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Social Capital
in a global
knowledge society

Capital social
et mondialisation
des savoirs

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Network effects in a global knowledge Society

by Peter Johnston and Robert Pestel*

The analyses presented here bring together ideas about the three dominant development issues at the beginning of the 3rd Millennium: The transition to a more stable population and level of resource-use after centuries of dramatic growth; the transition from an industrial economy in the developed world to a global knowledge society; and the ambition of a transition to sustainable development.

They are linked by the realisation that human society is a complex social network, and that population growth is strongly linked to the accumulation of shared "knowledge capital"; that the self-organising characteristics of complex social networks naturally tend to optimise access to shared knowledge, and that the realisation of sustainable development also depends on a rapid sharing of new knowledge, technologies and innovations.

Complex and self-organizing networks

Complexity arises from diversity and interaction. Human society has always been complex. Any group of people, with diverse interests and skills, interacting together, will defy any simple deterministic predictions of behaviour – at both the individual and group-level. Nevertheless, the limited interactions between groups has allowed relatively simple models of tribal, feudal and "totalitarian" governance to work in most societies until the late 20th century.

Two related developments have significantly increased complexity and models. They generated a crisis of complexity, and have made it necessary to re-invent organisation and governance structures:

A continuing expansion of diverse specialisations has become both necessary and advantageous as human knowledge has grown. It is impossible for anyone now to be expert in everything: we must all specialise. We therefore come to depend on an ever-wider range of other specialists – whether in plumbing; cooking; child care; medical care; financial services; entertainment; or teaching. In these conditions, any attempt at totalitarian central management, even in established countries (the USSR) or companies, is likely to break down.

A continuing widening in contacts and communications outside local communities, and around the world, has increased the number and diversity of interactions. The revolutions in transport of the 20th century: notably the individual freedoms offered by the private car and cheap air-travel have broadened the experience and contacts of most people in the developed world. This broadening has been complemented and further accelerated by cheap electronic communications: both affordable television and now the Internet and mobile telephony.

These increases in complexity now require new approaches to analysis and governance both within countries and regions, but also worldwide. We must now look at society and economic activity as a multi-layered complex system. In recent years, there has been a wide recognition that complex social networks self-organize. Each individual reacts to a variety of opportunities for mutually beneficial social contact, and the multitude of individual choices leads to a scale-invariant power-law distribution of linkage, and a "small-world" characteristic². This class of complex social networks is best known in the networks of scientific collaboration^{3,4}. Their "emergent properties" arise from the progressive accretion of new participants, each of which links preferentially to existing participants with the most existing links. It is characteristic of social networks⁵; business networks; other research networks; the network of Internet routers and of web-pages⁶; and appears to be a common social characteristic of a complex networked society.

Complex systems are not necessarily chaotic systems. A beehive is a complex system, but can still exhibit well-defined and predictable behaviour. A protein is a complex system of atoms, but still has a well-defined biological function and behaviour. These well-defined overall properties of complex systems "emerge" from the properties and interactions of their constituent parts, but cannot be derived from them in a simple way. The properties of ice are "emergent properties" of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, but cannot in practice be calculated from the properties of the separate atoms. The emergent properties must be recognised and measured at the right scale of aggregation. Similarly, the "emergent properties" of human society will change as its complexity changes; as the intensity and diversity of interaction changes. We cannot cal-

* European Commission. Robert Pestel died in April 2003, and the analyses presented here draw heavily on his contributions.

2. Watts and Strogatz : Collective dynamics of « small world » networks, *Nature* 393, 440-442 (1998).

3. The structure of scientific collaboration networks: M.E.J. Newman, Santa Fe Institute, *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA* 98, 404-409 (2001)

4. European research co-operation as a self-organising complex network : P.D. Johnston, Robert Pestel, Dunja Mladenic and Marko Grobelnik. 2003.

5. Exploring complex networks. S.H. Strogatz, *Nature* 410, 268-276 (2001)

6. Diameter of the worldwide web : R. Albert, H. Jeong and A-L. Barabasi, *Nature* 401, 130-131 (1999)

culate the effects of these changes by extrapolation from the behaviour of individuals, or of particular social groups or economic sectors. We must take a new holistic view.

The last two decades of the 20th century saw enormous progress in our understanding of complex systems: the recognition that order can emerge from apparently chaotic systems; that the multitude of interactions in complex systems can be seen as “networks” of linkage. A new science of networks has been brought to bear on them. As in all new developments, we stand on the shoulders of giants: in this field on the intellectual shoulders of the Hungarian mathematician Erdős, and on those of the Belgian Nobel prize-winner in chemistry: Ilya Prigogine.

On these foundations, there is now a wide recognition that human society is a complex network, and that it is the same type of complex network that we find in other natural systems. Our social networks and professional networks are the same type of complex network as we see in the neural network of the human brain; in the network of relationships between species in a natural ecology; and in the complex network of links between genes and proteins in our bodies.

These complex networks self-organise into a distinct and recognisable architecture:

- with a scale-free self-similarity: they look similar at different levels of aggregation;
- with a very unequal distribution of links to each node: many with few links, and a few with many links – with a “power-law” distribution: for example, with half or a quarter of the number of nodes with twice as many links;
- with a mix of short- and long-links to near or distant nodes; creating a “small world” connectivity in which the number of links connecting any two nodes is small.

In many ways, these characteristic properties of natural complex networks are surprising and anti-intuitive. We tend to see the world as “variations on a theme”. People look similar. Their height or weight falls within a sharply peaked distribution about an average: nobody is twice as tall as the average. It is therefore anti-intuitive to observe that the number of social links does not cluster around an average: most people have relatively few social links, and a very few people have an enormous number.

The characteristic power-law distribution of complex networks occurs in a variety of social and economic measures, and the observation of them is not new. Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist, observed in 1906 that 20% of Italians owned 80 % of their countries accumulated wealth: this is a just a particular example of a more general power-law distribution of wealth associated with the distribution of wealth-creating opportunities in a complex economy.

The implications for demographic change

In addition to their similar “architectures”, small-world networks should also show similar growth characteristics. They should show **self-limiting hyperbolic growth**: a typical “S”-curve of accelerating, then stagnating growth, but with a rigorous form determined by only three parameters.


Sergey Kapitza has observed⁷ that the human population has grown in proportional to the square of the number of people for 1.6 million years, as if humanity has always been a well connected society, sharing and building its knowledge capital. The “small world” property of complex social networks supports the hypothesis that most people have had access to the accumulated “knowledge capital” of humanity within the time-scales of significant population change. However, we are now beginning to see a slowing of growth consistent with a “transition point” near the year 2000 and a “time constant” of 45 years, comparable to a historic average human lifetime. This indicates eventual stabilisation of the world population at about 12 billion.

Population growth in the last 30 years already shows a major deviation from that of unlimited hyperbolic growth. In 2000, the world population is already 2 billion less than would be expected if self-limiting processes were not acting. Annual percentage growth is already slowing from its peak in the 1960s and 70s, and annual numerical growth is at the turning point. The UNPD medium estimate for the world population in 2050 is now 8.9 billion⁸, only slightly less than the 9.1 billion projected on the self-limiting model.

The match of population growth to this simple model suggests that it is a collective effect – an

7. *Information Society and the demographic revolution: the non-linear theory of growth of Humankind*, Sergey P. Kapitza, Institute for Physical Problems, RAS, Moscow, 2000
8. *World population Prospects : the 2002 Revision*, United Nations Population Division – www.un.org/esa/population/unpop

Actual population growth compared with the hypothesis of self-hyperbolic growth from 0-2600 AD



effect of co-operative behaviour, related to the interaction of all people in the world – the number and strength of connections between all people, and the transfer of information between them. This networking in human society is a unique characteristic, and credibly began with the development of speech, perhaps a million years ago, and has been reinforced progressively by writing, printing, the telephone, television, and now by the Internet and multi-media communications.

If the growth of the human population reflects the growth in the accumulated and shared “knowledge” of humanity, population is simply a “proxy” for our knowledge capital. Population self-limits when the knowledge capital of humanity approaches that which can be assimilated and passed on to each succeeding generation. As postulated by Sergey Kapitza: “we hit a systemic crisis of (the amount of knowledge) and the limited time for bringing up, educating and training the next generation”.

Parallels between social and technology-based networking

The Internet has grown as a self-organising network, which mirrors society and business. It has

not only strengthened and widened linkages in society and business, but now allows these networks to be measured and analysed. Until the late 1990s, the study of social networks was restricted to some special cases in which linkage was consistently documented: to linkages between Hollywood actors; to linkages between scientists who collaborated on the same publication; or to company directors who sat together on the same boards. The Internet allows a much wider set of analyses: of the physical links between servers; of the hypertext links between web pages, and of the e-mail links between people.

All of the analyses show complex networks with a self-similar structure at different scales. This is inherently related to their power-law distribution of links per node. At every scale of observation, the network is dominated by a few hubs with an exceptionally large number of links, and by a majority of nodes with few links. There is also a “clustering” of links between similar nodes; those that are geographically or topically close, but a significant number of “long-links” which cut across the whole network and tie together distant nodes.

These create the “small-world” characteristic: every node connected to every other by a

remarkably small number of links. For the Internet, which connects over 400 million people, the average number of links between routers is only about 10. In the European research community of about 8000 research institutions concerned with information society technologies, on average the research teams are only 3 links apart. This “small world” characteristic is extremely important for the coherence and efficiency of these knowledge networks.

The importance of understanding growth dynamics

We still need growth. Even in the narrow terms of traditional GDP, we still need to sustain growth. In the developed countries of Europe and north-America, despite the fact that the prosperous elite have “enough”, there is still a need to provide the collective wealth and capacity for most people to attain a better quality of life. So much remains to be done: we need better health-care; better schools; better (and more energy efficient) homes; more opportunities for self-expression and creativity.



In addition, the economic system of the OECD countries is only “in equilibrium” in the sense that we can sustain a high level of employment at about 2-3% GDP growth per year. This dynamic equilibrium reflects the continuing assimilation of new knowledge into society –increasing productivity; and the continuing assimilation of a larger number of young people

(from the post war population increase) into the mainstream of work and prosperity. However, even with stable and ageing populations over the next decades, Europe, Japan and North America can and must sustain this level of growth.

In the developing world, the need for sustained growth is even more pressing: To enable substantial convergence with the developed countries, most developing countries will need to sustain a GDP growth rate of 6-8% per year over the next 3-4 decades. China has succeeded in this since 1990, and India is now getting on track. At this growth rate, the current gross inequities in prosperity between developed and developing countries could be reduced to a level comparable to that within the USA by about 2050. By then, the GDP of the developed (OECD) countries will have quadrupled, but that of the developing world will have increased by a factor of about 30. Total world GDP will have increased 10-fold.

Yet, much as these rates of sustained growth as essential to social opportunity and equity, we must realise that we cannot increase resource-use tenfold without destroying the Earth’s ecosystem. We therefore have a double challenge – how to sustain GDP growth, but at the same time, stabilise or reduce total resource use.

Growth has always been an uncomfortable “externality” in general equilibrium economics. We know it is associated with new knowledge and innovation: innovations that open up new business opportunities – to offer new products



and services – or higher quality products and services. This has again been shown in the correlation between growth and the use of Information and communications technologies in business innovations⁹.

In complex, networked societies, we can now go beyond an empirical observation. We can understand and predict the dynamics and limits of growth. We can recognise the characteristic way in which innovations that enhance networking in society initially grow, then explode to near saturation at a level of use that is cost-effective.

To further test the hypothesis of self-limiting growth in complex “knowledge networks”, we have looked at growth in other complex networks to see whether they reflect the same functional form: The most significant are **digital mobile telephony, notably on the GSM standard, and the Internet.**

Both GSM and the Internet are networking technologies for which take-up in society should initially follow Metcalf’s law¹⁰: Initial growth rates being proportional to the square of the number of users. However, while new networking facilities first attract more prosperous and skilled people, continued expansion beyond a certain proportion of the population has **diminishing value, usability and affordability.** Self-limiting hyperbolic growth matches well the observed growth of users of the Internet and of GSM mobile telephony at the world level, from 1991 to the latest actual data in 2001¹¹.

At the world-level, the self-limitation is to a total population of users much smaller than the total world population - for GSM to about 1700 million, and for PC-based internet use, to about 800 million. This reflects the different “utility values” and the different affordability of these technologies to people – especially to the 2.4 billion of the world population with incomes less than a few Euros a day. The difference shows that GSM is useful and affordable for about twice as many people as PC-based internet access, but that neither technology is likely to be used by more than about 30% of the world population with the current wealth inequities and the technology’s usability and affordability.

The growth curves for GSM and PC access to the Internet differ only by a scaling factor. The

“critical time” (at which half the limit is reached) is the same (about March 2000), and the “time constant” of growth (about 6.5 years) both for the Internet and GSM. These are different technologies, having emerged independently in the early 1990s: GSM from the European telecommunications industry, and the Internet from the US IT sector. However, they address the same social networking opportunity that emerged in the late 1990s.

The value to society of these new tools is in how effectively and widely they are used. They are not just a new set of consumer goods: they radically change the type of things we can do and how we interact. They provide access to a much wider range of knowledge than ever before, and the ability to manipulate it; to share it and to exploit it. Key new challenges will therefore be in managing knowledge, complexity and security. The emerging “soft sciences” of knowledge management and the simulation of evolving complex systems are crucial

Understanding and benefiting from the type of complex networking enabled by mobile communications and the Internet will be increasingly important. The combination of simple and standard protocols for data transmission (Like the IP/TCP protocols) and for linking knowledge (like the www/html protocols) are a new paradigm in knowledge access and management. But it is a paradigm that remarkably matches the capacities and characteristics of the human brain and human society, in extraordinary ways, and at several levels. It matches the architecture of neural networks in the brain, as well as the architecture of knowledge networking in society. It is therefore not surprising to see the rapidity with which it has been assimilated.

The implications for sustainable development in a knowledge society

The nature of the self-limiting processes – for demographic change and resource use - is of vital importance for our approach to **sustainable development.** If the system-dynamic nature of human development holds, stabilisation in population and in resource-use will depend on knowledge assimilation and access by everyone. This is radically different from most other

9. European IT Observatory 2004 : *The impacts of ICT on economic growth; and OECD (2003) “ICT and economic growth – evidence from OECD countries, industries and firms.*

10. Bob Metcalf was the inventor of Ethernet. For further discussion see *Information rules*, Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian, Harvard Business School Press, 1999.

11. GSM growth in Europe has been earlier than in the rest of the world, and the European data shows the same form of self-limiting growth, but with actual data further beyond the inflection point. Similarly Spanish GSM growth was even faster, and the same form is again observed, with saturation at about 85% of the population.

hypotheses. Since Malthus¹², most other estimates of population limit presume that population and resource-use will be limited by the physical and environmental limits of the planet. In fact, in a system-dynamic model, the human population may always have been close to the “carrying capacity” of the planet – **for the level of knowledge capital of the time**. Populations may have always expanded to fill the “environmental space” available with the efficiencies of resource-use available to them. Even the latest estimates suggest that the current population is (only) somewhat in excess (20%) of the Earth’s carrying capacity for our current level of knowledge.

However, we also know that population self-limitation can operate well within the “carrying capacity” of a region. The European population has stabilised at 450 million, well within the “carrying capacity”¹³.

Nevertheless, it would also be dangerous and wrong to assume that we cannot, and should not attempt to accelerate the natural stabilisation of populations and resource-use to a lower level than currently appears inevitable. The simple model of a growing population and resource-use within a stable environment takes no account of the possibility that we may catalyse a major change in the Earth’s climate. We have no way yet to predict the effect of greater human perturbations to the earth’s environment – this would require that we integrate the earth’s **ecosystem, climate and ocean circulation patterns into a single dynamic system together with humanity**. There may be major instabilities, and multiple equilibria in such a tightly-coupled system: destabilisation of climate and ocean circulation could be catastrophic – there is little reason to believe that the current human population could be supported in ice-age conditions, despite the fact that our ancestors survived such conditions when they were much less numerous.

Furthermore, even if a larger stable population could be sustained without major global climate change, **regional imbalances may become catastrophic**. The “system-dynamics” implies that there are relatively free flows of knowledge, and of people or resources, around the world within the time-scales of significant change. This has historically been true: 1000 years ago, when the

rate of population knowledge growth was about 0.1% per year, knowledge and populations could migrate between regions within a few hundred years. The telephone, TV and the internet may now allow knowledge transfers at a rate similar to that at which knowledge and population now grows, but it is no longer true that populations can migrate to alleviate regional imbalances with the “carrying capacity” **within the time-scales of current change (some tens of years)**. The rigidities of the “nation-state” now impede migrations to regions where resources and knowledge are more abundant.

Some conclusions and observations

Once we understand the system dynamics, we can change it. If populations self-limit as they reach a critical level of knowledge, and knowledge-sharing is the key facilitator of this, we could increase knowledge-sharing to alleviate emerging regional imbalances between population and resources. We could therefore accelerate population stabilisation by improved access to education and knowledge throughout the world. The recent scenarios from the EU TERRA2000 project using the International Futures Model demonstrate that population levels even in 50 to 100 years time could be significantly changed by modest changes to levels of investment in education, R&D and network investment over the next decades.

To achieve sustainable development, in terms of economic stability, social cohesion and inclusion, and a better balance between population and resources, we still have to act on population growth, on the efficiency of resource use, and on the challenges of poverty and education. These analyses show that the transitions to a more stable population; to a global knowledge society; and to sustainable development, can be linked to the recognition that human society is a complex network: That population may be strongly linked to shared “knowledge capital”; that the self-organising characteristics of complex social networks naturally tend to optimise access to shared knowledge, and that the realisation of sustainable development depends on a rapid sharing of new knowledge, technologies and innovations around the world.

12. T.R. Malthus, *An essay on the principle of population: or a view of its past and present effects on human happiness*, with an enquiry into our prospects respecting the future removal or mitigation of the evils which it occasions; 1803

13. Europe imposes a larger resource-use “footprint” on the rest of the world through import of raw materials and commodities, but has been self-sufficient in food since about 1970.

Accelerating the transition to stability in population and resource-use, both regionally and globally, is a necessary goal, both to ensure that humanity stays within the “carrying capacity” of regions, and to minimise imbalances and migration pressures. A key contribution to this goal can be made by “connecting everybody” to the knowledge resources of the world. This will require investing in education; empowering women; eliminating the “Digital Divide”, and ensuring network access.

The analysis of the growth dynamics of GSM mobile telephony and PC-based access to the internet shows the importance of the attractiveness, affordability and usability of the technology. It shows that the most cost effective way to address the “Digital Divide” will be to invest into communication and knowledge-networking technologies that are attractive, affordable and useable for the “next 2 billion”, further increasing the value of social capital, and access to the common knowledge-capital of humanity.

Capital humain et capital social au cœur des paradoxes de la société de la connaissance

par Gérard Valenduc*

En mars 2000, à Lisbonne, le sommet de l'Union européenne s'est fixé comme objectif stratégique de faire de l'Europe "l'économie de la connaissance la plus compétitive et la plus dynamique du monde, capable d'une croissance économique durable accompagnée d'une amélioration quantitative et qualitative de l'emploi et d'une plus grande cohésion sociale". Depuis lors, le thème de l'économie de la connaissance et, plus largement, de la société de la connaissance, est devenu un leitmotiv des politiques européennes, au risque de voir les expressions *knowledge society* et *knowledge economy* devenir des passe-partout.

Cet article met l'accent sur la dimension humaine et sociale de la transition vers une société de la connaissance. Il insiste sur le rôle attribué au capital humain et au capital social, mais souligne un certain nombre de paradoxes et d'ambiguïtés dans les discours enthousiastes concernant la société de la connaissance. Une analyse de ces paradoxes permet de conclure à un besoin de nouveaux compromis sociaux et institutionnels pour anticiper les risques de polarisation ou d'exclusion¹.

Qu'est-ce qu'une économie basée sur la connaissance ?

La notion d'économie basée sur la connaissance rend compte du fait qu'aujourd'hui, la connaissance – plus encore que l'information – devient un facteur de production décisif, à l'opposé de la société industrielle, où le rôle primordial était joué par le capital et les matières premières. Ceci a amené certains auteurs à distinguer, dans l'économie, des secteurs "intensifs en connaissance" par rapport à des processus routiniers de production de biens matériels ou de services. Cette distinction doit toutefois être faite avec prudence. Une activité basée sur la connaissance n'est pas forcément une activité qui ne requiert que des qualifications techniques élevées et une activité traditionnelle n'est pas forcément peu qualifiée. Par exemple, certains services aux personnes exigent une grande qualité de relation humaine, certains métiers manuels un savoir-faire implicite très spécialisé, et ceci n'est pas toujours identifié comme de la connaissance. Par ailleurs, il faut éviter la confusion entre secteurs intensifs en connaissance et secteurs intensifs en technologies. Certes, les technologies de l'information et de la communication (TIC) constituent une infrastructure de base, mais l'assimilation des activités basées sur la connaissance à des activités basées sur les TIC n'est pas correcte. L'enseignement et le secteur médical sont tout aussi intensifs en connaissance que le service et le conseil en informatique, même s'ils sont moins intensifs en TIC.

Passer de l'expression *économie basée sur la connaissance* à l'expression *société de la connaissance* indique que, bien au-delà de la seule activité économique, c'est toute l'organisation de la

société qui est marquée par cette primauté du facteur connaissance. De plus, quand on parle de société de la connaissance plutôt que de société de l'information, c'est pour mettre l'accent sur de nouvelles dimensions : le savoir, l'apprentissage, la culture, la construction de la connaissance à travers le travail, et finalement la redécouverte du rôle clé de la ressource humaine.

L'appellation *société de la connaissance* est parfois détrônée par l'appellation *société apprenante*, principalement pour introduire une perspective dynamique dans la manière d'appréhender le rôle de ce facteur connaissance dans l'évolution de la société. Les deux qualificatifs désignent la même réalité, mais le qualificatif "apprenante" insiste sur le caractère non fixé des connaissances et leur faible durée de vie, même quand elles sont hautement spécialisées. Ce qui est mis en avant, c'est la capacité d'apprendre et de s'adapter à de nouvelles conditions. Il s'agit d'insister à la fois sur la croissance des activités basées sur la connaissance mais aussi sur le caractère éphémère de ces connaissances.

Finalement, cet accent mis sur la connaissance et ensuite sur la capacité d'apprendre est d'abord une réaction face à l'instabilité sans cesse accrue de l'environnement socio-économique, avec en corollaire une accélération et une multiplication des changements : changement technologique, changement des marchés, des règles de la concurrence, changement dans les modes de consommation, etc. Avant de parler de société de l'information, nous ne vivons pas dans une société faite d'activités rudimentaires, pauvres en connaissance et sans investissement dans l'apprentissage. La différence aujourd'hui, c'est qu'il

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1. Cet article s'appuie sur un exposé intitulé "Las paradojas de la sociedad del conocimiento", présenté lors de la conférence européenne "New forms of work organisation" organisée par le Conseil économique et social catalan les 3-4 novembre 2003 à Barcelone, ainsi que sur l'article de Patricia Vendramin et Gérard Valenduc "Les paradoxes de la société de la connaissance", dans la Lettre EMERIT n°36, septembre 2003 (www.ftu-namur.org/emérit).

faut connaître toujours plus de choses pour pouvoir s'insérer dans le monde du travail et qu'il faut en apprendre constamment de nouvelles pour pouvoir y rester.

Le rôle de l'innovation technologique

La notion d'économie basée sur la connaissance considère le fait de pouvoir accéder rapidement à de nouvelles qualifications et de nouvelles compétences comme un facteur décisif de compétitivité pour les entreprises. Disposer d'un personnel qualifié est une chose, disposer d'un personnel capable d'apprendre et d'innover, ainsi que d'une organisation qui permet ce processus, est un facteur compétitif supplémentaire. Ceci suppose une définition très large de la connaissance et de l'apprentissage, allant des connaissances apprises en formation à l'apprentissage sur le tas en passant par toutes les formes de synergies et d'interactions dans le travail. Finalement, c'est en quelque sorte redécouvrir la valeur du capital humain dans l'activité économique et le développement des entreprises, ainsi que le rôle central des hommes et des femmes dans une organisation.

Une économie basée sur la connaissance n'est pas forcément une économie high-tech. Le besoin constant de reconstruction des qualifications et d'apprentissage concerne également les secteurs traditionnels et les secteurs moins intensifs en technologies. Par ailleurs, le potentiel d'apprentissage n'est pas propre aux personnes très qualifiées, même les personnes dites peu qualifiées sont également confrontées à la profusion d'informations générées par les usages d'internet et des services accessibles en ligne.

L'engouement pour la connaissance et l'apprentissage est lié à la problématique de l'innovation : il faut apprendre parce qu'il faut toujours innover. Dans la vie économique, il faut innover pour durer, pour survivre dans un marché concurrentiel. Dans un contexte économique caractérisé par l'instabilité, l'incertitude et le changement, les meilleures garanties d'adaptation sont l'apprentissage, la connaissance et l'innovation. Les trois éléments constituent une sorte de cercle vertueux : l'apprentissage produit de nouvelles connaissances et les nou-

velles connaissances sont à la base de l'innovation. La connaissance n'est donc pas une ressource parmi d'autres, elle est le facteur de production essentiel au processus d'innovation.

L'évolution vers une économie basée sur la connaissance est certes une tendance structurante, mais elle ne suit pas une trajectoire prédéterminée. Elle est le fruit des stratégies des entreprises, des initiatives des décideurs politiques et de l'influence des partenaires sociaux. Les processus d'acquisition et de développement des compétences, aussi bien au niveau des individus que des organisations, sont au cœur de cette évolution. Les TIC ont un double effet sur ce processus². D'une part, elles contribuent à une codification croissante des connaissances, qui conduit à une standardisation et une industrialisation de nombreux services, notamment dans la banque, l'assurance, le commerce, l'administration, les communications. Mais d'autre part, elles mettent en valeur la connaissance tacite, fruit de l'expérience individuelle et collective, elles soulignent le rôle essentiel de l'organisation du travail et de la formation des travailleurs.

Connaissance codifiée, connaissance tacite

La connaissance codifiée est celle qui peut être transcrite dans des procédures structurées ou dans des raisonnements logiques, bref celle qui peut être transformée en information. Cette connaissance transformée en information devient alors un produit commercialisable, qui peut être facilement stocké dans des bases de données, introduit dans des systèmes experts, reproduit en de nombreux exemplaires, transmis à travers des réseaux. La tendance à la codification des connaissances est croissante, ainsi que le développement d'outils permettant d'utiliser cette connaissance codifiée. Les TIC y jouent un rôle central. Elles augmentent la valeur ajoutée de la connaissance codifiée en permettant son transfert à longue distance et à faible coût.

Pour les entreprises, le premier avantage de la codification est qu'elle réduit certains coûts liés à l'acquisition des connaissances. L'accès à des bases de données peut s'avérer moins cher que la constitution d'un centre de documentation. Le recours à un système expert peut être plus effi-

2. Lundvall B-A, Borrás S., *The globalising learning economy : implications for innovation policy*, European Commission, DG Research (EUR 18307), Brussels, 1997.

cient que de s'adjoindre ses propres experts, mais le coût ne sera pas forcément moindre. Le fait de codifier la connaissance, de l'inscrire sur un support, a pour effet de donner à la connaissance des propriétés semblables à celles d'un bien matériel. Elle peut faire l'objet de transactions, être vendue, achetée, stockée – mais attention à la date de péremption !

La limite la plus importante de la codification des connaissances est certainement le changement. La codification des connaissances est un processus complexe et coûteux, mais la durée de vie des connaissances codifiées peut être très brève. Il faut souvent investir beaucoup pour comprendre et exploiter la connaissance codifiée.

Par contraste, la connaissance tacite est la connaissance qui reste liée à l'intervention humaine. Elle ne peut pas être traduite dans un langage informatique, ni fixée dans un format spécifique. La qualification d'un travailleur comprend des connaissances codifiables mais aussi une part importante de connaissance tacite. Une personne qualifiée suit dans son travail, de manière inconsciente, des règles qui ne sont pas connues en tant que telles mais qui relèvent de sa qualification et de son expérience. La connaissance tacite fait référence à des actions que l'on peut réaliser sans être capable d'expliquer complètement comment on y parvient, ainsi qu'à des aptitudes, des modes de raisonnement qui sont mis en œuvre de manière inconsciente. On pense ici, par exemple, à tout ce qui constitue la touche commerciale, le sens des affaires, l'aptitude pédagogique, le coup de main, bref un ensemble de choses difficiles à recenser mais qui font qu'une personne est bonne, compétente, douée ou performante dans une activité.

La transmission de la connaissance tacite ne passe pas par les ordinateurs et les réseaux, elle passe par des formes d'interaction sociale proches de l'apprentissage. La connaissance tacite ne peut être ni vendue, ni acquise sur un marché et son transfert est extrêmement sensible aux contextes sociaux. Les croyances et les modes d'interprétation communs, qui rendent la communication possible, font également partie des connaissances tacites.

Par ailleurs, une codification accrue ne diminue pas l'importance de la connaissance tacite.

Des compétences restent indispensables pour s'approprier la connaissance codifiée, la repérer, la sélectionner, l'interpréter et la mettre en œuvre à bon escient. L'accès facile et peu coûteux à une surabondance d'information rend les compétences et les aptitudes d'autant plus nécessaires pour sélectionner cette information et en faire un usage efficient. Connaissance codifiée et connaissance tacite sont complémentaires.

Capital humain et capital social : l'exemple de la diffusion d'internet

Selon la définition de la Commission européenne dans les travaux du groupe ESDIS (European Social Dimension of the Information Society), le capital humain désigne les connaissances, les qualifications, les compétences et les aptitudes qui sont le propriété des individus et qui facilitent leur bien-être personnel social et économique. Le capital social désigne les réseaux de relations, la participation à la vie publique, les valeurs partagées, la culture, les habitudes et coutumes, ainsi que la confiance et la compréhension mutuelles, qui facilitent la coopération au sein des groupes, afin de poursuivre des objectifs communs³.

Pour comprendre l'importance du capital humain et du capital social par rapport à d'autres facteurs d'évolution de la société de la connaissance, l'exemple de la "fracture numérique" est instructif.

Dans l'accès à internet et dans ses usages, il existe aujourd'hui des écarts importants entre sous-groupes de la population. Ces écarts peuvent être mesurés en fonction de variables démographiques ou socioprofessionnelles (âge, genre, composition familiale, niveau d'éducation, revenu, catégorie professionnelle) ou de variables géographiques ou géopolitiques (écarts entre zones urbaines et rurales, entre régions ou entre pays, entre le Nord et le Sud). Ces écarts ne correspondent pas à une fracture bien nette, mais plutôt à une série de clivages qui se superposent. L'enjeu n'est pas seulement de décrire ces clivages, mais surtout de les comprendre⁴. Dans cette analyse de la fracture numérique, il est essentiel de distinguer ce qui relève de l'accès à internet, c'est-à-dire le matériel disponible, son

3. European Commission, *Building the knowledge society: social and human capital interactions*, SEC(2003) 652, Brussels, 28/05/2003.

4. Vendramin P., Valenduc G., *Internet et inégalités*, Editions Labor, Collection Quartier Libre, Bruxelles, 2003.

prix, le coût des connexions, le cadre réglementaire, et ce qui relève des *usages* et des contenus. Certaines difficultés liées à l'accès peuvent présenter un caractère transitoire. En revanche, des inégalités dans les usages renvoient à des questions plus fondamentales, qui concernent les contenus de l'information et des services en ligne et les compétences requises pour maîtriser ces contenus. Il faut donc s'intéresser aux ressources des utilisateurs, plus particulièrement à leurs ressources cognitives et leurs ressources sociales⁵.

Les ressources cognitives renvoient au capital humain. La recherche d'informations numérisées nécessite de savoir naviguer dans un univers de représentations complexes, qui n'est pas structuré et stable comme un livre mais infini et changeant, puis de pouvoir trier et synthétiser les informations obtenues. La maîtrise de cette information numérisée requiert des compétences particulières que l'on peut regrouper en trois catégories. Les compétences instrumentales, d'abord, ont trait à la manipulation du matériel et des logiciels. Les compétences structurelles, ensuite, concernent la nouvelle façon d'entrer dans les contenus : comprendre, évaluer, puis choisir. Enfin, les compétences stratégiques permettent de rechercher l'information de manière proactive, de l'utiliser dans son propre cadre de vie, de prendre des décisions et d'agir sur son environnement personnel et professionnel. Ces compétences étaient déjà pertinentes par rapport aux médias traditionnels, internet ne fait que les rendre plus nécessaires encore.

Les ressources cognitives s'acquièrent par l'éducation et la formation, par l'expérience individuelle et collective, mais aussi par l'habitude de les mettre en œuvre dans une grande variété de situations. L'importance des ressources cognitives justifie la priorité accordée à l'éducation et à la formation dans les politiques visant à réduire les disparités face à internet. Toutefois, on peut regretter qu'actuellement, les formations à internet se focalisent beaucoup sur les compétences instrumentales, au risque de négliger les autres, qui jouent pourtant un rôle clé dans la stratification sociale des usages.

Les ressources sociales, quant à elles, reposent sur la capacité de s'insérer dans des groupes et

d'utiliser les ressources d'autres personnes, dans des situations diverses : travail, école, clubs, associations, famille et amis, etc. Elles relèvent du capital social. L'expérience des points d'accès publics à internet, appelés aussi "espaces publics numériques", montre que ceux-ci ont pour utilité principale non pas de fournir un accès à internet à ceux qui n'en ont pas, mais de mettre à la disposition de tous des ressources sociales : rencontrer d'autres utilisateurs, recevoir de l'aide ou des conseils, découvrir de nouvelles possibilités, tisser des réseaux de relations⁶.

Certaines dimensions de la fracture numérique, notamment les écarts constatés en fonction du revenu, de l'emploi, du statut professionnel ou du niveau de formation, peuvent s'expliquer par l'inégalité d'accès aux ressources cognitives et sociales. L'environnement professionnel joue, à cet égard, un rôle clé. Les collègues et l'univers du travail constituent souvent une ressource sociale essentielle dans le processus d'apprentissage des utilisateurs domestiques. Le travail est un lieu privilégié d'expérimentation de la complexité et des avantages relatifs des services en ligne, ainsi qu'un lieu d'acquisition de compétences spécifiques. Bien souvent, c'est l'usage d'internet pour le travail ou pour la formation qui entraîne les usages domestiques. Pour la plupart des personnes âgées, qui n'ont pas eu l'occasion de se familiariser avec internet dans leur vie active, seul le dialogue entre générations peut leur permettre de franchir le pas.

Cet exemple de la diffusion d'internet montre l'importance du capital humain et du capital social dans la transition vers la société de la connaissance. Toutefois, il suggère aussi que cette transition ne va pas de soi et qu'elle s'effectue dans un tissu de relations sociales complexes.

Six paradoxes persistants

Dans la pratique, de nombreux obstacles existent sur le chemin de la société de la connaissance. Ils concernent notamment la formation, l'organisation du travail, le marché du travail, la culture du changement technologique. Ils ne peuvent être levés ou contournés que par un dialogue constructif entre toutes les parties prenantes. Quels sont ces obstacles ? On peut les appréhender sous la forme de six paradoxes.

5. De Haan J., Steyaert J., *Geleidelijk digitaal – een nuchtere kijk op de sociale gevolgen van ICT*, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, Den Haag, december 2001.

6. Allard P., Lelong P., *Les espaces publics numériques, moteur d'un Internet participatif*, Technofutur 3, Gosselies, décembre 2002 (www.technofutur3.be)

Le premier paradoxe est celui de l'intensification du travail. Alors que la plupart des chefs d'entreprise et des décideurs politiques plaident en faveur de la société de la connaissance, on assiste, sur les lieux de travail, à une intensification croissante du travail, qui laisse trop peu de place à l'apprentissage réflexif et à la formation continuée. Le temps de travail devient de plus en plus dense, les rythmes de travail de plus en plus rapides et ajustés à la demande des clients, les tâches de plus en plus abstraites. Les TIC permettent un affinement considérable du contrôle des performances et de leur étalonnage (benchmarking), ce qui place les salariés dans une situation de contrôle et de dépendance inédite alors qu'en même temps se développe un discours sur l'autonomie et la responsabilisation dans le travail. Bien souvent, la culture de l'urgence et l'obsession du "juste à temps" ne permettent ni de prendre le recul nécessaire ni de trouver le temps pour se former. Encore plus paradoxalement, c'est dans les métiers les plus qualifiés que cette intensification du travail constitue un obstacle à la mise à jour des connaissances.

Le second paradoxe est celui de l'investissement dans la formation. Alors que les investissements immatériels dans la connaissance et la formation sont largement reconnus comme une clé de la compétitivité et de la qualité, les entreprises ne sont pas assez encouragées à considérer l'apprentissage comme un investissement, et non pas comme un coût. La littérature économique et managériale plaide en faveur des investissements immatériels, mais les dispositifs réglementaires, fiscaux et statistiques s'adaptent très lentement. L'investissement immatériel est souvent concentré sur quelques groupes professionnels clés, comme les cadres, les informaticiens, les responsables commerciaux, sans irriguer suffisamment l'ensemble d'une organisation. Dans trop de cas encore, la stratégie de formation d'une entreprise se réduit à une pression en faveur de l'auto-formation des travailleurs, voire des dirigeants, sans encadrement du parcours de formation ni reconnaissance des compétences nouvellement acquises.

Le troisième paradoxe est celui, déjà évoqué, de la codification des connaissances. Alors qu'une économie basée sur la connaissance exige

une élévation du niveau de qualification des travailleurs et une amélioration de la coopération dans les situations de travail, de nombreux investissements en TIC privilégient une codification croissante des connaissances, qui résulte trop souvent en une parcellisation et une standardisation des tâches. Alors que les usages créatifs des TIC demandent une bonne communication interne et une compréhension globale des processus, des produits et des services de l'entreprise, les formes d'organisation du travail liées aux TIC restent encore largement prisonnières de l'héritage du taylorisme.

Le quatrième paradoxe est celui de l'employabilité. Alors que, pour faire face aux changements et aux incertitudes qui caractérisent une économie basée sur la connaissance, il est nécessaire de développer une notion d'employabilité qui allie flexibilité et sécurité, le fonctionnement actuel du marché du travail multiplie les trajectoires professionnelles discontinues, erratiques, voire brisées, où les apprentissages individuels sont difficiles à valoriser dans des carrières ou des projets professionnels à long terme. Les systèmes de validation des compétences acquises ou des formations suivies dans le travail en sont encore à leurs balbutiements, alors que les exigences des entreprises en termes de mobilité et mise à jour des savoir-faire sont omniprésentes. Les investissements exigés de certains salariés dans leur propre employabilité sont parfois disproportionnés en regard des avantages qu'ils en retirent.

Le cinquième paradoxe est celui de l'âge et de l'expérience. Alors qu'une société de la connaissance repose sur la mise en valeur de l'expérience acquise tout au long de la vie, on assiste trop souvent à une mise à l'écart des travailleurs âgés, pour des motifs opportunistes. L'expérience basée sur l'apprentissage réflexif est paradoxalement exigée des plus jeunes, qui doivent encore l'acquérir, et déniée aux plus âgés, qui y ont investi du temps et de l'énergie. Les rythmes de travail de plus en plus intensifs, imposés aux plus jeunes comme aux plus âgés, empêchent ces derniers d'envisager des fins de carrière équilibrées et les incitent à quitter au plus tôt la vie active. Dans les discours sur la société de la connaissance, l'âge est souvent associé à ses aspects négatifs (réflexes plus lents, diminution des capacités

visuelles et de la mémoire, moindre endurance) plutôt qu'à ses aspects positifs : l'expérience et le réseau de relations, qui sont deux composantes du capital humain et du capital social.

Le sixième paradoxe est celui des discriminations liées au genre. Alors que la société de la connaissance postule l'égalité des chances entre hommes et femmes, les clivages liés au genre persistent ou s'accroissent dans les métiers intensifs en connaissance, notamment les métiers liés aux TIC, ainsi que les postes d'encadrement et de direction en général. La proportion d'informaticiennes a diminué au cours des dix dernières années. Les femmes sont plus nombreuses parmi les diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur, mais elles se heurtent toujours au "plafond de verre" dans leur progression professionnelle.

Anticiper les risques sociaux d'une économie basée sur la connaissance

Dans l'évolution vers une économie basée sur la connaissance, les risques sociaux sont importants et ils doivent être anticipés. Polarisation et exclusion sont les deux mots clés. Polarisation entre des modèles opposés d'organisation du travail : un regain du taylorisme dans les tâches standardisées et banalisées, une organisation souple et "apprenante" pour les tâches qualifiées, créatives et évolutives. Polarisation du marché du travail, entre des emplois assurés et valorisés dans le noyau dur de l'économie, et une constellation d'emplois périphériques dans le travail temporaire, la sous-traitance, l'externalisation, les statuts précaires, le travail indépendant mais subordonné, etc. Polarisation dans les formes de travail flexible: d'un côté, une disponibilité de plus en plus étendue, même dans les services, une désynchronisation entre le temps de travail et les autres temps sociaux ; d'un autre côté, des îlots de flexibilité socialement positive, où le travail à distance et les horaires à la carte permettent de concilier activités professionnelles et activités personnelles ou sociales.

Quant à l'exclusion, elle prend plusieurs visages. Outre le fait qu'elle soit une conséquence logique de la polarisation, elle se manifeste aussi dans l'accès à l'emploi. Le paradoxe d'une économie basée sur la connaissance et d'un travail basé sur la compétence est que l'accès à l'em-

ploi devient plus sélectif. Quand l'apprentissage se fait surtout dans les situations de travail, au sein d'une organisation, la barrière à l'entrée est difficile à franchir pour ceux qui sont exclus du travail. De plus, dans une société où non seulement le travail, mais aussi l'accès à la culture et l'exercice de la citoyenneté deviennent tributaires d'une certaine familiarité avec les TIC, les inégalités dans l'accès aux TIC et leurs usages peuvent renforcer les inégalités existantes, voire générer de nouvelles exclusions.

La question de la fracture numérique, déjà évoquée, permet d'appréhender ces risques de polarisation et d'exclusion. La fracture numérique ne se mesure pas au nombre de connectés à internet, mais aux effets simultanés de la connexion des uns et de la non-connexion des autres. Si on adopte ce point de vue, il faut s'intéresser non pas aux écarts, mais aux effets discriminatoires. Des discriminations dues au non-accès à internet peuvent s'instaurer dans plusieurs domaines : dans le travail, notamment l'accès à l'emploi et les opportunités de développement professionnel ; dans la consommation, si les conditions d'accès aux biens et aux services sont différentes selon que l'accès se fait en ligne ou non ; dans la communication, car des mécanismes d'exclusion peuvent résulter de la rupture des réseaux de sociabilité existants et d'une forte sélectivité des nouveaux réseaux ; enfin, dans l'exercice de la démocratie, si l'accès à l'information publique et la possibilité de participer aux débats démocratiques ne mettent pas sur pied d'égalité les nouveaux et les anciens moyens d'expression et de communication.

Des synergies entre les acteurs concernés

La nature des difficultés à surmonter permet de préciser ce que l'on doit entendre par "parties prenantes" dans la construction d'une société de la connaissance. Il s'agit non seulement des partenaires sociaux au sein des entreprises et au niveau national ou régional, mais aussi des opérateurs institutionnels de la formation initiale et continuée, à tous les niveaux, et des "agents de changement", publics ou privés, qui peuvent faire évoluer l'organisation du travail et le fonctionnement du marché du travail.

Trois domaines sont particulièrement propices à la construction de synergies entre les acteurs de la société de la connaissance, synergies qui nécessitent bien entendu un suivi au niveau des politiques à mener : la formation, l'organisation du travail et les politiques du temps.

L'éducation et la formation sont des défis de premier ordre pour la société de la connaissance. Ces défis comportent de nombreux aspects. Comment réaliser concrètement l'objectif de formation tout au long de la vie, et avec quelles coopérations entre les partenaires concernés ? Comment la formation peut-elle corriger les disparités liées au genre ? Comment améliorer la qualité, mais aussi l'attractivité des formations supérieures qui combinent la technologie et la gestion, y compris la gestion du changement ? Comment introduire les TIC non pas comme un objectif en soi, mais comme un support créatif dans la formation aux métiers basés sur la connaissance ?

En termes d'organisation du travail, l'enjeu est de favoriser des "organisations apprenantes", c'est-à-dire qui intègrent le processus d'apprentissage dans leur culture et dans leur fonctionnement. Une organisation apprenante, c'est plus que la somme des connaissances de chaque individu qui la compose. Elle doit rendre possible l'expression de tous les savoirs, à partir d'un diagnostic de l'état des compétences et du besoin de développement de celles-ci. Souvent, le problème n'est pas tellement l'absence de connais-

sances, mais plutôt leur utilisation inefficace, soit à cause d'une inadéquation entre les salariés et les postes de travail, soit faute d'un management adéquat. La concertation entre employeurs et employés fait partie intégrante du processus d'apprentissage organisationnel, qui est à la recherche du meilleur équilibre entre les méthodes formelles et informelles de dialogue social. Les changements organisationnels ne sont pas possibles sans le soutien des salariés. Comment mettre en valeur les "bonnes pratiques" et développer des incitants dans ce domaine ?

Enfin, la société de la connaissance a besoin d'une politique du temps, qui dépasse la seule question de l'aménagement du temps de travail. Puisque le développement d'une organisation du travail et d'un marché du travail plus flexibles brouille les repères classiques de la sphère professionnelle et de la sphère domestique, comment rendre celles-ci plus conciliables ? L'apprentissage tout au long de la vie relève également de la politique du temps, pas seulement de la politique de formation. La fin de carrière des travailleurs âgés passe par un meilleur équilibre entre le temps de travail productif et le temps à consacrer à la transmission des savoirs. Ce sont à la fois des mesures au niveau politique et au niveau de l'organisation des entreprises qui peuvent favoriser une combinaison plus harmonieuse de ces différents temps sociaux.

A planetary contract for growth compatible sustainability, social balance, cultural balance, and ecology

by Franz J. Radermacher*

Ever since the Rio Earth Summit ten years ago, if not before, the world has been faced by the challenge to consciously shape a sustainable development. This especially involves a great responsibility concerning the economic design. This should aim at growth compatible with sustainability and simultaneously bring about a (global) social balance, in particular overcoming poverty and preservation of the ecological systems.

This is a complex subject and the constellation has been increasingly dramatized by September 11, 2001, the Rio+10 Earth Summit in Johannesburg, which failed to a large degree, and now even more so after the course of events in Iraq, and the failure of the recent WTO round in Cancun.

A fair interaction between world cultures becomes a key issue here, if overcoming of poverty with simultaneous attention to environmental protection issues and careful dealing with scarce resources should succeed. Even though technological and social innovations are an essential part of every solution they will not suffice alone. Needed is also better governance frame for global politics and the global learning. The Global Marshall Plan is a great step in this direction.

The challenges of an adequate global regulatory framework

Sustainability is a great challenge in terms of world policy at the transition into a new millennium. There is an international consensus that sustainability has to bring together two dimensions: on the one hand, protection of the environment, above all in a global perspective, on the other, the development of poorer countries, especially with the aim of overcoming poverty and bringing about other concerns of justice. With view to the year 2015, implementing the UN Millennium Development Aims is an important intermediate step in this direction however, implementation so far seems not to work at all.

The key issue the world has been facing since the fall of the (Berlin) Wall is whether this aim is best reached by further deregulating the markets and then counting on the power of these markets. Or does this subject also require a sociopolitical framework of world economy, as it is typical for, e.g., European market economies, namely, an ecosocial economic framework in the sense of an ordo-liberal model which is the model of the so-called Rhineland capitalism?

It seems obvious that the successes of development taking place in today's globalization processes are paid for too costly, on the one hand, by a global massive destruction of the environment and, on the other, by an increasing social split in the North as well as in the South of this globe. This is not compatible with peace.

This is not a sustainable development. Here the world faces a difficult situation which materialized itself, for instance, in the course of events on 9/11/2001 and also in the question of how to deal with this.

Exploitation instead of future orientation

If one studies the challenges of a sustainable development, one is especially confronted with the problem that the "sustainability" capital today, in other words, the social, cultural, and ecological resources upon which humanity depends, are seriously jeopardized in a globalized economy with inadequate global framework conditions.

We have been organizing international transport around the globe today almost free of charge with enormous negative consequences for the world climate. In form of the green card we have established mechanisms of exploitation of the social capital of poorer by richer countries. As a whole, this leads to instabilities that threaten future opportunities for life and development.

A large part of humankind, at the moment about three billion people, is extremely poor and has to live on less than two EURO per day. We realize that humankind is not in a position to guarantee elementary demands like water supply for all people despite the scientific, economic, and organizational potential of humankind, and

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dispute the fact, that all nations have agreed to the United Nations Development Goals for 2015, that set clear targets in this and other areas.

A deeper cause for this seems to lie in the (essential) free trade logic of the WTO in connection with the mechanisms of action of the world financial systems. This is a regulatory framework dealing with social, cultural, and ecological questions on a subordinate level that rather refers them back to the level of the nation-states. In today's globalization, however, the nation-states compete with each other, i.e., for invested capital. In a certain sense they are in a prisoners' dilemma situation that forces everyone to reduce standards rather than to implement internationally coordinated standards.

This particularly results in a comparatively uncoordinated, partly chaotic growth process with considerable societal fractures which, among other things, is characterized by the fact that it puts an enormous pressure on economically weaker cultures.

These cultures are put under considerable pressure by persistent new offers of opportunities, especially through advertisement in the media, which cannot be made available for a large part of the population because of their economic weakness. In its concrete execution this pressure is linked with many material infringements by the rich North at the expense of these cultures.

This condition results in severe frustration and finally an enormous hatred that is understandable and that constitutes an immense burden for coexistence on this globe.

Religions actually do not, as a rule, as is sometimes implied, drive conflicts in the sense of a "conflict of cultures." It is more likely that deeper lying concerns of justice that are nowhere addressed correctly today, occasionally find their cultural demarcation line in religions to separate one side from the other. This is a function sometimes also taken over by skin color and by language.

Northern Ireland shows that such conflicts are obviously not of a religious nature at heart. In Germany, Catholics and Protestants live together very harmoniously. In Northern Ireland obviously not. Why? Because deeper lying historical issues of justice are the real reason for this. Concerns of justice mainly affect the social area

and the environmental situation on this globe, which is seriously deteriorating due to the working of the global economic system. The most important environmental issues for the future are water, soil, oceans, forests, climate, and the maintenance of genetic diversity.

Ecosocial market economy and Europe as a reference

The question is whether the globalization process has to proceed in such a destructive way as is the case today. Or is there a better way? Yes, there is! There is an alternative. This is the European market model, the ecosocial market economy, the "balanced way."

The extension processes of the European Union as a small form of globalization are formed according to this logic. The next big step now is the extension of the EU to Central and South-Eastern Europe.

The crucial principle which the EU is counting on is a fair contract between developed and less developed partners. In this context the less developed countries adopt the high standards of the EU (the so-called *aquis communautaire*) but also give up part of their competitive advantages. To put it differently, they save us from what we like to call dumping, which, seen from these countries' point of view, is their comparative advantage.

Such an adjusted course of action is only possible because the richer part of the EU is willing to support the development of these economically weaker countries with the help of co-financing. This more or less corresponds with the idea of a Marshall Plan the way it was conducted by the USA in Europe after World War II.

Comparatively modest financial means have to be used, to the order of magnitude of 1 to 2 percent of the gross national product of the EU, in which case it appears to be possible to considerably accelerate catching up processes and to shape them in a particularly social and fair way. The obvious difference between this EU-type of approach and the Northern American NAFTA should be especially pointed out here. In the latter, the border between the USA and Mexico has to be guarded by the military. Within the EU, borders will eventually disappear completely.

A Global Marshall Plan as political strategy

This idea of an ecosocial market economy should be extended today to the whole globe. This would mean that international agreements would link the alignment of standards, i.e., in regard to education, women's rights, water supply, and environmental protection to co-financing development of poorer countries by rich ones. Corresponding suggestions for a Global Marshall Plan are at hand, especially from Europe's side, for instance with the aim to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Co-financing is a central issue here. A fair taxation of international mobility, a world kerosene tax, a fair dealing with CO₂ emission rights, eventually a Tobin tax on financial transactions, or an investment fee on global trade or an intelligent use of special drawing rights of the IMF can be thought of in this context to raise the corresponding financial means.

But today's problem is that the USA, or rather the current US administration, is blocking all the global processes of this kind even though the former Vice President Al Gore is one of the "fathers" of this idea and has also written a remarkable book on it.

Today, the USA is not willing to substantially participate in co-financing. The richest country of this world only comes up with an absolutely inadequate development aid of 0.12 percent (of the gross national product). The increase of the US military budget after 9/11/2001 alone has four times this volume. The 2003 military budget has 32 times the volume of the USA's development aid, thus 3.8 percent of the US gross national product. But the official US administration argues that more development aid or co-financing would simply be the wrong way and that opening up the markets of developing countries would be the solution to all problems of poverty.

The persons in charge are convinced of this or rather try to push through the idea – if necessary flanked by the military and always with a military threat in the background – that deregulated free markets are the best development program, even though it is quite obvious that poverty on the globe cannot be quickly overcome this way

and the environment cannot be sufficiently protected.

Especially the recent substantial problems of the new economy and the world capital markets and the fraudulent redistributive processes in regard to insiders that took place at the heart of economic and financial system have shown that a continuing deregulation is not even the right instrument for the organization of classical economic processes, not to mention an attainment of a sustainable global development.

The role of technological progress: factor 4 and factor 10 concepts

Much more appropriate is an ecosocial framework that suitably connects the possibilities of technological progress with the observation of the standards in the environmental and social areas.

Seen from the technological side the most decisive approach is the so-called factor 4 or rather factor 10 concept that goes back to scientists like Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker and Friedrich Schmidt-Bleek of the Wuppertal Institute. This concept aims to multiply the world gross national product over the next fifty to one hundred years, e.g., by a tenfold increase. This should, however, only happen with a simultaneous increase of eco-efficiency so that this increased extent of goods and services can be produced without polluting the environment any further and without consuming critical resources to a larger extent than today.

The point is to substantially produce more, to make more goods and services available with the same volume of resource input and environmental damage as today owing to better technology. Technological progress is the crucial instrument here for bringing about acceptable humane conditions for more and more people on this globe.

Restricting collective human behaviour as the greatest challenge: overcoming the rebound effect

It is important to observe here, however, that an increase in eco-efficiency and dematerialization is not something principally new, as tech-

nological progress has always been able to accomplish this. Whether sustainable development can finally be achieved is another question. There are other things necessary for this besides technology.

Ethically speaking social innovations, more precisely global contracts that set limits to collective human behaviour to keep it both within certain ecosocially as well as culturally acceptable limits are necessary. The imposition and implementation of such limits in today's world economic system is the true political challenge for a sustainable development and therefore is all at the heart of the initiative for a Global Marshall Plan in form of a planetary contract.

If one looks at the climate issue and the challenge of a worldwide limitation of CO₂ emissions, the point is to limit the extent of collective emissions and thus achieve altogether fewer emissions than today. This, however, takes place at a time when China, India, Brazil are substantially catching up and, as a result, gradually producing more and more emissions because they are quite understandably emulating our lifestyle there.

How is one supposed to deal with the scarcity and necessary limitations in this situation? Some very delicate discussions are taking place between North and South on the question of whether the distribution pattern is supposed to be "grandfather-like," i.e., everybody more or less stays on the current level. This would mean that the people in the up to now rich countries would be assigned many more CO₂ emissions rights than the people in poorer countries.

Or we must ask whether people in poorer countries have the same right as people in rich countries, that is, should they be principally allowed to catch up and should we reach a per capita equal initial distribution of emissions rights.

The latter would mean that every human being would from the start get equal pollution rights – today this would be about one six-billionth of the permissible overall extent – and then these rights are permitted to be put up for trading or auction. This would mean that those disproportionately polluting or wanting to pollute, like the US Americans today but also the Europeans, first have to purchase the necessary

pollution rights from the poorer countries. This would make such emissions considerably more expensive and would have the effect of a global green tax.

This means it is most important to control the consequences of technological progress. Or, to put it differently, we need to prevent people from simultaneously using up more and more "nature," more and more resources, and producing more and more environmental damage as has always been the case historically in spite of technological progress and increasing efficiency.

In retrospect it can be said: "Die Geister, die ich rief, die werde ich nicht mehr los."¹ Technology has always opened up opportunities to relieve nature, but in the end more and more people have more and more polluted nature on an increasingly higher consumption level. This is called the rebound effect (see J. Neyrinck's book "Der göttliche Ingenieur").

Overcoming the rebound effect is the central global issue for the attainment of a sustainable development. This rebound effect can be found everywhere. Computers get ever smaller but the amount of electronic waste permanently increases. The so-called "paperless office" is the place with the highest paper use in the history of humankind. Despite telecommunication we travel more and more, not less. While we travel, we use the possibilities of telecommunication and already organize the next trip.

This means technology is always only an opportunity. The simultaneous incorporation of necessary limitations into the world economic system through global contracts is required, however, to convert this opportunity into a solution.

The current free trade logic of the WTO is not in a position to do this. We have to further develop the regulatory framework of the WTO in terms of content or rather suitably link it with international agreements on the protection of the environment and employees and, i.e., international agreements on the protection of children in regard to child labor.

Once again this is bound to fail today because especially the poorest countries find it necessary not to have to obey such standards (even though they actually find them useful), because only this offers them chances on the world market.

1. Citation from Johann Wolfgang Goethe: "The spirits that I called will not withdraw."


If only the rich countries offer the poorer ones reasonable perspectives and co-financing, i.e., in accordance with the logic of the EU extension processes, it might be possible for them all to consent to sign the necessary contracts together. The initiative for a Global Marshall Plan intends to reach such a global contract for a sustainable future, overcoming poverty and caring for world peace.

The social question as key issue: the overcoming of global apartheid

Seen correctly, sustainable development today is mainly an issue of agreements that are required between North and South or between rich and poor. Environmental standards and regulations are important here for environmental protection. They need to be implemented globally and should be combined with the co-financing of development that would permit the poorer countries to still catch up economically in this process. Or to put it differently, this concerns a perspective for a global social balance in compliance with the observance of environmental concerns. Prof. Töpfer, who comes from Germany and is in charge of the global environment issue in the UN, is of the opinion that today the global social issue is the most central issue for the attainment of a sustainable development.

In order to treat the social question one first has to determine how to measure the extent of social balance in countries. The EU logic takes as a criterion the comparison of lowest income in relation to average income. According to EU logic nobody should have less income than about half of the average (gross national product per capita) in the respective country. This corresponds to a so-called equity of 50 percent.

This should be put in contrast to an extreme communism, which has an equity of 100 percent. Historically we know that too high a social balance does not really function. It is too discouraging and does not boost economic competitiveness. Instead, differentiations are necessary, including the possibility that certain major players can earn e.g. twenty times or more the average income, even if perhaps there should not be too many of them.



Correspondingly it is inevitable that most people's income is below average. But of how many and how much? If one looks at the successful states in this world, they all have an equity above 45 percent. Germany has about 57 percent, Northern Europe and Japan above 60 percent. The only successful country with an equity below 50 percent is the USA with about 47 percent. India and China are not much below that.

Empirically all the successful, which means all the per capita rich countries of this world, have an equity factor of between 45 and 65 percent in regard to social balance. In terms of content it can be explained why countries below an equity of 45 percent cannot be successful, why a country with too low a social balance must be poor in regard to the gross national product per capita.

The underlying reason for this is that such countries cannot invest enough in the education and health of all citizens. Colonial or apartheid structures with a large number of service personnel on the lowest education and income level are the outcome and must make a country really poor from a per capita perspective.

At this point the neo-liberal, market-fundamentalist argument collapses. If one takes socialist or communist societies as a basis it may be true that the increase of inequity makes a country richer and is advantageous for (almost) all people. But beginning with an equity of about

65 percent this statement is not true anymore, and at the latest with an equity below 45 percent, it is wrong.

The impossibility to find enough qualified teachers or doctors under such low equity conditions in order to educate the whole population well, keep it healthy, etc., means that in the end too many people will not have sufficient value added potential, at least not on an international level

Those who do cannot additionally also earn the money for their service personnel in a per capita perspective. Among the big states on this globe the lowest equity factors can therefore be found today in countries, which have a comparatively low gross national product per capita and still have conditions reminiscent of former colonial or apartheid regimes, as, e.g., Latin America (e.g., Brazil) or Africa (South Africa included) with equity factors of only about 27-30 percent.

Naturally this inequity also slows down growth in the long run. Truly high growth can only be permanently reached, if equity is developed parallel to the extension of economic activities in the direction of a level of at least 45 percent. India and China therefore have better prospects today than Latin America or Africa to become a rich part of the world someday.

The biggest problem on this earth today, however, is not the unfavorable conditions in most countries. Far worse is the state of inequity of the whole globe, if seen as an economic unit which increasingly becomes the right way of looking at things in times of globalization.

The whole globe today is on an equity level below 12.5 percent. This is global apartheid, but one which is significantly intensified compared to the former conditions in South Africa. This is an absolutely intolerable condition. It signals that inequities on this globe today primarily exist between and not within countries.

The world gross national product per capita today lies somewhere near 5,000 Euro. According to the European definition of poverty when applied to the globe no human being should have less funding financial means than 2,500 Euro per year, which means certainly not below 6 Euro per day. De facto three billion people are below 2 Euros, one billion among them even below 1 Euro per day. This condition is

absolutely not compatible with peace and is also associated with hatred and opposition. The course of events on 9/11/2001 can be interpreted very well within this context. It corresponds to the pattern of all previous revolutions in world history.

This is not supposed to mean that the poorest instigate revolutions or put up actual resistance. They are much too tired for this, too worn out, and too weak. Poverty and injustice, however, lead to other constellations in which other persons at the heart of the system think they are justified to act as – self-appointed – representatives of the poor or act according to their interests. In this context it has to be pointed out that less than 4,000 people died on 9/11.

From the USA's point of view this justifies preventive wars today of the world's strongest power against comparatively weak states that are seen as a threat or rather are described that way because certain weapons they have could eventually become a problem in the hands of terrorists. But it has to be called to mind that every day 24,000 people on this globe starve to death. Since 9/11/2001 every day 24,000 people have starved to death.

Even if most people and especially promoters of power in the North do not want to hear that they are perhaps partly responsible for this starvation, most people on this globe know the difference. This is also the author's position. But essentially they are the weaker human beings and they live in states that cannot put up resistance.

They have to endure whatever countries with a stronger economy and military impose on them. With mendacious arguments like "equal opportunities for all" (under a completely unequal starting point) they also even try to "sell" this as being just, which is intolerable and unjust – a double degradation.

But these players at the heart of the system should not think that people will ever accept this. Hatred builds up and looks for outlets. We should not be surprised about the results and the situation that emerge from it, especially with regard to terrorist and suicide attacks.

This is the greatest challenge for a sustainable development. The continuing deregulation of the markets alone does not bring the answer.

Those wanting security in a globalized economy cannot put the responsibility for globalization's social consequences on the poor nation-states in the South of this globe. What is needed instead is a transition to a world domestic policy that is oriented in the way the EU organizes its extension processes.

We would then all be responsible together for social development worldwide and overcoming of poverty and would be jointly working to build up worldwide powerful infrastructures, to strengthen the woman's role, to establish educational and pension systems and so forth. This would lead to a condition where the global population does not grow anymore. The number of people would some day even shrink from the now foreseeable nine to ten billion people for the year 2050, instead of continuously increasing as has been the case up to now.

Peace between cultures: cornerstones of a sustainable development

The interaction between cultures and the cultural context as such are a significant part of the already mentioned (global) social issue. The social unfolds within the framework of culture and culture reflects tradition. Tradition is, among other things, defined by what and how grandmothers and grandfathers pass on certain views on the world and on life to their grandchildren. Cultural imprints therefore reach very deeply and are not easily changed. In addition, they also contain a serious potential for psychological and emotional injuries, because a very deep sense of belonging, as well as tradition and expectations coming from childhood and youth, are directly affected.

Substantial cultural issues, among other things, concern the inter-generational interaction, as well as the relation between man and woman, and the public treatment of sexuality. These spheres of life have highest humane significance and are partly tabooed in many cultures. Cultural memory easily lasts from fifty to two hundred years and more. Social changes of cultural patterns in these areas can succeed in a peaceful way at best over longer periods of time. Globalization does not allow such periods of adjustment any longer because of the tight eco-

nomie link between all the countries and the global availability of information.

The new washes like a tidal wave after a dam failure over unprepared societies. No one even asks if something might be wrong with Western culture any more. And this is so, though there is still no unequivocal and definite answer to the question of who is right on this globe.

Will conservative, largely prohibitive cultures be the most sustainable in the long run or will it be the nearly unlimited free West where (almost) anything is possible? What is the effect of this limitlessness in the West for social solidarity or sustainability?

If compatibility with peace is the goal, globalization processes should, at any rate, be shaped so that they support peace and balance between cultures and not aggravate conflicts. An integral issue is thus cultural balance and a dignified interaction with one another, no matter who is momentarily stronger or weaker in regard to economy, technology, or the military.

Especially money and power should not always decide alone which person, organization, or culture may assert itself in a conflict situation, even if this only means that the children of the "losers" are flooded with information and offers of a kind not permissible in the respective other cultural context. This is also concerning subtle seductions or rather economic impacts which have problematic effects upon the life patterns of the respective defeated culture. To make the point even clearer, what happened in regard to the extensive extermination of the Native Americans and their culture in America or the enslavement and cultural rape of substantial parts of the African population during Colonialism owing to the superiority of Western culture in respect to economy, technology, and weaponry, should never happen that way again. Nor should it be done in a subtly concealed way under the guise of free economic processes that are formally directed towards equal opportunities, but do this on an absolutely asymmetrical basis which inherently can never be fair because true equal opportunities do not exist a priori.

On the other hand, this also means that a reasonable global social balance, a (world) equity à la EU poverty definition would be a very important prerequisite for attaining more improved

balanced conditions between the cultures than is the case today. All investments in a higher global social balance are therefore also investments in a higher cultural balance. This is true already for the reason that as a consequence of this higher balance other cultures are more able to economically defend themselves against the currently dominating Western model than before.

This observation has to be linked to another demand concerning social balance (one that exceeds a high equity), namely, that groups of people who are clearly separable according to categories like skin color, religion, language, gender, etc., should be equally equipped with material goods. It is not very compatible with peace, if the world's poor are obviously amassed in some of these categories, with the result that belonging to one of these groups is already a poverty risk.

By way of comparison, it should be remembered here that a German federal state like, i.e., Baden-Wuerttemberg has gone to a considerable amount of effort to provide balance between its two territorily and culturally separable parts, "Baden" and "Wuerttemberg," even though there are comparatively small material and cultural differences. And then one should think about the little effort being made for balance on this globe between, e.g., a rich Western culture and an Islamic world that feels it is being treated unfair and how much fuel is regularly added to the fire by the West in a provoking and self-complacent manner.

Consequentially this also means that purely individualistically oriented human rights, as especially seen in Anglo-Saxon areas, are not adequate for a balance of cultures. Human rights should be seen instead in conjunction with human obligations, as described in a very nice book published by Helmut Schmidt. This way one would forge a bridge between the Western way of thinking and Asian philosophy which is much more oriented towards solidarity within groups.

Today's overemphasizing of individual rights (e.g., the unconditioned right of free movement) and requiring such rights from poorer countries, which are trying hard to develop, can be absolutely rated as eco- or resource-dictatorial aggression. This is a very subtle mechanism

which helps richer countries prevent poorer countries from developing speedily by demanding the "impossible," namely, conditions which we also could not realize or pay for at the time when we were on a similarly low level of development as these countries are today.

World ethos and fair global contract²

As described above, the main subject is a fair global contract which we have to agree on, if sustainability and compatibility with peace is to be reached. Such a contract has to be fair and find consent from all sides. If this is the goal, dialogues between cultures play a very important role. The contributions of the Parliament of the World's Religions but also efforts to formulate a world ethos (Prof. Küng) should serve as an example. In such discussion processes common universal ethical principles are worked out, upon which all the major cultures and religions of this world can agree.

If one pursues this goal honestly, the intactness of nature and integrity of every individual human being as well as human dignity and equality prove to be the most important issues. One also has to especially prevent *de facto* double standards from being established, which happens quite often today. For example, the USA has attacked Iraq, because it allegedly boycotted resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Israel, however, does the same thing but this is not even worth mentioning, especially not by the USA which nonetheless tries to present itself as a guarantor of fairness and justice.

A world ethical design is not an easy topic. Of course one will be confronted with extreme positions which cannot be tolerated under any circumstance, not even temporarily, like female genital mutilation or stoning of convicted persons within the context of the Sharia in some Islamic countries. However, the West should certainly take a look at itself as well. The judicial system of the USA not only still applies the death penalty, but even applies the death penalty to children. Next to Somalia the USA is the only country in this world that did not sign the world children convention for exactly that reason.

2. This is the special concern of the Foundation Global Contract (www.weltvertrag.org), where the author is chairman of the committee.

In the USA we still also find a religious fundamentalism that is not only fighting actively against all UN measures taken with regard to the issue of reproductive rights, but also implementing “creationism” as an official alternative to biological evolution in school. The same applies to Israel’s religiously justified takeover of the Palestinian land, repeatedly referring to alleged rights going back thousands of years and thus running diametrically contrary to international law.

A discussion on ethical standards, for which a consensus has to be attempted on this globe, must also then name not just one but all the other fundamentalisms and also try to make changes there. This is true, at least, if the goal is to have such an order be accepted in the hearts of all people, including the population of the major Arabian states.

In any case, the good coexistence of Catholics and Protestants in Germany, for example, shows that a conflict like the one in Northern Ireland should essentially not be understood as being religiously motivated or impossible to overcome. This is not primarily a conflict between cultures (meaning a battle of cultures) or a conflict between two forms of Christianity. This rather concerns the overcoming of certain unjust constellations defined in practical life sometimes by religion, sometimes by language, sometimes by skin color, as already described above. Islam per se is also not a religion excluding modernization and secularization processes right from the start. The “hearings dimension” in Islam is a bridge that can be further developed for democracy.

Compared to other religions the tolerance of Islamic states in the Middle Ages was exemplary. The incorporation of women in science in some Islamic countries took place much sooner than in the West. This means that there are obviously prospects for the further development of the Islam and Islamic states towards a reasonable global contract. Work has to be done here as well for a world ethics. This is more onerous than a quick military strike and requires more intelligence, namely, empathy, which is the ability to abstract from one’s own position and to attempt to understand the other and also to learn from him or her. This means one should not be presumptuous and always know everything better, but rather be humble instead.

What is necessary now: the 10~>4:34 formula for a balanced way

What is happening on the world order level is crucial for coping with the problems described above and for the challenges. Of particular importance is what we do to suitably link, e.g., the WTO with other regimes and with other global regulatory systems. Therefore we ought to strive for an ecosocial consensus. If we tackle this in the right way, then we will actually have a reasonable, which is ecosocial, perspective for the world. It is conceivable to transfer a growth factor 10 over the next fifty to one hundred years towards a four-fold rise of wealth in the North of this globe in addition to the corresponding possible rise of growth of 34 times in the South of the globe.

The North would move from 80 percent of the “pie” to 32 percent of the tenfold volume of world economy. As a consequence of this development the South could move from today’s 20 percent of the “pie” towards 68 percent of the then tenfold larger global gross national product. This would be 34 times of the low gross national product, today. In growth rates this corresponds to an average growth rate of 2.8 percent in the North, in the South to an average growth rate of about 8 percent over fifty years. This is better than today’s ratios in India, worse than the ratio in China and overall not unrealistic. Countries catching up must primarily only copy and therefore can reach high growth rates. Countries at the top, rich countries, must invent innovations. In fact, fundamental considerations make it plausible that (honest) growth rates above 1 – 2 percent are hardly possible in developed rich countries.

The sometimes surprisingly higher growth rates of the USA are, next to the indirect effects of purely speculative financial market bubbles, mainly a result of other accounting methods, ones in which technological progress is valued as growth way beyond market prices (so-called hedonic accounting). For systematic reasons this might be quite legitimate, but as long as other countries do not do the same, comparisons are misleading. The discussed limitation in rich countries to a 1-2 percent growth refers to the

fact that hedonic accounting is not standard with the result that growth is usually assessed at market prices.

If we, however, reasonably combine worldwide both the high growth rates of catching up countries together with the lower ones (similarly high or even higher in absolute growth) of rich countries, we could find ourselves in a situation by the year 2050 where the people in the North are on a per capita average not twenty times as rich as the people in the South like today's "global apartheid." Instead they would only be about twice as rich, which makes them simultaneously on average four times as rich as today. This would be a level of balance à la European Union and certainly open up a perspective for a world democracy. This is not much different from the opportunity now arising from the EU's design processes offered to Europe by the European Convention.

In this respect, the ecosocial model opens a promising future perspective. It is an approach that takes human dignity and environmental protection equally serious and parts with simple solution philosophies. In this view a further increase of deregulation and social inequity will not solve the problems lying ahead of us. But hopefully the activation of market forces under reasonable framework conditions of a social-cultural-ecological kind will. The author actually gives this promising program for sustainability only a 35 percent probability. What would then be the alternatives? This question will be dealt with further below after preliminary considerations on prosperity, growth, and social balance.

Prosperity, growth, social balance: some new results

For some years now the author has been working very closely on the connection of prosperity, growth, and social balance, mainly within the context of the EU project TERRA³. This has already been partially discussed in the above. If prosperity is to be understood as a per capita high gross national product, a difference has to first be made between rich and poor countries. All rich countries in this world have a high social balance, more precisely an equity

between 45 and 65 percent and they are all democracies. There are reasons inherent to the system why equity in states with high prosperity can, on the one hand, not be above 65 percent and, on the other, also not be below 45 percent. For one this concerns a sufficient honoring of top performances and risk-taking and therefore sufficient differentiation (no equity above 65 percent). Secondly this also concerns the possibility to secure excellent education, medical care, infrastructure access and equal opportunities for the overall population. The latter requires an appropriate number of well-paid specialists such as doctors, teachers etc. The result from this is a social level of balance of at least 45 percent.

In rich countries growth essentially only happens through innovation. Scientific research must be supported, innovations have to be carried out and implemented in markets. Democracies with a substantial support of scientific research and technology offer the best opportunities for this. Growth rates are reduced to a good 1-2 percent if a hedonic accounting is not permitted. Taking into account the wealth of these countries this is, however, quite much.

The situation for countries catching up is quite different. These countries are comparatively poor. Partly they do not have a high social balance. Since they are lying so far behind, they can, in any case, reach high growth rates, already from the fact that they copy solutions and at the same time involve increasingly more people in a formalized economy. Growth rates up to 10 percent are conceivable (leapfrogging), though by far not self-evident. A democracy is not really the most favorable structure for the organization of such catching up processes. Authoritarian systems like in Singapore, Taiwan or in China today can be of advantage, even though Japan, on the other hand, has shown that at least under the specific Japanese democracy high growth has also been possible.

Countries can only become really rich, however, if a high equity exists, as was and is the case in Japan, Korea, and also Singapore, and is indicated in China and India. Democratic structures seem to be necessary at least when catching up processes are coming towards their end.

3. TERRA (www.terra-2000.org)

When taking this point of view, unlike China or even India, countries like Brazil and South Africa do not stand much of a chance to become rich per capita, unless the problem of social balance is solved at some point. In Brazil, among other things, another distribution of the land (land reform) must finally be carried out. To this very day, former colonial patterns of “above” and “below” continue to have an effect in these countries, just like in South Africa where old apartheid structures in the economic and educational areas still have not really been overcome, even though there has been some progress at least.

A certain moral dilemma lies in the fact that the rich of the corresponding countries are not always very interested in the increase of a per capita prosperity. Because of the much lower equity rate in a country with e.g., an equity of about 30 percent there are more people of a set absolute prosperity level than in a per capita country twice as rich with an equity rate of 60 percent. This means there are more rich people with more than ten times the average income than there are rich people in the rich country with five times the average income. There are more rich people in an absolute sense, in a relative one anyhow. Moreover, they profit additionally from very inexpensive personnel services, which actually cannot be financed to a great extent in rich countries with a high equity factor.

Under a corresponding inequity the elite also have a great many ways to stabilize their own position politically and intellectually by the use of financial means. Whereas the socially weaker side, which makes up the great majority of the population, is not even in a position to organize a corresponding intellectual counter-process even though under formally democratic conditions.

This can partly also be seen in the USA today. “The top of the pyramid” has e.g. succeeded in directing intellectual-political activity towards abolishing the estate tax. If it can manage to successfully repeal or substantially reduce the estate tax, substantial funds through think tanks and universities that are used by the “top” for political influencing would be invested in an extremely “value adding” way and would flow back to the rich investors with extremely high return.

Ways to disaster: exploitation until collapse or resource-dictatorial security regimes

In the above the ecosocial, sustainable global regulatory framework was given only a 35 percent probability to be successful in the sense of the world establishing a global ecosocial market economy and the question of alternatives was raised. Two alternatives are imminent in the future. One of them is that we just go on like we have been and as if we can keep on abusing the ecological and social systems worldwide as much as we want. One day though we will undermine the basis upon which our future and the future of our children depends. We will run into extreme scarcities, in the areas of water, food, and energy or in form of too high CO₂ emissions. There will be hell to pay as people try to secure scarce and too scarce resources and pollution rights for themselves in a race that will on no account open up any kind of perspective for anybody in the long run.

E.g., this means that “ecologically we will be up against a brick wall” and the situation concerning environmental problems is uncertain. This is the angst scenario of all the greens and people who are environmentally aware on this globe. The author, however, does not believe this scenario to be very likely.

He believes that humankind, especially the rich world, will not be so stupid as to further go on continuing in today’s disastrous way, as this would destroy its own basis. From the author’s point of view this disastrous way has maybe 10-15 percent probability. To put it even more clearly, in regard to ownership and property issues the top of the pyramid is usually obsessive and takes hard and brutal actions against any development threatening what it feels are its legitimate property interests.

Historically every possible means, from lawyers, the police, even the military, has been used to protect property no matter what it cost. The author therefore believes that things would not be any different, if it ever came to global serious resource conflicts or to conflicts resulting from environmental problems (i.e., in regard to the CO₂ problem). Although the position is taken here that we are not up against an ecolog-

ical brick wall quite yet, this does not necessarily mean that we will come to a reasonable sustainable solution.

From the author's point of view, this does mean with about 85 percent probability that we will deal more sensibly in world economy in the long run with the problem of physical or environmental borders than we do today. The author also believes that we will find solutions that will somehow integrate the last scarcities, in other words, physical necessities, into the world economic system.

The problem of how to avoid an ecological catastrophe is thus shifted to one of how burdens are to be distributed.

There are two possibilities left. One of them is the ecosocial way, a fair contract. This is what has been described above in detail and was given a 35 percent probability. But there is an alternative, at first unimaginable, but upon longer thought a quite obvious, seductive perspective, namely, an eco- or rather resource dictatorship in connection with a security regime. This third case is from the author's point of view the most probable (50 percent). Here, the rich North will some day deny growth to the poor South, like the rich prefer to do to the poor, just because a "business as usual" approach cannot be ecologically endured, if the poor do in the end what the rich always have. Here the rich would especially have to hamper the development of the poor countries (i.e., relatively soon in China) or even destabilize them. Since all rich countries are democracies we must ask ourselves if something like this is conceivable.

If one looks at what has been happening in politics in the recent past, especially the politics of the USA since 9/11/2001 and of Israel since Prime Minister Sharon came into office, elements of such an eco- or resource-dictatorial security-oriented strategy can easily be detected. In Israel, this can especially be examined by looking at the permanent destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure through Israel's military and, e.g., in the withholding of medical assistance for seriously ill Palestinians. This is, for example, pushed through by imposing curfews and by the refusal of passage at checkpoints for ambulances on the way to hospitals. Medical aid organizations working in Palestinian territo-

ry are constantly complaining about this scandalous situation. From what these non-governmental organizations say, an absolute persistent atrocity is happening there right in front of the world without audible protest from the democratic states.

The USA's refusal to contribute fairly to the Kyoto Protocol is unmasking. This is even truer for the USA's almost obsessive fight against an International Criminal Court. Symptomatic is the USA's regular refusal to move within the framework of fair global contracts, as well as its persistent demand for special, strongly individual oriented human rights in poor countries which are unable to pay for all of this. The efforts on the OECD level point in a similar direction, e.g., to only give national guaranty for credits for investments in poorer countries, if products of the highest technological standards are bought. This way if there is no co-financing, poorer countries are deprived of a great part of their competitiveness.

The USA's fight against measures taken by the United Nation in regard to the issue of reproductive health policy is also especially serious. All this naturally makes development more difficult. The least acceptable of all is the USA's persistent insistence on the right to decide all alone, whether an aggression is at hand, against which it may operate pre-emptively and in correspondence, for example, with the USA's new military strategic doctrines. This leads to arbitrary measures from the point of view of all parties involved. The unjustifiable pre-emptive war against Iraq proves this pattern, especially if this is seen in the context of Israel's non-observance of resolutions of the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council and the consequences that followed.

With the Iraq War the USA has put its cards on the table. This war has neither been legitimized by the UN charter nor the UN. This is rather a classical war of aggression by a nation for the enforcement and protection of its own albeit officially stated interests, which are attempts to protect itself against a perceived danger. In view of the low probability of these dangers and the still comparatively small damages in the worst case scenario, the damage done to a humiliated Arabian world exceeds them by far.

What is left is an attempt to portray this as an act of liberation or to legitimize it morally and ethically for which an inhuman despot like Saddam Hussein offers a good point of departure. However, if the USA were interested in helping human rights gain global acceptance, a Global Marshall Plan would offer many possibilities to do this in a peaceful way. This would mean, however, that one would have to use own money for others, for instance in the form of a 1-2 percent co-financing of development. But that is out of the question. Money is preferably put into the own military and everything possible is done to secure one's own position, even if the indirect consequence for others are serious problems and many killings.

If one compares the ratio of dead and wounded on both sides in the most recent Iraq War, the risks of the attacking side in this kind of war can be compared to the voluntary risks taken by hunters in big-game hunting. This has nothing to do with a classical idea of war. If one has night vision aid and the enemy does not, this is almost as if one is fighting against the blind. If one's own weapons reach much farther than those of the enemy the risk primarily consists of flukes or rather "friendly fire."

An encroachment à la Iraq War is, if understood correctly, resource-dictatorial and substantially asymmetrical. It stakes everything to a full extent on the safeguarding of one's own property interests, no matter what the others will have to pay for this. One does not have to be surprised if the poor side, the weak side, does not find this just and fair and tries to defend itself somehow. How can "David" defend himself against "Goliath?" This leads to terror and even more terror and in the long run the consequences cannot be controlled. Terror will be answered with even more national "counter-terror," followed by new terror, e.g., by suicide attacks. This kind of resistance is hard to fight against and incidentally can cost us our civil rights and liberties in the defensive actions against terror. This process has already progressed a good deal in the USA. Suicide attacks require that people who think they are freedom fighters are willing to sacrifice their lives for a belief.

How wrongly organized must a world be, how much hatred must a world order provoke to

cause such reactions? Can there be nothing learned from this, i.e., about the violations done to others, maybe even unconsciously and unintentionally?

The rich North must seriously give thought to whether it wants to continue in its currently unrestrained way or whether the European model of balance in the form of a global ecosocial market economy is the better alternative. This costs 1 to 2 percent of the global gross national product for co-financing in form of a Global Marshall Plan. As has already been mentioned above, such a plan has e.g. been suggested by former US Vice-President Al Gore. Basically it is amazing how a chance for peace and sustainable development can open up so inexpensively with an intelligent instead of a dogmatic approach. It is even more surprising to see what kind of intellectual effort is made on the side of the biggest winners from the current deregulated structures of world economy to not pay this price and what kind of willingness exists to invest instead the corresponding means into more and more armament instead of humane developments around the globe.

Ecosocial market economy as the probably only realistic opportunity

It is quite obvious that today's hope for a better future and a sustainable development is primarily put upon Europe and the developed Asian national economies. Together we must win the USA over to another view on the issue at hand. Therefore; we must be especially prepared to say that certain things are right and certain things are wrong, so that our silence does not give the impression that we implicitly agree at some points where we cannot agree. Seen this way the principal objection to the Iraq War by the majority of the world was the only just position. Within this context the world civil society, the NGO's like Amnesty International, Medecins sans frontiers, BUND, Greenpeace, Stiftung Weltbevölkerung, Terres des Hommes etc, as well as the Rotarians, Lions, and other service movements have a big influence on the forming of the global opinion, on facilitating understanding, and enlightenment in the truest sense of this philosophical position. It is important that these organizations speak out.

Great hopes are put in this context on the new information-technological opportunities of networking the world civil society which are used more and more efficiently. If one only succeeds in the struggle for a better world order to win over each year one more person who stands up for a new, better solution and who at the same time wins over an additional person per year with the same belief and so on and so forth, then this snowball system will reach every human being in thirty-three years, as 2^{33} makes eight billion. When it comes to such an important issue, it should be possible to be convinced that one person per capita and year can be found.

This situation today puts a special political responsibility on Europe. Because of this the introduction of the EURO was so important. Because of this the extension of the EU is important. Because of this the strengthening of the EU is important. In this difficult world this should also include building up the military strength of the EU in order to act independently

in regard to these central issues of world order and to be able to speak at eye level with the USA.

Is ecosocial market economy a chance or a utopian dream? For reaching a peaceful sustainable future an ecosocial market economy probably is the only chance we have and maybe the best innovation ever made in the political area, namely, the linking of reasonable balancing mechanisms and strict measures for environmental protection with the power of the markets and the potential of innovations. The present initiative for an eco-social Global Marshall Plan tries to bring this future into life, aiming at the implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals for 2015 as an intermediate step. One can only hope that Europe, a continent with a difficult history and still incomplete identification and integration process, can in this difficult phase of world politics despite the split in regard to the Iraq issue take on the responsibility momentarily weighing heavily on this part of the world.

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The role of social and cultural capital in the development process

by Bernardo Kliksberg*

The new debate regarding development

At the close of the 20th century, mankind possesses enormous productive resources. The technological revolutions underway have substantially altered mankind's potential capacity to generate goods and services. Simultaneous progress in fields such as information science, biotechnology, robotics, microelectronics, telecommunications, material science and other areas has led to significant breaks in standard production models, expanding them significantly with a continuous forward-moving growth horizon. However, 1.3 billion persons lack the bare essentials and live in extreme poverty with a per capita income of less than one dollar per day, 3 billion are at the poverty level and subsist on less than two dollars per day, 1.3 billion do not have access to drinking water, 3 billion have no basic sanitation facilities, and 2 billion have no electricity.

It is more feasible than ever before to achieve the desired goal of economic and social development in terms of technology and productive potential, but at the same time that goal seems farther removed from vast segments of the population on different continents, including Latin America.

The planet has been transformed into a "global village" where interrelations among countries and markets continually multiply, characterized in part by a boom in complexity, contradictory evolutionary directions, and high doses of uncertainty. Among the explorers of the frontiers of new realities, Ylia Prygogine (1988), Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, has stated that most of the structures of current reality are "open-ended dissipative structures," making it difficult to predict the direction in which they will evolve. Traditional logic has proven incapable of explaining what course they will take. Edgar Morin (1991) points out that instead of the "end of history" forecast by those who claimed that, with the disappearance of bipolar stress, world history would become predictable and even "boring," what we are actually witnessing is how, "from this point forward, the future will go by the name of uncertainty." History today is characterized by serious contradictions. Consequently, while available technological know-how has, for

example, increased our capacity to dominate nature, mankind has simultaneously created vast environmental imbalances, endangering the foundations of ecosystems and even its own survival. While productive capacities have increased worldwide production to over 25 trillion dollars, social polarization has increased considerably and, according the United Nations reports (1998), 358 individuals possess an accumulated wealth exceeding of that of 45% of the world's population. Some disparities invade even the most basic aspects of daily life. By 1997, accelerated progress in medicine had extended life expectancy considerably to 78 years in the 26 richest countries, compared to a significant drop that same year to 53 years in the 46 poorest countries.

The concept of indefinite progress is being replaced by visions that assign a greater role to complexities, contradictions, and uncertainties while endeavoring to find solutions by integrating them with an analysis of reality.¹

A new debate in the development field is being fomented within this general framework. Searching for more effective paths in a world where the day-to-day life of numerous social sectors is weighed down by acute shortages and it is estimated that a third of the active worldwide population is seriously affected by unemployment or under-employment, the debate is examining assumptions unsubstantiated by facts and beginning to consider variables to which minimal importance had been assigned in past decades.

A reevaluation of aspects not included in conventional economic thought has taken hold in this new debate. One powerful area of analysis has emerged through associating vertiginous growth with the concept of "social capital." One of the targets of this area, which in turn has its own specificity, is the reassessment of relationships between culture and development. As Lourdes Arizpe (1998) states, "culture has become the last unexplored frontier of international efforts to promote economic growth." Enrique V. Iglesias (1997) stresses that there is a vast field with great potential in this reassessment of relationships between culture and development. He goes on to say:

there are diverse aspects in the culture of each people that can promote economic and social development. These must be found, reinforced

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1. Morin highlights the difficulties encountered in getting a clear view of the direction history is taking: "We are in uncharted territory that moreover, has no name. Our familiarity with our times is manifested only in the formless prefix, 'post' (post-industrial, post-modern, post-structuralist), or the negative prefix 'anti' (antitotalitarian). We cannot give a face to our future; not even our present."

and used as building blocks. To accomplish this responsibly means to revamp the development agenda so that it will ultimately be more effective, having taken into account actual potentialities derived from its essence that have, to date, been generally ignored.

Within the context of this groundswell of support for a renewed debate on the conventional views of development and the integration of new dimensions, this paper strives to put into perspective a relevant topic of the discussion at hand; namely, the possibilities of social and cultural capital as contributors to social and economic development. The paper specifically focuses on potential contributions to Latin America, a region with serious problems of poverty (affecting widespread sectors of the population) and inequality (considered to be the most skewed continent on the planet). Most assuredly, the integration of these planes will make the search for appropriate strategies and designs even more complex, but that's precisely the idea, since policies based on designs that exclude aspects such as those previously mentioned have proven to have profound limitations.

This paper aims to achieve its objective through analyses prepared at separate but successive moments in time. First, it outlines the different aspects of the crisis in conventional economic thought, incorporating the recent focus on social and cultural capital. Secondly, in this particular case, it explores the idea of social capital, emphasizing its presence in everyday events rather than discussing theory. Thirdly, using prior developments as a starting point, "social capital" is observed "in action" in Latin America in order to examine why social and cultural capital constitute such powerful instruments of historic construction through an evaluation of specific experiences in the region. Lastly, a number of reflections are made regarding the possible contributions of culture to Latin American development.

The crisis in conventional economic thought

At this time, a number of diverse lines of discussion are actively examining the economic assumptions that have guided development in

recent decades. The debate as it stands does not appear to be confined to academic circles, where different schools of thought or individuals defend specific approaches derived from their own speculations. Rather, it has been strongly influenced by the difficulties encountered in current conventional thought. These difficulties have stimulated the debate, driven by processes such as the severe problems faced by the economies of Southeast Asia, the crises observed in economies in transition –such as, for example, the Russian economy–, the marked instability of international financial markets, the divergences and social polarizations in regions like Latin America, etc. Thanks to major strides made in terms of quantifying economic and social phenomena, it appears to be a debate where the infinite speculation based on personal premises so characteristic of previous decades has been replaced by analyses parting from the vast range of empirical evidence generated by quantitative and statistical instruments.

A primary characteristic of the current crisis is the growing insistence that the complexity of reality be respected. Warnings are being leveled against the "epistemological arrogance" applied by conventional economic thought to different problems in an attempt to understand or resolve them from a reference framework based on groups of limited, almost exclusively economic variables, leaving no room for other types of variables. Joseph Stiglitz (April 1998) claims that "one principle of the emerging consensus is that a greater degree of humility is required." He opts for a new post-Washingtonian consensus in light of the difficulties that arise in everyday life. Latin America, he says, is one of the cases that exemplifies such difficulties and states: "I would argue that the Latin American experience suggests that we should reexamine, rebuild and expand knowledge that is taken to be true regarding a developing economy, while planning the next series of reforms."

Another important aspect of the new discussion regarding development is the increasingly generalized appeal to surpass reductionist approaches and to search for perspectives that integrate multiple variables in order to capture their complexity. As Enrique Iglesias (1997) warns, "Development can only be undertaken

integrally; monist approaches simply do not work.” Joseph Stiglitz (October 1998) points out that development has been perceived “as a technical problem that requires technical solutions,” a vision in conflict with a reality that surpasses it by far. He emphasizes that “a turning point has been that while many countries have followed the dictates of liberalization, stabilization and privatization, which are the core premises of the so-called Washington Consensus, they have not grown. Technical solutions are evidently insufficient.”

One recurring theme of this ongoing discussion stresses avoiding any confusion between end and means, a shortcut taken, it has been suggested, all too frequently. The objectives of development have to do with expanding real opportunities available to individuals in order to develop their potential. A society advances when there is progress in key indicators, such as people’s life span, their quality of life and the development of their potential. Technical goals are absolutely respectable and relevant, but they are only means at the service of these target objectives. If a silent substitution of actual goals by these means takes place, one risks both falling short of the horizon toward which progress should be made and applying the wrong methods to quantify said progress. A rise in the per capita gross product, for example, appears in the new perspective as an important and desirable goal, but only if we do not lose sight of the fact that it is a means at the service of greater objectives, such as nutrition, health, education, freedom and other variables. Consequently, the measurements do not necessarily reflect what is happening in relation to those goals. Amartya Sen (1998) analyzes this general view with respect to human resources in detail. She maintains that the new emphasis being placed on them is a sign of considerable progress; however, it should be understood that the human being is not only the means for the development but also its ultimate goal. We should not lose sight of that vision. Sen goes on to stress that, “if in the final analysis we were to consider development as the expansion of the population’s capacity to engage in freely selected and valued activities, it would be inappropriate to extol human beings as ‘instruments of economic development.’

There is a great difference between the means and the end.”

Stiglitz (October, 1998) emphasizes that the means-end confusion has been frequent in the application of the Washington Consensus:

commercial privatization and liberalization have been considered to be more ends in themselves than the means for achieving sustainable, equitable and democratic growth. Too much emphasis has been placed on price stability instead of on the growth and stability of production. We have failed to recognize that the strengthening of financial institutions is as important for economic stability as controlling the budget deficit and increasing money supplies. The concentration has been on privatization, while insufficient attention has been focused on the institutional infrastructure required to make markets work and, more specifically, on the importance of competition.

These thoughts regarding the limited nature of the exclusively technical approach and the need to delineate ends and means, are used as the starting point for views that expand the objectives development should strive to attain. Along with economic growth there comes a need to achieve social development, improve equality, strengthen democracy, and preserve the environmental balance. The Consensus of American Presidents in Santiago (1998), reflected this series of concerns by including in its plan of action issues that go beyond matters addressed on a daily basis, such as, among others: a focus on promoting education, preserving and improving democracy, justice and human rights, the struggle against poverty and discrimination, the strengthening of financial markets, and regional cooperation in environmental matters.

Noteworthy in the criticism of conventional economics is the way in which the limitations of its analytical framework have generated serious operating insufficiencies. Excluded or bypassed variables such as the political or institutional ones, among others, are actually very important and will significantly impact unforeseen scenarios. To complain about them as “undesirable intruders” serves no real purpose. It would seem that what should be done instead is not make demands on reality, but rather to review the

conceptual scheme used for analysis, so as to assign the proper place to these variables.

Alessina and Peroti (1994), among others, suggest the need for an in-depth examination of the intersections between policy and economics. They point out that: "...economics alone cannot integrally explain the enormous variability between developing countries nor the economic results and policy alternatives on a more general scope. Economic policies are not selected by social planners who live in their ivory towers among academic works, but are rather the result of political struggles within institutional structures."

In this regard, Sen analyzes how political realities are determining factors in the mass famines that have afflicted vast segments of the world's population in this century. According to research (1981), famines are not necessarily the result of a food shortage. They are more often linked to factors such as disparities in relative prices, low salaries, and speculation, all of which are strongly influenced by political conditions. In examining the correlation between mass famine and the type of political regime, Sen (1998) has determined that "no country with a multi-party election system and opposition parties capable of acting as such, as well as a press that can report and question government policies without the fear of censure, has had any really significant famine." Powerful "political incentives" are in place in these countries to make decisions that will prevent famine. Meanwhile, larger-scale famines have tended to occur in "territories colonized and governed by foreign imperialist governments, modern style military dictatorships, those controlled by authoritative potentates, or in single-party regimes where political dissidence is not tolerated."

Institutions Count is the title of a recent paper on this topic by the World Bank (1998). The paper develops, in detail, the view that the entire topic of institutions should be incorporated into the analysis of economic realities and policy design, with these understood as the set of formal and informal rules and implementation mechanisms that influence the behavior of a society's individuals and organizations. Constitutions, laws, regulations, contracts, etc., may be found among the formal mechanisms,

while ethics, confidence, religious precepts, and other implicit codes may be included among the informal ones. According to the World Bank, one of the weaknesses of the Washington Consensus is its failure to include the above among the policies it recommends. The paper states in this regard that: "With one sole exception (the protection of ownership rights), the policies prescribed by the Washington Consensus overlook the potential role that institutional changes can play in jump-starting economic and social development." A broad spectrum of research bears out the important statistical correlation between fundamental institutions that work, such as the anticorruption mechanisms, quality of public institutions, credibility and others, and the progress made in achieving growth, social development, and equality.

The topic of human capital has been included as a central theme among the reformulations of conventional economic thought currently being implemented. To improve the population profile of a country is an end in itself, as Sen has indicated. At the same time, it is a fundamental means of achieving productivity, technological progress, and competitiveness in end-of-the-century scenarios where the role of human capital in production is a decisive factor. In current and future productive structures that are increasingly based on knowledge, the average qualification levels of a society will be pivotal insofar as their possibilities of generating, absorbing, and disseminating advanced technologies are concerned. According to available statistics, education makes a crucial difference both in the life of the people themselves, how families function, and company productivity, as well as in the macroeconomic results of the country. Education is, as it has been called, a "winning" strategy that benefits everyone. On the other hand, nutrition and health are now considered to be fundamental conditions required for the performance of human capital.

The active integration of the analysis of social and cultural capital is incorporated into this composite picture where the difficulties that abound in the real world have generated both a crisis and a process of deep refocusing of economic thought. A wave of research in recent years, supported by field data, shows how vari-

ous invisible components of the daily functioning of a society that are related to the condition of its basic social fiber can silently affect its possibilities of growth and development. These components, called social capital, will be explored in the following section. In some industrialized countries, social capital is beginning to influence policy design and is being included in the preparation of development projects, while institutions for international cooperation are implementing the progress made with respect to social capital among the criteria they use to measure the success of projects.

Multiple cultural elements may be found at the core of social capital. As Arizpe (1997) points out, there are all kinds of practical implications bypassed by conventional thought. Arizpe draws attention to the following fact:

Development theory and politics should incorporate the concepts of cooperation, confidence, ethnicity, community, and friendship because they constitute the social fiber on which politics and economy are based. In many places, the limited market approach based on competition and usefulness has altered the delicate balance among these factors and, consequently, aggravated cultural tensions and feelings of uncertainty.

Social capital and culture have begun to take center stage in the debate concerning development, but not as complementary additions to a vigorous model that is being somewhat further perfected by them. The entire model is experiencing serious difficulties because it is far removed from the facts, and criticism from different sources is aimed one way or another at "recovering reality" to ultimately generate policies with a better chance of achieving the target goals. Within this framework, the participation of social capital and culture in the debate forms part of the effort to bring reality into all discussions regarding development.

The restatement of the model is not being achieved exclusively by including diverse and, until now, absent variables. What is being discussed is a more profound underlying aspect, that is to say, the logic of interaction itself. A significant part of the new debate has focused on analyzing how the reciprocal links among different dimensions have been underestimated, and how this has generated considerable errors in

drafting policies. Alessina and Peroti (1994), for example, highlight a key interrelationship: "... inequality in income is an important determining factor in political instability. Countries with a more unequal distribution of income are politically more unstable, while political instability has, in turn, adverse effects on growth."

The economic, political and social arenas are inextricably linked. What happens in one of them will severely condition what takes place in the others. Experience has shown that a purely economic view of development may, at any given time, confront very serious impediments that have arisen from other sectors.

An integral reevaluation of the relationship between economic growth and social development is now taking place within this framework. From the conventional point of view, it was assumed that once significant economic growth rates had been achieved, this would "trickle down" to the more underprivileged sectors and extricate them from poverty. Growth would simultaneously spark social development. Experience, however, has shown that the relationship between economic and social development to be much more complex in nature. The follow-up on the experiences of numerous countries carried out by the United Nations in its Human Development reports finds no corroboration for the hypotheses of the so-called "trickle down" model. Growth alone is not enough to solve the problem of poverty. Although growth is absolutely indispensable, it can slack off in certain sectors of society and never reach the lower strata. There may also be high growth rates while acute shortages persist among large sectors of the population. James Migdley (1995) mentions that this form of growth has been characteristic of many industrialized and developing countries in recent years, calling it "distorted growth." He confirms that growth has not been accompanied in these countries by improved access to health services, education, public utilities, and other factors that contribute to social well-being. Therefore, he suggests that while there is an immediate need for efforts to achieve growth, active development policies should also be implemented and equitable distribution improved. Sizable and long-range investments in education and health, expansion of services to supply drinking water,

sanitation infrastructure and electricity, and protection for the family, among others, should form part of these policies. In order for growth to be synonymous with collective well-being, it must go hand-in-hand with social development.

The analysis of the relationship between growth and social development has been taken one step further in order to stress their interdependency. President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn (1996) has stated in this regard, "Without parallel social development there will be no satisfactory economic development."

Social development in fact strengthens human capital, empowers social capital, and generates political stability, which are the essential foundations for sound and sustained growth. Alain Touraine (1997) suggests that it is necessary to proceed to a new way of explaining the topic: "thus the core principle of a new social policy will be established: instead of offsetting the effects of economic logic, it should be conceived of as an indispensable condition for economic development."

The ensuing view is that social development is not viable without economic growth, but the latter, in turn, will not be sustainable unless supported by intense social growth.

Another crucial factor analyzed is the relationship between the degree of democracy and social development. Wickrane and Mulford (1996), among others, have examined the respective statistical correlations. Their data indicate that social development indicators improve when democratic participation increases and political power is dispersed among the entire population, and when governments tend to respond more closely to the needs of the majority of the population.

Tallying up factors, Wolfensohn (1998) hints at the need to surpass unilateral approaches:

We should go beyond financial stabilization. We should address the problems of growth with long-term equality, which is the basis for human prosperity and development. We should pay special attention to institutional and structural changes required for economic recovery and sustainable development. We should take care of social problems.

We should do all of this because if we lack the capacity to confront social emergencies, if we do not have longer-range plans to establish sound institutions, if we do not achieve greater social

justice and equality, there will be no political stability. Without political stability there will be no financial stability regardless of the amount of resources we allocate to economic programs.

It is clear from the above description that financial stability cannot be achieved without political stability. The latter in turn is closely linked to the level of social equality and justice. The ground to be covered is extensive and social problems must be tackled at the same time as with economic and financial problems, while institutional transformations move forward.

Social capital and culture are key components of these interactions. By their very essence, people, families, and groups constitute social and cultural capital. They transmit attitudes toward cooperation, values, traditions, and perceptions of reality that define their very identity. If this is ignored, passed over, or deteriorates, then important capabilities that can be used in development will be rendered useless, unleashing powerful resistance. If, on the other hand, their contribution is explored, valued, and reinforced, it may gain considerable relevance and generate "virtuous cycles" along with the other dimensions of development.

The crisis of conventional thought regarding the development that is underway is providing, among other things, an opportunity to actively cross social and cultural capital and development. Until recently, the mainstream of work on development paid little attention to what was happening in those areas. In response, much research was done on the fringes of possible connections with the development process. This crisis, while seeking to expand the underlying scope and overcome the narrow-mindedness exhibited by the normal framework, has also created a vast arena for surmounting isolation. In the following section, an attempt will be made to advance in that direction and explore some of the many potential interrelationships.

Social capital, culture and development

According to a World Bank analysis, there are four basic types of capital: natural capital, comprising the supply of natural resources of a country; constructed capital, generated by peo-

ple and including different forms (infrastructure, capital assets, financial, commercial etc.); human capital, determined by the degree of nutrition, health and education of a country's population; and social capital, a recent discovery in developmental science. At the close of the 20th century, some studies have dedicated a large percentage of national economic development to these last two forms of capital, indicating that therein lie the decisive keys to technological progress, competitiveness, sustained growth, good government, and democratic government.

What then is social capital? There is no commonly accepted definition. It is only from recent research that we can actually set the boundaries of its identity, of what it is and what it isn't. However, although there are considerable imprecisions, the overall impression is that in perceiving and investigating social capital, the development disciplines are acting on and incorporating into the body of knowledge an extremely extensive number of variables previously outside the conventional frame that nonetheless play very important roles.

Precursor of social capital analysis Robert Putnam (1994), in his widely read study of the dissimilarities between Northern and Southern Italy, considers that these basically comprise: the degree of trust existing among the social players of a society, the rules of civic behavior practiced, and their characteristic level of association. These elements demonstrate the wealth and strength of the internal social fiber of a society. Trust, for example, acts to "prevent potential conflicts" by limiting "argumentativeness." As far as civic behavior is concerned, positive attitudes that range from taking care of public spaces to paying taxes contribute to the general good. Membership in a wide variety of associations indicates that a society has the capacity to act in a coordinated manner, set up networks, adopt joint positions, and establish all kinds of inward synergies. According to Putnam's observations, this series of factors has greater presence and depth in Northern Italy than in Southern Italy, and the quality of government, political stability, etc. have played a defining role in the superiority exhibited by the former in terms of economic performance.

According to James Coleman (1990), another of the precursors in the field, social capital appears on both the individual and collective planes. For example, social capital is connected with the individual's degree of social integration and network of social contacts, which entails relations, expectations of reciprocity, and reliable behavior. It improves individual effectiveness. But there is also the common good. For example, if an entire neighborhood adheres to self-understood standards of looking out for each other and of nonaggression, children will be able to walk to school in safety and social capital will generate public order.

Different current analysts of this old-new form of capital emphasize distinct aspects. For Kenneth Newton (1997), among others, social capital can be perceived as a subjective phenomenon composed of values and attitudes that influence relationships among people. It includes trust, standards of reciprocity, attitudes, and values that help individuals transcend conflictive and competitive relationships in order to forge others that are based on cooperation and mutual assistance. Stephan Baas (1997) maintains that social capital has to do with social cohesion and identification with forms of government, as well as cultural expressions and social behavior that make a society more cohesive and greater than the sum of its parts. He also considers that horizontal institutional arrangements have a positive impact on the generation of networks of trust, good government, and social equality. Social capital plays an important role in stimulating solidarity and overcoming market flaws by means of collective actions and the use of community resources. James Joseph (1998) sees it as a vast set of ideas, ideals, institutions, and social arrangements through which people find their voice and mobilize their specific energies in support of public causes. Bullen and Onyx (1998) describe social capital as social networks based on principles of trust, reciprocity, and rules for action.

In his critical assessment, Levi (1996) points out the importance of Putnam's findings, but stresses that more emphasis must be placed on the routes available to the State in the creation of social capital. Levi considers that Putnam's focus on civil associations that have distanced

themselves from the State derives from his romantic view of the community and social capital. This romanticism restricts the identification of alternative mechanisms for creating and using social capital and limits theoretical conceptualizations as well. Wall, Ferrazi and Schryer's (1998) understanding is that the theory of social capital requires greater refining before it can be considered to be a quantifiable generalization. Meanwhile, Serageldin (1998) highlights that while it is generally agreed that social capital is relevant for development, there is no consensus among researchers and practitioners with respect to the particular manner in which it contributes to development, how it can be generated and used, and how it can be empirically applied and studied.

As this completely legitimate epistemological and methodological discussion continues, taking into consideration that systematic studies of this recent topic began less than a decade ago and that the topic itself is enormously complex, social capital continues to give signs of its presence and effective action. This is where our focus lies. A broad body of research that concentrates on "recording it in action" is continually providing new evidence of social capital's influence on development.

These researchers include Knack and Keefer (1996), who econometrically measured the correlations between trust and rules of civic cooperation and economic growth in a wide range of countries, finding that the former have had a very strong impact on the latter. Their study also shows that social capital integrated by those two components is more pronounced in countries less polarized with respect to inequality and ethnic differences.

Narayan and Pritchett (1997) prepared a highly thought-provoking study regarding the degree of associativity and economic performance in rural Tanzanian homes. They discovered that even in contexts of extreme poverty, families with higher income (measured by expenses) were the ones that participated more in collective organizations. The social capital accumulated through that participation benefited them individually and also generated collective benefits by different means, including the following: their agricultural practices were better than

those of households that did not participate in collective organizations, as they obtained information from this participation that encouraged them to use more agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, and improved seeds;

- they obtained better information regarding the market;
- they were willing to take more risks because they felt themselves to be more protected, given that they belonged to a social network;
- they had influence on improving public services and participated more in local schools;
- they cooperated more on a municipal level.

In their conclusions, the researchers state that "the channels identified by those whose income was increased by social capital and the econometric soundness of the scope of the effects of social capital, suggest that social capital is capital, and not merely a consumer good."

La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) tried to validate Putnam's theory among a broad sample of countries. Their statistical analyses showed significant correlations between the degree of trust existing in a society and factors such as judicial efficiency, absence of corruption, quality of the bureaucracy, and payment of taxes. They consider that "Putnam's results for Italy appear to be confirmed on the international level."

Teachman, Paasch, and Carver (1997) tried to quantify how social capital influences the children's performance in school. For this, they used three indicators: family dynamics, community ties, and the number of times a child changed schools. They found a strong link with a key performance indicator: the probability of dropping out. Their hypothesis is that social capital makes other forms of capital, such as human and financial capital, more productive.

The positive influence of a key component of social capital, the family, has been verified on numerous occasions by recent diverse research. The more solid this basic social capital is, the better the results and vice versa. Research involving 60,000 children in the U.S.A. (Wilson, 1994), has indicated that children who live with one parent are twice as prone to be expelled or suspended from school, sustain emotional or behavioral problems, and experience difficulties with friends. These children also

exhibited antisocial behavior more often. Katzman (1997) points out that studies in Uruguay show there is a higher rate of infant mortality among children conceived out of wedlock than among all the rest, and that those who do not live with both biological parents exhibit more serious deficiencies in the different areas of psychomotor development. Nonetheless, in research done in a completely different environment, in Sweden, under more favorable economic conditions, the weight of the differential of stable families and a child's performance remained unchanged. Jonsson and Gahler (1997) demonstrate that children who come from broken families do not do as well in school; consequently, their resources are diminished when compared with those available to children from stable home environments.

Sanders and Nee (1996) analyze the family as social capital by studying U.S. immigrants. Their studies show that the family environment creates conditions that make a key survival strategy, that of self-employment, feasible among immigrants. The family minimizes the costs of production, transaction, and associated information, facilitating the establishment of family-operated businesses. Hagan, MacMillan, and Wheaton (1996) point out that during migrations, even those from the city to the country, there is a loss of social capital and that this loss is lower among families where fathers are involved with the children and where there are protective mothers, whereas the loss increases when parents do not devote themselves as intensely to their children.

Kawachi, Kennedy, and Lochner (1997) provide interesting data regarding the link between social capital, equality, and public health. The well-known Alameda County (U.S.A.) study, subsequently confirmed in epidemiological trials in different communities, detected that individuals with fewer social contacts have a lower life expectancy than those with more contacts. The authors maintain that the social cohesion of a society, which provides interpersonal contacts, is a fundamental factor in public health. They statistically quantify the correlation between social capital represented by trust and the mortality rate in 39 U.S. states. The lower the level of trust among citizens, the higher the average

mortality rate. The same correlation is obtained by comparing the rate of participation in voluntary associations with the mortality rate. The lower the former, the higher the latter. In their analysis, the researchers introduce the degree of economic inequality as a factor, showing that the higher the disparity, the lower the trust some citizens feel toward others. The statistical model the researchers use allows them to state that for each point by which the inequality in the distribution of income increases, there is a jump of two or three points in the mortality rate over what it should be. The researchers illustrate their analysis with different comparative figures. Although the U.S.A. has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world (\$24,680 in 1993), it has a life expectancy (76.1 in 1993) that is shorter than countries with a lower per capita income, such as Holland (\$17,340, life expectancy 77.5), Israel (\$15,130, life expectancy 76.6), and Spain (\$13,660, life expectancy 77.7). A more equal distribution of income creates greater harmony and social cohesion while improving public health. Societies with the longest life expectancies in the world, such as Sweden (78.3) and Japan (79.6) are characterized by also having the highest levels of equality. Inequality, conclude the researchers, contributes to decreasing social capital, which strongly affects the health of the population.

On the fringes of speculation and the search for methodological precision that are now valid and necessary, social capital is operating on a daily basis and has considerable bearing on the development process. It can appear in a variety of ways. For example, as Stiglitz (October, 1998) says, the social capabilities existing in a society for resolving disputes, promoting consensus, and achieving agreement between the State and the private sector are strategic for economic development. Hirschman (1986), in a pioneering spirit, has raised a point in this regard that merits attention. He specifies that it is a question of the only form of capital that does not decrease or become depleted with use, rather, the capital itself grows. Hirschman says: "Love or public spirit are not limited or fixed resources, as other factors of production can be, they are rather resources whose availability, instead of decreasing, increases with use."

Social capital can also be diminished or destroyed. Moser (1998) warns us of the vulnerability of poor populations facing economic crises. He highlights the fact that among the poor, "while households with sufficient resources maintain reciprocal relations, those facing a crisis withdraw from such relations because of the impossibility of complying with their obligations." Fuentes (1998) analyzes how in Chiapas, Mexico, when the displaced peasant population was obliged to migrate, it became severely decapitalized in terms of social capital because its basic ties and integration were destroyed. Similarly, as a number of studies point out, there can be negative forms of social capital such as criminal organizations; however, they do not invalidate the immense potential of positive social capital.

Culture transcends all dimensions of the social capital of a society. It underlies the basic components of what is considered to be social capital, such as trust, civic behavior, and the degree of associativity. As described in the report of the UNESCO (1996) International Commission on Culture and Development, "culture is the means of living together ... it molds our thoughts, our image and our behavior." Culture encompasses values, perceptions, images, forms of expression and communication as well as many other facets that define the identity of peoples and nations.

There are all kinds of ties between culture and development, and it is astonishing how little attention they have received. They appear to be strengthened when all the silent and invisible, but clearly operative, elements contained in the concept of social capital are reappraised.

The values of a society will significantly impact development efforts, among other efforts. As Amartya Sen (1997) has stated, "the ethical codes of businessmen and professionals are part of the productive resources of society." If these codes stress project-related values desired by widespread sectors of the population, such as egalitarian development, they will support that project; otherwise, they will hinder it.

The predominant values in an educational system transmitted by the mass media and other influential, value-forming surroundings can stimulate or obstruct the design of social capital

which, as previously seen, has in turn a major impact on development. As Chang (1997) stresses: "Values lay the foundation for a concern between one individual and another that goes beyond just personal well-being. They play a critical role in determining whether networks, regulations, and trust will evolve." Values that are rooted in culture and strengthened or weakened by that culture, such as for example the degree of solidarity, altruism, respect, or tolerance, are essential for sustained development.

Culture has a marked influence on the lifestyles of diverse social groups. An important Dutch study (Rupp, 1997) attempted to determine differences in the lifestyles of workers of the same socioeconomic status who were distinguished by only one aspect: some of them sent their children to schools that specifically emphasized culture, while others sent theirs to schools that stressed economic concerns. The resulting conduct was quite different. Culturally oriented parents devoted more time and energy to simple art forms, such as singing, playing musical instruments, and reading a book each month. Their lifestyle included a taste for simple expression and a search for a healthful, natural, and uncomplicated life. Economically oriented parents focused on economic gains, material goods, and aspects such as external appearance. With similar jobs and income, the cultural attitude was the basic variable that generated very different behavior in the two groups.

Culture appears to be a key element in the struggle against poverty. As UNESCO discerned in the report mentioned previously (1997), "For the poor, their own values are often all they can affirm." Underprivileged groups have values that give them identity. If these values are not respected or are circumvented, it can be very detrimental to a group's identity and block even its most productive intentions. On the other hand, if they are strengthened and supported, an enormous potential for creative energy can be unleashed.

Culture is likewise a decisive factor in social cohesion. It allows people to relate to one another, cultivate each other's company, grow together, and develop collective self-esteem. As Stiglitz (October, 1998) points out, the preservation of cultural values is extremely important for devel-

opment because they act as a cohesive force in an era in which many other values are weakening.

Social capital and culture can be excellent promoters of growth if the appropriate conditions are present, whereas if ignored or destroyed, they can create enormous obstacles on the road to development. However, the following question remains to be asked: doesn't achieving such reinforcement belong to the realm of great utopias, to a future that is still beyond the current scope of societies? The subsequent section of this paper will attempt to prove that this is not the case, that there are concrete experiences which have been successful in mobilizing social capital and culture in the service of development, and that these should be examined closely in order to garner all teachings in this regard.

Social capital in action. Latin American experiences

What happens when one dedicates sustained, long-term efforts towards mobilizing key aspects of a community's social capital? What are the observable responses? What new opportunities and difficulties appear? Is it possible to gain significant insight by reviewing current experiences that are actually being implemented? A wide range of these experiences has taken place worldwide. Some of them are internationally renowned, such as the Bangladesh Grameen Bank. Dedicated to providing poor farmers with financing, this Bank has achieved surprising results based on elements that have to do with degrees of associativity, mutual trust, and other aspects of social capital. We will concentrate our work on Latin American experiences that are indicative of the latent potential in the region, and which can provide useful insights for formulating social development policies. We have selected three cases that have produced highly relevant results, have received national and international recognition as "very successful social practices," are the subject of ongoing analyses and are visited frequently in an attempt to see whether they can be replicated either in part or in full.

Villa El Salvador, Peru: From the sand pits to an innovative social experience

In 1971, hundreds of poor people invaded public land outside Lima. They were joined by thousands of those inhabiting Lima's slums. The government intervened to eject them, but finally agreed to let them settle in a vast, sandy area 19 kilometers outside Lima. These 50,000 impoverished people, lacking any resources whatsoever, founded Villa El Salvador (VES) there. Many more arrive at the site each day and the current population is now estimated at close to 300,000 inhabitants. The experience that they developed is considered to be unique because the urban plan distinguishes VES from other poor neighborhoods. The design includes 1,300 blocks that comprise 110 residential groups. Instead of housing the main public buildings in a single center, the design is completely decentralized. Each residential group has its own center where community centers, sports facilities, and areas for cultural and social activities are located. This design favors interaction and maximizes the potential for cooperation. The organizational model is one based on active participation. Starting with delegates for each block and residential group, an organization named CUAVES was created to represent the entire community and continues to have an important and decisive say in its development. Almost 4,000 organizational units have been established to find solutions to and deal with community matters. The vast majority of the population participates in these units, with close to 50% of those over 18 holding some sort of leadership position.

In this sandy area devoid of resources of any kind, virtually cut off from the urban area (one has to travel 3 km to find an access route to Lima), these people undertook a gigantic construction effort based mainly on the voluntary work of the community itself. A status inventory prepared at the end of 1989 showed that in less than 2 decades, there were 50,000 homes, 38,000 of which had been raised by the inhabitants themselves, and of that number 68% were constructed with solid building materials (brick, cement, concrete roofs, etc.). Moreover, on their own, these people had constructed 2.8 million square meters of compacted earth roads and had also built, for the most part with the community's resources and effort, 60 community centers,

64 schools, and 32 libraries. In addition, there were 41 integrated centers providing health, education, and nutritional services; community health centers; a network of pharmacies; and a reasonable network of roads with 4 main roads and 7 perpendicular avenues for internal access. As a final touch, the community planted half a million trees.

While they continue to be poor and experience serious difficulties in obtaining employment—as in the case of most of Lima—the social achievements of VES are very significant. The illiteracy rate has dropped from 5.8% to 3.5%. Enrollment has risen to 98% at the grade school level, and in high school it has surpassed 90%, with all these figures exceeding national averages as well as those in similar poor settlements. With respect to health, the community preventive vaccination programs that cover the entire population and the organization of the community for preventive health and pregnancy control have been decisive in contributing to the drop in infant mortality to 67 per 1,000, a figure much lower than the national average of 88 to 95 per 1,000. The overall mortality rate is also lower than the national average. Moreover, progress has been recorded in obtaining services such as sewers and electricity within a term estimated to be 8 years shorter than that reported for other poor communities. VES has succeeded where other communities have failed in developing considerable infrastructure, community services, and other required services. The enormous collective effort has been described by long-time incumbent VES mayor, Michel Azcueta (1991), in the following manner: “the town of Villa el Salvador, through its own efforts, has built a city from nothing, with hundreds of kilometers of water mains and lighting, recreation facilities, schools, markets, a farming and ranching area, and even an industrial park. This also with the aid of small industrialists in the area.”

One basic question remains: how was it possible to achieve these results starting from poverty, in such a difficult natural environment, in the midst of an acute economic crisis that ravaged Peru and the entire region in the 1980s, while at the same time facing all sorts of other difficulties? The key to understanding achieve-

ments that, although they did not eradicate poverty, improved the basic standard of living of VES inhabitants and transformed it into a different type of poor town, apparently lies in elements encompassed by the concept of social capital.

The people who founded VES were for the most part families from the Peruvian mountains. Farmers from the Andes, they lacked all forms of material wealth but were rich in social capital. They brought with them indigenous culture and tradition, as well as a centuries-old historical experience of cooperation, community work, and solidarity. The coexisting core aspects of this culture, such as an intensive community life and communal ownership of public services, were applied in VES along with the concept of family and individual ownership. This culture facilitated the establishment of an extended participatory organization in which all inhabitants were called on to act in providing solutions to collective problems. It worked well because of favorable historical foundations that for ages had been a part of Peruvian farm culture. Even technical formulas, such as oxidation ponds used by the Incas, were extensively implemented at VES. They permitted waste processing via a system of ponds that ultimately produced fertilizer, subsequently used for agricultural production and to create tree- and shrub-covered areas.

The vision anchored in the culture of VES inhabitants that perpetuated the transcendence of collective work as a means of finding solutions was rooted from the very beginning in the history of the Villa. One vivid example is that of how the villagers confronted the problem of building schools. Michel Azcueta (Zapata, 1996) narrates:

...from day one, the inhabitants organized themselves to build schools so that their children would not forfeit the school year. Twelve pro-school committees were formed in the first three months and construction of many classrooms began in an effort that, when we look back on it, seems to be enormous and cannot be understood unless we explain it on the basis of subjective motivation. Classes began to be taught in rooms that had mats woven out of grass for walls and were “weatherproofed” with

plastic sheeting to provide minimum protection from the winter cold, while the floor consisted of loosely compacted earth. The few bricks we had were reserved to be used as precarious benches for the children. These classrooms were built on Sundays through the efforts of the entire community and with such enthusiasm and eagerness, that the effort has left participants with unforgettable memories.

A broad and solid associative fabric was created at VES that favored these conditions. Organizations of youths, women and mothers were established as well as market cooperatives, associations of small industrialists and businessmen, urban coordination rounds and youth brigades, sports leagues, all sorts of cultural groups, etc. This associative activity at VES took on widely varied aspects, including producers who joined forces to buy raw materials and machinery to improve its quality; by way of example, more than a hundred mother's clubs have set up 264 lunchrooms and 150 "glass of milk per day" programs; and young people have worked together to direct and organize hundreds of cultural and artistic groups, libraries, sports clubs, student associations, communications workshops, etc.

The work of the community, organized into optimally participatory units, was the foundation for the progress achieved in such a short time. This process "empowered" latent social capital, which multiplied in turn. The creation of an entire municipality out of nothing by its inhabitants generated a solid identity and boosted personal and collective self-esteem. As Carlos Franco (1992) says, the settlement was founded as an expression of its residents. They were not merely inhabitants, they were its builders. By creating and developing VES, they created themselves. Consequently, as a sort of trademark, whenever the residents of VES are asked where they are from, they don't reply like others who have come from the interior of the country by referring to their place of birth, but rather they say "I'm from the Villa," the place that gave them an identity which they so highly prize. The process of facing very difficult challenges and nonetheless making progress served to shore up and strengthen their self-esteem, which is a fundamental stimulus for productive action. Franco

describes: "...often when one attends town meetings and converses with the 'founders' of the community or its leaders, it is not difficult to glimpse recurring expressions of collective self-confidence, of certainty as to their organized clout, and belief in the capabilities of the community to set goals and unite to achieve them."

Self-esteem was also specifically cultivated in the VES schools. Teachers tried to free children of all feelings of inferiority derived from the fact that they came from poor families. They tried to give the children self-assurance so that they would not feel deprived.

From the very beginning, culture played a significant role in this experience. In 1974, Azcueta founded and transformed the Grass-Roots Communications Center (Centro de Comunicación Popular), the space earmarked for all kinds of extracurricular activities. First to be installed were theater and music workshops; subsequently the initiative was expanded to other areas through everyone's hard work. From those cultural spaces, an effort was made to encourage the population to take part in decision-making meetings and community activities. Over the years, the VES theater produced entertainment that was brought to metropolitan and national stages, and cultural activity became a part of people's daily lives. Franco writes:

...the intermittent operations of 39 loudspeakers, internal sports competitions, the community's radio programs, communications workshops, numerous artistic and cultural groups, the new and modern radio of the Grass-Roots Communications Center, and the growing number of musical clubs and groups contributed to the evolution of an intense and bustling community life.

VES's community building effort, carried out under the most difficult conditions, was presided over and guided by certain values. The people defined their project as the establishment of a participatory, self-governed community. A collective vision that focused on furthering community values of active participation and self-government was the framework for this effort. In 1986, VES became a municipality. In its structuring, all previous principles were retained and it was determined that community decisions would constitute the basis for municipal

decisions. Recently, with the help of a number of NGOs, the newspaper *El Comercio*, and other entities, VES set up a system designed to facilitate public participation via information technology. Among other innovations, the Municipal Council now transmits its sessions via closed circuit to the Villa, so that residents can receive information on the topics to be discussed on computer terminals and, in turn, relay their points of view to the Council.

The experience of VES has received worldwide acclaim and prestige. In 1973, UNESCO honored it with an award as one of the most challenging experiences in grass-roots education; in 1986, the Lima newspaper *La República* declared it the "person of the year in Peru"; in 1987 the United Nations designated VES the "City, Messenger of Peace," distinguishing it as the exemplary proponent of forms of community life. Also in 1987, VES received the "Príncipe de Asturias" Prize, from the King of Spain, for the impressive development achieved by the community in the social and cultural spheres. Among other awards it has received the Peruvian National Prize for Architecture and Urban Development and an award for being the community with the highest percentage of land covered by trees and other greenery. In 1985, Pope John Paul II visited Villa El Salvador and praised its achievements by saying: "It is with great joy that I have learned of the generosity with which the inhabitants of this 'young town' help their poorer brothers in the community, in the grass-roots and family lunchrooms, in the groups that take care of the sick, in the solidarity campaigns to help brothers ravaged by Nature's catastrophes."

At VES no solution was found for the underlying causes of poverty, which are related to factors completely beyond this experience that form part of the problems faced by the country as a whole. However, progress was made with respect to other poor settlements and a profile was created of a very unique society that fully merited the long list of awards it received. The empowerment of social capital played a decisive role in VES's achievements. Invisible, silent factors that work within the social fabric played a constant positive role here. Among these were: permanent encouragement of forms of cooperation; mutual trust among organizational actors;

communal, constructive, and creative civic behavior; shared guiding values; mobilization of a unique and particular culture; affirmation of personal, family, and collective identity; and growth of self-esteem from the experience itself. All of these elements were vitalized by the genuinely participatory model adopted by the community. Despite starts and stops and very difficult moments such as those experienced during the outbreak of violence in the country, today, in 1999, VES is searching for even more active forms of community involvement. According to Peruvian newspapers, it is most likely the first Latin American municipality that has incorporated virtual democracy into the standard methodologies of democratic participation.

Family-oriented Consumer Markets in Venezuela: Social Capital Dividends

The dilemma of how to lower the cost of food products for underprivileged sectors of society received a significant response in the city of Barquisimeto, Venezuela. Since 1983, its family-oriented consumer markets have successfully reduced the retail price of produce such as fruit and vegetables by 40% and the price of other food staples by 15 to 20%. On a weekly basis, this system benefits 40,000 families in a city with a population of 1 million. With these markets, families mainly from the low and medium-low income sectors obtain estimated annual savings in the range of 10.5 million dollars.

The markets bring together a large number of organizations from civil society. Formally, they belong to CECOSOLA, the Central Cooperative of Lara State; however, groups of producers, consumer associations, and small, self-run enterprises intervene in operations. As a result, 18 associations of agricultural producers representing some 600 producers and 12 community production units participate in them. These small- and medium-size farmers and other food producers sell their products through these markets at 50 points of sale that operate the last 3 days of the week. A total of 300 tons of staple fruit, vegetables and other food products are sold directly to consumers each week.

These markets sell each kilo of fruit and vegetables as a basic product and at the same price, allowing for maximum simplification of operations. Among the produce sold are the follow-

Year	1984	1990	1997
Sales units	1	87*	105**
Weekly sale of fruit and vegetables (in tons)	3	168	300
Number of families serviced	300	20,000	40,000
Number of workers	15	400	700
Number of agricultural producers	15	100	500
Number of organizations of producers	1	n/d	18
Number of community production units	1	9	12

* Includes all of Lara State; approximately half in Barquisimeto

** Includes 50 markets and 55 integral supply centers

Sources: CECOSOLA. Family-oriented Consumer Markets. Lara State. Barquisimeto, 1990; CECOSOLA. Presentation of the Family-oriented Consumer Markets at the meeting of the Santa Lucía Group. Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela. October 1997.

ing: potatoes, tomatoes, carrots, onions, green peppers, lettuce, yams, taro, celery root, pumpkin, cassava, cabbage, and plantains. Small-scale farmers transport these products and market them directly to consumers through their points-of-sale, and everyone profits. Through these markets, small producers who previously had to depend on middlemen and other continual fluctuations can now sell their crops at reasonable prices as co-managers of the entire initiative, while consumers receive fresh produce at much lower than market prices.

These consumer markets have grown rapidly over 15 years and have become the principal supplier of basic foods and products to the city of Barquisimeto. Their expansion can be observed in the following chart, as well as the systematic study of these markets prepared by Luis Gómez Calcano (1998):

Having started out with only one market and scarcely any capital up front, it is evident from the indicators shown in the above table that these venues have grown rapidly. Between 1990 and 1997, the number of tons of vegetables sold rose by 78% and the number of families reached doubled.

What were the bases for the economic and dynamic success of a group of organizations born from civil society, lacking in capital and attempting to sell food and agricultural products

in a highly competitive market with notoriously low profit margins?

The key element of this success appears to have been social capital. Participants in this experience cite the following (Family-oriented Consumer Markets, 1996):

In an attempt to find the key to understanding the success we have had, we can only mention:

- 1) A history of forming social and human capital.
- 2) Empowering social capital above and beyond financial capital.
- 3) Innovative forms of participatory management.

The hundreds of workers at the markets and related associations have established an organizational system strongly guided by values and based on cooperation, participation, and horizontal organization.

The markets are backed a vital concept that, according to those involved, emphasizes solidarity, personal and group responsibility, transparency in relations, promotion of trust, personal initiative, and love for work.

This table of values has not been confined to a single written declaration, as is generally the case; rather, an attempt has been made to systematically cultivate the underlying themes in the organization. An external observer (Bruni Celli, 1996) describes the day-to-day dynamics of the markets as follows:

Cooperative values of personal growth, mutual support, solidarity, frugality, and austerity; of showing others; of not being an egotist and giving the best of oneself for the community; these are topics of continual reflection during the meetings lasting 8 or more hours and attended weekly by all CECOSOLA workers. This high number of hours devoted to meetings could be perceived as a loss of productivity, but they are the principal means for achieving dedication, enthusiasm, and commitment from the organization's workers.

Within these values, the organizational design adopted here appears to have played a decisive role in the results obtained. The design is based on principles such as active participation by all members of the organization, fluid communications, shared analysis and learning, and continuous rotation of tasks. One of its characteristics is that all the hundreds of workers of the organization receive the same pay, which is some 57% higher than the national minimum wage. Moreover, the organization has established a financing fund in order to lend money at low interest rates as well as an integrated health fund. Since this is a modest remuneration, the members have cited that there are other incentives, such as participating in a project with these values, forming part of a democratic and nonauthoritarian work environment, and having access to training and development opportunities.

The specific operating mechanisms of the organization include: weekly meetings of each group for evaluation and planning, decision making by consensus, sharing of information, collective discipline and monitoring, decentralized work by each group, and the aforementioned rotation of responsibilities. Added to this are spaces designated for the development of "harmonious relations." These areas are set aside for personal and social encounters.

The above organizational characteristics coincide with many of the recommendations of advanced management. They are conducive to creating what is today called "an organization that learns" and "an intelligent organization." The organizational model used by the markets is very flexible and allows those involved to absorb information on what is actually happening

through all its "pores." By sharing this internally, the organization's reaction capacity when faced with change increases. It likewise establishes monitoring processes for the quick detection and correction of errors. The climate of confidence established among its members prevents elevated costs associated with the lack of trust and permanent confrontations so characteristic of other organizations. On the other hand, the model's elements favor a deep sense of belonging that is a basic stimulus for productivity, a continual search for ways to improve the task at hand.

The markets have withstood all predictions that they would find it difficult to deal with the rigors of the market. Rather, they have maneuvered themselves into a leadership position in their niche, obliging other business competitors to try to adjust their processes in order to carve one out for themselves. These markets have become the main purveyors of basic food products for the fourth largest city, population-wise, of Venezuela, and despite their local dimension in terms of available figures, they are one of the foremost food product marketing concerns in the entire country; demonstrating how a fully sustainable company, in 15 years, is capable of continually expanding its operations. At present, this model is being copied in other Venezuelan cities. The keys to excellence that have been achieved in this case are not derived from large capital investments handled with a classical business criteria of maximizing profitability and "rigid" top-to-bottom management. The capital that has been mobilized is essentially social capital. These markets have fostered certain latent values in civil society and have proven that a collective project has possibilities, simultaneously being productively efficient as well as socially useful and attractive as a life setting. And with their unique managerial style, which they have called "solidary management," they have also empowered the basic elements of the accepted notion of social capital, such as associativity, mutual trust, and positive standards of behavior with respect to community assets.

Their objective is not confined to the economic plane. One of the leaders of this experience, Gustavo Salas (1991) made the following statement: "... the fundamental objective of the

program and its greatest contribution to grass-roots organization lies in the creative process that we are trying to promote along with all its concrete activities.”

Observed from the outside, it would seem to be an audacious and innovative marketing mechanism. But as one astute observer, Luis Delgado (1998) puts it: “... in reality, they are the school of life; a school that empowers human development in a collective setting and promotes happiness in work, family, and personal relations.”

Local analysts such as Machado and Freytes (1994) point out, in turn, that these markets have benefited from the support of vast, pre-existing social capital in Lara State, which also harbors a longstanding tradition of being the Venezuelan state with the largest representation of cooperative organizations. In 1994, it had 85 cooperatives, of which 36 provided multiple services. Similarly, the state has a dense network of nongovernmental organizations (more than 3,500), numerous neighborhood associations and other forms of social organization. There is in Lara State an entire “cultural” habitat that encourages the development of social capital and has thus given birth to an experience with these characteristics.

The Porto Alegre shared municipal budget: expanding existing social capital

The Shared Municipal Budget program initiated in Porto Alegre Brazil in 1989 has attracted a lot of attention and evolved into an international “stellar” experience. For example, in 1996, the United Nations selected this experiment as one of the 40 urban changes throughout the world to be analyzed at the World Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II, held in Istanbul) and in 1997, The World Bank Institute for Economic Development held an international conference in Porto Alegre, attended by representatives from 9 countries from the region, in order to examine the experience. The IDB likewise selected it as one of the models to be included in its Master Book on Participation. Nationally, close to 70 Brazilian municipalities are generating similar programs inspired by Porto Alegre.

The impact it has had is due to the very specific results obtained. In 1989, the city of Porto Alegre, with 1,300,000 inhabitants, had many serious social problems. Broad sectors of its population had limited access to basic services and suffered a severe shortage of fiscal resources. The newly elected mayor (elected governor in 1999 of the State to which the city of Río Grande do Sul belongs) decided to invite the people to co-manage the budgetary process in order to administrate these limited resources on the basis of actual priorities and thereby increase efficiency. The co-management offered would cover the investment caption of the budget. In this case, the invitation was not just “lip service,” but rather a complex and elaborate system established to make mass participation possible. The city was divided into 16 regions, in each of which budgetary execution figures were examined, while future estimates and priorities were identified on a neighborhood level. These figures were then reconciled and brought in line on a regional and global level. Concomitantly with these regions, another analysis and decision-making mechanism was implemented on the basis of the great themes of urban concern, such as: urban development, transportation, health care, free time, education, and culture. Discussion rounds, intermediate meetings, plenary sessions, and other types of meetings take place throughout the year with the participation of an eclectic public, formed by delegates who, in some cases, are elected by the people themselves and in others, with the aid of municipal authorities. A bottom-up budget is then prepared and formally approved by the Municipal Council. The population reacted to the mayor’s invitation with a “participatory fever,” as Navarro (1998) calls it. By 1995, it was estimated that 100,000 people had taken part in the process.

The results have been surprising and have belied the pessimistic predictions of sectors that considered handing over a technical and delicate task such as balancing the budget to a grass roots participation process to be an inadmissible heterodoxy. On one hand, the population determined its most pressing needs, leading to a precise identification of priorities; then resources were redirected towards the most critical prob-

lems. On the other, the entire processing of the budget, previously closed and impenetrable, was completely opened up to the citizens so that all the information became transparent by virtue of having been shared with them. This subsequently gave rise to conditions conducive to the eradication of all forms of corruption. En masse, the people took social control of preparing and executing the investment caption or 15% of the total budget, which in the 1989-1995 period totaled 700 million dollars. Similarly, because there were clear rules of the game regarding the decision-making process, opportunities for arbitrary patronage practices were diminished.

The relationship of the budget with priority needs and the improvement in its administration contributed to generating very significant results. For example, from 1990 to 1996, the number of homes supplied with drinking water rose from 400,000 to 484,000, covering 98% of the population. While in 1989, only 48% of the homes were connected to the sewer network—comparable to the national average of 49% in Brazil—in 1997, that figure rose to 80.4% as a result of the shared municipal budget. Between 1990 and 1996, the program of legitimizing ownership of land in the poor sectors and towns benefited 167,408 people, or 13% of the entire population. The road-paving program reached a figure of 30 kilometers per year in the poor sectors of the city. School registration in grade schools and high schools rose by 159% between 1989 and 1997, and the municipality established an adult literacy program that in 1997 had 5,277 participants.

The identification of priorities in tune with reality and the as a whole system produced a vast redistribution of resources that, combined with the participation of the inhabitants in monitoring the execution processes, made results of this magnitude possible. The population was transformed into an important player when it came to balancing the municipal budget. As the IDB Master Book on Participation (1997) describes:

The citizens of Porto Alegre have had the opportunity to experience a completely participatory process by:

- expressing their understanding of the crucial problems faced by the city;
- establishing priorities among the problems

- that require the most immediate attention;
- selecting priorities and finding practical solutions;
- having the opportunity to compare solutions found in other areas of the city and for other groups of topics;
- deciding, with the support of technicians from the mayor's office, to invest in less costly and more easily monitored programs
- making the final decision regarding whether or not to approve the investment plan; and
- reviewing the successes and failures of the investment program to improve criteria for the subsequent year.

The broad social base that supported these in-depth budgetary changes also exerted strong pressure to make the Municipal fiscal system more progressive and efficient, while bringing about major reforms to expand collection and improve fiscal impartiality.

As a whole, the project notably changed the traditional political make-up of the municipality, previously similar to that of many others in the region. Other examples of this change were: a redistribution of functions between the municipality and civil society, energetic activation of civil society, implementation of forms of direct and representative democracy, a strong reduction in the margin of corruption as a result of a transparent and well-monitored process of handling public finances, weeding out unfavorable conditions for patronage, and decentralizing decision-making.

The process was based on extant social capital with a relevant tradition of community associations. These operated actively in society and played a vital role in the different levels of deliberation that were established. As Navarro points out, a pivotal point of the process was the political willingness of the mayor to change habitual concentrations of power and invite the people and these associations to “share the power.” Convening the people and installing genuine mechanisms of participation acted as multipliers of social capital. The willingness to cooperate skyrocketed and a climate of confidence evolved among the players, generating significant stimuli for constructive civic behavior. The preexisting culture of partnerships was an essential foundation for citizen participation and, in

turn, was enormously strengthened by the process, which demonstrated the potential that emerges when false oppositions between the State and civil society are overcome and a partnership is achieved.

In Porto Alegre, social capital behaved according to Hirschmann's predictions. It grew when an investment was made through shared budget mechanisms that ensured its intensive use. The aforementioned IDB book (1997) itemizes these, highlighting the fact that the participatory process "... has had an enormous impact on the ability of the citizens to respond to challenges in an organized fashion, as a community, and on their ability to work together to improve the quality of public administration and, consequently, the quality of life."

Some lessons

The three experiences described here have all had a major impact, demonstrating their strong sustainability and meriting diverse awards and recognition. What are the keys to their success? These experiences took place in very different scenarios; however, in response to this question, it is possible to identify certain common elements that have significantly influenced their results.

First, in all three cases, the strategies used were based on mobilizing non-traditional forms of capital. They resorted to intangible elements that had not been identified by the usual productive approaches and promoted the activation of latent, extant forces that can considerably affect the capacity of social groups to generate creative solutions. In all three cases the capacity to search for answers and cooperatively implement them was put into play. A climate of trust among the players was established; their cultures were used as a starting point and assiduously respected. This stimulated, in turn, their development while promoting a style of solidary civic conduct that was considerate of everyone's welfare. Motivating these and other similar factors generated community and organizational energy that made it possible to carry out large-scale construction projects and build on nothing more than the misery rampant in Villa El Salvador, the paucity of resources for the

Markets in Barquisimeto, and the limited resources and deficits of Porto Alegre.

A second shared trait of these experiences was the adoption of a totally non-traditional organizational design that, in practice, proved to be a shaper of an appropriate habitat for the movement of social and cultural capital and for ensuring efficiency. In all three cases, the foundation for that design was organized community participation. The organizational possibilities of participation were analyzed in detail in a recent paper (Klikberg, 1998). In this work, based on an analysis of comparative international experiences and extensive empirical evidence, the author points out that participation has relevant competitive advantages with respect to the usual hierarchical designs and identifies the mechanisms through which said advantages are generated. In a similar vein, participation forms the nucleus of the managerial models used by the most advanced organizations in existence today.

A third distinctive element of the three experiences is that of the movement of social and cultural capital. Their open and democratic management design was backed by a value-based concept. This is decisive: without that concept, they would not have been able to solve the problems that arose along the innovative and non-traditional routes they followed. These values provided continual guidance, while at the same time powerfully motivating behavior and transmitting the vision of their ultimate goals as a form of permanent inspiration.

Other experiences under development in the region are partially or completely characterized by the specifics of the above cases, including traits such as those described above and adding others. The results are quite remarkable. Among many others worth mentioning are: the EDUCO program in El Salvador, where poor rural families have independently organized themselves to run rural schools; the "glass of milk a day" program in Peru; the role of organized indigenous communities in Bolivia and Ecuador; parental participation in school administration at Minas Geraes, Brazil; as well as the different programs identified and systematically documented and evaluated in the framework of the encounter "Social programs, poverty and citizen participation," organized by the IDB (1998).

It may be argued, as in fact it has, that experiences such as these are of limited scope. However, reality proves that while they encounter considerable difficulties and cannot easily be expanded, they do make formidable contributions by directly improving the quality of life of vast, underprivileged sectors of society. They are a laboratory of progressive social patterns and also a motivating call to advance in this direction.

The reply to the question posed at the end of the preceding section of this paper is to be found in all these programs. The mobilization of social capital and culture as active agents for economic and social development is not a desirable proposal; but, in combination with other utopias, it is viable and brings about favorable results. There are significant references on which this premise can be based. Carrying out said mobilization on a larger scale, which is the great challenge for the future, will require basic policies and consensus between the government and civil society. The last section of this paper will address specific potential courses of action in the area of empowering culture for development.

A time to mobilize cultural potential

Cultural activity has often been perceived from the viewpoint of economics as a secondary field extraneous to the central course that should be followed in order to promote economic growth. It has frequently been treated, in fact, as an area of dubious management quality that consumes resources, fails to return economically viable profits on investments, and is difficult to quantify. In the cultural sphere, however, there has also been a certain tendency towards isolation and a failure to seek out links to economic and social programs. All this has created a breach between culture and development, a situation that translates into considerable loss for society. This stance seriously hinders the advance of culture, which has come to be treated as a secondary field of “pure spending” with a considerable “cost of opportunity”. Moreover, potential contributions towards the processes of development are seen as untapped.

Systematic efforts should be made to bridge the gap that is causing these losses. As seen in

previous sections, culture is a relevant part of social capital that carries with it diverse opportunities to contribute to developmental actions. This is not just theory, as the experiences described earlier and many others currently underway have shown. The crisis in conventional economic thought is providing an “opportunity” to legitimately incorporate cultural dimensions, in the search for a more comprehensive and integral concept of development.

Before exploring some of the possible points of convergence, a word of caution. Culture can be a formidable instrument of economic and social progress; however, its identity does not end there. It is not just an instrument. Cultural development is a social end per se. To advance in this field means to spiritually and historically enrich a society and its individuals. As the UNESCO (1996) Report of the International Commission on Culture and Development underscores: “it is an end that is desirable in and of itself because it gives meaning to our existence.” This perspective must not be lost. Renowned economist Françoise Benhamou (1996) voices warnings in this regard that must be heeded. She states:

Only in areas of extreme economicism can one actually pretend to justify cultural expense on the basis of tangible resources that it can generate in payment. The gains that cultural life can contribute to the group as a whole do not always cover the expenses incurred. Obviously, the interest on these expenses should be evaluated using other criteria that go beyond the economic dimension.

Benhamou calls for the use of different criteria to quantify the “yield” of something that undoubtedly is one of the ultimate goals of society. She draws attention to the mechanical application of criteria normally used in the economic field and the “facile” and erroneous consequences that can result. The author continues:

It would be a shame if at a time when economic sciences acknowledge the value of the qualitative object that is being assessed, the economists were to continue to insist on only considering the commercial repercussions of cultural investment. Is it really necessary to complain about the cost of cultural life, which is actually quite modest? Shouldn't we see in it the

symbol of a mature and prosperous nation?

Along with being an end in and of itself, culture has an extremely broad potential to organize for development. Aspects of this potential are summarized in the following section.

Culture and social policies

Cultural movements can be of significant importance in the struggle against poverty, which, in different forms, currently afflicts close to half of Latin America's population. The underlying "intangible" elements in culture can cooperate in many ways. Groups of the poor do not possess material wealth, but they do have cultural knowledge that often dates back for centuries or millennia, as in the case of indigenous peoples. Within the framework of social programs, the profound respect held for their culture will create favorable conditions for making use of accumulated knowledge, traditions, ways of relating to nature, and natural cultural capabilities of self-organization that can be very useful.

On the other hand, taking into account and valuing the culture of underprivileged sectors is a key point in the crucial issue of collective identity and self-esteem. Impoverishment and economic poverty are often accompanied by cultural diminishment. The culture of the poor is stigmatized by other segments of society as inferior, precarious and backward. Sometimes the reasons for such poverty are even "facetiously" ascribed to the norms of that culture. In addition to their material difficulties, the poor are made to feel that there is a silent process of "cultural disdain" for their values, traditions, beliefs and manner of relating to one another. When culture is belittled, its identity is definitely weakened, and an identity that has been maligned generates collective and individual feelings of low self-esteem.

A paramount objective of social policies should be to revert this process and raise both group and individual self-esteem among the underprivileged. Strengthened self-esteem can be a powerful driving force for construction and creativity, with the indisputable intermediary here being culture. The promotion of grass-roots culture, opening up channels for its

expression and cultivation by future generations, and the creation of an ambience of genuine appreciation for its components will foment cultural growth and become instrumental in returning an identity to the poorer segments of society.

There are interesting experiences in Latin America that bear this out. These include the avant-garde creation of grass-roots choruses and musical groups in Venezuela in recent decades. Different communities, many of them poor, have founded groups through sustained efforts that brought together thousands of children and young people, by focusing on topics from their grass-roots culture. Likewise, these cultural spaces allowed the members to express themselves and to grow artistically, while transmitting a love and appreciation for their culture and strengthening their identity. There were also unforeseen effects. The systematic practice of these activities encouraged discipline, a work ethic, and cooperation. Similar experiences have been recently implemented on a large scale in Colombia and other countries.

Culture and social integration

One of the basic problems of Latin American societies is social exclusion, which makes it extremely difficult for people to gain access to job and consumer markets and impossible to participate in society as a whole. Certain factors reinforce others to form a regressive vicious cycle.

The democratization of culture may be able to break these cycles insofar as one relevant aspect is concerned. Previously unprecedented channels of integration can be established by creating accessible and especially stimulating cultural spaces for the underprivileged sectors of society.

Culture can also significantly reinforce educational capital in poor areas characterized by high dropout and repetition rates among grade school children, where close to half of the students drop out of school before finishing the sixth grade. A concerted effort should be made to improve this situation, but in the meantime, cultural activities can function as an educational para-system offering informal training to complement and reinforce what is being taught

in schools. This can be particularly significant for adults who dropped out of school while still in their teens.

Culture can be an attractive and concrete framework of integration for the vast contingents of Latin American youths currently excluded from the job market and simultaneously outside the educational system, while comprising a sector of the population with a high rate of exposure to juvenile delinquency. Analyses regarding the inroads made by criminality in the region in recent decades indicate that a growing percentage of delinquents are youths with a profile of unemployment and limited education. These sectors of society can be given alternatives for social acceptance and personal growth within these proposed cultural spaces.

Culture can make an effective contribution to the most basic institution of social integration, the family. Research in recent years has shown that along with playing a decisive affective and spiritual role, the family has had very significant impacts in other areas. It strongly influences a child's school performance, the evolution of creativity and critical awareness, and the development of emotional intelligence, while instilling a culture of preventive health practices. It is, at the same time, one of the main networks for social protection and the primary fundamental framework of social integration.

In Latin America, confronted by the impact of poverty, numerous families in the poorer sections of society are under maximum stress and find themselves in the crisis stage. It is estimated that close to 30% of the families in the region are units headed only by the mother. In a vast majority of the cases, these are families with limited resources. In addition, the number of children born out of wedlock has increased, indicative of the resistance of young couples to form stable families, which in many cases is influenced by the economic difficulty of providing for a family.

Cultural spaces can help strengthen this institution, which is a core element of society and of innumerable contributions to that society. Activities engaged in jointly by the family in those spaces can strengthen family ties. In these spaces, families can find stimuli and answers,

they can enrich their reality, as well as share experiences with other family units that are experiencing similar difficulties.

Culture and values

Decisive importance in development is assigned to the values of a culture. This point has been addressed extensively in recent years, particularly with respect to the types of values that have been of help to those countries that have registered sustained growth and achieved important social breakthroughs.

If dominant values focus on individualism, indifference to the destiny of one's fellow man, an absence of collective responsibility, a lack of interest in the general well-being of society, the search for personal wealth, consumerism and other similar traits, it is only to be expected that such conduct will seriously weaken the social fabric and possibly lead to a vast array of regressive impacts. These impacts can range from serious economic inequality, which, according to numerous studies, can generate powerful impediments to sustained economic development and, as was mentioned earlier, can diminish social cohesion, thereby negatively affecting the average life span.² One of the visible effects of the presence of anti-solidarity values is the spread of corruption in diverse societies. As Lourdes Arizpe (1996) highlights: "The monothematic insistence on getting rich as the only thing that is worthwhile in life has contributed enormously to this trend."

Positive values lead in different directions. Thus, for example, societies that have stimulated and cultivated values favoring equality –as exemplified in various categories, ranging from their fiscal systems to the scope of their global health services and the quality of their education– have currently achieved good results in this area which, in turn, facilitates economic and technological progress as well as competitiveness. Cases such as those of the Nordic countries, Canada, Japan, and Israel, among others, are often mentioned in this regard.

Culture is the basic sphere in which a society generates its values and transmits them from generation to generation. Work in the area of culture to systematically promote and disseminate

2. A pioneer investigation on the effect of values on quotidian life and the social fabric may be found in the thought-provoking UNDP paper *Human Development in Chile, 1998. The paradoxes of modernization*, UNDP, 1998. The work delves into the internal world of the persons and the quality of their relations with others, generating findings of great relevance in terms of social capital, culture, and development problems. It identifies social unease in society that are linked, among other things, to the weakening of interrelations, lack of trust and fear of the "other."

nate values in Latin America such as: deeply rooted solidarity among autochthonous cultures, cooperation, shared responsibility, common consideration for the well-being of a group, doing away with discrimination, eradication of corruption, the perspective of improving equality in a region with glaring inequalities, and democratic attitudes can all clearly assist development while contributing to the establishment of a social profile.³

The results achieved by societies that have consistently cultivated the spirit of volunteer work among future generations are noteworthy in this regard. Volunteerism encompasses many of the previously cited values. It has enormous educational value, produces major economic results –when significant hours of unpaid work are added to programs that are crucial to society– and it is a stimulus that cultivates a sense of solidarity and cooperation. In many countries, volunteers comprise a significant percentage of the total work force in the social sector. There are large contingents of volunteers, for example, in the Nordic countries, Western Europe, the U.S., and Israel. In the latter case, Faigon (1994) points out that approximately 25% of the population does some sort of volunteer work on a regular basis, particularly social work, thereby generating goods and services equivalent to 8% of the gross national product. He goes on to say that the basis for these results may be found in the Jewish culture, which prioritizes volunteer service in the community as a duty and reinforces the concept through systematically teaching such values in Israeli schools.

The cultivation of values through culture and early participation in volunteer activities and community work has considerable influence on the acceptance of civic commitments in adult life, according to recent research carried out by Youniss, McLellan, and Yates (1997). A statistical correlation is observed between youths' participation in organizations and their involvement in society later in life. A study in the U.S. showed that children who had belonged to the 4H Clubs were two times more likely than those who had never belonged to be involved in civic associations 25 years later, and four times more likely to be involved in politics. Another study of high school graduates showed that it was

more likely that those who had participated in extracurricular activities would be involved in volunteer associations 15 years later. Values and participation mold what the authors call a "civic identity" geared towards accepting commitments and continually contributing to the community.

An interesting program was launched a short time ago in Norway with the objective of promoting cultural values of importance to society. On January 30, 1998, a Government Commission on Human Values was created. Its basic aim is to: (a) create awareness in society regarding values and ethical problems, (b) contribute to increasing knowledge with respect to the development of human values in our contemporary culture, (c) identify current challenges to ethics in society and discuss possible responses, and (d) encourage different sectors of society to participate in this debate.

The Commission includes members from different generations and social sectors. Their activities revolve around ensuring that the issue of values be placed on top of the public agenda and discussed by public and private institutions, ethical dilemmas be identified and explicitly stated, and answers to these dilemmas be found. One of the first initiatives to be implemented was the discussion in schools nationwide of how the rights proclaimed in the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights are being applied locally. In addition, on the municipal level –where many of the activities will undergo decentralization– studies are being carried out regarding the tensions that children and young people are experiencing when confronted by the often contradictory values they are taught at home, at school, and at church as compared to those disseminated by the mass media. The aim of another project is to increase the degree of awareness regarding the significance of responsibility, solidarity, and participation. One of the projects invited mayors from the country's municipalities to participate in a local forum that posed the question: what are the basic characteristics of a good local community?

In mobilizing the cultural potential of Latin America, a region of enormous potential –as evidenced by its fecundity in so many artistic fields– major opportunities can be found in

3. A detailed exploration of the importance of cultural values in strengthening a democratic society and the need in Latin America to confront and overcome authoritarian cultural attitudes, may be found in the work corresponding to the regional "A Culture for Democracy" project promoted by the Latin American Studies Center at the University of Maryland, College Park under the direction of Saúl Sosnowski.

terms of contributing to areas such as those addressed thus far: the struggle against poverty, the development of social integration, and the strengthening of the community as well as solidarity and participatory values. This mobilization requires coordinated action from the State and civic organizations. Both must closely combine their efforts and contribute to the best of their ability in order to jointly release the vast grass-roots forces of cultural creativity latent in the region, reinforcing their legacy of positive values.

The failings of Latin America are serious in this regard. While some sectors make great efforts to advance culture and achieve important goals, evident reservations and marginalization can be observed in others when it comes to incorporating culture into the agenda for basic development. Resources are often denied for this purpose or this budget is the first to be cut.

Continual changes are made, denying the effort the necessary stability to actually develop activities and establish the required institutions. Likewise, it is often argued that this is a secondary need of some kind that will be taken care of once other priorities have been satisfied. In some cases, this struggle reaches the point that is so well described by Pierre Bourdieu (1986) in the following quote: "... the absence of culture is usually accompanied by an absence of the sense of that absence."

This reasoning and its related practices are blocking the use of large forces that can make profound changes in the realities of a continent facing such difficult challenges in the decisive areas of day-to-day life of the people, as, for example, poverty and inequality.⁴ The time has come to put them behind us and actively explore the diverse contributions that culture can make towards development.

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Facilitating knowledge networks in Eastern Europe¹

by Jonathan Bach* and David Stark**

Summary

This paper examines the co-evolution of interactive technology and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Eastern Europe. It addresses, on the one hand, the emergence of NGOs as actors who exhibit new organizational topographies and, on the other, the emergence of the Internet and related interactive technologies that not only provide a new medium of representation in a virtual public sphere but whose adoption makes possible fundamental changes in the character of organization.

Non-governmental voluntary organizations play a key role in strengthening civil society in Eastern Europe. The extremely rapid growth of the voluntary sector since 1989 has coincided with the digital revolution, and today both NGOs and the Internet are experiencing exponential growth throughout the region. In little more than a decade, the technological framework in which voluntary associations are operating has gone from the limitations of a pre-Gutenberg setting to the opportunities of advanced communication technologies. Jonathan Bach and David Stark explore how organizations of civil society can be a source of organizational and technological innovation necessary for their societies' continuous adaptability in a fast-changing global economy. They argue that NGOs can enhance their use of new technologies to go beyond their existing roles as safety nets (mitigating the social problems of emerging market economies) and as safety valves (giving voice to underrepresented social groups in the newly competitive polities). In doing so, NGOs may function as social entrepreneurs that explore new organizational forms, and thus as sources of societal innovation.

If interactive technology is altering the organizational form of NGOs, however, this poses a whole new set of problems: can new hybrids remain within the accepted definition of voluntary organizations? What new accountability problems might ultimately compromise their autonomy or flexibility? What impact might such changes have on their ability to act as socially transformative organizations? In this paper, Bach and Stark focus on three NGOs in

Eastern Europe that are co-evolving along with interactive technology: the Center for Advanced Media—Prague, in the Czech Republic (C@MP); the Center for Culture and Communication (C3) in Hungary; and Klon/Jawor in Poland. They follow their development as organizations that facilitate collaboration, develop new entrepreneurial programmes, create novel organizational forms such as the virtual meta-NGO, and transform technology and social relations through their practices. As NGOs become sites of competing and co-existing evaluative principles, they are increasingly caught between the value systems of business (efficiency, solvency) and social mission (adherence to principles, ideological agendas). The authors see a tension between successfully exploiting these contradictions and the challenges raised by the proliferation of performance criteria, where the danger is that actors who are accountable according to many principles become accountable to none.

Introduction

New digital, interactive technologies are both heralded and maligned as evidence of a world increasingly structured by technology. This is especially the case since digital technologies figure prominently in the space-time compression at the core of globalization. Discussions about controversial issues regarding digital technology—from how to provide equal access to what new laws should govern the virtual world—are most always inclined to start from normative premises about technological properties. Yet while assumptions about technology's social effects provide good rhetorical ammunition for debates, they tend in most cases to outstrip our knowledge of how technology is actually used (O'Mahony and Barley 1999). The social practices that evolve around the use of a technology tell us more about its effect than assumptions based on technological properties alone (Bijker 1997; Giddens 1984). To understand the axial transformations implicit in globalization, including the key shift away from mass communication and production toward interactive media and network modes of organizing, we

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need to explore the ways in which technology and society co-evolve.

This paper examines the co-evolution of interactive technology and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Eastern Europe. In the decade following the revolutions of 1989, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe successfully launched structural reforms that consolidated a transition from socialism; in the present decade, the region faces an increasing imperative to promote innovation in order to move toward a more integrated role in Europe and the global economy. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have successfully achieved the stable minimum structure of modern society, with private firms operating within institutionalized markets and political parties competing within institutionalized democracies (Stark 1996; Agh 1998; Lavigne 1999). Yet the region still strives for a vibrant civil society, without which this twinned transformation cannot create deep-seated structural improvements. Partially as a result of such underdevelopment, these economies remain hungry for investment and their business culture exhibits low levels of innovation. The accomplishments of the transition are thus tempered by uncertainty as increased social and economic tensions follow in the wake of socialism and governments navigate the demands of the new global information economy (Iatridis 2000; Zwass 1999). These developments make a strong civil society all the more imperative and its mechanisms more complex.

The task of strengthening civil society is widely entrusted to the realm of NGOs, which have grown from at best a few hundred per country in 1989 to tens of thousands across the region today. Spurred by a combination of real need, normative motivations and Western funds, NGOs engaging in advocacy and service provision grew exponentially in the 1990s. These otherwise diverse organizations share the common denominators of being founded independent of state control, having a formal structure and being motivated by a normative value rather than profit (see Osborne 1998:16; Salamon and Anheier 1997).² The exponential growth of the voluntary sector since 1989 coincides with the digital revolution. Today, both NGOs and the

Internet are experiencing exponential growth throughout the region. In Hungary, for example, the number of NGOs jumped to about 15,000 in the first year after the revolution and now stands at over 50,000, while at the same time, by conservative estimates, the number of people online doubles every year and the number of Web sites doubles every six months (Kuti 1996, 2001). In the time span of little more than a decade, the technological framework in which voluntary associations are operating has gone from the limitations of a pre-Gutenberg setting to the opportunities of advanced communication technologies.

We emphatically do not presume that these technologies will be either magically liberating or harbingers of Orwellian control. Rather, we ask how the shift from mass communication to interactive media affects the practices of NGOs as an emerging organizational form in the region. We are equally well aware that one cannot conflate civil society with the presence of NGOs (Hann and Dunn 1996). Yet NGOs are now an inescapable factor in the post-socialist landscape, and they are expressing increasing interest in the potential of digital technologies to promote change, address social issues and streamline their operations (Lewis 1998; Hamelink 1997; White 1997). This creates an extraordinary laboratory for exploring the co-evolution of organizational forms and interactive technology.

There is, however, little empirical work on NGOs' use of new technologies. Can the capacities of the Internet to link people and resources, to search formal and informal archives of information, and to allow people to interact both in real time and at a time of their own choosing enhance NGOs' ability to mobilize and effect social change (compare with Gurstein 2000; Schuler 1996)? We know from studies of firms that the introduction of new technologies can substantially affect an organization's internal and external relations (Orlikowski 1995). Could NGOs' structures come to reflect the collaborative and less hierarchical organizational forms observed in firms that have introduced information technology and who operate under conditions of high uncertainty (Kahn 2000; Girard and Stark 2002)? If yes, then the use of interac-

2. Our working definition of NGOs encompasses advocacy or service organizations whose self-understanding includes a commitment to democratic values and progressive change (however they see fit to interpret this). These are the types of NGOs that Western foundations and governments encouraged during the early years of the transition in the hope that their presence would help create the public trust and social networks that had frayed to the breaking point under the previous regimes. This differs from the social capital approach (see Putnam 2000), where any civic group regardless of normative motivation can become a vehicle for the creation of bonds that strengthen civil society. This arguably could allow undemocratic groups such as xenophobic right-wing organizations to be discussed within the discursive realm of NGOs. This is a complex problem, but at the risk of oversimplification, our definition of NGOs explicitly excludes extremist groups. Although such groups also exhibit entrepreneurial characteristics and innovative uses of technology, they fall outside the purview of our study of civil society NGOs.

tive technology and related organizational changes should allow NGOs to more flexibly address the competing demands placed upon them. However, if in the process NGOs are being transformed into new kinds of hybrids that coincide uneasily with conventional images of non-profit, voluntary organizations, might this not enhance the risk that NGOs will encounter problems of accountability that ultimately compromise rather than enhance their flexibility? What impact might such changes have on their ability to act as socially transformative organizations as globalization proceeds apace?

NGOs as innovators and social entrepreneurs

NGOs are potential innovators that can play the role of social entrepreneur. The literature on civil society often interprets NGOs either romantically as the institutionalized “conscience” of society, or cynically as vessels for power struggles between class interests. The former is problematic because it implies that NGOs somehow guide society back to an ideal true self. This is a fiction, for the consequences of social change are not a return to an earlier state but a move toward new, uncertain directions. The latter view is equally problematic since it empties NGOs of agency and reduces them to pawns of external interests.

In both advanced and consolidating democracies, NGOs have developed into major societal actors primarily because they meet real political and material needs: they serve as a source of political legitimacy for the system by providing voice beyond electoral participation. Since they allow dissent to find form and content rather than fester unproductively, NGOs can be considered a type of “safety valve” essential to the functioning of a democracy. Materially, NGOs provide services that seek to mitigate the effects of social inequalities that arise in the new market economies, acting as a “safety net”. Both these roles serve to stabilize and ideally balance the inherent tension between self-interest and the common good within a democratic free-market system.

In the above roles as safety nets and safety valves, NGOs are systemically desirable for

democracies; but NGOs are not (or should not be) safe for the system in the sense of cementing the status quo. On the contrary, NGOs are rooted in a normative commitment to transforming the system, so that it becomes more responsive to the diverse and changing needs of citizens. The common perception of NGOs as oppositional to government and industry is often correct, for the bureaucratic machinery of the state and entrenched commercial interests rarely welcome criticism. Yet NGOs increasingly achieve change through partnership with government and the private sector. NGOs are therefore paradoxical creatures: by promoting change they both legitimize and challenge democratic society.

Simultaneously legitimizing and challenging democratic society is the core tension that NGOs embody in democracies. It is exacerbated by diverse pressures exerted on NGOs by constituents, donors, governments, and a broad array of amicable and hostile forces (Edwards and Hulme 1996). These diverse pressures create different ways in which an NGO legitimizes its self-worth: an organization must develop different strategies for justifying its existence vis à vis a donor, a client or an opponent; yet all of these must nonetheless be employed simultaneously. Because NGOs exist in an environment rife with uncertainty, there is a tendency for NGOs to treat potentially ambiguous situations (such as having to employ different forms of justification for different audiences) as something to be contained or avoided. The most successful strategies, however, require exploiting the ensuing ambiguity. In exploiting ambiguity, actors attempt to hold a resource that can be justified or assessed by more than one standard of measure (as, for example, the curious scene in Michael Moore’s documentary film, *Roger and Me*, in which a rabbit breeder’s roadside stand advertises “Pets and Meat”.) NGOs that seek to exploit ambiguity through employing different standards of measure mirror characteristics of social entrepreneurs (Stark 2001).

Using the word entrepreneur and NGO in the same sentence may at first glance seem contrary the spirit of voluntary organizations, but at closer look the best NGOs are adept entrepreneurs. It is a mistake to consign entrepreneurial skill to

the realm of the private sector, for the notion of entrepreneurship reflects an organization's ability to exploit multiple regimes of worth and not primarily the ability to make a profit (Stark 2000; Spinosa et al. 1997). The "original" NGOs in Eastern Europe—the dissident groups of the socialist era—were in a sense very entrepreneurial. The scarce dissident NGOs under the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe were true social innovators, pushing the limits of the system, devising ingenious methods for circumventing obstacles and proposing daring ways of thinking. A Polish editor once explained to us how his group bartered Italian wine and Russian watches in a complicated transaction to get paper for an economics journal. This ability to exploit ambiguities is an entrepreneurial feature. But being an entrepreneur today is vastly different from manoeuvring around the margins of the informal economy under socialism. To understand how NGOs are acting as social entrepreneurs and innovators we need to examine their ability to turn ambiguity into an asset. Studies of firms indicate that this is best done by re-combining, re-cognizing, and re-presenting existing material and ideal resources. How might such a recombinatory approach affect NGOs?

One possible answer is that NGOs might seek to become more isomorphic with businesses or government agencies with which they compete. Such an attempt at recombination makes sense given the pressures facing today's NGOs, as from the United States to Eastern Europe they encounter new and similar problems. For example, NGOs are being thrust into service-provision roles by governments who turn to them as expedient, if not always effective, sub-contractors for diverse issues from health care to housing (Kuti 2001; Osborne 1998). At the same time, they are overwhelmed on a day-to-day basis with the uncertainties and resentment generated by economic and social change. The scarcity of donors forces some NGOs to turn to business solutions to survive and to intensify their relations with business and government. Thus self-interest compels increased co-operation with public and private sectors. This opens new opportunities for sustainability, yet if they work too closely with the state or business,

NGOs risk serious accountability problems, including co-optation, loss of legitimacy and failure (Bendell 2000; Hulme and Edwards 1997). Conversely, if NGOs reject co-operation with state and market forces too radically they risk slipping into an exclusively oppositional role with diminished opportunities for agenda-setting. Co-optation by state and market forces are the Scylla and Charibdis of NGOs.

Even more difficult than avoiding co-optation may well be distinguishing co-operation from co-optation at all, as the state and market undergo fundamental changes. NGOs are caught in similar radical transformations; globalization is a time of redefinition and uncertainty, and for NGOs this situation exacerbates their already ambiguous position between state and market. Being forced to negotiate multiple and contradictory claims may lead to redefinitions of the organization itself. By regarding NGOs as emergent organizational forms we may gain a welcome perspective from which to track the development of this important sector in times of great change.

Interactive technology as a (re)source for organizational change

One felicitous perspective for observing change within NGOs lies in their use of interactive technologies such as the Internet, which is widely held to have a significant impact on both democracy and organizations. The advent of many-to-many communication (as opposed to one-to-many) has direct bearing on the social, institutional and international environments in which NGOs operate (Naughton 2001; Gurstein 2000; Schuler 1996). Interactive technologies are becoming important in expanding the web of social interaction, increasing its density, and promoting new connections among diverse and dispersed social actors.

Many committed proponents of democracy are highly critical of these new technologies and perceive the Internet as just another means for instrumental rationality to colonize our life-world, where "freedom on the net is the freedom of the market" (Dean 1999). Equally committed colleagues, including representatives of many American foundations, could not disagree

more, seeing the Internet as “particularly suitable to building open societies” (OSI 1993), enriching and empowering civil society, and acting as a natural catalyst for democracy. Similar oppositions are drawn regarding the introduction of interactive technology into organizations. Champions of interactive technology tout its potential for reducing constraints, improving communication and increasing participation within firms. Critics are fearful of the surveillance dimension of new technologies, their potential to turn the modern workplace into a panopticon and the potential alienating effects of computer-mediated communication.³

Such proponents and detractors of interactive technology commit the common fallacy of reading social effects from technological properties. Discussions about controversial issues regarding digital technology—from how to provide equal access to what new laws should govern the virtual world—almost always start from normative premises about technological properties. Yet, while assumptions about technology’s social effects provide rhetorical ammunition, they tend in most cases to outstrip our knowledge of how technology is actually used (O’Mahony and Barley 1999). The social practices that evolve around the use of a technology tell us more about its effect than assumptions based on technological properties alone (Bijker 1997; Orlikowski 1992; Giddens 1984). Technology only “affords” certain potential uses (intentional and unintentional), but it is the institutional setting that determines whether these “affordances” are recognized (Bockowski 2001). Accordingly, rather than speculating on whether a certain technology will lead to a specific outcome, empirical studies about how people interact with technology can help trace how technology facilitates or constrains social practices, and how certain paradigms transform or replicate themselves.

As we will see, the use of interactive technology is an inescapable part of Eastern Europe’s rapid social change. How is technology conditioning the shape of these changes? What relation exists between NGOs and their confrontation with new technologies? At first glance we found a felicitous elective affinity between NGOs and interactive technology. Commun-

ication and networking are integral to NGOs’ basic tasks of getting information to constituents, channelling and interpreting information from varied sources, aggregating information and demands and transmitting them to diverse audiences, and mobilizing individuals and groups. Interactive technology is designed and promoted as a tool for processing information, increasing communication and facilitating networking. If technology is seen as a tool, then NGOs seem organizationally ideal for adopting information technology.

The problem with viewing technology as a tool, however, is that once new technologies are introduced to solve old problems, the problems themselves change. Email may enable an NGO to increase its level of communication, but it may also create such a flood of requests for information that the NGO becomes paralyzed (compare with DiMaggio et al. 2001). Early studies of decision making via email find that email may make it harder to resolve conflicts, and that consensus building may be more difficult electronically (Sproull and Kiesler 1986). The need for computers, bandwidth and skilled staff affects the budgetary structure of NGOs, and raises new workplace and accountability issues. Web sites are often carelessly designed, yet they are increasingly becoming the representation of an organization to the outside world. Thus while it is true that NGOs’ functions significantly involve information, communication and networking, it does not follow that these functions will necessarily be improved by the properties of interactive technology. They will, however, most likely be transformed. The design of a technology seldom corresponds to its actual use (Suchman 1987; Fischer 1992), and organizations themselves change when they adopt different practices to make use of technology.

NGOs and interactive technology in Eastern Europe

Almost overnight, NGOs in Eastern Europe went from the limitations of a pre-Gutenberg setting to the opportunities of advanced communication technologies. Despite material limitations, NGOs today in Eastern Europe preside over an almost unprecedented amount of tech-

3. The most widely-publicized report on negative social effects of the Internet by Kraut et al. (1998), has been considerably modified in a less negative direction by his more recent research (Kraut et al. 2002).

nological firepower. Prior to 1989, the few beleaguered voluntary associations communicated by samizdat.⁴ With no access to photocopy machines, pre-1989 civil society organizations such as the Polish Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) or Charter 77 attached special springs to typewriter keys to produce up to seven carbon copies of their documents. In Prague, for example, it was not uncommon for the members of an underground philosophy seminar to circulate texts that were literally in manuscript—some in the handwriting of elementary school children who had painstakingly copied a parent's writings so it could circulate more widely.

Today a relatively developed telecommunications infrastructure covers the historical core of Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). Yet advances in the introduction of interactive technology are distributed unevenly across the four countries. Poland, for example, boasts the highest number of Internet hosts overall and the highest total connectivity. The Czech Republic, however, claims the highest numbers of hosts per capita, which indicates a greater penetration of the technology throughout society. Hungary has the highest number of backbone hosts, indicating a more decentralized market structure, while Slovakia, lagging in most other categories, surprisingly leads in the number of Internet users per capita (www.ceenet.org, accessed November 2000).

The organizational structure of NGOs also differs across the region. While they share some qualities such as segmentation and relative decentralization, each country differed in subtle yet important ways during socialism and began the transition with different sets of institutions (Stark and Bruzst 1998; Anheier and Seibel 1998). NGOs in Poland suffer from the lack of both state and society support, while in Hungary NGOs face a different challenge: the government has sought to use them as a vehicle for privatization and political control (Anheier and Seibel 1998; Ekiert and Kubik 1999; Kuti 1996). Despite sharing in the dramatic growth of NGOs (from slightly more than 2,000 in 1989 to over 40,000 in 1998), the Czech state has favoured pre-1989 organizational relationships with civic associations involved in "safe"

areas of education and sports, resulting in criticism that it is reducing civil society's involvement in the policy-making process and thereby inhibiting civil society development (Green 1999; Potucek 2000). Slovakia, whose social development was hampered by long years of political stagnation under the former Prime Minister Meciar, saw a growing role for NGOs in the 1998 "get out the vote" campaign (Wagner 2001).

The relationship between NGOs and interactive technology in the region is extremely mixed. Funding from Western foundations made up the initial influx of interactive technology, especially grants from the Soros Foundation and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to enhance connectivity and promote electronic communication, some of which were then re-granted by local organizations. This type of explicit funding for information technology has markedly decreased since the mid-1990s, with the notable exception of that from the European Union. The cost of going online remains prohibitively high, with Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic remaining in 2000 the most expensive countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the price of 30 hours of connection at off-peak times (OECD 2002). The high rates charged by telecommunications carriers result in fewer users and constrain existing potential for Internet use: for example, in Hungary, although 300,000 households had computers in 1999, only 50,000, or 0.7 per cent of all Hungarian households, subscribed to the Internet (Pattinson 2000).

The problems that NGOs encounter in using interactive technologies are serious and form a familiar litany: lack of funding to purchase equipment or services, lack of skilled staff, too little time and interest. We must not forget that the majority of NGOs by all accounts appear not to have computers. Some NGOs find ways to overcome even this obstacle by using public terminals at "tele-cottages", public libraries or Internet cafes. But even for NGOs with trouble-free access to the Internet, keeping up with technology can create difficulties regarding the effective allocation of scarce financial resources and

4. The clandestine printing and distribution of literature banned by the government, especially in the former Soviet Union and the communist countries of Eastern Europe.

changing valuation of competencies among the staff. These problems will intensify as using technology becomes increasingly part of an organization's daily life. Some of the unexpected organizational challenges resulting from the undeniable difficulties of adapting to a different technological environment will appear in the following discussion of actual cases (especially regarding meta-NGOs).

Using interactive technology, we stress, is no guarantee of any positive outcome in a given organization (though, by the same token, its use cannot be regarded in itself as detrimental). Consider NGOs' use of their Web sites. Thousands of NGOs in Eastern Europe maintain Web sites today, with vastly varying results. In a preliminary study during spring 2001 of NGO Web sites in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Bach and Vedres found that the sites varied widely. About one-fifth of the sites studied were rich in information and online activity and were sophisticated in design, followed by a group of similarly rich and active but amateurishly designed sites. More than half the sites we encountered, however, were outdated, contained little in the way of information and lacked any indication of activity.⁵

These findings, while preliminary, hint at a larger story about how and why NGOs find it desirable or necessary to have a Web site and how they use it. In interviews Bach and Vedres were told that Web sites were perceived as indispensable "calling cards", but that endowing them with functionality beyond a simple page often exceeded resources and skills. Some NGO staff saw Web sites as necessary to remain in the good graces of foreign donors, and this catering to donors might explain why, of the approximately 20 percent of the Web sites surveyed that featured languages other than the local one, they were nearly always English or German. Only in the rarest of cases did a Web site feature a neighbouring Eastern European language. Some sites were full of activity in the local language, however, reflecting not only a vibrant virtual culture but also an interest in exploring new ways to be active in society.

Nevertheless Web sites are but one facet of interactive technology. It is important to understand the dynamics of web presence, but of

greater interest is how the use of technology, including Web sites, contributes to organizational transformation (compare with Orlikowski and Iacono 1999). Let us therefore look more closely at some examples of NGOs in Eastern Europe whose own form and function are changing with their use of interactive technology. The following cases were drawn from interviews and research conducted during 2000. They are not meant to be a representative sample of the region but rather to highlight NGOs that seek actively to adopt interactive technology. This is a small but growing group, and their experiences may prove relevant both to understanding regional trends, as more and more NGOs go online, and to understanding how technology and organizations co-evolve.

From brokering to collaboration: hybrid NGOs

Digital technologies make it easier for people to reconstruct what counts as information so that its definition, or at least its circulation, is no longer the exclusive prerogative of those with power, money and connections (Nunberg 1996). The increased ability of individuals to gain access to large amounts of disparate information is justly celebrated as empowering (Cairncross 1997). At the same time this kind of access presents serious problems for any organization that seeks to exert control over information collection or dissemination.

NGOs have a long history of brokering information as both a service and a source of social and financial capital. We suggest that acting as information brokers is ultimately an inadequate response to the conceptual shifts of the digital age, because it relies on antiquated ways of understanding communication flows. Nonetheless, providing information remains a central function of many NGOs, and the more savvy organizations within the information broker model are learning to compensate for the shifting environment by creatively marketing their information. They augment their now easily shared information, such as directories or databases, with value-added aspects, such as efficient search engines and non-database related services, such as training and web hosting. In

5. From March through May 2001, Jonathan Bach and Balazs Vedres studied a random sample of 600 NGOs from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, drawn from a population of 1,500 NGOs compiled from available directories. They measured for centrality based on the number of incoming links to a given site and then focused on stratification by identifying groups of Web sites with peculiar combinations of properties, employing cluster analysis and discriminant analysis.

the process, they begin to make services available that provide not only information as such, but knowledge forms such as skills (know-how) and, through collaboration and links, knowledge of others (Peizer 2000).

NGOs are thus learning to approach information as a commodity in order to enhance sustainability. The resulting outcome-oriented processes are leading to hybrid NGOs that combine social and business ventures, such as the “dot-corg” dual enterprise model, in which revenue generating is separated from the NGOs’ social mission and evaluated according to business metrics, or in which the NGO sets its long-term goal as evolution into a socially oriented, for-profit venture, such as many Internet service providers in Eastern Europe who began as non-profits and grew into viable businesses (Peizer 2000).

The Center for Advanced Media—Prague (C@MP) is an example of this kind of hybrid NGO. Its origins lie in the Soros Foundation’s early work on providing Internet access and training to Central and Eastern Europe. By the mid-1990s, however, the foundation’s attention had shifted from providing access to developing “content” with greater emphasis on sustainability. One result was the Media Development Loan Fund launched by Soros’ Open Society Institute (OSI) in 1996 to support low-cost financing and technical assistance for independent “indigenous” media in transition countries as a means to facilitate debates on core economic and social issues (www.mdlf.cz). The fund, with a Prague and a New York office, developed C@MP in 1998 to advance new media operations. Its audience consists of independent media and NGOs in the post-communist and developing worlds that seek new media concepts and solutions. C@MP delivers such services through training, technical and content-building consulting, and project-oriented product development.

C@MP seeks to create a self-organizing “hub” for the interaction between digital and print media. Although its beginnings lie in Eastern Europe, it has quickly moved beyond being a regional NGO and sees itself as an “interface”, offering opportunities for technological collaboration between the developed and developing

countries. Its projects, accordingly, are not limited by geography; and they extend from South Africa to Southeast Asia, where the organization was a finalist in the Ericsson Internet Community Awards for its work with a virtual nationwide radio network. As a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Digital Divide Initiative, C@MP is actively involved in finding opportunities for overcoming the digital divide.

For independent media to fulfil its role in democratic and democratizing societies, it needs to compete and function at the standard of commercial media, especially regarding content distribution and avoidance of censorship. One of C@MP’s most innovative elements is the “Campware” programme, which develops software for independent media that cannot afford to meet the requirements of an increasingly electronic medium. Campware helps with automating web publications, managing subscriptions and allowing remote contributors to feed content to the publisher’s database; and it also offers content management software. The programme is innovative in the way it develops and delivers technical assistance. In helping design software that would otherwise be beyond the means of independent media, C@MP works with existing bandwidth and resources to remain relevant and effective. It builds self-support networks to rival the technical support components of commercial software, which itself becomes a collaborative international enterprise. Importantly, all the software is made public (under the GNU General Public License) so that its development can benefit from maximum input; and the organization also provides limited fellowships to help develop Open Source projects.

C@MP thus uses technology to transform technology, while pursuing a normative mission with social change as a desired outcome. The organization’s output is increasingly identical to the client’s input: in other words, rather than a top-down service delivery relationship, C@MP’s expertise is shaped by the collaborative activity of its members. If C@MP’s private sector analogue is a consultancy firm, then we can see its success as a result of a “collaborative advantage” (compare with Huxham 1996).

Although C@MP began as an information broker trying to fill “gaps”, it has evolved into

what we can call a knowledge facilitator through its emphasis on collaborative production of software solutions and self-support networks. This is part of the shift from “information” as a discrete property that (in theory) exists independently of a subject, to “knowledge” that requires a knowing subject and cannot be conceived of independently from the communication network in which it is both produced and consumed. The very notions of producer and consumer are blurred by the emphasis on knowledge facilitation. This blurring is to some degree a function of digital technology’s characteristics: online consumption, for example, blurs with production process by allowing (or forcing) users to engage in an activity formerly relegated to production, such as data entry, or by producing information in the act of consuming that is then sold for profit (for example, information gathered about web-surfing activities). Yet the social effect of this obfuscation of traditional roles ultimately depends on how organizations approach this situation.

Embracing collaboration as C@MP does is not an obvious choice for most NGOs, because the information broker model is a reasonable and conditioned reaction from the age of mass communication and mass production. Modern society is traditionally organized along lines of access to quantifiable information brokered between those who have information and those who want or need it. It has an hourglass structure, with information passing through the broker in the middle on the way from A to B, similar to Burt’s (1992) bridges across structural holes or Latour’s (1988) obligatory passage points. This can take the ruthless form of a monopolistic corporation or the benevolent form of an NGO seeking to spread formerly guarded information. Structurally, however, brokers work in the same way by exploiting gaps and, accordingly, gaining rents. They have a vested interest in maintaining the gap between information producers and consumers. The affordances of interactive technology can be used to maximize this brokering role, along with the power (and perils) that come with it.

In contrast we can imagine a “knowledge society” with the structure of a network, emphasizing not information per se but communication.

Whereas in an information society brokers have a vested interest in maintaining the gap between information producers and consumers, organizations in a knowledge society function as facilitators and help blur the line between users and producers. This does not displace or solve the practical and epistemological problems occasioned by “information” (for example, how to process large amounts of data, how to insure data protection, how to ascribe meaning to data), but raises different questions of an ontological nature and questions the very a priori assumptions of organizational forms. Knowledge network facilitators, as opposed to information brokers, have the potential to be genuinely transformative of social structure. But what sort of NGO would take on this task?

Creating “knowledge sources”: arts, culture and communication

In the forefront of NGOs that initiate technological innovation are new media arts organizations. Arts organizations are rarely considered as national resources for innovation. Yet they are well-positioned to act as knowledge facilitators rather than information brokers, to mediate between design and use, to have sociocultural insights that governments or corporations lack, and to engage in experimentation on a constant basis (Century 1999). New media arts organizations confront the paradoxical way that interactive technology recombines much of the traditional toolbox of artists:

All the strategies developed to awaken audiences from a dream-existence of bourgeois society, like constructivist design, new typography, avant-garde cinematography and film editing, as well as photo-montage, now define the basic routines of post-industrial society; that is, the interaction with a computer (Manovitch 1999).

Artists, however, are seldom content with the basic routines of society; and new media artists search for ways to illustrate the radical nature of everyday interactive technology, and at the same time to push the technology itself to new tasks and forms. While often highly critical of capitalism (see, for example, www.eto.org), the very playful, exploratory attitude that fuels art catches the attention not only of critics and audi-

ences, but also of industry. Firms, such as Xerox or Ericsson, have taken interest and have come to regard artists and art organizations as a laboratory of sorts, consisting not of research scientists but of "research artists" (compare with Larcon 1998; Harris 1999). "What distinguishes art from the research sciences and commercial entrepreneurship", writes Joel Slayton (1999), "is a very thin veil." New media arts organizations are therefore good examples of the sort of entrepreneurship discussed earlier. As their relevance for industry grows, they have to find a balance between their role as incubators of future designs and technologies, and their sense of social responsibility and critique. The lines between art collective, start-up Internet company, research laboratory and socially conscious NGO are increasingly blurred.

The Hungarian Center for Culture and Communication (C3) exemplifies this type of NGO. C3 has evolved from a public centre for artists to a self-described centre for advanced research and development, with the application of new media technologies at its core. The organization sponsors myriad exhibits and projects, including grants; but one particularly relevant example of its critical, functional and experimental work is support for public access web terminals, set up in 1998 in order to "make the advantages of network information and communication manifest to every literate passer-by, or at least [to ensure] that the existence of digital culture is not a mystery, [to show] that no special expertise is required in order to handle it, and that the rich content of the Net offers the procurement of information, as well as dialogue" (www.c3.hu).

Mixing the social criticism of the artist with new media opportunities resulted in the "Inside Out" project that ran in the earlier days of C3, from 1997–1998. The rise of homelessness was one of the more shocking elements in the inequities of the market system, and C3 sought to draw attention to the problem. The challenge was to approach the subject without further reinforcing the conception of the homeless as "others", outcasts whose situation evoked pity but no understanding. "Inside Out" gave colour disposable cameras to approximately 40 homeless persons in Budapest, with no instructions

aside from the invitation to photograph those aspects of their everyday experience that they felt important or interesting. They knew that their pictures would be viewed eventually as part of a public exhibit and Web site. Each photographer was interviewed about the photos after they were printed, and each was compensated for his or her work. The exhibition and Web site served to humanize a marginal population, while helping make homelessness a topic for public debate.

C3 also provides a service for NGOs, hosting their web pages and providing a directory of NGOs hosted on its server. C3 was one of the first NGOs to offer a free dial-up email system that grew to over 300,000 users (it was later sold to the Hungarian telephone company Matav). Its main Web page looks like a periodic table of elements, with each element a link to other pages in the site. There are current and archived virtual exhibits, digital video, software to download, a sophisticated e-magazine and links to international art databases. Going beyond the innovative use of technology, C3 itself offers grants and residencies in support of projects "which demonstrate an expanded exploration of digital media technology, display creative usage of the Internet, and which offer challenging and innovative ideas regarding communication and culture" (Eisenstein 1999). C3 sees itself as a space for innovation in the use and even creation of digital tools and as a place where the spheres of art, science and technology can meet and co-operate. Andrea Szekeres, C3's programme director, sees C3 not as a "centre" in the traditional sense, but in as an organization that treats its users as "producers of knowledge". "They might not think they are producers of knowledge but they are," she told us. "We help them be a knowledge source."

Szekeres' comment is telling, because it points to the shift discussed above from information to knowledge, from users and producers to users as producers. Interactive technology may be a necessary development for this shift, but it is not sufficient. The information broker model remains dominant for reasons of expedience and inertia; the promise of revenue from gaining rents is a more familiar bet than the promise of facilitating knowledge networks. Knowledge-

based organizations also face being held to account in multiple registers, an inherently unstable situation that requires ingenuity and flexibility. Yet as NGOs adapt to changing environments, they will increasingly be faced with a need to re-evaluate their roles. Co-existing and competing evaluative principles within an organization will increase as interaction with governments, private funders, business, other NGOs and constituents increase in complexity. The conjunction of globalization and privatization that forms the environment for NGOs in transition countries will make it difficult to operate successfully on a strict information brokerage model. How is this tension between information and knowledge models manifesting itself among NGOs?

“Meta-NGOs” and the virtual public sphere

We confront this tension in the emergence of “meta-NGOs”. These organizations’ primary purpose is to provide information and assistance to other NGOs, including databases and online services, and they effectively strive to serve as clearinghouses for a country’s NGO community in whole or in part (compare with Fazekas n.d.). Today there is at least one such organization in each country, and usually more. A typical example is the Slovak NGO, Changenet, which bills itself as the “virtual community of Slovak not-for-profit citizen’s organizations”. Changenet provides a press service for NGOs to centralize their press releases, a calendar of events organized by NGOs, a classified advertising area for NGO-related issues (services, spare resources, jobs), databases on funding and news media organizations, and a subjects area (environment, human rights, youth, charity) that provides original content, in the form of explanations and FAQs, as well as texts of selected laws and how-to manuals. It also provides a gallery for a “photographic perspective” on issues important to NGOs. Particular to Changenet is a section providing information about a Slovak council of NGO organizations. A thematic link page is broken down into topics that generally mirror the subject areas. An account (with five email addresses, Web space,

access to online conferences and restricted areas of the Web, technical support and training) is available to NGOs for a nominal fee. Essentially Changenet is organized like a house with many rooms to visit and amble through. Design is important to the function of meta-sites; and this organization tends to pay more attention to it than other NGOs (except art-oriented sites).

While meta-NGOs act as conduits of information for their members, thus fitting an information brokerage model, their use of the Internet often leads to the creation of networks of communication beyond the purview of the organization. Tension thus arises concerning its level of “control” and the positioning of the meta-NGO relative to its constituents in what we can label the “virtual public sphere”: NGO sub-networks are often under the “jurisdiction” of the meta-NGO in cases where the meta-organization provides member NGOs with a Web site, server space, connectivity, training and guidelines, as well as providing individual users with moderated environments for communication. Meta-NGOs would like to be the primary, if not the sole, provider of these kinds of services to their specific NGO community. In the language of advertising, they aim to be the “category killers” and avoid redundancy through consolidation. While this kind of consolidation may make sense given resource scarcity, it raises questions as to whether it might dull the community nature of the Web. The logic of consolidation confronts the desirability of diversity.

A second tension arises from the meta-NGOs’ wish to generate income to support their operations. The virtual public sphere is run through very real computers, servers and connections, all of which cost money. At what point does the need to charge for services or partner with commercial enterprises sacrifice an organization’s autonomy or commitment to social justice? It is not clear that this is necessarily a problem, because it is also possible that entrepreneurial elements of NGOs are what allow for creative solutions. Yet entrepreneurial activity can lead to a crisis of legitimacy if badly handled, or if the result is co-optation or commercial domination.

Despite these tensions, meta-NGOs have great relevancy for shaping the virtual public sphere because of their claims to be representa-

tive and their high visibility in search engines and links. Klon/Jawor in Poland is an example of the most sophisticated type.⁶ Originally a developer of a non-profit database, this organization shifted in the late 1990s from simply gathering data on NGOs in Poland to providing more tailored information for Polish NGOs and promoting the flow of information among them. To provide a means for NGOs to gain Internet access, an Internet server (www.ngo.pl) was established. This was then complimented by an extensive Web site (www.klon.org.pl) and a non-commercial free service for NGOs (free.ngo.pl), which currently has approximately 2,000 accounts. Plans were underway in autumn 2000 to develop a template that NGOs could use to quickly and efficiently gain a Web presence by filling in a form that would generate a Web site.

Klon/Jawor is a textbook case of how a relation to information transformed an NGO into a central node. Founded by a group of sociologists from the University of Warsaw, Klon/Jawor developed a (print) database on NGOs in its early years, making it a place for NGOs to turn to for information about the rapidly developing sector. A dense network grew up with Klon/Jawor as a central node, and the organization became even more essential to other NGOs as they gradually moved many of their databases to the Web and added services such as free email and Web site hosting. In 2000 Klon/Jawor became fully independent (it had been affiliated with an older civil society organization, the Regardless of the Weather Foundation); and it now presides over a physical and virtual network as the head of a consortium of 12 smaller centres that support Polish NGOs (known as Splot). Like many other NGOs, Klon/Jawor took advantage of privatization and struck a deal with the government to acquire its own building, renamed the Szpitalna Center, now shared with nine other NGOs. Working closely with the Batory Foundation, the local representative of the Soros Open Society Institute, Klon/Jawor seems to have rather comfortably laid claim to its central and progressive role in the Polish NGO sector.

Fazekas argues that the cohesive nature of Klon/Jawor is a function of country-specific fac-

tors allowing Polish co-operative networks to morph relatively painlessly into a formalized structure. In contrast, Hungarian meta-NGOs did not exhibit the social intimacy and camaraderie that were the norm at the Szpitalna Center. Their relations were pervaded by distrust and competition, caused in part by a more pronounced generational split, between a younger generation of activists who increasingly adopted the rhetoric of professionalization clash and an older generation committed to grassroots organizing.

It was in this context that a planned Hungarian co-operative venture to establish an NGO portal for the region went sour—in part because of distrust between two organizations that we will refer to by the pseudonyms “Information Central” and “Civic Sector Action”. Like Klon/Jawor, both were the creation of academics. Information Central saw its primary role as information gathering and dissemination, while Civic Sector Action focused on consulting and training to build sustainability. Both NGOs were constrained by the competition for limited funds that affects all NGOs in the region to various degrees. As one programme director at a third Hungarian NGO put it, all local foundations want to be not only the only source of information but also, significantly, the NGO closest to the Soros Foundation.

The co-operative plan to establish an NGO portal sought to establish an interactive information and communication platform where both civil society actors and representatives from other sectors could communicate. Meant not just for Hungary but for all of Central and Eastern Europe, this portal aimed to improve NGOs’ services through use of the kinds of “new media technologies and knowledge resources of its members” that would help “form communities around various areas of interest and devise independent projects in collaboration with others” (Fazekas n.d.:63). This enhanced communication and interactivity was to be achieved through chat rooms, listservs, forums and the availability of technical know-how.

Yet while the focus was on collaboration and utilization of knowledge resources, neither organization was particularly keen on co-operation.

6. The discussion of Klon/Jawor and the Hungarian NGOs draws upon the research of Erzsebet Fazekas—a doctoral student in sociology at Columbia University—for the project.

Civic Sector Action possessed neither the resources nor the willingness to shoulder all the costs. To win a grant for this project, it was necessary to complement its strengths by associating with a partner who had experience in information dissemination. Information Central seemed a perfect choice, since Civic Sector Action could increase its own visibility, by being the lead organization in the grant, and in the process eliminate Information Central as a rival in overlapping areas while benefiting from their resources. Information Central approached the overtures for co-operation warily; and distrust overcame potential mutual interests, resulting in failure. Ironically, it was Information Central which, late in 2000, received a prestigious grant to create a very similar, though less ambitious, portal, whose goal is to “to make accessible at one place all the services and information now dispersed in a structured way” (Fazekas n.d.:56).⁷

Klon/Jawor and the Hungarian NGOs generally have found themselves following the technology, often pushed by the priorities of the funders and pulled by the demands of their clients. They innovatively use interactive technologies, yet they are only beginning to stress user innovation and tacit knowledge, or to combine technological know-how and sociocultural insight in a collaborative environment (Century 1999). They are, however, important organizational developments in an emerging virtual public sphere and exemplify the transition from information to knowledge among civil society actors.

If meta-NGOs are successful in facilitating knowledge networks rather than providing mere information brokering, then NGOs may become less a space for the “anti-politics” that characterized civil society under the old regime than a sphere for what might be called “parapolitics”, concerned with improving access to information and facilitating contact and collaboration between people and groups. This would not extend an already existing public space into the virtual realm, but rather create a new type of interaction among individuals and organizations. Ideally, meta-NGOs will become a vital part of a virtual public sphere, structured as an emerging networked social system that distributes knowledge production along self-organizing principles.

Conclusion

NGOs such as C@MP, C3 and Klon/Jawor are co-evolving along with interactive technology, as they move from brokering knowledge to facilitating collaboration, developing hybrid entrepreneurial programs and creating new organizational forms such as the virtual meta-NGO. Since technology both shapes and is shaped by the society from which it emerges (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985), C@MP's media software and C3's experimental virtual art also transform technology through their practices. This same symbiotic process also transforms social relations (DiMaggio et al. 2001; Marcuello 1998). For example, the linguistic codes that transmit socially shared meanings are changing, as the vocabulary of “listservs”, “baud rate”, “hyperlink” and the attendant jargon of the Web become commonplace for educated users. Originally used in English, these terms have now been translated or adapted into local languages, so that initiation into the language of technology is now easier for larger numbers of people. This new literacy brings with it altered social relations: within organizations that embrace new technologies, we observe an increase in social status among those who are proficient in the language and use of computers (Marcuello 1998). The type of educational background and experience necessary for mobility within the NGO world thus changes to include fluency with technology, which means not only literacy but familiarity—a certain ease of interaction—with technology.

This is significant because, at their most ambitious, NGOs seek ultimately to change social practices and redefine public discourse. The shifting linguistic codes mentioned above are one way in which the co-evolution of NGOs and technology are embodying and fostering new practices. Others include relying on email as a central organizing tool for any progressive political campaign, or the trend toward challenging the idea of what constitutes adequate access to computers and the Internet, as the standards that define the so-called digital divide are raised and refined.

For the future evolution of NGOs themselves, the possibilities for networking provided by

7. The planned services include a “non-profit press observer”, a mailing list for civil organizations, a grant observer and funders' directory, search engines, databases of NGOs, an online consultation service, a map of non-profit service providers, introductions to different NGOs, a match-making service for fundraising, service seeking and problem solving, and an online non-profit bookstore (Fazekas n.d.).

interactive technology are of key importance. Broad networks linking people and organizations across regions are not in themselves democratic, but they do help institutionalize methods of communication that are not (yet) as easily susceptible to censorship or monopoly control as communication was in the past. By playing a major role as the central actors in such intersecting networks, even nationally based NGOs could take on an additional role of facilitating knowledge and collaboration that goes beyond their provision of “safety nets” and “safety valves” (as discussed above). Such a development could herald new roles for NGOs in the construction of a global civil society (see Salamon et al. 2001; Warkentin 2001; Anheier et al. 2001).⁸

These organizational changes in NGOs—real and potential—are directly related to the larger societal changes (positive and negative) that are inextricably intertwined with the use of technology: changes in the circulation of information, the value and form of labour, the nature of the commodity, new methods of political mobilization, and new forms for identity and self-expression. The move toward knowledge brokering and value-added information services shows NGOs are adapting to the changing political economy. Some of the rewards for this are sustainability, innovative capacity and transformative potential. Some of the challenges they will face lie in the increased professionalization of the voluntary sector, commercialization, the proliferation of performance criteria and accountability problems. NGOs are becoming sites of competing and co-existing evaluative principles, caught between the value systems of

business (efficiency, solvency) and social mission (adherence to principles, ideological agenda). In the best case they may exploit these contradictions, but the danger is real that actors who are accountable according to many principles become accountable to none (Stark 2001). For the countries of Eastern Europe, these issues have become particularly acute as they seek to be part of a more tightly integrated Europe. More research is needed on how NGOs negotiate these opportunities and challenges as they increasingly collaborate with state and market.

Our observations are a snapshot of a period in great flux. The Internet as we know it may soon merge into a mixed form of telephony and broadcasting that could make “the Internet” (with a capital “I”) a historical marker rather than a permanent descriptor of digital interactive technologies to come. Instead of attempting to predetermine the outcomes of interactive technology’s social effects, as futurologists are wont to do, we would rather view its advent as what Georg Simmel called an “interstice”—an opening that allows people to produce innovative responses when large-scale change “disorganizes” the familiar world. NGOs in Eastern Europe face a doubly disorganized world, for not only is transition itself a traumatic upsetting of generations of conditioning, but NGOs today often find themselves ill-prepared for the different tasks they face, despite their predecessors’ earlier success in overthrowing recalcitrant regimes. We are cautiously hopeful that the affordances of interactive technology will be used by NGOs creatively to confront the uncertainty heralded by the new century, and not simply to submit to its exigencies.

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8. If NGOs institutionalize networks in which weak ties distribute non-redundant information to the widest possible audience, this could have meaningful social implications since weak ties form the best bridges across social worlds and increase innovative potential (Granovetter 1973; Burt 1992). If this were done primarily through online ties, however, they would still have to be sufficiently strong to provide even the minimum benefits of weak ties, a point on which there is some disagreement (Walsh and Gabbay 1997).

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Acronyms

C3	Center for Culture and Communication	NGO	non-governmental organization
C@MP	Center for Advanced Media—Prague	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
KOR	Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (Workers’ Defense Committee), Poland	OSI	Open Society Institute
		USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Social capital as a factor in indigenous peoples development in Ecuador¹

by Jorge E. Uquillas* and Martien Van Nieuwkoop**

Introduction

In the early 1990s the World Bank launched its Indigenous Peoples Development Initiative in Latin America and has been working ever since to open new and innovative avenues of support for indigenous peoples development. Initial efforts focused on mitigation measures, training and capacity building, and preinvestment operations. Gradually, indigenous peoples development is becoming an integral part of the Bank's loan portfolio.

Ecuador's Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project was the direct result of this initiative. Furthermore, as indigenous people in Ecuador often point out, local conditions for such a project were right in terms of both the level of organization of indigenous peoples and the readiness of the government to enter this uncharted territory. In fact, the major national indigenous federations claim that the project was the result of their long struggle for recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, including their right to a fairer share of fiscal resources.

The project is the first stand-alone investment operation financed by the World Bank that focuses exclusively on indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities. It is the first time that Ecuador borrowed resources specifically for investments to benefit poor indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran populations, channeling resources directly through indigenous organizations with only a minimal role for the government. It is also the first time that indigenous federations and the Ecuadoran government have joined forces in an effort explicitly based on putting into practice the vision of "development with identity," or "ethnodevelopment." This vision builds on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies—such as their sense of ethnic identity, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources for shared goals—to promote local employment and growth. It is an effort to build social capital as an asset of the poor, while at the same time working directly with that asset.

This is a complex project, with an arduous preparation and implementation process that illustrates some of the difficulties of taking

certain parts of the social capital argument seriously. The project has found that strengthening existing organizations is not easy, that building coalitions and alliances takes a great deal of time, and that often these alliances are fragile and short lived. Nonetheless, this project has become a flagship for other initiatives trying to foster community-based approaches that emphasize the notion of poor people having assets, as opposed to only deficits (World Bank 2001).

Because the Bank is still building its knowledge and experience in this field, it is essential to share information and lessons learned from actual operations carried out in partnership with indigenous peoples and their organizations. This study attempts to distill lessons from the preparation and initial implementation of the Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project. It draws heavily from a working paper previously published by the authors (Van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000).

It is worth noting that the project was designed around concepts such as participation and self-managed development. These concepts were being discussed in some sectors of the World Bank in the 1990s (for example, see Davis and Soefstestad 1995). Other concepts, such as social capital, culture in sustainable development, social exclusion, and community-driven development have become fashionable at the turn of the millennium and therefore are briefly reflected in this work (Carroll 2003).

The Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project invests in local capacity building, small-scale demand-driven rural sub-projects, land tenure regularization, cultural heritage activities, and institutional strengthening of the Council for the Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (*Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador*, CODENPE).

The total project budget is \$50 million (\$25 million from the World Bank, \$15 million from the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and \$10 million from the Ecuadoran government and beneficiary communities and organizations. The project was prepared beginning in early 1995, approved in early 1998, and became effective in September 1998. Implementation was completed in April

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2003. A second phase is being prepared during 2003 and is expected to become effective in early 2004.

The emergence of indigenous peoples as political actors in Ecuador

Socioeconomic profile

Indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans are important parts of Ecuador's multicultural society. They differ from the mainstream Hispanic (white and mixed or mestizo) population both in their degree of economic deprivation, their high level of social capital (particularly among indigenous peoples), and their cultural and social characteristics.

Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples together represent almost 30 percent of the population, although estimates vary widely.² There are 13 officially designated, non-Hispanic ethnic groups or nationalities in Ecuador.³ The largest nationality comprises the highland Quichua-speakers (also known as the Runa) who constitute more than 90 percent of Ecuador's indigenous peoples. However, the Quichua or Runa themselves are culturally diverse, as demonstrated by the contrasts between subgroups such as the Otavalo and Saraguro, or the Chibuleo and Cañari peoples.

Many indigenous people have moved to urban areas and in some cases have become assimilated into the dominant mestizo society. However, in rural areas they have tended to maintain their distinct identity. Ecuador's rural population of indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans is concentrated in 288 of the country's 966 *parroquias* (parishes, the smallest division in the country). This segment of the Ecuadoran population, more than 1.5 million people, has the country's highest indices of poverty measured both in terms of income and unsatisfied basic needs. By the early 1990s, 35 percent of Ecuador's population lived in poverty and another 17 percent was highly vulnerable to poverty.⁴ Overall, the relationship between poverty, household characteristics, and social indicators varies considerably both across and within regions and areas. Urban poverty is associated with low education-

al achievement, employment in the informal sector, rented housing rather than home ownership, and low rates of participation in the labor force by women. Rural poverty is associated with lack of education, little access to land, a low degree of market integration, and lack of employment in the vibrant nonfarm rural sector (World Bank 1998).

The World Bank's 1995 poverty assessment for Ecuador also found that poverty and ethnicity are closely correlated both in rural and urban areas. Households in which an indigenous language is spoken are more likely to be poor than are Spanish-speaking households, and strongly indigenous cantons are worse off with respect to a wide variety of social and service variables, such as education, nutrition, water, and sewerage. In *parroquias* with an indigenous majority, the poverty rate (including those highly vulnerable to poverty) is approximately 85 percent. This is 14 percentage points higher than the rural average, and 32 percentage points higher than the national average.

The indicators of socioeconomic development in Ecuador, when disaggregated, show important geographic, residential (rural/urban), gender, and ethnic dimensions (tables 1 and 2). Thus, poverty is concentrated in certain cantones and *parroquias* of the coast, highlands, and Amazon regions; rural people are in general poorer than their urban counterparts; women are at more of a disadvantage than men; and both indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants are at the bottom of the social ladder. In sum, resources (including public goods and services) are unequally distributed.

Levels of social organization

In general, indigenous peoples in Ecuador suffer from economic deprivation, but are well endowed in social capital (for example, organization, solidarity patterns, and shared social and cultural values). They are well organized at the grassroots, regional, and national levels. Their forms of organization vary. In some cases they are principally organized along the lines of political parties and labor unions, in others by religious affiliation, and in still others directly by ethnic affiliation. This diversity of origins and

2. Indigenous organizations often give higher estimates (about 40 percent of the total population), while Ecuador's Integrated System of Social Indicators (SIISE 2003) puts the figure closer to 10 percent on the basis of census data.

3. Indigenous peoples in Ecuador prefer to be designated as "nationalities" or "peoples" rather than "ethnic groups." The first two terms imply having standing as a nation, and a broad range of rights established in United Nations instruments and the International Labour Organization's Convention 169. Non-Hispanic nationalities in Ecuador are: Runa or Quichua, Shuar, Huao, Siona, Secoya, Cofán, Huancavilcas, Manteños, Punaes, Chachi, Epera, Tsáchilas, Awa, and Ecuador's Afro-descendant population.

4. The 1998 financial crisis and its aftermath, however, have aggravated poverty. By 1999, 55% of the population lived in poverty (40% of the urban population and 76% of the rural population).

organizations has caused friction among regional and national federations, particularly after the 1998 Constitution elevated the legitimacy of ethnic-based organizations. However, they all are part of a vibrant social process that is contributing to the revitalization of the indigenous identity and leading to the formulation of new perspectives on indigenous development.

Organizations along ethnic lines were recognized during the Inca Empire. The *Conquistadores* tried to dismantle and destroy these organizations, and during colonial times community-based organizations were used by the Spaniards to wring taxes and labor from the indigenous population. However, the organizations persisted, and in the period following Ecuador's independence they were known as *parcialidades indígenas*. With approval of the *Ley de Organización y Régimen Comunal* in 1937, many organizations were formally recognized and became known as *comunas*. The 1964 *Ley de Reforma Agraria* as well as subsequent reforms in 1973 also specifically recognized the *comunas* as an element of Ecuadoran society.⁵ Originally *comunas* were managed and held land resources jointly, but in recent years there has been a trend toward individual land ownership. However, contributing labor for community enterprises (*mingas*) is still common, especially for small infrastructure projects.

There are about 2,500 grassroots indigenous organizations (communes, centers, and cooperatives) at the community level. By 1998 these community-level organizations had formed about 250 second-tier organizations (*organizaciones de segundo grado*, or OSGs). The OSGs may be considered associations, unions, or federations, and frequently are affiliated with provincial, regional, and national organizations. Many of the OSGs have been created or promoted initially by activist church groups and sympathetic NGOs (Carroll 2003).

Grassroots indigenous organizations are distinguished by features such as their members' sense of belonging to a community, communal territoriality, their own system of government, solidarity through collective works, and joint celebrations and communal calendars.⁶

The first effort was to build community-level organizations, which in turn organized into

higher-tier associations or local and regional federations in a pyramidal scheme, ending with the formation of national federations. Illustrative of this trend is the case of the Shuar, who in the early 1960s organized at the community level as "centers," then formed second-tier organizations called "associations" and these in turn created the Shuar Federation. The Shuar Federation joined other ethnic federations in the eastern lowlands to form the Confederation of the Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadoran Amazon (CONFENIAE), which in turn joined with highland and coastal federations to organize the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). The topic of induced social capital and the indigenous federations, including the case of Guamote in Ecuador, is discussed at some length in Bebbington and Carroll (2000) and Carroll (2003).

In a long and arduous process over about four decades, indigenous organizations have become more complex and have also broadened their agenda. They still try to strengthen their own social organizations and secure land for communities that lack access to it. Yet their struggle has led them to question the basic political structure of the country and the development model being implemented. Today they advocate a peaceful transformation of the country, eliminating corruption at the highest levels, maintaining state control of key national strategic assets such as energy, oil, and communications, and giving greater voice to social organizations representing the poor.

Indigenous organizations have become stronger and are increasingly recognized as significant actors in Ecuadoran development and politics. In the 1980s, while Latin America as a whole suffered a recession, indigenous peoples strengthened their social capital. In the 1990s they have advanced further and participated successfully in local, regional, and national politics. As a result, by the beginning of the new millennium there were several indigenous legislators in the National Congress, one of whom recently became the first indigenous woman to hold the office of Vice President of the Congress. In the May 2002 elections, the Pachacutik Indigenous Movement and their

5. The agrarian reform process stimulated the organization of indigenous peoples so as to either facilitate their access to land being redistributed or to recognize their ancestral possession.

6. The Afro-descendant population in Ecuador has less formal organization than the indigenous population. The main organization for most Afro-Ecuadorans is at the community or grassroots level (commune, compound, cooperative, committee, and peasant union), and only recently have they begun to form more complex organizations. The main features of grassroots organizations are a sense of belonging, a recognizable territoriality, certain forms of self-government, and calendars of celebrations. Grassroots organizations are formed more through real or ascribed family networks than as community societies.

allies gained control of 26 municipalities (12 headed by indigenous mayors) and increased their representation in the municipal councils (*consejos cantonales*) and juntas parroquiales. They have built on the experience of Guamote, a municipal government controlled by indigenous peoples since 1992, which has evolved into a model of indigenous governance (*poderes locales*) (for details, see Bebbington and Carroll 2000, 12–18). Guamote has been able to coordinate actions among its local indigenous federations, have a municipal government under indigenous control as well as a local development committee, and create a unique indigenous law-making body called the “Indigenous Parliament” (see report on Guamote in Carrasco and others 2000).

On top of these gains, in January 2003 an alliance of the Pachacutik Indigenous Movement and other center-left political parties succeeded in electing Colonel Lucio Gutierrez as President of the Republic, and he in turn appointed several indigenous leaders to high-level government offices, including ministerial posts.⁷

Public policy environment in Ecuador

Indigenous peoples policies

Although government policy regarding indigenous peoples still is not clearly defined and has numerous ambiguities, certain general trends may be distinguished. Since the creation of Ecuador in 1830 attempts have been made to integrate indigenous peoples into the general society. However, these efforts usually promoted acculturation without concern for preserving indigenous peoples’ cultural identity, and furthermore certain forms of social exclusion often persisted, such as restrictions on collective indigenous private property, citizenship rights (for example, not allowing illiterate persons to vote or be elected), land ownership, and the right to maintain their own forms of government.

Since the 1980s there has been a gradual shift toward greater openness to the interests and demands of indigenous peoples. Although agrar-

ian legislation has many gaps, significant progress has been made in acknowledging indigenous land rights. Bilingual education has been legitimized, with autonomous management by indigenous organizations. Opportunities have been created for the training and legal recognition of second- and third-tier organizations, from community associations to provincial federations to regional and national organizations. The 1998 National Constitution states that the country is multicultural and recognizes a broad array of collective rights for self-identified indigenous peoples and nationalities, clarifying previously recognized rights to ancestral lands and separate forms of cultural identity and self-governance, including the establishment of indigenous “jurisdictions.” Moreover, processes have definitely begun that will allow the inclusion of indigenous people in national society, within a context of cultural diversity.

Rural development policies

Historically, development interventions in Ecuador have been top-down, designed and implemented by government agencies or intermediary nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Poor people generally have not been active participants in these schemes, despite the fact that they are usually the target population. The assumption was that the design and implementation of projects had to be done by formally trained technicians, that is to say, development experts. Local knowledge and capacity were thus neglected and treated as useless or not relevant for change. The “transfer of technology” concept, which assumed a one-way flow of skills and knowledge, pervaded both governmental and nongovernmental organizations (Uquillas, 1993).

Ecuador’s state-led approaches included a wide array of models in line with the interests of international organizations. Among the better-known models is the community development approach, which became fashionable in the 1960s and was supported by the United Nations International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Ecuadoran government. The best-known effort along these lines was the famous Andean Mission of the ILO.

7. Nina Pacari became the new Minister of Foreign Relations, and Luis Macas the Minister of Agriculture. The *Comité del Decenio* sent a letter to the World Bank and to the Government of Ecuador stating its formal commitment to collaborate in the project. In the final analysis, indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations became the majority bloc in the committee, since the coordinator of the Technical Unit was the secretary and a voting member of the *Comité de Gestión*.

In the 1970s there were other ambitious approaches to rural development, among them the integrated rural development projects and the regional development projects, which usually were associated with agrarian reform and/or irrigation schemes. Some areas of Ecuador, such as Guamote, Jipijapa, and Salcedo have been the object of consecutive regional and/or rural development projects. The beneficiaries were again rural people, either those who participated in land distribution or who benefited from new water irrigation sources. The objectives were usually to transform whole regions, converting them into models for the development of similar areas. Local people were beneficiaries and were often informed about the proposed projects, but had little participation in their preparation.

Other projects that shared the same approach were the agricultural development projects, characterized by the transfer of technology mentality, whereby knowledge about new varieties of plants and animals and the use of agricultural inputs (chemical fertilizers and pesticides) was in the domain of university-trained scientists. Poor farmers, in contrast, were supposed to change their old-fashioned/backward technology for the new. Most of these projects promoted improved varieties of wheat, maize, and improved animal husbandry. As a consequence, traditional knowledge about plant varieties and the centuries-old peasant knowledge about crops and animals were gradually being eroded (see Uquillas 1993 for a case study in Ecuador's Amazon region).

Along with greater investment in rural areas, NGOs appeared as intermediaries between the state and the rural population. They were either providing technical assistance to rural people or advocating local people's rights. Although participatory approaches were increasingly being used, they usually were limited to sharing of information and consultations, with little feedback to local people.

The application of these new development approaches, aimed at better distribution of land, water resources, and agricultural production knowledge, had a strong impact in rural areas. Indigenous peoples in particular benefited a great deal from these efforts, which liberated many of them from semi-feudal land tenure systems, allowed them to hold or aspire to hold

title to their own land, and provided technical assistance to improve agricultural production. With the oil boom of the 1970s, Ecuadorian peasants had greater access to improved seeds, fertilizers, and pest control, inputs that they had long been denied. The new development projects helped indigenous peoples organize, first to obtain land titles and then to administer larger water irrigation schemes or to work on agricultural development projects.

The infusion of financial resources and technology had a great impact on indigenous capacities, assets, and organization. Yet not all impacts were positive. Along with the emphasis on new knowledge and technology came a disregard for the value of their own traditional knowledge. New commodities were introduced and traditional crop varieties were gradually replaced by the new hybrids. Old cultural patterns of production and consumption were labeled backward and economically unfit, and thus tended to disappear. In addition, some development initiatives, such as the opening of roads in the coastal and Amazon lowlands, had deleterious effects on native peoples and their environment. With their lands and forests threatened, the survival of indigenous peoples and cultures themselves were put at risk.

The new trend made physical assets more important than cultural assets (see World Bank 2000) and favored the appearance of new, development-oriented social organizations that were led by young people, many of whom had initially been trained by the Catholic and Protestant Churches (Partridge and Uquillas, 1996). The role of traditional authorities became negligible. The new organizations emphasized sociopolitical aims, and besides building social capital their main goal was the struggle for physical assets, that is, land rights as a basic condition for indigenous cultural survival and development.

Interface between Ecuador and the World Bank

Conditions favoring collaboration

By the mid-1990s a combination of favorable factors led to the preparation of the Indigenous

and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project (PRODEPINE)—the first World Bank operation focusing exclusively on ethnic minorities.

First, indigenous peoples' level of organization and capacity for social mobilization had grown substantially. In a demonstration of their newfound power, in 1990 indigenous peoples marched from Puyo, in the eastern lowlands, to Quito to push their demands for recognition of collective title to the lands they occupied. In 1992 indigenous and Afro-descendant organizations joined forces and formed the *Coordinadora Agraria* (Agrarian Coordinating Commission) to pressure the government to revise its recently approved Agrarian Law. After the United Nations declared 1995–2004 the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People, and called for the formation of joint government and indigenous peoples committees, the *Coordinadora Agraria* was transformed into the Committee of the Decade (*Comité del Decenio*) with the mandate to propose and to respond to proposals for development activities for member organizations.

Second, in 1994 the Government of Ecuador created the National Secretariat of Indigenous Affairs and Ethnic Minorities (SENAIME) and appointed an indigenous entrepreneur as its first secretary. Immediately thereafter Ecuador initiated a series of contacts with donors to request support for SENAIMÉ and its proposed operations to benefit indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans. The government conveyed its interest in this matter quite strongly to the World Bank through direct contacts between the president of Ecuador and the vice president of the Bank's Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, a visit by the secretary of SENAIMÉ to the Bank's headquarters in Washington, and other means.

Third, partly in anticipation of the United Nations International Decade of the World's Indigenous People, in 1993 the World Bank started its own Indigenous Peoples Development Initiative, hiring more social science staff, organizing workshops to discuss alternatives for indigenous peoples, and designing preinvestment operations—particularly a technical training program for indigenous peoples in Latin

America. Thus, the institution was relatively well positioned to respond to requests such as that from Ecuador.

Fourth, the strong ethnicity–poverty relationship identified in the Bank's 1995 Poverty Assessment for Ecuador strengthened the case for targeting interventions at Ecuador's indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population. The fact that other rural development projects had difficulty reaching these populations further emphasized the need for a new approach.

When the government asked the World Bank to help identify an operation focusing on indigenous peoples, the Bank's experts on indigenous peoples issues recommended making contact with national indigenous organizations in Ecuador and taking a gradual, fully participatory approach as the minimum steps required to create conditions for success. While initial contacts found willingness on the part of the government, there was great reluctance on the part of national indigenous organizations to deal with either their own government or with the Bank. To overcome this distrust, the initial project concept document started addressing the historical demands of indigenous organizations—namely, access to land, strengthening social organizations, and increasing rural investment. Strengthening the government's ability to formulate indigenous peoples' policies was not demanded by the indigenous organizations, but was eventually accepted by them as a necessary part of a project in which a government agency was the counterpart.

Preparation of the project depended not only on a tripartite agreement among the Bank, the government, and the indigenous federations, but also required reaching consensus within each separate social actor. While Bank technical staff, particularly those working in the rural and social development sectors, tended to support this initiative, some project advisors and country economists argued that indigenous peoples were already being served by existing projects such as the Social Investment Fund and that targeting indigenous peoples would create conflicts with other sectors of the poor population.

Ultimately, an alliance of social and rural development specialists, the Bank's country representative for Ecuador, and some division chiefs (envi-

ronment and rural development) persuaded the Bank that targeting ethnicity within a rural development context was necessary and that it made sense financially to invest in indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples. The task team successfully argued that targeting was not new in the Bank and that given the fact that indigenous peoples were among the poorest of the poor in Latin America generally (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1995), and in Ecuador specifically as shown in the detailed quantitative analysis of the 1995 Ecuador Poverty Assessment, it was sensible to direct resources at this sector of the population. In addition, proponents of this approach brought to the attention of Bank decisionmakers the enormous assets of indigenous peoples, mostly in terms of their social capital but also in terms of physical capital such as their communal landholdings in tropical forests and other important ecological regions.

Alliances also had to be strengthened or formed at the governmental level in Ecuador. Although SENAIME, an agency attached to the presidency, had made the request for Bank support on behalf of the Government of Ecuador, other key public agencies such as the National Planning and Coordinating Secretariat, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Institute for Agrarian Development (INDA), and the National Forestry and Natural Resources Institute (INEFAN) had to be brought on board in favor of collaborating with indigenous peoples.

Finally, considerable effort was needed to maintain the fragile coalition of national indigenous federations and build their trust in both the government and the Bank. In the early 1990s there was an attempt by the government to pass an agrarian law that would have facilitated the breakup of communal lands in order to create a more open land market. Indigenous federations joined forces by forming an Agrarian Coordinating Group (*Coordinadora Agraria*) to oppose the law. Thus, the government again became the object of fear and suspicion. Indigenous leaders had not completely accepted SENAIME and were concerned that attempts at co-optation could divide their organizations. They also had grievances against the World Bank, particularly for its support for neo-liberal reforms, which they opposed.

The main line of argument to convince indigenous federations to participate in project preparation was that indigenous peoples had the right to public investments and that one of the best ways to secure funds was through internationally financed projects. This was going to be the first time that Ecuador obtained a loan for poor indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans. The Bank not only was interested in financing a project targeting ethnicity but also was ready to do it in a fully participatory way that would become a model of other operations to follow in the future.

Many of the above activities required a deep knowledge of the social and political realities of the country. Building alliances and coalitions was facilitated by the fact that one of the authors of this study had a long working relationship with Ecuadoran government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and indigenous peoples and thus had his own network of contacts and a high degree of credibility. The importance of personal trust and a proper political approach cannot be underestimated because without it indigenous federations would have had stronger resistance to the idea of collaborating with the Ecuadoran government in a Bank-financed project. This was further facilitated by the continuity of the task team, whose composition has not fundamentally changed over the entire life of the project.

During implementation SENAIME was replaced by the National Council of Planning and Development for Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans (CONPLADEIN), whose executive board included all the national indigenous federations plus an Afro-Ecuadoran representative. After more than a year of operation, CONPLADEIN was replaced by the Council for the Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE), which includes only representation of peoples and nationalities—that is, organizations with an ethnic orientation—leaving out those which have a social class orientation (peasant federations). This changing institutional reality meant that the Bank's task team had to redouble its efforts to maintain old alliances and promote new social and institutional arrangements to ensure the project's inclusive approach and the conditions for successful implementation.

Building internal coalitions was also a way of building social capital—first in the relationships among indigenous organizations, particularly the national federations in the *Comité del Decenio*; second, in the relationships linking indigenous organizations and government at the local and national levels; third, in the relationships linking the project team to other constituencies in the Bank; and finally, in the relationships between indigenous organizations, the Ecuadoran government, and the Bank.

The process of social organization in Ecuador is constantly changing. In the past five years it has been affected by the general crisis that the country is suffering as well as by new developments such as the existence of PRODEPINE, a new Constitution with ample recognition of collective rights and a focus on peoples and nationalities, and the new protagonism of indigenous peoples under the banner of CONAIE. All these changes have affected the project in unexpected ways. The main effect has been strong pressure to adjust the project to the new mandate of strengthening peoples and nationalities, which some federations interpret as recognition of the long struggle for reaffirmation of cultural identities, while others see it as an artifice to exclude the class-oriented federations from the decisionmaking process and from the benefits that the new projects can offer.

As a result, the Bank has insisted on the basic principle of social inclusion, by which not only should all indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran grassroots organizations have access to project benefits, but all federations regardless of origin, political, religious, or class orientation should also sit at the table and participate in the decisionmaking process, particularly revision and approval of annual operating plans and periodic reports, and supervision of the implementation process.

Participatory framework

From the very beginning of project preparation the Bank committed itself to three basic guiding principles: (a) alleviation of poverty through targeting resources at the poorest sectors of the population, (b) promotion of participatory processes to ensure that project design

responds to grassroots demands and builds social capital and trust, and (c) close coordination between governmental and nongovernmental organizations to increase project efficiency.

Preparation started with a project concept paper based on a proposal from the Ecuadoran government and the knowledge of Bank staff about the situation of indigenous peoples in Ecuador. The concept paper, along with an invitation to a project inception workshop, was sent to key government offices, NGOs, and national indigenous organizations. Participants at the workshop discussed the objectives, basic components, design methodology, and preliminary work plan for the project. The initial response to the project concept was favorable.

Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the indigenous organizations had reservations about working with the government and the World Bank. The largest indigenous organization, CONAIE (claiming to represent 70 percent of all indigenous people in Ecuador) turned out to be a particularly tough negotiator. In the early 1990s CONAIE organized well-attended popular marches to advance claims for indigenous rights, thereby gaining very high credibility with the indigenous population as the genuine representative of their interests. With relations between the government and indigenous organizations historically defined by confrontation rather than cooperation, it was clear that a substantial change in the mindsets of both sides was required before they could engage in constructive dialogue (even though they recognized that such dialogue was desirable).

Moreover, it also became clear that although the national indigenous organizations had come together in the *Comité del Decenio*, they were not particularly well linked and did not necessarily speak with one voice. In fact, there was a fair degree of rivalry and continuous jockeying for the best position at the negotiating table. The role of the Bank's task team as an honest broker and intermediary to assist the stakeholders in defining common ground for joint action turned out to be crucial at this stage of the project preparation process and later during implementation.

It took several months to gain a formal commitment from the indigenous organizations to

participate in the project. At first the government suggested the creation of a Consultative Group in which indigenous organizations would be represented, but with a minority status. This model of participation was rejected by the indigenous organizations. Instead, they proposed a model in which indigenous organizations had a direct relationship with the Bank, and administered project preparation and implementation themselves without the participation of the government. However, the World Bank's charter mandates that it work with national governments, so this model could not be accepted.

Further negotiations led to a coadministration model in which a Managing Committee (*Comité de Gestión*) would make decisions with equal representation by government and indigenous peoples. Three delegates from SENAIIME would represent the government, and three delegates selected by the *Comité del Decenio* would represent the indigenous organizations. In addition, the parties agreed to create a Technical Unit (*Unidad Técnica*) to support the work of the *Comité de Gestión*. The coordinator of the *Unidad Técnica* was also a member of the *Comité de Gestión*.⁸ This helped ensure a strong link between the decisions of the *Comité de Gestión* and implementation of those decisions by the *Unidad Técnica*. Because the coordinator was selected from a list of three candidates provided by the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations, in effect they gained an extra representative on the *Comité de Gestión*. Annex I provides an overview of the agreed institutional structure.

During the first two years of project implementation, the role of the *Comité de Gestión* has been partly played by CODENPE (whose council includes representation of peoples and nationalities). Yet the project has faced strong pressures from the Secretary General of CODENPE to not only adjust to new constitutional principles but also take into consideration the new protagonism of CONAIE. In fact, in 1999, during negotiations between the government and CONAIE, an important part of the agenda was PRODEPINE. CONAIE argued for the need to restructure the project and made great efforts to have a greater say in its imple-

mentation by pushing for the appointment of CONAIE-affiliated professionals in the project's senior management team. Meanwhile, the other indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran federations pressured the government and the Bank to be inclusive and to keep the project open to the participation of all stakeholders.

CODENPE has also strongly questioned the relative autonomy of the project, arguing that as the government counterpart it should have greater control over the procurement and disbursement process and that PRODEPINE should be an instrument to advance central government policies on indigenous peoples. The project, with Bank support, has resisted these efforts under the argument that the institutional arrangement of the project was the result of a consensual agreement among the national indigenous federations and the government that took three years to achieve. Project agreements, having international legal standing, reflect this institutional setup. More importantly, for the project to succeed it needs to be relatively free of political interference from the national government and indigenous federations. The directors of PRODEPINE maintained that they were obliged to implement the project and annual operating plans as agreed between the government and the World Bank. The World Bank supported their position, but after the presidency intervened in favor of CODENPE, it reluctantly accepted the dismissal of the Executive Director, which was then followed by the resignation of the Technical Director in June 2000.

Conflict resolution mechanisms

The project's high degree of autonomy provided an opportunity to create a "business culture" conducive to a productive working environment. The subject of business culture was discussed explicitly at various stages during project preparation. Key notions about the appropriate elements of the business culture were even included in an aide-mémoire signed by the various parties. The discussions resulted in an agreement that the project's working environment would be based on several factors, including (a) a high degree of tolerance and respect, (b) direct, frank, and transparent communica-

8. John Durston, in his work in Guatemala, argues that native communities have latent social capital that was disrupted and repressed during the civil strife in that country, but which now, with a combination of physical and financial investments and organizational assistance, can be resuscitated and built up in an atmosphere of trust (Durston 1998).

tion focused on issues rather than persons, (c) drive for high-quality results, and (d) willingness to learn from mistakes and to accept constructive feedback. This provided an agreed code of conduct for people who, until recently, had never worked together. The usefulness of this exercise was reflected in the fact that people referred to the written principles on various occasions. Agreeing on these principles early in the process definitely helped shape a positive work environment and contributed to an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual trust.

The mechanisms and processes that were employed by the project to deal with conflicts and differences indirectly contributed to fostering more constructive relationships among the indigenous organizations themselves as well as between indigenous organizations and the government. A case in point is that when the National Council of Planning and Development for Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans (COMPLADEIN) was established in March 1997, its organizational structure reflected that of the *Comité de Gestión* as agreed in November 1995. Because all the indigenous organizations were interested in having the project hire professionals affiliated with their particular group, considerable efforts were made to ensure that the rules of the game, particularly the hiring procedures, were clear to all stakeholders. Terms of reference, qualifications, and selection criteria for each position financed under the project were agreed up front. To acknowledge and validate the goal of having indigenous professionals employed in the project, knowledge of indigenous languages was included as one of the selection criteria for positions in which a pool of qualified indigenous professionals was available. For specialized positions in which there were expected to be very few, if any qualified indigenous candidates, the language requirement was replaced by a stipulation that the candidate should have relevant experience working with indigenous organizations.

The Bank went to great lengths to ensure that all parties complied fully with what they had agreed on paper. This was necessary because of the significant pressure to appoint consultants and divide training budgets according to quotas

put forward by indigenous organizations. Though the Bank risked being labeled bureaucratic by insisting that the rules be observed, in doing so it actually established a solid reputation as a guarantor of due process for all stakeholders. Given the lack of strong trust among the stakeholders, this role was highly appreciated, and probably was one the most valuable aspects of the Bank's role in the preparation process.

Regarding fiduciary issues, the Bank made it clear from the beginning that the project had to comply with the full range of requirements that are applied to other Bank-financed projects, and that obtaining exceptions to these rules would probably be more painful and frustrating than complying with them. This slowed down project preparation because of rather weak institutional capacity and the fact that most project personnel lacked experience working in Bank-financed projects. Nevertheless, it was considered the right thing to do from a long-term perspective. It avoided potentially endless discussions about which requirements would be subject to exceptions, what the alternatives should be, and what would be the minimum justification needed to agree to an exception. It also avoided the trap of creating false expectations. In addition, it was made clear to the government and the indigenous federations on various occasions that certified compliance with Bank procedures, as implied by external audit reports, would in itself be a major benefit because it would demonstrate that indigenous peoples were fully capable of managing public funds. A series of external audit reports would establish a clean track record that would help indigenous peoples maintain access to public funds in the long run. By 2002 the project had passed five external audits, thereby establishing a solid reputation for responsible financial management.

Building broad alliances

Second- and third-tier indigenous organizations: the executing agencies

While the national-level indigenous organizations were legitimate representatives of the project's intended beneficiary population, it was recognized that their particular strength was in

the political and public policy arena. Given the project's orientation toward generating direct benefits for indigenous communities, it adopted a strategy of also working directly with second-tier indigenous organizations (as stated previously, under this definition were a broad range of organizations linking communities at the bottom with the national federations on top). These organizations, in effect, are the members of the national-level organizations. They usually are based in small urban or rural towns accessible to their community-level member organizations. Since second-tier organizations have a closer relationship with indigenous communities, they are in a better position to know local needs and demands, are inclined to focus on providing services to their members rather than merely representing them politically, and in general have a more pragmatic agenda. During implementation, executing agencies not only included second-tier organizations but also some third-tier organizations and even a few municipalities where indigenous mayors and councilors have been elected recently.

This strategy of making the project known at the regional level, including the second-tier organizations in project preparation, and aligning project design to their pragmatic agenda, created a substantial "pull" effect of second-tier organizations speaking in favor of the project at meetings and forums. Because the credibility of the national indigenous organizations depends to a large extent on effective linkages with their bases, the opinions of second-tier organizations tend to be taken into account by national leaders, though not often enough. Reaching out to the second-tier organizations therefore created a more deeply rooted and more solid base of support for the project, and reduced the risk of facing politically motivated decisions by a few indigenous leaders at the top.

International Fund for Agricultural Development

Since the project was the first of its kind, the Bank recognized that it did not necessarily have comparative advantage in all areas covered by the project. In this context, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

proved to be an appropriate co-financing partner.

First, IFAD had two ongoing rural development projects—one in the province of Cañar and another in Saraguro—that already worked closely with indigenous organizations at the local and regional level. Learning from IFAD's experience in those projects, whether positive or negative, could benefit preparation of the Bank-supported project. Second, IFAD had a strong interest in starting a rural development project targeting Afro-Ecuadorans in the coastal province of Esmeraldas. Third, IFAD's experience in financing rural credit programs complemented the Bank's experience in financing matching-grant funds. This enabled the project to establish an integrated program of rural investments that could respond to a wide range of demands from indigenous communities, including those with a public-good or a private-good nature. Fourth, IFAD's more flexible stand on financing land purchases made an interesting complement to the Bank's in-house possibilities, and widened the range of options for financing land regularization and conflict resolution programs. Fifth, combining the Bank loan with lower-interest IFAD resources offered a more attractive financial package, and lessened the chance that the government would lose interest in the project, even if macroeconomic conditions deteriorated. In addition, bringing IFAD on board added its dialogue with the government to the factors ensuring continued official support for the project.

Inter-American Foundation

Another attractive partner was the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), which was experienced in financing and implementing small-scale initiatives in cooperation with Ecuadoran indigenous organizations. The IAF had a long and successful history in this field, and had established a wide reputation and excellent relations with the indigenous movement in Ecuador. The Bank project provided a good opportunity to build on those experiences and successes, especially since at the time the IAF was scaling down its programs due to cuts in U.S. bilateral aid. To benefit from their experi-

ence, the IAF was enlisted to serve as a peer reviewer during project preparation.

This arrangement provided mutual benefits. First, it provided a vehicle for the IAF to increase the scope of the model it had developed. Second, with some former IAF staff as part of the team, the project had unrestricted access to relevant information that was required to design some key aspects of the project, particularly with respect to participatory planning and local capacity building. Third, by associating the project with IAF's efforts and network, the former IAF officials became effective spokesmen for the project and provided an excellent alternative channel of communication with indigenous organizations. If indigenous organizations were in doubt about the Bank's intentions at some point during the preparation process, they could express their doubts to the IAF officials who they had known and worked with for a long time, and get a response they trusted from people who were knowledgeable about the Bank's opinions and intentions.

Food and Agriculture Organization

During project preparation another alliance was established with the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to create a window of access, almost on a standby basis, to technical expertise on the preparation and implementation of small-scale, demand-driven rural investment subprojects. The arrangement allowed the project to tap into international experiences in this field and to design this project component in line with best practice. In addition, FAO's expertise on monitoring and evaluation systems helped the project focus increasing attention on quality assurance, and particularly on the effects and impacts of its interventions.

Continuity of the task team

During the five years between preparation and implementation, the Bank task team remained substantially the same. There was good complementarity of member skills (which includes expertise in agricultural economy, rural sociology, and agriculture, among others). They had a

shared belief that this is a unique experience that requires a long-term commitment in order to make it succeed. In any case, this continuity paid off in several ways.

First, given the sensitivity of the relationship between the indigenous organizations and the government, especially in the early stages, the task team played an important intermediary role that required a fair amount of trust that could only be built up over time.

Second, the various indigenous organizations did not necessarily have a common strategy, and on occasion pursued their own separate agendas. Continuity allowed the task team to understand and appreciate these different agendas, and to move project preparation forward while taking these agendas into account.

Third, continuity enabled the team to build a track record as an objective mediator. It consistently proposed solutions based on three basic principles: (a) inclusiveness, or ensuring that the solution to a certain problem allowed all stakeholders to continue to participate, (b) technical orientation, or keeping political issues from interfering at the operational level, and (c) clear formulation of rules or codes of conduct.

Operationalizing the project focus on social capital

Targeting ethnicity and poverty

One of the first challenges of the project was to identify the indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans who were the intended beneficiaries. The two principal questions were (a) whether the mestizo population living in the same areas would be part of the project's target population, and (b) how to settle the politically contentious issue of defining who is indigenous.

To tackle this issue an approach was adopted that combined quantitative methods and geographic location with the notion of self-identification and community affiliation with second-tier organizations. Census information on the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population at the *parroquia* level was crossed with data on poverty (an index of unsatisfied basic needs), to obtain figures on the level of poverty by ethnic-

ity. Additional information was gathered in the field, particularly self-identification of communities as either indigenous or Afro-Ecuadoran, and membership in a second-tier indigenous organization. This information was then represented in an indigenous poverty map.

The quantitative analysis gave an idea of which parroquias had a majority indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population and which ones had a significant minority presence of those groups. Once the parroquias were known, second-tier indigenous organizations could be identified that were operating in them. The project would then form an alliance with these organizations for implementation purposes, and in so doing would accept the membership eligibility criteria of the organization as the basis for targeting the intended beneficiary population in that particular parroquia. Depending on these locally defined criteria, the project would include the mestizo population to the extent that they are members of the second-tier organizations.

Through this analysis the project targeted about 815,000 people who were members of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities in rural areas. Being considered "indigenous" was based on self-identification, membership in a specific indigenous community or grassroots organization, and recognition as indigenous by other members of that sociocultural unit. Being considered "Afro-Ecuadoran" was based on self-identification and membership in a black community.

The indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population of rural Ecuador is concentrated in 48 cantons, which comprise 288 rural parroquias (230 indigenous and 58 Afro). This is 29 percent of the country's rural parroquias. However, in nearly all cases indigenous and black people live in areas where there is also a mestizo population. In fact, only 150 parroquias have a majority indigenous or Afro population (of which 111 are indigenous and 39 are Afro). In the remaining 138 parroquias indigenous people and Afro-Ecuadorans account for between 10 and 50 percent of the total population. Thus there is ample opportunity to put the principle of interculturalism into practice.

There are about 180 second-tier organizations operating in the 288 parroquias included in the project area. It is through these organizations

(generally grouping contiguous communities) that the project defines its annual operational plans and implements agreed activities.

The target population exhibits great cultural diversity, especially among indigenous peoples. The most numerous of the indigenous people are the Quichua speakers (or Runa) in the *Sierra*. They may be further subdivided by area of ethnic predominance, including the Otavalo, Carangui, Cayambi, and Quito in the northern region, and the Panzaleo, Puruha, Cañari, Salasaca, and Saraguro in the south-central region. The next largest group is the peoples of the Amazon region, including the Shuar, Achuar, and Runa or Quichua speakers of the lowlands, and the Waorani, Cofán, and Siona-Secoya. In the coastal region are found the Awá, Emberá, Tsachila, and Chachi, and other peoples such as the Huancavilca, Manteño, and Puna who have lost their language but retain strong indigenous cultural features. Afro-Ecuadorans live in both coastal and highland areas, though there is not as much diversity between their subgroups as there is between the indigenous subgroups (see Annex 2 for details and estimated population sizes).

Conceptual framework

Social exclusion, economic deprivation, and political marginalization are sometimes perceived as the predominant characteristics of Ecuador's indigenous peoples. But as they often remind outsiders, indigenous peoples are also characterized by strong positive attributes, particularly their high level of social capital. Much of this type of social capital is manifest at the level of the traditional community through informal networks of reciprocity and is strongly survival oriented. The challenge is to mobilize or build on these types of relationships for development purposes and more formal organizations that often require different types of collective action and hierarchies.

Besides language and their own sense of ethnic identity, the distinctive features of indigenous peoples include solidarity and social unity (reflected in strong social organizations), a well-defined geographical concentration and attachment to ancestral lands, a rich cultural patrimo-

ny, and other customs and practices distinct from those of Ecuador's national society, which bears a strong western influence. There are also some negative traits embedded in indigenous culture such as political and religious factionalism and particular forms of gender inequality. Nevertheless, the project aims to mobilize this social capital, based on these characteristics, as a platform for ethnodevelopment following the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1.

The ultimate aim of the project is to generate results and impacts that directly benefit indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities. To achieve this, the project finances investments to improve the stock of human, financial, physical, and environmental capital at the disposal of these communities. In the process, it expects to build social capital in at least three different ways. First, when social capital is already strong, the other forms of capital can complement it effectively (for example, by strengthening preexisting water-users associations). Second, when, social capital is weak, these additional resources, which in most cases are not individual goods, will promote collective management and solidarity among members.⁹ Third, when the existing social capital in traditional indigenous communities is different from and not necessarily compatible with the type needed in modern administrative/economic and even social infrastructure management, the project will stimulate the gradual extension of the original social capital into new fields, levels, or types of cooperation (such as women's solidarity credit associations, which have no equivalent in traditional Andean communities).

To ensure relevant use of these various types of capital, the project relies on participatory planning as a mechanism to facilitate the effective demand-driven nature of activities and self-management as a tool to retain a strong sense of project ownership on the part of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations. The configuration of investments in various types of capital coupled with the focus on participatory planning and self-management as the basic principles for the project's operational procedures forms the conceptual framework of the project.

Despite the strong desire for self-management in order to take the process of development into their own hands, relatively few second-tier orga-

nizations had the technical and financial management capacity to assume their role as project implementing agents. In fact, there is a very wide range in available institutional capacity in these organizations, with some of them having a long history of providing services to their member communities, while others even lack the basic knowledge of managing their own finances. Recognizing this large variation in institutional capacity, it became clear that the project could not use a blueprint approach to enter into partnerships with these organizations as project implementing agents. A standard level of supervision might be interpreted by one organization as the absolute minimum level of operational support to effectively assume its responsibilities, while others might consider it as excessive micro-management.

In order to tailor the relationship between second-tier organization and the project at a mutually acceptable level, the project is investing in the development of an index of organizational capacity, which includes social capital indicators.¹⁰ This index combines indicators in the categories of management capacity, organizational culture, human capital, and financial capital. Following criteria outlined in Annex 3 an index of organizational capacity is calculated. This index then determines the nature of partnership with the project in terms of operational responsibilities and local capacity-building support activities.

The index was applied to all known second- and third-level organizations in the Amazon. Three categories of potential partnerships are distinguished.¹¹ The first category includes second-tier organizations that have ample institutional capacity to be effective partners on the full range of activities supported by the project. Most support provided by the project for this type of organizations is demand-driven, while controls tend to be of an ex-post nature. In case of noncompliance with the agreed rules of the game, the project can reassess its relationship with a second-tier organization and base it on the rules of the game that apply to the second category.

The second category includes organizations with limited institutional capacity. The project enters into agreements with these organizations

9. This work ties in with initiatives in this area launched by the Social Development Family of the World Bank, under the "Social Capital Initiative," underwritten by the Danish Trust Fund. The PRODEPINE index was developed in dialogue with researchers of an Andean study on campesino federations while they experimented with measures of organizational capacity and structural social capital (see Bebbington and Carroll 1999).

10. The universe of OSGs was divided in three groups based on their scores on a 114-point scale: (a) those with scores above 81, representing 27% of the total; (b) those with scores between 50 and 80, representing 55%; and (c) those with scores below 50, accounting for 18%. The main purpose of this exercise was to determine which OSGs could or could not manage project resources (see Ramón 1999).

for the design and implementation of subprojects if there is a willingness on their part to participate in training programs supported by the project. The project also maintains a ceiling of \$25,000 instead of the usual \$90,000 for subprojects implemented by organizations in this category. Project personnel maintain close relations with these organizations to provide support on a regular basis. Controls exercised by the project tend to have a more ex-ante nature. Once an organization has successfully implemented a number of subprojects, the relationship can be redefined based on the rules of the game that apply to organizations that have ample institutional capacity.

The third category of second-tier organizations includes those that have no apparent institutional capacity whatsoever. The project enters into agreements with these organizations if they associate themselves with an NGO in a formal alliance. The underlying idea is that the NGO has a local presence and is in a position to provide support on an almost continuous basis, something the project cannot do. Most of the capacity building efforts supported by the project focus on the second category of organizations as described above. Hence, by using the index as a tool to focus and tailor local capacity building activities it also contributes to greater cost effectiveness in this area.

The project also supports a range of activities that are specifically aimed at improving the institutional capacity of second-tier organizations, particularly those of the second and third category. These activities include support for building management capacity and technical capacity with special emphasis on project preparation and management. The project also helps organizations obtain juridical status if needed. To emphasize the focus on ethnodevelopment, the project also supports activities that strengthen the identity and cultural patrimony of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities and their organizations.

Capital accumulation

To make the investments of the project in human, environmental, financial, and physical capital more effective, social capital needs to be

taken into consideration in the orientation and design of these investments.

Human capital

To increase the available pool of indigenous professionals in the long run, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, the project entered into agreements with 27 universities and colleges to provide complementary financial support and design an appropriate course of studies for indigenous students supported by the project. The project also supports students in disciplines that are particularly relevant for the modus operandi of the second-tier organizations, including community development, anthropology, and communications. Potential candidates for project support are proposed by second-tier organizations and subsequently selected by the project based on previous educational achievements. To increase the probability that students remain in their communities and organizations after they have completed their education, the formal education program puts a heavy emphasis on distance learning. The presence of many indigenous students in the usually white/mestizo university is already changing attitudes and giving indigenous people a new degree of respect.

In addition to the formal training programs, the project supports short courses for professionals who are actually working in implementing agencies. Courses include a wide range of topics, most of which are closely related to participatory planning, project administration and management, procurement, and technical issues. Since learning by doing is a key element of these courses, they are coordinated closely with the program of small-scale investments financed by the project. The project also offers a limited number of internships in its regional offices. These internships expose young indigenous professionals to the operational aspects of the project's rural investment program, which can enhance the interns' work in the second-tier organizations.

By the end of 2002, 1,080 high school students (including 335 graduates) and 850 college students (including 67 graduates) had received academic fellowships from the project. In addition 77 people had completed short courses in

irrigation, soil conservation, agroforestry, and other topics (World Bank 2002).

Environmental capital

The project supports a significant land titling and regularization program in collaboration with the *Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario* (INDA). Because of the sensitivity surrounding land property rights, this program is being implemented by locally trained paralegals from the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities participating in the program rather than by government officials. In collaboration with CARE, the project has supported a program to train and to establish a professional network of paralegals. Given their local background and knowledge of participating communities and organizations, the paralegals are in a much better position than outside government officials to effectively facilitate resolution of land conflicts. The cooperation agreement between the project and INDA explicitly calls for integration of these paralegals into INDA's land titling and regularization procedures.

Currently, 122,685 hectares of land have been titled to 71 grassroots organizations, 97,312 hectares are in the process of being titled, and 160 paralegals have finished the training program. In addition studies of irrigation systems have been conducted that cover 2,647 kilometers of irrigation works serving 458 communities and 37,194 users (World Bank 2002).

Financial and physical capital

The project finances a substantive program of small-scale rural investments identified through a participatory planning process at the community level. Investments with a public-goods character are financed through matching grants. Investments with a private-goods character are financed on a credit basis. Contributing labor for community enterprises (*mingas*) is accepted as the counterpart contribution of the communities to the matching grants for financing particular rural investments. Indigenous communities typically conduct the practice of *minga* on a regular basis to construct, maintain, or repair infrastructure that has a communal character. By doing so, the project is explicitly building on existing social reality.

Another example of this is the way *empresas comunitarias* (community enterprises) are financed under the project. These enterprises are typically some sort of small-scale agribusiness owned by the community and operated by a number of people from the community. After covering all relevant costs, including salaries of personnel, profits are ploughed back into the communities and invested in social infrastructure (for example schools, health clinics, etc.). From the outsider's point of view these agribusiness ventures are private firms, which according to the project's investment rules should be financed with credit. However, the point of view of the indigenous communities is that these ventures are public since the communities own them and the profits are used to finance public goods. Given the project's orientation toward ethnodevelopment, it is hard to justify any approach other than applying the rules according to the point of view of the communities and their organizations. Consequently, the project finances capital investments (such as machinery, buildings, etc.) for *empresas comunitarias* through matching grants.

After about four years of implementation, PRODEPINE has supported the preparation of 210 local development plans, 1,918 subproject proposals, and 830 preinvestment studies. It has also provided \$12 million in financing for 654 small investment operations, with the communities contributing an estimated \$4.5 million. In addition, 547 community banks have been created, benefiting 14,022 members, as part of a special activity targeting indigenous women (World Bank 2002).

Self-management, participation, and cultural identity

Project beneficiaries and their organizations are empowered to manage the project at the strategic level through an Consultative Committee (*Comité Consultivo*) formed at the Council for the Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE). The Consultative Committee includes representatives from CODENPE and delegates from the main indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations. The committee

reviews and approves the project's annual operational plans, and discusses progress reports submitted by the Project Technical Unit.

The Project Technical Unit is responsible for coordinating implementation of the annual operational plans approved by the National Council. The unit is headed by a three-person management team composed of an executive director, a technical coordinator, and a financial-administrative coordinator. The criteria for selecting members of the Project Technical Unit include knowledge of indigenous languages and experience working with indigenous or Afro-Ecuadoran organizations. This naturally encourages hiring of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran professionals and creates a technical unit staffed by qualified and culturally diverse professionals, including *mestizos*, that mirrors the project's design and areas of operation.

Because the project's success will largely be measured in terms of concrete results at the community level, the vast majority of professionals in the technical unit work in regional offices. This puts them closer to the second-tier indigenous organizations through which most project activities are implemented. Over time, the project has worked in close partnership with about 250 of these indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran membership organizations. As a first step, second-tier organizations and the communities they are drawn from agree on a local development plan that provides an overall vision and serves as a tool to prioritize project activities in a particular area. Once defined, the organizations prepare and implement small-scale investments, not exceeding \$90,000 per subproject, that benefit their member communities. Second-tier organizations also provide input into the elaboration of the annual operational plan of the project in a particular region, further contributing to the demand-driven nature of the project. An additional benefit of operating in a decentralized fashion in which most of the operational decisionmaking authority is shifted to the regional level is that once the annual operational plan is approved, the project operates relatively independently from the political arena. This independence is enhanced by the fact that small-scale investments are financed solely

through the loan funds and the counterpart contributions from the communities. Problems with government counterpart funds, for which Ecuador is notorious, therefore do not directly affect the project's investment program in indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities.

Recognizing self-management as a crucial element of community development implies that project activities, by definition, should be demand-driven. The project relies on participatory planning as an underlying process to obtain a genuine demand-driven focus for its activities. The process is designed to help make community and grassroots organizations effective players in their own development. More specifically, participatory planning is used in the context of the project as a way to (a) contribute to the decentralization of decisionmaking, (b) stimulate grassroots participation in local planning and generating demand, (c) help rural communities formulate development strategies and investment plans, and (d) increase investment sustainability by intensifying stakeholders' commitment in the execution and supervision of rural investments.

The participatory planning process used by the project draws heavily on the experience of the Inter-American Foundation (and Comunidec, a national NGO) in Andean countries, particularly on its methodology for participatory community planning. It also builds on the practical experiences in the Nicaragua Rural Municipalities Project, the Bolivia Rural Communities Development Project, and other projects that use the Goal-Oriented Project Planning (GOPP) method. In the GOPP approach, community and district workshops are held over the course of several weeks. At the workshops, project field promoters and second-tier organizations help the communities carry out a participatory diagnostic and formulate a development strategy by applying methods of group dynamics. Workshop participants are community delegates, representatives from development organizations, and interested individuals. After each workshop time is allotted for the community delegates to return to their communities, inform them of the workshop's proceedings, and get community feedback. This process can be lengthy because in some communities decisions are taken by consensus.

In an attempt to put the concept of development with identity into practice, the project has also tried to incorporate a series of concrete activities designed to preserve and strengthen the rich cultural patrimony of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples. However, progress under this program has not met expectations. So far these activities have included seven video documentaries about indigenous cultures, ten publications, three encounters to discuss cultural heritage issues, and 28 festivals of music and dance. The challenge is to better embed culture in productive investments and activities that generate revenue.

The project also includes features intended to sustain and strengthen indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran cultures indirectly. As part of the institutional strengthening efforts geared toward CODENPE, the project supports a team of professionals whose mandate includes reviewing and assessing the potential impact of new legislation on the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population and proposing changes when adverse impacts are anticipated. As part of the land tenure regularization efforts supported by the project, an attempt is made to clarify the concept of ancestral rights in more concrete terms to improve land ownership of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities in forestry and protected areas. Finally, in the rural investments program supported by the project, the criteria for matching grants to finance community infrastructure takes into account indigenous notions of communal and private property rather than relying on definitions from outsiders. For instance, even though indigenous community enterprises can be considered private firms, the project finances them with matching grants rather than loans because they are owned by the indigenous communities and part of the profits are invested in social infrastructure such as schools and health clinics.

Conclusion

This project is part of a new breed of poverty-targeted interventions by the World Bank. It is also part of an experimental initiative, started in 1993 in Latin America, designed to build social capital and promote ethnodevelopment.

Ecuador's Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Development Project represents an effort to operationalize new and old concepts (ethnodevelopment, social and human capital, community-driven development). It is an effort to mobilize local resources and direct new ones to the poorest segment of the population, and to have that population manage the resources in accordance with their own vision of the problems they face and the solutions they choose.

The project is unique because it is the Bank's first stand-alone operation that exclusively targets indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples, and also because it is highly participatory throughout inception, preparation, and implementation. But the operation's most unique feature is that it is strengthened by building on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies, such as their sense of ethnic identity, cultural values, solidarity and social cohesion, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources to attain shared goals.

Some aspects of this project should be incorporated as fundamental features of other, similar operations. First, the design should recognize and seek to consolidate and strengthen the capacity of many indigenous peoples and ethnic or racial minorities to mobilize social capital, including its cultural dimensions. Second, the design should incorporate a range of complementary inputs, including the formation and strengthening of human, environmental and physical, and financial capital. The exact specification of interventions in these fields should take into account how they interact with and complement existing social capital. Third, to ensure the relevance of activities financed under the project, its investments should reflect priorities established in local development plans elaborated in a participatory fashion. Fourth, to ensure ownership—and ultimately the sustainability of the investments financed—the institutionalization of self-management should be a guiding principle of project implementation.

The Bank's major investment in this project is building alliances among poor people and between the poor and other social sectors. Indigenous peoples are increasingly conscious

that financial investment will bear fruit only if those alliances are maintained and strengthened. In contrast, if they are weakened, and as a consequence the links holding the different groups together break, then domination by the white-mestizo society will continue unabated and the social exclusion and poverty of indigenous peoples will greatly increase. Thanks to their organizations and the capacity to mobilize alliances, indigenous peoples have become important social actors in local, regional, and national politics. At the moment, they are at the forefront of the social movement advocating change. To continue playing that role and to reach their high goals, they need to maintain their social cohesion and demonstrate true leadership capabilities.

The experience of the project indicates that the formation and consolidation of these alliances is not an easy task since indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian grassroots organizations do represent different political orientations and ideologies. The challenge is to isolate, to the extent possible,

development efforts supported by the project from political interference and manipulation by government, national indigenous organizations, or other external actors. This requires an explicit commitment to the technical focus of the project by all stakeholders involved, the use of professional criteria in the selection of its personnel, and the recognition of social inclusion as the driving principle for the project's participatory framework. An important institutional project design feature for this purpose is the existence of a decisionmaking body and conflict resolution mechanism at the strategic level, with participation by representatives of key project stakeholders. Also, having a third party to act as a broker and to remind stakeholders of the agreed core principles of the project—in this case the World Bank through its local field office representatives and supervision missions—can play an important role in consolidating the alliances that form the foundation of the project.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere	ILO	International Labour Organization
CODENPE	Council for the Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador <i>Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador</i>	INDA	National Institute for Agrarian Development <i>Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario</i>
CONAIE	Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador <i>Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador</i>	LCSES	Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit (of the World Bank's Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office)
CONFENIAE	Confederation of the Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon <i>Confederación de las Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana</i>	NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
CONPLADEIN	National Council of Planning and Development for Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans <i>Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros</i>	OD	Operational Directive (World Bank)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)	OSG	Second-tier organization <i>Organización de segundo grado</i>
IAF	Inter-American Foundation	PRODEPINE	Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project <i>Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador</i>
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	SENAIME	National Secretariat of Indigenous Affairs and Ethnic Minorities <i>Secretaría Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y Minorías Étnicas</i>
		SIISE	Integrated System of Social Indicators for Ecuador <i>Sistema Intergrado de Indicadores Sociales de Ecuador</i>
		UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Essai d'interprétation de la diaspora chinoise à la lumière de la notion bourdieusienne de capital social

par *Philippe Ricaud**

Propos général

Je voudrais tenter, dans les lignes qui suivent, d'appliquer la notion de capital social à l'analyse de la diaspora chinoise. Comme cette notion a reçu diverses définitions et tolère des acceptions fort différentes, il convient de préciser d'entrée de jeu que nous nous référerons dans la suite de cet article à l'acception bourdieusienne. Nous aimerions, d'une part, confirmer l'intérêt d'une notion qui a déjà montré à maintes reprises sa fécondité, et d'autre part contribuer, en toute modestie, à combler une certaine lacune en matière d'études sinologiques. Le fait diasporique soulève, en effet, la question de la nature du lien unissant les multiples implantations d'outre mer entre elles et le rôle tenu par la Chine. On doit aussi s'interroger sur les causes de son étonnante puissance financière bâtie dans un environnement socio-politique souvent hostile. Nous pensons, et nous aimerions partager cette conviction, que le mécanisme décrit par Bourdieu – la capitalisation de biens immatériels en vue d'accroître une domination – est en mesure d'ouvrir des perspectives intéressantes.

Une réalité peu théorisée

Que le fait diasporique soit très peu théorisé ne doit pas surprendre. Il est constaté plus qu'observé, décrit plus qu'analysé. Les monographies révèlent que la diaspora s'élève à une trentaine de millions d'individus dont 90% sont originaires des provinces côtières du sud de la Chine, et particulièrement du Guangdong, du Guangxi et du Fujian. Qu'avec des implantations dans plus de 130 pays, à travers les cinq continents et réparties autour des trois grands océans, son éclatement géographique est total. Que l'Asie du Sud-Est (anciennement appelée Nan-Yang et regroupant des pays comme l'Indonésie, la Thaïlande, la Malaisie, Singapour, les Philippines, etc.) concentre près des neuf dixièmes de ses effectifs. Historiquement, il est établi que très tôt des émigrés chinois se sont implantés dans l'Asie du

Sud-Est, mus par des motifs commerciaux. Après un tassement des flux migratoires, une deuxième vague d'immigration est provoquée par la chute des Ming (1644), cette fois pour des motifs politiques. Les sujets restés fidèles à la dynastie déchu ont fui les nouveaux maîtres de l'Empire du Milieu, les Mandchous (dynastie Qing) et se sont établis à Taïwan ou au Viêt Nam. Une troisième vague migratoire a lieu au 19^{ième} siècle. Elle est la plus massive et la plus éclatée géographiquement. Ces causes sont principalement économiques.

Ces données de base rappelées, il reste qu'en comparaison des tonnes d'études sur la Chine proprement dite, celles qui se concentrent sur la diaspora forme un ensemble qui pèse beaucoup moins lourd. Quant aux Chinois, ils n'ont jamais tellement jugé nécessaire de mener une réflexion qui dépasse le stade des préoccupations utilitaires. Symptomatique de cette carence est l'absence de mot chinois pour traduire diaspora (ce dernier terme provient du grec et signifie dispersion). Le terme en usage – *huaqiao* – signifie « émigré temporaire chinois » et désigne les personnes, non le collectif ni le mode d'organisation. Ce terme est souvent inapproprié puisqu'il englobe de véritables migrants temporaires avec des émigrés installés définitivement dans le pays d'accueil, et la plupart du temps assez bien acculturés ; avec, enfin, des descendants d'émigrés, nés dans le pays d'accueil, assimilés, et sans expérience personnelle de la vie en terre chinoise. Cette appellation traditionnelle, en raison de l'ambiguïté qu'elle véhicule, est un révélateur de la quasi absence de réflexion politique et sociale sur la question.

A propos de capital

Chez Bourdieu, capital est un concept clé et polymorphe. Bourdieu, on le sait et cela lui a parfois été reproché, manifeste une certaine propension à transposer des notions économiques à la problématique sociale ou à s'inspirer de concepts marxistes et wébériens. Il entend, par ce moyen rendre compte des rapports de pou-

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voir et de domination au sein de la société. A côté de marché (linguistique), lutte, violence symbolique, etc. capital est l'une de ses transpositions. Notion polymorphe, avons-nous dit, parce que Bourdieu la décline en capital culturel, capital social, capital symbolique, etc. A chaque fois, il définit par là un ensemble de biens immatériels (en quoi ils se distinguent du capital économique) que l'individu hérite ou se constitue et dont il va se servir pour conforter sa position sociale.

La notion de capital est donc au cœur d'un mécanisme qui rend compte de la production de pouvoir. Bourdieu illustre ce mécanisme par l'exemple prototypique du « grand nom ». Appartenir à une famille de l'aristocratie fortunée concentre toutes les espèces de capital, condense tous les avantages matériels et immatériels, avantages hérités, accumulés et dont les porteurs sont recherchés et se recherchent. Une approche similaire peut être faite pour la diaspora chinoise. Cette dernière constitue un pouvoir économique et financier de première importance dans les pays où elle est implantée.

Cette situation est encore plus remarquable lorsque l'on sait que cette puissance se bâtit la plupart du temps dans des pays dépourvus d'une économie forte. De plus, ces communautés émigrées ne disposent d'aucun soutien politique de la part de la Chine. Bien au contraire, elles sont chroniquement en butte à l'hostilité de la part des sociétés autochtones, elles font les frais de la « discrimination positive » que certains États pratiquent plus ou moins officiellement, enfin périodiquement elles sont les victimes de massacres et de pogroms qui laissent derrière eux des centaines de milliers de morts. Cette violence physique peut s'interpréter comme le pendant d'une « violence symbolique » que la diaspora exerce à l'encontre des sociétés d'accueil, c'est-à-dire une violence insidieuse, « douce, invisible, méconnue comme telle, choisie autant que subie » (*Sens pratique*, 219). Violence symbolique de la domination, ici économique, qui comme l'échange rituel instaure une relation d'inégalité entre les partenaires. Dans l'échange rituel, en effet, l'un des partenaires se soumet à l'autre et accepte tacitement cette soumission. Une telle conception prolonge la critique de l'*homo oeconomicus* faite par Malinowski et par Mauss, qui

montrèrent à partir des systèmes de la kula chez les Trobriand, et du potlatch en Amérique du Nord que ces échanges ne visent pas à remplir une fonction économique. C'est la théorie dite de l'« économie du don ». Mais tandis que pour les deux anthropologues, l'échange est réciproque (quoique différent et différé) et générateur de lien social, Bourdieu tient l'échange rituel pour une source de violence symbolique (Cf. *Méditations pascaliennes*, 276 sq.). Il y aurait glissement subreptice d'un échange de biens matériels à peu près symétrique à une relation dissymétrique et inégale.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la question se pose d'expliquer par quels moyens ces communautés émigrées parviennent à accumuler un tel potentiel financier, à représenter une force économique si grande et par là même à s'assurer la domination dont il vient d'être fait état. En d'autres termes, de quel capital dispose la diaspora ? A vrai dire, elle semble bien disposer de toutes les espèces de capital, comme nous allons essayer de le montrer. Mais au préalable, nous devons mettre en évidence la nature fondamentalement réticulaire de la diaspora, cadre dans lequel le capital social prend sa pleine mesure.

Un réseau sans territoire

Comment cerner la diaspora dans sa spécificité ? On reconnaît l'existence d'un lien entre une communauté mère et des implantations dispersées sur les cinq continents, mais sur quoi se fonde ce lien, quelle est sa nature, à quels autres exemples de liens intercommunautaires le rapprocher ? La première idée qui vient à l'esprit est de chercher des modèles connus. Mais cette approche s'avère vite décevante.

D'une part, il est clair que la diaspora ne s'apparente pas à une forme de fédéralisme. Les idées de contrat, de pacte, d'égalité entre partenaires, de droit, et un certain équilibre entre autonomie et centralisme qui sous-tendent les rapports entre des États fédérés ou simplement unis. Ce ne sont pas ceux qui régissent les rapports entre les communautés d'outre-mer. On notera, en outre, qu'il n'existe pas d'administration centrale pour coiffer les diverses communautés, la Chine ne jouant aucun rôle de ce type. D'autre part, la diaspora ne rappelle guère le

colonialisme. Les rapports de domination et d'inégalité, qu'impose le colonialisme, entre la métropole et ses colonies traduisent très imparfaitement les liens entre la Chine et les communautés d'outre-mer. Ces dernières ne sont certainement pas dépendantes ni soumises à la mère patrie. Elles sont des partenaires économiques. Le trait le plus remarquable de la diaspora est justement l'absence d'institutionnalisation du politique. Et la même absence d'instance administrative analogue à une bureaucratie coloniale ou fédérale. Bien entendu, ces cinquante dernières années ont été marquées par la querelle opposant Pékin à Taïpei. Chaque régime étant en quête de légitimité faisait les yeux doux à la communauté d'outre-mer, avec des résultats plutôt décevants des deux côtés d'ailleurs. Ces événements se sont déroulés dans un quasi vide institutionnel. Chaque communauté virtuellement en rapport avec n'importe laquelle des autres, la communauté mère ne jouissant pas d'une primauté particulière. Si bien que la diaspora fait penser à un réseau.

Capital social

C'est dans ce contexte réticulaire que se meut l'émigré chinois. Or, Bourdieu montre qu'un individu accroît ses chances d'ascension sociale ou a toutes les chances de maintenir ou de renforcer une position avantageuse, s'il dispose d'un capital et sait en tirer le meilleur parti. À l'inverse celui qui ne dispose rien de tout cela est condamné à vivre sous la domination des autres, ce sont des « hommes sans avenir », les chômeurs de longue durée, les clochards, les sans-papiers, etc. Entre ces deux extrémités du prisme se situent tous les cas intermédiaires que l'on peut imaginer. « Avoir des amis, c'est avoir du pouvoir. » (Hobbes) Et cela dans un rapport proportionnel, car plus le capital est substantiel et diversifié, et plus il est aisé pour celui qui le détient d'en tirer profit. Comme l'argent va à l'argent ainsi que le veut l'adage, le capital a un effet démultiplicateur.

C'est dans le domaine économique que ce réseau est le plus impressionnant. Il existe un tissu d'associations (*hui*) en tous genres, de toutes tailles. Les flux de capitaux sont considérables en volume, le *modus operandi* est souple,

rapide et opéré dans la plus grande discrétion. La pratique encore très courante de la tontine, système de crédit communautaire, permet à un particulier de lever des fonds sans passer par les établissements ayant pignon sur rue. En outre, les participants s'engagent non seulement à rembourser leurs créanciers mais encore à s'engager dans toutes les tontines que ceux-ci pourraient organiser. Les liens sont donc financiers et personnels, immédiats et durables. Les tontines sont relayées par d'autres systèmes comme les Chambres chinoises de commerce (*zhonghua shanghui*) et, à date plus récente, de véritables banques chinoises d'outre-mer, par exemple l'*Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation* (fondée en 1919) ou l'*Overseas Union Bank* (1949). D'une envergure considérable, elles illustrent excellemment la puissance économique et financière de la diaspora. Les relations commerciales sont autant entre communautés d'outre-mer qu'entre l'outre-mer et la Chine. Celle-ci peut sans inconvénient être court-circuitée. En fait, s'il fallait désigner un centre des relations financières dans cet ensemble complexe, Singapour (avec ses 70% de ressortissants chinois) serait choisi, en raison de sa remarquable stabilité politique et de sa non moins remarquable prospérité économique.

Cet ensemble ne saurait fonctionner sans la garantie qu'apporte la pratique du *xinyong*, notion qui désigne à la fois la confiance, le crédit moral et la réputation. Y manquer, c'est perdre la face et parfois la vie. Ce *xinyong* est accordé sans hésitation à un membre de la famille, à un ami, ou simplement à un inconnu s'il est recommandé par une personne de confiance. Une conversation autour d'une tasse de thé, un coup de téléphone peuvent suffire pour qu'un prêt soit accordé, un service rendu, des fonds convertis en monnaie étrangère. Les banques ordinaires avec les pesantes formalités qu'elles exigent, se trouvent *de facto* court-circuitées. Si bien que, depuis l'ouverture de la Chine dans les années quatre-vingts, on a pu assister à un déferlement d'investissements tous azimuts, confirmant l'intensité des échanges qui existaient déjà.

Si la notion de capital est centrale dans la pensée bourdieusienne, la distinction entre les types de capital est d'un intérêt secondaire. Qu'il s'agisse de capital culturel, social ou symbolique,

le mécanisme de base est toujours le même. D'une part, il y a conversion, transmutation d'un type de capital en un autre type. Et au final, accroissement de pouvoir pour celui qui détient un capital. Ainsi, Bourdieu peut écrire : « Toute espèce de capital (économique, culturel, social) tend (à des degrés différents) à fonctionner comme capital symbolique (en sorte qu'il vaudrait peut-être mieux parler, en toute rigueur, d'effets symboliques du capital) (...) » (*Méditations pascaliennes*, 285). Bourdieu décrit ainsi une alchimie dans laquelle l'or est le pouvoir acquis et le plomb est tantôt des moyens matériels (capital économique), tantôt des diplômes, un savoir, de l'éducation (capital culturel), tantôt du prestige, de la reconnaissance, du crédit, de la légitimité (capital symbolique), tantôt enfin, des relations, des amis, des obligations, des entrées dans les bons milieux et c'est en propre ce que Bourdieu appelle capital social. Mais il importe de saisir que tout cela fonctionne de concert, et que l'articulation entre ces dimensions du capital est aussi déterminante que l'amplitude du capital. Le capital social auquel ouvre la diaspora ne prend tout son sens que relié au sentiment d'appartenir à une entité une et unique.

La reproduction d'un modèle

La diaspora a souvent été assimilée aux chinatowns parce que c'est sous une forme urbaine qu'elle se manifeste généralement et qu'elle est immédiatement repérable. Ces quartiers où les émigrés chinois se regroupent, logent, travaillent, sont avant tout un fait culturel et offre une forte visibilité des particularités de la culture chinoise. Ils s'appellent en chinois *tangcheng* (ville Tang ; en référence à une des plus illustres dynasties), *tangren jie* (rue des Tang) ou, plus rarement, *huabu* (port chinois). Ils tendent à reproduire l'aspect et la structure traditionnels d'une ville de la Chine classique. On y retrouve, chaque fois que cela a été possible, la même organisation de l'espace, avec ses rues se coupant à angle droit et délimitant des îlots urbains constitués d'un entrelacs de ruelles et d'impasses. On retrouve également ces commerces au rez-de-chaussée, étroits et profonds, disposés le long de trottoirs couverts et bordés d'arcades.

Les enseignes gigantesques, rédigées en idéogrammes, achèvent cette impression d'exotisme qui envahit à coup sûr le promeneur. La boutique, le restaurant, l'atelier de confection sont les établissements les plus représentatifs de la diaspora. Les restaurants, les petites épiceries, les boucheries, l'école, les agences de voyage, les banques, les auto-écoles, tout est en chinois et pour les Chinois. Tous les commerces sont présents, tous les services sont assurés. Par là, la chinatown s'assure une autosuffisance. Elle est une ville dans la ville, une portion de Chine incrustée en terre étrangère. Il y a reproduction d'un modèle par scissiparité. Ici, identité rime avec identique.

Un capital social en prise sur un capital symbolique

Ce connaisseur inspiré qu'est Simon Leys rapporte qu'il s'est souvent étonné de la tranquille assurance de lettrés pétris de poésie, de philosophie et d'histoire, devant la destruction méthodique de leur propre culture, en particulier pendant la Révolution Culturelle et qui a vu des campagnes contre des personnages fondateurs comme Confucius et des destructions massives de temples anciens, de monuments historiques, d'œuvres d'art d'une valeur inestimable, qui ont été saccagées par les Gardes Rouges pendant les terribles années de la Révolution culturelle. Il explique cette impassibilité par la conviction intime de ces lettrés que la culture chinoise est immortelle. Les efforts pour l'abattre ne peuvent causer que des blessures mais ne sauraient atteindre leur but ultime. Un peu comme un mystique chrétien, habité par la certitude que la foi est dans les cœurs et non dans les édifices, ne s'émouvrait pas exagérément devant le saccage et le pillage de la Basilique Saint Pierre par des hordes de barbares. Leys peut écrire cette formule : « La Chine est la religion des Chinois. » (*Essais sur la Chine*, 473). De même, le touriste occidental s'étonnera de ce que cette nation, si chargée d'histoire, soit à ce point dépourvue de monuments historiques. Les Chinois n'ont pas le culte des choses du passé et se sont chargés de le faire disparaître. Cette destruction n'est d'ailleurs pas le fait des seuls Gardes Rouges. Avant eux, presque à chaque époque, les monu-

ments et les œuvres du passé ont été régulièrement détruits, si bien que quelques années ont suffi aux Gardes Rouges pour parachever cet iconoclasme chronique. Le passé est physiquement absent mais il continue d'animer la vie chinoise. Cette attitude ne peut se comprendre qu'en admettant que la Chine n'est ni une race (les Han), ni un territoire, ni un gouvernement particulier, qu'il soit impérial, nationaliste ou communiste. La Chine au sens d'un Etat avec un gouvernement dirigeant une population à l'intérieur de frontières géographiques est une idée qui ne s'est développée qu'à date relativement récente et au contact de l'Occident. A cette Chine visible et perpétuellement soumise à la destruction, il correspond une Chine invisible, une entité culturelle qui ne connaît pas de limites physiques, ne s'inscrit dans aucune forme matérielle. La culture habite les gens plutôt que les pierres.

Cette Chine invisible et idéalisée est la référence ultime et le trait d'union entre les émigrés chinois. Ils sont ainsi les héritiers d'un capital culturel partagé par tous et transmis à chaque génération. Traditionnellement, on est Chinois par le père. Les enfants de mariage mixte sont ou ne sont pas Chinois selon que leur père est ou non Chinois. Tel sera Chinois, même si un quart de sang chinois coule dans les veines, si ce sang lui vient de son père. Par contre, si son sang chinois lui vient entièrement de sa mère, il ne sera pas considéré comme Chinois, même s'il possède la moitié de sang chinois. Ce principe du *jus sanguinis* limité au père est très ancien. Il explique que les mariages des Chinois avec des femmes étrangères soient plus nombreux que l'inverse. Jusqu'à une date très récente, Taïwan transposait dans sa législation cet usage ancestral. La loi taïwanaise ouvrait des droits aux enfants métis issus de père chinois alors qu'elle les refusait aux autres enfants métis. Par exemple, les premiers avaient accès à l'école chinoise tandis que les autres n'avaient d'autre choix que de s'inscrire dans une institution américaine ou française, évidemment plus coûteuse et surtout moins socialisante. Les mêmes restrictions s'appliquaient au droit de séjour, sans réserve dans le premier cas et soumis à un visa périmable dans l'autre. La République Populaire de Chine a rompu avec cette antique tradition à

la Conférence de Bandung (avril 1955) en se ralliant au *jus soli*, et comme par ailleurs elle ne reconnaissait pas la double nationalité ce choix équivalait à renoncer à un droit de regard sur les émigrés chinois devenus citoyens étrangers. Il s'agit là d'une entorse à la règle ancienne et générale qui de toute façon perdure dans les mentalités et les usages.

En ne retenant comme critère que l'ascendance paternelle, la reconnaissance de l'identité chinoise est indépendante de la nationalité et de la présence sur un territoire. Elle s'étend donc à tout individu quel que soit son lieu de naissance, le passeport qu'il détient, son histoire personnelle, sa connaissance ou son ignorance de la langue chinoise, etc. C'est pourquoi nous souscrivons à cette conclusion de Pierre Trollet : « Le caractère commun à l'ensemble du fait diasporique chinois, c'est son *identité sans territorialité*, c'est un sentiment d'appartenance moins à un pays, encore moins à un Etat, qu'à une *culture* dont la *langue écrite* permet le dépassement des nombreux dialectes, et où l'héritage historique plurimillénaire, les mythes fondateurs, le moule confucéen, etc., constituent un « *conglomérat hérité* ». » (*La Diaspora chinoise*, 85)

Pour conclure

Dans cet article, nous avons montré que le processus de domination qui s'élabore à partir du capital social s'applique avec assez de bonheur à la diaspora chinoise. Il nous semble toutefois que le cas chinois inverse le schéma général suggéré par Bourdieu. Ce schéma veut que les biens matériels soient susceptibles de procurer des biens immatériels. Or, appartenir au Monde chinois représente un capital de départ. Transmis et reçu, il est un sésame, il fait entrer de plain pied dans un tissu relationnel dense. Ce capital social se transforme ensuite en réseau économique, étape vers l'accroissement des biens matériels. Les effets du capital symbolique s'avèrent donc considérables. Et c'est ainsi que nous croyons pouvoir affirmer que l'amorce du processus réside dans les biens symboliques.

Les commentaires qui précèdent inclinent à penser que la nature du fait diasporique n'est pas d'ordre politique. Elle serait davantage à chercher au niveau des réalités symboliques et des

liens qui en proviennent. Si les autres relations, économiques en particulier, découlent des liens identitaires, ces relations ne fondent pas la dia-

spora. Au contraire, elles n'existeraient pas sans la dimension réticulaire de la diaspora ou, en tout cas, auraient une ampleur bien moindre.

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The Architecture of Global Governance: An Introduction to the Study of International Organizations, by James P. Muldoon, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 2004, 322 pages.

James Muldoon's new textbook ranges from Buddha to Bush. It treats the history, types, and roles of international organizations and places them in the historical context of international relations theory and the evolving world order. Such a broad overview of the trends and actors affecting local and global governance can easily fail, because it requires an intellectual synopsis of the disparate fields of philosophy, history, international relations, and economics, as well as business and public administration. Finding the right balance between depth and breadth also implies that the author had to decide which information to include and which to leave out. Muldoon succeeds admirably in making these hard choices in slightly over 300 pages. His easy-to-read book will engage new students into the international relations field and foster debate among scholars on the linkages among such seemingly separate issues as failed states and financial markets.

The book is divided into an introduction and two parts. The introduction sets the stage by identifying the main themes of the book. It is based on the premise that "international organizations, despite their many problems and limitations, are essential building blocks of a global governance architecture" (p. 3). Muldoon introduces three interdependent sectors—he calls them the political, economic, and socio-economic pillars—that include the community, national, and international levels and are crucial to shaping global governance. The political pillar corresponds with states and intergovernmental organizations. The economic pillar includes markets and transnational corporations. The socio-cultural pillar incorporates civil society and international NGOs.

In the first part, Muldoon treats the foundations of international order to explain how these pillars have evolved. Chapter two begins with a brief discussion of the ancient civilizations, such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, China and Mesoamerica, and their ways of establishing order. Muldoon notes that although the earliest political thinkers, e.g., Plato and Confucius,

"did not think of the 'international' as we know it, they inform most of the fundamental principles of contemporary political theory and international thought." He also describes many of the earlier thinkers and civilizations as barely interacting with each other. Yet, he argues that current global society in many ways presents the final reckoning of competing worldviews that many of these thinkers also helped to shape. The implication is that although western thought may have dominated the international relations field, it may not have the last word. At the very least, it will interact, and sometimes struggle with basic Islamic attitudes or Asian values. The third chapter treats the further development of theory from the 17th to the 19th century when the concept of the "international" gained importance and different systems of thought foreshadowed the idealist/realist division. The fourth chapter shifts attention to international relations theory in the US and treats the idealist/realist debate in particular.

No doubt that specialists will find details to argue with in this overview. They will note that medieval philosophy also used the word "realist," but with a completely different meaning in the so-called realist-nominalist debate. Others may object to the cursory treatment of the reformation, while students of the 18th century may observe that Paine receives equal treatment to Kant. Yet, specialist usually do not write overviews and Muldoon succeeds in explaining the relevance of the different schools of thought and the excitement that accompanied the problems and solutions these thinkers wrestled with. Currently, for example, the writings of Bodin and Grotius can offer a jumping board for discussions of sovereignty in failed states.

The second part discusses the "manifestations of international order." Chapter five explains the genesis and growth of international organizations in the context of a changing world order. The sixth chapter provides a highly original overview of the similarities, interaction, overlap, and tensions among different types of international organizations that belong to the different

pillars. The seventh chapter focuses on the role of the different international organizations in managing global change in such diverse fields as international law, human security, sustainable development, and global economic policy. Chapter eight concludes the book with a meditation on the future of international organizations in a new world order spurred by globalization.

Muldoon contends that the state-centered international system established in the wake of the Second World War is coming undone by the forces of globalization that assign a greater role to corporations and civil society organizations. However, this is not a straightforward process. As the reaction by the Bush Administration showed after 11 September, the state and high-politics, with its emphasis on security, made a comeback that was initially considered quite unlikely in the Post-Cold War context. In addition,

Muldoon highlights the tensions and power relationships in and among the three pillars of global governance. He distinguishes two broad possibilities for further change: a reform outlook that focuses on closing operational gaps and a more revolutionary position that emphasizes correcting the global participatory gap. As both the role of the state and international governance are being rethought, we may need international organizations more than ever before in closing these gaps. This well-written textbook is an important step forward in the study of these organizations. It will be ideal for introductory courses in international relations and deserves to be widely read by both new students and advanced scholars.

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NGOs win ODS access

On December 23, 2003, the United Nations finally cleared the way for open public access to the organization's digital document database, known as the Official Documents System (ODS). NGOs had been campaigning for open ODS access for nearly seven years. "It has been a long effort, and we are delighted to have succeeded at last," said Global Policy Forum Executive Director Jim Paul.

UN action came when the General Assembly approved a new budget with funds for necessary computer hardware to operate the system online. Two years earlier, the Assembly's Budget Committee had axed the \$1.5 million appropriation at the last minute, so the outcome remained in doubt throughout the fall 2003 negotiations.

The ODS database contains all UN official documents since 1993, in all six official languages. The UN has been adding key documents to the database going back to the organization's founding in 1945, including all resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The UN website has been offering UN documents online since the mid-1990s, but it posts only a fraction of all official texts and it does not offer the powerful search facilities offered by the ODS system. ODS will now be available free to users worldwide through a web portal,

greatly helping the work of NGOs, scholars, media reporters and citizens interested in the UN's work.

Concerned NGOs began to press for free access to the ODS in February, 1997. An NGO memorandum, drafted by Global Policy Forum and sent to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on April 25, 1999, set forth at length the arguments for access. Twelve leading NGOs signed the memo, including Amnesty International, Global Policy Forum, Human Rights Watch, Médecins sans Frontières, Oxfam, and the World Federalist Movement.

Over the years, NGOs pressed their case with the Secretary General and with UN member states, but they got little action. The budget cut in December 2001 was the last in a long series of disappointments. Beginning in early 2003, a number of NGOs coordinated efforts for a new push. Global Policy Forum published a new statement summarizing the case. The NGO advocates wrote statements and letters, held meetings with delegates, contacted governments, lobbied with the Secretariat and mobilized the wider world NGO community. The World Federalist Movement took an active role in this effort, alongside GPF. A high-level panel appointed by the Secretary General on "UN-Civil Society Relations" offered an additional

target for NGO advocacy and its head, former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, personally took up the case.

During the fall of 2003 there were many moments of uncertainty. Early on, Germany announced reservations about the cost of the ODS, blocking consensus in the European Union. Delegates from poor countries also expressed doubts about spending money on what they saw as a high-tech information system. But NGOs in such low-tech countries as Mongolia called unambiguously for ODS access. And in Germany, after NGO lobbying, the government eventually changed its posture. Many factors combined to carry the day – a recommendation by the Secretary General, support from friendly delegations and intense NGO lobbying and scrutiny.

As the new budget comes into force, the UN will purchase new computer servers and prepare the system for worldwide use. Necessary software was already in place. Technology sources at the UN say that the system should be fully operational in the second half of 2004.

Global Policy Forum January 26, 2004

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/un/access/ods/2004/0126victory.htm>

Renewing the UN: the institutional agenda

A High-Level Panel on Reform will be set up by Kofi Annan to report on 4 areas: the current challenges to peace and security; the contribution which collective action can make in addressing these challenges; the functioning of the major organs of the United Nations and the relationship between them; and ways of strengthening the United Nations,

through reform of its institutions and processes. The Panel will report back before the next UNGA session, where Kofi Annan will make recommendations. It is up to the General Assembly to make decisions on reform. "Those decisions might include far-reaching institutional reforms," said the Secretary-General.

"Indeed, I hope they will."
Handbook of Proposal for UN Reform

The Center for UN Reform Education has released the 2003-2004 edition of its Handbook of Proposals for UN Reform, which contains excerpts from monographs, books and papers on UN Reform.

www.unreformcenter.org.

Le dialogue du FMI avec les parlementaires

Le dialogue du FMI avec les parlementaires nationaux, qui s'est intensifié ces dernières années, prend les formes suivantes :

La Direction, les administrateurs et les services du FMI rencontrent les parlementaires lors des visites du FMI dans les États membres et à l'occasion de la venue des parlementaires aux États-Unis.

Lors de séminaires organisés en Zambie, en Indonésie, au Kenya, au Cameroun, au Ghana et en Asie du Sud-est, les services du FMI et les parlementaires locaux ont discuté des stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté des pays

concernés, des programmes appuyés par le FMI et du rôle et des activités du FMI.

À l'Institut multilatéral de Vienne, le FMI propose depuis 1995 des sessions de formation aux parlementaires des pays en transition d'Europe centrale et d'Europe de l'Est.

Le FMI a participé aux conférences annuelles, aux visites sur le terrain et au lancement de la section Afrique de l'Est du Réseau parlementaire sur la Banque mondiale. À la conférence annuelle de 2003 du Réseau, le Directeur général du FMI, M. Horst

Köhler, a pris part à une séance de questions-réponses d'une heure en compagnie des parlementaires (voir le *Bulletin du FMI* du 7 avril 2003)

Les services du FMI ont participé aux assemblées et réunions de l'Union interparlementaire, collaborent avec l'Organisation mondiale de parlementaires contre la corruption et ont organisé à Washington des rencontres avec les parlementaires en collaboration avec le Centre parlementaire du Canada.

Bulletin du FMI pour la société civile, février 2004

The IMF and the MDGs

According to a recent Oxfam report, the IMF needs to radically change the way it works in low income countries. "It must finally

move on from an outdated focus on exclusively short-term macro-stability and pessimism about aid

to one based on long-term poverty needs and the MDGs."

www.oxfam.org

Primer directorio del voluntariado de América Latina

La inscripción al Directorio del Voluntariado se está llevando a cabo en estos momentos. Inscriba gratuitamente su organización en el sitio web de la Iniciativa Interamericana de Capital Social, Ética y Desarrollo:

<http://www.iadb.org/etica/DirVoluntariado/Introduccion.cfm>

El Directorio del Voluntariado permitirá:

Facilitar una mejor identificación

de cada organización individual.

Aumentar la incorporación de voluntarios.

Incrementar la colaboración y cooperación entre las propias organizaciones de voluntariado.

Proporcionar a las organizaciones un mejor acceso a información sobre posibles becas y financiamiento.

Posibilitar una mayor colaboración con organismos internacionales

y con la Iniciativa Interamericana de Capital Social, Ética y Desarrollo.

Patrocinado por la Iniciativa Interamericana en Capital Social, Ética y Desarrollo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) y el Programa de Desarrollo y Alcance Juvenil del BID.

<http://www.iadb.org/etica/images/Bletin-LogoBID.gif>

Workers' rights in the global economy

Giampiero Alhadef, Solidar Secretary General, welcomed the report released in London by the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalisation and confirmed the findings in Solidar's own publication *Workers' Rights in a Global Economy*. "The Commission is right in its analysis and recommendations: decision-making at the global level has developed in an unbalanced way, equipping international institutions dealing in trade and financial matters, with hefty incentives and sanctions at their disposal. Meanwhile, global organisations dealing with social or environmental issues are left in the cold."

Entitled *A Fair Globalisation: Creating Opportunities for All*, the report was compiled over two years by a special World Commission set up by the International Labour Organization (ILO). With 175 member countries and as the UN's only tripartite body, the

ILO is the key actor in creating, adopting, promoting and safeguarding global labour standards. What the report calls for to achieve a fair globalisation is improved governance at all levels: local, national, regional and global. "The ILO serves as a benchmark for labour and social policy, Solidar enthusiastically commends its recommendations covering fairer rules for trade, better international policies and more accountable institutions." One of the key priorities identified in the ILO World Commission report is a new social contract which protects the fundamental rights at work and strengthening social protection.

Solidar affirms the World Commission's findings in its recent publication on labour rights in the global economy asserting that labour conditions are often unacceptable, particularly in Export Processing Zones and in the informal economy.

In its report, Solidar supports the ILO's initiative and draws attention to the fact that current tools designed to protect workers' rights, can often become little more than a public relations exercise.

"While tools such as codes of conduct are increasingly being adopted by companies seeking to appease growing consumer pressure, they can also serve as merely a public relations campaign to redress negative publicity and win back the ethical consumer, rather than as a tool for improving labour practices."

Whilst the impact of globalisation varies among different groups and countries the World Commission report finds that especially unskilled workers in both developing and industrialized countries have been adversely affected by trade liberalisation and the relocation of production.

"To redress these dishonourable conditions where people are

deprived of their basic labour rights we need to strengthen the workers themselves. They must know what their rights are in order to defend them," says Rodney Bickerstaffe, ex Secretary General of the British trade union Unison. Mr. Bickerstaffe now chairs the Global Network for a

Global Dialogue, building capacity about the rights of workers in 21 developing countries.

SOLIDAR is an independent international alliance of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in development and humanitarian aid, social policy, social service provision and life-

long learning for an equitable and sustainable world.

Press Release, Brussels, 24 February 2004

www.solidar.org

Solidar's Communications

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Solidarités transnationales

Le colloque de la Sextion d'études internationales de l'Association française de science politique sur les solidarités transnationales, qui s'est tenu les 21 et 22 octobre 2003 à l'Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, a réuni un nombre important de chercheurs et doctorants, donnant ainsi lieu à de riches débats.

Guillaume Devin, professeur à l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris et responsable scientifique, a invité d'emblée les contributeurs du colloque à analyser la structuration des phénomènes actuels de solidarité à l'échelle mondiale dans une perspective évolutionnelle, au sens de Norbert Elias. Pour ce faire, reprenant l'hypothèse de Durkheim suivant laquelle " densité matérielle " et " densité morale " vont de paire, il a proposé que les travaux des participants s'efforcent tout au long du colloque de vérifier l'hypothèse suivante : les solidarités se sont individualisées à l'échelle internationale à mesure que les sociétés se sont resserrées.

Après avoir rappelé que le terme " solidarité " était d'origine juridique, les participants ont défini la solidarité dès le début du colloque comme une relation d'entraide entre acteurs, un fait social

qui renvoie à des formes d'action sociale s'inscrivant dans la durée : la solidarité ne saurait donc être appréhendée comme un phénomène a-temporel. Autrement dit, il apparaît indispensable de contextualiser, d'historiciser toutes les recherches sur les solidarités, de mettre en perspective leurs modalités d'intervention sur la scène mondiale afin de pouvoir mieux rendre compte des conditions sociales d'émergence des solidarités transnationales actuelles et donc de prendre en compte l'intervention des nouveaux acteurs, désormais parties prenantes de ce processus.

Aujourd'hui, force est de constater que :

- les solidarités se sont diversifiées et démultipliées,
- les acteurs des solidarités sont innombrables, hétérogènes, pas toujours identifiables, voire anonymes, pas toujours en connivence les uns avec les autres, voire pas toujours liés les uns aux autres. A cet égard, le colloque a d'ailleurs souligné le paradoxe suivant : les solidarités se déploient parfois même dans l'anomie.
- les espaces de solidarité sont : local, national, mondial, imaginé (au sens de Benedict Anderson).

Un processus d'individualisation plus accentué

Modalités de circulation de la solidarité

Plus la transnationalisation des solidarités s'opère facilement, plus la dialectique et la dynamique homogénéité/hétérogénéité se met en place par une valorisation simultanée des échelons local et mondial. Avec bien souvent l'échelon national qui se trouve court-circuité, notamment grâce au " bricolage " d'une nouvelle identité, celle de " citoyen du monde ".

Composante organisationnelle

Le colloque a fait apparaître qu'il existait des phénomènes des solidarités intra-organisationnelles (Greenpeace) mais aussi de concentration organisationnelle et de coalition organisationnelle (exemple de VOICE) avec des campagnes de solidarité de plus en plus globalisées. De même, il existe à présent des formes d'expression de solidarités transnationales inter-organisationnelles, notamment dans le cadre de l'altermondialisation.

Processus d'intégration

Pour analyser la structuration des solidarités à l'échelle mondiale

le, il convenait de se pencher sur la coopération, les coordinations, les articulations qui existent entre les différents acteurs des solidarités transnationales (États, firmes, O.I, ONG, individus, groupes).

Mixité des modalités de construction des solidarités

L'ensemble des contributions a mis l'accent sur les " mixtes " privé/public (ex : États/ONG ; États/firmes ; ONG/O.I., firmes/O.I.), micro/macro poli-

tiques, local/mondial par lesquels s'expriment et se construisent les solidarités transnationales aujourd'hui.

Chaînes de la solidarité

Plus le mouvement de transnationalisation des solidarités s'opère sans heurts, plus les chaînes de solidarité sont amples et bénéficient de relais nombreux et plus la solidarité est perçue comme légitime. Au contraire, plus les chaînes de solidarités

sont courtes, contestées, clandestines et moins il y a de coopération.

Les travaux du colloque concluent à la nécessité d'entreprendre une sociogenèse des solidarités transnationales. En l'occurrence, il s'agirait de faire le plus grand cas du fait qu'elles se déploient désormais dans le cadre de la mondialisation de l'économie de marché.

Joseph Laroché

Association française de science politique

La thèse d'une mondialisation homogénéisatrice ne résiste pas à l'examen

L'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques (IRPP.org) publie une étude de Christian Lammert, du Centre d'études nord-américaines de Francfort, intitulée *Modern Welfare States under Pressure: Determinants of Tax Policy in a Globalizing World*.

L'auteur y met en cause la thèse répandue d'une mondialisation qui nivellerait par le bas les régimes fiscaux des nations. Il observe au contraire une hausse continue des taux d'imposition et des recettes fiscales. Comparant entre elles les statistiques de l'OCDE, du Canada, des États-Unis, de la Suède et de l'Allemagne, il soutient en effet que depuis 1965, l'augmentation globale des recettes fiscales des gouvernements provient essentiellement des hausses de l'impôt sur

le revenu des particuliers et des cotisations de sécurité sociale. Cette thèse prédit tout aussi erronément une convergence des régimes fiscaux. Dans toutes les catégories d'impôt sauf l'impôt sur les sociétés, des différences majeures persistent entre les régimes nationaux et on n'entrevoit aucun signe de convergence en dépit d'une intégration économique et fiscale plus poussée.

L'étude Modern Welfare States under Pressure: Determinants of Tax Policy in a Globalizing

World, dernier document de travail en date du programme de recherche Politique économique et croissance de l'IRPP – est disponible en format Adobe (pdf) sur le site de l'Institut (www.irpp.org).

Fondé en 1972, l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques est un organisme à but non lucratif national et indépendant ayant pour mission d'enrichir la pensée politique en stimulant la recherche, la réflexion et les débats susceptibles de contribuer au processus décisionnel et à la qualité des politiques publiques mises de l'avant par les gouvernements, citoyens, institutions et organismes du pays.

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The reality of trade

The Reality of Trade, a report of the North-South Institution was launched at a roundtable in Cancun. In *The Reality of Trade*,

contributors from the South and the North document and evaluate the impact of the trade agreements which came out of the last

round of trade negotiations.

*View the document in pdf at:
<http://unconnections.c.tep1.com/maabvtwaa0VcMa4JFDxe/>*

Foundations of globalisation international conference Manchester, November 6-7 2003

An international conference on the foundations of globalisation was held at the University of Manchester, 6-7 November 2003. Featuring 19 speakers covering a wide range of American philanthropic foundations' global activities - including the Green Revolution, public health, economic development or 'modernisation' strategies, foreign policy and the Cold War, management ideas and theories - the conference was attended by over 30 delegates from the United States, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands and, of course, Britain. The Conference papers mainly assessed the roles of the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations, although a number of papers also examined, in part, Phelps-Stokes, Russell Sage, and other smaller philanthropies while one paper (Nicholas Guilhot, LSE/CNRS) examined the relationship between 1990s philanthropies, such as Soros, with those of the early 1900s. In the final session of the Conference, delegates discussed how to take forward research in the area of foundations, the knowledge-networks which they have fostered, and their impacts on globalisation processes. It was decided that the papers/conference proceedings would be published, that the new academic network would be consolidated by future workshops and conferences, and that links would be forged with other relevant research groups. The Conference organisers - Bill Cooke, Inderjeet Parmar and Jonathan Harwood -

aim to continue their work in these areas and to keep participants informed of progress. A number of provisional offers to host future conferences on foundations were made by Giuliana Gemelli (Bologna), Donald Fisher (British Columbia) and Giles Scott-Smith (Roosevelt Study Centre, Middelburg, Netherlands).

One of the main contributions that the Conference made was successfully to demonstrate the breadth of American philanthropy's activities and its global reach. Beginning from the early 1900s, the major foundations began an active global programme of health, disease control, food production, population control and other programmes. In addition, Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies built strong links with European and other institutions, principally with universities and research institutes, both in the social and natural sciences. In effect, the foundations began a process of building knowledge networks across the world, mainly to promote good causes but also to promote America's national interests. Established by some of the most successful industrial capitalists of the early twentieth century, and with boards of trustees who were heavily connected with Wall Street banks and international law firms and educated in east coast private schools and Ivy league universities, the foundations were steeped in the east coast WASP establishment. Their domestic and international pro-

grammes reflected the concerns of US elites who wanted to use their financial power for the public good, to improve society and the world. Their approaches were always elitist, technocratic, "scientific", and utilitarian - "to put knowledge to work", as one RF officer said. They were well-connected with the State Department and other foreign policy agencies of the US state, as well as quasi-state research and propaganda organisations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association. The foundations were, from their very beginnings, globalist in outlook. In their view, America should lead the world, exporting its values and institutions.

During the Cold War, the foundations promoted American hegemony in numerous ways, in alliance with official agencies of the American state. A paper by Ali Fisher (Birmingham) pointed out how the Rockefeller Foundation negotiated with both the State Department and British Americanists to set up the British Association for American Studies during the 1950s, while Wendy Toon (University College, Worcester) showed how influential were the foundations in the planning and execution of official policies during the postwar occupation of Germany and Japan. Scott Lucas (Birmingham) noted the numerous ways in which the foundations were overtly and covertly connected with the CIA and its notorious attempts to manipulate European and other

intellectuals. Inderjeet Parmar's (Manchester) paper showed the roles of Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations in Indonesian, Latin American and African higher education, specifically in building institutions favouring "modernisation" theories of economic development. Ann Vogel further examined the foundations' roles in promoting higher educational institutions abroad, and introduced sociological networking techniques to enhance our understanding of the interlocked nature of American philanthropy. And John Krige (Georgia Tech.) considered the Rockefeller Foundation's attempts after 1945 to 'Americanise' French science through its support for the CNRS.

Three papers also placed the foundations' support for 'Green Revolution' programmes in the context of the Cold War. Nick Cullather (Indiana) analysed the ways in which justifications of the Green Revolution repeatedly had to adapt during the 1950s and 1960s to shifting ideas about third world population growth generated by demographers as well as to the critiques of high-tech agriculture developed by environmentalists. In addition to exploring a series of issues concerning the foundations' underlying assumptions, their relations to U.S. government agencies, and their potential gains from the Green Revolution, Robert Anderson (Simon Fraser) emphasised the need for more research on the all-important 'Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research' which has supported the Green Revolution since the 1970s. Placing the Green Revolution against the

backdrop of the growth of high-tech agriculture in both Central Europe and the U.S. since the late 19th century, Jonathan Harwood (Manchester) sought to clarify the foundations' aims in championing the Green Revolution and concluded that despite frequent claims to the contrary, 'solving the problem of world hunger' was never seriously attempted.

Building on the question of Foundations' role in constituting the Cold War order, Guiliana Gemelli (Bologna) presented a paper on the role of the Ford Foundation Ford in OEEC/OECD institutional development. Bill Cooke (UMIST) extended some of Gemelli's earlier work on management education by tracing ideas used by the World Bank in its management of contemporary globalization processes, particularly those associated with change management, to foundation support of the Research Centre for Group Dynamics in the US and the Tavistock Institute in the UK. Thomas Cayet's (European University Institute) presentation was also on the development of management ideas, but this time in the context of the inter-war period, where he pointed to the little recognized ambitions of proponents of scientific management for its possibilities in engendering progressive social change, and particularly to the engagement of the Twentieth Century Fund with this aim. In an impressive and well received paper Nicolas Guilhot (LSE/CNRS) contrasted present and past foundation philosophy and practice, skillfully dissecting the nature, role and functions of the philanthropy of George Soros and comparing it

with the philosophies of Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford.

From the foundations themselves, Courtenay Sprague (Carnegie Corporation) and Darwin Stapleton (Rockefeller University and Rockefeller Archive Center), provided case studies of Ford in reforming and challenging apartheid in South Africa, using organisations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and their legalistic techniques and strategies, and of Rockefeller public health fellowships' role in globalisation. Both papers argued that [out: importance of considering] the foundations' activities [as] constituted genuinely liberal programmes for political and social betterment. The Conference benefitted greatly from participation by foundation insiders and it is hoped that such intellectual exchanges will continue in the future.

The Conference was opened by three speakers who were, in effect, the pioneers of foundation studies - Robert Arnove (Indiana), Donald Fisher (British Columbia) and Martin Bulmer (Surrey). Their impact is still widely felt since they established many of the boundaries and modalities of the field and of the debate. In their Conference papers they reiterated their ideas, drawing upon subsequent bodies of theory and applying them to more recent developments, thus providing the Conference with a number of frameworks in which case studies could be situated.

The second major contribution of the Conference was to fill an important gap in the current literature and thinking about the early

phases and origins of “globalisation”. If by this term is meant greater levels of integration between the knowledge/power networks of the world, with particular emphasis on those emanating from the metropolitan world centres such as the United States, then the foundations were shown by conference speakers to have made a vital contribution to its early history. The American foundations were linked with global power/knowledge strategies: building up existing research institutions, creating new ones, promoting particular kinds of knowledge and research (eg modernisation theories of economic development) and constructing power-

ful networks of individuals and institutions centred in the United States, both physically and in terms of American interests in global hegemony and Cold War competition. In the international knowledge economy, Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie were the powerhouses that integrated national and international networks to promote the intellectual components of America’s global hegemonic strategy. In that regard, therefore, current-day global knowledge networks, such as those centred round the World Bank (the “Knowledge Bank”), were pre-figured by those built by the Big Three American foundations.

All in all, the Conference was a very successful first step in building a network of foundation scholars and practitioners. For that reason we are especially grateful to our sponsors for enabling us to meet the financial costs of the Conference: the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at Warwick University, the Vice-Chancellors of UMIST and the University of Manchester, the Centre for International Politics in the Department of Government, the Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine, the Manchester School of Management, and the BISA International Political Economy Group.

Summer course on international humanitarian law

International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy

5 - 17 July 2004
 San Remo (Italy) - Geneva
 (Switzerland)
summer@iihl.org
<http://www.iihl.org>

The Fourth Summer Course in International Humanitarian Law shall take place in San Remo (Italy) from 5 to 15 July and in Geneva (Switzerland) from 15 to 17 July 2004 with the main topics:

- Introduction to International Humanitarian Law
- Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law
- Protecting the Civilian Populations
- Internal Conflicts

- Implementing and Enforcing International Humanitarian Law
- The Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ad-Hoc Tribunals, and domestic courts in prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law.

The language of the Course will be English. The number of participants is limited to 60. The Course will include a study trip to Geneva, with organised visits to the United Nations Office in Geneva, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

At the end of the Course, all participants will be awarded a certificate of participation.

The Director of the Course is Dr. Michel Veuthey, Vice-

President of the Institute, Professeur associe, IDPD, Universite de Nice, assisted by Cecile Jannotin and Patricia Panizzi, International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL).

The registration fee amounts to 1.800 Euros. Please note that, for the time being, no scholarships are available.

The fee includes hospitality (hotel bed and breakfast accommodation with lunch provided on course days), transportation from and to Nice Airport (a shuttle will be organised on Sunday 4 July), documentation, the study trip to Geneva (including transportation by bus San Remo-Geneva-San Remo and hotel accommodation), and the possibility of using the library of the Institute, its technical facilities and entire documentation during the Course.

The Course is supported by the Swiss Foreign Ministry, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

For further information and application forms, please visit <http://www.iihl.org>

Application forms should be sent as soon as possible to :

summer@iihl.org
or by fax to San Remo (Italy) +39
0184 541600
or to Geneva (Switzerland) +41 22
9197933

Comité d'entreprise européen

Une directive européenne de 1994 prévoit l'institution d'un comité d'entreprise européen pour les entreprises ou groupes d'entreprises de dimension communautaire. La Cour de justice de l'Union européenne a récemment indiqué que lorsque la direction centrale d'un groupe est située dans un État tiers et qu'elle n'a pas de représentant désigné dans l'un des États membres de l'Union, la direction de l'entreprise du groupe employant le plus grand nombre de travailleurs dans l'un des États membres, autrement dit la direction centrale présumée, est tenue de mettre en oeuvre les moyens permettant l'institution du comité d'entreprise européen.

Collège européen de sécurité et de défense (CESD)

Le Collège Européen de Sécurité et de Défense, en cours de définition, répond au souhait de plusieurs Etats membres de l'Union européenne de développer une culture commune de politique européenne de sécurité et de défense. L'impulsion décisive de ce projet a été donnée récemment par Michèle Alliot-Marie, ministre de la Défense qui, en liaison avec ses homologues allemand, belge et luxembourgeois, a souhaité que soit élaborée une formule pilote

associant les pays membres et futurs membres de l'Union européenne.

Par ailleurs, la France, le Royaume-Uni et l'Allemagne ont présenté devant le Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS) de l'Union européenne, leur projet de constituer des "groupements tactiques", c'est-à-dire des unités de combat capables d'être déployées très rapidement sur des lieux de crise.

Source : *La Lettre de la Fondation Robert Schuman* n°154
info@robert-schuman.org
16 Février 2004

The first Workshop of the Global Marshall Plan

On January 29th and 30th more than 130 representatives of NGOs, Business Associations and other interest groups got together in the Royal Academies in Brussels to launch the first initiative of this kind. The Global Marshall Initiative is a network of people, organisations, and clubs, which support the establishment of an effective, all encompassing plan for global eco-social development. The Global Marshall Plan Initiative was founded May 16th, 2003 in Frankfurt/Main by representatives from various non-governmental organisations (NGO's) from The Club of Rome, BUND, The Club of Budapest, and The Global Contract Foundation to ATTAC and the South German Newspaper.

The minutes: <http://www.global-marshallplan.org/e515/e659/e662/e676/>
Report: <http://www.global-marshallplan.org/e515/e659/e662/e674/>

The dynamics of large events

Olympic Games Knowledge Services (OGKS) was borne out of the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) 1998 initiative, in conjunction with the Sydney Organising Committee for the 2000 Olympic Games, to formalise the transfer of knowledge from one Games organiser to the next.

Olympic Games Transfer of Knowledge was created as the IOC's programme to capture important information and know how for the benefit of future Games' Organisers.

In February 2002 OGKS was launched by IOC President Jacques Rogge as a joint initiative of the IOC and Melbourne (Australia) based Monash University through its company Monash Ed.

From this time, OGKS was entrusted by the IOC as its exclusive knowledge management services company, in collaboration with its shareholders - the IOC in particular, providing advice, support and knowledge services for the Olympic Games and other major events across the globe.

<http://www.ogks.com>

NGOs and Equity Investment: a critical assessment of the practices of UK NGOs in using the capital market as a campaign device *by Steve Waygood*

Abstract

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have significantly increased attempts to use the Capital Market (CM) to change corporate practices. The main purpose of this thesis is to critically review UK NGO CM intervention in order to establish whether it is legitimate and effective and why. It argues that NGO CM intervention with welfare-enhancing objectives is both legitimate and in the long-term collective interests of listed companies and their shareholders. It demonstrates that, under certain conditions, NGOs can generate welfare-enhancing outcomes through CM intervention effectively and efficiently.

The thesis develops a model of NGO CM intervention and presents a chronology of UK intervention between 1990 and 2002. It uses the model to analyse the chronology in order to discern whether there have been any underlying trends in the evolution of NGO CM intervention strategy.

The analysis of this empirical data demonstrates that, while capitalism and the capital markets have been heavily criticised by many NGOs, NGOs in general have an under-developed understanding of the structure of the CM, and tend to make strategic mistakes when using it as a campaign device. Furthermore, even where an NGO believes that the CM is systematically undermining the achievement of its long-term objectives, it tends not to have a detailed alternative public policy agenda that would reform or replace the functions of the CM in a way that redresses the balance.

Presentation of the practical conclusions relating to the normative implications for NGO CM strategy is the main outcome of this research. The findings of this research include that the probability of success is significantly increased when the NGO targets institutional investors, when it uses financial as well as moral arguments, and when it calls for investors to use the influence within the rights associated with share ownership, not divestment.

Some items in recent issues:

Parmi les thèmes traités récemment :

Transnational actors in the international system <i>Les acteurs transnationaux dans le système international</i>	6/1999, 2/2000, 3/2001, 4/2002.
The recognition of the legal personality of INGOs <i>La reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des OING</i>	3/1986, 3/1990, 5/1990, 3/1995.
Cooperation between INGOs and IGOs <i>La coopération entre les OING et les OIG</i>	6/1999, 6/2000, 3/2003, 4/2003
Sociology of international relations <i>Sociologie des relations internationales</i>	3/2001, 4/2002, 1-2/2003, 3/2003.
Social movements, trade unions and cooperatives <i>Mouvements sociaux, syndicats et coopératives</i>	6/1996, 3/1997 5/1999, 1/2001.
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Language, communication, education and gender <i>Langage, communication, éducation et égalité des sexes</i>	2/1998, 1/1999, 6/1999, 2/2000.
Civil Society and the State <i>La société civile et l'Etat</i>	4/1998, 1/1999, 4/2000, 2/2001.
Latin American and North-American Associations <i>Les associations latino-américaines et nord-américaines</i>	6/1989, 3/1990, 1/1993, 4/1996.
African Associations <i>Associations africaines</i>	1/1996, 2/1996, 1/1999, 4/2002.
European Associations <i>Les associations européennes</i>	3/2000, 6/2000, 1/2002, 3/2003.
Arab Associations <i>Associations arabes</i>	1/1998, 6/1999 2/2001
Asian Associations <i>Associations asiatiques</i>	2/1997, 6/1999 3/2003

Some authors / ont publié dans nos colonnes :

Sami A. Aldeeb, Chadwick Alger, Benjamin R. Barber, Chérif Bassiouni, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Jan Berting, Maurice Bertrand, Elise Boulding, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Cynthia Cockburn, Jacques Delors, Adama Dieng, Francis Fukuyama, Johan Galtung, Susan George, André Gorz, Group of Lisbon, Robin Guthrie, Robert Harris, Jürgen Höffner, Bill Jordan, Alexandre Kiss, Alain Labrousse, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Marc Luyckx, Federico Mayor, Elikia M'Bokolo, Marcel Merle, Morton Mitchnik, Edgar Morin, Basarab Nicolescu, Ignacio Ramonet, François Rigaux, Nigel Rodley, John G. Ruggie, Wolfgang Sachs, Pierre de Senarclens, Jan Aart Scholte, Vaudana Shiva, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Rajesh Tandon, Charles Taylor, Fernand Vincent, Peter Waterman.

