidence les processus d'établissement d'une identité, laquelle prend en compte toutes les vicissitudes du passé mais aussi les enjeux du présent où il est question de bâtir une nouvelle nation, une nouvelle entité (après la longue nuit coloniale) dans laquelle l'homme africain peut s'épanouir librement et être à même de posséder une identité qui lui est propre mais qui tient compte aussi des apports universels.
‘A world fellowship’: the founding of the international Lyceum club

by Grace Ellen Brockington *

In May 2004, the International Association of Lyceum Clubs celebrated their centenary with a conference held in Basel, Switzerland, where they discussed the future of their organisation and reviewed its beginnings. A world-wide network, the Lyceum caters for professional women with an interest in lifelong learning and international exchange. This article examines its early purposes in the context of the contemporary growth in women’s organisations, debates about women’s rights and employment, controversy surrounding imperial expansion, and the rise of a secular peace movement. Drawing on the memoirs, novels and unpublished letters of Constance Smedley, the Lyceum’s foundress, it demonstrates the epic scale of her ambition to create a global sisterhood, and explores the radical feminist and pacifist ideals that motivated her. Though not the first women’s club, the Lyceum was pioneering in its aspirations. It offered women artists, writers and professionals the opportunity to meet in luxurious and prestigious surroundings, to compete equally with men, and to forge links with like-minded women across the world. It also insisted on the autonomy and equality of its different branches, and, through a programme of cultural cooperation between countries, contributed to international diplomacy before the First World War.

On 20 June 1904, an alien invasion disrupted the complacent fraternity of London’s clubland. Bus passengers passing the former building of the British Imperial Service Club in central London craned their heads at the spectacle of women on the Club’s balconies, and in its great bow windows. All the leading newspapers reported this remarkable event; not only had the women infiltrated the sanctuary of a male club, they had actually taken the premises, and established their own exclusive society. The International Lyceum Club, as they called themselves, flourished over the next few years. It earned a prestigious reputation, and set up sister Clubs throughout Europe and the British Dominions. It became a social and cultural centre for women all over the world, and the centenary conference, which took place in Basel, Switzerland, in May 2004, bears witness to its success. The first Lyceum was situated at 128 Piccadilly, opposite London’s Green Park. The building still stands (it is currently used by the Royal Air Force Club), and looking at its magnificent façade, it is easy to imagine the excitement and ceremony surrounding the Club’s inauguration. One hundred years later, it also makes us wonder what gigantic purpose could have motivated the Lyceum to acquire it. Who was behind the venture, and in what circumstances did the Club first operate? The Lyceum was not the only women’s club in Britain at that time – far from it. From about 1880, women’s clubs began to proliferate. In 1882, there were two advertised in London. In 1900, that number had risen to twenty one, and in 1906, it peaked at thirty six. They catered for all interests and social classes, from aristocrats to actresses, university lecturers to city clerks. Their sudden popularity bore witness to women’s changing aspirations, and their willingness, if not to challenge, at least to match, the Victorian institution of the gentleman’s club. How did the Lyceum compete in this expanding market? What did it have to offer that was different, and how did it manage to fill the imposing halls of its London home?

The Lyceum was remarkable because it combined the gravitas of a respectable institution with the reforming zeal of a political pressure group. It conducted a campaign for women’s rights and international cooperation that threatened to disrupt the British Establishment, yet itself became a feature of the Establishment. No one can dispute its success as an institution. I would like here to emphasise its progressive vision.

An advertisement placed in The Englishwoman’s Year-book of 1910 highlights the features which were meant to distinguish the Lyceum from all other women’s clubs. The Yearbook was an annual publication listing all the professional and recreational resources available to women. It was here that the Lyceum competed for their attention. It was, the notice claimed, no ordinary social club, for it provided a unique information bureau to advise women about their careers, a permanent art gallery and, pre-eminently, an international network of clubhouses across Europe. The Club offered an attractive synthesis of women’s emancipation, culture and cosmopolitan contact. The idea of


Miss Constance Smedley, the Club’s founder, was (I quote from the advertisement) ‘to establish centres of intellectual and artistic life’ throughout the world, and thereby to ‘promote interchange and thought between the cultured women of all nations’.

That emphasis on Smedley’s personal vision draws our attention to the character of the women who began it all. Constance Smedley was born in 1876 in the industrial city of Birmingham, in the British Midlands. Her father was a wealthy businessman, her mother a cultured woman who was decorated by the French government for her services to Anglo-French relations. Smedley grew up in a home that encouraged women to take an active interest in the Continent. She herself showed early talent as an artist, becoming a star student at Birmingham School of Art. However, her interests soon shifted toward the theatre, where she again achieved rapid success as a playwright. When she was in her early twenties, her family moved to London, where she embarked on a promising career as journalist and novelist. Her severe physical handicap, probably caused by childhood polio, rarely prevented her from pursuing her ambitions, or attracting admiring attention. In her prime, she impressed her friends as ‘a radiant personality’ who ‘never saw any reason why one should not attempt the biggest project his [sic] mind could hold’.

Smedley’s early publications analysed the dilemmas of modern womanhood with wit and perception. I recommend in particular her extravagant feminist polemic *Woman: A Few Shrieks!* Setting forth the necessity of Shrieking till the shrieks be heard (1907); also the lively journalistic dialogues collected in *The Boudoir Critic* (1903); and *An April Princess* (1903) together with its sequel *The June Princess* (1909). *An April Princess* was her first and most successful novel. Its exuberant intelligence marked her out as a rising talent on the British literary scene, and critics applauded it as ‘new wine in a new bottle’. The champagne of youth, originality, cleverness and self-confidence. The story, in part autobiographical, concerns a young woman who lives a fantasy life as a princess. She rules over her own private kingdom of friends, while treating with charming disrespect the rules of society. The book’s publication in 1903 coincided with the founding of the Lyceum. Six years later, *A June Princess* appeared just as Smedley was preparing to leave the Club. The two volumes serve as stage-posts along the route of her career, the first proclaiming the literary ambitions of a young author, the second meditating, more soberly, on her experience of public life.

It was her unhappy experience at a London club for women writers that motivated Smedley to begin the Lyceum. Many of the women who belonged to the Writers’ Club were poor, struggling to maintain a show of respectability while making a professional impact. The Club offered them a bare minimum of hospitality which Smedley, demonstrating the vision and audacity that would take her far, demanded it increase. When the governors scorned her proposals for a more lavish service, she set about founding the Lyceum as a rival intellectual institution.

The problem, as she saw it, was that professional women stood at a disadvantage to their male colleagues, who could entertain men and women in style at their club or at home. At home, single women risked compromising their reputation. At the Writers’ Club, the food was an embarrassment. The Lyceum therefore provided a meeting place which allowed women to compete equally with men in their working lives. As Smedley put it in her memoirs, the Club ‘was intended to be a corporate social home for educated women, wherein women of small or large incomes could feel part of the aristocracy of intellect, and come into free and helpful contact with men and women from all over the world’.

The Lyceum’s solid, institutional presence allowed it to negotiate controversial feminist debate with tact and decorum. It was able to reconcile traditional models of womanhood with radical new ideas about women’s liberation, giving professional women a passport to respectability at a time when many objected to their working outside the home at all. Contemporary argument centred on the notion of ‘separate spheres’, the public sphere of paid work and government belonging to men, and the private sphere of home and family, to women. Increasingly, women challenged this dichotomy, asserting their right to work, and
forming organisations, such as clubs, which gave them a public presence. However, the Lyceum avoided any accusation of impropriety by presenting itself as an extension of the domestic sphere. On the occasion of the London Club’s first birthday its Chairwoman, Lady Balfour, declared that ‘we would have this Club, made by women [...] what we have always been proud that our British homes should be, as made by our women – places of good repute, places full of purity and high ideals’. Here, she disarms her critics by appropriating the language of home and morality. A woman’s club, she suggests, poses no threat to the status quo of female domesticity.

However, Smedley’s writing indicates that her own agenda was more daring. She fully intended the Club to promote women’s suffrage, and she wanted to do away with the notion of separate spheres altogether. Women, she believed, should compete with men, not as women, but as professionals. As she put it wittily, ‘we cheerfully admit that we are just as human as men [...] and are universally deciding to come down to the level of his comrades and his equals’. She sought not only to support women, but to free them from the limitations imposed by the category of femininity. Although the Lyceum gave sanctuary to women artists, it refused to protect their art within the critical arena. Smedley counted herself successful when she could record in the Club journal of 1905 that they were ‘beginning to drop the fatal catchword “women,” and to talk of “excellent work” rather than “excellent women’s work”’.

Her novel On the Fighting Line (1915) explores the problems of gender stereotype that the Lyceum sought to transcend. Minnie Blunt, Smedley’s heroine, embodies the contradictions, disadvantages and illusions against which modern women had to battle. She scrapes a menial living as a secretary, but dedicates herself to work with passionate idealism. She lives in a dingy garret, but papers the walls with pin-ups of male heroes. Her idolization of what she terms ‘real men’, epitomised by Mr Richard, her manly young employer, redeems an otherwise dreary existence. Minnie and Mr Richard begin an office romance but the affair, fuelled by romantic delusions, turns sour. The couple’s expectations of one another are impracticable, and Minnie discovers that her aspirations as a modern, working woman are incompatible with her conventional ideal of men and relationships. Her desire to follow in the footsteps of her heroes unnerves Mr Richard. As she records in her diary, after their first kiss, ‘he hates women to be unwomanly and he will have to kiss all the hardness in me away’. Although herself a single, self-sufficient woman, she clings to the principle that, as she puts it, ‘true men give women everything and work for them’, but when Mr Richard offers to support her, she feels demeaned. As the stab of reality punctures her fantasies, Minnie discovers that happiness had awaited her all along in her next-door neighbour Jack, an unmanly writer who attends Suffragette rallies. His contempt for the traditional roles of men and women alike makes him, in Minnie’s words, ‘the one man for whom marriage wouldn’t be a perpetual strain, but just a happy, interesting companionship’.

The reality of the domestic sphere, argued Smedley, was for the most part one of exploitation without protection. As Minnie puts it, ‘men aren’t to be trusted with so much power. It isn’t good for them. They can use it to make things comfortable for themselves, not to protect the weak’. Women should be allowed to work, not as did most out of bare necessity, but for the dignity and satisfaction it could give them. Smedley proclaimed that ‘a remarkable thing is happening [...] Woman’ is not only learning to earn her living, but she is learning to enjoy work’. Here, she added her voice to a growing body of opinion which demanded respect for working women. The Englishwoman’s Year-book of 1882, for instance, prefaced its catalogue of professional resources available to women with a polemic defending their right to make full use of them. A woman’s employment, it claimed, could ‘give a zest and dignity to life, unknown to the idle and the pleasure-seeking’.

The Lyceum advertised itself as a unique resource for women whose work had become their vocation, yet it also made strategic allowances for the pursuit of pleasure. Its magnificent premises lent it an aristocratic aura. Although it insisted that it was not just another luxurious social club, it courted high society.
These mixed criteria might seem to bring into conflict the values of women’s professional independence, and their dependence on men. It seems that in the early days, the Clubs worked hard to satisfy disparate expectations. Smedley’s letters home from Germany, written in 1904 when she was helping to establish a clubhouse in Berlin, comment revealingly on the juncture of upper and professional classes. ‘We are getting the court circle to take up the Club’, she reported, and wrote enthusiastically about her encounters with women such as the Countess Von Buhlow, Baroness von Sutton, and the Princess de Rohan, whom she described as ‘the most beautiful looking woman in a lovely pale blue frock, very young with snow white hair and covered with wonderful diamonds’. She was overjoyed when the Countess von Gröber took charge of the social committee and made it her mission to eradicate any tension between what Smedley called ‘the working members and society members’. Gröber was determined, explained Smedley, to ‘fuse the elements’ and ‘make them feel all one sisterhood’.25

That desire to fuse and unify the Lyceum’s various factions was central to Smedley’s cosmopolitan vision. Her joyful belief in the unity of human nature fired her ambition to create a global network of sister-clubs, united by their common idealism. Perhaps the original Writers’ Club was only prudent when it dismissed what she described as her ‘simple scheme of a world Club with Clubhouses in the world’s chief capitals’, for her intentions were, from the beginning, epic.26 As well as demolishing the ghetto of sexual discrimination, she aspired to create an international, cultural organisation to promote world peace and democracy. Even before the Lyceum acquired its first premises in 1904, she had begun negotiating the formation of European centres, and she spent much of the next six years helping to set up Clubs across the continent.

Her novel The June Princess makes explicit the ideals which drove her to promote the Club so relentlessly. The Princess is Smedley’s alter ego, and in the opening scene we find her slaving away at the business of a fictional Club through the heat of a summer’s morning. A friend asks her how she can bear to work so hard for other people. ‘It isn’t for other people; it’s for Internationalism’, she blithely replies. The Club, she explains, is really bringing the women of the different countries together, and making them understand how much they can do for one another […] You see, it is such a sensible and beautiful idea to bind the world together.27

She made this seemingly optimistic statement in 1909, five years before the outbreak of World War I. With hindsight, the shadow of that war lies across the foundings of the Lyceum, placing it in the context of wider debates about war and peace, patriotism and internationalism. The early twentieth century was an age of empire-building and imperial unrest, national consolidation and insecurity. It was during the first decade of the last century that Britain first anticipated its long decline as a world power. The Boer War (1899-1902) exposed the weakness and unpopularity of the British Empire, while Germany’s increasing unity and strength left Britain vulnerable to attack. Defensive European treaties, battles in the Balkans and an escalating arms race generated a warlike mood. From the 1880s, British women became increasingly involved in supporting the Empire, setting up women’s imperialist organisations such as the Ladies’ Imperial Club and the Victoria League.28

At the same time, however, a counter-current of internationalist sentiment challenged the model of the war-like nation-state. From the late nineteenth century, international organisations began to proliferate, aiming towards the creation of a global community. The peace movement underwent a renaissance, becoming increasingly involved with progressive, secular causes such as socialism and feminism, and organising international peace congresses in response to the rising European hostilities.29 Their high-profile endeavours, though ultimate-
contemporary women's

ly futile, helped to create the impression that war was not inevitable, that Europe could progress toward peace. Several of these new organisations focused specifically on cultural cooperation. They included the French society Concordia (established 1895), the British International Society of Sculptors, Painters and Gravers (1897), the Italian Società Internazionale degli' Intellettuali (1909), and in 1911 a German group called die Brücke. The Lyceum contributed to a growing movement towards cultural internationalism. Though so far neglected, its endeavour to enhance world peace by facilitating cooperation between women artists, writers and intellectuals deserves more prominence.

The early twentieth century was an era of startling artistic experiment, as well as political unrest. Smedley’s travels across Europe on behalf of the Lyceum gave her access to modernist ideas, ideas which fed her vision of art as a vehicle for social change. Her friendship with Count Harry Kessler, the German patron of modern art, encouraged her to forge a connection between modern theories of aesthetic unity, and the politics of international relations. With Kessler, she debated the idea that all the arts are essentially one, which provided a metaphor for the ideal of international unity. In Kessler’s company, remembered Smedley, ‘a unified world where mutual understanding and love of beauty reigned, seemed natural and inevitable’.

Artistic cooperation was key to the Lyceum’s campaign for better international relations. The different Clubs held exhibitions of each other’s work, and at one show of British art in Berlin, Smedley arranged for a symbolic display of German books, bound by Britishbinders. In 1906, the Lyceum was instrumental in organising an exhibition of modern German art in London. The idea was first suggested at a Lyceum dinner, and the Club hosted its opening reception. The organisers, who included Smedley, were fully aware of the show’s diplomatic importance. The exhibition catalogue declared it a symbol of Britain’s friendship with Germany, and advocated art as ‘one of the best guarantees of international amity’. In the decade preceding the First World War, the Lyceum coordinated its members to offer just such a guarantee. As Smedley remarked in her character as the June Princess, ‘the different forms of Arts must be the surest links to bind the world together, because Art holds universal understanding’.

Any international organisation runs the risk of empowering one nation at the expense of others. It must be observed that the Lyceum, with its bases in Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world, was not international in a post-colonial understanding of the word. However, Smedley’s determination that the various Lyceum Clubs should relate to one another as independent equals challenged the imperial model of a hierarchy of Clubs, with London at its apex. At the opening of the Berlin clubhouse, she offered instead the model of a circle, a unified shape with no beginning. She insisted that the European Clubs should manage their own affairs, declaring that ‘the greatest obstacle in the path of the Lyceum towards International Fellowship would have been British domination’. Her antipathy to hierarchy was from the outset explicit, based on her understanding that ‘the initial Club did not occupy a commensurate position to the foreign Lyceums similar to that which the Mother Country holds to the Dominions’. In 1911, the imperialist, women’s Victoria League ran a children’s drawing competition. The winning entry, entitled ‘Britannia Welcoming her Daughters’, demonstrates the sort of language and imagery against which Smedley was reacting. The metaphor of the family, particularly of mother and child, was widespread in imperialist rhetoric. Smedley chose instead to talk of sister clubs, which would operate amicably, but with complete autonomy and equality. Thus, when the founding committee of the Florence club-house refused to accept English money or management, and the Paris Lyceum designed its own administrative system, she approved their show of independence. We should therefore take care not to confuse her version of internationalism with the corporate globalism which seems to threaten national democracies today. Rather, she advocated a balance between global cooperation and national diversity. In The June Princess, she puts the Club at the service of national cultures, describing it as ‘a clearing-house in every country for all that is best in that
organisations which aimed to promote internationalism, rather than empire, adopted similar policies. For example, the International Council of Women (founded 1888) agreed that the central body should have no power over member groups, while the International Alliance of Women (1904) undertook not to interfere in national concerns (Rupp, Worlds of Women, pp. 111-112).

42. Smedley, Crusaders, pp. 77, 172.
43. Smedley, The June Princess, p. 79.
44. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
46. Constance Smedley to ‘Dearest People’ (9 June 1904, Gordon Bowe); ‘Dearest Di’ (12 June 1904, Gordon Bowe); and ‘Dear People’ (13 June 1904, Gordon Bowe).
47. Constance Smedley to ‘Dearest People’ (9 June 1904, Gordon Bowe).
50. Smedley, Crusaders, p. 122.
53. Smedley blamed the delay on her publisher’s timidity. ‘The advanced views, the passionate chastising of puritanism, the portrayal of its inherent dishonesty, and, above all, the ruthless analysis of war,’ she claimed, deterred them from promoting her book.
54. As one fictional character remarks, ‘we become forgetful of our duties to our country if we don’t think in countries sometimes; and so it’s splendid to get up dinners in honour of other nations and understand their point of view. It widens one.’
55. The business of setting up the international network was a strenuous yet delicate operation. Smedley’s letters home from Europe convey its excitement and complexity. In Berlin in June 1904, she described a big reception at the Palast Hotel where she worked till midnight promoting the Club (it was splendid, she exclaimed, except for the fact that there was nothing to eat except chocolates and lemonade). Two eminent women, the Princess de Rohan and Countess de Brazza both honoured her with their company, but then began fighting over who was to organise the Club’s publicity (Smedley had to intervene with a tactful compromise). She involved herself in all the Clubs’ business negotiations, calculating rent and running costs, memberships and fees. She established good relations with the national press of the various countries, and delegated tasks on all sides. As she confessed in a letter to her family, ‘I leave everyone I see, making lists, going to see people for me and generally being busy.’ She loved the glamour and gaiety of foreign Club receptions, describing in detail the crush of people, and their elegant outfits. After one successful evening in Berlin, she noted how there had been ‘every sort of evening dress to morning dress, some very smart and some very pretty women, and everyone seemed to be enjoying themselves. I think it is nice having all kinds of dress’, she remarked. In Italy in 1908, she exerted herself to attract the country’s strongest and best women, then watched in admiration as they set about establishing their own clubhouse, independent of London. As she observed to her father, ‘the intelligence of these women here is of a very high order. It is wonderful to see how the Italian men have suddenly taken their hats off – before their womenkind.’
56. That sense of feminist triumph draws attention to the intimate connection between Smedley’s internationalism, and her campaign for women’s emancipation. In her mind, the two ideals were entwined as one. Indeed, she suggested with a dash of chauvinism, women are far better equipped than men to achieve world peace. In Germany, for instance, the idealism of the women she had met through the Lyceum contrasted painfully with what she called ‘the arrogance and rudeness of a certain section of the male community’, not just in Germany, but all over the world.
57. Two of her novels pursue this theme with particular eloquence. In On the Fighting Line, Minnie Blunt works for a company called the Imperial Alliance Trust. Minnie’s misguided faith in the company’s imperialist credentials goes hand in hand with her deluded admiration for masculine chivalry. She idolizes the heroes of empire, yet her discovery that the Imperial Alliance Trust has perpetrated a fraud triggers her disillusionment with men, empire, and the militaristic values they embody. She decides that the conventional distinctions between men and women, as between one nation and another, are quite artificial, mere excuses for waging war.
58. The second of Smedley’s novels exploring the relationship between war and gender is Justice Walk, published in 1922, but written seven years earlier, in the midst of the European conflict. The story centres on Johanna Hervey, a rebellious woman artist who dies alone and in poverty, because society cannot stomach her revolutionary art and uncompromising moral principles. She leaves a Will that consists not of a legal document, but of a letter condemning her critics. In it, she makes a direct connection between the subordination of women, and the vicious psychology of war. Her letter compares a conventional woman’s mind to a sewing box full of sentimental trinkets, which seduce men into accepting the treacherous sentimentality of war. The trinkets, warns Hervey, flood the battlefields. They entangle the soldiers [...] They stifle them with knowledge of the women’s gratitude. They warm the hand that slays the Fellowmen.
59. She urges women to discard feminine sentiment, and to remodel themselves as peacemakers, who sew the clothes of the world together with firm and beautiful stitches of love for Humanity.
60. In 1909, Smedley resigned as Secretary of the Lyceum Clubs, after six years of intensive cam-
paigning and administration. Her reasons were manifold. In the first place, she had married the artist Maxwell Armfield and felt she could no longer give the Club her full attention. 54 Then, she had her own career as a writer to pursue, and hoped that the Clubs were sufficiently established to manage without her. As she wrote to her mother in 1912: ‘the International basis has become established now, and I am perfectly confident that I shall not be missed in the slightest, just as I know that the Club work is no longer in my line’. 55 She had worked phenomenally hard to establish the project. A letter written from Berlin in June 1904 gives a taste of the energy with which she promoted it. ‘I have a whole day of engagements’, she explained, followed by a reception at the Philharmonie, then at 10pm an appointment with an editor which would last for at least two hours, and a seven o’clock start the next morning. ‘I have an awful cold and headache today’, she complained, ‘but if I were dying I feel I should go on – I’m so keen – there’s so much to be done […] Excuse all this awful Club talk. I dream of nothing else.’ 56

I sense, however, that the institutional compromises the Club demanded had begun to grate on her. Herself provocative, radical, outspoken, revolutionary even, she found it difficult to submit to the rule of respectability which the Club demanded. The Lyceum had provided a conventional cover for her reforming ambitions. Now, she felt she could operate outside it. The character the June Princess speaks for her, when she voices ambivalence towards the novel’s fictional Club. ‘I’ve loved the ideals’, she exclaims, ‘I’ve loved the world, and it’s been splendid to see the beginnings really grow; but sometimes I feel in prison […] I don’t like responsibility. I’d like to be a private person. Oh! Freedom has always been the carrot.’ 57

Smedley’s rediscovery of herself as a private person brings my story to a close. Thereafter, she and her husband devoted themselves to the theatre, setting up their own drama company which they took to the English provinces, London and across America. 58 Yet although she never again played a public role at the Lyceum, she continued publicly to promote the principles of international cooperation, women’s equality and professional achievement which have made it such a remarkable and enduring organisation. When the Lyceum was founded, those principles inspired women across the world, and one hundred years later, they continue to inspire. I would like to offer the International Lyceum Clubs my warmest congratulations on achieving their centenary!

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What happened to the Brandt Report?

by Mohammed Mesbahi*

In the early 1980s Willy Brandt created an Independent Commission to study world poverty. Brandt was concerned that the prevailing economic system was the cause of immense poverty, suffering and degradation. He proposed introducing emergency measures to alleviate this, realising full well that these measures would always only touch the surface of the problem and that until the deep underlying cause (an unjust economic system which favours the first world to the detriment of the third world) was addressed, the problem would never be solved.

In a series of recommendations the Brandt Report called for sweeping changes to be made to the global economy, rendering it more democratic, fair and equitable. Brandt was critical of the structure of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were, he said, unrepresentative of many of the countries that they served. The policies of the World Bank and the IMF are determined by the finance ministers, central bank governors and treasury secretaries of the G7. This is openly undemocratic, since third world countries have no say in policy making.

Brandt had a vision for the future in which all the issues facing the world would be discussed by the leaders and representatives of every nation, rather than by a small group of rich nations (the G7) as is the case today. Poor countries would have a chance to say what their needs were, rather than having solutions, which in many cases further compounded their problems, foisted upon them. Poor countries would have a say in global economic policy making. Their participation in institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF would be real, rather than an illusory presence and they would be listened to.

Brandt recognised the importance of organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, World Health Organisation (WHO), World Trade Organisation (WTO), UNESCO etc. He did not propose doing away with these organisations, but rather making them more accountable to the people they purport to serve. He wanted to see more co-operation between international organisations and between world nations in order to solve the many problems facing the world today.

The Brandt Report was well publicized, read and discussed, but twenty years later none of Brandt’s recommendations have been put into practice. Indeed the third world has been plunged deeper and deeper into poverty, hunger and degradation, while environmental destruction and pollution have continued to increase.

Budget and trade deficits plague most countries but in the third world debt actually interferes with many countries’ capacity to look after their citizens. Brandt recommended that third world debt should be reduced through partial or unconditional debt forgiveness. However, despite the fact that third world countries have long since repaid the value of their debts through their interest repayments, in most cases their debts have never been forgiven and indeed have continued to rise.

There are several reasons for the increase in third world debt. One is that when the money was originally lent to third world countries, export revenue for raw materials and crops in most third world countries was more than adequate for the repayment of interest on loans and their currencies were tied to the gold standard. However in 1971 the International Financial Institutions demolished the gold standard and floated the world’s currencies. Brandt warned that the abolition of the gold standard was a rash and foolish move. When the gold standard was in existence every country knew what its currency was worth. It could devalue it at its peril, but that was the choice of an individual country. Ever since the gold standard was dropped, no country has been able to predict what its currency would be worth from one day to the next. Currencies are bought and sold on the international stock market. Small countries, having far less currency, are more vulnerable to the buying and selling of investors, who can reduce the value of their currencies by anything up to 90% overnight, just by selling it. Countries such as the US and Britain with strong currencies are not as susceptible to these massive fluctuations. The abolition of the gold standard resulted in massive devaluation of many third world countries’ currencies.

Another reason for the increase in third world debt is that the price of third world commodities has fallen constantly over the years, making...
it harder and harder for these countries to repay their loans.

As many third world countries struggled to repay mounting interest out of diminishing export revenue, in many cases they have been obliged to take on further loans. These further loans were tied to the strict conditions of Structural Adjustment Programmes: programmes imposed on the receiving countries, obliging them to cut back on health care, education, sanitation and housing programmes, thus further worsening the plight of their citizens.

Brandt recommended convening a summit of world leaders to plan and mobilize a major international relief program, targeting hunger and poverty. He proposed that world leaders should organise the provision of basic necessities such as food, clean water, health and medical care. He also proposed that these world leaders should organise preventable disease control programmes in poor regions of the world. Recently the World Health Organisation has reiterated the need for disease control programmes, but (a) the WHO has no power to enforce its proposals and (b) the countries worst affected by infectious diseases lack the money to implement disease control programmes.

In the world today twelve million people die of preventable disease every year. The largest number dies from dysentery and diarrhoea. These diseases are caused by water born disease organisms. Far from improving the provision of clean water in the third world, International Financial Institutions have worsened the situation by imposing structural adjustment programmes which include the privatisation of water supplies. In many parts of the world people cannot afford to pay for water, so where their water supply has been privatised they have been forced to fall back on the remaining, often unsafe, meagre water supplies which have not been privatised. As water privatisation increases so will the incidence of water born disease.

1,600 million people worldwide are at risk of infection from malaria. 300 million people are infected (of which 275 million in Africa) and somewhere between 1.4 and 2.8 million people die of this disease each year. It is caused by the Plasmodium parasite, which lives in mosquitoes. Over the years the parasite has become resistant to all the drugs used to treat the disease. Combinations of drugs now have to be used to treat and prevent it and millions of people in the third world cannot afford these drugs, all of which have serious side effects. There is no vaccine against malaria.

The mosquito which carries the plasmodium parasite is not restricted to the third world. This same mosquito lives and breeds in Europe. But Europe does not suffer from malaria. Why is this? A century ago malarial plagues used to strike many parts of Europe in the summer, especially the poorer Mediterranean countries. However as these countries drained their swamps and treated the malarial victims in hospital, the disease was eradicated. The malarial mosquito continues to live in many European countries but because the people of these countries are not infected, the mosquitoes that bite these people do not become infected. One of the reasons why the majority of malarial sufferers are to be found in Africa is because Africa is poor.

The majority of the population in Africa live too far from the city to obtain any sort of medicine. Road and rail infrastructure is often rudimentary and people are too poor to pay for public transport even where it does exist. Hospitals, doctors and nurses are insufficient to treat the vast number of infected people. To compound this already desperate situation, much needed doctors and nurses are leaving many African countries, where their governments can no longer afford to pay them a living wage, to provide medical care in the west. Another reason why malaria is endemic in Africa is because there is no concerted pan-African mosquito control programme. And for as long as wars continue to rage in many African countries no such programme can ever be implemented.

The deadly African sleeping sickness occurs in 36 African countries, including Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Republic of Central Africa, Zaire and Sudan. It is caused by the African trypanosome, a parasite that lives in the tsetse fly. 50 million people are at risk of catching it, despite the fact that the disease was almost brought under control in the early 1950s. Sleeping sickness can be controlled simply by
trapping the tsetse flies which cause the disease. Cheap effective traps can be made from sticks and cloth impregnated with cow urine. In the 1950s a disease control programme was implemented in all the African countries affected by the disease.

However, wars over mineral deposits and oil have interfered with tsetse control programmes, and cutbacks in health spending ordered by the IMF have put an end to diagnosis and treatment of infected carriers of the disease. As long as economic conditions continue to worsen in Africa, sleeping sickness epidemics remain a continuous threat. There is no vaccine against sleeping sickness and the few drugs which can be used to treat it are highly toxic. The people at risk live in some of the poorest counties of the world, so there is no incentive for the big western pharmaceutical companies to put money into research and development of drugs and/or vaccines to treat the disease.

200 million people in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe are at risk of infection with Leishmania, a hideous, disfiguring and potentially lethal disease which can affect the skin, the viscera or the nasal passages. It is caused by the Leishmania parasite which lives in the phlebotomine sand-fly. Half a million people will die from Leishmaniasis each year, if not treated. All the anti-leishmanial drugs are highly toxic, the first choice drugs being based on antimony. The parasites are becoming increasingly resistant to the current drugs and there is an urgent need for new, effective, safe drugs.

In parts of Africa 90% of the population suffer from Schistosomiasis (Bilharzias) a debilitating disease caused by the schistosome parasite, which lives in a water snail. This parasite leaves the snail at certain times of the day, swims through the water and burrows into the skin of anyone who puts their feet into the water. This disease can be cured by a single dose of the drug praziquantel. It can be prevented by a number of health measures: educating the public not to swim in infected water, not to urinate into the rivers and streams, snail control measures and protection of rice field workers with Wellington boots. Ducks can be used to control snails in rice fields. In China, where a concerted effort was made, schistosomiasis was brought under control and in all but a few remote areas, was eradicated.

Chagas disease is caused by a parasite which lives in the reduvid bug, an insect which doesn't even fly. Originally these bugs lived in a small area in Central America. However they found ideal conditions in the cracks and crevices in the houses of the poor, and so the bugs spread, taking the disease with them. Over the past century Chagas disease, a highly debilitating incurable disease which affects the heart muscle, has spread all over central and southern America even reaching some of the southern states of the US. This disease is completely preventable, simply by providing adequate housing, where the reduvid bug cannot survive.

AIDS is yet another example of how a disease can have a far worse impact on the third world than it does in the West. The AIDS virus has spread not just through sexual transmission, but also through the re-use of hypodermic needles and contaminated blood and serum. Many third world countries lacked the equipment for screening blood products and re-used needles before the danger of this became apparent, because they could not afford to use new sterile needles.

Why is Queensland, Australia, which enjoys a tropical climate, apparently free of the tropical diseases which affect the third world? This is because it is not a poor country. White Australians do not suffer from malaria, leishmaniasis or dysentery because they have adequate medical provision, housing and clean water. However, just as the poor in the US suffer from some terrible parasites (eg hookworm) which do not affect the rest of the population, Australia too has its forgotten poor community - the Aborigines, the only members of the Australian community to be affected by tropical diseases.

Brandt stressed the necessity for International co-operative disease control programmes. A co-operative approach to world health could rid the world of much of the ill health which holds back the populations of the poorest countries. The WHO has written reports outlining problems such as dysentery, bilharzia, malaria, etc. recommending control measures, but the countries affected do not have the money to implement these measures. The countries worst affected by
tropical diseases are all in the third world, struggling to repay interest on their debts and forced into cutbacks on health care due to structural adjustment programmes.

The current world economic system is failing the majority of the world's population.

Much disease is preventable through insect control programmes, clean water provision, adequate housing, diet and education.

Brandt recommended that rather than allowing corporations to invest and produce mainly where wages, taxes, trade and financial regulations and environmental safeguards are the lowest, there should be a commitment to raise the income and quality of life of people in developing nations. However the International Financial Institutions allow big corporations to treat the world like a giant chess board on which they can move their industries about like pawns, taking advantage of low wages and lax environmental controls in poor countries, to produce goods at minimum cost and maximum profit. Thus corporations are allowed to profit from cheap labour in the third world, but are not obliged to ensure the health and wellbeing of these same workers. These are the double standards which were employed by the Victorian Industrialists in Britain at the turn of the last century. In the twenty first century, such double standards are shameful.

Brandt proposed reducing arms exports. He wanted to see a huge reduction in the sales of arms and proposed high tax on arms exports to be used for international development. He wanted more transparency for arms exports. It is iniquitous that huge sums should be spent on the development, production and sale of armaments, when so large a part of the world lives in abject poverty. Sale of armaments and backing of unjust despotic regimes has led to destabilisation and war in many parts of the world, especially Africa. 95% of armaments are manufactured in the first world and 98% of wars are fought in the third world.

It should not be forgotten that countries who rely on the export of arms to provide a large proportion of their national income need to promote the sale of these arms. It is not in the interest of an arms producing country to promote peace. Without international controls such as those proposed by the Brandt Reports, the arms trade will continue to grow and conflict will continue to be fuelled. The importance of transparency cannot be overstated. If the entire population of Britain were aware of the magnitude of the arms trade originating in Britain and of the impact of this arms trade on the third world, there would be an outcry. Huge numbers of people would demand the closure of factories producing weapons.

Brandt stressed the importance of preserving the environment. The first world does far more damage to the environment but the third world suffers more as a result of that damage. A healthy environment is essential for the wellbeing of all who inhabit the earth and the earth can only be preserved by co-operative effort. A world governed by financial institutions is not and cannot be a stable, sane or healthy world.

We should, of course, be concerned for the plight of third world populations purely for humanitarian reasons. But there is a further reason why we should be concerned. It has been well proven that poverty leads to a high birth rate. In numerous cases, where the standard of living has improved in a country, the birth rate has dropped as a result. Even in Catholic countries like Italy, this has been the case. The poorest countries in the world suffer from hunger, lack of housing, sanitation, clean water supplies and health care. And yet their populations continue to grow. Even in countries racked by war, populations continue to grow. People in poor countries have many children because they know that many of them will die. They have children to help them grow food and to look after them when they are old. They even have children so that they can grow up to be soldiers or freedom fighters.

If we do nothing to remedy the current world economic situation, poverty will continue to increase and the world population will continue to expand. Famines, epidemics, massive population migrations, environmental degradation and wars will be the result. If on the other hand, we are prepared to envisage a world where essential changes have been made to the global economy, where every citizen of the world has enough for his/her need, then poverty can be eradicated, the world population can be stabilised and wars can
become a thing of the past. We need a global economic system in which third world countries have a say. Third world countries should receive a fair price for their raw materials. They should not have to pay out their entire export earnings revenue in interest on loans. Housing, health and education should be considered the right of every citizen of the world.
La société de la connaissance est une nouvelle société : nouvelle vision du monde

Le changement de l'outil de production change toute la vision de la vie

Comme je montre dans mon livre1 la transition vers la société de la connaissance ne représente pas le niveau le plus profond du changement qui secoue nos sociétés actuellement. Cependant ce niveau de changement est comme un turbo qui accélère les autres transformations plus profondes qui ont lieu. Il contribue donc fortement à façonner et à modeler la civilisation de demain. Karl Marx fut le premier à mettre en évidence l'importance de l'outil de production pour une société : lorsque celui-ci se modifie, ce sont tous les rapports de production qui changent à sa suite et c'est, en définitive, la vision, les valeurs et les formes de la société qui se transforment.

Or, sous nos yeux, s'opère le remplacement rapide de notre outil industriel, par un outil nouveau : l'information et la connaissance2. Pour certains observateurs de la Silicon Valley, l'économie américaine serait d'ores et déjà immergée à 60% dans la société de la connaissance. En clair, celle-ci s'infiltreait de plus en plus même au cœur même des activités industrielles et agricoles traditionnelles, l'information étant stockée et gérée par de petits ordinateurs dont les puces, en quelque sorte, accomplissent un travail de fourmis.

Dans la société agraire, le pouvoir était lié à la possession de la terre. Celui qui ne possédait pas de terre était un manant, un serf. Il n'avait même de nom3. Le noble, lui, possédait la terre, *Expert auprès de la Commission européenne. Directeur de « Vision 2020 », Sparrenweg, 10, 3051 Sint Joris Weert, Belgique. Tél. fax 32 16 35 59 24, Email : marcluy@skynet.be


2. Selon certains économistes, nous serions toutefois simplement dans une phase d'industrialisation plus avancée, les services y occupant une place plus importante.

3. L'Église chrétienne n'a imposé le baptême pour tous et, partant, un nom de baptême, qu'au 11ème siècle. Mais ce faisant elle a puissamment favorisé au sein de la société occidentale la notion d'égalité de tous les citoyens devant Dieu. Même les serfs sont sortis de la non-existence et ont reçu un nom de baptême, qui ne pouvait par être le nom du suzerain. C'était leur nom. Nous touchons ici à la racine de la notion occidentale de personne.

**Territoires intelligents et esprit d’entreprise**

*par Marc Luyckx Ghisi*  

**La société de la connaissance est une nouvelle société : nouvelle vision du monde**

**Le changement de l'outil de production change toute la vision de la vie**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critères</th>
<th>Société industrielle</th>
<th>Société de la connaissance</th>
<th>Scénario positif</th>
<th>Scénario négatif</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pouvoir</td>
<td>Possession de capital et technologie innovante</td>
<td>Equipes de personnel créatif et innovant</td>
<td>Manipulation subtile de l'esprit humain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secret</td>
<td>La concurrence + la défense = basée sur le secret/brevet</td>
<td>L'information « fuit » de toute façon : OUVERTURE</td>
<td>Protections de plus en plus sophistiquées FERMETURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Management</td>
<td>Centré sur la machine et sa logique, l'homme doit s'adapter.</td>
<td>Recentré sur l'humain. La machine doit s'adapter.</td>
<td>Manipulation de l'humain par le management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Commerce</td>
<td>Trade = argent OU beurre</td>
<td>Echange et don d'information</td>
<td>Monopolisation de l'information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Économie</td>
<td>Gère la possession du capital et de la technologie</td>
<td>Gère la créativité humaine en fonction du bien commun</td>
<td>Gère la créativité humaine pour des intérêts particuliers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Argent</td>
<td>Concept exclusif et accumulatif</td>
<td>Concept de plus en plus symbolique</td>
<td>Manipulation du symbolique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Travail</td>
<td>Concept unique pour créativité, insertion, dignité, famille</td>
<td>Mêmes valeurs organisées autrement</td>
<td>Les politiques d’emploi aggravent les problèmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Social</td>
<td>EXCLUSION = inexorable</td>
<td>Logique INCLUSIVE</td>
<td>Pseudo-inclusion = EXCLUSION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Education</td>
<td>Diminue la créativité et adapte à la logique mécanique</td>
<td>Développe la créativité et la maîtrise de la machine</td>
<td>Manipulation plus subtile sous des dehors de créativité.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Culture</td>
<td>La culture a un rôle périphérique. (Cerise)</td>
<td>Rôle central, car est la racine essentielle de la créativité</td>
<td>Manipulation de l’âme des cultures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Buts de la société</td>
<td>Produit un maximum d'objets bon marché</td>
<td>Promouvoir le progrès humain, culturel et spirituel</td>
<td>Dualisation encore plus accentuée de la société.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1 : Troisième niveau de changement : la société de la connaissance**

**Le turbo du changement de paradigme**

8. Social

9. Education

10. Culture

11. Buts de la société

*1/2005, 29-44

*Expert auprès de la Commission européenne. Directeur de « Vision 2020 », Sparrenweg, 10, 3051 Sint Joris Weert, Belgique. Tél. fax 32 16 35 59 24, Email : marcluy@skynet.be


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et il en portait le nom. Il devait toujours posséder plus de terre pour asseoir son pouvoir. D'où les guerres et les invasions. La « science économique » n’existait pas car la gestion de la terre était assurée par les autorités politiques ou par les autorités religieuses, quand celles-ci avaient le pouvoir.

Lors de l’apparition de la société industrielle, le pouvoir est progressivement revenu à ceux qui parvenaient à rassembler du capital et une technologie innovante. La force de travail, c’est-à-dire les anciens agriculteurs, était supposée s’adapter, plus ou moins durement, à la logique de la machine industrielle. Ceux qui n’ont pas compris ce changement de l’outil et donc du pouvoir, sont certes restés dans leurs somptueux châteaux, mais bientôt tels des marginaux plus ou moins fortunés.

Aujourd’hui, un glissement analogue se produit. Certes, la machine industrielle et agricole continue à produire, même plus et à meilleur marché, mais elle va probablement absorber de moins en moins de main-d’œuvre. Au début du siècle, l’agriculture occupait 87% de la main-d’œuvre en Europe. Aujourd’hui, 4% à peine.


La figure 1 tente de synthétiser le passage de la société industrielle à la société de la connaissance. Pour une bonne compréhension de cette figure et des commentaires qui l’accompagnent, il est nécessaire de définir quatre termes clés :

- les données sont l’information brute comme elle nous arrive dans notre boîte aux lettres électronique ou non, le matin : non triée ;
- l’information est le résultat d’un tri, lequel peut être opéré mécaniquement, par exemple déjà par les filtres électroniques.

- la connaissance est le résultat d’un tri réalisé par un cerveau humain créatif en fonction d’un ensemble de valeurs donné. C’est un tri créatif et intelligent qui produit quelque chose qui n’existait pas avant. Il y a un processus de création.
- la sagesse consistera à prendre les décisions qui prennent en compte au maximum le Bien Commun y compris celui des générations futures. Ce dernier niveau de connaissance est difficilement compatible avec la logique industrielle, qui ne parvient pas à l’intégrer. Commentons maintenant le contenu de la figure 1.

Le pouvoir

Nous assistons à un basculement progressif mais fondamental du pouvoir. En prendre conscience n’est pas chose aisée, tant nous étions convaincus depuis toujours que le pouvoir réside dans la possession de capital et de technologie. Or, cette « évidence » vacille aujourd’hui. De plus en plus, du moins dans les branches innovantes et en croissance, la créativité humaine devient la clé. Pourquoi sinon se mettrait-on à parler de human capital, à reconnaître aussi que le capital humain ne peut se gérer de la même manière que le capital financier ? C’est que, dans la société de la connaissance, l’enjeu est de produire de la connaissance nouvelle en communiquant et en filtrant les données et informations. Or, ce processus peut certes être facilité par les ordinateurs, mais la contribution de la personnalité humaine s’avère centrale et indispensable. Autant l’homme pouvait être remplacé par la machine dans la société industrielle, autant il redevient absolument indispensable, dans la société de la connaissance. Cette transformation est tellement rapide et fondamentale que nous avons du mal à la percevoir.

La fin du secret

Le système de concurrence actuel repose sur le secret de fabrication. Si quelqu’un dispose d’une technologie que le concurrent ne connaît pas, il gagne des parts de marché. De même, lors d’une guerre, si l’un des ennemis possède une arme inconnue de l’adversaire (fusil, poudre à canon, bombe atomique, etc.), il vaincra et parviendra même à dominer la terre. N’est-ce pas là, en
effet, une des clés de l’histoire des conquêtes occidentales dans le monde ? Or, ainsi que l’observe finement Harlan Cleveland, homme d’État et membre de l’élite intellectuelle des États-Unis, le secret a tendance à disparaitre dans la société de la connaissance, car « l’information a une tendance inhérente à fuir, à se répandre ». Et il ajoute que « l’information est plus accessible à plus de gens que les autres ressources mondiales ne l’ont jamais été dans l’histoire », si bien que les hiérarchies fondées sur la possession exclusive de l’information et de la propriété intellectuelle sont en train de s’écrouler, en silence mais rapidement. L’opinion s’approfie de plus en plus vite ce qui hier encore relevait du monde des « secrets ». Internet y contribue. Songez, à titre d’exemple, aux programmes Linux qui ont été inventés récemment par un jeune Finnlansais. Ils sont non seulement disponibles sur le Web sans avoir à verser un dollar ou un euro ; ils sont en plus « ouverts », c’est-à-dire que, contrairement à ce qui se passe avec le Windows de Microsoft, chacun peut améliorer le programme et le remettre ensuite sur la toile afin d’en faire profiter d’autres. C’est donc comme si un cercle vertueux s’instaurait grâce à l’ouverture. Cette nouvelle logique ouverte me semble porteuse d’avenir.

Le management

Notre inconscient collectif tend à se méfier du terme même de management. Il craint la manipulation humaine qu’il pourrait receler. Or, un revirement spectaculaire des théories du management est en cours. Peter Drucker, l’un des pionniers et l’une des autorités les plus respectées en la matière, annonce un recentrement du management sur l’humain dans une société post-capitaliste. Des propos a priori étonnants sous la plume de quelqu’un que l’on ne peut suspecter d’être « de gauche » ou un critique viscéral du capitalisme. Mais voilà, pour lui, ce n’est plus la plume de quelqu’un que l’on ne peut suspecter d’être « de gauche » ou un critique viscéral du capitalisme. Mais voilà, pour lui, ce n’est plus la plume de quelqu’un que l’on ne peut suspecter d’être « de gauche » ou un critique viscéral du capitalisme. Mais voilà, pour lui, ce n’est plus la machine qui peut dicter sa logique à l’humain. Ce sont, tout au contraire, les machines (ordinateurs) qui doivent désormais devenir « amies de l’homme » pour être vendues.

Du commerce au partage

Dans la société industrielle, le commerce est monétaire. En clair, on donne une marchandise en échange d’une somme d’argent. Et la sagesse populaire dit qu’il est impossible « d’avoir le beurre et l’argent du beurre ». Or, dans l’échange d’information, on ne perd pas l’information qu’on partage. Au contraire, plus on partage l’information, plus on peut bénéficier de retours intéressants d’informations complémentaires, contradictoires ou nouvelles. La différence de nature de l’échange saute aux yeux. D’abord, on ne perd pas l’information dans l’échange. Ensuite, le retour n’est pas essentiellement de l’argent, mais bien de l’information enrichie et enrichissante. Enfin, cet échange et ce partage de l’information sont essentiels pour la création d’une information nouvelle. Évidemment, nous vivons encore le temps de la transition entre les deux logiques, si bien que l’argent semble de nos jours conserver une importance démesurée. Nonobstant, une toute nouvelle logique sous-jacente est en train de naître. Sans tambours ni trompettes, elle condamne la logique du commerce « industriel » à une obsolescence rapide et irrémédiable.

Évidemment cette vision peut susciter les objections suivantes :

a) Accès de plus en plus inégal à l’information. Il est clair que la société de l’information ne diffuse pas « naturellement » vers les couches les plus basses de nos sociétés mondiales.

b) Le stock d’informations produites et diffusées le sont en fonctions des intérêts des classes dominantes de nos sociétés et ne répondent pas forcément à la demande de la grande majorité des populations.

c) À la transmission et à la réception, il y a déperdition, perversion ou changement de significations. Ceci nous ouvre l’énorme domaine de la qualité de la communication interpersonnelle.

d) Attention à ne pas succomber à ce qu’Armand Mattelart appelle la techno-utopie sociale de la communication. Je considère que les deux premières objections sont tout à fait importantes, car elles correspondent à la situation actuelle et à une analyse moderne-industrielle. Mais je ne suis pas sûr que ces objections correspondent aux dangers réels qui guettent la société de la connaissance et transmoderne dans laquelle nous entrons en silence.
Par contre, la troisième objection me semble beaucoup plus sérieuse, car elle touche à un des fondements problématiques les plus difficiles de la société de demain : comment harmoniser et coordonner les significations multiples incarnées dans les différents substrats culturels. Nous abordons ici les luttes de pouvoir nouvelles pour le sens. En bref, les questions de sémiologie politique et sociale.

Ma thèse est que tout en prenant en considération les objections « industrielles », il est urgent et important de se préparer aux dangers de demain qui relèveront probablement plus de l’ordre de la manipulation des significations et des esprits, voire des âmes humaines. Ces nouveaux dangers sont redoutables et on en parle vraiment trop peu.

Quant à la dernière objection. Oui, ce livre est peut-être de l’ordre de la techno-utopie sociale de la communication. Mais je demanderais à Mr. Mattelart quel est son point de départ ? N’est-il pas encore un peu trop moderne-industriel ? Quelle est son analyse des changements en cours ?

L’Économie se transforme

L’économie a été inventée pour établir des normes de gestion du nouveau pouvoir émergent de la société industrielle, le capital et la propriété. Dans la nouvelle société de l’information, le pouvoir se déplace et le commerce se redéfinit. Il est probable que nous allions vers une nouvelle discipline qui sera probablement transdisciplinaire, plus ouverte à l’analyse qualitative et à un dialogue constant avec la société civile. Cette nouvelle logique économique pourrait être inclusive et elle devra respecter l’environnement.

Il ne s’agit donc pas de s’opposer à l’économie traditionnelle, mais bien plutôt de commencer à écrire de toute urgence, des chapitres nouveaux sur la société de la connaissance ou, si l’on veut employer les termes actuels, sur les intangibles.

Actuellement on assiste déjà à une pluralisation de la science économique, d’où le nom « Économie plurielle » qui est le titre même de la nouvelle collection lancée par Henry Panhuys et Hassan Zaoual aux Éditions L’Harmattan. Mais à mon avis cette pluralisation est l’annonce d’une recomposition probablement plus fondamentale de l’économie et de l’ensemble des sciences sociales et humaines.

L’argent de plus en plus symbolique ?

Depuis que le président Nixon a décidé de couper le lien entre le papier monnaie et une certaine quantité d’or, la définition de l’argent est de plus en plus virtuelle, liée au jugement de valeur que le « marché » porte sur un pays. La dimension symbolique devient donc prépondérante. Cette tendance pourrait encore être accentuée par l’apparition des monnaies électroniques, elles aussi de plus en plus virtuelles. Quelles sont les règles et les normes dans cette nouvelle logique ? Quels en sont les dangers ? En même temps, l’époque est marquée par une efflorescence de monnaies dites « alternatives » dont la logique est différente. N’est-elle pas mieux adaptée à la société de demain ?

Une nouvelle définition du travail

Le concept de travail qui prévaut encore et toujours a été forgé de toutes pièces par la société industrielle. Non qu’on ne travaillait pas avant, mais la société industrielle a rassemblé dans ce concept unique des valeurs aussi diverses que l’épanouissement personnel, l’insertion sociale, le maintien économique de la famille, l’assurance de la pension, le statut dans la société, etc. Si bien que si quelqu’un perd son travail dans la société industrielle, il perd toutes ces valeurs d’un seul coup et subit, de ce fait, un dommage énorme, incomparable même. Dans l’avenir, il est tout à fait possible que toutes ces valeurs soient à nouveau réparties en différents concepts et fonctions.

Vers l’inclusion sociale

Une des caractéristiques majeures de la production de connaissance est qu’elle s’enrichit par le biais du partage de l’information. Plus elle inclut de personnes différentes dans le partage, plus elle devient porteuse de richesse. Par conséquent, nous nous trouvons bel et bien devant une logique inclusive. Nous sommes toutefois tellement imprégnés de notre credo industriel dominant d’économie excluante que nous avons toutes les peines du monde à apercevoir la nouvelle logique inclusive qui affleure.
Une éducation favorisant la créativité

Il s’agissait, dans la société industrielle, de diminuer la créativité des enfants afin de les « adapter », de les insérer dans la logique d’une société dominée par la machine. Selon certaines études, le potentiel créatif d’un enfant passerait ainsi de 100 à 5 au cours des premières années de scolarisation. Or, dans la société de l’information, il faudra tout au contraire favoriser au maximum la créativité puisque celle-ci sera la ressource centrale. Ce qui implique une ré-invention de l’éducation. Ce sera une tâche exaltante, mais elle suppose une excellente analyse des changements en cours.

Rôle central de la culture

Dans la société actuelle, la culture est malheureusement trop souvent considérée par les milieux politiques comme la cerise sur le gâteau, comme un luxe, non comme une valeur centrale. Or, cette place centrale, la culture pourrait se la voir offrir, dans une société vouée à favoriser la créativité tous azimuts11. Pourquoi ? Tout simplement parce que si vous coupez les citoyens de leur culture, vous tuez les racines de leur créativité. Comme aujourd’hui, la créativité s’étiolerait alors, petit à petit, en conformisme. Ce qui serait la négation de la société entrevue. C’est précisément pour éviter ce danger que, dans un livre dense en voie d’achèvement, Henry Panhuys, nous fait visiter une série de sites socio-culturels pour y recueillir les éléments constitutifs du terreau à partir duquel pourrait se former – et se forme déjà effectivement – la société de la connaissance et de la créativité que nous souhaitons voir se créer davantage par le bas que par le haut12. Sinon nous aurons une nouvelle société avec des généraux sans armées.

Nouveaux buts de la société

Si ces changements se réalisent selon l’hypothèse positive que nous explorons, une redéfinition fondamentale des objectifs de la société nous attend sans doute au bout du chemin. La société pourrait alors délaisser le but purement matérialiste de produire toujours plus d’objets bon marché qui est le sien aujourd’hui pour promouvoir le développement humain dans le sens le plus large possible, en harmonie avec le cosmos tout entier. Et en incluant la dimension spirituelle. Vaste programme !

Scénario négatif

Pour positives qu’elles soient, les tendances observables ne font pas davantage le printemps que les hirondelles. Elles peuvent se renverser, se pervertir. Sans compter qu’à lire le journal, c’est plutôt le scénario négatif qui semble monter en puissance au fil des jours. Or, ce scénario est vraiment dangereux dans la mesure où les nouvelles technologies permettront une manipulation beaucoup plus subtile des citoyens, de leur intelligence, voire même de leur cerveau. Avec son « Big Brother », Orwell n’a-t-il pas fait œuvre de visionnaire ? Ce n’est absolument plus à exclure. Par conséquent, il est capital d’en avérer les citoyens. Et urgent d’en débattre plutôt que de se cantonner dans les débats industriels d’hier.

La société de la connaissance est post-capitaliste.

Le phénomène est passionnant et angoissant. La logique du monde qui se dessine à toute allure est complètement différente de celle qui avait cours auparavant. Leurs valeurs et concepts de base s’arrêtent même antagonistes. Et pourtant, notre monde continue, imperturbable, son petit bonhomme de chemin traditionnel : il utilise sans trop d’être d’âme les concepts d’hier, l’ancienne économie continue à le régir. Tout au plus les économistes les plus avertis - ou qui, du moins, refusent les œillères - se mettent-ils à parler des « intangibles », à admettre qu’un pan non négligeable de l’économie est constitué d’éléments que leur outil actuel leur interdit d’appréhender et d’analyser.

Il est temps désormais d’analyser les caractéristiques de la connaissance, de manière à pouvoir en tirer les conséquences pour la société et l’économie de demain. Avec pour source d’inspiration principale, cette fois, les écrits13 de Harlan Cleveland, l’un des précurseurs de la pensée sur la société de la connaissance, mais aussi Hazel Henderson14, Verna Allee15, etc.

Au-delà de la matérialité des biens vers l’immatériel ?

La société industrielle grave désormais jusqu’à la nausée autour des biens matériels qui, à travers le capital et la technologie dans leur
dimension la plus matérielle, celle du profit quantitatif qui se mesure en nombre de ou $, sont au cœur et le centre de son pouvoir. Tout, dans ce monde, est réduit à l’aspect matériel, voire matérialiste par une mesure quantitative.

Or, la connaissance est par définition immatérielle. Certes, des efforts herculéens sont actuellement déployés par certains en vue de « matérialiser » cette connaissance, pour pouvoir la mesurer à son tour en termes quantitatifs. En vain : même très intelligents, ces essais échouent. Pourquoi ? Parce que nous passons dans un autre monde, de plus en plus centré sur l’immatériel. Peut-être serions-nous en train de quitter le matérialisme en silence ?

Attention toutefois : l’apprentissage sera difficile. C’est que le matérialisme est devenu, pour nous, comme une seconde nature. Il fait partie de notre paysage familial. Il colore les lunettes - le paradigme - à travers lesquelles nous regardons et apprécions le réel. Quoi d’étonnant, dès lors, si nous semblons avoir d’énormes difficultés à nous en défaire ?

Au-delà du commerce : vers l’échange et le partage ?

Le commerce tel que nous le connaissons est une notion assez récente. C’est une transaction où l’on procède à l’échange d’une marchandise contre de l’argent, point à la ligne. Une fois que l’échange a eu lieu, la transaction est considérée comme terminée. Aucune suite n’est en principe prévue, seulement une éventuelle transaction ultérieure. Cette perception du commerce nous semble, elle aussi, éternelle : puisque nous n’avons connu qu’elle, elle fait partie de notre vision du monde. Et pourtant...

Au Moyen Âge, par exemple, le commercium était une relation fort différente, beaucoup plus englobante et riche. Cette relation de commercium était principalement fondée sur l’échange et le don.16 Prenons un exemple. Un fermier avait besoin de semences, son voisin en avait. Il lui en donnait en échange de quelque chose ou d’argent... ou de rien. Et le premier acceptait alors de rester en dette d’honneur. En cas de nécessité, il était entendu qu’il rendrait service. Qu’il ferait, en tout cas, un autre don quand l’occasion se présenterait. De même, au marché de la ville, des denrées s’échangeaient contre de la monnaie, mais il y avait aussi beaucoup d’échanges informels d’informations concernant les filles et les fils à marier, l’actualité politique, le savoir faire agricole, etc. La notion de commercium englobait donc beaucoup plus que les seules transactions d’argent. En réalité, ce n’est qu’à l’apparition de la société industrielle que le concept de commerce s’est rétréci dans le sens que nous lui connaissions. Et qu’a disparu, hélas !, la notion de dette réciproque, laquelle constituait pourtant un ciment social extraordinaire.

Or, dans la société de l’information, si j’échange de l’information, je ne la perds pas. Et mon avantage n’est pas nécessairement l’argent, mais le retour de l’information qui me revient enrichie de la créativité de l’autre que je ne connaissions pas. C’est la raison pour laquelle les nouveaux entrepreneurs insistent tellement sur le partage de l’information.

Il y a donc rupture radicale avec le fondement même du concept moderne du commerce, où je ne peux, par définition, jamais « avoir le beurre et l’argent du beurre », mais seulement perdre ce que j’échange. Nous basculons donc dans une logique de partage et d’échange. Ce qui ne peut être sans conséquence sur le rôle assumé par l’argent : il n’est plus tout à fait au centre de la transaction, celle-ci peut aussi se dérouler sans argent. Voilà qui, à n’en pas douter, annonce une redéfinition fondamentale du rôle de l’argent dans la société de demain.

Toutefois, les notions du commerce capitaliste sont ancrées en nous à une profondeur dont nous n’avons pas conscience. Donc, nous nous échinons encore et toujours, au prix d’efforts énormes, à adapter l’échange de connaissances à nos normes commerciales. Des centaines de chercheurs consacrent des milliers d’heures de travail à tenter d’insérer la logique de la connaissance dans la logique moderne capitaliste. Leurs efforts peuvent-ils être porteurs d’avenir ? C’est tout sauf évident ! Pourquoi, sinon, d’autres auraient-ils pris conscience, dans le même temps, de l’existence d’une différence de logique ? Ainsi, pourquoi certaines firmes de la Silicon Valley ont-elles désormais érigé en règle l’obligation de faire circuler l’information, en clair de la partager ? Si un employé garde pour lui plus de 24 heures

une information importante, il est licencié ! Ces firmes ont compris que la valeur ajoutée de la connaissance s’acquiert lorsqu’elle circule. Plus on partage l’information, plus elle s’enrichit. Si, au contraire, l’information est tenue secrète, elle perd de sa valeur, la créativité du groupe baissant à vue d’œil. Et pourtant, nous continuons à cultiver le secret.

L’exception qui confirme la règle, c’est paradoxalement dans le domaine de la Défense qu’on le trouve : le Traité sur les Forces Conventionnelles en Europe est le premier à avoir été fondé sur un partage de l’information 17. A ce titre, il a semblé faire basculer la stratégie mondiale dans la logique transmoderne post-capitaliste. Prudence toutefois : le Pentagone campe sur l’ancien modèle et cultive de nouveaux secrets technologiques dans la perspective - moins hypothétique depuis l’élection de Georges W. Bush - d’une course aux armements stratégiques dans l’espace.

Au-delà de la rareté et de l’exclusion ?

À l’évidence, le capitalisme fonctionne sur la base d’une logique de rareté de l’argent et d’exclusion. Tout au contraire, la société de la connaissance semble devoir se fonder sur une logique diamétralement opposée d’abondance et d’inclusion. L’information y abonde et on a avantage à la communiquer à un nombre maximal de personnes pour la multiplier : plus j’échange de l’information, plus je la partage, plus je serai ensuite enrichi par les informations dont je bénéficierai en retour. L’intérêt bien compris est donc d’inclure un maximum de monde dans son circuit d’information. Un nouveau dicton pourrait en découler : « L’information, c’est comme l’amour. Plus on en donne, plus on en reçoit ». Une perspective choquante ? Admettons plutôt que nous n’osons pas y croire parce que la logique industrielle et capitaliste est fondamentalement basée sur l’échange commercial, la rareté et, donc, l’exclusion. Or, c’est cette logique parfaitement intériorisée qui domine encore nos sociétés.

La nouvelle logique inclusive qui envahit doucement la vie économique pourrait, en tout cas, avoir des conséquences positives et inattendues au plan géopolitique. Dans la société de demain, il pourrait devenir avantageux d’inclure le Tiers Monde. Il pourrait même devenir avantageux d’inclure le Cosmos, la nature et les générations à venir. À tout le moins, il y a là matière à débat et réflexion. Soyez en sûr, il passionnerait l’opinion publique dans le monde entier. Très rapidement ! A l’inverse, il va de soi qu’il risque de déranger ceux qui profitent de la logique actuelle. Dès lors, il ne sera pas facile à instaurer. C’est pourtant une piste d’espérance et de réenchanter.

Cette piste semble d’autant plus séquente qu’il n’est pas acquis que les pays les plus industrialisés seront nécessairement les premiers à s’engager dans la société de la créativité et du partage.

Sur ce plan, « nos » valeurs dominantes constituent plutôt un frein, un obstacle. Par contre, pour des sociétés « sous-développées » qui nourrissent encore un sens fort de la solidarité et du partage, la transition vers la société de la connaissance pourrait être - en principe - plus facile. Et plus tentante.

Au-delà du secret et de la propriété privée ?
A travers cette question, c’est le cœur même du système industriel capitaliste ou communiste qui est abordé. Le débat entre le capitalisme et le communisme ne tournait-il pas, en fait, autour de la propriété des moyens de production ?
L’information « fuit ». Des fuites, il y en a et il y en aura toujours. Geler l’information, la stocker dans le secret n’est pas possible, précisément parce qu’elle est immatérielle et qu’elle se répand, surtout si son contenu interpelle. La sagesse populaire ne dit-elle pas qu’un secret est une nouvelle qu’on ne communique qu’à une seule personne à la fois ? Harlan Cleveland, qui travaille sur cette dimension depuis 1980, définit la question en ces termes : « L’information est poreuse, transparente. Elle fuit. Elle a une tendance inhérente à fuir. Et plus elle fuit et se répand, plus nombreux sont ceux qui en ont connaissance. Les corsets que constituent les secrets “gouvernementaux”, les secrets commerciaux, les droits de propriété intellectuelle et la confidentialité de toute sorte, conviennent très mal à cette ressource toujours en mouvement » 18.
Or, l’information et la connaissance constituent le centre du pouvoir de la nouvelle logique. Et il n’y a pas moyen de les isoler ni de posséder la connaissance. Donc, la nouvelle logique ne peut se baser sur la propriété privée de quelque chose que l’on ne peut posséder. CQFD.
Autre chose est aujourd’hui à inventer. Peut-être le temps de concepts plus ouverts - la notion de propriété collective, de patrimoine de l’humanité, de propriété de la planète Terre - est-il venu. C’est, en tout cas, encore un pilier des concepts industriels et capitalistes qui s’effondre.

Propriété personnelle des moyens de production ?
Nous arrivons ici à la caractéristique la plus déstabilisante de la société de l’information. Contrairement à ce qu’avait prédit Marx, il n’y a plus d’aliénation du travailleur par rapport à la propriété des moyens de production. Il n’y a plus non plus moyen d’être propriétaire des moyens de production. C’est en même temps la fin du capitalisme et du marxisme. Tous les soirs les travailleurs de Microsoft rentrent chez eux avec leur outil de production : leur cerveau humain et créatif.
On se souvient que la critique de Marx était que le système capitaliste « aliénait » les travailleurs de la propriété des moyens de production et que le but de la révolution était la réappropriation collective par les travailleurs des moyens de production. On sait que les tentatives de marxisme concret ont dégénéré en une étatisation abusive et totalitaire des moyens de production.
Or, ici, ce n’est plus ni le « capitaliste » ni la « collectivité » qui sont propriétaires des moyens de production, mais la personne individuelle. Et plus il y a de propriétaires créatifs et actifs des moyens de production, plus une société sera prospère. Il deviendrait donc intéressant pour l’État de développer des stratégies inclusives favorisant la créativité du plus grand nombre de citoyens. Nous sommes dans un autre monde.
Certains objecteront que nous pourrions aller ainsi vers une société où la personne individuelle n’aurait plus besoin des autres pour crée ni survivre. Bref nous serions en train d’aller vers une société hyper individualiste où le lien social serait pratiquement absent. A notre avis cette analyse qui pose des questions redoutables est encore trop industrielle. Le lien social est à notre avis une composante essentielle de la société de la connaissance. Il n’y a pas de créativité sans interaction et échange d’information. Entrer dans la société de la connaissance c’est apprendre un nouveau type de lien social absolument indispensable pour continuer à être créatif.
Ensuite on peut dire également que l’entrée dans la société de la connaissance est peut-être aussi l’entrée dans ce que Teilhard de Chardin appelait la Noosphère. Cette société de demain pourrait être une société qui réinvente et recrée de nouvelles modalités de lien social. N’allons-nous pas vers une redécouverte de la dimension de sacré au sein même du lien social de demain ?

C’est en ce sens que ce livre parle de réenchantement.

Redéfinir le progrès en termes qualitatifs ?

Un autre fondement de notre société industrielle capitalistes consiste en une foi inébranlable dans le progrès, assimilé de plus en plus à la croissance quantitative indéfinie. Or, dans un monde fini, une croissance indéfinie est mathématiquement impossible. C’est désormais connu, mais tout le monde fait comme s’il n’en était rien : nous continuons à ressasser les bienfaits de la croissance.

Mais voilà, la connaissance ne peut être mesurée que très médiocrement en termes quantitatifs. Peter Drucker l’a bien montré 19. Dès lors, que nous le voulions ou non, la question de la mesure de la connaissance nous fait basculer dans l’ordre qualitatif. Dans la société de la connaissance, un progrès quantitatif n’aura plus de sens ! Il faudra donc nous habituer à nous servir d’un concept nouveau : le progrès qualitatif.

Voilà qui modifie totalement l’horizon de la discussion. Désormais, il ne conviendra plus d’augmenter impérativement les quantités, mais bien de se préoccuper de la dimension qualitative du progrès. C’est un nouveau paradigme ! Dans ce contexte, il sera par exemple possible de placer l’environnement et le facteur social et humain au centre des préoccupations. Ce qui est précisément le souhait d’une majorité importante de l’opinion publique mondiale.

Irruption de l’éthique et de la transparence ?

Dans la logique industrielle, les objets vendus ne sont pas associés à une connotation éthique. En principe, une tonne d’acier vaut une tonne d’acier, où qu’elle soit produite et quelles que soient les méthodes de production. Par contre, dans la société de la connaissance, tout se sait et toute connaissance a un contenu, donc un sens. Faire abstraction du sens n’est plus possible. À terme, il en ira de même de l’éthique.

Un exemple très éclairant m’a été donné, à cet égard, par le directeur de recherche d’une entreprise de consultation bruxelloise. La firme Coca-Cola a été confrontée récemment à une série de crises mineures, notamment en Belgique où quelques enfants ont été légèrement malades après avoir ingéré du Coca-Cola. Or, le management de Coca-Cola a géré cette crise comme s’il s’agissait d’une crise de produit, donc d’un problème matériel. Il a retiré du marché belge des millions de canettes suspectes et les a ensuite expédiées sur le marché africain. L’opération a été découverte et a, bien entendu, fait scandale. Sur le plan des objets, c’était peut-être du bon management car cela économisait beaucoup d’argent et ne semble pas avoir causé de problème en Afrique. Malheureusement, le management n’a pas compris à temps qu’une canette de Coca-Cola est aujourd’hui constituée de 10% de liquide brun et de 90% d’image immatérielle. Or, on ne gère pas cette image comme on gère un produit matériel. Pour gérer une image immatérielle, il faut prendre en compte un contenu, une signification. Coca-Cola aurait pu, par exemple, investir dans une aide à des écoles pauvres de Belgique. Voilà qui aurait pu redonner à l’entreprise une image positive parce que liée à une signification l’étant aussi.

Cette histoire témoigne du fait que nous sommes dans un autre paradigme, dans un autre monde de valeurs. La conséquence a été qu’en six mois, l’action Coca-Cola a perdu 50% de sa valeur sur le marché mondial et que le président mondial de l’entreprise a été contraint à donner sa démission.

Et ce qui est vrai pour Coca-Cola l’est aussi, aujourd’hui, pour les voitures et autres produits usuels. Tout simplement parce que notre société est déjà, sans s’en rendre compte, à plus de 50% dans la nouvelle logique de la connaissance.

De la maîtrise et la domination à la reconnexion et à l’harmonie ?

L’apparition et l’affirmation de la connaissance et de la créativité comme nouvelles sources de pouvoir transformer de fond en comble le paysage de notre société. De manière étonnante, ce nouvel outil met potentiellement fin à la stratégie de domination et de maîtrise. Pourquoi ? Tout simplement parce qu’il n’y a plus moyen de contrôler la connaissance et moins encore la créativité, contrairement à ce qui se passait avec le capital et l’industrie.

Ces transformations confirment l’abandon progressif des valeurs de maîtrise et de domination au profit d’un glissement vers des valeurs de

19. Peter DRUCKER, op. cit., p.186. L’argument principal est que la quantité de connaissance, son aspect quantitatif, est beaucoup moins important pour mesurer la productivité de la connaissance, que sa dimension qualitative.
partage et de respect de l’humain dans toutes ses dimensions, phénomène déjà observé dans d’autres domaines. Tout se passe donc comme s’il y avait une synergie silencieuse entre les différents niveaux de transformation.

Certes, la cause n’est pas entendue. Il y aura des tentatives désespérées et violentes, voire même extrêmement violentes, pour préserver cette maîtrise. Mais l’évidence est là : la logique change de manière fondamentale sous nos yeux ! Les données du jeu civilisationnel se modifient radicalement. Et même si les vagues donnent l’impression de rester les mêmes, les courants marins profonds changent, eux, de direction.

Le scénario négatif ?

Ce changement radical de valeurs qui s’opère est-il niable ? Non. Les pages précédentes, j’espère, en ont témoigné. Toutefois, toute valeur peut être utilisée dans un sens positif ou négatif, pour le meilleur et pour le pire. Les nouvelles valeurs qui émergent au fil des jours et des mois peuvent ainsi être détournées et dénaturées par les actuels détenteurs du pouvoir pour tenter de perpétuer leur domination. A vrai dire, ce danger les guette probablement dans un avenir pas trop éloigné. Toute ingénuité est à proscrire.

Dès lors, annoncer des lendemains qui chantent n’a pas de sens. Ce qui importe, c’est d’essayer de déterminer les termes du débat de demain. Comment allons-nous envisager une société post-capitaliste appelée à reposer sans cesse davantage sur ces nouvelles valeurs ? Quelles manières de vivre envisager ? Comment repenser l’économie au sens de la gestion de la maison individuelle, régionale, nationale et mondiale ? Quelles sont les potentialités de cette société inclusive et centrée sur l’humain ? Comment repenser les relations Nord-Sud ? Autant de questions qui requièrent une imagination collective positive.

En même temps, un effort d’imagination prudentielle est tout aussi indispensable. Quels sont les nouveaux dangers qui nous menacent ? Les nouveaux écueils qui nous attendent ? Prendre conscience que ces dangers sont énormes et qu’ils se manifesteront probablement là où l’on ne les attendait pas est d’une urgence capitale, vitale.

Tel est le débat auquel il me semble urgent de se préparer. Et de préparer l’opinion publique mondiale.

Conclusion de la première partie

Nous sommes donc sans vraiment le savoir dans un changement de société important et profond. Il est évident donc que les stratégies des régions des entreprises vont se modifier en profondeur. Si nous sortons de la logique industrielle, nous sortons aussi des stratégies industrielles.

Les valeurs de base de l’entrepreneuriat se transforment aussi en profondeur, puisque l’entrepreneur de demain devra absolument avoir un management centré sur le respect de l’humanité autrement ses « moyens de production » c’est à dire ses collaborateurs risquent d’aller chez le concurrent et de le priver de ses moyens de production principaux.

L’importance du local et de l’enracinement concret devient prééminente. Car sans enracinement culturel et local la créativité du personnel diminue rapidement. Elle se dessèche. L’importance sur le local et l’enracinement culturel ne sont donc pas des luxes, comme dans la société industrielle. Ils deviennent une partie centrale de la stratégie de créativité.

Dans la société industrielle l’enjeu était de disposer d’un personnel docile et formé à la logique industrielle, donc capable de s’adapter aux rythmes et à la logique de plus en plus exigeant de la machine. Maintenant il va falloir avoir à la disposition un « territoire intelligent. »

Le territoire intelligent, clef de voute de la société de la connaissance

Définition du territoire intelligent

Un territoire intelligent est un territoire où cette nouvelle société peut prendre petit à petit racine. Mais pour que les racines poussent, il faut que le terrain soit favorable, bien exposé et fertile. Voici quelques caractéristiques qui à notre avis seraient favorables à l’éclosion de cette nouvelle logique de société.
Un territoire intelligent est un territoire où :

Les interactions entre les citoyens sont multiples et denses : chorales, clubs de philatélie, comités de toutes sortes, mouvements caritatifs et d’entraide, mouvements politiques, cercles de réflexion d’échange, réseaux d’échanges de services et de produits, et surtout, de monnaies alternatives, etc.

Les liens familiaux se reconstituent ou se resserrent à nouveau, quelle que soit par ailleurs la forme de la famille (classique, monoparentale, reconstituée, etc.)

les relations homme femme sont différentes, ne sont plus régies par une logique patriarcale. La sortie de la logique patriarcale contribue fortement à libérer la créativité de la moitié de la population, celle des femmes.

La créativité artistique, culturelle, mais aussi entrepreneuriale, fleurit naturellement, et est une composante forte et dominante de la culture locale.

L’enracinement culturel est fort et produit une identité culturelle positive, c’est à dire non refermée sur le passé (récupération des gloires passées, etc.). Le critère est que les citoyens soient fiers de leur région et sans complexes si bien qu’ils osent la concevoir comme ouverte sur le monde d’aujourd’hui et de demain.

Une dimension spirituelle est de nouveau partie intégrante de la vie sociale du territoire, mais dans un climat de tolérance profonde. La dimension profonde de l’existence n’est plus niée systématiquement. Il y a donc une nouvelle dimension de profondeur dans ce territoire.

L’entrepreneuriat est une force d’innovation et d’inclusion, qui favorise la créativité, la responsabilité et la participation des collaborateurs. L’entrepreneur est aussi celui qui accepte les erreurs de son personnel, sinon la créativité n’est pas possible.

Le leadership politique n’est plus un leadership qui « sait », mais un leadership qui « fait sens », qui est capable de mobiliser les citoyens autour d’un projet nouveau et porteur d’avenir et de sens pour le territoire. Mais pour ce faire il s’agira d’aller au delà de « futurs probables » (proiection linéaire dans le futur.), qui sont produits par le cerveau gauche uniquement. Il faut au contraire s’orienter vers des « avenirs choisis », qui engendrent ce qu’ils annoncent en balisant et créant la route à suivre...(cerveau gauche et droit). Il s’agit donc de faire appel, non seulement à l’intelligence mais aussi au désir, à l’imagination, à la créativité individuelle et collective.20

Le territoire intelligent est, selon notre hypothèse, un territoire dans lequel les transformations de valeurs, de comportements et/ou la redécouverte de valeurs enfouies dans le passé, rendent possible l’éclosion de cette nouvelle logique, cette nouvelle culture post-industrielle et post-capitaliste.

Trois niveaux d’innovation

Operationnel par la nouvelle plateforme technologique

Il est très important de ne pas sous-estimer la portée de la dimension technologique. S’agissant de créer un “territoire intelligent”, il est essentiel de dépasser l’innovation technologique. Cette condition n’est toutefois pas suffisante, car il est aussi essentiel d’intégrer deux autres niveaux d’innovation : celui des comportements et celui des institutions, qui requièrent par ailleurs des modèles théoriques et cognitifs d’un genre nouveau.


Stratégique : il faut engager une réforme radicale des images et des modèles de pensée et d’interprétation du monde. Nos schémas et méthodes de pensée doivent évoluer. Le cocktail des valeurs qui fondent notre mode de penser doit se transformer et se réorienter vers la vie et la survie de l’humanité et le partage de la connaissance (voir première partie).

L’Europe comme territoire intelligent ?

Quand les obstacles d’hier deviennent les avantages de demain...

Si l’on accepte cette hypothèse de travail, le paysage se transforme progressivement. Et une
des conséquences de cette nouvelle manière de voir est une bonne nouvelle qui est rarement communiquée au public : les tares qui sont reprochées à l’Europe, entre autres par l’OCDE, en cette fin de la société industrielle, sont précisément les avantages essentiels sur lesquels seront basés et construits la société de demain. Ces « tares » sont des caractéristiques très importantes du territoire intelligent de demain. Il serait donc suicidaire de s’y attaquer comme les experts « industriels » le préconisent.

Voyons cela de plus près. Pour l’instant, ce qui est reproché à l’Union européenne, c’est d’avoir encore :
- trop de régulations sociales, un filet de solidarité trop dense et donc trop coûteux ;
- trop de diversité culturelle qui contribue à une trop grande segmentation des marchés ;
- trop de solidarité avec le Tiers-Monde alors qu’il vaut mieux que les pays du Sud soient confrontés à la réalité du marché mondial ;
- trop de prise en compte des besoins familiaux, crèches, congés parentaux, etc. Cela coûte beaucoup trop cher et finit par handicaper la compétitivité.

Mais aussi :
- trop de régulations inutiles et infiniment diverses ;
- trop peu d’esprit d’initiative et de créativité ;
- trop peu de vision et d’audace.

Les trois derniers reproches sont pleinement justifiés et méritent d’être corrigés au plus vite. L’Union et les gouvernements s’y emploient ou essaient de le faire.

Par contre, dans l’optique de société de la connaissance et de créativité, que nous venons d’esquisser, les quatre premiers reproches visent des « défauts » qui sont appelés à devenir la terreau qui alimentera, fera vivre et grandir la créativité humaine. Car il faut le dire à haute et intelligible voix :

Sans réseau humain dense et souple, sans tissu social vivant, la créativité humaine diminue rapidement et dépérit. Le tissu social d’une région est donc un atout primordial pour demain si nous voulons que l’Union européenne non seulement s’adapte aux nouveaux outils informatiques, mais qu’elle devienne un acteur mondial dans l’invention de la nouvelle société de la connaissance.

Sans enracinement culturel, sans capitalisation sur la diversité culturelle, il n’y aura pas de créativité humaine. La créativité se nourrit de la culture, de l’enracinement culturel. Mais cet enracinement doit être positif, ouvert sur l’avenir et la tolérance.

L’inclusion est le principe de base, la pierre angulaire de la formation de la connaissance. Si l’information ne circule pas, le cerveau humain n’enrichit pas sa connaissance. Pour faire circuler la connaissance, il faut partager, mettre les autres dans le coup. Il faut donc inclure à tout prix ! Ce qui tue l’énergie créatrice, c’est précisément le principe d’exclusion, du « chacun pour soi ». C’est la logique inverse de ce que nous connaissons. Par conséquent, toute la tradition de solidarité sociale au chèque au Européens est à conserver et à favoriser à tout prix.


Le respect de la famille et des préoccupations légitimes des parents est une autre condition sine qua non de la créativité. Sans familles équilibrées, reconstituées ou non, où l’amour, la confiance et la sérénité circulent, il n’y a pas de créativité possible. Toutes les formes de stress sont nocives, voire mortelles pour la créativité.

L’intuition des citoyen(ne)s européen(ne)s est donc juste. Il ne faut pas liquider la solidarité et les acquis sociaux. Il ne faut absolument pas laisser se détériorer le tissu social. Celà reviendrait à tuer dans l’œuf les germes de la créativité de demain. Ceux qui ont succombé à cette tentation risquent de s’en mordre les doigts à moyen terme, sauf si, comme les États-Unis, ils importent d’ailleurs les cerveaux créatifs.

Un nouveau concept d’éducation ?

L’éducation, on l’aura compris, est également appelée à se transformer assez profondément. Le concept général est facile à comprendre. Il s’agit de passer rapidement d’une éducation qui dimi-
nue la créativité et informe énormément à une éducation qui favorise la créativité en la cataly-sant et en l’éduquant, en la guidant pour qu’elle permette aux élèves de devenir des acteurs créa-tifs et efficaces dans l’invention d’un monde transmoderne et dans la société de la créativité et de la connaissance.

La connaissance reste certes importante, mais il convient à l’évidence de se rendre compte que nous sommes dans une période de changements technologiques si rapides et profonds que les techniques apprises aujourd’hui aux élèves seront probablement dépassées quand ils seront appelés à les mettre en application ! La seule chose qui demeure très importante, c’est donc d’apprendre à apprendre.

Il s’agira, dans les années à venir, de s’atteler à la tâche exaltante de revenir à ce que l’éducation n’aurait jamais d’cesser d’être : un chemin vers l’appropriation de la créativité et, partant, vers le développement humain dans le sens le plus large et le plus profond du terme. Une mission noble qui a de quoi motiver les enseignants du monde entier et leur rendre une légitime fierté. C’est encore un domaine dans lequel l’Europe pourrait jouer un rôle de révélateur, de catalyseur du changement.

C’est encore un domaine dans lequel l’Europe pourrait jouer un rôle de révélateur, de catalyseur du changement.

Une nouvelle université formant des « généralistes » ?

L’Université de demain pourrait se présenter de manière fort différente de ce que nous connaissons aujourd’hui. Au lieu de former des généralistes qui se spécialisent dans les années de doctorat, on pourrait imaginer le contraire. Elle formerait des généralistes en bout de cycle supérieur. Les étudiants commenceront par une spécialité comme ingénieur électronicien, puis ils acquerront une « généralisation ». C’est à dire qu’ils apprendraient à travailler réellement en transdisciplinarité. Ils seraient invités à élargir leur vision spécialisée par un point de vue philosophique, anthropologique, économique, politique, linguistique, etc. Si bien que leur thèse de doctorat serait une généralisation de leur approche spécialisée. Les doctorants seraient des « généralisations ». Et les carrières supérieures seraient réservées aux « généralistes » diplômés.

L’Europe convainc a un monde nouveau ?

Le rôle de l’Europe ne sera pas de s’essouffler à essayer de redevenir une « grande puissance industrielle et militaire » comme par le passé, ni de se poser en concurrente plus ou moins habi- lable des États-Unis. Elle n’excellera d’ailleurs pas tellement à ce jeu.


Elle peut devenir un des premiers territoires intelligents de la planète.

Appendix

Neskey

A roadmap on new measurements in the Knowledge society

Characteristics of Neskey:

Neskey’s Roadmap is about measuring progress toward a sustainable society. If EU wants to become a sustainable and inclusive knowledge society, it is crucial for the actors to be able to measure and assess any progress towards that goal. Without measurements it is impossible for the EU to know if it is progressing or falling behind.
Hence Neskey has brought together a unique gathering of experts in three dimensions. Experts in intangible and sustainability metrics, including research groups working on measurements of sustainability to join the roadmap construction: “GRI” (Global Reporting Initiative), and “Accountability.”

Business and technology partners like Brutish Telecom, GeSI (Global e-Sustainability Initiative), a consortium of telecommunications companies working on sustainability.

Cities and organizations that focus on the “built environment” as a responsible party for addressing overall sustainability issues such as pollution and high quality human environments.

Neskey roadmap takes a systemic view of measuring sustainability. The concept of sustainability has environmental, social, economic and cultural dimensions. It has quantitative dimensions, but is becoming more and more a qualitative concept. Progress presupposes the creation of new measurements. It presupposes also that norms and measurements correspond and integrate with each other, which for the moment is not the case, especially between cities and Business. Corporations are developing reporting systems that do not correlate to the needs of cities, of governments, advocacy groups, consumers, or employees. The current reporting focus is skewed toward the needs of the investment community.

Neskey studies those new measurements in the context of the knowledge society. Although acknowledging the overall importance of technology, Neskey is not really a technological project. Rather, Neskey is confronting the growing importance of intangibles and the societal implications of this shift in values. (An intangible is a source of future benefits that does not have a physical or financial embodiment). According to that definition, sustainability and social inclusion are more and more considered as “new” intangibles, increasing greatly the value/brand of the companies, and the reputation of the cities.

The Vision of Neskey:

Internet and computer technologies are the new “tools of production” that have expanded competitiveness and value capability from corporations and industrial complexes to individuals and networks. A new economy emerges that requires dramatically different business practices: the knowledge economy. Some authors speak about “post capitalist” economy, because the power resides more in knowledge than in capital.

Instead of being based on secrecy and exclusivity, new business practices (in the knowledge society) are going towards sharing, transparency, accountability and real cooperation. Knowledge grows as it is shared: the more you share the more you have of it. This is not the case with financial capital. So, the basic logic is changing.

Other research on sustainability shows also that the actual economic frame is seemingly not able to lead Humanity towards a really sustainable future. We need a new economic frame, called the “Economy of sustainable development”.

This leads Neskey to the vision that in the coming years the global trend could be towards 360° Accountability, transparency and participation in a sustainable economy. This means corporations, governments, cities, advocacy groups, and civil society organizations seek ways they can collectively share knowledge about indicators, participate in the sense making processes around those indicators and become more transparently accountable to each other embracing sustainable practices.

This accountability/transparency/participation would become an extraordinary accelerator towards more sustainability and social inclusion, because the value of those new intangibles (sustainability and inclusion) increases with transparency.
This vision presupposes the availability of an “elegant CORE set of measures, indexes and methods, commonly used by Business, cities and regions, civil society, and governing bodies. The current feedback mechanisms and systems of indicators are too limited and if this is not addressed they may seriously impede the emergence of new practices and metrics that will be required to achieve the EU goals proclaimed at Lisbon.

In order to reach this point of transparency and acceleration of sustainability, we need to switch to a post industrial/sustainable economic frame. We need to understand that we are already in another society, although our minds are still in the old structures, references and habits.

In order to realize the Neskey roadmap, we need the next generation of technology, which fosters this transparency and participation, and makes visible new metrics for the built environment, societal health, environmental viability, and corporate intangibles.

We need innovation. But not only in technology, which was the foundation of the industrial society. In the knowledge society, we also need social innovations for inter-organizational cooperation, including new institutions and a new vision (paradigm = set of values), which is not linear and systemic.

In this new society, based on sharing, collaboration and open source, the main research tool could become the thematic network (like Knowledge Board) linking together experts, business, cities, governments, and citizens. They all would be working to calibrate the measurement of intangibles and sustainability. They would be the real new research engine, producing new knowledge.

In the follow up discussion, many participants found the roadmap interesting and challenging. S. Curwell, finds it “very exciting”, and asks what are the priorities? Would a priority not be the standards of information quality?

Clark Eustace confirms the growing importance of intangibles and asks for removal of the incentives to the monopoly rents in public goods. This is the deeper, systemic issue beyond the obvious. Transparency is also about those type of issues.

Pol Deschamps underlines the importance of citizens’ participation.

Peter Johnston:
- considers that Neskey is right in thinking that there is an irresistible movement towards self-organizing from below, through “communities of practice” and action networks. Those communities are indeed pushing for more transparency and participation. They are pushing towards something new…We have yet to fully recognize it.
- He also considers Neskey roadmap as making a “correct jump” in saying that in the following phases of the emerging knowledge society, public policies will be subjected to public screening concerning their influences on sustainability.
- He finally asks how to combine this extraordinary diversity of experiences with 360° transparency.
Civil society and the uncivil state

Land tenure reform in Egypt and the crisis of rural livelihoods

*by Ray Bush*

In this paper, Ray Bush examines the impact of recent changes in the relationship between landowners and tenants in Egypt and the links between economic and political liberalization, specifically in rural Egypt. In this context, he considers the declared intentions of the government and donors (the United States Agency for International Development—USAID, and the World Bank, in particular) relating to political liberalization and the role of rural civil society. In terms of political representation, participation in local institutions, rule of law, and improvement of rural livelihoods.

His study raises two immediate questions: the likely outcome of the state's withdrawal from the provision of agricultural inputs, and the ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) to substitute for the state's withdrawal from agricultural provision.

Introduction

This paper examines the impact of recent changes in the relationship between landowners and tenants in Egypt by looking at Law 96 of 1992, which revoked rights of tenure for tenants, to see whether the proposed shift toward market-based formulas for tenancy have improved opportunities for rural civil society. Put simply, has there been any link between economic liberalization on the one hand and political liberalization on the other, specifically as it relates to rural Egypt? Have the possibilities for political expression by farmers and rural dwellers, through local organizations and associations, expanded as the opportunities for entry into a land market are also supposed to also have increased?

These questions raise issues that are at the heart of rural livelihoods, asset redistribution and especially land. This paper examines the declared intentions on political liberalization and expansion of rural civil society of the Government of Egypt (GoE) and donors, notably the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank. Those intentions will be set against actual recent outcomes for political representation, participation in local institutions and the rule of law, and the improvement of rural well-being and protection of rural livelihoods. The approach is rooted in political economy. The paper examines the relationship between the state and economy in Egypt, identifies the actors who shape that relationship, and looks at the impact of structural adjustment on rural Egypt's institutions.

This is not always easy work in the Egyptian context. Egypt's ruling elite views the control of access to information and the debate of policy issues as central to its maintenance of political and economic power. Egypt has at different times been characterized as a democracy of newspapers, as the centre of Middle Eastern media and cultural liberalism: that view has always been questionable, and especially so at the start of the twenty-first century.

While there have been many GoE announcements of the importance of widening political participation, and donors have stressed the need for an expansion of what they call "civil society", neither has taken place. This failure raises two immediate questions related to Egypt's rural areas that the GoE is reluctant to address. The first of these is what will be the likely outcome of the state's withdrawal from the provision of agricultural inputs and marketing for the fellahin's, or peasants', ability to continue agricultural production? How have the fellahin managed to cope with the reduction of GoE support with agricultural services as rural poverty increases? Second, has there been an increase in the number and variety of civil society organizations (CSOs) to substitute for state withdrawal from agricultural provision, and has this ushered in a new era for political liberalization and democratization?

This paper demonstrates that there has been, in recent years, a political deliberationization (Kienle 2001). There has been a narrowing of the possibility for political action independent of the state. This narrowing authoritarianism challenges the view that a civil society exists as anything other than as a slogan used by the GoE to curry favour from the donor community. This should not be surprising for any keen observer of Egypt's political economy. While there was a degree of political reform following the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, with the ending of the single-party system by Anwar Sadat's in 1977, Egyptian politics has...
been unable to break free from the fact that the main political parties were created by the state. Any new party still has to be approved by a committee on the formation of political parties. The state continues to determine what constitutes formal political practice—the extent to which a political party can politicize, organize and recruit new members as well as hold meetings and organize democratic opposition to the regime—and even the number of representatives that will be tolerated in the People’s Assembly.

One of the failures of Nasser’s revolution was its dependency upon limited and restricted political participation from the social and class forces it had used to fight the injustice of the ancien régime. Yet the social contract that was imposed to protect the revolution coerced the fellabin and working class to accept political quietude for limited land reform, and improved living and working conditions. That compact reduced political participation during the Nasser years, but also inhibited future reform that sought to widen the scope for decision making and formulation of policy beyond the armed forces and crony political and economic elite. As Shahenda Maqlad has noted, reflecting on her life as a rural activist and leftist Tagammu militant:

One of the big mistakes of the July 1952 revolution was that it didn’t allow autonomous populist organizations. When Sadat took away peasants’ gains and started his campaign against everything Nasser stood for, resistance was weak and unorganized (Cairo Times, 4–10 May 2000:20).

President Hosni Mubarak’s regime (1981–present) has failed to move away from the authoritarian corporatism and nationalist populism that characterized the previous regimes. He has concentrated efforts to sustain his political power that was, at the time of Sadat’s assassination, without much legitimacy. The 1960s and 1970s were marked by severe limitations on political participation as the regimes tried to quell unrest with moderate improvements to service provision. The limited improvement to health and education was only possible while the regime could finance it. However, Egypt’s economic crisis intensified as its ability to generate growth away from its traditional rentier sectors like revenue from the Suez canal, migrant labour remittances and oil with a sustainable agriculture and manufacturing base drove it into deeper recession and fiscal crisis.

The record of the 1980s and 1990s has been largely of the Egyptian regime equipping itself with the ability to continue to manage dissent while also promoting a somewhat garbled partial message of economic reform, market liberalization and financial austerity, for farmers and workers.

This paper examines opportunities that have arisen for the fellabin, especially tenants and those dispossessed since 1997, to mobilize and promote their interests within the context of Egypt’s “uncivil” state—a state that often rides roughshod over human and civil rights without due process of law. I will discuss issues raised by several tenants who lost land after 1997 and the consequences of that land loss for their asset base, their level of poverty, the social exclusion that they have endured and the assault on their rights to land. I will examine the level of violence that took place in Egypt’s countryside, especially after 1997, and assess the extent to which that might be seen as indicative of protest within the realm of civil society, or as a new and different form of political mobilization. It will become clear that while the declared rationale for donors and the GoE at different times has been that the 1992 reform of tenancy was intended to promote improvements in Egypt’s land market with the parallel development of improved opportunities for rural political expression, this has certainly not taken place. I will not focus on issues of a land market, which has been looked at elsewhere (Bush 2002). Instead, I will highlight the fact that civil society groups have not emerged as a result of market reform. Egypt’s history of the last decade has been one of deliberatization. Where people have spoken out locally or have organized against impoverishment as a result of market liberalization, they have tended to do so around family and kinship structures. Market liberalization has generated greater rural poverty and unemployment that has been partly managed by the fellabin in terms of a greater dependence upon family resources. Yet this has also become jeopardized as economic hardship has intensified, and there is little sense that it will diminish.

Improving opportunities for civil society rep-
presentation has never been on the agenda of Egypt’s policy makers. It has been, at different times, part of the pretence of political liberalization that commentators have assumed will ipso facto emerge alongside market reform, but the GoE has no intention, or need, to liberalize politically. And even if it did, it certainly would not focus on rural political empowerment which might jeopardize the wealth and status of landed interests.

I will begin with a brief review of whether the concept of civil society is an appropriate one to use and whether it has any usefulness in understanding rural Egypt. I will also trace the recent process of deliberalization. I will then provide the context for examining agriculture and rural livelihoods by looking at what the characterization of Egypt’s persistent agricultural crisis has been. It will then be possible to look at the debate about tenure and markets and the impact recent government policy has had on rural livelihoods and assets. There has been a significant continuity in the debates about Egypt’s countryside and the political role of the fellahin within it. However, there has been no notion that rural organizations that might challenge authority would be important for farmers’ self-esteem and confidence, and that support for a political process might empower rather than enervate rural producers and possibly enhance regime legitimacy.

**Deliberalization and politics in Egypt: whither civil society?**

The idea that a vibrant civil society is necessary to keep rulers and politicians in check, and to promote democratic transition and consolidation, is prevalent throughout the donor community and is part of the rhetoric of most developing country governments (Keane 1988; Clark 1991). Political conditionality has been written into most aid and donor relations with developing countries. The need for civil society has been taken for granted and its virtues extolled by, *inter alia*, the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID). 4. Egypt is no exception to this, although what is meant by civil society at a time of deliberation and an authoritarian regime is unclear (Kandil 1994; Ibrahim 1995).

**Civil society**

Since the mid-1980s, the term civil society has been “dusted off and deodorized to suit a variety of ideological, intellectual and practical needs” (White 1996:178; see also Keane 1988). In its broadest definition, civil society refers to public space independent of the state where many different forms of associational life exist. Additionally, it has been used to refer to all activity outside the state, whether spontaneous or organized. It was the protest movements that emerged to help transform the political regimes of Eastern Europe in the 1980s that many Western commentators saw as capturing the vibrancy of civil society. In that context and since then, the notion of civil society was very much linked with “opposition” to the state (Geremek 1996). There is another view of civil society: A “catchall” to refer to associations between firms, families and the state, especially to refer to the presence of voluntary organizations. These two views of civil society, the more theoretical and analytical category defining “political space” between the state and private life, and the more empirical view referring to all public activity not directly sanctioned by the state, has left a lot of room for confusion.

The difficulty of establishing a clear definition of civil society and avoiding its use to include every activity beyond the state, as in some sense in opposition to it, has often rendered the term too inclusive. If we accept, moreover, the term to include the association between people beyond the home and the state, we need to examine what it is that the organization actually does to determine whether it can be called “civil” or not. That continues to be the case even though civil society is used by policy makers and politicians to imply an arena outside government or state control. In the Egyptian context I will indicate farmers’ adoption of a range of strategies to cope with economic liberalization. These have involved aspects of using formal protest through existing state-orchestrated avenues as well as elements of what Bayat has called “quiet encroachment” (1997, 1998, 2000; World Bank 2000a).
2002). But they have most obviously been characterized by farmer adoption of more usual coping strategies to reduce economic stress, and they have failed to impact positively on the creation of rural civil society.

The focus for most commentators of civil society is to argue that associations therein tend to take an organized form with a routinized character (Steward 1997, citing Hadenius and Uggla 1996). Yet this view of civil society does not adequately capture the forms of protest and opposition that have arisen in Egypt since 1990. Indeed, such a view of civil society does not capture the reality of civil society in Western liberal democratic states either. This is because of the difficulty of knowing what to include in the list of “non-state” actors, or those that operate outside the sphere of the state. For in many social formations it is clear that civic institutions like academic unions, public sector interest groups and those citizens who derive core income from the state are firmly embedded in the state system itself (Bangura 1999:1). This raises issues related to the boundaries of civil society when discussing associational groups. Are all groups and associations, irrespective of membership, aims and objectives, to be included as part of civil society? If civil society is to be linked with political liberalization, do all groups within it contribute to that process or is it more appropriate to discriminate in the assessment of the associations contributing to civil society? Might we want, for instance, to look not only at the aims and objectives of different groups, the types of recruitment mechanisms and social base that they have, but also at the precise relationship they may have with the state?

There is a lot of theoretical slippage when dealing with debates of contemporary civil society. This relates in part to the fact that it was seen in political theory as part of the organic growth with European capitalist development in its early formulation. In its subsequent use to chart a “proper” course for political democracy in developing countries, it has failed adequately to locate the specificity of the term in its historical genesis within continental Europe and has not recognized the difficulties of structurally embedding it in non-Western society. This is not to minimize or fail to see the significance of civil society in the global South. It is instead to understand the possible implications for its late arrival in political discourse and the way in which it has rather confusingly been bandied about, viewed as a liberating force in authoritarian regimes and linked closely with donors and political conditionality. I want to now look a little closer at a number of general limitations to the usefulness of the term, civil society. I want to look at the way in which it has automatically been linked with democratization and why its link to the importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can misleadingly imply *ipsa facto* that a process of democratization is under way simply because a “civil society” can be discerned.

The presence of civil society and organizations such as NGOs have been hailed as the necessary ingredients for promoting and consolidating democracy, empowering people in their struggles against states, and increasing political participation. The argument of many commentators in the 1980s and 1990s was that the pressure to liberalize economies by promoting market reform should be accompanied by political liberalization promoting a plurality of associational groups to ensure greater accountability of the state. While international agencies at the heart of economic liberalization promoted the need for states to reform politically to advance associational life, it has also been the case that political reforms have been seen to necessarily follow market reform. They must follow, rather than predate economic liberalization, to avoid a Russian-style reform fiasco. Second, the political reforms on the agendas of international financial institutions (IFIs) are not envisaged to empower organizations that might challenge the “sanctity” of property rights.

The difficulties with using the term civil society have led Chris Allen to question its use and its simplistic linkage with democratization. He has argued that

the concept of civil society is difficult to pin down empirically, and the theoretical arguments with which it is involved are so closely associated with neo-liberal ideological campaigning, as to cast doubt on the value of the concept overall (Allen 1997:330).
Allen is unhappy with the term because it has carried with it the ideological assertions of its neoliberal origins. First, the preoccupation with associational life asserts that civil society is the source for liberal democratic values, namely openness, transparency, accountability and the rule of law. Second, civil society is seen as the motor for democracy—that is, a liberal democratic version. And third, civil society is posed in opposition to the state. Crucially, a flourishing civil society requires a non-interventionist state—one that furthers the interests of market-oriented individual freedoms (Allen 1997:335).

What has followed for Allen and others (Fowler 1991; Powell and Seddon 1997) has been a development agenda since the early 1980s that has made donor funds conditional with the presence of, or policies to facilitate, a strong civil society in recipient countries. Civil society, made up invariably of a plurality of NGOs, is seen by donors as an opponent of inefficient, corrupt and rent-seeking states. It is here that donors and the debates about civil society have been misleading. In arguing for universal support—some might argue “knee-jerk” support—for NGOs in their opposition to the state, donors have operated with a very naive idea of what NGOs are and the role they might play in a proposed democratization process. As Robert Cox has suggested:

In a ‘bottom-up’ sense, civil society is the realm in which those who are disadvantaged by globalisation of the world economy can mount their protests and seek alternatives? In a ‘top-down’ sense, however, states and corporate interests influence the development of this current version of civil society towards making it an agency for stabilising the social and political status quo (1999:10–11).

While there is no doubt that donors have been careful to channel funds to NGOs that are broadly in agreement with donor policies for development, economic liberalization and political reform that do not challenge the interests of foreign capital, it is also the case that there are many different types of NGOs with different agendas. NGOs, for example, might complement the state by providing social services. They might oppose the state by trying to generate local opposition to aspects of state policy, and they might try to reform the state from within by working with the government (Marcussen 1996:418). And some NGOs are undemocratic in their internal organization and in their ultimate aims and objectives. That has certainly been the accusation made against many Islamist groups in Egypt that have articulated the interests of militant armed groups, promoted exclusion of women and would probably limit the scope for non-Islamic groups and political opposition more generally, if they came into power. In other words, there is no necessary relationship of NGO opposition to the state. The NGO sector, as might be expected, is subject to internal divisions, in relation to what the aims and objectives of NGOs might be and what position they might adopt, or be encouraged to adopt vis-à-vis the state. It is more likely that some business NGOs, although clearly not all in the Egyptian case, will be more sympathetic to the state than, say a human rights organization. And of course we might note here too that while NGOs are divided horizontally, they are also divided vertically, internally, in terms of their class membership, organization, recruitment and activist base.

It is perhaps more fruitful in understanding civil society to take the focus away from a preoccupation with NGOs and associational activity per se and instead to use the term to describe the processes by which states configure relations of consent and coercion. Gramsci’s concern in the spiralling fascist Italy of the 1930s was to grapple with a topsy-turvy world where life outside or beyond the state at different times and often in quick succession became enmeshed with the state, separate from it or subordinate to it (Gramsci 1976; Showstack Sassoon 1978). For Gramsci, the essential way in which dominant classes maintained authority was to present themselves as legitimate rulers. This was done, most of the time, by convincing subordinate classes of the hegemonic dominance and legitimacy of governing class actions. The constant creation and re-creation of hegemony—rule by consent, but when necessary by force—was, for Gramsci, the crucial factor characterizing the exercise of political power in the interests of the dominant economic classes. According to Gramsci, civil society was only meaningful as a
political concept or political reality if it was part of a relationship with the state. Thus while contemporary donors and mainstream academic commentators have tended to talk about civil society in opposition to the state or as a substitute for it, Gramsci believed that civil society could not exist without the state.

This leads us to what Marcussen has identified as a paradox. To cite Naomi Chazan reporting on patterns of state-society incorporation and disengagement in Africa, “strengthening civil society requires as a necessary indispensable condition the strengthening of the state: the state and civil society stand or fall together” (cited in Marcussen 1996:421). It is thus mistaken to counterpose civil society to the state. This dichotomous view is guided by the ideological premise that states are necessarily bad and civil society, namely NGOs, are good. While this neoliberal concern was founded on the importance of securing individual rights, it has been used, since the 1980s, in an ideological battle by donors against states perceived as corrupt and inefficient. The policy formula that resulted from this was to downsize state activity and improve opportunities for individuals to organize collectively in civil society. While there is a need for state reform in the South, by, for example, opening up the arena of decision making, improving transparency and opportunities for political expression, and promoting and upholding the rule of law, donors against states perceived as corrupt and inefficient. The policy formula that resulted from this was to downsize state activity and improve opportunities for individuals to organize collectively in civil society. While there is a need for state reform in the South, by, for example, opening up the arena of decision making, improving transparency and opportunities for political expression, and promoting and upholding the rule of law, donors against states perceived as corrupt and inefficient. The policy formula that resulted from this was to downsize state activity and improve opportunities for individuals to organize collectively in civil society. While there is a need for state reform in the South, by, for example, opening up the arena of decision making, improving transparency and opportunities for political expression, and promoting and upholding the rule of law, donors against states perceived as corrupt and inefficient. The policy formula that resulted from this was to downsize state activity and improve opportunities for individuals to organize collectively in civil society.

A strong civil society, composed of competing associational groups of different sizes with different foci, needs a strong state to help facilitate the arenas in which civil society can operate. States provide rules for participation and opportunities to express dissent. In short, states deliver the different political, social, economic and cultural processes whereby hegemonic classes remain dominant. States provide the framework, therefore, and are also subject to contradictions and oppositional forces that emerge as a result of the myriad conflicts that states can never fully contain. There is also another contradiction. Strong states are required for strong civil societies, but also jeopardize the independence of NGOs. For example, some organizations have tried to pursue democratic reforms, but this was made difficult by the fact that their leaders were part of the government (Allen 1997:336). And it is common in Egypt for the relationship between the state and civil society to be harnessed around NGOs and “partnerships” between government and associations. Talking more broadly, Allen has noted that there is no single pattern of relationships between regimes and elements of civil society. Not only are there some organisations close to authoritarian governments, but there is a general sense in which civil society as associational life depends on the state, while its growth may depend on material support from government (Allen 1997:336).

Instead of donors therefore seeking to undermine an often already fragmented state, they might more usefully seek to enhance state capacity. Unfortunately, where this has been adopted, it has tended to promote management reforms, including privatization that has lessened rather than promoted state effectiveness and, ironically, enabled “spoils politics” to continue (Bangura 1999:5). In so doing, donors prioritize the political liberalization of the state that is intended to directly assist economic liberalization and pressures for globalization. Because of the Egyptian state’s still rentier character, the GoE remains insulated from the pressures of local political forces. This has been aided by a corrupt electoral process, severe limitations on political organizations and censored media. While donors have been fixated with encouraging the GoE to withdraw from economic activity, to shed its “socialist” inheritance, they have effectively promoted a wish list for NGOs to replace government services. Yet that fails to understand that the state’s withdrawal cannot be adequately picked up by the new donor-funded entrants—even if that was the policy intent—and such intervention would be divisive and would fragment oppositional political forces. In other words, while it is
useful to view the relationship between the state and NGOs as one of a struggle for ideas, policy and active legitimacy, it would be wrong to invest in NGOs as the force for democratization, simply because they may emanate from beyond the state.

**Deliberalization in Egypt**

Civil society debate is seldom concerned with rural civil society. Whether donor- or government-led, debate is generally focused to include urban society, and social and political forces, namely the working class and other class or associational forces. Egypt is no exception to this, except for the rhetorical views expressed about Sharouk to which I will refer later.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of NGOs in Egypt. A 1998 World Bank study suggests there were 28,000, while the Ministry for Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA), which was responsible for registering NGOs (prior to 2000 this was the Ministry for Social Affairs) indicates that there were 14,600. MISA has the responsibility to effectively regulate NGOs under Law 32 of 1964. While that law was revised in 2000 it was deemed unconstitutional, and a new law to replace Law 32 was redrafted in 2001 to avoid the embarrassment of MISA being unable to intensify the legal policing and marshalling of NGOs. In any case that policing role was effectively managed by internal security, and apparently the previous Minister of Social Affairs was removed partly because she was unable to counter external attempts to intervene in the workings of her ministry. Among other things, the legal restraints on NGOs ensure that no foreign funding finds its way to the organizations unless it has been channelled through and agreed with MISA. The registration of NGOs characterizes them as welfare or development agencies, the latter more commonly known as community development associations (CDAs).

Welfare organizations, or gamiyat reiaia, are required to focus on a specific activity, namely delivery of health services, welfare or literacy. CDAs may have a range of activities as long as they are approved by MISA and based in a single location. This classification is restrictive, fails to capture the complexity of different NGO activities, and hides many different political and religious activities (Mahfouz 2001).

While on the surface the numbers of NGOs may indicate a certain vibrancy in Egypt’s civil society, the measures of state control and the limitations imposed on NGOs constrain effective independent action that might offer the pretence of autonomous public activity outside of a state intent on control. The level of control by the Egyptian state of NGOs may not be total—even the most repressive of regimes is unable to stifle all opposition—but the sleight of hand between the GoE pronouncements for liberalization, and the actual de-liberalization that has been the hallmark of the 1990s, is very evident.

USAID notes that less than one third of MISA’s figure of 14,600 Egyptian NGOs work in the countryside and only about 3,000 actively play a part in “developing and representing their communities” (USAID 2001:1). This is despite the fact that 50 per cent of Egypt’s population is rural. And for USAID, the importance of NGOs for rural governance is significant. Before Egypt’s structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1991, the GoE controlled agricultural input and output markets, and the major vehicle for driving agricultural growth were the co-operatives. These were located throughout the country and in every village. Nasser’s vision had been that they would provide part of the social contract with the fellahin, substituting the power of merchants and feudal landlords.

There were effectively two kinds of co-operatives. The multipurpose co-operatives handled issues of credit, agrarian reform and land reclamation. They provided production and marketing services to membership that was compulsory where individuals had benefited from Nasser’s agricultural reform. But, more generally, membership was not voluntary as the co-operative was the sole vehicle for access to farming inputs. The second type of co-operative specialized in areas like livestock, poultry and agricultural machinery.

In 1998 there were 6,604 agricultural co-operatives, including 776 agrarian reform co-operatives and 520 land reclamation co-operatives.
About 67 per cent were multipurpose co-operatives and 33 per cent were specialized. Table 1 indicates the number of agricultural co-operatives and their main activities.

**Table 1: Number of agricultural co-operatives in Egypt, 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and level</th>
<th>Credit co-ops</th>
<th>Agrarian reform</th>
<th>Land reclamation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipurpose</td>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,995</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The evidence from table 1 is misleading. It suggests a vibrant co-operative structure, yet the co-operatives have, in fact, collapsed following the implementation of economic reform. Their demise has led to much unrest among poor landowners and tenants who were previously dependent upon subsidized inputs and guaranteed marketing structures and have been deprived of subsidized inputs and controlled markets. While there had been widespread dissatisfaction with the old co-operative system, it was little compared to the villagers’ unease with the new control by merchants and large landowners that emerged with market liberalization. The prices of inputs fixed by these groups are now much higher compared to the old system and control markets in less flexible ways than the old co-operatives did.

There is a clear tension between the erosion of old rural structures and institutions for the maintenance of agricultural productivity and the rhetoric that market reform will empower the rural individual to make decisions that will enhance agricultural productivity. On the one hand, the rhetoric of both USAID and GoE has repeatedly paid lip service to rural governance issues and political liberalization alongside economic reform. On the other hand, there has been the dissolution of Nasserite agricultural institutions (albeit many of these had served to depoliticize farmers), the erosion of the legal rights of tenants and increases in costs of production that have led to higher levels of rural poverty and unemployment (USAID 2000, 2001; Fergany 2002).

USAID has noted, for instance that there is an important role for NGOs in developing Egyptian society. They are keen to promote “Participatory, accountable governance and a strong non-governmental organization...community” because they are “also important for supporting economic growth” (USAID 2000:1). Nevertheless, USAID does recognize that most Egyptian PVOs [private voluntary organizations]/NGOs are not meeting the needs of their communities due to lack of autonomy, institutional capacity, and resources? Overall, few PVOs/NGOs in Egypt are effectively engaged in making contributions to Egypt’s development (USAID 2001:1).

There are two reasons why USAID is unlikely to see any improvement in the role that NGOs might have in developing Egypt’s political economy, including its organization of governance. The first is that too much is invested in the idea that NGOs will transform Egypt’s political structures. This was raised earlier in relation to donor optimism regarding the importance of NGOs in struggles for development. There is little point in promoting NGOs as a vehicle for democratic governance (meant here to go beyond formal democratic practices of regular free and fair elections). They seem unable, without other political and social pressures, to encompass issues like the possibility for agenda setting, popular mobilization and citizenship with social and economic rights defendable in an independent judiciary. In other words, while NGOs may be important as conduits for expressing particular interests, they will not add much to the processes of democratization unless and until institutional reform recognizing the right of democratic participation and expression is actively promoted. And this also needs to be

7. The figures for this table conflict with USAID Policy Brief No. 18, September 1999, where a similar table is reproduced.
promoted by non-NGO forces. There does need to be an arena in which citizens can dissent without fear of reprisal, torture or ridicule. And this broader and deeper view of democracy extends to a deeper view of human rights, which can only be effective if people’s obligations are acknowledged by everyone in society, and political institutions effectively deliver the normative system to recognize and respond to attacks on people’s rights (Beetham 2000). This is far from being achieved in Egypt.

This leads to the second reason why it is inappropriate to invest in the idea that civil society promotion through NGOs in Egypt is a vehicle for democratization. The GoE in the 1990s has promoted a strategy of deliberalization. This theme has been dealt with extensively by Kienle (2001). He has detailed the processes whereby the GoE has restricted positive liberties in the central institutions of the state by, among other things, restricting participation in government, political parties and in the “election” of the president in a referendum where he has been unopposed for four terms. Kienle has also examined the ways in which the GoE has restricted participation in municipal and local government arenas. What Kienle has euphemistically called “streamlining the state apparatus” included preventing participation from below in elections for umdas (village headmen) and deans of university faculties. During Mubarak’s presidency these officeholders have become state appointments rather than electoral positions (Kienle 2001:164).

There are many reasons for Egypt’s deliberalization and among these, the idea of a conflict between the regime and radical Islamic groups has been central. So too has the impact of economic reform that has generated greater inequality and the threat of greater political dissent. Kienle has documented the legal restrictions imposed on the Egyptian press and the ways in which the state sought to restrict both personal liberties and collective freedoms (Kienle 2000: 89–115).

The evidence of deliberalization is substantial. It was much debated in Egypt during the referendum campaign that confirmed Mubarak for an unprecedented fourth term on 26 September 1999. The state-controlled media pulled out all the stops in the referendum campaign. Many street banners and news headlines read, “God gave three gifts to Egypt; the pyramids, the Nile and Mubarak”. Mubarak himself announced a new dawn for the country after gaining a declared 93.79 per cent of the vote. The president called for greater political participation to accompany economic liberalization. Yet in the cabinet “reshuffle”, he retained 19 of the old guard, and the ageing technocrat Atif Abeid was named prime minister. The 13 new appointments, moreover, were not popular and it became clear, especially after the 2000 parliamentary general election, that the government of Atif Abeid was the most criticized for many decades (Cairo Times, 19–25 July 2001).

There has been a discrepancy between the statements of politicians and the actual policies to initiate political liberalization. The GoE’s evasion of crucial political issues and forgoing an opportunity to develop its own legitimacy was also at odds with the unprecedented and short-lived agreement between Egypt’s four main political parties (excluding the ruling party). The leftist Tagammu, Waf, the Islamist labour party and the Nasserites, together with almost 200 prominent political figures, initiated a petition to the GoE in September 1999. It called for the lifting of emergency legislation, which had been virtually uninterrupted since Sadat’s assassination in 1981. The petition also called for the release of political prisoners; guaranteed free and fair elections; full freedom to form political parties; and independence for the country’s trade unions and syndicates.

Taken together, the petition effectively called for a parliamentary republic that was clearly not on the agenda of a government that continued to benefit from spoils politics. It was a short-lived political moment when there was agreement among groups that normally fail to find any common ground. Since there was no social movement able to translate slogans from a petition into political mobilization around a programme for reform, the GoE was not alarmed.

From crisis to crisis: agricultural neglect to economic reform

There have been several major themes of continuity and discontinuity in the history of land
and agriculture in Egypt. The first of these is the depoliticization of Egypt’s farmers by successive regimes—the felt need to reduce opportunities for farmers to organize independently of the state—and the second is the politicization of land. This politicization was first promoted by Nasser as a vehicle to marginalize feudal royalist landowners, who were opposed to the 1952 revolution, in his attempt to redraw rural political boundaries, to secure legal land rights for small farmers, and to stabilize prices and security of tenure. However, the politicization of land continued after Nasser’s death, in the struggle for de-Nasserization, to reverse the revolutionary changes of land tenure and security that Nasser had put in place and to replace them with increased strength of the social and economic forces of the ancien régime. This was first promoted by Anwar Sadat and was continued by Hosni Mubarak. It has taken the form of market liberalization in agriculture pushed by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture Yussef Wali and culminated in Law 96 of 1992. That law revoked rights of tenure for tenants that had been a hallmark of Nasser’s social revolution.

Egypt’s land reform in 1952 was the first large-scale reform in the Middle East. Nasser retained the sanctity of private property, and individual family farms remained the centerpiece for rural development. The land reforms in 1952 and 1961 redistributed about one seventh of the country’s cultivable land from large landowners to middle peasants and landless. Prior to 1952, about 0.1 per cent of total landowners owned 20 per cent of the cultivated land. One hundred and ninety-nine out of a total of about 2,000 large landowners owned 7.3 per cent of the agricultural land. Many of these were owners or relatives of those who had received land from Mohammed Ali Pasha during the Ottoman period as rewards for involvement with his military campaigns or for helping rural tax collection. In contrast, 3 million fellahin owned less than one feddan. These near landless represented about 75 per cent of landowners but only held 13 per cent of the total cultivable land. Those who owned the rest of the land were largely absentee landlords who lived luxurious lives. This led to many disturbances during the early twentieth century as poor farmers rebelled against their harsh living conditions.

Nasser wanted to break the hold of powerful rural elites, who would force the fellahin to vote en masse for whoever their masters wanted. The reforms gave the state the authority to seize an individual’s privately held land that exceeded 200 feddan, a ceiling reduced to 100 feddan in 1961; however, families could still hold up to 300 feddan, and the amount a landlord could rent out was limited to 50 feddan. Exemptions were allowed where families had more than two children, where an additional 100 feddan could be retained. There were also exemptions to waqf land (endowed land held by religious authorities), desert land or land owned by industrial or scientific organizations. Landowners received compensation, except the royal family who lost 170,000 feddan.

Seized land was distributed to agricultural labourers and tenant farmers with holdings of less than 5 feddan. The recipients on average received 2.4 feddan and paid for the land in instalments over a 40-year period. There were almost 2 million beneficiaries of the reforms. Smallholders also benefited from an increase in land sales, as landowners feared expropriation or sequestration of their estates. The biggest impact of the reforms was felt by the largest and the smallest landholders. Those with less than 5 feddan increased by 13 per cent and the land they owned by 74 per cent. The biggest estates of more than 200 feddan disappeared. The reforms helped to improve income distribution, rural diets and levels of productivity.

According to El-Ghonemy (1999, 1993), the land reforms between 1952 and 1975 helped reduce poverty and promoted growth. One estimate is that rural poverty fell from a level of 56.1 per cent in 1950 to 23.8 per cent in 1965 (El-Ghonemy 1999:11). This reduction was not solely due to agrarian reform. The rural poor benefited from extensive government food and agricultural input subsidies, improved health and education provision. Yet the reforms might also have been more effective. Ceilings on landholdings remained high, so they did not substantially undermine the interests of big landlords. When challenged regarding their contin-

9. One feddan equals roughly one acre, or 0.4 hectare.
ued large holdings, the landowners simply signed land ownership to family members or used local or national patron-client links to influence policy implementation and keep the state off their backs.

Sadat began reversing Nasser’s legacy in the 1970s by reducing the gains made by small-holders and tenants. He reinforced the economic and political strength of large landholders and removed elected farmers from representation in co-operatives and other rural institutions. In this he paved the way for the eventual passing of Law 96 of 1992.

Exit left, enter right: economic reform in agriculture

Agricultural reform was intended to redress the record of poor growth. Between 1981 and 1992 the average rate of real growth in the agricultural sector was about 2 per cent per annum. This was 2 per cent less than was thought to be necessary to sustain economic growth and far short of the GoE target of 5 per cent. Agricultural growth of 1.9 per cent in 1980–1985, down from 2.8 per cent in 1965–1980, was less than estimated population growth of 2.7 per cent per annum and government policies that had favoured food imports led to an estimated annual net deficit of $3 billion in agricultural trade by the mid-1980s (Khedr et al. 1996:53).

Egypt’s Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) identified excessive government intervention during Nasser’s presidency as the cause of a decline in agricultural productivity. These policies included price and marketing controls, state ownership of major agricultural industries and an overvalued exchange rate. By the early 1980s, the extent of the agricultural crisis led the GoE to work with USAID to formulate a reform programme.

While the statistical evidence is unreliable, it is estimated by USAID that agriculture in Egypt accounts for about 19 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), at least 36 per cent of employment and an estimated 22 per cent of commodity exports. According to USAID figures, half of Egypt’s population of approximately 65 million lives in rural areas and industrial activity linked to agriculture, like the processing and marketing of commodities, and provision of agricultural inputs like water, fertilizer, pesticides and seeds, accounts for another 20 per cent of GDP and “a substantial portion of the work force”.10

Egypt’s agricultural sector reform, which began in the mid-1980s, predated the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) agreed in 1991. The programme had two main elements to promote the withdrawal of the state from economic activity. The first was to liberalize markets and input provision. The second was to promote the production for export of high-value, low-nutrition foodstuffs and cut flowers for Europe.11

USAID has been a major driving force in Egypt’s strategy for liberalization and land tenure reform. It initiated two major programmes. The first was the Agricultural Production and Credit Project between 1986 and 1996 that cost $289 million. This was followed by the Agricultural Policy and Reform Programme. Between 1986 and 1996, the emphasis of economic reform was market-led growth, liberalization of inputs and prices, and a smaller role for the state agricultural credit bank, the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC). There have also been debates with the World Bank regarding cost recovery in water, health and education provision more generally.

USAID’s concern since 1996 has been to confirm changes in pricing policy, focus on export-led growth and encourage Egypt to emulate a US-farm-type model of extensive capital intensive agriculture. USAID is keen to reform price and marketing policies in cotton, rice, sugarcane, livestock and fertilizer. The benchmarks also include privatization of marketing and distribution, increased efficiency on public investment in agricultural research and the removal of consumer subsidies.

State intervention in general and the Nasserist reforms in particular, have been identified by both the GoE and the IFIs, the World Bank, IMF and USAID as causing Egypt’s need to turn to the international agencies for help with debt reduction and policy reform. As USAID notes, “Due to state intervention, agriculture sector

growth during the early to mid-1980s was very poor with value of production growing at less than 1 per cent per year".12

The agricultural reform programme has been trumpeted as a success by academics and aid bureaucrats alike. It has been reflected, reformers argue, in an increase in the real value of crop production for the 23 major crops in the period 1980–1990; and an increase in farm incomes and a doubling of wheat production between 1986 and 1992 because of improved yields and area planted. There has also been a decline in food subsidies and the deregulation of controls on cropping patterns (Faris and Khan 1993; Fletcher 1996).

Yet beneath evidence of reform success lie several persistent concerns.13 There are six major areas that the reforms ignore or downplay and where there is a significant disjuncture between policy and actual outcomes. This helps prepare the way for debating the implications of Law 96 and possibilities for local political actions against reform.

The evidential base used by reformers is questionable as is the accuracy of data where often “guesstimates” are used to indicate aggregate production and growth figures.

Most arguments used by the protagonists of reform relate to the early evidence of increases in output and changes in cropping patterns, particularly in the period between 1986 and 1992. Yet there is little evidence that early improvements in productivity have been sustained and that early increases were due to price reform per se (Mitchell 1998:23).14

Productivity increases that were heralded by the IFIs seem not to have been sustained. The World Bank, for example, suggests that the rate of growth in agriculture since 1990 (apart from 1996–1997) has been less than for 1980–1987 (World Bank 2000b).

Any increase in agricultural exports has been surpassed by an increase in major agricultural imports. Most Egyptian agricultural imports include commodities characterized by low elasticity of demand, like wheat and edible oils, while most exports are marked by elasticity. Agriculture now contributes more than 33 per cent of Egypt’s trade deficit.

Economic reform has had a disastrous impact on employment. Fergany (2002) has estimated that job losses in agriculture for 1990–1995 alone were at least 700,000. Reform was premised upon high levels of national economic growth to create urban jobs to absorb displaced rural labour and for these jobs to be created by the private sector: there is little evidence of either.

Poverty levels have dramatically increased. The latest government Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) indicates that the level of poverty more than doubled in Egypt between 1990–1991 and 1995–1996 from 21 per cent to 44 per cent. The poverty line is defined by the cost of a minimum basket of nutrition. But if a more widespread criterion is used, such as a minimum income of $1 (or equivalent in LE) per person per day, and we assume that LE500 is necessary for a family of five per month, the extent of poverty is far worse. By this measure more than 80 per cent of Egyptians are poor.

There is very little debate about Egypt’s agricultural future apart from the notion that it lies with the export of high-value horticultural products. The MALR and United States Embassy have indicated the need to press forward with agricultural reforms because the recent record has been less good than at the start of the reforms. This has been the institutional response rather than thinking further about the strategy itself, whether it is appropriate and how it might redress issues of poverty creation and persistent marginalization of poor, landless and near landless, and particularly women and women-headed households. The institutional response seems to be that policy will be effective if it is better implemented and if farmers are more conducive to market reform.

The failure of USAID to promote a policy of greater transparency and of greater sympathy with the majority of Egypt’s farmers has played into the hands of Egypt’s landed elite. That elite has taken advantage of the veil that market reform offers to repoliticize land as a significant but not openly debated policy issue. It was very evident from the “debate” about Law 96 of 1992 that farmers were regarded as lazy and as charlatans who had benefited after Nasser’s reforms while landowners had lost status, wealth and political influence. Yet the way the legislative

13. The detailed critique of the strategy has been dealt with elsewhere (Bush 1999; Mitchell 1998, 1999).
14. Mitchell is led to the conclusion that “the impact of the free-market reforms may have been greater on the statistics published by the state than on what farmers actually grow” (Mitchell 1998:23).
proceedings for Law 96 were affirmed and the way in which the media were unwilling to debate the impact of tenure reform on tenants demonstrated precisely the power and influence that landowners had to marginalize the interests of the rural poor. There was certainly an absence of any discussion for improved rural civil society or political and institution building for local governance. The fellahin have once more been characterized falsely as passive and malleable to central government policy making as policy makers suggest smallholder inefficiencies hold back strategies for agricultural modernization. Policy makers, it seems, misunderstand the complexity of the way in which rural production is organized and the benefits that might accrue to a society if farmers had the political institutions to represent and articulate their views.

Land tenure reform and political violence

We can now look in more detail at what the tenure reform of 1992 ushered in and what its rationale was. One issue is clear: the attempt to promote a more open and comprehensive land market failed. And it certainly did not lead to the emergence or the elements of a rural civil society in the form of organized NGO or other formal activity. Opposition to the land act was largely unco-ordinated, and was dealt with extremely harshly and brutally by security forces, who were in collusion with landowners. This prevented poor tenants from voicing their views. Spontaneous opposition to the act emerged piecemeal and did not spread across Egypt. It did not facilitate the development of NGOs and other associational groupings, nor did it protect and further peasant interests. Instead, there seems to have been a greater reliance upon family and kinship lines for coping with the rural disruption and increased poverty that followed tenure reform.

Law 96 of 1992 revoked Nasser’s Agrarian Reform Law No. 178 of 1952 that had given tenants security of tenure and legalized the right to inherit tenancy agreements. The law was fully implemented in October 1997 after a five-year transition period. Contracts during the transition were intended to remain valid so rights to land could still be inherited but the rent after 1992 was increased from seven to at least 22 times the land tax. The land tax is revised every 10 years and is based on the fertility and location of the land. After 1 October 1997 all landowners could take back their land and charge tenants market-based rent, which in some cases increased to between LE 1,200 and LE 1,800 per feddan, an increase of 300–400 per cent depending on location and productivity. Tenancies became annual contracts renewed at the landowners’ discretion, yet it is rare for an actual contract to exist. Landowners can dispose of their land without notifying tenants, who might have been farming the same plot for 40 years. Despite contract renewal, they remain vulnerable and insecure because of threats of eviction from landlords. Rents in many locations by 1997 had increased to LE 2,500 per feddan.

15. See Saad (2002, 1999) for detailed discussion of the way in which the tenancy bill became law and the way in which farmers in general and tenant farmers in particular were depicted by the state-controlled media.
Table 2: Recorded deaths, injuries and arrests in rural Egypt, January 1998–December 2000, relating to Law 96 and associated land conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assuit</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharkia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minya</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakhalia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sohag</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damietta</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayyum</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minoufi a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalubia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gharbia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qena</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beheira</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aswan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni Suef</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Said</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaf El Sheik</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismailia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
<td><strong>846</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,409</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Land Centre for Human Rights, Cairo (2002).

Table 2 indicates the extent and geographical spread of violence linked to the implementation of Law 96. The figures for fatalities, injuries and arrests are indicative rather than complete. In spite of the fact that the Land Centre for Human Rights in Cairo has unprecedented access to Egypt’s countryside and excellent informants, it remains difficult to assert the comprehensiveness of the data they supply. The figures reflect the growth in the politicization of land-related violence. This can be violence linked to dispossession of tenants by the forces of law and disorder—the security forces, landowners and thugs—but it also relates to the increase in conflict between farmers over disputed boundaries, irrigation and other issues. All these disputes seem to have increased following October 1997, when access to land was contested in a way that had not happened since 1952. Law 96 effectively gave a green light to landowners, including relatives of the Minister of Agriculture, to contest rights in land that went far beyond the terms and conditions of tenanted land. Many disputes that emerged after October 1997 relate to landowners wanting to regain access to land that had been confiscated in the 1950s and that was not part of the terms of reference of Law 96.

Law 96 established for USAID “a more normal and balanced relationship between tenants and owners” (USAID 1999:2). Yet their understanding of the outcome of the law has been very narrow, focusing only on the view that the legislation helped to further a land market and thus the overall strategy of economic liberalization. They glossed over any notion of conflict and upheaval for the poor that accompanied the law and failed to ask questions about governance and rural institutions that went beyond recognizing that there was the need for legislative change to remove obstacles for rural organizations. USAID studies of land tenure since 1997 emphasized good relations between landlords and tenants where police were rarely used to settle disputes. The peaceful implementation of Law 96 was seen as a result of the creation of reconciliation committees by local officials. In contrast, the Land Center for Human Rights in Cairo noted that relations between owners and tenants in the Egyptian countryside after 1997 were often far from cordial. And where reconciliation committees were established, they were identified by tenants as working in the interests of landowners and often held proceedings in the intimidating presence of police and security officials.

One of the aims of Law 96 was to create more conducive conditions for market liberalization; part of this strategy was for owners to have the ability to sell their land if they wanted to. Before 1997 an owner could not sell until a settlement had been reached with the tenant. If tenants did not want to move from their tenancy, they could argue for continued access to part of the land they worked. After 1997 the landlord could do what he liked with the land that had previously been leased. This increased landlord power is seen by USAID and other IFIs as facilitating a land market. Yet this assertion implies that a market did not previously exist and that by

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16. Data for January to May 1997 indicates five deaths, 86 injuries and 167 arrests. Private communication with the Land Center for Human Rights, Cairo.

17. Descendents of Amin Wali, a large landowner in Fayoum, tried to regain land that had been confiscated from the family during Nasser’s land reforms.
empowering the wealthy the market will somehow work more efficiently.

USAID explains the slow development of the land market as a result of “difficulties from trying to prove land ownership” (USAID 1999:9). It concludes that a reform of land titling is now urgent so as to benefit from the change in landlord-tenant relations. Land registration procedures in Egypt are complicated. In many cases the land remains registered in the names of the people who owned it at the time of the first cadastral at the start of the twentieth century. Registration only took place if a conflict had previously arisen between landlords and tenants. Landlords are unable therefore to prove ownership of land by accessing deeds, but they can do so by producing contracts between themselves and tenants—although there are many cases where these have been forgeries. USAID has thus called for “the valid and up-to-date registration of land ownership...for future land market stability and continued investment in land improvements” (USAID 1999:9). The transaction costs for farmers to register land when it is sold are seen simply to be too high for an effective market to develop alongside the liberalization of other aspects of the agricultural sector. Islamic inheritance laws add to the problem for USAID because children are supposed to inherit a portion of land (although females receive a smaller share than their male siblings); this fragments viable holdings.

Underpinning USAID’s concern with titling and land registration is the view that rural stability and increased productivity will only be forthcoming if landowners have security of tenure and legal rights of land alienation. There has been very little said about the associations that would be instrumental in facilitating the greater security posited as necessary for the land market. And there is little said about the need for a rural civil society that might promote greater representation to ensure checks against large and powerful landed interests. Economic adjustment has progressed for USAID from the macroeconomic concerns of the post-1991 period to the post-1996 demands of putting in place a regulatory framework that secures the interests of private capital and private land ownership in an accessible legal structure. Clearly, one of the problems in focusing on titling is the reification of a land market, which excludes issues of security of access to land and landlessness, rural work and markets, the development of rural infrastructure, affordable production inputs and rural growth, and political representation. These issues need to be raised concurrently, rather than be offered as a vague by-product of economic reform. The emphasis on title and tenure reform oversimplifies local traditions of work and the prior existence of markets in land. Taken together, these shortcomings accelerate processes of rural social differentiation and class formation in which, since Law 96, the landless and near landless, and especially female-headed households and dispossessed are marginalized.

**Formal and informal rural resistance and livelihoods**

The GoE does not seem to have indicated the role it envisages for rural civil society. Its position on urban-based NGOs is draconian. The regime does not encourage civil society activity and that which exists is heavily policed. The more effective agencies have usually been those registered under civil law as private non-profit companies which also act effectively as NGOs. The Ibn Khaldun Centre was one of these until its director, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, and associates were incarcerated by the GoE in 2001 for, among other things, being found guilty by a military court of receiving foreign funds without declaring them and bringing Egypt into disrepute. Although he was temporarily released on appeal, he was imprisoned again in 2002 for seven years on the same charges. The GoE does not encourage any political or associational group activity because it fears that the groups will generate opposition to the regime even if the activity is around issues which might be seen as marginal to local political reform.” The donors have refused to promote the civil society card because they favour Egyptian political stability and regional influence, although the latter has diminished significantly.

The only formal policy instrument that is in place by the GoE is Sharouk, which was an initiative for integrated rural development driven
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and early donor interest regarding rural representation. Sharouk was intended to reduce the development divide between town and country. It was intended to improve the rural resource and service base, and local government institutions. Launched in 1994, its aims and objectives were to incorporate service provision for all Egyptian villages by 2002. It was to function until 2017 and promote infrastructural development, human resource development, and economic and institutional development. The programme's aims were to encourage "popular participation" and to provide "democratic channels for the participation of the rural population in the decision making process" (Institute of National Planning 1996:85). However, the programme's greatest achievements have been limited improvements in rural services like roads and drainage. There is no evidence that it is delivering even limited governance and institutional opportunities for farmers to voice their concerns to the GoE. While on paper Sharouk suggests greater opportunities for rural political participation, there is no evidence of mobilization and popular participation. Moreover the programme relies heavily on GoE financial support, which is not forthcoming as rural development is not a policy commitment.20

In addition to using Sharouk to improve local governance, USAID identified another formal activity for enhancing local decision-making structures, namely, water-user associations (WUAs). These associations, which began in the mid-1990s, were formed to improve water delivery into mesqas (small irrigation canals), and to operate and maintain improved mesqas and improve on-farm water-user efficiency. USAID estimated that by 1999 there were 2,900 registered WUAs (USAID 1999:5).

USAID is very optimistic about the role of WUAs. It has argued that the WUAs have achieved greater "equity in the distribution of irrigation water while reducing the cost of irrigation", and these improvements have extended to increasing crop productivity. USAID notes that "the establishment of water-user associations offers a success story for an institutional arrangement that can contend with the problem of using common property: irrigation water" (USAID 1999:5). Yet the optimistic write-up about WUAs glosses over many issues. It slurs over the mechanisms that ensure local dignitaries maintain a presence in determining WUA policies and strategies for irrigation, and a gender bias against women whose irrigation needs are often subordinated to male interests. The way in which gender issues are obscured by institutional structures has been highlighted in several recent reports (Ibrahim 1998).

Somaya Ibrahim noted in appraising several irrigation and WUA schemes that gender issues have been ignored and that WUAs tend to marginalize women in rural decision-making structures. This is not to downplay women's struggles to maintain a voice within WUAs and in household structures across a whole range of activities including, but also going beyond, irrigation matters. However, as Ibrahim notes, "All members of the water associations are men. This male domination reflects the assumption that irrigation tasks in general and water management specifically is a male affair" (Ibrahim 1998:4).21

Ibrahim found that stereotypes regarding so-called women's work and status informed the ways in which WUAs operated. For example, despite the fact that there were many de facto and de jure women-headed households, it was assumed women did not take part in irrigating land. There was thus little communication between women and men over issues of irrigation. Women were not, in Ibrahim's Minia case study, consulted by WUAs regarding the selection of WUA board members, did not know the terms of reference of office holders, and did not have a voice in policy relating to the distribution of water. All board members were men, and this division over the administration of irrigation was mirrored in the distinction made by men and women in terms of the problems that they identified for agriculture. Men raised problems related to machinery and prices of irrigation, while women noted issues of water shortage because of competition with male users and night irrigation slots. As Ibrahim notes, "Needless to say it is the male farmers who can better defend their interests and get their turns at appropriate times during the day" (1998:4). It seems that while WUAs have been an initiative...
that has accompanied rural market liberalization, they have acted to promote the interests of many existing village office holders, dignitaries and landowners. Opportunities for voicing concerns of a broader range of rural social and class forces, women, landless and near landless have not improved.

Community development associations

There is at least one other recent development where an existing formal structure has been used to promote improved rural governance. This has been with the work of the development agency, CARE Egypt, with community development associations. CDAs are one of the two types of NGO allowed to register with MISA (along with welfare organizations). There has been much debate about these organizations, their effectiveness, independence and outreach, which will not be repeated here (Mahfouz 2001; Saad n.d.). The criticism of CDAs is that they lack autonomy and serve only the interests of the state. CDAs often deliver welfare benefits that the state should be delivering and subsidize government expenditure, but generate little improved governance because of tight MISA control. A recent example, however, of an attempt to empower CDAs with an opportunity to deliver resources and improve governance is highlighted in the work of one of CARE Egypt’s development initiatives.

In 2000, CARE Egypt, together with the Swiss Development Fund, initiated a project called Capability Enhancement through Citizen Action, or CAP (CARE 2000). This project is intended to “improve the quality of life including participation in civic affairs of 32,500 vulnerable households in rural communities of seven governorates of middle and Upper Egypt by 2003” (CARE 2000:2). While the strategy of a donor to improve local livelihoods is not new, CARE’s project concern with enhancing community participation does seem important. CARE’s work is unrelated directly to changes in land tenure and market liberalization, although clearly the burden of helping to improve rural livelihoods during economic reform has become a greater challenge, and they report an increase in the needs of respondents who recently lost land. CARE’s aim is to ensure 130 community-based NGOs in seven governorates “will be better able to represent and involve their constituencies in community affairs and decision making processes” (CARE 2000:3).

The innovation in CARE’s work seems to be the recognition that there might be some space for CDAs, often where they have lain dormant, to be energized and to become vehicles for greater rural decision making. A problem historically is that while CDAs may have been “on the books” since the 1960s, they often have been empty shells. Alternatively their local administration may have been dominated by landowners, rural elites and village sheikhs who act as local policemen and inform the government of any potential local unrest. CARE has thus sought to combine the improved efficiency of CDAs, reorganization of administration and decision making by involving the CDA in promoting a household livelihood/security framework for allocating donor resources.

One of the first questions that CARE asks the CDAs it works with is: “If you want to help the poor, are you willing to pay for change?” CARE has promoted a more rights-based approach to work—seeking, in their words, to move away from simple philanthropy. CARE admits that the big problem with this approach is that, for the livelihoods strategy to be effective, it is necessary for issues of local social differentiation and conflict to be recognized by CDAs.22 Ultimately, moreover, the CDAs must admit members of the disadvantaged groups in society to become office holders in the CDA. This involves the rich and powerful relinquishing authority and control of the CDAs, including umdas who were appointed by the government to keep control and act as local intelligence for possible sources of village conflict.

One of the target groups for CARE has been the landless and those who lost land following implementation of Law 96. In el Minia, CARE reactivated a traditional syndicate registered in the 1950s. It drew on an alliance of seven local CDAs and involved government and non-government personnel in the idea of recasting the roles of CDAs to actively include people in the local community that the CDAs claimed to support. In Sohag, the idea of using CDAs was

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taken further. An association for *tarahil* (labour migrants) was established. These *tarahil* worked for subcontractors and would often go long periods without payment, especially during the liquidity crises of 1999–2001. They were encouraged to convene collectively to defend their legal employment rights. In this, the group seemed to have benefited from visiting the Better Life Association (BLACD) in el Minia, which has had success in defending worker and welfare rights for quarry workers.

CARE’s work, still in its early stages, has highlighted the possibility of concentrating on an existing structure within civil society, seeking to revitalize it. Working with local and central government personnel and institutions, CARE has operated fully within the restrictive practices of the Egyptian state, and persuaded bureaucrats and villages of the benefits of CDAs having more open and accessible rural decision-making structures. Reinvigorating CDAs is intended to initiate a round of debate about local democracy and greater participation for landless and smallholders. The intention is to help the reactivation of CDAs by facilitating greater opportunities for younger elements and the poor. CARE seems to be more optimistic about the outcome of this work in the newer CDAs, where landless and day labourers can more effectively express their concerns. It seems too that unemployed university graduates or technical graduates who return to the countryside might help develop a movement that demands local change, greater representation and more opportunities for younger people. It is too soon to see how sustainable this strategy will be and whether it will weaken existing undemocratic forces within CDAs. It is also unclear whether other donors are prepared to invest in CDAs as possible vehicles for promoting local governance. And while individual CARE workers and others linked to the attempt to empower CDAs may be optimistic about their liberalizing potential, it is also necessary to note that CARE works fully with central and local government agencies. That ensures that CARE can deliver on its promises and legitimizes the donors’ strategy. However, it might also be a way for the Egyptian state to promote hegemony. Yet, as in most of these processes of negotiation between donors, states and social forces, there is a dialectic of struggle at work. This means that there is always a possibility that, while the forces of the state are dominant, they are not immune from social and class pressure to change or develop conditions for rural civil society. At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, there is little indication that the struggles between these competing forces are being resolved in the favour of smallholders or the rural poor.

**Informal rural civil society**

Egypt does not have a rural civil society in the sense of one that is autonomous and active, free and able to organize and publicize as well as politicize agendas for action to redress grievances, government neglect and facilitate associative life. Since the land act was fully implemented and the consequences of economic reform for increasing rural poverty intensified in 1997, there has been more active use of informal mechanisms, usually through family support, to provide a safety net against market failure. There was a tendency at the time to see the absence of mass rural revolt against landlords as another example of farmer quietude. Yet there were bloody confrontations, usually in the governorates like Daqahliya where there were large landholdings and landowners were impatient to test the legality of Law 96. In el Zeni, Daqahliya, a landlord sold 82 feddans that had been rented to 126 tenants, and he needed the help of security forces to ensure new landowners could take possession of the land. Protesting villagers were tear-gassed, 90 arrested and seven imprisoned more than 120 kilometres from their village for 45 days.

It seemed inevitable that a government that had used the threat from Islamists as a reason to maintain the state of emergency and deploy the military would blame outside forces for the dissent that emerged. Yet the favoured view of authoritarian regimes (and liberal democratic ones too) of blaming dissent with unpopular legislation on terrorist activity rather than recognizing it as a legitimate criticism of government policy does not withstand scrutiny. The extent of continued rural unrest caused by disputes over land is indicated in table 2 above. It

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is now important to try and indicate a way of understanding it.

One fruitful attempt to understand opposition to state and dominant class action in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East has been offered by Asef Bayat. He has used a notion of “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”.

This refers to non-collective direct actions of individuals and families to acquire basic necessities (land, shelter, urban collective consumption, informal jobs, business opportunities) in a quiet, unassuming fashion (Bayat 2000:iv).

Bayat formulated the idea of quiet encroachment (1997, 1998, 2002) while discussing essentially urban unrest. It is for him qualitatively different from defensive measures or coping mechanism. Yet it represents a silent, protracted, pervasive advancement of ordinary people—through open-ended and fleeting struggles without clear leaderships, ideology or structured organisation—on the propertyed and powerful in order to survive (Bayat 1997:5).

One of the reasons Bayat gives for this type of struggle is the outcome of the Nasserist social contract with the working class and peasantry. Effectively, as indicated earlier, the relationship Nasser established in the 1950s and which has had the most serious consequences for Egypt’s political history since was the social contract: the state provided basic services while the subordinate classes agreed to political passivity. However, the peasantry did not agree to passivity. There are many cases of political opposition and violent antagonism being expressed by the fellahin to landlords and the state. Yet, according to Bayat, the legacy is that political struggles have often taken the form of individualistic solutions to problems instead of class or group solidarities being the major vehicle for opposition.

Bayat has also noted that, in the 1990s, while trade unions often opposed the austerity packages of the IFIs, these bodies represent only a small proportion of the workforce, not only in Egypt but the Middle East region as a whole. The majority of workers toil in small-scale informal locations in the urban economy, and it is therefore in these areas, among neighbourhoods and within communities, that Bayat has argued collective action might find support and opportunities for success. This may well be a useful model to examine in relation to recent rural struggles over land access, access more generally to resources as well as outputs and market power. Yet more research is needed to demonstrate that farmers are doing anything more than adopting coping strategies in the face of worsening hardship rather than actually taking the initiative themselves to recover lost ground.

Since October 1997, tenants have experienced a dramatic increase in the level of poverty resulting from changed lifestyles as a result of being expelled from their land. There has been an increase in rural debt, dispossession and enforced proletarianization—the search for wage employment often in harsh labour regimes that are reminiscent of indentured and contract labour. This has had a particular impact on child labour. Children have been removed from school as recently dispossessed families try and compensate for loss of agricultural income by reducing schooling costs.

Significantly there has been an increase in rural insecurity. Evidence suggests at best a very uneven level of information reached tenant farmers regarding implementation of Law 96. Many respondents in Giza and Daqahliya either simply did not know about Law 96 (despite its five-year transition period from 1992 to 1997), or had not been informed regarding the content of the new legislation and how it would impact on tenants. There had been scant regard paid by government to farmers’ access to information and formal networks like co-operatives; local and village councils were unclear both about the law and its consequences, especially about the legal rights of tenants to appeal the non-renewal of contracts. Tenants had not been informed about the legislation in a systematic way. There had been no provision of information by either central government or governorate authorities regarding Law 96, and many tenants learned of its dramatic implication on 1 October 1997—when landlords refused to renew rental contracts.

One group of tenants was especially affected by a decline in their livelihoods: women who headed households and worked tenancies registered in their late husband’s name. These women were expelled from the land in October 1997. They either could not pay the new, high-

24. The bloody episode at Khamsheesh is one illustration. On 30 April 1966, the peasant leader Salah Hussein was murdered in Kamsheesh by assassins hired by the powerful landowning Figgi family. The family refused to hand over land earmarked by the state for sequestration to the supposed class agreed to political passivity (Bayat 2000:iv)
er rents, or were victims of prejudiced landlords who did not want to renew women. Women in this category whom I interviewed periodically over a 20-month period, 1999–2001, seem to confirm a pattern of greater reliance upon family and neighbours for accessing resources and defending livelihoods. While people admitted to tensions within the village community in Giza and Daqahliya as a result of Law 96, it was also the case that the lines of cleavage between landlords and tenants within the community may have reinforced family and kinship bonds, while also stretching these bonds to the limit in their uneven delivery of material assistance.

While women respondents had not engaged in direct opposition to the land act nor tried to establish a formal organization to oppose the act’s implementation, they had promoted a range of actions that sought to defend their original position. Many had tried to use networks of family and kin to put pressure on landlords not to dispossess them, although this was not successful. The women had experienced a dramatic loss of income after 1997. One respondent who previously had a net income of LE6,965 was reduced to accepting infrequent loans of LE25–50 from relatives, handouts from an Islamic charity, and had to take her children out of school and send them to work in neighbouring fields. Another respondent who in 1999 had managed to keep her son in school, had to remove him in autumn 2000 to work as a carpenter. He complained of the hard life that he was forced into at 14 and blamed her for it. And while she hoped that one day he would have a workshop of his own to sustain the family, she herself had become a seasonal agricultural labourer picking vegetables when there was enough demand. Other respondents became dependent upon charity, help from family and child labour.

Respondents had also sold jewellery to raise cash for daily living expenses or pay for a daughter’s wedding, and two of the respondents had managed to eke out a living on savings from livestock sales in October 1997 when they lost the land, yet by 2001 these savings were exhausted.

For women respondents in Giza and Daqahliya, depending on family for loans, using the opportunity to visit on weekends for a respite, thereby lessening weekly expenditure, was central to coping with economic difficulty. It nevertheless remained extremely difficult for respondents to transform increased reliance upon family and friends into a strategy to oppose the reasons for their new poverty. It was also not always possible to see that elements of a strategy for “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”, conflicts over land and access to rural resources, was transforming coping mechanisms into a proactive strategy against those responsible for accelerated rural poverty.

### Conclusion

Egypt does not have a healthy civil society. Attempts to enliven it beyond the watchful eyes of the state and its cronies have not been successful. This is not surprising, given the history that was traced early in this paper. It is also the case that, because associational life itself can so easily be hijacked by both governments and donors, perhaps the absence of civil society in this form should not be too loudly lamented. But civil society is more than just associational life. It involves the struggles within the state and beyond it that embody the many ways in which the dominant classes try to ensure the reproduction of their dominance. In this the GoE has been very successful. For while there might occasionally be signs of dissatisfaction with economic reform, market liberalization and broader regional issues, demonstrations, wildcat strikes and even the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”, nowhere have these been able to come close to a counter-hegemonic political movement.

It remains remarkable that criticism of Egypt’s agricultural strategy, including Law 96, has been limp, ineffectual and unfocused. Some university academics, and even departments, have reported on the devastating impact of increased poverty linked with economic reform, but internal security discouraged any attempt to hold meetings with affected farmers or mobilize even peaceful dissent. The agricultural co-operatives have been devastated, rural trade unions are non-existent, and agricultural research centres keen to accrue donor resources have complied
readily with the message of market prudence and economic liberalization.

One of the problems in mobilizing an academic and intellectual opposition to land tenure reforms has been the difficulty in making a case for the necessity of reform without capitulating to the IFI and GoE agenda. The “debate” about market liberalization has crudely and naively parroted the mantra that the Nasserist “socialist” period was the cause of Egypt’s economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and the only alternative was state retrenchment and economic liberalization. This dominant discourse is a disservice to the credibility of the tremendous vitality of Egyptian intellectual life and has led to a neglect of debates around the crises of rural livelihoods. For where academics and party political leaders have sought to use the parliament or newspapers to criticize the GoE, it has invariably been a critique of the impact of reform on Egypt’s macro-economy, or on its urban landscape and social forces. Egypt’s fellahin remain the forgotten souls. They do speak out but to each other and usually only in muted terms and with little impact on an aloof urban elite. There is little evidence that Egypt’s reforms are promoting new configurations in rural civil society, and the possibilities for future effective rural mobilization are bleak.

**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLACD</td>
<td>Better Life Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Capability Enhancement through Citizen Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE Egypt</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc., Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>community development association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERSAP</td>
<td>Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoE</td>
<td>Government of Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIES</td>
<td>Household Income and Expenditure Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Developement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>international financial institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE</td>
<td>Egyptian pound (1 LE = 0.1623 USD, at time of publication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALR</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISA</td>
<td>Ministry for Insurance and Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBDAC</td>
<td>Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>private voluntary organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>structural adjustment programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WUA</td>
<td>water-user association</td>
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Guide sur la transparence/ Guía de transparencia
Guia para a Transparência

Le FMI a affiché sur son site la traduction en français du Projet de guide sur la transparence des recettes des ressources naturelles. Ce Guide vise à aider les pays à mieux gérer les recettes des industries extractives (pétrole, gaz naturel et ressources minières). Il insiste aussi sur le fait que le renforcement des institutions et une plus grande transparence peuvent être extrêmement bénéfiques, tant pour l’État que pour les contribuables. L’amélioration de la transparence des finances publiques encourage un débat public mieux informé et contribue à la mise en œuvre de politiques budgétaires avisées.

Commentaires à envoyer à rrt@imf.org

El FMI acaba de publicar en español el Borrador de la Guía de transparencia del ingreso proveniente de los recursos naturales, cuyo objetivo es ayudar a los países a administrar mejor los ingresos provenientes de industrias extractivas como la explotación de petróleo y gas natural y la minería. Asimismo, subraya que el fortalecimiento de las instituciones y de la transparencia puede aportar significativos beneficios tanto a los gobiernos como a los contribuyentes. Con un nivel más elevado de transparencia fiscal se fomenta un debate más informado en la opinión pública y se facilita la aplicación de políticas fiscales más acertadas.

Los comentarios y sugerencias se deben enviar a rrt@imf.org

O FMI acaba de publicar o Projeto de Guia para a Transparência da Receita dos Recursos Naturais em português. O Guia visa ajudar os países a mel-

The European Trade Unions and the future of the European Economic and Social Model

Speaking on the day of the much-awaited publication of the Wim Kok expert group report on progress on the Lisbon Agenda, John Monks, Secretary General of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) painted a sombre picture of what he called “a pretty depressing set of circumstances.” The EU was struggling against slow growth, high unemployment and the cost implications of an ageing population without immediate prospect of any major macro-economic solution. The ETUC had no list of easy answers but the future depended on “a social model that works.”
A quel moment peut-on parler de crise humanitaire ? Où s'arrête la neutralité du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) ? Comment renforcer les relations entre cette ONG et la presse pour mieux alerter sur les conséquences d'un conflit armé ?

Quelle est la meilleure protection pour un journaliste dans une zone de crise ? Ce sont là les questions autour desquelles un débat intéressant, mais souvent houleux, a été ouvert durant cette fin de semaine à Beyrouth, la capitale libanaise, entre des responsables du CICR et une trentaine de journalistes venus de quinze pays arabes. Sous le thème générique « Nouveaux défis de l'action humanitaire », les participants ont mis en exergue « la menace » qui pèse sur les activités humanitaires et l'exercice du métier de journaliste dans les situations de conflit armé, mais aussi le coût humain qu'elles engendrent. « Les deux sont en train de payer un lourd tribut parce que l'une tente d'alléger les souffrances des victimes et l'autre de dévoiler leur douleur », a déclaré Balthazar Staehelin, délégué général du CICR pour le Moyen-Orient et l'Afrique du Nord, à l'ouverture des travaux.

Oui, nous savions

Trois points importants ont marqué la première journée, à savoir la torture dans la prison d'Abou Ghraib, le massacre de Falloudjah, en Irak, et le génocide du Darfour. Toutes les questions ont été axées sur le « silence » du CICR. « Oui nous savions, mais de par notre statut, nous ne pouvions rendre publique l'information afin surtout de préserver les victimes. Nous dialoguons avec ceux qui torturent et ceux qui tuent juste pour avoir accès à leurs victimes et essayer de changer ou d'améliorer leur sort. Si nous parlons, nous coupons tout espoir de les assister », a indiqué Yahia Alibi, du service communication du CICR à Genève. Selon lui, l'action humanitaire est aujourd'hui « frappée de suspicion » par les gouvernements et les parties en conflit « parce que les deux ne respectent pas les règles selon lesquelles les populations civiles doivent être épargnées. Ils appliquent le principe du ou vous êtes avec eux ou on vous considère comme leur ennemi et ils vous trouvent les plus grands défauts qui persistent avant de vous expulser... ». Journalistes et membres du CICR affirment que l'absence de sécurité détruit toute action humanitaire et activité médiatique. Le journaliste irakien Ahmed Abdelmadjid a très bien résumé la situation dans laquelle il exerce dans son pays : « Au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme, l'Irak a été attaqué par les USA. Aujourd'hui, l'absence de sécurité a eu pour conséquences la destruction de 3170 écoles et des dizaines d'universités, le pillage des hôpitaux, des centres de santé et des laboratoires, le sabotage de nombreuses infrastructures économiques, 1,5 million de veuves vulnérables et affectées et 500 000 enfants handicapés. L'absence de sécurité a nourri le banditisme. Néanmoins, dans ce constat chaotique, il y a des images d'espoir, celles des enfants qui poursuivent leurs études, des médecins qui continuent à soigner les malades. Mais cette image est censurée par les médias... » La Palestine, une autre zone de conflit, a été le sujet de discussions très houleuses.

La confidentialité est un moyen de réussite

Un confrère de la radio palestinienne, Radouane Abou Ayache, a expliqué comment l'exercice du métier de journaliste se transforme en « un risque mortel sous un régime aussi répressif que celui d'Israël ». Après son long témoignage sur le comportement violent et raciste des militaires israéliens à l'égard des Palestiniens, Abou Ayache s'est demandé si le CICR peut déposer une plainte contre l'Etat d'Israël pour racisme. Alloula Bira Kidani, journaliste sud-africaine, s'est attaquée avec virulence aux régimes arabes et à la presse de leur pays, les accusant d'avoir « occulté » le génocide du Darfour et « parfois même justifié » ces crimes contre l'humanité. « Même le CICR est venu en retard, bien après que nos journaux eurent relayé les faits et que Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch eurent dénoncé le génocide. » Les réponses du CICR ne se sont pas fait attendre. « Le CICR ne peut aller dans un pays sans l'accord de son gouvernement. Pour atteindre les victimes, nous devons passer par le bourreau pour l'obliger à épargner les personnes civiles non impliquées dans les conflits, mais aussi apporter aide et assistance à ces dernières. La confidentialité est très importante dans ces cas. Elle n'est pas un objectif, mais un moyen pour réussir notre mission », a déclaré Nada Doumani du CICR. Elle a ajouté qu'à propos de l'Irak, l'ONG a été « la première à avoir qualifié la présence américaine dans ce pays d'occupation telle que définie par les
conventions internationales ». D’autres journalistes de Jordanie, de Syrie et de Tunisie se sont interrogés sur les motifs qui poussent la presse à ne pas parler de la situation des prisonniers dans les pays arabes. « Nous écrivons les vérités qui sont ailleurs, mais nous n’apparaissions pas dans nos pays respectifs. », ont-ils souligné.

Feriaz Rouandazi, journaliste du journal de l’union kurde, s’est aussi interrogé sur l’absence d’intérêt de la presse arabe à la situation en Irak, particulièrement à cause des Kurdes d’Irak qui ont mené un combat contre le régime de Saddam Hussein. Intervenant pour faire la comparaison entre la presse du Moyen-Orient et celle du Maghreb, le journaliste tunisien Kamel Benyoune, du journal Essabah, a estimé que les journalistes de l’Afrique du Nord se montrent plus palestiniens que les Palestiniens eux-mêmes, mais se refusent de faire état de cette situation des prisonniers dans leurs pays respectifs. Pour étayer ses propos, il a cité le cas de l’Algérie où « la dernière guerre a fait 100 000 morts et que personne n’a mentionné du côté algérien. Pour la porte-parole de l’ONM, le dossier est en train d’être géré... », lui a répondu une consoeur algérienne. Une journaliste jordanienne, a, quant à elle, conclu en disant à l’intervenant qu’il est plus facile de parler de l’Algérie que de parler de la Tunisie. La deuxième journée, des travaux a été axée sur le droit des journalistes arabes et de respecter les lois internationales, mais aussi sur les moyens qui peuvent protéger les journalistes dans les conflits armés. Intervenant sur l’expérience d’Amnesty International (AI) dans le domaine des campagnes médiatiques, Ahmed Keroud a expliqué que l’ONG agit en faisant pression sur les gouvernements et les parties en conflit à travers les campagnes de presse. L’intervenant a longuement parlé du principe de neutralité qui régit son organisation. Un journaliste égyptien a exprimé son doute quant à cette neutralité. Il lui a exposé un rapport d’AI publié en mai 2004 sur la Palestine où figure une carte géographique d’Israël qui ne fait aucune mention de la Palestine occupée. Reprenant la parole, M. Balthazar a insisté sur le principe de confidentialité de son organisation et rappelé que lorsqu’il a rendu visite à Nelson Mandela, alors en prison, ce dernier lui a dit : « Ce qui est important pour nous, ce n’est pas le bien que vous nous faites, mais le mal que vous nous évitez. Cela explique assez bien le pourquoi du principe de la confidentialité. » Nous savons tout sur Abou Ghrâib, mais nous n’avons pas mis de gants pour le dire aux autorités militaires américaines. Nous voulons garder le contact avec les victimes. Si nous avions parlé, nous n’aurions pas pu soigner les malades parmi les prisonniers... » Sur le problème de la sécurité des journalistes, tous les intervenants ont exprimé leurs « inquiétudes » quant au danger qui guette les journalistes dans les zones de conflit, citant comme exemples la Palestine et l’Irak. A aucun moment, les conférenciers ne citeront le cas de l’Algérie où plus de 120 professionnels des médias ont été assassinés, dont 70 journalistes, en l’espace de quatre ans. « Nous avons l’impression que les confrères arabes découvrent les assassinats de journalistes en Irak et en Palestine. Il n’est pas tiré les leçons de ce qui s’est passé en Algérie. Il n’est pas question ici de faire le décompte de nos morts, mais de trouver les moyens d’assurer une meilleure sécurité pour les journalistes dans les zones de conflit, mais également dans les pays où il n’y pas de liberté... », a déclaré une journaliste algérienne. Pour la porte-parole du CICR, de par son métier, le journaliste est « une personne civile protégée par les lois et ne doit en aucun cas être ciblée ». Elle a précisé que son organisation s’occupe aussi des journalistes menacés et exerçant dans les régions à risque. « Il est aussi
important que les responsables des entreprises de presse soient conscients de ces dangers et qu’ils n’envoient pas sur le terrain des journalistes non expérimentés et sans assurance vie. Il est important de ne pas se rapprocher trop d’une zone militaire ou occupée par des parties armées... » Des conseils, a-t-elle dit, qui peuvent sauver, mais qui souvent ne sont pas pris au sérieux par les journalistes. Les participants de Jordanie, Iran, Bahreïn, Tunisie, Algérie, Soudan, Syrie, Irak, Ghaza, El Qods, Qatar, Koweït, Liban, Egypte, Arabie Saoudite se sont entendus pour mettre la lumière sur les zones de conflit, mais aussi sur leurs conséquences sur les populations civiles, notamment les femmes et les enfants.

El Watan, 13 décembre 2004
Salima Tlemçan

ADB pilot program gives boost to 60 NGO initiatives

Since 2003, Asian Development Bank’s NGO/Civil Society Committee has approved over $800,000 in small grants to 60 NGO-run projects in 15 developing countries. ADB’s Poverty Reduction Cooperation Fund provides financing for these projects though a pilot program designed to support small-scale NGO initiatives. With most of the available funds now allocated, ADB will, in 2005, evaluate the pilot and consider possibilities for creating a permanent NGO small grants fund. To date, grants have been provided to support handicrafts training for disabled women in the Kyrgyz Republic, a biogas demonstration project in the People’s Republic of China, legal aid clinics in Peshawar in Pakistan, poultry raising in Viet Nam, an NGO Information Center in the Cook Islands, and many other activities.

For more information, contact Bart Édes at ngocoordinator@adb.org.

http://www.adb.org/Documents/PRF/REG/RETA6109.ai

Citoyenneté active

La Commission européenne a lancé une consultation en ligne sur le futur programme d’action communautaire visant à promouvoir la citoyenneté active. Cette consultation constitue la première étape d’une procédure qui invite les citoyens et les organisations intéressées à faire part de leur avis sur les orientations du futur programme. La deuxième phase se présentera sous la forme d’un forum qui rassemblera les représentants des parties intéressées, au mois de février 2005, autour d’un débat plus approfondi. La période de consultation en ligne durera deux mois.

La Lettre, Fondation Robert Schuman, 193/2004

Iraq launches new NGO ministry

A new ministry of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) has been created in Iraq to build national and local aid agencies and civil society groups. Dawood Pasha, Director- General of Iraq’s new NGO ministry, was recently interviewed by IRIN in Baghdad about plans to regulate NGOs, the need for training of local staff and the image of NGOs in Iraq, where a deteriorating security situation has forced many international agencies out of the country.


(Source: IRIN News.org: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
Call for Submissions to Democracy & Society

Georgetown University’s Center for Democracy and the Third Sector (CDATS) invites article submissions for the next issue of Democracy & Society.

Theme: Global Civil Society: role and impact of global civil society as well as changes in its structure or composition. Potential questions to address include, but are not limited to: In what ways is global civil society able to promote greater international democracy? In what ways is it failing? Whom does global civil society represent, and how is representation legitimated? How is global civil society responding to the challenge of the rising power of “regressive globalization” who favor globalization only when it is in their particular interest? What has been the effect of a more formalized role for civil society in global institutions? How are the values of transnational civil society shaping our world? Can we look to global civil society to address concerns about inequity, health, and security? What are the implications of growing demands for the accountability of global civil society organizations?

Submissions are due Friday, March 3, 2005.

For additional information, please contact Nicole Love or David Madland at cdatsnews@georgetown.edu.

http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/cdata/newsletter.htm
Some items in recent issues:

Parmi les thèmes traités récemment :

- Transnational actors in the international system
  Les acteurs transnationaux dans le système international

- The recognition of the legal personality of INGOs
  La reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des OING

- Cooperation between INGOs and IGOs
  La coopération entre les OING et les OIG

- Sociology of international relations
  Sociologie des relations internationales

- Social movements, trade unions and cooperatives
  Mouvements sociaux, syndicats et coopératives

- Economic and trade issues
  Questions économiques et commerciales

- Environmental problems
  Les problèmes écologiques

- Humanitarian aid and humanitarian law
  L'aide et le droit humanitaires

- Language, culture, communication and gender
  Langage, culture, communication et genre

- Civil Society and the State
  La société civile et l'Etat

- Latin American and North-American Associations
  Les associations latino-américaines et nord-américaines

- African Associations
  Associations africaines

- European Associations
  Les associations européennes

- Arab Associations
  Associations arabes

- Asian Associations
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- Participation of NGOs in WTO
  La participation des ONG à l'OMC

- Civil society and democracy in Germany
  Société civile et démocratie en Allemagne

- International cooperation among local and regional authorities
  Coopération internationale entre les régions et les collectivités territoriales

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