

# Transnational Associations

The review of the Union of International Associations



4-5/2001

The Movement  
of people

Les mouvements  
de population

Revue bimestrielle  
Juillet - Octobre 2001  
Bureau de dépôt Bruxelles X

# Associations transnationales

La revue de l'Union des associations internationales

## Transnational Associations *Associations transnationales*

*Transnational Associations* is a unique bilingual journal whose aim is to deal with major current problems within the perspective of international nongovernmental organizations. It is intended to provide a forum for authoritative information and independent reflection on the increasing role played by these organizations in the international system, and on its philosophical, political, economic or cultural implications.

The approach is intrinsically interdisciplinary, and calls for both specialist expertise and practitioner experience in transnational association matters. *Transnational Associations* provides background information about the actions and achievements of international associations, and insight into their interrelations with intergovernmental organizations. It covers a wide range of topics, among which social organization, humanitarian law, scientific cooperation, language and culture, economic development, to cite just a few.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UIA, clarifies general awareness concerning the association phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, informs associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them. Contributors to the journal include association officers, research workers and specialists of association questions who engage only themselves.

Founded in Brussels in 1907 as the Central Office of International Associations, the UIA became a federation under the present name in 1910 at the 1<sup>st</sup> World Congress of International Associations. Activities were closely associated with the Institut international de bibliographie, which later became the International Federation for Documentation. Its work contributed to the creation of the League of Nations and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (the predecessor of UNESCO). During the 1920s, the UIA created an International University, the first of its kind.

The UIA has consultative relations with UNESCO, UN/ECOSOC, and ILO. It collaborates with FAO, the Council of Europe, UNITAR, and the Commonwealth Science Council.

*Associations transnationales est la seule revue traitant des grands problèmes contemporains dans la perspective des organisations internationales non gouvernementales. Elle se propose d'apporter des éléments d'information provenant des sources les plus autorisées, propres à susciter une réflexion indépendante sur l'affirmation du rôle joué par ces acteurs dans le système international et sur les aspects philosophiques, politiques, sociaux et culturels de cette évolution.*

*La visée adoptée est essentiellement interdisciplinaire et fait appel au savoir comme à la pratique des spécialistes du champ d'action des associations transnationales. Les documents, articles et études publiés par Associations transnationales traitent également des liens établis entre celles-ci et les organisations intergouvernementales. Les domaines couverts s'étendent aux problèmes de société, au droit humanitaire, à la coopération scientifique, aux questions linguistiques et culturelles, au développement économique ou à tout phénomène affectant la vie de ces associations.*

*Le programme de la revue, conformément aux buts de l'UIA, vise à éclairer l'opinion sur la signification de la dimension associative des relations internationales, notamment en informant les associations au sujet des questions qui relèvent de leurs domaines ou affectent leurs intérêts communs. Les textes des auteurs publiés par la revue (dirigeants d'associations, chercheurs et spécialistes des questions associatives) n'engagent que leur opinion.*

*L'UIA a été créée officiellement en 1910 à Bruxelles au cours du premier congrès mondial des associations internationales. Ses fondateurs, le Sénateur Henri La Fontaine, prix Nobel de la Paix 1913 et Paul Otlet, Secrétaire général de l'Institut international de bibliographie, avaient mis sur pied en 1907 l'«Office centra/ des institutions internationales» auquel l'UIA succéda sous la forme de fédération. En 1914, elle regroupait 230 organisations, soit un peu plus de la moitié de celles qui existaient à l'époque. L'UIA devait incarner, dans l'esprit de ses fondateurs, les aspirations internationalistes et les idéaux de paix qui animaient les associations et qui allaient aboutir en 1920 à la création de la Société des Nations.*

*L'UIA a obtenu le statut consultatif auprès de l'ECOSOC, de l'UNESCO et de l'OIT. Elle collabore avec l'UNITAR. La FAO et le Conseil de l'Europe. Elle entretient des relations générales et ponctuelles avec les organisations régionales.*

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# Introduction: the movement of people

by Raymond J. Smyke\*

\*Raymond J. Smyke, chaired the Webster University Geneva, International Relations Department, and directed the Refugee Studies Program which he co-founded, lecturing in both refugee and development studies. Concurrently he chaired the EADI Working Group on Refugees. His field experience includes thirty years of staff development work with African educators. He is now adviser to the Association of African Universities, Graduate Programme on Humanitarian and Refugee Studies (GPHRS).

1. The proposed World Conference was incorporated in the Program of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, adopted in Cairo in September 1994 by 179 Governments. Its aim is to search for an integrated, comprehensive and balanced global policy frame to understand why people move, now more than ever before. The concern, of course, is not with ordinary documented migrants but with illegal immigration into Europe by well organised trafficking which have reached epidemic proportions' and are estimated at 'hundreds of thousands each year. Interagency rivalry has slowed the process down. The logical lead agency, IOM, has launched the initiative *Managin Migration: New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People (NIROMP)*, directed by Prof. Binjal Ghosh.

2. Juan Somavia, Director General ILO, speaking at *Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit* Bern, 11 May 2000.

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The notion of *the movement of people* is an opportunity for the international community to reconsider the labels attached to people on the move. Some of the categories are asylum seeker; clandestine and illegal migrant; internally displaced; refugee; returnee; repatriate, and other collectives. The 1995 call for a World Conference on International Migration, aimed to address this concern, and although it worked its way towards the United Nations General Assembly—approval was not voted. It succumbed to an interesting combination of partisan, small state, and institutional fears over mandate erosion. Despite the initial setback there is agreement in the UN and elsewhere that *something* must be done to stem the wasteful, seemingly never ending, scramble for funding to assist the growing number people on the move.<sup>1</sup> A current initiative, the *New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People* aims to learn why they move.

Individuals concerned with development and civil society are generally aware of the inequitable global human condition. They can cite the now well known fact that one-third of the world population—two billion souls—live on less than USD 2.00 per day. In reality, a great deal is being done by intergovernmental agencies like the ILO and the WBG, particularly the WB/IMF Development Committee. Coalitions of the larger INGOs like Oxfam, Action Aid, Education International and others focusing on specific needs—debt relief, education and health for all, stemming corruption—have raised both consciousness and the level of discourse.

But still, on reflection, it seems almost unnatural for a human being to wish to leave his normal place of abode, family and friends, for a strange and often hostile country unless the need to do so is compelling. That need is a job that pays hard currency which, in turn, is remitted to the family remaining behind. "Despite progress on many fronts, unemployment and poverty remain pervasive. The ILO estimates that by the end of 2000 some 1 billion workers—one-third of the world's labour force—were either unemployed or underemployed, of these some 150 million are openly unemployed. Youth unemployment rates continue to be on average double those of adults. There are some 60 million young people, between the ages of 18 and 24, who are

in search of work but cannot find it... the implication is clear: 50 million jobs have to be created by 2010 of which 80% are in developing countries."<sup>2</sup>

The papers in this study highlight areas for consideration, the authors are actively engaged with people on the move. Our aim is to explore the phenomenon through a prism seeking new and different perspectives and to contribute to the New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People.

## Background

The problem briefly stated is this. The immediate post World War II settlement of 30 million European displaced persons including refugees and immigrants, was a massive success story. The majority of these people went *from the centre to the periphery*, that is from Europe to other parts of the world including the United States. Effective instruments and institutions for the resettlement task were devised and some are still in place. But, 50 years later almost everything has changed. World population had doubled from the 1945 figure of 2.5 billion to 6.0 billion in 2000 and further growth is projected. Today, the people on the move are non-European, coming from the *periphery to the centre*. For the most part poor by developed country standards, they are often ethnically different, arriving in the main illegally, and not wanted. Yet, this movement is growing. Humanitarian service providers and their own ethnic communities offer assistance to the new arrivals who are often powerless and unprotected.

There are many aspects to this complex situation with little agreement on the best means to cope with people on the move. Nevertheless, immigration, emigration and migration are old and honourable processes, going on through all time in recorded history, but the last century informs us the most. European emigration was massive, up to World War I in 1914, forty-per cent of the population left Great Britain, thirty-six per cent left Norway-800,000 Norwegians—while similar numbers left from other countries. Between 1895 and 1914 a steady 1.3 million people a year went from Europe to the so-called new world. Most had a hard time. Labelled

'greenhorns' by those who arrived earlier, the migrants kept together linguistically, nationally and by religion—integration was practically impossible. The big difference between then and now was that jobs were available for those who could work. Low paying, long hours, gruelling work which took many lives in accidents. About half of this vast flow of people left Europe as refugees, but arrived in North America and elsewhere as immigrants!

The notion of the movement of people is relatively new. It responds to a need for understanding some very practical problems that are no longer containable by either the refugee or the immigration regimes. Beginning with the mid-1970s oil crisis, and possibly linked to it, a noticeable increase occurred in the numbers and diversity of peoples leaving their normal place of abode to go elsewhere, generally towards poles of attraction. Europe was not a major target at the time as normal immigration mechanisms were in place covering the need for temporary labour. Most of the movement was among developing and newly industrialised countries. Two major impulses were involved: fleeing internal disorder for a safe haven—the case of Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Afghan conflict; and seeking gainful or improved employment opportunities—the case of East Asia. The so called 'brain drain' to Europe and North America, in very small numbers, began to be seen.

By the early 1980s scholarly interest in the phenomena of refugees began, but the work of actually dealing with refugee flows was coordinated by the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in cooperation with other intergovernmental (IGO) and nongovernmental (NGO) organisations. National governments were key to it all because they provided the funds and hosted large numbers of refugees. NGOs often served as proxy's for national aid agencies which financed efforts on behalf of refugees, often in response to domestic constituencies and pressure groups moved by what they saw on television.

In the latter half of the 1980s and onward, large scale flows of very diverse people found their way to a Europe unprepared to receive them. It is important to note that every Western European country, with out exception, had an

arrangement worked out with UNHCR to accept an agreed number of refugees, often called 'convention' or 'quota refugees for which provision was made'. For example, a South-East Asia Orderly Departure Program was administered by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The Program brought selected refugees to an orientation base in Bataan, The Philippines where lessons were given in the language and culture of the new host country. Some Nordic countries made heroic gestures by accepting severely handicapped persons.

This annual process in cooperation with the UNHCR was manageable. The flows of people to different European countries, 'spontaneously' seeking asylum, were *not* manageable. Governments were surprised, some responded harshly. Asylum is an important prerogative in international law. Anyone fleeing for their life has a right to request asylum in a safe haven; host country responsibility for asylum seekers is defined in treaty and practice. In Norway, for example, at end 1986 there were 2,772 spontaneous asylum seekers. Twelve months later this grew to 8,613, a tripling of numbers which overwhelmed the capacity of the public service to cope with the new arrivals. A comparable equivalent based on Norway's 4.8 million population would be the arrival of 546,000 spontaneous asylum seekers into the United States in one year. Larger European countries like Germany witnessed annual arrivals of a hundred thousand persons in this same period.

Many European governments and a large part of their electorates believed that the right of asylum was being abused by the spontaneous arrivals. The dilemma of how to identify people fleeing for their life and genuinely needing asylum, from others wishing to 'change their luck' was a real one. Popular, but imprecise terms arose. Economic, clandestine, convention, illegal, development, or environment refugee, undocumented alien, smuggled immigrant—terms that were picked up and used by an often confused media trying to explain events to a perplexed and at times fearful public. Yet, as Davies clearly shows the feared economic consequences have little basis in fact.

There was a need for state bureaucracy to bring order to the chaos. The European Union.

then the Community, responded stridently by announcing its proposed measures to contain this influx through statutory and non-statutory groupings adding to the lexicon such names as: Trevi, Schengen, and Dublin. At the time none of these measures stemmed the inflow.

Consistent efforts by national humanitarian groups, generally NGOs, helped to protect individual human dignity and the personal security of the new arrivals. Eventually, national civil servants rose to the occasion and established procedures for 'status determination'—a judgment whether or not an asylum seeker would receive refugee status and thus be allowed to remain in the country.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s the public services in states dealing with this movement were submerged. Frontier and municipal police, departments of the interior, immigration, social services, health and others were hastily involved, without any specific training or guidelines, to deal with the growing backlogs. There is little evidence of inter-state cooperation at the level of public service departments at the time.

To quantify the events and provide an order of magnitude, between 1988 and 1992 over two million asylum applications were made in ten European countries. One-third were submitted by people from former Yugoslavia and Rumania, while four nationalities made up fifty per cent of the total. The same countries of origin are consistently at the top of the list. In the above period Germany was the main receiving country registering over one million applicants for asylum. (UNHCR, 1993)

Asylum seekers were housed in confined holding areas awaiting status determination. Church and humanitarian groups felt that the process of status determination was a charade aiming only to rid the country of as many arrivals as possible, with little concern for those fleeing for their life. There is some truth to this claim. (Monnier, 1995). Nevertheless, domestic pressure was on all governments. As levels of national resentment grew, so did right-wing political parties; this unhealthy climate provoked extremists to violence against foreigners. Innocent victims were swept along in the current of xenophobia including the ethnically non-European people who *were naturalised or*

*native born citizens of a European country.* Caught up in this anti-foreign hostility, the whole concept of 'citizenship' was called into question. Associations of immigrants, some quite old, began to expand. New ones formed made up of the citizen-victims or legally resident but ethnically different persons. The EU responded with important confidence building measures at national and regional level.

### Population growth and people on the move

Twenty-five percent of all the people ever born are still alive today.<sup>3</sup> There are more people on the move today because as shown above numbers have grown. Although population growth is slowing down, the UNFPA points to the largest ever generation of young people (15 to 24 years old) reaching child bearing years, with ninety percent of population expansion in the so called developing world.

In 1983 the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHE) held a conference in Florence, Italy on the "Movement of People." It was prompted by the uneasy feeling that the traditional ways of looking at transnational migrants, such as refugees fleeing armed conflict and receiving United Nations protection, or as persons fulfilling national requirements to immigrate to labour short countries—failed to account for markedly increased non-voluntary migration outside of the traditional framework. It was the humanitarian aspects of the latter vulnerable groups that caused concern.

Seven years later a follow-up Round Table on the "Movement of People: New Developments" was held in San Remo, Italy, co-sponsored by the IIHL and the IOM. The concerns expressed at Florence had materialised much more rapidly than expected. IOM's then Director General set the tone at San Remo: "We are witnessing today an increasing number of persons who, for either valid or questionable reasons, leave their countries of origin without admission documents from a receiving country and without obtaining refugee status or certification as a national migrant. Factors responsible were: fear, famine, economic dislocation, increased opportunity, natural calamity, disasters or other compelling reasons.

3. Taken from a publishers announcement for the World Index of Resources and Population. (Hargreaves, et al., 1994)  
4. Report on the "Round-Table on the Movement of People: New Developments," San Remo, May 1990, published jointly by the IIHL and IOM.

It was hardly an academic discussion since the governments in the more attractive receiving countries were under pressure from right-wing political parties and interest groups to drastically curtail the inflow. The meeting at San Remo sowed the seeds for the idea of a World Conference. However, it was the UNHCR representative in his statement who came close to pin pointing the key moral issue: "What is a complex phenomenon is sometimes being dismissed arbitrarily as a simple issue of illegal immigration. The truth is, however, that while the refugee problem is a social evil, the evil is essentially that of conditions which are producing refugees and asylum-seekers and *not* that of the problem which the hapless and often tragic victims of these conditions are perceived as causing others...the challenge is to change or improve the conditions in the countries of origin which have forced them into exile."<sup>6</sup>

### Improving conditions in countries of origin

What occurred in France in this context is interesting. The June 1993 national elections involved six political parties.<sup>7</sup> The vocal and popular Front National had as the first plank in its platform the *repatriation of three million immigrants* out of a population of 56 million. Although unlikely to become the government of the day its 12.4 percent of the vote was sufficient to trouble the leading parties which adopted hard line immigration policies. The Mitterand government (1981 to 1996) was masterful in confusing the immigration issue. In early June 1993, interior minister Charles Pasqua startled France and its neighbours by announcing that his country will move towards "zero immigration." Amplified in a *Le Monde* interview he said: "*The immigration problem, from the East or the South, can be resolved only by development in the countries of origin. Populations will stay put only if we decide to carry out an ambitious development policy and if the world's seven richest countries devote 1 percent of their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to it.*"<sup>8</sup> This bold statement from a senior political figure responsible for police and internal security reflected a general mood in Europe that has since hardened.

In the same year, 1993, the liberal German admission policy was rescinded by a 1 June constitutional change severely curtaining the right of asylum. In the same month Greece announced plans to deport 100,000 Albanian illegal immigrants; the Czech Republic imposed visa restrictions on six East European countries; Denmark, Sweden, Belgium imposed new visa requirements and in Switzerland, Federal Counsellor Arnold Koller expressed public concern about latent xenophobia as the number of asylum applications increased. The voice of human rights activists and those promoting a more supple approach to European immigration was effectively stilled at this time.

There was, therefore, a national context for the Pasqua statement, but calling for "*an ambitious development policy and...the world's seven richest countries devot(ing) 1 percent of their GDP to it*" was blatant political posturing.

'Zero immigration' is a catchword used by right wing political parties. The government in power merely coopted the phrase to blunt its political opponents knowing full well that 'zero immigration' was impossible to achieve in a country the size of France. Cool heads in the National Assembly pointed out that the nation's external policy since 1905 centred around a vast colonial enterprise in Africa and Indochina that *actively promoted the assimilation of indigenous people urging them to emulate the French in all things*—as so many did. President Mitterand would often cite the 'special relationship' that his government had with former African territories. In the heat of the 1993 debate on 'zero immigration' his own parliamentarians reminded the President that the immigration problem in France was, in reality, assimilated colonial wards returning home.<sup>9</sup>

Analysis is needed of the phrase "*ambitious development policy and...the world's seven richest countries devot(ing) 1 percent of their GDP to it*" as a means to keep foreigners in their own country. Similar advice, "*to facilitate development and trade in order to keep would be immigrants at home,*" is favoured by the American and Australia press, countries where immigrant pressure is also felt. These and other statements may be examined by looking at two important regimes within the United Nations system—refugees and develop-

5. Gervase J. L. Coles,

UNHCR made the statement at San Remo.

6. The six parties with the percentage of vote in the first round of the election: Rally for the Republic (RPR) 20.4; Union for France Democracy (UDF) 19.1; The Socialist Party (PS) 20.3; The Communist Party (PCF) 9.2; The Front National (FN) 12.4; The Greens 7.6.

7. *International Herald Tribune*, 10 June 1993. See also Smyke, Raymond J. "Development vs Refugees," Paper presented to the Seventh General Conference of the European Association of Development and Training Institutes, Berlin 1993.

ment—to see how both relate to the development funding system.

### Definitions

The *refugee regime* is an organised humanitarian effort for helping people forced to flee their normal place of abode for fear of their life. The *development regime* is an international system aiming to raise the living standard of disadvantaged people who make up the world's majority. Refugees and Development are separate and historically distinct functions in the international system. UNHCR founded in 1951, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) founded in 1965, are the lead agencies for each task. Like other parts of the UN, each has a very specific mandate or job to do and, as will be shown, neither has its own *income generating capacity*. Cooperation between the UNHCR and UNDP is complex. Purely humanitarian demands, both normal and emergency, resulting from small wars, earthquakes, pandemics, natural and man-made disasters impinge on mandates. In addition, other agencies are also involved: The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO-1972), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA-1997) for example. Moreover, extremely complex emergencies like ex-Yugoslavia, and Rwanda I and II, have taxed agency ability to cope, all the while new categories of destitute people needing help are being identified.

### Intergovernmental Funding System

The humanitarian regime requires vast sums of money to function, yet, it has no income generating capacity. Indeed, the United Nations as a whole, including its specialised agencies, must depend on the generosity of member states. From a few countries that founded the United Nations, membership has expanded to almost 190 member states, all of whom are obliged to pay *annual dues* to support the work of the UN. Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of members are able to pay very little, moreover these small states are net consumers of UN benefaction. Others like the United States of America refuse to pay at all, at end of 2000

being more than a billion dollars in arrears. Annual dues payment, called regular funding, concerns the functioning of the United Nations Headquarters System as a whole, the Secretariat, General Assembly, Security Council and related organs. The UN development process differs from this and is of immediate interest.

### Official Development Assistance (ODA)

A hand full of donors—no more than a dozen industrialised states—annually provide 90% of all UN *development revenue*. ODA is the vehicle for transferring and accounting for most government aid to poor countries. The goal of 1% of GNP mentioned by Mr. Pasqua is the target that wealthy countries are urged to contribute to ODA. Which countries? Grouped into the Paris based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are 28 industrialised nations. Some of these have come together in a Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and are pledged to contribute funds from their governments to promote development. These are official contributions from donor governments thus the name Official Development Assistance, differentiating ODA from private or nongovernmental aid.

For 35 years from 1965 to 2000 the percentage of donor GNP has *rarely* exceeded 1%. Small Nordic countries and the Netherlands have done so from time to time but none of the economic giants in the G-7 mentioned in the *Pasqua statement*. Indeed, the steady trend among the powerful G-7 is decreasing allocation to development aid. The average ODA for the last decade is shown in the chart with the actual US dollar (USD) equivalent and the percentage of the donor's GNP. Three small nations are near the 1% target but among the four industrialised giants, the United States is last. Due to the subsequent world economic crisis the amounts and percentages for 1996, 1997 and 1998 follow a steady downward trend without any short or medium-term hope of reversal.

The ODA high point came in 1990 with approximately USD 60 billion available for development assistance. Ten years later this fell to USD 42.5 billion according to the World Bank, Official Development Assistance is in

free-rail, and at the lowest point since 1973. Efforts to protect people in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), and to reduce debt and debt servicing costs from the same countries have fallen short of expectations. Development scholars believe that ODA, sometime called a world welfare system, is not working because, "no political authority is accountable for misallocation of resources and welfare in the global system." (Hettne, 227, 1995)

Mr. Pasqua, a well informed politician, clearly knew the impossibility of ever achieving zero population growth or, one percent of GNP from the world's seven richest countries or, the likelihood of UN agencies solving "the immigration problem from the East and the South."

One learns quickly that national domestic politics severely complicates legitimate efforts to seek long term solutions.

### The search for solutions

But still, one may use the Pasqua statement as a measure of the progress that has been made since. No sensible person will deny the current world wide inequity condemning one third of the population to poverty while "the joint wealth of the world's three richest individuals is greater than the combined gross domestic product of the 48 poorest countries—a quarter of all world's states." (Le Monde Diplomatique, 11.98). There

is limited possibility to alter official structures to change this ratio, but a forthright and realistic national discourse on immigration is imperative. Fortunately, another French politician has shown the way—and the extent that national policy has changed. In August, 2000. Interior minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement tabled a paper at the Marseille EU ministers meeting saying that "EU citizens should be told that Europe would become an area of *métissage*—cross fertilisation or cross-breeding." That "the European Union could admit up to 75m immigrants over the next half-century and must be prepared to become a racially hybrid society."<sup>8</sup> The contrast between the French positions in 1993 and 2000 is an indication that important states are publicly reconsidering the earlier fortress stance, and beginning to engage voters in a dialogue, even at the risk of party-political unpopularity.

Behind this change lies the fact that policy makers have acknowledged, for the first time, that "Irregular migration, including trafficking in migrants, has emerged as a major international challenge, representing one-quarter of the total yearly inflow in the United States and as much as one-half of that in Europe. At the global level some USD 7 billion is channelled every year into human trafficking, with its close links to trafficking in arms, drugs, forced prostitution of women and child abuse, amounting to an increasingly alarming menace."<sup>9</sup>

Average percentage of GNP contribution to Official Development Assistance during the 1990s.				
USD 14.4 Billion		Japan		0.28% of GNP
USD 8,439		France		0.55% of GNP
USD 7,481		Germany		0.31% of GNP
USD 7,303		USA		0.10% of GNP
USD 3,321		Netherlands		0.80% of GNP
USD 3,185		Britain		0.29% of GNP
USD 1,982		Sweden		0.89% of GNP
USD 1,628		Denmark		0.97% of GNP
USD 1,521		Italy		0.14% of GNP
USD 1,309		Spain		0.23% of GNP
USD 1,244		Norway		0.87% of GNP
USD 1,084		Switzerland		0.34% of GNP
USD 1,033		Belgium		0.38% of GNP
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Whether or not the proposed World Conference will ever be held, a search must go on for an integrated, comprehensive and balanced global policy framework to understand why people move. A thoughtful new study will help to clarify some of issues. It may even add to

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the nucleus of common sense, that may transform into political will, for the benefit of people on the move.<sup>10</sup>

8 December 2000  
Morges, Switzerland

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# People on the move: some economic aspects

by Robin Dairies\*

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1. "The growing concern about world-wide migratory pressures" was among the topics discussed by the G-7 at their London meeting in June 1991. (*Times*, 18 July 1991).  
2. In European OECD countries there are 13 children per ten persons over 65 years; in Africa there are 159 children per ten persons over 65 years. 'Population Vitality and Decline: the North-South Contrast', A. Golini, et.al, paper presented to the OECD International Conference on Migration, Rome, March, 1991. Another calculation shows that in order to prevent population decline in the European Union during the first half of the 21st Century, an estimated 1 million immigrants per year would be required. 'Trends in South to North Migration: The Perspective from the North', H. Zlotnik, *International Migration*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, June 1991.

*Transnational Associations*  
4-5/2001, 190-198

## Introduction

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, four out of five people live in the developing world. This, plus the widening disparity between rich and poor countries suggests that the potential for large scale population movements and the inverse question of receiving governments ability to absorb additional migration, whether legal or otherwise, will become a politically sensitive issue with global dimensions. The growing asymmetry of the north/south demographic pyramid and the commensurate individual pressure to seek better socioeconomic opportunities across frontiers, cannot but intensify. If appropriate policy responses are to be formulated then the root causes of peoples on the move need to be understood. What has Economics to offer? This paper argues that 'push' and 'pull' factors require economic analysis if the inevitable migrant flow is to become a manageable part of sustainable global development strategies.

Emotive slogans like 'rich north, hungry south', 'stranger at the door', 'before the flood witness why, in the rich countries, opinion polls overwhelmingly show that the public majority wants immigration curbed. No wonder, then, that the issue of migrants, whether authorised or not, has become a hot political issue in the industrial democracies and a talking point on the international political agenda.<sup>1</sup>

While essentially socioeconomic in origin, the reason for public concern is also strongly dosed with emotion and simplification. A potent cocktail of myth and irrationality face today's policy makers. Graphic headlines suggest an explanation. In popular opinion, 'movement of people' suggests something huge, something sinister and, like a tidal wave, menacing. Statements such as 'outsiders force down wages'; 'illegals add to unemployment and 'migrant families on social welfare', indicate the basis of this fear. A fear that has a grip on the imagination despite the historical fact that immigration has proven to be a positive economic force around the world.

Why should this be so? There are two basic reasons. First, a fallacy of long date: there is only so much work to go around. Secondly, a primitive belief in the risk of a mass exodus of the world's poor coupled with a feeling that such an influx cannot but cause massive dislocation to

Western societies thus increasing the potential for ethnic and communal conflict.

*None* of these views are new, but in addition, they are also *wrong*. Take the idea of a fixed job ceiling, that there is a limit to employment at any one time. It follows therefore that if jobs in the workplace are lost whether to migrants, new technologies rendering some work obsolete, or if increased cheap imports displace workers then, over time, statistics should show a permanent rise in unemployment. If this were true then growth in modern Western economies would always have been accompanied by a steadily expanding unemployment rate. This, of course, has *never* happened. The historical record in every country conclusively proves the falsity of this proposition! Then too, historical and current data also show there has never been a mass migration of all the poor of one country to a richer one. The numbers have always been relatively small.

So, why has international migration become such a preoccupation? A preoccupation found more within industrial democracies than in other countries where cross-frontier migration is even more acute. Probably three main reasons, all of which became media-topical more or less at the same time, are responsible. The first reason is clearly numbers. The September, 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo, unwittingly heightened the north-south demographic and economic divide. The media made much play of such simple statistics as four out of five people will live in developing countries by the year 2,000 and that with per capita incomes varying from USD270 in low income countries to USD 14,400 in so-called developed countries, the poor could improve their standard of living up to seven times simply by migrating westwards.

More dramatic was the contrast drawn with the north's inverted age pyramid, allegedly almost the opposite of the south's. The argument ran as follows. On one side of the equation, looms the spectre of a Third World needing to create 55 million new workplaces a year just to keep pace with their rate of population growth, a tall order. The other side of the balance shows an aging population in the west<sup>2</sup> needing additional workers to compensate for low birth rates if welfare standards were not to

drop. The inference from such a juxtaposition was obvious, people would move! The 22 high income countries of the world, as compared to the majority of 100 middle and low income countries, would face a dual threat. Not only would they have to accept migrant workers to keep their economies going but they would also face a flood of job-seekers fleeing economic and social misery from a Third World unable to cope with explosive population growth.

Secondly, the break up of the former Soviet Union and its satellite states in 1989, and the social problems created in them during the transition from communism to democracy, created fears that millions<sup>3</sup> would invade the west seeking the 'better life' they had been denied so long. The impact, especially in time of deep recession in the rich countries<sup>4</sup> where concern about job security now effects everyone, was seen to be analogous to the unexpectedly high cost impact on West Germany of reunification with East Germany.

Finally, and uppermost in the popular mind, today's refugees are more visibly different and with less desire to assimilate than before.<sup>5</sup> In many industrial democracies host populations, unlike in the past, have begun to find themselves living along side large immigrant groups that manifest little interest in mixing. These migrant enclaves stand out. Their high profile accordingly gives force to rightist scare propaganda of 'aliens in our midst' further compounded by widespread reports, since the end of the Cold War, of outbreaks of ethnic violence. The newly perceived potential of further immigrant disruption in mature societies has made many Western governments less certain about the value of multiculturalism and to requestion their country's absorption capacity for foreign newcomers.

### Economics

What has economics to offer in both understanding the issue and dealing with this popular perception? As income differentials between countries are generally accepted to be the prime cause of migration, the short answer must be *everything*. Thus, any meaningful attempt both to educate the man in the street and devise

appropriate policy responses will have to start with a grasp, however rudimentary, of the economic aspects of the problem. To meet this objective, this paper will present an economic rationale for international migration and then suggest a more simple way of looking at the phenomenon, analytically. It concludes by placing the problem in a likely, but less threatening future context. The intention in so-doing is to demystify current perceptions without minimising real possibilities calling for government action.

Three major caveats. First, the paper does not address refugees *per se* and asylum-seekers. Though politically significant, their numbers are relatively small; more importantly, they are special categories with their own history of official responses. Secondly, questions of internal migration and internally displaced people are not considered either; they are of limited concern to Western immigration authorities. The main focus will thus be confined to what has allegedly become one of the most pressing of global political worries - the expected flood of economic migrants, especially, illegal migrants - and what can be done about them.

Thirdly, despite cross-frontier migration having a very long history, a lot remains unknown about what actually determines the volume flow of migration over time and how - on the assumption that it should be done - costs and benefits of such movements can realistically be allocated between donor and receiver countries. Equally, while a common sense view suggests that migration and development must be linked, experts admit that the correlation is "complex" and difficult to tease out in terms of causes and consequences. The analysis, therefore, will be more broad-brush than in-depth, with respect to the various issues involved.

### Problem dimension

Economists like statistics: it is their way of gauging the dimensions of any problem. Although basic data is subject to considerable qualification (for definitional and collection reasons), some reasonable global estimates are available. They concern non-national migrant workers. The figures indicate a total 30 to 35

3. Recent estimates suggest that Western Europe might have to cope with ten million would-be immigrants, made up of four million from eastern Europe and six million from ex-Soviet Republics, excluding three million ethnic Germans moving to Germany. *East-West Migration: the Alternatives*, Layard, Blanchard, Dornbusch, Krugman, MIT Press, 1992).

4. Currently 30 million, or seven point five percent of the labour force in OECD countries is unemployed. Of those unemployed in the European Union, 40 percent have been out of work for at least a year, while one-third have never worked at all. *Economist*, 'Europe and the Under Class', 30 July 1994, p 18.

5. *Economist*, 'The stranger at the door', 23 December 1989, p. 2.

6. From what we know concerning the relationships between migration and economic growth - and it is precious little - rapid and successful development is likely to be profoundly disturbing to developing countries in the short-run. *United States Commission for the Study of International Migration and Co-operative Economic Development*, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1990).

7. Migrants, Refugees and International Cooperation, International Conference on Population and Development, (ICPD) Cairo, 1994, table p. 2. Joint publication by the I.L.O., IOM and UNHCR (ISBN 92-9068-046-6).

8. International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 65th Session, Document MCI/INF/225, 17 November 1992, pl. 9. UNHCR 1993 estimates there are 19 million refugees not to mention

24 million persons displaced within their own countries. Between 1984-91, the number of refugees doubled. Worldwide, nine out of ten refugees have found asylum in developing countries. (ICPD, Cairo, Document A/Conf.17/14, p. 85).

10. 'About three million clandestine aliens in the USA... one point three to

Europe ... about 100,000 in eastern Europe ... one

million in Malaysia and 300,000 in Japan, International Migration: 'Challenge for the Nineties', R.T. Appleyard, IOM, 1991; booklet published for the 40th Anniversary of IOM). In addition, Appleyard estimates that Italy, Spain and Greece, which had provided a large proportion of northern Europe's guest workers, now host probably one million illegal migrants from non-European bordering countries. (p.13 op. cit.).

11. Ibid. ICPD, Cairo, Doc A/Conf. 17/L.1 May 1994, p.67.

12. "An Overview of Present and Future Emigration Dynamics in South Asia". *International Migration*, N.M. Shah .Vol. XXXI-2-1994, p. 227).

13. Ibid. 'Challenge for the Nineties', IOM, p. 11.

million people working world-wide outside of their home country together with 40 to 50 million dependents, giving a total expatriate population between 70 to 85 million people.<sup>7</sup> Further estimates suggest that an additional 50 million are involved annually in international migration.<sup>8</sup>

These figures do not include around 19 million refugees.<sup>9</sup> However, they do include legally documented migrants plus an estimate for clandestine workers.<sup>10</sup> While the overall figure looks big it is really surprisingly small in a global context. Migrant workers represent just one point four per cent of the world's 6 billion people and around the same percentage if expressed against the total of the world's work force. Even if one accepts the figure of 125 million migrants world-wide put forward at the Cairo ICPD meeting the percentage still remains just over two.<sup>11</sup> Logically, the proportion of 'illegal immigrants' must be even smaller.

Disaggregating the total shows that well over half non-national migrants are in the so-called Third World. On a regional basis, Europe has the most non-nationals, eight million workers plus 12 million dependents, followed by Africa with five to six million workers plus 11 to 14 million dependents and North America with seven million workers and eight to ten million dependents.

Statistics for legal migration show that the countries of permanent migration, those countries that positively encourage migrants like the USA, Canada and Australia, admitted about four million immigrants between 1980-84 and some 4.5 million between 1985-89. The figures exclude the nearly three million undocumented migrants in the USA whose status was regularised in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By contrast, the main receiving countries in western Europe recorded about 4.6 million incoming migrants during 1980-84 and 6.3 million in 1985-89. However, most were not admitted on a long-term basis.

Two other major areas willingly accepted migrant workers. The oil countries of the Middle East attracted around one million contract workers per year in the 1980s until the Gulf War. Thereafter, emigration from the area increased. Towards the end of the decade, Japan and the newly industrialising countries of South

East Asia also drew in foreign workers as their local labour markets became increasingly tight and demand for skilled contract workers grew. The stock of south Asian migrants largely working in these areas is currently estimated at 3.3 million; again but a tiny fraction of their total home population.<sup>12</sup>

Recent movements in terms of national populations have also been statistically small. A few Western examples. Between 1970 and 1988 over three million Mexicans, or only four per cent of Mexico's population, moved to the United States. During the 1950s and 1960s some five million, or three per cent of their population, moved from Yugoslavia, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Italy to northern Europe. A comparable number of southern Europeans moved to America. These figures are minor when compared to the large-scale migrations of the 19th century when 45-50 million Europeans went West and when 30 million Indians were sent as indentured workers to the Colonies.<sup>13</sup>

While the number ratios are small the relative concentration of foreign to local workers increases anxiety and official concern in the host society. This is especially true in the industrial countries where unemployment is not only high, but whose geographical proximity to areas of potential migration located within Latin America or eastern Europe and the southern Mediterranean regions - where spectacular population growth rates have been projected<sup>14</sup> - increases a sense of vulnerability.

The proportion of non-nationals in the work force in Switzerland, for example, is 30 per cent. For Germany, eight per cent; France, six point seven per cent; the UK three point four per cent and Italy, two point one percent. On the other hand, in certain developing countries, it is even higher ranging from 13 per cent in Malaysia to 70/80 per cent in all six Gulf countries. Most of these people, however, have legal entry permits.

The previous set of statistics confirm some important points made by analysts. Although economic differentials (and in some places political freedom and human rights) between north and south have been sufficiently wide enough to have incited mass immigration, *they have not done so*. Two other facts follow. Most people *never* cross frontiers to live or work in another

14. Demographers project that the population of the three Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) will be two times the size of France by the year 2010. (*Economist*, 'The Year of the Refugee', 23 December 1989, p.28).

15. Refugees enter western Europe at much the same rate - 20,000 to 30,000 - as ten years ago. (*Economist*, 18 February 1995, p. 32)

16. Briefly the United Nations Convention and its 1967 Protocol identifies as refugees those persons who flee their country or stay away because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.

17. Asylum-seekers in European countries have risen from 68,700 in 1983 to 401,500 in 1990. (*Ibid.*, 'Challenge for the Nineties', p.27). However, according to the Inter-governmental Consultation on Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies, applications for asylum in 1994 were less than half those of 1992. (*Economist*, 18 February 1995, p.32.)

18. Sweden alone spends more on the care and maintenance of asylum-seekers than the annual budget of the UNHCR. (*Economist*, 23 December 1989). However, Sweden has lightened up its procedures and in 1994 took only 18,000 asylum-seekers as opposed to 84,000 in 1992. (*Economist*, 18 February 1995, p.32).

country, and the main movement is south-south. Well over half of all migrant workers move from one developing country to another or remain within their immediate geographical region.

Another aspect of the problem dimension is the imprecise nomenclature given to people on the move. To help analysis, a six-fold typology of international migration has been developed:

permanent means settlers or persons seen by countries of traditional immigration as positive human capital inputs to 'nation-building'; the group also includes persons admitted under family reunion, contract workers are normally unskilled or semi-skilled who are employed for a finite period; their numbers vary with socioeconomic conditions. More particularly, their numbers are determined either by the perceived demand for unskilled foreign labour to fill low-paid jobs that nationals no longer consider, or the need to augment the local labour supply. professional transients are people usually employed by international organisations or multi-national corporations operating in different countries, clandestine immigrants is the polite term for illegal workers, without any documentation residing in country other than their own asylum-seekers are persons applying for country entry on grounds of political discrimination, whereas refugees are those clearly defined by the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and subsequent international instruments.

All except the clandestine category fall under the recipient government's control. The first three categories have long been subject to official regulations dealing with flow volumes and skill composition. Problems in this area are usually concerned with the political acceptability of control measures by the host country and the numbers involved" as well as the practical administration in terms of cost-effectiveness. Another legal control problem for host countries concerns verification of asylum requests and subsequent status determination for asylum seekers granted refugee status.<sup>16</sup> In addition, the growth in numbers<sup>17</sup> has been such as to push up application processing costs to unacceptable levels. For example, the total cost in western Europe for such activities has been placed at USD five bil-

lion just for handling around 400,000 applicants,<sup>18</sup> or USD 12,500 per person.

A related political as opposed to administrative issue concerns illegal workers. Although there is no accurate data on their numbers, there is a strong current belief that any extension in their numbers would lead to a breakdown in the existing social and political equilibrium. As a result, western governments have enacted a host of preventive measures, such as tightened border security, the adoption of strict visa requirements, imposition of fines on airlines that carry passengers without valid documents or the out-fight deportation of such persons at the airlines expense, plus heavy penalties on employers taking on clandestine or undocumented labour.

### Root causes of migration

The economic conditions and political reactions thereto in donor and receiving countries are important considerations. Demand pull factors operate whenever a country has an overall labour shortage or jobs that remain unfilled either because they offer low wages or have other inconveniences. In such conditions, employers or their middlemen<sup>19</sup> deliberately attempt to hire migrant workers (with or without government approval) to fill the gaps. Such workers are seen to have distinct advantages; they accept long hours, seasonal or unpleasant work and, especially, low wages. Thus migrant workers are to be found wherever a particular sector requires a flexible work force, e.g., construction, agriculture, menial service and domestic household work<sup>20</sup> or where output is labour-intensive, such as garment manufacturing and assembly work of any kind. The main advantages for the receiver country are two: worker migrants assist existing labour mobility; and, where there is wage-push inflationary pressure, help to dampen its force. The net effect is to contribute to policies designed to keep the country export-competitive. One big difference today is that in the industrial countries migrant worker flows could usually be correlated with fluctuations in unemployment levels. Current research, however, indicates continuing migrant flows despite record unemployment in OECD countries. This phenomenon is partly explicable by growth in the 'black' economy and partly by gen-

erous welfare provisions in many countries which have encouraged a work-shy attitude among the jobless.<sup>19</sup>

'Supply push' factors clearly derive from lack of work opportunities and relative low wages in countries generating a continuous annual surplus in their labour markets. Apart from countries with a steady stream of youthful entrants looking for work each year, supply push most clearly emerges when a country decides to go in for economic restructuring or adjustment by adopting market-driven economic policies. Such policy changes are often associated with suddenly displaced workers as well as an increase in rural to urban drift. The net effect is that those who cannot find replacement work seek temporary cross-frontier employment.

'Networks' are a relatively new though important feature. A migrant network is simply a structure (often informal) that exists to assist migrants by helping them to find work and providing support while they do so. A more academic formulation would regard them as linkage facilitators between demand pull and supply push.

In practice there are two sides to the network. Countrymen abroad who tell about their new life" and, in the case of friends or family, provide funds and practical help on arrival. Returning workers also provide a similar source of practical information. Middlemen and employment agencies are their counterparts whether acting as bona fide contractors or, often, illegal transporters. However, when networks have been established in a host area, preliminary research suggests that they take on a semi-permanent character. Should these develop to the point of critical mass, migration flows can easily become self-perpetuating.

### Economic theory

Although Economics is known in the text books as the 'dismal science', the application of economic theory to migration shows it cannot but be positive! The argument goes as follows with 'factor-cost equalisation' the key insight. Countries that have a labour-surplus, export their workers to countries that are relatively rich in capital but where labour is in short supply and, hence, high cost. The net effect of the work-

er influx is to cause wages to fall thus encouraging a more economical use of labour. The receiving country will benefit from the spill over effect of the addition to its human capital. The converse is equally beneficial in the sending country where, as a result of the labour efflux, wages rise. Overall, the two-way movement brings about an equalisation in the labour price factor of production. It follows that migration ceases once wage and income differentials are equalised. Or, migration is self-regulating. If the effects on the two partners are combined one can readily see why international migration is considered beneficial overall since it assists in the normal process whereby scarce resources are reallocated to a more efficient or higher wage use.

The above Classical theory, grounded in wage differentials, implicitly stresses the importance of the individual's decision in whether to migrate. An extrapolation of this at the policy level can easily lead industrial democracies, worried about migration pressures, to advocate what are called 'stay-at-home' development aid programmes to dampen supply push factors. But recent research suggests that a much finer balance is drawn and not by the individual alone. Thus, simplistic Western counter-migration policies that are not properly targeted may not have the desired impact.

The new insight is based on 'Portfolio Investment Theory'. Put simply, the theory says that families (rather than solo individuals) are the core units in deciding how to allocate their main resource - their male/female labour assets. Maximising the household portfolio is determined by overall family needs for stable income levels. This they try to achieve through a mix of work specialisation and cooperation that is governed by their assessment of the probability of finding work at home or abroad.

If the balance of pros and cons suggest the migratory option, then a member of the family seeks work abroad and sends back cash remittances. This different way of looking at migration decisions seems to fit known facts. Migration is usually a process over time, not the quick burst one would expect at news of a sudden widening of wage differentials. Next, the majority of surveys indicate few potential migrants see themselves as leaving for more that

19. Economically, middlemen, might be regarded as arbitrageurs of differences between international labour market conditions today, however, they are more likely to be involved in much of the illegal migration usually extracting substantial fees from migrant smuggling from the individual or future employer.

20. For example, fully half of all migrant workers from Sri Lanka are female. (*International Migration*, Vol. XXXII-2-1994, p.228)

21. Dutch researchers have concluded that Holland with its generous welfare benefits had produced a group of unemployed who deliberately chose to live off social welfare. (*Economist*, 'Europe and the Underclass', 23-30 July 1994.)

22. As an example: Vietnamese refugees resettled in the USA would send back photographs of themselves posed against an attractive house or car implying, thereby, the "good life" to be had in their new country. (Anne Davies, UNHCR, personal communication, 7 June 1994).

a few years; most are in search of short-term job opportunities. In addition, contrary to what one might expect, the worst off in any country are rarely those likely to emigrate, it is the young hopefuls who tend to be willing to leave; the great majority stay home. Thus, Portfolio Investment Theory suggests several things. First, the decision to migrate reflects many factors *not* just wage differentials. Secondly, migratory flows are the product of an individual household or extended family decision in the aggregate. There will always be some form of migration as families seek the best return on their labour assets. Thirdly, most migration is short-term with the individual retaining close links with his home setting.<sup>23</sup> It follows, therefore, that if industrial countries wish to specifically influence the economic migration option at source then the particular environment which determines the units decision-making has to be targeted, and this will not be reached through the usual blanket approach to development assistance.

### Economic effects

It is important to note that most countries are both senders and receivers of migrants. Turkey is the classic example, with the mix depending on the respective socioeconomic conditions prevailing at the time. What are the more specific economic effects on donor countries and receiving countries?

'Donor countries' tend to be poor with an uneven income distribution, a rapidly growing labour force with a high degree of un- or under-employment. Development takes place because its migrating workers help to reduce unemployment, while their foreign currency remittances supplement foreign exchange flows. In addition, returning workers bring home more advanced skills, a more sophisticated work experience and, often, a new sense of entrepreneurship thus aiding productive development.

Key benefits derive from the feedback process of the two 'R's': remittances and returning workers. Remittances have become the most significant and fastest source of foreign exchange for many countries. They are now seen as the central link between migration and development. The total has grown rapidly to some USD75

billion or more than one and one-half times of the 1990 level of Official Development Assistance (ODA). For many countries as wide ranging as Bangladesh, Lesotho, Portugal and Turkey, remittances now represent a sizable proportion of either gross domestic product, exports or imports.

The main question is the extent to which such remittances can be used to accelerate sustainable development, part of a familiar debate on 'investment versus development'. The issue for a government is how to ensure that such remittances pass through official rather than private channels. However, the issue may be academic since monies sent home go straight back to the originating family group, *unlike ODA*. One can argue that the cash received, directly benefits a key unit of society - the household.

A similar policy problem relates to properly using skills of returning workers. If not exploited rationally, the donor country will lose the full benefits from their comparative advantage in the export of labour but, more importantly it will not be able to offset the 'brain drain' of their professional and skilled workers who have taken their knowledge with them.<sup>24</sup> In short, labour sending countries can be likened to exporters of a commodity, in this case units of labour from which they hope to benefit directly and indirectly. There is an additional more diffuse benefit: the efflux reduces pressure on the local labour market and the resulting shortages may induce greater use of appropriate technology and a more rational use of existing capital resources.

'Receiving countries' benefits can generally be divided according to their stage of development. Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) in South East Asia enjoying rapid rates of economic growth while acquiring labour skills not readily available have clearly benefited from foreign workers, particularly with respect to infrastructural development. Conversely, mature economies with tight labour markets have also seen benefits from allowing in migrant labour. The advantages derive from having a stock of temporary labour, prepared to work at jobs local workers have vacated or avoid, but whose demands on their social expenditures will be minimal, thus holding down sectoral wage

23. It is instructive to recall that labour migration often remains region and village specific, even after decades of migration.

Over two-thirds of Mexico's US-bound migrants originate in seven of the country's 32 states; they often come from specific villages within these provinces. (Migration and Trade: Challenges for the 1990s', P.L. Martin, 10 October 1994, p.9). Paper prepared for the Nihon University Conference on International Migration, Tokyo, 5 - 7 December 1994; No. 4-3-1 in *Work and Family Life of Migrant Workers*.

24. Between 1960-1985, an estimated one million qualified migrants moved from developing countries to developed countries. However, if considerable numbers of highly trained people remain unemployed in the home country, skill migration may be regarded as 'brain over-flow' rather than 'brain drain'. (*International Migration*, XXX 3/4-1992, p. 315).

costs.<sup>25</sup> Oddly, this is the situation even when unemployment is high because, low wage foreign labour does not necessarily compete with local labour for the same jobs. The main losers in the latter case, of course, are unskilled domestic nationals having to compete with cheap foreign labour.

### Policy issues

What policy issues stem from the preceding observations? Though hard to implement in practice, they can be stated simply: how, in both donor and receiving countries to maximise benefits and reduce the costs of international migration?

'Donor countries' clearly need to enhance the development potential of remittances. Though easier said than done, two things need to be tackled. Ensure that migrant funds come through regular channels and that remittance funds are directed more for productive investment than consumer expenditure. As noted, this may be a false issue. Empirical studies, show that remittances are spent rationally even if used to satisfy current living needs.<sup>26</sup> Generally, government policies that aim to keep exchange rates stable, see that banking or postal facilities are safe, timely and secure, and which take acceptable steps to encourage domestic savings are the policies most likely to influence the level and direction of private remittances.

The other major policy area concerns worker return. Upon return of their foreign workers and families, specific institutions should be designated to assist their réintégration into society, and to obtain gainful employment with appropriate skill use in predetermined priority areas.<sup>27</sup> In reality, few countries are able to do this and many surveys show that returnee workers are often penalised and tend to become self-employed. Apart from these two issues, there are indications that labour exporting countries have begun to show greater interest in the need to prevent illegal migration while also trying to stop worker exploitation of their nationals when abroad.

'Receiving countries'. Here there are two totally different aspects of the people problem; stopping unwanted inflows while encouraging needed human skill capital. On the domestic front governments, in both cases, have the legislative

means to regulate unwelcome migrant flows while designing immigration policies that are custom tailored to the demands of the domestic labour market.

Where the real fear concerns the potential growth of illegal movement of people, there are also two areas of approach. One is to meet the problem head on by promoting and advertising in labour exporting countries programmes for reciprocal short-term project-related contract workers.<sup>28</sup>

The second approach, mainly advocated in reports on international symposia, is externally oriented and based on the proposition that most developing country problems stem from too high a population growth. The basic idea is to tackle the root causes of illegal migration by influencing supply push conditions at home. 'Stay-at-home' development programmes combining a mix of trade liberalisation, debt relief and development aid targeted towards rural areas, are supposed to be the answer by the advocates of this approach. However, the extent to which such broad programmes would influence individual group decisions on whether to migrate is a question about which one can remain skeptical.

### Summary

What sort of a future emerges from this brief survey tour? Again, there appear two options. One can be called the 'Doomsday or mass exodus' scenario with which the literature and the right wing press and political parties abound. 'More of the same with a silver lining' is what the author prefers to call the other less dramatic alternative.

'Doomsday'. The first scenario is founded, as can be imagined, in the upward march of different sets of scary numbers all chosen to show the huge and growing difference between north and south. Such statistics are of two kinds. The first contrasts the dramatic difference in the age structure between the two areas. Briefly, while the south has a typical age pyramid whose base is growing through the increase in young people, that of the north because of its aging population, is beginning to resemble an urn - some would say a burial urn!

25. Most migrants and refugees contribute more in taxes than they consume in social services. (*Economist*, "The Year of the Refugee, p.25 op cit).  
26. "Migration in LDCs: Risk, Remittances, and the Family", O.Stark, (*Finance and Development*, IMF, December 1992).

27. cf. Tunisian policy which tries to ensure the country obtains the maximum benefits from citizens settled abroad viz. through offering import duty exemptions for those returning to set up a business to the establishment of projects designed to attract investment by Tunisians resident abroad. Korea, provides inter alia, interest-free loans to those planning to set up an enterprise in their destination country. (*Ibid*. IOM MC/INF/223, 9 November 1992).

28. cf. German programmes that admit temporary workers and encourage their return through bilateral agreements which include recruitment provisions together with a reintegration package on return home. (IOM op. cit.)

Some illustrative figures. In the south, one in every three persons is under 15 years with one in 20 over 65 years. Comparable figures for the North are one in five and one in seven. More dramatically, the world's population and work force are increasing by 90-95 million every 12 months. To make matters worse, the expected growth in the labour force in developing countries in the next 20 years is placed at a youthful 733 million compared with the west's *present* diverging age structure labour force of 586 million.

When these figures are set in the context of the enormous differences in national per capita income levels between north and south, the conclusion drawn is obvious. The inevitable widening of international economic imbalances and differentials cannot but lead to the threat of potential mass migration westwards. Or, as President Clinton put it in once addressing the State Department, 'when you think of the future problems of the world, it gives you a headache!' Again the conclusion is obvious. The only chance, albeit inconclusive, of doing anything to stop the flood, is through a massive increase in south-directed programmes of the 'stay-at-home' encouragement variety.

'More-of-the-same with a silver lining'. Though the alternative scenario does not ignore the statistical dynamic, the emphasis is more on the logical inferences to be drawn from recent world-wide economic developments.

First, the overall context. Considering the wide gulf between north and south, in existence for years, the surprising thing is how few, *not how many*, migrants have moved into the industrial democracies. Secondly, not only are the ratios of non-nationals in the global work force small, under two per cent but, as the majority of those who migrate internationally move only a short distance, so most of the world's migrants move from one developing country to another or intra-regionally. *And there is no evidence to suggest that this pattern is going to change radically in the future either.* Finally, recipient countries have a battery of border controls at their disposal even if attempts at illegal entry will always present a problem. In other words, the dimension of the international migration problem is manageable. It may well become even more manageable in the future. What the author calls the 'silver lining'

part of the alternative future. Too many current scenarios are based on simply extrapolating the present without considering the longer range dynamic of what the world has recently gone through. According to a recent special survey 'over the next 25 years the world will see the biggest shift in economic strength for more than a century'.<sup>29</sup> Another way of saying prospects in most of the South areas will improve dramatically, thus precluding the need for people to move anywhere except within their own region. This is not unfanciable: there are so many predictions of Third World development that writing reports to show that the west has nothing to fear has recently become a growth industry!

The confidently expected shift and thereafter sustained expansion will derive from the working through of a number of important developments. They are present already, though often underestimated in their spin-off effects:

- the dynamics of market-friendly reforms that have started to be embraced by a growing number of countries all over the world;
- the new ease with which capital and production technology is being transferred across borders;
- the explosion of international trade which can only be added to now that the World Trade Organisation has been successfully launched;
- the spill-over effects from new technologies like micro-processors and the benefits to be derived - by theoretically everybody - from the information super-highway.

- finally, within the last six to seven years, democratic institutions with a greater respect for basic human rights have replaced long running dictatorships in an increasing number of countries. The end result, once the combined economic feedbacks of these factors work through the global system can best be described in the *Economists* own words as:

'you ain't seen nothing yet!'

The important implication of all this for international migration is easy to see. With better prospects at home migration will become even more self-regulating. This will be reinforced as potential migrant groups reassess their portfolio diversification strategy in the light of these new developments. In the end, just like today, the majority will probably decide to stay

29. 'War of Worlds: a survey of the global economy.' (*Economist*, 1 October 1994), pp. 3 to 46

home - the place where most people seem to want to be!

### Conclusion

To end with a few pertinent conclusions.

[i] throughout history international migration has proven to be beneficial and there is no reason why this should change;

[ii] international migration (just like internal migration) is the rational response of households to economic, social or political differences between countries; thus there will always be some individuals on the move;

[iii] most economic migration flows continue to be to adjacent countries and are generally short-term. The growing trend towards establishing major regional groupings cannot but reinforce this;

(iv) today's real problem, which is border-containable, is the potential for illegal migration;

(v) The important problem centred on western

Europe, concerns: a shortage of children to support today's workers in retirement because of the declining birthrate; the strong emotive resistance to migrants (however necessary for economic reasons), and increasing resentment of those who are too 'visible' and reluctant to assimilate. While more difficult to deal with in its ramifications, it is also policy containable.<sup>30</sup>

None of these conclusions deny that every major developed country is obsessed by migration. Unlike the increasing cross-frontier movement of capital and goods, states want to manage the movement of people.

Whatever the political prescription, politicians would do well to remember an old Russian proverb when thinking about containing international migration or, indeed, other seemingly intractable problems:

*'it's not the horse  
that draws the cart,  
but the oats!'*

30. As an example of what can be done, cf German contract workers programmes, (27 and 28 op.cit.)

# Norway's response to immigrants and a multicultural society

by Amaradasa Ranaiveem\*

by Amaradasa Ranaiveera\*

## Introduction

On 19 November 1994, all of the established Immigrant Advisory Boards (IAB) in the country gathered at a constitutional meeting in Trondheim to form the Immigrant Federation of Norway (IFN). Participating in that historic meeting were the IAB's from Trondheim, Rogaland District, Hordaland District and from Drammen. The IFN, which is the first of its kind in the history of Norway, has as its main goal to work for the equal rights of immigrants to Norway, irrespective of sex, race, religion or political beliefs. This aim will be achieved when immigrants become an integral part of the indigenous society and carry their fair share of the development of our adopted country. Following up quickly on this initiative a June 1995 seminar, with foreign participants, was held in the international city of Stavanger to inaugurate and officially open the first secretariat for immigrants. This new office is the headquarters for all immigrant organisations in Norway.

The birth of the Immigrant Federation is not by chance. Immigration into Norway is slowly growing. Many small and diverse groups exist, but the absence of any central and co-ordinating body meant that the needs of these groups were not being met. The Immigrant Federation of Norway will act as the spokesmen for all the immigrants; it will play an active role by co-operating with the Norwegian government to influence the formulation of policy and the correct interpretation of issues related to immigrants and legal refugees. While this has been done to some extent before on an ad hoc basis, the IFN has the advantage of speaking with one voice while representing and negotiating with the local and national authorities on important matters. In the same vein it should not surprise anyone that IFN will oppose and work vigorously against the laws, regulations and practices which are unfriendly, offensive or discriminatory. This means that we will confront those public servants who use their position to abuse immigrants.

The above agenda is based on the hard won experience of local organisations over the past decade or more. This is why it aims specifically at improving relations between the people of Norway and immigrants. However, IFN would be totally dishonest if we did not look into our own prob-

lems and weaknesses. One of the biggest challenges we are going to face is to establish *better contact among the immigrants themselves* trying to get them to understand each other and to appreciate their own diversity. This will not be easy. My active involvement in immigrant work for two decades in Norway tells me that this may be our greatest challenge as a national organisation.

Another obstacle is this. For bureaucratic convenience we are all placed in one heterogeneous group and carry the label of immigrant, legal refugee, asylum seeker and others. These labels work against self respect and mobility in our society, particularly for those who have been full citizens of this country for decades. When does an immigrant stop being an immigrant and become a Norwegian? The media has some responsibility here in labelling people, often inaccurately. Therefore, to achieve some progress on these and other matters it is essential that we organise ourselves and learn to work together for a common goal. There is plenty to be done to assist the most needy among us, while at the same time to combat the undesirable elements - those few immigrants who, in the paradox of Norwegian society, get the lions share of media attention, thus bringing a bad reputation to all immigrants.

## The immigrant experience - recent background

The international attention given to Norway's response to the unexpected rise in asylum requests during the crisis years 1985 to 1990 should not be a surprise. Norway is frequently cited by European scholars because it offers 'research manageability' on immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. I believe that a variety of factors - economic, political, social, demographic and linguistic - make Norway a European microcosm for studying immigration. But there are two other dimensions. The first is the country's historic response to foreigners; the second is how the asylum seekers, who were admitted as refugees from the early eighties are actually coping today as immigrants in Norway.<sup>1</sup>

I believe that Norway's response to asylum seekers is a continuation of its historical response to immigrants, and that what was viewed *internally* as a five-year crisis, was viewed *externally* as a favourable reaction-model to crisis. If this is so,

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1. Beginning in 1988, Prof. R. J. Smyke and I have informal study on the transition of asylum seekers to immigrants, and immigrants to citizens with the implications of this on indigenous perceptions. This paper is informed by my many open, friendly and deeply frank discussions on this aspect of the movement of people.

then Norway's response to the integration or assimilation of those who are legally accepted to reside in the country, may also be a model for other European nations to study. I propose to examine this premise by: first briefly surveying the economic, political, social and demographic factors in the latter half of the 1980's; *seconds* review Norway's historical attitude and position toward immigrants from an *immigrants point of view*, and *third* to see how effectively the government response to the crisis appears to 'new Norwegians' today.

Norway has a small, homogeneous population 4.6 million in 1995 with many Norwegians having a good command of English as a second language. It is a wealthy country with an excellent international record of providing development and humanitarian assistance. In addition, the Gross National Product (GNP) per inhabitant is very large. Well over USD \$30,000 in 1999. The income from the nations significant oil and gas production over the last twenty years has fuelled a changing economy with improved status for workers and families. 78 per cent of married women work outside the home. Life expectancy is long for both men (72.9 years) and women (79.6 years). The strong socialist influence in government prompted the oil wealth to be spread throughout the nation, assuring a comparable standard of living for all Norwegians, including state-supported health care, education and facilities for older people.

The real trouble began when government planners, *incorrectly* assumed that the early high selling price for oil would remain constant and calculated national income accordingly. In 1984, oil's share as a percentage of GNP was 19.1 per cent, while four years later in 1988 it was ten per cent, a reduction of almost one half. In monetary terms, government oil tax revenue over the same period fell from NOK 47 billion to NOK nine billion. This had a ripple effect through the rest of the economy, showing up forcefully in two main indicators: enormous external deficits, and inflation. It was at *this precise time*, 1984 to 1988, that Norway experienced a sharp rise in the number of 'spontaneous refugees' or asylum seekers. Persons who turned up at our airports and seaports requesting asylum. These people were distinct from the 'quota refugees' or 'convention refugees', those that the government had agreed to accept through negotiation with the

United Nations. The progression in the numbers of asylum seekers in the spontaneous category showed: 1984: 300; 1985: 829; 1986: 2,722; 1987: 8,613. This *greatly* disturbed the Norwegian sense of order. Just as the economy was declining, with increased unemployment and cuts in public spending, the nation felt under assault by the new arrivals. There were, of course other factors that accounted for the people of Norway feeling under pressure by the arrival of 'unannounced foreigners'. For those of us involved in immigrant work it was a very troubling and fearful time. Xenophobia affected all foreigners who appeared different, whether Norwegian citizens or not.

The population of Norway is among the most homogeneous in Europe. People are united by a single Germanic-based language. Eighty-eight per cent of them belong to the Lutheran State church. The Sami (Lapp) ethnic minority of about 30,000 people are concentrated in the north of the country. Three-quarters of the total population live in four or five densely populated urban areas, which also hold an attraction for new comers.

No country can ignore its past, and while each generation of leaders makes the decisions necessary for their time, the nations historical and cultural 'baggage' is part of that decision-making process. Temporary workers from other countries who did the job they were engaged to do and went back home were a part of Norway's past. Continental Europe's obsession with its own imperial past, the pre - World War I Ottoman' Romanov, Hapsburg and Hohenzollern Empires, has obscured the fact that Norway's 1814 Constitution was considered a model for its day, advancing liberal thinking to then unknown limits. It declared that all were welcome, save for an even-handed discrimination against Jews and Jesuits. Immigrants were to raise their children in the State Evangelical Lutheran Church. Though Norway was not a colonial power, this Church's 19th century missionary efforts in Africa were the important historical beginning of the nations 20th century international outreach. When the Constitution was modified in 1851, the reference to Jews and Jesuits was removed. The 1905 and 1917 events in Czarist Russia sent the First waves of refugees to Norway - Jewish people fleeing the pogroms and persecution unleashed in their native land. But Norway's glob-

al pre-eminence in humanitarian assistance and human development really began with the Nansen period. The very first High Commissioner for Refugees, appointed in 1921 by the League of Nations, was the Norwegian scientist, explorer, statesman and diplomat, Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930). Generous Norwegian support helped to settle the masses of moving people who were victims of the break-up of the four empires mentioned above; but this did not mean taking immigrants into the country. The obvious reason for this was that Norway was a poor country. The 1920s saw very large numbers of Norwegian citizens emigrating to the United States and Canada in search of a more prosperous life. The State neither wanted, nor could afford, any liability. For a refugee to be allowed into the country, a guarantor had to vouch for all financial responsibility, plus deposit a considerable sum of money as bond. Work permits were not to be had and, needless to say, very few refugees came to settle in Norway at this time.<sup>2</sup>

It was difficult for me, a Sri Lankan, arriving in Norway in 1975 as an immigrant to understand and appreciate all of this history until I studied it thoroughly. Most difficult for an outsider to comprehend is the impact on Norwegians of the surprise 1940-45 Nazi occupation. Sensitivity to this is still vibrant. The country felt secure in its neutrality, but that was not enough. This experience with vulnerability, and its difficult-to-defend sea-coast, placed the country in the forefront of post-World War II internationalism. The first Secretary General of the United Nations was a Norwegian, Trygve Lie (1946-53). In 1949 the country became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and has played a strong and active role in European co-operation. But it was in the immediate post-war humanitarian and development aid regimes where Norwegian generosity began to excel. While many European refugees went to North America and to Commonwealth countries, Norway took those who could not qualify for settlement elsewhere - the blind, for example, and Jewish tuberculosis victims liberated from the death camps. This practice of accepting physically and mentally handicapped refugees, those who would have most difficulty resettling on their own, is still a hallmark of Norwegian refugee policy. In 1996 this traditional generosity translates into Norway's lead position.

among all donors in the world, in the percentage of GNP allocated for development and humanitarian aid. In monetary terms it is less than some of the large donors, but as a measure of commitment no nation surpasses Norway in the apolitical, efficient response to these needs world-wide.

### Community memory

There is a concern among those who have worked with refugees and immigrants for a long time, about the absence of institutional or community memory. This was expressed some years ago by Ron Baker: 'Because there has been little development of a "community memory", or a flexible range of guiding principles that has grown out of assisting refugees in the past, each time a new "wave" or "trickle" arrives much time and energy is used in beginning from scratch.

One wonders how many times the wheel needs to be reinvented before we learn this basic lesson.'<sup>3</sup> He was writing about refugees but the same may apply to immigrants.

Norway has a unique internal conscience towards refugees and immigrants that may not exist to the same extent in other immigrant receiving countries. This walking community memory is Leo Eitinger, a Norwegian medical doctor and psychiatrist, a refugee and immigrant and a survivor of both Auschwitz and Buchenwald. He has been professionally concerned with refugees and death camp survivors since the end of World War II. The 1986 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Elie Wiesel, in his famous autobiography *Night*, acknowledges that Eitinger saved his life when he was a child in Auschwitz, describing the incident in moving terms. I believe very sincerely, that having Eitinger in Norway - this visible, concerned, world renowned medical authority on refugees and immigrants - tempered the nation's response to the upsurge of asylum seekers in the late 1980s. Eitinger's story has fascinated me since I first heard it.

He recounted a portion of his past experience in 1988. To work as a doctor in the barracks of Auschwitz (these, as a travesty, were called sick bays) was thus a highly appreciated privilege. It was also a very ambivalent and problematic one. To help a sick person back to health meant sending him back to hell. On the other hand, not to

2. The Norseman, No.5, September 1987, 4.  
3. Ron Baker, Ed., *The Psycho-social Problems of Refugees* published by the British Refugee Council and the European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, London, 1983

4. I am grateful to Prof. Smyke who brought this to my attention. On 28 September 1988, Leo Eitinger was the guest of Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri. (Smyke was Professor and Director of Refugee Studies at the Webster University, Geneva campus). Dr. Harry James Cargas, a distinguished Christian authority on the Holocaust had organised a University-wide "Holocaust Conference", which brought together Eitinger, Wiesel and others. Cargas carried out an extensive interview with Eitinger at that time, and this was shared with Smyke. On 6 November 1989, while in Norway, Smyke spoke to Eitinger on the phone to explore some of these links. Eitinger invited him to Oslo to meet with him, but this proved impossible. They discussed some of the linkages between the two refugee flows forty years apart Eitinger concurred that it would be an interesting study but said that "I am no longer doing field work".

5. It is interesting that no immigrant or Norwegian

scholar has, to my knowledge, linked up Eitinger's research on post World War II refugees in Norway with research on recent refugee flows into Norway. An examination of arrivals

would surely be of fundamental value in the history of the refugee regime. This is perhaps one example of

6. UDI document subtitled, "Information on the duties of the Directorate, the responsibilities of the various departments, the Regional Offices, the role of the Norwegian Red Cross, the main points of the agreement between the

help him back meant his certain death. And how many of those whom one could send back to work, had any chance to survive? No wonder then, that one often despaired over the senselessness, the hopelessness of one's work, knowing that the patients died, whatever was done. Incredibly enough and quite unexpectedly, some survived. How and why - who can answer this question here and now?<sup>4</sup>

Eitinger was featured on a number of occasions as a public speaker, and he was often interviewed or asked to comment on key and delicate issues. Television coverage during that period showed Eitinger involved, quietly explaining, interpreting and cajoling the body politic on what it means to be a refugee. The role of the 'community memory' in this case was providing advice, background, strength, hope and experience to those Norwegians who had an ear to listen.<sup>5</sup>

Added to this depository of 'community memory' must surely be Norway's own experience as an occupied country. How could it be otherwise? Norwegians suffered repressive measures, concentration camps, summary executions and torture of its citizens by the occupying power. Whenever I am in Oslo near the Victoria Terrasse - that large old building, the seat of the Foreign Office, I think of the wartime occupation. Victoria Terrasse was not only the headquarters of the repressive Nazi forces, but in its basement were the torture chambers used against Norwegian citizens between 1940 and 1945. I am a 'new Norwegian', an immigrant, and I have these reflections. What must it be for those who have lived it? It was this, I believe, that made the Norwegian status determination process, one of the most scrupulous in Europe - the fear that a genuine refugee, who suffered as they did during the war, might be refused entry. While Eitinger is the embodiment of the 'community memory', that memory belongs to the nation and to *all* Norwegians - new and old. Many living today experienced what it means to 'have a well-founded fear of persecution' long before these words were written in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. While some sought refuge in neutral Sweden, others offered resistance and ended up in concentration camps in their own beloved Norway! These and many other factors, in my view, converged into the overall national

response to the arrival of people seeking a safe haven and a new life.

Nevertheless the population felt that their generosity was being abused and advantage taken of them at the very moment of their own economic troubles. They demanded a change in the system to control the number of entrants; a responsible government probably had no alternative but to act decisively.

## Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI)

On 1 January 1988, the Directorate of Immigration (UDI) took over the main responsibility for implementing government policy on foreign nationals, immigrants and refugees.<sup>6</sup> This was a bold and innovative step dictated by national needs and may be a model for other European nations.

Along with the UDI was the debate in the Stortinget on the new Act to replace the Aliens Act of 1956.<sup>7</sup> In May 1988, the Director General of the UDI noted that in 1985 Norway had been on the periphery of Europe as concerns asylum seekers but all that has ended in 1988. The government was in a dilemma to restrict entrants but to be thorough and fair. Well funded, and staffed with confident senior civil servants, the UDI had a clear mandate not only to limit the number of new arrivals through its status determination authority, but perhaps more importantly to build consensus towards a clear refugee policy in the nation and among the people. This is its uniqueness. The UDI took over from the disbanded Government Refugee Agency (Statensflyktningsekretariat) and the Government Office of Immigration (Statens utlendingskontor). It also assumed some of the work of the Department of Immigrant Affairs of the Ministry of Local Government and Labour, specifically the interpreting services. The UDI was made responsible for information and the documentation going to municipalities (who were expected to house refugees) and to government agencies, foreign nationals, immigrants and the general public. Practical measures aimed at long-term integration of refugees, providing grants to immigrants, co-operation with immigrant organisations, reception of applicants for political asylum - all

became a part of its brief. In mid - 1988 UDI was advertising for 125 lawyers to fill staff vacancies. This is high-level employment creation for native Norwegians. Twelve years later what was the result?

In 1988 - 6,602 asylum seekers arrived; in 1989 - 4,433; in 1990-3,962. In that year 2,409 or 60 per cent of asylum applications were rejected. In 1991 out of 4,023 arrivals, 2, 269 or 56 per cent were rejected. This trend continued. Rejections for 1994 were 68 per cent and as of one September 1995, 62 percent of asylum applicants were rejected. At the beginning of the year 2000 there were 6090 asylum seekers and only 4270 applicants were accepted to be in Norway. In addition there were 8059, considered on "collective judgement" and another 1543 on family reunion. There were a number of charitable, voluntary and religious groups working to ease the plight of the new arrivals and to have more applicants accepted and fewer rejected. Structured and broad based immigrant associations that catered for non-Europeans did not exist, although some large ethnic groups were well organised to look after their own. For example, the 5,000 member Vietnamese community in Norway at the time.

Looking at the numbers alone it can be said that the UDI did the job assigned to it by limiting the number of new arrivals, whether or not one agrees with the policy. Did UDI succeed in its other objectives like caring for those allowed to stay in Norway? Or, defining when does an asylum seeker become a refugee? when does a refugee become an immigrant? when does an immigrant become a Norwegian? These questions began a never ending debate in a sensitive area. Fundamentally, this is why the Immigrants Federation of Norway was formed- so that we can take matters in our own hands as to who we are, what we shall be called and what is our role as 'new Norwegians'.

Part of the UDI mandate was to supervise state refugee centres in different parts of Norway, holding persons accepted into the country, pending their settlement in a municipality (kommune). However, an unsatisfactory situation arose because no local or municipal council was willing to take them. More and more municipalities were refusing any additional refugees. Since the early 1980s a steady stream of quota refugees' were arriving

into Norway under international arrangements and orderly departure programmes' from Asia and elsewhere. These people were accepted and settled around the country into municipalities. The spontaneous asylum seekers' were unexpected. Many of the towns and cities made a strong point that they could take no more.

The consequence of this refusal was serious, creating insecurity and fear among the people in the centres. Many felt that they would be expelled from the country. The rumours were unfounded but the climate of fear started breaking down the experience and competence built up by these centres during the past few years. It also affected the long-term process of integration of these refugees. It was one huge bureaucratic mess! UDI limited those arriving but they could not force fellow Norwegians to do what UDI thought best. One reason for the refusal was that the municipalities - including large cities and small townships - that had earlier received large numbers of refugees began, in 1988-89, to limit the new arrivals to people admitted for family reunification.

The difficult economic situation and the higher unemployment rate forced almost all municipal councils to cut expenses by not committing themselves to taking more refugees.

In this way they eliminated the costs involved in providing housing and employment.

Norway is such an open and democratic society it proved very interesting for all foreigners to observe this heated debate. Most of the councils blamed the central government for not providing enough economic assistance. Some of the councils had refugees who received social help for a longer period than foreseen. In such cases, after a certain period, the entire responsibility for the refugees was borne by the councils.

### The changing role of municipalities

Even though refugee numbers are small compared to other European countries, the central government, during the crisis period, continually experienced difficulty in finding new homes for the refugees. The municipalities were not willing to take more refugees due to new economic cutbacks. This had created renewed apprehension and insecurity among the

Government and the Norwegian Association of Local Authorities, etc., and addresses, important telephone and telefax numbers, and persons to contact. June 1988", 9 pages, English version. 7. Immigration Act, Act of 24th June 1988 concerning the entry of foreign nationals into the Kingdom of Norway and their presence in the realm (Immigration Act)", 22 pages, English version. The coming into force of this Act rescinded the previous Aliens Act of 27 July

refugees, who expressed the feeling - the system has failed again! Since 1988, as mentioned earlier, the central Government has taken over responsibility for all asylum seekers and refugees and for giving asylum and settling them. The initial general agreement between the central government (state) and the municipalities is that once asylum seekers get permission to stay in the country, they are settled in different municipalities. In 1985, 47 municipalities were involved in this work; by 1989 the number had increased to 275. For years this agreement has been the subject of discussion, largely as to levels of financial aid. Although new regulations are introduced from time to time, it appears that little progress has been made on the issues. The state wants to control financial assistance because it believes that the earlier arrangement was complex and difficult to follow. The municipalities want a system that will guarantee that all their expenses are refunded. For most of the municipalities the aid system was not acceptable because they did not receive any grants for the refugees after five years, as they did before. The system worked in this way.<sup>8</sup>

**Financing Formula Initially:** A general advance payment is made to the municipalities for their administration and overhead expenses. An advance is given per person if the municipality provides housing without the involvement of the central government. The latter covers the expenses for teaching the Norwegian language to adults and for special classes and teaching their national language to children in the primary schools. On top of this, the expenses incurred by the municipalities in the form of social assistance are refunded. This arrangement is changed when a refugee loses refugee status and becomes a Norwegian citizen. The settlement of the refugees, it is important to recall, is entirely dependent on the willingness of the municipalities to take them. The UDI has established six regional offices, whose duty it is to negotiate with the municipalities to take a fixed number of refugees every year. Particulars about the persons to be settled are agreed upon later. From the refugee point of view, the situation remains unsatisfactory.

The number of accepted refugees waiting in various centres to be settled was 1,200 at the end

of 1990; about 3,200 at the end of 1991 and 2,290 on 1 August 1995. In year 2000 the Norwegian government needs to settle 8000 selected persons, who may have already spent some years in foreign refugee camps. The Municipalities will accept altogether 5000 of these refugees. The government is aware that something has to be done to improve this situation because all involved in this process are going to be the losers at the end. The refugees are losers because of their delay in getting themselves qualified for work and start a normal social life in Norway. The municipalities on the other hand are the losers because they have to settle people who have been idling in camps for a long period. Finally the government is also a loser since the yearly administration cost of the asylum centres is increasing. In the year 2000, it is estimated that the government has to allocate NOK 1 billion and 250 million, for administration and for the welfare of those living in these centres.

This whole process began to back-up. The pipeline leading to settlement was clogged with accepted asylum seekers unable to be placed among municipalities. The key to it all seemed to be the lack of balance between the demand for places and the rate of settlement.

**New Financing Formula:** This was devised by the Department of Local Government in 1991 following recommendations in Parliamentary Paper number 61<sup>9</sup>, concerning the settlement and integration of refugees in municipalities.<sup>10</sup> The main aims of the new system were to: a) make sure that none of the refugees stay in refugee centres longer than the time required to prepare them for settlement; b) establish a financial system which will collectively include financial and administrative responsibilities; c) stimulate better economic utilisation and bring about better socio-economic integration. The earlier system of refunding expenses incurred for social help, child care, administration and housing was replaced by a single integration subsidy that stretches over five years. Other changes include: Municipalities will receive during the first year of settlement NOK 75,000 for each refugee accepted on humanitarian grounds, NOK 65,000 for each person in his second year, NOK 60,000 in his third year and 50,000 in his fourth and fifth year of settlement. To encourage municipalities to take more refugees the government introduced a so-called

8. The Report of the Working Committee was entitled, "Settlement and integration of refugees and persons accepted on humanitarian grounds: "Organisation, Use of Resources, Financial Commitments, and Certain Foreign Control Questions", 6 December 1989. The Working Committee was composed of civil servants, appointed from the Department of Local Government, Department of Finance, Prime Minister's Office, Social Service Department and the Justice Department.

9. Parliamentary Paper Number 61. 1989-1990.

10. Parliamentary Proposition Number 1, the Department of Local Government, 1991-1992. Chapter 505, Settlement of Refugees and Integration of Immigrants, 57-60.

11. In June 1995 the Stortinget passed the government's proposal to include important amendments to the national refugee policy. (See Stortings Act Nr. 17 1994-95). The amendments represent a new perspective in Norwegian refugee policy. *The main aim is to give protection to as many people as possible.* This protection is temporary and it means that persons granted asylum or a residence permit on humanitarian grounds in Norway should, as a rule, return to their native country when the situation there improves so that they are no longer in need of protection. The residence permits that are granted for the temporary protection period will not form the grounds for a settlement permit. If changes in the situation in the native country enable a return within three years, returning to the native country shall be the main rule. Connection to Norway or other grounds which otherwise would have been in favour of continued residence will not be of significance in this period. However, the opportunity is present to grant permanent residence after three years based on an individual evaluation of humanitarian conditions. After five years protection, a permit is granted which forms a basis for a settlement permit and permanent residence, and a return to the native country will only occur on a voluntary basis in the form of repatriation.

12. Parliamentary act 17 1996-1997 (St meld nr 17), Immigration and Multicultural Norway.

•volume subsidy of NOK 500,000 for every 25 refugees a particular municipality accepts. This payment is given only once, for first time settlement, and is important for the big municipalities who receive large numbers of refugees. Yearly negotiations with the central Federation of Municipal Councils (KS) have stopped. Instead of this, a committee has been appointed, which is composed of representatives from the Federation and the state. The committee estimates the actual expenses that will be incurred, and their recommendations are taken into consideration when the yearly budget is discussed in the Parliament. For unaccompanied juveniles, the repayment system will be continued according to the Child Care Law. For each person over 60 years of age or handicapped the receiving municipality is eligible for a one-time payment of NOK 1,000,000. In cases where extra care is needed, this might be extended up to NOK 150,000. The number of hours of Norwegian language and social studies instruction has been increased to 700, at an hourly rate of NOK 40. The labour exchange department was given an additional NOK 10 million to strengthen its administration in order to give better service to refugees.

The rationale for above reductions was a further amendment to Norwegian refugee policy made in the Parliamentary (Stortinget) Act Number 17.<sup>13</sup> This Act reflected what appeared to be a common European approach towards refugees from the ex-Yugoslavia conflict, formulated well before the Dayton Peace Accords. In other words Norway anticipated the return of these persons once peace was secured and closed off all avenues of appeal to remain in the country based on prior temporary - emergency residence. Yet, the Act left the door open for the few genuine asylum seekers who fit the narrow interpretation of the basic international criteria that Norway was obliged to uphold.

#### Parliamentary act number 17 (St meld nr 17), (1996-97) Immigration and multicultural Norway

In 1997, the Stortinget passed the governments proposal, the Stotings act nr. 17 1996- 997 concerning Immigration and Multicultural

Norway.<sup>13</sup> The main aim of this act was based on the fact that the Norwegian Society has been growing gradually in to a multicultural society. Cultural diversity is an enrichment for fellowship. In all aspects, the society should be prepared to adjust themselves for openness and dialogue, co-ordination and new way of thinking. Racism and discrimination which will be in direct conflict with the basic values of the Nation shall be strongly counteracted.

Within the frame work of the Norwegian Laws and basic human right principles, people from any origin have the right to maintain their values, follow their cultural traditions and practice their beliefs. Practical solutions should be found through dialogue, mutual understandings and adjustments, and democratic process which hinder the risk of power abuse.

There is a large variation among immigrants and their decedents in relation to their background, living standards and conceptions. Within the period of a reasonable time limit there has been a considerable change taking place from one generation to another, among the different ethnic groups with respect to their beliefs and their ways of life. The cultural conditions are steadily changing. Many work hard to better their own conditions and to contribute for the improvement of the social development.

Many immigrants have at least the same living standards as the average native Norwegians. Some of those groups with a refugee background have low incomes, higher unemployment and a low standard of living. The reason for this difference is due to power difference, shutout, racism and discrimination. This is well illustrated in some big cities where social and environment problems prevail.

One of the main goals will be to eradicate this difference in living standards between the people with immigrant background and the native Norwegians. With this as the main aim the government will give priority to introduce relief measures that will enable the persons with immigrant background to participate in working life using all the knowledgeable resources they have. This will include the knowledge one already has and those acquired after coming to Norway. It is important to give a better Norwegian language education to children, youths and the adults

which will be the major factor contributing to improved active participation. Active recruiting and certain priorities should be given to these groups to achieve equal opportunities.

### Conclusion

The fifteen year period between the onset of the crisis in 1985 and 2000 saw the basic outline of a refugee settlement system described above, working more or less according to the policy norms set up by the UDI.<sup>13</sup> While the crisis may be over for the government, it was just beginning for the Immigrants Federation of Norway which represents and deals with the new arrivals in their day to day struggle.

A fifteen year evaluation might suggest that in spite of the earnest effort, time and money devoted to refugee settlement in Norway, the results fall short of expectations. Although the UDI fulfilled its mandate of strictly controlling applicants for asylum in Norway - in what might be called a 'textbook case' in public administration - most of the big counties have not been able to cope with this challenge of settlement. Many are experiencing 'refugee fatigue' with the problems encountered in regard to employment, housing, schooling, and other aspects mentioned in this paper. A large number of refugees and immigrants living in big cities in Norway are dependent on social help. The government has attempted to settle the accepted refugees into normal life as soon as possible; but from the refugees' point of view this is not happening. *The unresolved question is whether the goal should be to integrate or assimilate the refugees—the mosaic or the melting pot? One reason for the ambiguity may be that no one is yet certain what this means in practical terms.*

One pan of UDI's mandate was to build consensus towards a clear refugee policy among the Norwegian population. The sharpness of the current political debate on the issue is evidence that

this goal has not yet been fully achieved, but strides have been made. What Norway has done is to advance in certain directions that other European countries might wish to study. No other European country, for example, has the equivalent of a UDI. Secondly, while a national consensus on refugee-immigration policy does not yet exist, the mandate to develop it has been taken seriously and is being slowly but conscientiously implemented. Thirdly, the existence of UDI has given rise to refugee associations with the freedom to interact with local authorities on both programme execution and policy formation, thus providing valuable feedback to UDI on their own national policy issues. In settling refugees in Europe, there is no substitute for the democratic process. Indeed, it is the only way that this challenge of the 'movement of people can be met. While well organised, vocal and proactive refugee immigrant organisations, like the IFN, may unsettle the tranquil life of state and local government civil servants by their sometimes haranguing demands for action and results, this is what the democratic process is all about and why ultimate success is achievable.

The sad reality in Europe today is the widespread but unstated assumption that asylum seekers and refugees should be silent, humble and grateful for what is given to them. Fortunately this is gradually changing as refugees increasingly become immigrants and immigrants become full-fledged citizens - demanding what is their right by the laws of the host country. Lastly, although Norway is outside of the European Union, future European relations will surely affect refugee policy as the quiet work of further adjustments towards harmonisation of European policy goes on. More important, is the long-standing, inter-Nordic co-operation as it applies to the 'movement of people'. Immigrant associations in all of the Nordic countries are long established, active nationally and since 1995 - co-operating at the Nordic level.

Year	Asylum seekers	Resident permit	Asylum	Direct refugees	Collective appraisal	Family reunion
1996	2026	610	600	588	782	661
1997	1992	550	1368	433	495	882
1998	3863	1564	1226	261	467	915
1999	6090	2609	1661	1967	8059	154.3

13. Table showing number of refugees, persons with permits on humanitarian grounds, collective appraisal and family reunification entering Norway during the period 1996-1999

# The politics of suffering

by Norah P. Niland\*

*"Morality cannot be legislated but behaviour can be regulated"*  
Martin Luther King?, 1963

30 March 1993 was a day dedicated to the formal closure of the last remaining camp on the Thai-Cambodian border. On the hot and dusty plains at the foot of the Dangrek mountains it was a day of mixed emotions. A repatriation exercise, which had commenced precisely one year earlier, had resulted in a steady decrease of the Border camps' population; only a few convoys remained. Site 2, scene of the closure ceremony, was once home to the largest concentration of Cambodians outside Phnom Penh. All told, some 380,000 people had returned to their homeland after thirteen years of dubious refuge. People were returning to a war-scarred country littered with mines, and with one of the highest infant-mortality rates in the world. But the biggest concern was peace. Would peace finally break out and allow these people to rebuild their lives? Was this really the end of people fleeing their homes? While an overwhelming majority were eager to return, and were anxious to leave the stifling confinement of closed camps, a small number were fearful of the future and were not convinced that the camps were finally closing.

The closure ceremony was not just the formal termination of a complex repatriation exercise. It also marked the end of one of the most torturous and controversial relief operations in the history of humanitarianism. Emotions were mixed since there was much that had been accomplished throughout the history of the Border, as this stretch of territory and relief programme came to be known. But equally, there was a strong minority perspective which queried whether the overall end-result was less than zero. Yes, lives had been saved but how many lives were lost and maimed as a result of a relief effort that did not adhere to its principles, that did not rebuff the cynical manipulation of its mandate, that narrowed its scope to logistics and allowed itself to be closely aligned with armed groups and a military campaign dominated by the Khmer Rouge. For many, the relief programme had contributed to a scenario that was clearly harmful to the refugees held on the Border as well as their compatriots struggling to survive in

a country traumatized by Pol Pot, years of war and oppression, and an embargo which prohibited development assistance.

The fact that it was but a minority which had misgivings about the Border operation is in itself a telling feature of an exercise that is now being applauded as one of the most successful relief operations ever. Whatever the real impact of the Border experience there is an obvious need for greater analysis, debate and accountability in relief operations particularly in complex emergencies where the meaning of "success" is not easily defined.

## Roots of history

The long history of the Indochinese Kingdom of Cambodia, known also as Kampuchea and Siam, was inextricably linked with its neighbors, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. But it was the Cold War involvement of China and the Soviet Union in the region that overwhelmed its traditional neutrality.

With the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, US B-52s aircraft were diverted to Cambodia to unleash some \$7 billion worth of tonnage.<sup>1</sup> A new tactic called 'carpet bombing' was devised for Cambodia. The havoc and devastation provoked a massive exodus from the countryside accelerating control by a small band of insurgents labelled 'Khmer Rouge' by Prince Sihanouk when they challenged his autocratic rule in the mid-1960s. Lon Nol, who overthrew Sihanouk in 1970, also contributed to the advance of the Khmer Rouge. Propped up by US Government funding, Lon Nol, as incompetent as he was corrupt, had little regard for the hungry peasants who streamed into Phnom Penh swelling its population to 3 million from a prewar estimate of 600,000. Lon Nol fled the capital shortly before the fanatical Khmer Rouge marched into town on 17 April 1975.

Words are woefully inadequate to describe what is now known as "Pol Pot time", the 3 years, 8 months and 20 days of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) rule from April 1975 to December 1978 when some 2 million Cambodians perished. This

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1. Albin, David A, and Hood, Marlowe (eds) *The Cambodian Agony* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1987).

self-destruct mission, which gave new meaning to our understanding of genocide, was a continuing and increasingly brutal reality when the Vietnamese army intervened in December 1978 and routed the Khmer Rouge.

Cambodians, slowly emerging from the nightmare of DK tyranny were stunned at the swiftness of the Vietnamese victory. Within days the Khmer Rouge were obliged to escape to jungle sanctuaries in the remote mountainous regions of western Cambodia. Refugees fleeing ahead of the Khmer Rouge provided numbing accounts of massacres and death by starvation. As the full horror of the Killing Fields was unearthed, much of the world recoiled in shock and disbelief; it is not easy to understand an ideology that devours its own. The quest for "year zero" has no precedent in the annals of human barbarity.

Abandoning forced-labour teams, a hungry nation stormed granaries as a bewildered people crisscrossed the country in search of family and food. In the resulting euphoria and chaos, little rice was harvested. Early 1979, as the scale of the disaster which was Cambodia became known, it was clearly imperative to get assistance to the suffering as quickly as possible. There was genuine concern that many more would die if assistance did not arrive immediately. A massive relief effort was initiated but even before it began it was caught in a web of Machiavellian politics that seriously compromised its ability to help a population decimated by the cruelty of DK rule.

Preoccupied with the remnants of the Khmer Rouge, the new regime in Phnom Penh was poorly equipped for the task of averting famine. The Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) did warn of impending food shortages in February 1979 and in July, Hun Sen, the Foreign Minister of the newly installed Government, made an appeal for assistance and warned of the danger of famine. However, "only Vietnam and the Soviet bloc responded immediately to the appeals of the PRK".<sup>2</sup>

Why? Why did it take some ten months before the first consignment of life-saving supplies were airlifted to Phnom Penh in mid-October 1979? The short answer is *realpolitik* and the unprincipled abuse of humanitarianism! A longer answer centers on a changing geopolit-

ical landscape and the willingness of many to ignore the heinous crimes of the Khmer Rouge.<sup>3</sup>

Washington's ignominious departure from South East Asia in 1975 was not as final as the images of the last helicopters taking off from the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon might have portrayed. Still besieged with the memory of its stinging defeat, Washington "wanted the rest of the world to treat the new Vietnamese state as a renegade."<sup>4</sup> Capitalizing on the deepening wedge between Moscow and Beijing, the US energetically pursued rapprochement with China, a relationship that was bolstered by their mutual resolve to isolate and destabilize Vietnam.

Shifting power alliances in South East Asia, which came to the fore in the wake of Washington's departure, saw Hanoi strengthen its alliance with Moscow, a relationship which heightened China's fear of encirclement and traditional distrust of Vietnam. The Soviet Union, never unaware of its populous neighbour on its southern flank, was anxious not to see China overwhelm Moscow's allies and threaten its perceived interests in the region. For its part, Hanoi was alarmed at the growing alliance between a hostile Democratic Kampuchea and the Peoples Republic of China. At a regional level, Thailand and Vietnam are historical opponents, wary of each other's potential for expansion, and conscious of their looming neighbour to the north.

It was against this background that a strange mix of bed-fellows coalesced around the resuscitation of the Khmer Rouge into an anti-Vietnamese phalanx consisting of China, Thailand, the US, ASEAN and a range of Western countries, committed to unseating the newly-installed Phnom Penh regime of Heng Samrin, head of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Alarmed by the loss of its traditional buffer, Thailand quickly came to an arrangement with China in January 1979 resulting in a "de facto Sino-Thai alliance".<sup>5</sup> As noted by Nayan Chanda, this agreement which concerned the use of Thai territory and support for the Khmer Rouge "proved to be the beginning of the most significant strategic relationship developed by Peking in post-Vietnam South-East Asia."<sup>6</sup> In February, Beijing with the tacit support of Washington, launched an attack across Vietnam's northern bor-

2. Evans, Grant and Rowley, Kevin Red *Brotherhood at War*, (London: Verso Editions, 1984), 181.

3. In 1987, Australia, Canada, Norway, the UK, and the US proposed an investigation of alleged Khmer Rouge atrocities. In presenting its Report, the Chairman of the Sub-Rights referred to wholesale violations in Cambodia as "the most serious that occurred anywhere in the world since

"nothing less than auto-genocide."

However, early 1979, as the world became aware of Pol Pot's charnal house, western governments at the UN Commission on

Human Rights decided to shelve discussion and not take action on the report it had requested, UN Document E/CN.4/SR.1510.

4. Becker, Elizabeth, *When the War was Over*, (New York: Simon Schuster, 1986), 373.

5. Chanda, Nayan, *Brother Enemy, The War after the War*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1986), 349. See also: Shawcross, William, *The Quality of Mercy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 261. This "shadowy agreement," as Shawcross describes it, included the provision of oil to Thailand "at favourable prices" and "even more importantly, decreased their aid to the Thai Communist Party." 6. Chanda, op. cit. 349.

ders with the aim of teaching Hanoi a "lesson". It is unclear who learned most from this military adventure, but the lines were now clearly drawn. At a Special Session of the UN Security Council in March the Vietnamese were roundly condemned and the United States supported Democratic Kampuchea when the latter was challenged in the Credentials Committee: the Khmer Rouge retained their seat in the General Assembly as the recognized government of Cambodia.<sup>7</sup>

### Food as weapon

Although it was known that Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia was provoked by vicious attacks on its people and territory, Hanoi was subjected to a loud chorus of condemnation that ignored the ouster of the Khmer Rouge and the end of its genocidal rule. It was even alleged that Hanoi was responsible for the famine which then threatened the lives of hungry Cambodians. No evidence was ever provided to support allegations of rice being shipped out of the country yet I reports in the media to this effect were prevalent and persistent throughout 1979 and 1980. Notwithstanding denials by relief officials of any deliberate disruption of food assistance, pointing to poor management, lack of transport and communication equipment as the reasons for rice not moving fast enough to vulnerable areas, Phnom Penh continued to receive bad press. Analysts such as Michael Vickery asserts that there was a subtle orchestration of misinformation both to remove the spotlight from the Khmer Rouge and to present the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin government in a less than favourable light.<sup>8</sup>

The net result was to downplay the continuing reality of the Khmer Rouge and to impede and distort the delivery of relief assistance particularly to those under the administration of the Phnom Penh government. This was carried out in the following way.

Early 1979, there was only a small trickle of refugees but by mid-year numbers had grown to hundreds of thousands in sprawling encampments north of the Border town of Aranyapraphet which was the field headquarters of most relief agencies. The Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasts which encouraged people to move towards the Border were seen as a deliberate

attempt to attract them away from the PRK, thus to further discredit it and to foment a "non-communist resistance" with the objective of involving the international community in the funding of the relief operation.

The Khmer Rouge had its role. Despite, straitened circumstances they dug in south of Aranyapraphet, that is in Thailand, positioned to launch sorties into Cambodia, herding people on the move towards the Border back into malaria-infested jungles. Those under the control of the KR included soldiers, cadres and their families, villagers pushed ahead of the retreating DK army, and refugees who inadvertently found themselves in KR encampments.

Meanwhile, Thailand with the backing of the US, insisted that the Khmer Rouge be fed. Washington essentially withheld funding until food was provided up and down the Border. Phnom Penh, already suspicious of the UN and Washington's role in dominating relief, bitterly objected to the provision of food to Pol Pot's forces.

For relief agencies, it was a preposterous situation. They were aware of the urgency to feed people and could see that lives were being lost as major donors callously manipulated efforts to launch a relief programme. Cambodians, in desperate need of help, were under the control of the Khmer Rouge who made no distinction between combatants and non-combatants.

Early 1979, UNHCR had offered assistance to the Thai authorities but this was rejected. In June, the Thai army forcibly pushed back an estimated 45,000 Cambodians over the cliffs of Preah Vihear. Many lives were lost in the heavily-mined area at the foot of the cliffs. This generated an international outcry and renewed public pressure to end Cambodia's agony. In August 1979, the Khmer Rouge, as the officially recognized government of Cambodia, requested assistance for one million people. In September, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), now known as the Joint Mission, visited Khmer Rouge areas and were appalled by what they saw; suffering from a lethal strain of cerebral malaria and starvation, the people they encountered were in a shocking condition; they estimated they had seen about 10,000 in whom "life barely flickered".<sup>9</sup>

7. At the Credentials Committee, the Congolese delegate proposed that the seat be left vacant. But it would take another eleven years before this materialized. In the meantime, Cambodia was subjected to an embargo.

8. Vickery says it was only a matter of time before the Phnom Penh authorities were deemed "as dangerous as their predecessors."

Vickery, Michael, *Cambodia 1975-1982* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984), 37.

9. Shawcross, *Quality of Mercy*, 136

10. Ibid. 170.  
11. HCR, sceptical of the Border operation and fearful of the "magnet effect" the overall assistance programme was likely to

have, favoured voluntary repatriation to the interior

of the country and publicly advocated this. Referring to the espousal of voluntary repatriation, Nayan Chanda writing in the *Far Eastern Economic*

*Review* of 7 March, 1980 speculated that That concern on "...the need for continued military pressure on the Vietnamese through the Pol Pot remnants along the Thai Border and concern for the views of China and the US could militate against such a (voluntary repatriation) move."

12. Disregard, or less than forthright commitment to humanitarian principles and standards both characterized and complicated the work of relief agencies. While struggling to remain aloof of geo-strategic ambitions the relief programme saw itself primarily as a "maintenance" operation. This involved discounting or not holding itself responsible for the implications of confining people, often against their will, in closed camps where they were essentially held hostage to the whims of war and those underwriting it.

Shortly following the "discovery" of the frightening and emaciated condition of people under Khmer Rouge control, Thailand announced, in October 1979, its "Open Door" policy. Finally it was possible for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to exercise its mandate and for the Joint Mission to ship long-awaited rice and medicine to Phnom Penh. The first people moved to the hastily-constructed camp of Sa Kaeo, some 40 kms inside Thailand, were the "awful spindly creatures, with no flesh and with wide vacant eyes" who had stumbled out of the jungle areas where they had been held by the Khmer Rouge; as noted by William Shawcross at the time, they "had malaria, they had tuberculosis, they had dysentery, they were dehydrated, they were famished, they were dying."<sup>10</sup> It was the image of these people, dying as they reached Sa Kaeo, which galvanized a massive international response.

In November, UNHCR was requested to establish a second camp primarily for the people pressing against the Border north of Aranyaprathet. Khao-i-Dang was opened on 21 November 1979 and by January 1980 it was home to some 110,000 refugees. An estimated 1 million were encamped along the Border north of Aran (Aranyaprathet) but already these settlements were booming trade centres dominated by warlords and black marketeers.

Optimism that the donor community was more open than heretofore to respecting the mandate of humanitarian agencies was short-lived. In January 1980, Thailand closed shut its "Open Door" and with it the prospect of a compassionate and coherent relief programme. In February, Heng Samrin proposed negotiations on the return of the refugees but this was frowned upon by Thailand and its allies anxious not to give "legitimacy" to the Phnom Penh government. At the same time, Thailand began a clandestine relocation of people from Sa Kaeo and Khao-i-Dang back to the Border at night-time. There was clearly a certain interest in retaining a population at the Border although this never stopped Thai authorities complaining about the refugees being a "burden".<sup>11</sup>

An attack on settlements north of Aran in June 1980, shortly after 9,000 people left Sa Kaeo and

Khao-i-Dang, was seen as retaliation by Phnom Penh for the movement of people from refugee camps to resistance-held areas. Some 400 were killed. The "unique characteristics" of this relief programme were increasingly self-evident.

Never enthusiastic about its involvement in the messy politics of the Border, UNHCR, subsequent to the closure of Sa Kaeo, restricted its activities - and the application of its mandate - to Khao-i-Dang. Increasing stability and improved rice harvests in Cambodia, coupled with the continuing diversion of food to soldiers, and the rise of corruption and extortion in the so-called "non-communist" camps, prompted both ICRC and UNICEF to withdraw from the Border feeding program in August 1980 and December, 1981 respectively.

Presumably, such changing circumstances should have provided an opportunity to re-appraise the entire relief endeavour, its rationale and future purpose. It is not clear whether any re-thinking occurred but a new entity, the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO), was specifically created to work along a 750-km stretch of the Thai-Cambodian border. Of its many unique features, UNBRO, a creation of donors intent on maintaining a Border programme, had no mandate other than that prescribed by the self-same donors who periodically met to review its "progress" and the state of its finances.

Devoid of any "constitutional" safeguards, in the sense of impartial mandate, or clearly-defined humanitarian objectives geared to durable solutions or solution-oriented interventions, UNBRO operated in a vacuum which made it vulnerable to abuse and weakened its ability to exert the moral authority inherent in a humanitarian mandate.<sup>12</sup> Given the contradictory nature of its mandate - to advance the unspoken agenda of its donors while operating as a humanitarian agency for those tied to the anti-Phnom Penh resistance - it is, perhaps, not too surprising that UNBRO developed a belief that it was apolitical and focussed its energies on the mechanics of relief, or at least on the logistics of moving rice and systems geared to its orderly distribution. But even in this latter, apparently straight forward, activity it had problems understanding its role.

1982 also saw the creation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which everyone knew was *not* a coalition in the general understanding of the term, did *not* govern Cambodia (or Kampuchea as it was then known) and was decidedly *undemocratic*.

The CGDK was the creation of Thailand, China, ASEAN and the United States. Both Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC party and Son Sann's KPNLF (Khmer People's National Liberation Front) joined reluctantly.<sup>13</sup> The Khmer Rouge were the dominant "partner" and retained representation at the UN. The primary purpose of this new addition to the alphabet of Cambodian acronyms was to sanitize the image of the Khmer Rouge and to make the provision of assistance to it more palatable and presentable.

Although regarded as a loose political and military alliance of convenience, the CGDK was primarily a useful misnomer in camouflaging support for Pol Pot and his insurgents. Its formation had far-reaching consequences for the people on the Border and their compatriots in Cambodia. For the relief community, preoccupied with its immediate concerns, it was an event largely unnoticed.

### The perilous border - Pawns, Puppets and Pol Pot

By 1983, some four years after the first bedraggled refugees crossed into Thailand subsequent to Pol Pot's ouster, there was much that had been learned about the delivery of rice and its distribution. UNBRO was justly proud of the progress it had achieved in monitoring the distribution of supplies and instituting a certain regimen in the camps which were more ordered than the chaotic early days of 1979.

However, not everyone on the Border had access to UNBRO's largesse. A large number of Cambodians were beyond the reach of the UN and ICRC in areas which became known as the "hidden border". These were "military camps" which included women and children in line with Khmer Rouge practice of combining families with fighters in guerrilla bases. For those in the more accessible Border areas, the gripping scenes of 1979 and 1980 had given way to a new range of problems, less "photogenic", but equally acute.

Death by starvation was no longer a concern; killing by shelling was now the major hazard. Being blown apart by mines was an equally frightening reality." The Thai-Cambodian border is one of the most booby-trapped pieces of land on earth.<sup>15</sup> There was little apparent interest in a negotiated settlement. President Ronald Reagan had taken office in January 1981 and, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US policy hardened towards Moscow and Hanoi.

War, a constant reality, intensified in the dry season period of December to March. Between 1982 and 1985, UNBRO supervised 85 camp evacuations; 65 of these occurred under intense artillery fire. Occasionally, those fleeing such bombardments were allowed temporary refuge in Thailand. They were sheltered from the scorching sun under blue plastic sheeting until the onset of the rainy season when they moved back into Cambodia.

Such fitful bursts of war took on a pattern of its own. Dry-season offensives were launched by Phnom Penh and Vietnamese troops. The Khmer Rouge and their CGDK allies intensified their guerrilla attacks when the monsoon rains bogged down the heavy equipment of their opponents. Thus, the CGDK became known as the "resistance", a designation which was never easy to explain since they were also the recognized government of Cambodia in the UN and elsewhere.

Increasingly, the relationship between relief assistance and the resistance became more pronounced. In contrast to the Border, the sole encampment under the aegis of UNHCR, namely Khao-i-Dang, was never attacked even though it was a mere 6 kms inside Thailand. Khao-i-Dang residents were seen to be refugees not linked to any of the resistance groups.

For Cambodians on the Border, the bloody stalemate of seasonal warfare meant no escape from their wretched misery. During the 1984-85 dry season, the PRK and its allies launched a withering offensive to dislodge the resistance from their string of bases on the western frontier. This time there was no return to the Border settlements; the camps were totally destroyed and the area occupied by its conquering army.

For Cambodians seeking refuge anew in Thailand this should have been an opportunity to

13. Both the Sihanoukists and the KPNLF claimed that it was more a question of arm-twisting than coaxing. Nayan Chanda reports that ASEAN and the United States made it clear "that they could give assistance only to a legal government like the DK and not to a guerrilla movement." Chanda, *op. cit.* 391.

14. Also, in areas along the Border denied access to health care, environmental conditions, lack of safe water, and the drug-resistant falciparum strain of malaria prevalent in the jungle, were major killers. Children denied access to immunization were particularly vulnerable.

15. An Asia Watch Report (September 1991) states that Cambodia has "the highest percentage of physically disabled inhabitants of any country in the world...the highest percentage of mine amputees of any country...." Such grim statistics, says the report, "mean that the Cambodian war may be the first, in history in which land mines have gained more victims than any other weapon." Cited by Pilger, John in *New Statesman and Society*, 27 September, 1991.

distance themselves from the war and its protagonists. Instead, new camps were established directly inside the Thai border and within shelling range of the army which had so recently obliged them to flee. The organization of the new camps tended to follow the same structure as before in that they were controlled by the different CGDK parties. However, a major difference is that they were now "closed camps"; this effectively meant that the Border population associated with FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF were confined to a restricted area and had lost the limited mobility they had enjoyed previously. For those held by the KR freedom of movement had never been an option.

From a humanitarian perspective, the most dramatic feature of this new scenario centered on the fact that the camps were now *in* Thailand; civilians seeking asylum in a similar situation elsewhere would be seen as *mandate refugees* entitled to have their rights as such recognized. Instead, these people were described as "displaced persons", a ridiculous terminology that was widely used by relief workers and government officials.

UNHCR is the sole body, internationally constituted, entrusted with the protection of refugees.<sup>16</sup> In 1981, it won the Nobel Prize for Peace for its work on behalf of refugees worldwide. Yet it did not involve itself with the Border population.<sup>17</sup> In 1980-81 one of the stated reasons for UNHCR's absence from the Border was that many of those seeking refuge were still physically located in Cambodia.<sup>18</sup> But now that they were in Thailand they were held to be the "citizens" of the CGDK and, as such, could not be recognized as refugees. One of the immediate effects of being a "CGDK citizen in Thailand" included not being able to go home if wishing to do so.

It is difficult to know who actually believed the cruel fiction of the hastily concocted "sovereign" Coalition Government, dependent as it was on donated rice, canned fish and trucked water to keep its captive population fed. It is equally difficult to know if anyone actually believed that holding a population captive enhanced the credibility of the CGDK. The Coalitions claim - supported in and by the UN - to represent the territory and nation of Cambodia was remarkable for its audacity. The Border camps were physically located in

Thailand in an area subject to martial law imposed by the Thai army and clearly lacked independent sovereign status. Neither would it be easy to claim that the CGDK and the Thai authorities enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction since Cambodians were not allowed to fly their own flag without authorization from Thailand. Even simple everyday procedures and regulations (for example, permission to own a bicycle or use it as a "taxi" *within* the camp perimeter) were overturned or modified by the Thai authorities. Thailand had established a special unit, "Task Force-80", in 1980 to patrol the border areas both to regulate the flow of people and, in principle at least, to provide security around the camps.

Notwithstanding the charade surrounding the CGDK's claim to be the legitimate government of Cambodia, indefensible in international law, it never ceased to enjoy the recognition of the vast majority of member states at the UN General Assembly for a decade and a half. Such steadfast support for the CGDK, the compromises it entailed, and the policies it represented, had immediate and long-term humanitarian consequences for the people on the Border and their compatriots in Cambodia.

Although Cambodia and its population was amongst the most impoverished and traumatized in the world it gained the unenviable distinction of being the only nation ever denied a United Nations development programme; this included, for example, the technical expertise of the World Health Organization (WHO) which had the resources for training medics to organize maternal and child welfare programmes to aid children. Some NGO humanitarian agencies worked in Cambodia among the estimated 7 million people. By comparison they had only a fraction of what was needed to work with, when compared to the humanitarian aid given to the Border camps with a population of 350,000.

For the people on the Border, support for the CGDK meant that while they were, in principle the beneficiaries of a massive relief programme, in reality they were being used as *pawns* to propagate a war which militated against a political settlement and a peace which would put an end to the suffering of all Cambodians.

The history of the Border throughout the '80s is the history of a relief programme that was

16. UNKWA, specifically mandated to work with Palestinian refugees, is an exception.

17. The Border population's rights as refugees were never acknowledged. Even within the relief

ered provocative to refer to the Border population as refugees. HCR staff were forbidden by their own in-house rules to visit the Border camps. HCR eventually became actively involved with the Border population upon the signing of the Permanent Five Agreement, October 1991. 18. However, a decade later, HCR went into Iraq to assist Iraqi Kurds.

usurped by the *politics of suffering*. Unsure of its direction, and lacking the commitment and competence to uphold a clearly articulated definition of humanitarianism within the context in which it worked, the relief community narrowed its focus to manageable issues of logistics.

Unlike Khao-i-Dang, which was managed by UNHCR which maintained a 24-hour presence, the Border camps (where the UNBRO had access) were administered by representatives of the parties which constituted the CGDK.<sup>19</sup> Relief personnel could visit during daylight hours only. While the camps had many distinguishing features, not only in terms of geography, population density, distance from the border, susceptibility to shelling et cetera, all the Border camps shared the common reality of being run by Administrations (as camp management structures were known) subordinate to the political and military leaders of their respective parties. None of the camp Administrators were elected nor could they claim to be the representative of the people of whose behalf they made decisions. The goals of the 'resistance' and for some, financial enrichment, were the major pre-occupations of camp Administrators.

However, few questions were raised on the overall structure or philosophy of camp Administrations. Within the relief community memories of the chaos which disrupted and hindered the delivery of rice in the early days of the operation constituted the benchmark against which progress was measured. To an alarming degree the *means* had supplanted the original end purpose of the relief endeavour. By the mid-80s, humanitarianism was reduced to a creed of meeting "basic needs" which were defined by the philosophers of a predominant "bamboo, rice and medicine brigade". A common refrain was that issues of a non-logistical nature were "outside our mandate".

Having allowed its fundamental principles to be compromised by those intent on expedient and partisan politics the relief programme was itself compromised in its ability to formulate and implement policy which would cut short the cycle of suffering. This was all too apparent when the operation was confronted with the realities of working in a war zone, gross violation of human rights, the social implications of pro-

longed confinement, and blatant abuse and diversion of relief resources.

The hazardous world of "Borderland", the strip of territory or "CGDK country" which was "home" for the "displaced Cambodians", demanded a number of survival skills which did little to minimize the dangers which were exacerbated by the lack of refugee status.

It is a rule of thumb that refugee camps are located outside conflict zones wherever possible. Not too surprisingly there is a marked correlation between proximity to the battlefield and the number of casualties. In one particularly terrifying incident in November 1988, people who had been herded out of the UN-assisted camp of Ta Luan by the Khmer Rouge were taken to Khao Phlu, close to the Cambodian border, where they were pounded by non-stop artillery fire for days. Casualties were understood to be high but the ICRC was not allowed to assist or evacuate the wounded.

All of the Cambodians held in different camps as well as those whose rice fields and villages became part of the widening war, were daily victims of mines which have been planted, without record, throughout the Border area. For an estimated 100,000 Cambodians held in the "hidden border" camps, the danger of mines was particularly acute since the location of their camps was largely dictated by the whims of war. It is too mind-crippling to contemplate what happened to victims trapped in the "hidden border" and denied access to medical care. These people were also subjected to the ravages of life in a jungle where cerebral malaria is endemic.

Commenting on the contents of a confidential ICRC report in December 1988, William Shawcross referred to civilians being used as "slave labour" in KR-controlled camps. The same report, based on interviews with 200 escapees, indicated that conditions in the "hidden border" included "restricted or no access to hospital treatment, lack of doctors or medicines, total absence of personal freedom".<sup>20</sup> Such documented evidence of abuse merely reiterated what was widely known about life and death in this war zone. However, for the backers of the CGDK, in the United Nations and elsewhere, ensuring the anti-PRK alliance had a ready supply of foot-soldiers took precedence over concrete measures that

19. It needs to be understood that people in the camps were not necessarily supporters of the CGDK party controlling their camp.

20. Shawcross, William "The Return of the Khmer Rouge", *The Spectator*, December,

would give substance to the hand-wringing and anguished sentiments Western governments readily expressed when reminded of the continuing atrocities of the Khmer Rouge.

The use of civilians, who were *de facto* refugees, for war purposes and the Khmer Rouge practice of not making any distinction between civilians and combatants, should have been an issue of major importance for the humanitarian and relief community. Once the camps were firmly inside Thailand, the UN renewed its efforts both to separate civilians from the military and to improve monitoring, two goals which were intrinsically interlinked. Early in 1987, the outgoing Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Tetsuro Kumugi warned that the military nature of the camps would jeopardize an "understanding" with the Phnom Penh government whereby civilian camps would not be attacked. This understanding was of particular relevance to the residents of four Khmer Rouge-controlled "remote border" camps where the UN had limited or no access but had provided supplies since the beginning of the operation through Thai channels. It was a matter of concern, said Mr. Kumugi, that the UN could not confirm that assistance "which is meant for civilians only, under UN resolutions, is not being siphoned off by the group's military personnel".<sup>21</sup> Discussion on the nature of access and what would constitute minimum conditions necessary for the on-going provision of assistance continued throughout 1987.

Eventually, in April 1988, supplies were stopped to one of the camps, Huay Chan where the Administrator, Om An "never hesitated to tell even the most senior official or critical visitor that the camp was essentially a military base."<sup>22</sup> Negotiation on access to the other camps continued but Ta Luan camp, reputedly run by a relative of Pol Pot, was emptied of its people with the exception of the disabled and the infirm. This occurred towards the end of 1988 just as UNBRO officials had "stumbled upon a village of several hundred handicapped people who were believed to have been separated from the others because they were no longer of any use to the Khmer Rouge".<sup>23</sup>

The issue of access to the "remote" camps was never satisfactorily resolved. Although in 1989 it

was possible to report that two camps namely O'Trao and the newly-established Site K were assisted on conditions similar to other camps many of the people under DK control had already been forcibly moved closer to the frontlines beyond the reach of the UN. In 1989 there was a noticeable increase in fighting as CGDK forces battled to regain a foothold in Cambodia prior to the Paris talks and subsequent to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in September 1989.

Abuse of people and relief supplies for military purposes was most extreme in "hidden border" and "remote" camps but the four "closed" camps where relief agencies had extensive operations were not immune to military influence. Notwithstanding a noticeable military presence these camps were always presented as civilian or as "displaced persons camps". No-one referred to soldiers. Cambodians who turned up at hospital with malaria, which was non-existent in these camps as a result of a stringent vector-controlled programme, were described as "people from outside the camp". This was not only misleading but constant use of such sanitized language soon took on a life of its own; it bred a certain psychological reluctance to acknowledge the presence of soldiers.

The inclination to present a positive and upbeat picture was counter-productive and contributed to a general acceptance of the underlying reasons for the Border programme. The presence of soldiers and diversion of supplies to the military was never a major issue. This unquestionably had the effect of sending the wrong message to refugees who did not wish to be part of the war, did not agree with resources being siphoned off for this purpose, but were daily witnesses to UNBRO and the relief agencies general acquiescence to the policy and practices of camp Administrators.

Not all relief practitioners were content with the situation. Some were haunted by the implications of augmenting the capacity of the CGDK and the legitimacy seen to be conferred on them by virtue of the close collaboration between camp Administrators and the relief community. Many wondered whether they, as individuals, were a party to widespread corruption and abuse including violations of human rights that added to the victimization of those held on the Border.<sup>24</sup>

21. Tunsarawuth, Sinfah, "29,000 Khmers face food supply cut-off" *The Nation*, (Bangkok), 9 February, 1987.

22. Carwright, Wayne, "A Relief Worker's Personal Account", *Indochina Issues*, No 86, Washington, December 1988.

23. Eng, Peter, "Khmer Rouge Horror Begins Again", *The Nation*, (Bangkok) 22 December, 1988.

24. A small number of relief workers were involved in initiating the non-governmental advocacy group: The Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation, aimed to ending the war and help generate peace in Cambodia.

Flagrant violations of human rights were more the norm than the exception. A distinctive pattern of abuse in all the camps highlighted the vulnerability of those held on the Border and the brutalizing reality of camp life.

Site 2 was the only camp where refugees were not coerced into joining any of the Border armies. In Khmer Rouge-controlled camps forced relocation to areas of increased danger and denial to health care were commonplace. The Khmer Rouge acted with impunity. In January 1990, some 4,000 people were taken out of Borai camp even in the presence of UN and ICRC personnel. For the most part, the relief community felt powerless or uninvolved. There was even speculation that the Khmer Rouge had changed. Relief workers were reported to "consider the UN-aided Khmer Rouge camps much better than the oppressive camps of the non-communist forces of Prince Sihanouk and of Son Sann".<sup>25</sup> There were others who felt that working with the Khmer Rouge would have a civilizing effect.

This is not the occasion to review the basis or rationale of such perspectives. However, it provides some insights to the ambivalence of the relief community in general towards human rights violations. Additional insights can be gained from the dramatic and contrasting response of UNBRO, the UN Secretary General, the Thai Foreign Ministry, the US Government and various NGOs when they loudly condemned the involuntary removal of 16 Khmer Rouge officials (camp Administration personnel) from Site 8 in September 1991. This was the last forced removal from a Border camp with a UN presence.<sup>26</sup>

Other issues which were commonplace in KR-controlled camps included the reality of refugees being press-ganged into "portering duties". This involved being a "human mule" for the transportation of arms and munitions to the interior of Cambodia. This was a dangerous and frequent experience for camp residents including pregnant women and children. A 1990 Report by Asia Watch provides a devastating account of the coercion used to make people submit to treks which were often of a month's duration.<sup>27</sup>

Denial of access to health care was one issue which did provoke a reaction; the majority of

NGOs on the Border were medical agencies and UNBRO's health personnel were equally perturbed by the ruthless policies which condemned countless young children and the sick to untold suffering and death. In August 1988, a medical emergency was declared in Ta Luan when a 15-year old medic was found in charge of "110 patients, 45 of them seriously ill".<sup>28</sup> Ta Luan was undoubtedly one of the most shocking examples of botched medicine and cold-blooded indifference to people who were ill or disabled but it was not an isolated case. A polio outbreak in 1989 brought attention to the suffering needlessly endured by children elsewhere along the Border. In July and August, aid workers in Site 8 "treated 35 polio patients all less than five years old"; 3 children died and 31 were paralysed.<sup>29</sup> Mothers of the victims who had arrived from a nearby "hidden border" camp lamented that "many other kids had died before they were allowed to take their children to Site 8".<sup>30</sup>

It was difficult for many to understand how the Khmer Rouge was able to retain, relocate and repress such large groups of people under the eyes of the international community. Fear was the controlling agent. With their reputation preceding them few challenged the authority of the Khmer Rouge. Ta Luan, for all its horrors, was not a barbed-wire enclosure. Indeed, the fact that it could be reached some 20 minutes from a busy Thai highway made it all the more unnerving.

Anyone familiar with the Khmer Rouge should have understood this fear. There were numerous reports of summary executions. In March 1987, an escapee told of three female porters who "were executed after being caught trying to escape".<sup>31</sup> In 1988, there were two killings in Site 8, a camp where UNBRO and others had daily access. These shootings occurred in front of eye-witnesses and involved soldiers visiting relatives apparently without formal permission.

With all the documented evidence of abuse, and its everyday manifestation along the Border, such abuses had, in many respects, become an accepted part of the humanitarian and political landscape. The Khmer Rouge had not changed but concern about their policies and practices was primarily of the lamentation variety. Indeed, less than ten years after the Khmer Rouge had

25. *The Bangkok Post* (Bangkok) 9 January, 1990.

26. Subsequent to the signing of the Permanent Five Plan in October 1991, it became politically correct to express concern about forced removals and relocations.

27. *Asia Watch*, "Violations of the Rules of War by the Khmer Rouge," (April 1990), 8-11.

28. Eng, Peter, *The Bangkok Post*, (Bangkok) 10 November, 1988.

29. Niland, Norah, "Report from the Border " Asia-Pacific Task Force, Geneva, August 1990

30. *Ibid.*

31. Hiebert Murray, "Caught in the Middle", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (Hong Kong) 19 March, 1987.

been routed to the enormous relief of their victims, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that "Western relief officials point out that Site 8 and the other Khmer Rouge-controlled camps are far easier to deal with than the more populated camps of the KPNLF and Sihanoukists."<sup>32</sup>

By 1989 human rights violations and criminality which occurred in the non-KR camps tended to dominate perceptions of abuse, both within the relief community and among the thousands of visitors that came annually to see the camps. There was genuine and valid concern about deteriorating conditions particularly in Site 2 which was seen as the epitome of lawlessness.

Closed camp realities included the brooding presence of Task Force 80 (TF-80), a self-styled security force that plagued the lives of many refugees. Eventually disbanded in August 1988, TF-80, which was partly funded by UNBRO, was essentially a para-military outfit with little training; it traced its origins to village-based defense militia initiated in the 1970s to combat insurgency in the border areas. Documented abuse indicate that rape and robbery occurred routinely as did beatings, harassment and general mistreatment. A number of refugees were tortured and killed.

With TF-80 and its successor the Displaced Persons Protection Unit (DPPU) confined to the perimeter of the camp, the different Administrators were deemed to be in charge inside the camps. Hierarchical camp structures ensured that the majority of refugees were at the mercy of those who wielded power. Freedom of expression was not a known characteristic of any of the camps. In Site 2, this was complicated by the reality of a criminal underworld of organized prostitution, gambling and smuggling rackets. Such abuse and criminality was deeply entrenched in the ethos of Site 2 and took a heavy toll on human life, dignity and well-being.

Violence and victimization were also the outcome of the bleakness and misery of camp life. People struggled to cope in different ways but as tension mounted so did domestic disputes and the number of families which fell apart. Alarm bells first began ringing in 1987 and had grown

to an incessant din by mid-1988. Armed robberies were noted to have increased nearly sevenfold while the incidence of "rape and sexual harassment tripled".<sup>33</sup>

The source of the problem was clear but what could be done about it less so. Action was initiated on a number of fronts but it was clearly beyond the capacity of such programmes to cure the chronic ailments which afflicted the Border.<sup>34</sup>

Lack of political will to seriously challenge Administrators, or to think more imaginatively about a different style of camp management was endemic. Thus, opportunities which would allow for the representation and participation of refugees in the organizational structure of services were lost. Confinement and sheer boredom of camp life dulled human initiative and undermined the effectiveness of interventions geared to addressing the issue of victimization and the debilitating trauma of hopelessness and despair.

Soldiers could act with impunity and violence fed on the corruption which was symptomatic of the deep-rooted problems of Site 2, its relationship with the war, and the politics which nurtured it. "We've built an empire of crooks and connen" said Fr. Tom Dunleavy, a Maryknoll priest who worked for eight years in Site 2.<sup>35</sup>

Corruption undermined the relief programme's capacity to be effective. Refugees knew what was happening and came to believe that widespread abuse was acceptable, if not condoned, by the relief community. One of the many mechanisms used for the diversion of supplies included inflated numbers and phantom names, the stratagem many KP generals had employed in the days of Lon Nol.

In 1989, in a determined effort to roll back corruption, UNBRO started planning the organization of a census, a massive, complex and risky undertaking given the population of Site 2. Camp Administrators were not enthusiastic about such an exercise; reduced numbers meant less rice and a smaller gravy-train. A count of all people present in Site 2 was conducted early on 4 July, a date which was kept secret until the morning of the event; it resulted in a population figure of 140,000 rather than the previous

32. Tasker, Rodney, "Order in the camps," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), 2 November, 1989.

33. Maat, Bob, "The Weight of these Sad Times," *End of Mission Report*, Aranyprathet, 30 April 1989, 23-25.

34. Measures included the recruitment of Protection Officers to document and follow through on abuses in the larger camps. A police-training programme was developed and attempts made to initiate an independent judiciary. An ambitious education programme was organized to allow some 60,000 children to attend primary school. A programme geared to enhancing survival skills and off-setting the corroding impact of camp life included early childhood care, literacy, skills training, support for cultural activities, Buddhist education and an in-camp newspaper.

35. Erlanger, Steven, *The New York Times*, 9 December, 1988.

180,000. All of the elaborate preparations necessary for such an undertaking appeared more than worthwhile until it transpired that an arrangement to provide an additional 14,595 rations had been agreed upon prior to the actual count.

The number of additional rations coincided with the reported number of KP soldiers, the majority of whom were unlikely to be in the camp during an unannounced "headcount". The ostensible purpose of these extra rations was to help "single women", primarily those dependent on "absent men", an arrangement which apparently evolved during discussions designed to elicit Administration collaboration in the census. However, given the existence of an ongoing social welfare programme which included quantities of rice above the basic ration for vulnerable groups such as female-headed households, and the absence of specific criteria and monitoring mechanisms for the new 14,595 rations, there was some scepticism as to whether single women would see any of the additional rice. In response to mounting pressure, and an internal review of the decision-making which led to the extra rations, UNBRO ceased to deliver any further such supplies a short while after their initiation.

Clearly, what the whole episode indicated was the extent to which the relief programme had slipped from its humanitarian moorings and the fragility of the concept itself. Years of working in the Border environment, and the vague awareness of most that some relief items did go to soldiers, had helped dilute the core concept of humanitarianism in everyday programme management. In some respects it showed that the means had become an end. The immediate goal of the census was to counter corruption and reduce inflated figures but these limited objectives somehow took precedence over the larger objective of providing humanitarian assistance which necessarily involves a separation of civilians and combatants.<sup>36</sup>

Regrettably, few lessons if any were learned from this experience. A new camp, Site K, was established mid-1989 to provide a safer alternative for the residents of the KR-controlled camps of Ta Luan and Borai. In July 1989, the Site K population increased rapidly when some 10,000

people converged on it having killed their guards to escape heavy shelling in the Border area of Kaiche. However, even though these new arrivals expressed concern about being moved out of Site K, within three months the population had dwindled to some 8,500. There was no attempt made to investigate such relocations or to support the organization of a camp management structure which would have allowed for greater protection of camp residents and ensured that the provision of relief supplies was less dependent on a self-appointed Khmer Rouge Administration.

From mid-1989 to the signing of the Permanent Five Agreement in October 1991, Cambodians on both sides of the Border were again subjected to intensified fighting. As opposing armies sought to gain and defend territorial claims, a wide swathe of terrain was turned into a free-fire zone with different groups alternatively claiming that they had "liberated" it.

On the Border, refugees who had high hopes of going home following the Vietnamese troop withdrawal in September 1989 found themselves, instead, hemmed in by new uncertainties as the possibility of peace and repatriation receded. Some 3-5,000 did succeed in leaving Site 2 but when the KPNLF became aware of such night-time departures, exit routes were blocked. Indeed, all of the CGDK parties were appalled at the idea of reduced numbers particularly when this involved refugees voting with their feet.

There was renewed discussion on the need for a "neutral camp" and a small number of refugees circulated a petition requesting such an entity in September 1989. The non-existence of a neutral camp, or place where the Border population could be treated as refugees, was an issue of such longstanding, and such sensitivity, that it was only rarely dusted off and its merits tentatively articulated. It was clear to many that the inability of the refugees to exert their rights to return home when many of them wanted to do so was a gross injustice and a major determinant in the resistance's ability to wage war.

However, prevailing wisdom held that nothing could be done pending the outcome of the Permanent Five negotiations. With the signing of the Paris Accords in October 1991 the way was finally open for an organized repatriation which commenced on 30 March, 1992.

36. The implications of additional rations were also compounded by the political and military events then unfolding pursuant to the break-down of the Paris talks in August. In the wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal, CGDK partners pushed to establish "liberated" zones across the border from the camps; the cut-off in rations was seen as undermining this latest offer-

## A humanitarian space

Disasters are complex phenomena whatever their origin or nature. Most complex disasters can be understood as a failure of politics while others can be seen as a failure of the development process. Relief programmes cannot of themselves solve these problems but this does not detract from the *vital* role humanitarianism must play in ameliorating suffering and allowing disaster victims the necessary "breathing space" to recuperate and regain their ability to survive beyond dependence on disaster relief. Thus, humanitarianism can never be used as a substitute for political action necessary to resolve the issues which triggered the disaster.

For humanitarian assistance to be effective, indeed to be worthy of the name, it must remain true to its core principles. Not to do so is to jeopardise both its own survival and the lives of those it directly and indirectly affects. However, the transformation of humanitarian principles into effective relief is less straight-forward than generally appears as evidenced by the experience of the Thai-Cambodian border operation. Humanitarianism, the essence of which is to save lives, necessarily incorporates the concept of protection with its twin components of physical and non-material needs; *the safety and dignity of the human person is no less important than food and medicine.*

What the Border demonstrates is the absolute necessity of relief agencies having both a clear understanding of the constituent elements of humanitarianism and an undiluted commitment to its fundamental objectives. While such assertions will not raise any objections the history of the Border also shows that agencies are in need of a "code of conduct" to ensure that those operat-

ing under the banner of humanitarianism respect its values. In the complex world in which we live, defining appropriate action under this "banner of humanitarianism" requires informed as well as compassionate decision-making. Preoccupation with short-term goals is no excuse for ignoring long-term ramifications. Inherent in this perception is the thesis that relief agents must be held accountable for their actions.

The importance of safeguarding a "humanitarian space", and nurturing the conditions which will allow it to be maintained, cannot be over-emphasized. Not to do so is to become a party to the politics of suffering. The fact that there has been much erosion, and that relief programmes are usurped for partisan purposes, ought to provoke greater not lesser commitment on the part of everyone convinced of the value of humanitarianism and to carve out the space necessary for it to operate. Power politics and vested interests will not disappear. The need for humanitarianism will continue both to ameliorate the suffering of victims and to staunch the flow of events which further suffering will exacerbate. A "humanitarian space" is necessary both for the well-being of victims directly affected by disasters and as a critical component in the search for peaceful and durable solutions.

Compassion as an expression of the desire for justice is neither a luxury nor an indulgence in a community of nations struggling to reach greater equilibrium, peace and security in a world striving for a new order. As Dag Hammarskjöld would say:

*the constant struggle to close the gap between aspiration and performance now, as always, make the difference between civilization and chaos.<sup>37</sup>*

37. Cited in: Urquhart, Brian. *A Life in Peace and War*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987). 378.

# Migrants and refugees in modern Greece

by C.G. Vgenopoulos\*

## Introduction

The various population movements that have occurred in the Hellenic space can be looked at both from a Greco-centered and a non Greco-centered point of view. In the former case there have been strong currents of refugees, as well as of emigrants and returnees. In the latter case, immigration and refugee movements (with the exception of those of 1919 and 1923) are relatively recent phenomena. Distinctions among the various types of population movements have never been absolutely precise. The respective definitions are mainly reflections of convention and/or convenience, political or otherwise. In this paper emigration is treated in its external form. Internal and temporary migration are not discussed. Here we deal only with the permanent emigrant, i.e. the person who leaves his country of origin intending to effect a more or less lasting (at least 12 months) change in his residence. The distinction between migration and refugee movement is not always clear. A refugee is a person who has been compelled to leave his homeland mainly for reasons of political, racial or religious persecutions. A migrant, on the other hand, is thought to leave voluntarily. In many instances, however, the compulsion to emigrate can be as strong as that of seeking refuge to another country.

## Movements of Greek refugees

### Population exchanges

This type of movement aims to solve the problem of minorities and re-establish ethnic and religious homogeneity through the replacement of entire alien populations. Greece as well as the other Balkan countries occupy an area of the world, which for the greatest part of its history has lived under an imperial regime (Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman). The wars of independence of the Christian peoples of the peninsula against the Muslim oppressor led to the formation of states based mainly on ethnicity, but this meant that smaller or larger ethnic groups were left outside the newly drawn national frontiers.

**Voluntary or involuntary steps towards ethnic homogenisation were taken through two major population exchanges:**

1. Between Greece and Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly, 1919) when almost 50,000 Greeks were exchanged for a nearly equal number of Bulgarians.

2. Between Greece and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne, 1923) when 1.2 million Christian Orthodox people from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace were exchanged for 0.5 million Muslims of Eastern Thrace, Macedonia and Epirus. An exception was made for the Orthodox of Instabul and of the islands of Imvros and Tenedos as well as for the Muslims of Western Thrace, established there before 1918.

### Outward movements

There have been two outward movements since the end of World War II:

The *first* was the exodus of approximately 100,000 persons, mainly members and followers of the Greek Democratic Army of the defeated Left, who fled the country and established themselves in the Soviet Union and other countries of the formerly socialist Eastern Europe.

The *second* was during the period of the military dictatorship in Greece (1967-74). The total number of refugees is difficult to ascertain as official statistics do not make the relevant distinctions. It is believed, however, that most of these people have returned to their country of origin.

### Inward refugee movements

There have been several inward refugee movements from countries with sizable Greek populations, when profound political changes took place in them:

a. *Albania* - The commencement of a liberalisation process has meant a limited freedom of expression for the ethnic and religious components of population. Lack of official statistical data makes room for journalistic estimates, according to which Muslims represent about 65% and Christians 35% of the population. The Christian population consists of Catholics (15% of the total) and Orthodox (20%). Among the Orthodox element, 7% are ethnic Albanians, while the remaining 13% represent the Greek minority in Albania.

b. *Bulgaria* - Despite the above-mentioned exchange of populations, a Greek element seems

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to remain in Bulgaria. A number of Sarakatsanoi nomads are thought to have expressed the desire to cross the border into Greece. Some Greek-speaking persons are believed to live on the Black Sea coasts of Bulgaria.

c. *Egypt* - Until the mid-1950s there was an important Greek community in Egypt, settled mainly in Cairo and Alexandria. Many had emigrated to Egypt during the period between the two World Wars, when changes in the American policy on immigration shifted the Greek migratory movement away from the U.S. It is believed that between 70,000 and 100,000 Greeks, employed primarily in the secondary and tertiary sectors, returned to Greece from Egypt between 1955 and 1964.

d. *Soviet Union* - The association of the Greeks with the northern part of the Black Sea is a rather long one. In fact the myth of the Golden Fleece and the expedition of the Argonauts predates the War of Troy. A good part of the Hellenic element in what was formerly the Soviet Union, however, consists of Greeks who fled to Russia from Turkey. While flows of Greeks from Turkey to Russia have been frequent, starting with the fall of Trebizond in 1461, the bulk of them crossed the border between 1916 and 1923 in order to save themselves from the Turkish genocide, during which 350,000 Greeks and 1.5 million Armenians were put to death. Most of these Greeks who escaped settled in the Caucasus area<sup>1</sup>.

The inward migration of Greeks from that part of the world is not new. Initially almost 70,000 were estimated to have come to Greece since the beginning of the century<sup>2</sup>. It has always been felt in Greece that the official figure given for the Greek element in the Soviet Union - 350,000 people - was an underestimate. With the advent of perestroika the numbers were constantly being revised upwards as more people re-assumed the Greek names they had abandoned or adjusted for reasons of survival. It is currently thought that they are about 1 million people of Greek origin living there. Greece envisaged the settlement of at least 100,000 of them between 1990-94, naturally in the regions most depleted by emigration. In order to do this, the country received a US \$300 million credit from the Development Bank of the Council of

Europe in 1989. The total cost of the resettlement exercise was estimated at \$ 750 million.

e. *Turkey* - The influx of refugees from Turkey presents a special interest in that it refers to the persecution of people whose welfare was supposed to be safeguarded by the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. At the time of its signing there were approximately 300,000 Greek Orthodox against 60,000 Muslims (roughly 50% Turkish, 25% Pomaks and 25% Gypsies) in Western Thrace. Today, the Orthodox element in Turkey numbers no more than 5,000 persons, while the Muslim element in Greece is certainly 100,000 people. Most of these Orthodox persons were forced to leave. Some of them emigrated to various parts of the western world. The vast majority of them, however, sought refuge in Greece. It is not the purpose of this paper to give a detailed account of the atrocities perpetrated against the Orthodox element in Turkey. The treatment of minorities as well as Turkey's long-term policy goals of ethnic cleansing are well documented in the international bibliography<sup>3</sup>. There remains in Greece, however, the bitter feeling that as policy instruments genocides are effective. They are also easily forgotten.

All the violations of the Lausanne Treaty, however, look like misdemeanors compared with the 1955 state-sponsored pogrom against the Orthodox element in Istanbul and to a lesser extent in Izmir. It resulted in extensive injuries, rape and loss of life; destruction of homes and business; desecration of churches and cemeteries. Total damage was estimated at US \$150 million at 1956 prices<sup>4</sup>.

## Contemporary emigration

### *The background*

At the end of World War II and of the Civil War that followed, Greece lay practically in ruins. Human losses were estimated at nearly one million people, while most of the country's stock of capital equipment was destroyed. In spite of the existence of numerous and very serious problems economic growth was satisfactory, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. As soon as normal political, economic and social life was established, emigration began to occur. Initially it was directed

1. B. Agtzides, *Pontian Hellenism: From Genocide and Stalinism to Perestroika*, Thessaloniki, 1980.

2. E. Enke-Pouloupoulou, "Migrants and Refugees in Greece", *Etiogy*, No. 85/86, 18.

3. See, among others, A. Alexandris, *The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-74*, Athens, Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983; J. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A study in Irridentism*, London, 1981; and F. Weber, *The Evasive Neutral*, London, University of Missouri Press, 1970.

4. Idas, "The Lausanne Treaty and its Violations from 1923 until today", *Nea Koinonolova*, No 9, 56-70 (in Greek).

towards Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, but it later spread to other countries, assuming worrying proportions by the mid-1960s. In 1965 and 1966 emigration exceeded the rate of population increase. It became apparent to many people that the country was facing a very serious problem. Today it appears that migration has exhausted all existing manpower reserves, making necessary the import of foreign labour.

A fundamental characteristic of contemporary Greek emigration is that it took place during a 40-year period of continuous peace - the only such period in modern Greek history - and of satisfactory political stability, with the exception of the period of military dictatorship (1967-1974). Prior to World War II Greek emigration was linked with successive military confrontations, which influenced economic performance and kept the standard of living at very low levels. After the establishment of the neo-Hellenic state, the struggle to eliminate foreign interference and the relative poverty led a sizeable part of the population to emigrate. They even went towards Asia Minor, which, although under Turkish rule, remained largely Greek-speaking. The Greek defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 was followed by the economic crisis of 1929-32 and by political instability marked by frequent military coups. Finally, the country experienced the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-40), the Second World War and the Civil War (1946-49).

#### *The magnitude of the human outflow*

According to official statistics, between 1821 and 1940 just over half a million people left Greece to establish themselves abroad. This, however, is a gross underestimate, since these data refer only to transatlantic emigration. Similarly, many Greek emigrants reached the countries of their destination without necessarily having departed directly from Greece.

Emigration after the end of the Civil War assumed alarming proportions at times. Unfortunately, reliable and detailed data supplied by the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) cover only the period 1955-77. For the periods immediately before and after that, estimates can be arrived at only indirectly. During the 23-year period from 1955-77, the

number of permanent emigrants was 1,236,290, while temporary emigrants numbered 1,197,601 persons. Annual permanent emigration involved 53,752 individuals while population increased (net) during the same period by 81,350 persons. In addition it is generally accepted that there were 100,000 emigrants between 1949 and 1954, as well as an equal number during the 1978-87 period. By all accounts, this is an impressive total figure, especially for a small country like Greece. Most of the Greek emigrants came from the northern regions of the country (Macedonia 31.75%, Thrace 7.49%, Epirus), as well as from the islands of the Aegean and the Ionian Seas (5.62% and 2.53% respectively). Contrary to the pre-war transatlantic pattern, the contemporary migration movement has had a distinct European (61.34%) and more specifically German (57.53%) orientation. Emigration to the Americas accounted for 19.21% and to Oceania 14.35% of the total. Female participation has been distinctly higher than that of the pre-war period (38% for European and almost 50% for transoceanic emigration). As expected, emigration has been age-selective, with 82% of emigrants belonging to the 15-64 year group<sup>5</sup>.

#### *The 'netting of migratory flows - emigrant return*

The picture of the neo-hellenic migratory phenomenon becomes more complete if reference is made to repatriation, or the return of emigrants to their country of origin. The NSSG started compiling data on repatriation in 1968 and it ceased in 1977. when the whole chapter "migration" was abandoned as no longer significant. Consequently for the periods 1968 and after 1977 estimates of the number of emigrants returning to Greece can be arrived at only indirectly.

The return of emigrants has been historically a point of major interest for the formation of the Greek society, perhaps as important as emigration itself. This is so because it reached remarkable levels from the statistical point of view and because every movement of repatriation posed a series of social and economic problems relating to the insertion and assimilation of the returnees. The formation of the neo-Greek, who came not only

5. National Statistical Service of Greece (N.S.S.G.), *Statistical Yearbooks 1966*, 311; *1979*, 52; *1980*, 52.  
6. C. G. Vgenopoulos, *Growth and Unemployment*, Athens,

from the Hellenic area but also from different parts of the world (the Soviet Union, the Balkans, Asia Minor, Middle East, EEC, America, Australia, etc.) challenged policy makers.

Contrary to emigration, which sometimes was carried out in a relatively organised manner (e.g. bilateral agreements, international organisations), repatriation has usually been rather unorganised, except for cases where economic assistance is given to the returnees by the receiving countries in periods of recession. Lack of sufficient, reliable statistical data is common in both the 19th and the 20th centuries. According to available evidence, during the previous century repatriation accounted for 25-30% of the active male population in the agricultural sector, from which came the vast majority of emigrants<sup>7</sup>. The rate of return is equally high in the 20th century. Existing data, especially for the early part of this period, refer mainly to transatlantic emigration, as 95% of the emigrants of that went to the U.S.A. In spite of differences in the estimates of various researchers, repatriation must have reached relatively high levels. According to Polyzos<sup>8</sup>, repatriation from overseas between 1908-21 corresponded to 55% of permanent emigration. Tsoukalas<sup>9</sup> argues that it amounted to 61% but for the period 1908-1930. By any criteria either of these estimates is impressive.

The migratory movement during the inter-war period presents a particular interest due to the fact that the Greek defeat in Asia Minor and the subsequent arrival of 1.2 million refugees in Greece coincided first with the imposition of immigration controls on the part of the U.S. and subsequently with the American economic crisis. These events influenced the direction of emigration away from the U.S. and towards the Mediterranean Basin. During that period repatriation was also important, even though estimates vary. According to Polyzos<sup>10</sup> the rate of return amounted to 25% of annual emigration. Filias<sup>11</sup> argues that between 1922-1939 repatriation was almost equal to external emigration.

Finally, war and post-war migration can be divided into two sub-periods, mainly:  
-> 1940-54 - During the period, characterised by war, political instability, and a consequent lack of official statistics, the major feature was not so much voluntary emigration as the

flight of 100,000 Greeks. Repatriation during that period was insignificant. According to Siampos, between 1946 and 1950 there were perhaps 20,000 returnees, but they were refugees and not in the strict sense migrants<sup>12</sup>.

-> 1955 - today - This has been a time of political stability (with the exception of the military dictatorship, 1967-1974). Certain statistics exist for this period, but not reliable repatriation data. As mentioned, the return movement before and after the 1968-77 period must be estimated indirectly<sup>13</sup>.

With regard to the period before 1968-77, one would have to take into account the estimates of official Greek sources such as the Bank of Greece and/or the Ministry of the Interior. According to them, during the 1960s at least, repatriation equalled nearly 30% or permanent emigration. International organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as independent researchers, seem to agree with these estimates<sup>14</sup>. The higher rate of repatriation is that from (formerly West) Germany, (almost 50%). This is a way was to be expected as the majority of contemporary Greek emigrants went to that country. At the same time the phenomenon can be explained to a large extent by the recession the German economy experienced during the same period.

During 1968-77, a period for which reliable data exist, it is evident that an equilibrium between the two movements was established in the beginning of the 1970s, while since 1974 repatriation is clearly greater than permanent emigration. The sources of data for the period after 1977 are basically two: one Greek and one German. The data of the Greek Organisation for Labour Force Employment (OAED) "do not reflect the real number of returnees as they refer mainly to persons [who] have acquired the right to an allowance on account of their work in Federal Germany and they present themselves to OAED in order to exercise that right"<sup>15</sup>. The Statistical Office of the Federal Republic of Germany is the other source. These data seem to be more precise, as they compiled from residence declarations submitted to the competent local authorities. It is clear, however, that they are limited for the purposes of this paper, as they refer only to one country.

7. C. Tsoukalas, *Dependence and Reproduction*, Athens, 1977, 110 (in Greek)
8. N. Polyzos, *Essai sur l'émigration grecques*, Paris, Sirey, 1947, 53.
9. C. Tsoukalas, *Dependence and Reproduction* (op. cit. 7), 116.
10. N. Polyzos, *Essai sur l'émigration grecque* (op. cit. 8), 53.
11. V. I. Filias, *Problems of Social Transformation*, Athens, 1974, 185.
12. G. Siampos, *The Greek Migration in the 20th century*, Athens, 1980, 236.
13. See, among others B. Kayser, *Géographie Humaine de la Grèce*, Athens, 1968.
14. X. Zolotas, *Migration and Economic Development*, Athens, 1966, 39. Also, Organisation for Economic Development (OECD), *Emigrant Workers Returning to their Home Country*, Paris, 1967.
15. I. Hadjipanagiotou, *The Labour Market in 1982*, Ministry of Labour, Athens 1983, 44 (in Greek).

## The return movement

### *The decision to return to the homeland*

The return of permanent emigrants cannot be explained simply on the grounds of their desire to go back to their country of origin, i.e. through nostalgia. A number of other reasons weigh also in the taking of such a decision.

An analysis of "push and pull factors" may again be useful.

### *Reasons referring to the receiving country*

During the post-war period, two major return movements took place. It is impossible to make a systematic distinction between them. Despite the "grey areas" that become apparent in the attempt to define each one of these movements, one can, nevertheless, distinguish the following:

a. *Sub-period 1968-87*: This was characterized mainly by the return of emigrants who left the country during the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. Consequently, it involves people that emigrated mainly to the West. In the above mentioned period, more than 200.000 persons returned to Greece, in their largest part (69%) coming back from Europe. Simultaneously, repatriation from overseas was not at all negligible (24%).

b. *Sub-period 1987-97*: This period was marked by the return of people of Greek origin who decided to settle in Greece after the collapse of the communist regimes. Those who came from Albania, on the one hand, and from the Soviet Union, on the other, from the two main poles of this movement. Unfortunately, there are no analytical and/or reliable data for the Greeks of Albania. One thing is clear, however, namely that the Greek community in Albania was much larger than the Albanian authorities were prepared to admit. Anyway, this impressive return movement is still unfolding today and it is thought that it will continue to do so for quite a long period.

In principle, economic recessions in receiving countries constitute a fundamental reason to repatriate. In fact unemployment and underemployment often lead to restrictions on the employment of foreigners. At the same time economic crises aggravate the conflict between

indigenous and foreign workers in a way that makes the latter more vulnerable to unemployment than the former. There seems to be a lot of truth in the assertion that migrant workers are the blotting paper of capitalist crises. With regard to Greek workers, available data indicate that during the recession caused by the oil crisis, the level of unemployment for them was the same as for other migrant in West Germany. Subsequently, however, the picture is somehow modified in that the unemployment among Greeks is certainly higher than among Germans, but relatively lower than among other foreign workers. This is partially explained by the fact that many Greek migrants are self-employed.

As already indicated, however, no one is forced to return home because of economic crises and their consequences alone. The receiving countries take measures restricting the influx of immigrants either in the face of a recession or after it. Such measures have been taken in the past by many countries and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany. One such measure has been the possibility of capitalisation of the unemployment benefits and the insurance contributions for those who decide to leave. In addition, the Government of that country arranged through the German and Turkish banking systems and in collaboration with the Development Bank of the Council of Europe, the granting of housing loans to Turkish immigrants returning home. Similarly, state intervention discriminating against foreigners can be exercised in an indirectly way. A well known case in point is the preference given to indigenous workers for employment that would otherwise have gone to immigrants. Finally, Federal Germany has taken measures to discourage or even prohibit immigration, such as the prohibition in 1973 of employing workers from non-EEC countries. This decision had negative effects on the Greek workers who wished to settle in Germany, as Greece became a full member of the EEC only in 1981.

In the case of the Pontians, the justification of their return is somehow different. One of the consequences of the change of regime has been the creation of many new states, organized on ethnic bases, as well as the subsequent aggravation of tensions. In spite of their large number.

Greeks from the former Soviet Union were not clearly defined geographically. The Greek element was actually scattered. A good part of it lived in urban areas. The resurgence of ethnic differences naturally led the Greeks to abandon many of these countries, particularly those where the Muslim element was dominant. Thus the preservation of Greek identity constitutes a serious cause for return. On the other hand, the establishment of a new socio-economic order leads, among others, to high unemployment, a phenomenon that persists for a relatively long period of time. Financial insecurity, therefore, becomes an additional cause for choosing Greece as a new place to settle. Finally, a third very important reason is the preservation of family unity.

It is almost impossible to estimate accurately the number of Pontians that have permanently settled in Greece. There is, on the one hand, the official data based on the number of "permits" issued by the Greek authorities. However, there is, at the same time, a larger number of Pontians who enter Greece originally as tourists and subsequently extend their stay. Nevertheless and irrespective of the number of tourist who finally stay, it is a fact that, apart from those who are legally settled, there is a quite significant Pontic "continuum" in Greece estimated at about 150,000 persons.

#### *Reasons referring to the country of origin*

It is difficult to estimate accurately the relative weight of reasons that have prompted Greek workers to return home, namely, the consequences of economic

recession in the receiving country or the creation of new employment opportunities in Greece. According to existing studies, it seems that the improvement of the political, economic and social climate - especially after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974 - contributed to the growth of the return movement of migrants to Greece<sup>16</sup>. Increased repatriation, however, poses a number of problems for the returnees themselves. The most serious is perhaps their professional "grafting" into employment corresponding to the specialisation they acquired while abroad. This presupposes the existence of

the appropriate infrastructure and in the Greek case that is in fact the greatest obstacle to using the skills of the returnees productively.

#### *Basic Characteristics of the Returnees*

##### *a. Repatriation by sex, age and family status*

It is clear that repatriation has been smaller than emigration. Male participation has been higher than female, as was the case with emigration. During the period 1968-77 the average age of returnees was 39-32 for men and 30-33 for women. This is higher than the average age of emigrants (25-32 years for men and 25-29 for women, but for the period 1955-77). As was to be expected, the proportion of those over 45 years of age is rather high (18.5 per cent of the total). The German statistical data are quite revealing in regard to age. It appears in fact that the proportion of persons below the age of 16 is also high. Finally, the number of married returnees is higher than that of the emigrants<sup>17</sup>.

Unlike what characterized the previous period, the percentage of repatriated Pontic women is higher than that of the men. As expected, the largest part of those who returned falls into the 30-34 age group. It is worth noting that the percentage of people over 45 is not only high (21.2%) but also higher than the corresponding percentage of the period 1968-87. Furthermore, comparing the age structure of settled Pontians and that of the native population is particularly important. It is clear that the structure of the former presents a demographically progressive composition while, on the contrary, the latter reveals an ageing Greek population<sup>18</sup>.

As far as marital status is concerned, it is observed that the settled married Pontic men represent approximately 58%, while the women constitute 69% of the total. Both these percentages are higher than the Greek equivalent. Finally, an impressive finding is the quite high percentage of divorced Pontians (3.45%), in relation to the Greek equivalent. This is probably due to the fact that it is easier to get a divorce in the former Soviet Union as compared to Greece<sup>19</sup>.

##### *b. Country of origin, destination, education*

Repatriation from European countries between 1965-1977 was clearly higher than

16. R. Fakiolas, *Problems and Opportunities of the Greek Migrants Returning from Western Europe*, Strasbourg, 1982, 167.

17. E. Enke-Pouloupoulou, *Problems of Migration and Repatriation*, p.p. 77-78, *ibid.*, 78-80.

18. X. Petinioti, *Migration to Greece*, p.p. 41-43 and L. M.

Moissouris, *Migration-Return and Family*, in G.S.S.A. *Research Program of Emigration and Return of Greek People*, *op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 267-284.

19. I.B. Maos, *Demographic Evolution of Greek Pontians in Former Soviet Union in Greece*, K. Kassimati, *Pontian Migrants from the Former Soviet Union*, Athens, 1993, p.p. 99-145.

from overseas. This should not be attributed solely to the fact that emigration towards Europe has been higher than that towards other parts of the world. Reasons should be sought also in the crisis of the German economy and the relatively short distance between the two countries. Those who emigrate to America or Australia have a lower rate of repatriation. As mentioned earlier, the earlier, the largest number of emigrants came from the islands, Epirus, Thrace and Macedonia. Repatriation presents a similar picture. A large number of the returnees have settled in Macedonia (37.6%) and the Greater Athens Area (22.7%).

In the case of the Pontic Greeks, things are somehow different. As expected, most of them settled in the major areas of Athens and Thessaloniki. Smaller cities are, nevertheless, not rejected. What makes the difference in this case is the decision to offer incentives in order for Pontians to settle in Thrace. A fundamental element of this policy is the provision of free accommodation. This effort is made in the framework of a project undertaken by the National Foundation for the Reception and Resettlement of Repatriated Greeks. Approximately 20,000 people have resettled so far in that region under this programme. One wonders, though, why the number is so small. It is, however, obvious that this ambitious project will fail if it is not placed within a broader framework of the economic development of the region.

Concerning the level of education of the returnees, reliable data are scarce. In general terms, the level of education of the emigrants is low. One might expect the level of those coming back to Greece to be significantly higher. Improved levels of education are expected to be found among the emigrants' children. This point is confirmed by Professor Drettakis<sup>20</sup>

Equally interesting is the structure of higher education. For their greatest part, the people that fall within this category hold basic degrees (75%), while as concerns their fields of study, 50% of them represent the field of technological sciences. Finally, the percentage of scientists holding a degree in medicine is particularly high<sup>21</sup>.

The educational status of Pontians is very different from what was described above. In general, Pontians have a higher educational status

than those who returned during the first period. This is mainly due to the following:

- a) They had easier access to education in the Soviet Union
- b) The Greek element was characterized by an increased vertical social mobility.

Thus, on the basis of the available research data, the graduates of higher education among the Pontians represent a high percentage (27%), which is definitely higher than the native equivalent (6.5%). Oddly enough, however, the percentage of the illiterate among the settled Pontians (11%) is also higher than the native equivalent (9%)<sup>22</sup>.

### c. *The issue of employment*

The first sub-period was characterized, at least initially, by higher unemployment rates among the returnees, than among the native population. Employment rates are lower when it comes to women, even those who have had higher education<sup>23</sup>. Interestingly enough a very high percentage of the returnees have declared to be workers or technicians. It is worth noting that the proportion of those who have not declared any employment is surprising (44.5%). However, this could be explained by the fact that a large part of those who have filled in the necessary forms are women who declared themselves as housewives, either because they were or because they did not consider going to work after their return to Greece.

Similarly, it is clear that most of the returnees find employment in the urban rather than the rural sector of the economy. This increased rate of *embourgeoisement* is justified by the gradual strengthening of the modern, vis-avis the traditional, sector of the economy during the post-war period. Moreover, it is linked with the likely previous employment of returnees in the urban sector of the country of origin. It is, nevertheless, linked more directly with the fact that Greece has the largest percentage of self-employed people (50.7%) among the European Union countries<sup>24</sup>. It seems that the repatriation movement gave a new boost to this phenomenon. Interestingly, several returnees who came from Germany and Australia are employed in the primary sector, while the ones from North America work mainly in the tertiary sector<sup>25</sup>.

20. E.G. Drettakis, *Le niveau de formation des migrants en Grèce*, *Population*, No. 2, 1979, p.p. 463.

21. P. Souis, *The Composition of the Return of Scientists*, in G.S.G.A. *Research Program* (op. cit. 18), p.p. 161-2.

22. K. Kassimati, *The Educational Level of Pontian Migrants*, in K. Kassimati, *Pontian Migrants*, (op. cit. 19), p.p. 149-185.

23. N. Petropoulos, *Return Movement 1971-86*, *Conclusion of the Small Census of 1985-86 and Proposals of Government Policy*, in G.S.G.A. *Research Program*

Vol. II, p.p. 95-96

24. N. Patiniotis, *Repatriation and Socio-economic Re-integration*, *The Greek Review of Social Research*, No. 56, 1986, p. 95.

On the other hand, the descent of the Pontinas as well as of the other returnees and foreigners has been taking place in a period when the Greek economy is characterized by high unemployment levels (approximately 10%) and successive austerity policies. It is obvious that the economic conjuncture affects the level and type of employment as far as the newcomers are concerned.

It should be noted, firstly, that the share of the non-active population among the settled Pontians is lower, as compared to the Hellenic equivalent as well as to that of the Pontians before they settled in Greece. This finding indicates the involvement in the production process people under 15 and over 64 years of age. Among the economically active population, the percentage of the unemployed returnees is higher than that of the native population. At the same time, however, the share of the employed population is only just lower (49-8%) than the percentage representing the unemployed. Moreover, it is observed that unemployment affects mainly the female population (60.9%), which constitutes 46.4% of the total of the settled Pontians. An additional source of insecurity is created by the fact that today's returnees belonged to the salaried classes, in the context of a nationalized economy. In the context of the Greek economy, however, the situation is rather different<sup>25</sup>.

Finally, as regards the structure of the Pontians' employment by sector, it is observed that the largest part of them (47%) is employed in the tertiary sector, an equally important part (44%) in the secondary sector and only 8.8%, that is a percentage much lower than the Greek equivalent, is employed in the primary sector of the Greek economy. There is, of course, an issue of non-correspondence between the professional qualifications obtained in the country of origin and the employment found after repatriation. It is estimated that 78% of those holding university degrees are employed in fields that are different from their field of study<sup>27</sup>.

#### *Demographic consequences of return*

Repatriation has contributed to the increase of population, as emigration was responsible earlier for slowing down its rate of increase. This was quite evident during 1872-81, a period in which the country's population increased by 917,000 persons.

more than double the increase from 1961-71. The influence of repatriation on the age-structure of the population has also been significant. Returning emigrants seem to fall into two age groups: first, the senior citizens who go back to Greece as pensioners, and secondly, the very young. Empirical studies carried out on the subject have not produced conclusive results. Polyzos argues that repatriation has aggravated the already uneven picture of the population age pyramid. Other researchers however indicate that repatriation has slowed down the rate of aging of the population<sup>28</sup>.

Because of the lack of analytical data and special studies, it is difficult to ascertain whether repatriation has influenced the sex structure of the population. We observe however a slight increase in the proportion of males from 48.8% in 1951 to 49.1% in 1981. If we take into account that male participation in emigration is higher than the female, we may simply advance the suggestion that repatriation has played a small equilibrating role. As concerns the Pontians, it is still difficult to draw definite conclusions regarding the extent to which their settlement has affected the country's demographic condition. Their repatriation does not yet involve a large number of returnees, neither have they lived in Greece long enough. What their presence here has indicated so far is that their inclusion in the Greek society will eventually have positive demographic effects<sup>29</sup>.

#### **Non-Greek migrants and refugees in Greece**

Greece is a country closely associated with emigration. However, it is true that she has also received a substantial number of immigrants and refugees, especially in recent years. In the absence of official and reliable data, relevant information has been collected from various unofficial sources. Thus the probability of inaccuracies and/or overlapping is high.

#### *Refugees in Greece*

Refugees in Greece - whether asylum seekers, people with status under the UNHCR mandate, or de facto refugees - come mostly from areas of the world where political and other freedoms are suppressed. In the vicinity of Greece, the Balkan

25. N. Petropoulos, *Return Movement 1971-86, Research Program*, op. cit. Vol. I, p.p. 87-108.

26. A. Ragoussis, *The Greek Pontian Migrants from the Former Soviet Union*, K. Kassimati, *Pontian Migrants* (op. cit. 19), p.p. 194-205 and 274.

27. D. Karantinos, *Labour Force, Employed and Unemployed*, *Social Sciences Review*, No 66, 1987, p. 142.

28. N. Polyzos, *Conséquences de retour en Grèce des émigrés*, Paris 1971.

29. E. Emke-Poulopoulou, *Problems of Migration and Repatriation* (op. cit. 17), p. 358.

and Middle East countries have been the main providers. It is certainly an under-estimate now, since scores of non-Greeks have sought refuge in Greece in the past few years. As a result of the profound socio-economic changes in Eastern Europe, Greece has received many refugees, especially from the Balkan countries. According to official statistical data, the total number of asylum seekers in Greece between 1991 and 1999 (October) was 18,291 persons<sup>30</sup>. The legal status of refugees and other foreign workers is governed by the provisions of Law 1975/91, which replaced the practically dead letter of Law 43110/29. Under the new law, a person recognized as refugee is entitled to stay and work in Greece for one year (residence and work permits are renewable).

In recent years the first recorded influx from the Middle East was possibly the 3,000 Iraqi Christians who came to Greece via Lebanon in 1967. Recently, however, the bulk of Middle East refugees, have come from Turkey. They are either Turkish or Kurdish origin. The latter are more numerous (about 70 per cent), as they are persecuted not only because of their political ideas, but also for their ethnic difference. According to them at least, the Kurdish element - which official Turkey refers to as "mountainous" Turks - accounts for almost 20-25 per cent of that country's total population. Political refugees in Greece, strictly speaking, do not have an automatic right to work. Most of them however do work, albeit in employment often different from the one they were trained for. At any rate, for the majority of them Greece is basically a stop-over on the way to the richer countries of the western world.

#### *Immigrants in Greece*

There are two main categories here:

a. *Legal immigrants* - Ascertaining the numbers of immigrants in Greece is a near impossible task. A good number of them come from countries of the European Community and are, therefore, no longer considered immigrants in the strict sense. The number of immigrants in Greece can be arrived at only indirectly. According to the NSSG data, for example, there were 180,000 foreigners in Greece in 1981. This information, however, refers in general to foreign nationals that happened to be in the country on

the day of census. It is obvious that not all of them can be classified as immigrants. On the other hand, the Directorate of State Security issued 61,361 residence permits in 1988, a marked increase compared with the 2,126 permits issued in 1973. Most of these legal immigrants come from European countries (53,800). Asians, especially Filipinos, also constitute a sizeable group. These legal immigrants are mostly male (60 per cent) and under the age of 40. By and large they are employed in the service sector.

b. *Illegal immigrants* - The real number of foreigners working in Greece becomes much higher if the illegal immigrants are taken into account as well.

Included here are seasonal workers (often tourists), foreign students, foreigners supplied with residence permits, but not with work permits, and of course those who have entered the country illegally. Estimates about the magnitude of this category of people vary. The Organisation for the Employment of Labour Force (O.A.E.D.), had stated that the number of illegal immigrants ranged between 60,000 and 100,000 in 1989<sup>31</sup>. According to press reports, on the other hand, the number of foreigners working without a permit was almost 300,000 in 1991. Today it is believed that they are more than 600,000<sup>32</sup>. Illegal immigrants are mostly young, with limited education and training.

c. *Legalisation process* - The Greek Government, in an effort to provide a legal framework regarding the presence of illegal immigrants in Greece, issued Presidential Decree 358/1997 by virtue of which aliens should apply for a temporary permit of stay (white card). As result 369,629 persons were registered, while it is believed that the number of those, who failed to comply ranges between 150,000 to 200,000.

The main finding is that 65.0% of them are Albanians, although most of them belong to the greek minority of Albania. The second largest ethnic group are Bulgarians (6.7%). Female participation is not very high (26%). As it was to be expected, the largest part of them (44.3%) resides in the region of Attica<sup>33</sup>.

#### *Reasons to choose Greece*

The logical question that arises is, why would a migrant or a refugee choose to go to Greece?

30. Ministry of Public Order.

31. IN.Tzavella, Interview in the Newspaper

"Kathemerine", 15.01.90.

32. S. Goutzaris and S. Karalis, Foreigners Constitute 9% of the Employment in Greece, *Kathemerine*, 20.01.1995.

33. J. Kavounides, *Aliens who Applied for a Temporary Residence Permit*, National Institute of Labour, Athens, 1999.

Notwithstanding the fact that the choice of destinations is usually a very limited one, it could be argued that the geographical factor has played an important role. Greece is situated at the crossroads of three continents. Another element is religious identity. Most of the people in the Balkans are Orthodox, while the Christian Egyptians and Ethiopians are Coptic. Also, during the past forty years, with the exception of the 1967-74 period, Greece has enjoyed political stability and freedom which compare more than satisfactorily with the situation that has prevailed in any neighbouring country. Climatic compatibility for persons from Third World countries may also be a factor. Immigration into Greece, however, could not be adequately explained without reference to the emi-

gration that preceded it. It brought about serious distortions in the Greek labour market. Today manpower shortages seem to coexist with surpluses. The former usually occur in the primary sector, a consequence perhaps of the fact that most emigrants came from there. Labour surpluses are found mainly in the secondary and tertiary sectors. At the same time a process of vertical social mobility is making its presence felt in Greece as well. Indigenous people tend to avoid low paid jobs with limited "social standing". As in many other countries, these vacancies are filled by foreigners. Finally, at the present stage of development, Greece has a very large number of small businesses, which provide employment - often seasonal - at wage levels that mainly foreigners find attractive.

# Brain drain and African universities

by Raymond J. Smyke\*

## Introduction

Brain drain as commonly understood in development and labour literature refers to the departure for other countries of university-trained persons and other skilled manpower that have received a costly and specialised education. This training is provided by the state with the legal or implied understanding that the skills and knowledge gained are to be used for the benefit of the nation.

In Africa the public service, according to the ILO, is the largest employer dwarfing the private salaried business sector. Since brain drain seldom refers to entrepreneurs, and there is very little evidence that senior civil servants—secure in privileged jobs, voluntarily quit to go abroad—the default assumption is that professionals like physicians; research scientists and university teachers make up the brain drain. This paper concentrates on how it applies to African universities, the larger segment.

Though not as destitute as doomsayers would have us believe, African universities face serious problems. Of the 95 state or national institutions in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), most are functioning as they should, many showing signs of marked improvement, but as one country differs from another so do their universities. Entering the Third Millennium the dominant characteristic among the more successful institution is strong leadership and emerging good governance. This encouraging and positive evolution cannot be overestimated. Specifically, the chief administrative officer—called the rector, president, or vice chancellor—is today a recognized academic, providing stability to faculty, staff and students, often in a desperate economic and political environment. Above all, he or she is an example to the nation of what university leadership is all about. None of this is spontaneous. It stems from a remarkable level of inter-university coordination fostered by the Association of African Universities (AAU).

The singular difference between institutions in North America or Europe is the dominant role of state authority and its exercise of political control over higher education. What is taught, who teaches it, and how students behave are issues influenced and even regulated by the state; they

are among the important causes of non-creative tension on African campuses. With the total cost of tertiary education paid from public funds, political control of the process is often justified, while attempts to privatize higher education have fallen short of expectations. Development agencies are marginally helpful. They make no secret of their priorities for universal primary education, and the eradication of illiteracy.

At independence in the 1960s few state universities had departments that taught practical subjects like agronomy, business, engineering, health sciences and the like. The reality is that teaching and curriculum in African universities and secondary schools is not linked to job creation, in the market sense, but tied to employment in the public sector. This entrenched attitude is gradually changing because other faculties now exist, but still they are seldom the first choice of students, adding to state annoyance. The point is that African higher education is turning itself around thanks largely to indigenous leadership. As this continues it will augment the overall contribution to economic, human, political, and social development.

## The issue

One way of looking at brain drain is to ask why so many African professionals, trained university scholars, teachers and administrators, live and work outside their own country? One can see this in the United States, for example, by African authored articles in scholarly journals; by counting the university positions they occupy; by observing the African Studies Association where African scholars may well be in the majority; and by the proliferation of national groups, for example, the Liberian Studies Association; the Nigerian Scholars Association, and others.

Statistical and census evidence may also be examined. In the mid-1990s there were 134,500 Africans in Great Britain. Of those over 18 years old 14,500 had first degrees and 4,600 had advanced degrees. (Owen, 1994) The author points out that Black Africans, of all the ethnic groups, have the largest percentage of recognised educational qualifications. The wealth of data in this report corroborates another, perhaps more germane study, stemming from pioneering work by

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I. B. Logan (Logan, 1992) on the Africa-US flow of professionals between 1980 and 1989. Logan analysed U. S. census data and statistics found in the Justice Department's Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service. He confirmed the observations noted above with hard evidence on the brain drain from Africa to the United States. Building on both studies, particularly Logans, I intend to advance the work in another direction by asking the question: What was the situation at African universities that prompted well trained personnel to emigrate?

A World Bank official noted that: "African governments, in many cases, have pushed away professional talent that was trained at very, very high cost. In many cases, this is just the result of very poor economic performance. Government can't pay these talented people, and they are not going to spend their lives working for nothing and not even having the psychological rewards of working in a dynamic, forward-going society." (Jaycox, 1993, p.73)

The answers to these questions are an integral part of the movement of people, a phenomenon deeply troubling the international humanitarian regime and developed countries—the poles of attraction for the movement of people.

Migration is an old and honourable process for labour exchange and for people to begin new lives in another place. "Man is naturally mobile. In every epoch, in every part of the world and in every civilisation, there has been migration. Migration must not therefore be regarded as an abnormal phenomenon disturbing the natural order of things. The migrant is no exception because migration is a normal part of people's individual and collective lives. This is an essential truth that is little appreciated nowadays and of which we should all become more fully aware." (OECD, 1987, p.27)

The United States is an example of a receiving country. Between 1895 and 1914, 1.2 million persons a year left Europe for the United States where they furnished desperately needed labour for a growing industry. World population is the main change since then. In 1900 it was estimated to be 1.2 billion people—one hundred years later it is 6 billion people and growing, with 80 per cent living in poor countries. The U.S. Bureau of the Census shows that immigration remains

important. In the decade 1980 to 1990 total population increased by 22.1 million with one-third or 7.3 million due to legal immigration. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) claims that illegal immigration (two to five million) plus the children born to all immigrants account for over one-half of the 22.1 million. (Fox/Mehlman, 1992, p. 64) Legal or illegal, no concern has ever been expressed in the United States—either at national policy level or among advocacy groups—for the harm that brain drain and emigration do to countries of origin. Significant emigration from Cuba, Eastern Europe, Haiti, India, Latin America, Vietnam and elsewhere, demonstrate this lack of concern. Migration studies confirm the obvious, that people in poor countries afflicted by poverty and lack of opportunity often leave their normal place of abode to try their luck elsewhere. As migrants they have an element of choice—to go or not to go—and should not be confused with refugees who are forced to leave their normal place of abode because of famine, natural or man made disasters, persecution, or war. Refugees often have little choice. When they flee to another part of their own country they are called *internally displaced*, when they enter another country they are called *asylum seekers*. International conventions, treaties, and a body of humanitarian law provide guidelines on how a receiving country is to treat asylum seekers. Migration, however, is a national responsibility with each state deciding its own immigration policies. Despite all of the rules and regulations at international and state level, common sense tells us that the unemployed, the chronically poor, adventurous young adults, and others will head for a country where they believe their personal and economic security can be enhanced. In sum, poverty among a majority of the earth's inhabitants is the nub of why people are on the move.

### Why a brain drain

Africa is in dire straits and conventional wisdom suggests that its best and brightest should help solve the continent's problems rather than become a brain drain. Indeed, as used in development literature brain drain is pejorative, a stigma, but also a development paradox. "About

100,000 foreign experts work in Africa, while some 100,000 skilled Africans work in Europe and in North America." (Williams, 1994)

Prominent African scholar Prof. Ali Mazrui in his 1986 television documentary *The Africans: A Triple Heritage*, saw no problem at all with brain drain pointing out that culture spreads with migrating people moving to a new place and settling down. Seven years later an older and wiser Mazrui laments the destructive influence of "the brain drain syndrome" on African universities which he observes are being "dis-Westernised" without re-Africanisation," calling the process "the Bantustamsation of African universities," (Mazrui, 1993, pp. 4-7)

Logan identifies brain drain as the loss of professional, technical and kindred workers (PTK) from one country to another. It takes place at different levels: developed to developed (UK to USA); developed to resource-rich, less developed (US to Saudi Arabia); least developed to slightly more resource-rich country (Mali to Côte d'Ivoire) and less developed to a developed country, the case under discussion. (Logan, 1992, p. 289) He singles out the last case for in depth study because it deals with the Reverse Transfer of Technology (RTT) and applies more specifically to the African condition. RTT is made up largely of students who once studied in the United States as private or sponsored scholars. Upon completion of their studies they return home as intended from the start, but after several years the conditions of work, their professional development and the contribution they are making to their own society become marginal and depressing. To assure the future well being of children, family and their own careers they use contacts from student days to seek legitimate employment in the United States, generally with an American university. This is important for two reasons: first, it is the reverse of what development aid tries to achieve through transfer of technology and human resources; second, it reflects a rational, well thought out family decision based on a lengthy trial period at home before emigrating. Other persons complete training and choose to remain in the United States for personal reasons; still others must remain because changed circumstances like war or political strife make it unsafe

to return. A small number become clandestine immigrants. There are many variations on the theme, but the numbers are small.

Logan finds that people in the RTT group tend to come from the large population African countries, Nigeria and Kenya for example, that are politically pro-Western. Some scholars from pro-Marxist countries were admitted as political refugees not immigrants. The first choice of a PTK is the former colonising country meaning: Belgium, England, France, Portugal, or Spain. The first choice of the RTT group is where they studied showing absolute linguistic correlation. Specifically, people from countries where English is a national language go to where English is spoken as do others from French, Portuguese, and Spanish language countries. Linguistic compatibility, prior residence as students, knowledge of the host country's culture, and ease of employment are called *pull factors*, a combination which facilitates the decision to emigrate to one country and not to another. The 1994 South Africa elections that ushered in the Mandela government stimulated regional pull factors. Trained manpower, particularly university lecturers were needed to assist with educational expansion for the Black population. Attractions included a higher standard of living than in neighbouring countries with salaries paid in Rand, a fully convertible currency.

*Push factors* are circumstances in the home environment that make a person think about leaving his normal place of abode for another part of the same country, a neighbouring country, or for a more distant place like the United States or the United Kingdom. For university dons a significant push was the absolute reduction of African government expenditure on higher education due to the mid-1970s world-wide recession set off by the first oil crisis. The pinch began to be felt in the early 1980s as deplorable economic conditions set in to stay, causing generalised belt tightening. No African country was exempt, not even the major oil producers like Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon. University career prospects for the best and brightest were eliminated along with research, travel, library, equipment, and professional enrichment opportunities. Cuts in secondary education resulted in poorly qualified students

going to university, students needing more, not less support. Some African governments had recruiting teams travelling abroad to get their own nationals to return and take part in nation building, appealing to a sense of patriotism and loyalty. Many qualified men and women responded positively. But this too stopped, sending a signal to Africans abroad to sit tight and look for a job locally until things improve at home. As time passes people settle into careers making it difficult to return.

By 2001 African university employment has largely stabilized, recruitment coming from the ranks of new doctoral graduates. An encouraging sign among young African scholars in the United States—many from prestigious universities—is their willingness to use academic leave to teach specialized courses in their home country, often paying their own expenses to do so.

When compared to overall immigration figures, the PTK and RTT groups are small in number but show interesting trends: a) as a world percentage the growth rates of African experts are higher; b) professionals make up a larger part of the continent's migrant pool compared to other regions; c) the growth rate of professional migrants from Africa, and the world as a whole, is increasing.

Perhaps one of Logan's most interesting findings is the large number of Africans admitted to the United States under Third Preference Principles (TPP). These are immigrants "who are granted preferential status specifically on the basis of their specialised, high level skills." (Logan, 1992, p.295) Of all TPP visas more than 5% went to Africans, and in two specific years, African TPP exceeded the rest of the world. The implications of this are intricately linked to brain drain because United States government visa allocations are partly responsible for draining African brains. In addition, the less developed country that paid for the formation of its own expert, the RTT, is now subsidising the United States of America and abetting its own under development. In the context of TPP visas it exposes the pejorative notion of African brain drain. In a sense, though, nothing has changed. American scientific and research laboratories continue to recruit newly graduated PhDs in science and math's from universities in English and French speaking Africa.

## Conditions on the ground

The 95 state universities in Sub-Sahara Africa serve a population estimated by the United Nations in 2000 to be just under 600 million people. Elsewhere, there are 22 state universities in South Africa serving a population of 48 million, and 33 in North Africa—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia—for 160 million people, making a total of 150 state universities for a continental population of 810 million, projected to double by the year 2025. One may compare the nearly 100 universities in the United Kingdom serving 60 million people, projected in the same time frame to grow to 63 million. (Higher Education in Developing Countries, 2000)

All told there are about 8,000 degree granting institutions worldwide. Approximately one-half are in the United States of America with the rest spread throughout the world. The SSA ratio of one university to roughly six million inhabitants is lean in comparison to any other continent. Understandably there are other tertiary or post secondary training institutions in Africa as elsewhere. But state or national universities are a very specific type of institution, authorised and supported by the government to function as a university. They are recognised internationally by each other for the degrees that they issue and these degrees and the quality of education that they represent have international currency. The world's 8000 universities are expected to maintain recognised, comparable, standards of instruction. Private, religious, and quasi-public institutions, some older than national universities, are local or territorial in character and designed to fulfill specific needs. Their quality of instruction, the degrees and certificates issued, and the effectiveness of their graduates may in many cases be superior to a national university, but these institutions are not easily comparable.

The American system of higher education is *essentially private*—someone other than the national government pays for the education of the students. The system in the rest of the world is *essentially public* because the national government regulates higher education and pays almost all of the costs for its own nationals from tax revenue. This is the practice in SSA. Since

independence, governments have paid all of the expenses for their students to attend university. Up until the mid 1970s this worked well, but since then the expense involved has imposed a near impossible burden on the state. International agencies intent on reforming African higher education would like to see more costs shared by the private sector through scholarships, or by the parents and the students themselves. Student loans, part of this reform thinking, have been tried in a number of places without marked success. In light of the depressed economic climate, the social cost of such changes is more than governments are prepared to pay.

### **The social cost of reforming higher education**

The notion of social cost means the immediate and usually unexpected negative effect on society of government policy. In Africa when higher education charges were shifted to students and parents in an attempt at burden sharing, the immediate and unexpected results were student riots, police intervention, university closure, physical damage to participants and property, sometimes loss of life. Disturbances that get our of hand make the social cost too high for the state to continue implementing the policy change. It is not always easy to isolate precisely the nature of student grievances, but three salient elements always seem to be involved: money, instruction, and accommodation—all being inadequate. In French language countries belonging to the CFA monetary zone late payment of monthly allowances is most often the reason for student disturbances. Elsewhere, student housing, food, transport, academic facilities and the quality of instruction combine to keep students at a low level of seething resentment against their own university. Sporadic student unrest is not new anywhere in the world; it has been a part of SSA academic life since these institutions were founded. But, a serious and destructive turn began in the mid-to-late 1970s as a response to the belt tightening mentioned above. From 1980 to 1990 student unrest has become institutionalised into annual university rituals. The onset of serious disturbances correlates with

the increased volume of RTT emigration to the United States outlined in the Logan study. From a long list of events at institutions throughout SSA, the academic year 1992/1993 may be highlighted. Universities in Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia were all closed for portions of the academic year. A closer look at some of these will illustrate how complex each closure is.

In *Ivory Coast* the declining years of late President Felix Houphouët-Boigny witnessed dramatically increased student-police confrontations devoid of identifiable academic issues. It appeared that student power was determined to change the government while those responsible for law and order (riot-police, gendarmes, army) were determined to contain student unrest and maintain the status quo. This antagonism is old. When the University of Abidjan was built at independence, a training school for the Gendarmerie was constructed opposite the main gate. The meaning was clear; the result was festering antagonism. In May 1991 an Armed Forces punitive expedition was mounted in a university undergraduate residence; rape, torture, wanton violence was committed. There seemed little doubt that the move was officially sanctioned by the senior military. The President ordered a commission of inquiry and things were quiet for a time. Classes resumed on 19 January 1992 amid mild unrest. In early February the commission findings were released naming the Armed Forces Chief of Staff as the instigator and recommending punishment. The President declined to pursue the matter, as he desperately needed the military to stay in power. On 13 February, university and secondary school students went on a rampage that was brutally put-down by a combined security operation. Classes later resumed under a false calm, but change occurred only after the death of the President on 7 December 1993 and the installation of a new government.

*Nigeria* has a long pattern of higher education turmoil. In 1992 it began to get violent with increased loss of student life. In the first three months of that year: Usman Dan Fodio University in Sokoto was closed after violent demonstrations; the Federal Polytechnic at Ado-Ekiti was closed after students rampaged through

the town; the Vice Chancellor of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria fled the campus threatened by student violence. In 1993, 23,000 university lecturers went on a four-month strike with a long list of complaints including the non-implementation of a September 1992 government agreement on salary and additional money for education and institutional autonomy. Writing in *West Africa* Paxton Idowu observed: "The chaotic educational system in Nigeria appears now worsened by another [university] teachers' strike. Once reputed to be one of the best in Africa, Nigeria's educational system is fast disintegrating as a result of inconsistent policy guidelines, inadequate Rindling and perennial teachers' work-to-rule action. The situation is fast getting out of hand and students and parents look on helpless. Students seem to spend more time at home than at school." (Idowu, 1993) Students at many institutions supported the lecturers.

In *Ethiopia* in early January 1993, the President of Addis Ababa University, Professor Alemayehu Tefera, issued a statement to the student body about the aftermath of student demonstrations that closed the University. The student toll included one death, 204 treated in hospitals, and 49 held by police, with the associate dean of students injured. Public authorities throughout SSA seemed to have taken a harder line during this period when student disturbances leading to loss of life were on the increase.

The majority of universities in Sub-Saharan Africa today are functioning at a much lower level of turmoil. Generalised discontent remains, due to inadequate institutional funding, and student-parent reluctance to accept, or even consider, pay-as-you-go education. The social cost of this turmoil is immense, placing the burden on teachers, parents, students, the police, and civil administration. Above all it is a bad example for students in primary and secondary education.

### Student activism

In SSA students have been called a threat to state security. In a weak state this may be true, but the Ivory Coast example showed that abuse of human rights is among the important reasons for continued student unrest. The clients or students in an African university community differ from

students in advanced industrialised nations. After competitive selection, the basically rural, eager, hopeful, young person, encouraged by family and village, enters a life-shaping process as one of the fortunate few to obtain higher education. Each year a new cohort enters and each year an educated cohort exits. It is ludicrous to suggest that those lucky enough to get in, do so with the intent of rioting and disrupting their own classes. But still something happens. Incoming students are quickly informed by upper classmen as to what is wrong with the place. As they move through the system, a very small like-minded group assigns itself the mandate to improve things. These so called *movers and shakers* gravitate towards campus leadership. There is a strong correlation between student leadership and later political activity. In Africa demagogic student activists are invariably from another country. It's as if the local students given this one chance do not want to lose it. They are aware that coven security forces are on campus tracking the agitators, so that anyone aiming for a career in the civil service, as most are, will not soil their own nest. They leave the rioting to others.

Confronting students and teachers in many institutions are physical facilities including classrooms, libraries, accommodation, and food services that have not been maintained. Decay is the first word that comes to mind in seeing the once proud grounds and buildings. The colonial higher education legacy to Africa—government paying all student expenses—never entertained the notion of student employment on campus. When maintenance budgets were slashed, staff was made redundant, facilities left to tropical wear and tear. The philosophy and practice of students helping to maintain their own alma mater is alien.

A rundown, shoddy-looking, overgrown, campus is not a pleasant learning environment and students often visualise their future the same way. Many accept it, others rebel. Closures are a fact of university life, but the process of moving students through goes on, and fortunately things are getting better. The Geneva-based World University Service (WUS) issues a monthly *Human Rights Bulletin* and an annual report on *Academic Freedom*. There is good news. Where democratic state governance is

practiced, universities are generally calm, but still, some things seem never to change—like favoritism—a factor in student discontent. It was noted earlier that the public service is the largest employer in Africa today. Senior civil servants in all countries enjoy a regular salary, good terms and conditions of work. They are the elites in the midst of poverty. Their status precludes the need to become part of the brain drain. A common complaint of parents is that available state scholarships, student loans, or study abroad opportunities are not competitively awarded but go to the children of this elite group. Worse still, jobs in the civil service are arranged upon graduation. This favoritism contrasts with the burden sharing preached by political leaders. The bulk of society is poor. Favoritism for privileged children is resented.

Though waves of unrest and rioting often appear baseless—a banal incident touching off a storm—the daily frustration at the inability to study, to learn, and to be taught under decent conditions is difficult. Still, selfish concern for their well being at university does not seem to be the primary source of discontent. There is a deeper fear that the state, to which their whole future is linked, cannot survive in a sufficiently workable form to assure their future. This concern for civil society is Africa-wide.

### Universities in a civil society

Current indicators that measure African economic, social and political development are in the main negative. But Africa is part of a world system and cannot easily be singled out and placed under a microscope for analysis without some reference to the whole developing world. The same may be said of African universities, they are part of the world system; students, faculty, libraries, internet and research facilities should be on par and interchangeable with institutions the world over.

Higher education everywhere is just another social function among many provided by the state. It is special only through its articulate international constituency anxious to maintain appropriate standards. A generally accepted premise after World War II held that university education provided the intellectual driving force

to develop a nation and was well worth supporting. The clientele were a select number of students who passed through a rigorous secondary education. University was definitely not intended for the masses. In 1945 there were state universities in North Africa and in the then Union of South Africa, but none in Sub-Saharan Africa. As independence approached in 1960, some national universities were built in SSA based on the prevailing *elitist* premise. Starts up costs were funded from a combination of sources—government, private industry, and foundation grants. The new states could generally not afford the expense involved. External funding was not pure charity it also assured control of higher education in Africa. Along with the money came expatriate teachers and administrators vital for the task of institution building. This outside direction was justified because colonies, except for Ghana perhaps, had no funds or qualified staff. A deeper concern was the need to make world-class institutions, at the time this could only be achieved with control in the hands of expatriates. The first indigenous African Vice Chancellor, Prof. K. O. Dike, was appointed to Nigeria's University of Ibadan in 1960, after the nation-achieved independence.

By the late 1970s it was time for foreigners to let go and let the universities become fully African in every sense of the word, unfortunately, stagnated economic development prevented the state from paying the bill. Weak national leaders found it cheaper, and politically safer, to contract expatriate teachers and to let donors pay some of the expenses. (Ajayi, p.70) In developed countries what came to be called the *massification* of education had already begun—students and parents from all strata in society demanded higher education as a right—governments responded by hastily expanding facilities, and in so doing, abandoned the elitist notion of universities "providing the intellectual driving force to develop the nation." The massification occurred in Africa slightly later, but resource poor countries added no new facilities. Elsewhere, a choice is possible, curtail the service or pass the increased cost to the student. Both were tried in Africa, without success. Thus began the serious deterioration of university life, and the acceleration of the brain drain. Turn

around began a decade and a half later when Africans finally took full control of their own institutions. By the mid 1990s the strong leadership found among Rectors, Presidents, and Vice Chancellors was perceptible. The role of the Association of African Universities (AAU) remains crucial to completing the turn around.

### Towards solution

Practically everyone concerned with African development can list the continent's problems through short descriptive labels. TV watchers, alert readers of print journalism, even school children in advanced countries know these by heart: illiteracy, unemployment, discrimination against girls and women, debt burden, negative terms of trade, military spending, corruption, HIV/AIDS—the list goes on. Given all this, a strong case may be made that without a vibrant, fully functioning university system in each country Africa's condition will remain unchanged—for the simple reason that the rest of the world cannot solve the continent's problems.

Though African higher education benefits from modest external assistance, it is more a case of everyone's concern, but no one's priority—not the World Bank, nor UNESCO, nor bi-lateral aid agencies—not even their own governments in some instances. The awesome task of making it all work has devolved on a small band of university leaders, less than two hundred in all, plus the professors, lecturers and others staff who choose to carry on, giving their best to the student, despite poor terms and conditions of service. Specifically, university leadership in close cooperation with the AAU has made critical adaptations, accounting in part for the new learning environment. Among these adaptations are: crafting the *modus operandi* that accommodates government demands for tight control over universities, with institutional needs to preserve academic freedom. This alone has enhanced institutional ability to: a) survive in a harsh economic climate, b) adapt to an SSA-wide nine-fold increase in enrolments, c) do so with marginal expansion in staff, or facilities. All this and much more goes on quietly, day in and day out, making higher education meaningful for the students and the state, while slowing the brain drain.

To support this momentum, a unique private consortium: "The Partnership to Strengthen African Universities" was launched in April 2000. Four major American foundations support the Partnership: Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Rockefeller, Ford and MacArthur foundations. (Partnership).

### Conclusion

For a long time some staff at some African universities dealt with job frustration by finding other employment at home or abroad—but most did not! Higher education—firmly in African hands—now delivers the best quality that circumstances allow. From this, several conclusions may be drawn.

First, the hopeful expectations of the 1960s did not materialise in the following decades because the university model could not mature under foreign control. The new African model must be credible in the world community, and inculcate young men and women with what it means to be an African in an economically troubled land—but their own land—which only they can nurture and develop.

Second, the conundrum, which may well, be an agenda for the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennium is this. Can western style academic freedom co-exist in newly democratic, poverty-stricken societies, dependent on higher education to accelerate national self-sufficiency? Political leaders have no patience for spoiled and pampered students who have every privilege and yet wreak havoc on a national institution. This implies a collision course between human rights activists and African governments, with the university as a potential arena.

Third, chief executives, almost without exception, are accomplished *academic-politicians* carrying out a delicate and thankless mission to: placate government; mollify recalcitrant faculty and students; maintain international integrity; renew rundown resources; while pursuing excellence in the classroom. Examples abound that many are doing just this.

Fourth, there is general agreement that the brain drain has been slowing down in recent years. The best-qualified teachers and administrator's stay on the job despite conditions of

work that would hardly be tolerated elsewhere. This translates into genuine promise, and a new hope for African universities. The brain drain, in modest proportions, will continue as a small

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# Solution: the critical factor

by G.J.L. Coles\*

## Introduction

Today, the movement of people is increasingly marked by the massive - and growing - size of its negative side i.e. its disorganised, aggressive, involuntary and illegal character. This side is now a major cause of disorder and violence, both within and outside the country of origin, but it is, fundamentally, only one, although among the most negative, of the many effects of a rapidly emerging state of anarchy and chaos in the world. That state threatens the whole world with violence of a nature and scale that is unprecedented. It is, basically, that state which must be addressed if there is to be any hope of solving today's problem of the increasing negative side of the movement of people.

In this paper, I shall examine the problem of the negative side, then, consider its causes, and, finally, look at the question of its solution.

## Examining the problem

First, how should we understand here the movement of people? I think that we should understand it in its broadest sense, that is, so as to include not only movement across frontiers but also within them. The various aspects of movement are more closely related than is sometimes supposed, for they have common origins and interact with one another, and today, we are living in an unstable world of shifting frontiers.

Also, we should see movement today in a context of aggression as well as that of peace. In the present state of the world, movement is increasingly taking place in the form, at least initially, of organised force to expel neighbouring peoples and to occupy their lands. Although this movement still does not appear in most contemporary Western typologies of migration, it should: its omission is indefensible. Throughout history, invasion and settlement have been by far the most important form of migration. Entire continents have been 'discovered' and 'occupied' by this means; and much of the present violence between peoples is over past and actual movement. The movement of people lies at the heart of the problem of war and insecurity. If this form is ignored, as it has been by many migration experts, the perception of the movement of people is seriously inadequate, indeed gravely distorted. Such a

defective perception is at the origin of such statements, which are still heard today, that the negative side of movement is greatly exaggerated and that is largely a benign phenomenon. To a great extent, this perception is a baneful legacy of decades of manipulative post-War thinking, where even the coerced movement of people, provided it was in the 'right' direction, was positive.

If we see the movement of people in its broadest sense, we will recognise at once that it has its positive as well as negative side. Without movement, there is no community; and the facilitating of movement aids the development of community, whether it be national, regional or international. However, if movement is to tend towards the strengthening of community and to individual well-being and development, it must normally be peaceful, orderly, voluntary and legal. If it is disorderly, aggressive, involuntary and illegal, it is mainly negative as it normally tends towards the weakening of community as well as towards individual ill-being and regression.

In this paper, I shall mainly be looking at the negative side of movement, the solution of which problem, I believe, is critical today if we are to avoid the impending global disaster brought on by the anarchy and chaos in the world.

Although, overall, the negative side is still largely offset by the positive one, the former is now growing rapidly in size and significance, and, before too long, it may outweigh the positive. Should this happen, it will inevitably have a harmful effect on the positive side as movement generally is affected. Already, this is happening; and it is both the sign and source of deteriorating community relations. A perfect illustration of the effect of the negative side on the positive is where the social polarisation of war and the threat of invasion leads to the complete suspension of movement for peaceful purposes between the belligerent parties.

The actual dimension and significance of the negative side are greatly underestimated by many migration experts who adopt a too limited definition of movement. Apart from the serious omission of movement by organised violence, there is the widespread limitation of migration thinking to trans-frontier movement, despite the vastly larger phenomenon of internal migration. If, over the last thirty years, trans-frontier migratory movement

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*Transnational Associations*  
4-5/2001, 239-251

can be counted in fives of millions, internal migration can be counted in hundreds of millions.

In the general context of movement, this separation of the two aspects, that is, internal and trans-frontier movement, is too arbitrary to be satisfactory. The former aspect of movement is properly to be considered as mainly negative as it is largely the result of pressure, if not coercion, and it is largely disorganised, taking place in conditions where little or no arrangements are possible for its accommodation.

Of internal migration, a contemporary American historian, William McNeill, has remarked that within the world as a whole, (peasants) persist in their billions, poised on the margins of commercialised society and seeking access to townspeople's privileges and comforts.

Enormous risks and enormous possibilities inhere in such a posture. The human majority is stirring around the entire globe for the first time in history. This makes our age different from any other.

Elaborating on the enormous risks which inhere in such a posture, McNeill went on to note that the magnitude of the problem boggles the imagination, so much so that I find it hard to imagine any perceptible happy solution of the current population explosion. For the foreseeable future, it seems sure that overcrowded and impoverished lands, in which traditional patterns of migration and modes for utilising (and consuming) rural surplus populations have been interrupted, will share the earth with far less densely populated lands, in which the standard of living is immensely higher; and the gap between such regions is more likely to widen than narrow in the immediate future. This in turn means, I think, that pressures for migration into the richer, emptier lands will mount, and only an increasing ruthless force is likely to prevent such movement. (McNeill, W., 1982).

McNeill made the last statement twenty years ago, so it has to be evaluated, today, in the light of more recent economic growth in some of 'the overcrowded and impoverished lands'. To some extent that growth may reduce in the longer term the population explosion and the pressure for migration. However, in any analysis, the imagination would have to include uncertainties, such as that there can be no firm assurance that political conditions will provide the

social stability necessary for uniform development and for movement of a positive character, and that there can be no guarantee that the present process of the liberalisation of world trade will continue so that the newly burgeoning economies, some potentially among the largest in the world, will continue to consider that they have satisfactory access to resources and markets. Moreover, there are still populous and impoverished regions where social and economic conditions have deteriorated further in the last few years. Even in regions where conditions have improved, in the shorter term that improvement may increase the size of the negative side, principally by stimulating illegal migration.

If the Pacific rim is burgeoning, the same cannot be said of much of Africa and Central Asia as well as of some other regions. In regard to Africa and Central Asia, conditions are now such that the British historian, Paul Johnson, has spoken of 'rich Europe facing an arc of envy stretching from Gibraltar to Murmansk.' Along this arc, which follows what the Director of the Harvard Institute of Strategic Studies, Samuel P. Huntington, has called 'the fault-lines' of Christian and Islamic Civilisations, mutual envy, and greed, have been for many centuries constant features of power struggle and territorial annexation.

According to Paul Johnson, Europe will be in the eye of the coming storm. It is the largest collection on earth of affluent people, overwhelmingly white, as yet, with high and rising incomes, chronically low birth rates and stagnant or declining populations. It is, he said, a privileged minority sitting on the world's most desirable real estate and a high proportion of its total wealth. To the south and east live the overwhelming majority of the world's inhabitants, spectacularly poor for the most part, alien to Europe's religion and culture, but with birth rates so high in some cases that they must export populations or starve, countless millions of them driven by a fierce desire to escape from the corruption and violence which dominate their lives. Throughout history, he said, such unbalanced ratios of population and wealth have invariably been corrected by conquest, colonisation and slaughter. Migration by the countless millions of these people presents an insuperable problem. Their numbers are too great, their cultures too different, their demands exorbitant.

Paul Johnson concluded that while the governments of Western Europe have been haggling over the Maastricht agenda he had an uneasy feeling that history had moved on and that the issues which had been discussed so passionately - monetary union and the precise meaning of federalism - had little relevance to the real perils which Europe would soon be facing. What was conspicuously not being prepared for, he said, was the future that was likely to be faced; one of menace, violence and extremism, requiring fierce vigilance, strong leadership, moral and physical courage.

At the present time, it is not so much a case of Islamic aggression against Christian lands as that of Christian aggression against lands with an Islamic majority - constituted, in some instances, by recent immigration - and that of the assertion of independence by Islamic populations incorporated by force into predominantly Christian nations. This may change if a further rise in Islamic fundamentalism leads to overt aggression. This aggression has been accompanied by 'ethnic cleansing' and by talk of inevitable population transfers and exchanges. Elsewhere, mass de-naturalisation has been considered as a preliminary to expelling unwanted minorities.

Largely as a result of the aggressive movement of people, conflicts, mostly internal, are now waging in many parts of the world, causing, overall, the largest displacement in history. Not even the displacements of the two world wars, massive as they were, equal in size today's world-wide displacement. In some parts, the displacement has occurred in such conditions that people have died like flies, in tens of thousands, the survivors enduring traumatic conditions. In many cases, the displacement has already lasted more than a decade; in others, it has lasted for more than a generation. In many cases, the displacement has served to prolong conflict or to undermine fragile peace processes. Early in 1995 the Secretary-General of Doctors Without Frontiers, Alan Destexhe, observed of the Rwandan camps in Zaire: The camps have turned into prisons. The Hutu who led the genocidal campaign against Tutsi civilians last spring are now holding hundreds of thousands of refugees hostages while they plot their counter-attack against the new government in Rwanda.'

Has not the same been said in the past of countless camps in many other parts of the world? Today, however, the number of major conflicts is high i.e. over thirty-five, and some of them are seriously threatening to become regional ones, engulfing such strategically sensitive regions as the Balkans and the Caucasus and setting off broader inter-civilisational conflicts.

And in many of the new megapolises of the populous and impoverished areas of the world, numbers continue to rise, while conditions worsen. In some cases, concern over illegal immigration from vast urban slums has led to the creation of regional free trade areas and enormous financial loans to deal with economic crises. Their results remain to be seen and cannot be guaranteed in view of fragile political situations. Illegal immigration has caused a backlash which is growing in scope and virulence, poisoning community relations. While the size of illegal immigration has not grown dramatically in recent times, the anarchy and chaos in markets and in society as a whole have significantly reduced the capacity of communities to accept this immigration.

In every quarter of the globe, barriers against illegal immigration are being set up or strengthened, mostly by administrative means but increasingly by physical ones. In some cases, the barriers are electrified fences or walls several hundred kilometres long patrolled by armed soldiers. Illegal immigrants are being detained in remote military bases, by the tens of thousands, behind barb-wire.

Some of these barriers are not new, but the accelerating rhythm of their construction is. International efforts in the last few years to prevent conflict, especially in areas of 'civilisational clash', have largely been unsuccessful. Mostly, it has been a case of too little, too late. So have international efforts to enforce or restore peace. So far, sanctions and reparation measures have also failed to stop conflicts. Worse, many instances of insufficient or inappropriate international action have been counter-productive: for example, peace-keeping, when there has been no peace to keep; mediation, when war has made the test of strength the determining factor, not diplomacy; and humanitarian action, when the basic need is justice and peace, not relief, have all invit-

ed manipulation for partisan ends, which has not been difficult to do because of the international community's dependence by and large on the parties' consent. In nearly all the situations in which it has been asked in recent times to play a 'peace' role, the United Nations has failed, for, in the last analysis, it lacks the means for compelling the parties to shift from intransigent positions. The recent whole-scale withdrawal from Somalia is only one among a growing list of failures. Faced with the hard and inescapable logic of war, that it is about the imposition of will by superior force and not about a peaceful settlement of a dispute, the international community has desperately sought to conceal its inability or unwillingness to enforce the peace by a smokescreen of bluff, which has ruthlessly been called by belligerents. The authority and credibility of political and military organs of the international and regional communities has been badly damaged.

Most ominously, perhaps, is the emergence of 'civilisational blocs' in international politics, which is leading some strategists to predict that the clash of civilisations will dominate global politics. Should this emergence be confirmed and consolidated, which, I believe, is still not certain, the role of the United Nations in the maintenance and restoration of peace will inevitably be adversely affected, if only because of the difficulty in the way of affirmative voting among all the permanent members of the Security Council.

In view of all this, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the present negative side of the movement of people is a sign and a source of a rapid - and mostly unforeseen - emergence of a world crisis. Any assessment of the significance of the negative side of this movement must include, finally, an appreciation of the conditions generally underlying not only this problem but also all the other major and related problems. For the negative side is only one among many symptoms of a general underlying crisis. In other words, the problem of the negative side of movement must be considered in the context of the general state of the world. It cannot be seen as sui generis, as it was seen so often in the past.

Here, the observations of the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, on the 1995 World Summit for Social Development, are rel-

evant. He said: that the heads of state and government, 'will address a crisis that would have been unimaginable a decade ago; the unravelling of society. The crisis is of a different order from the ideology driven nuclear peril of the Cold War. Yet it threatens many nations - ultimately the whole world - as much as any weapon of mass destruction'.

### **The question of causes**

The unravelling of society', which the Secretary-General referred to as the grave crisis facing the whole world, is not a state or a cause but a process or symptom. What, then, has set this process in motion and lies at the root of the symptom?

In his observations, the Secretary-General did not say, preferring, evidently, not to enter too deeply into the area of explanation. Instead, he limited himself to mentioning a long list of current problems. Yet, obviously, a deeper level of explanation is required: under development and overpopulation, ecological crisis, human rights violations, ethnic conflicts and so on are insufficient by themselves, individually and collectively; they are only the consequences of a general underlying state in society.

What that state is, which is unravelling society, the poorer person has no trouble in saying. It suffices to ask a taxi driver. It is the rich who avoid identifying it, usually on the ground that 'we all know what the causes are and there is no need to go into them.' However, such talk as there is in government and bureaucratic circles is generally confused - and confusing. For example, the phrase 'root causes' is often used indiscriminately to cover practically everything, as if there were no chain - or sequence - of causes. At times, it is as if there were a deliberate effort to avoid a penetrating and meaningful examination of causes.

A refusal to examine seriously the issue of cause amounts, finally, to an unwillingness to tackle the problem; an unwillingness, in the case of those responsible for society, which is wholly indefensible where the problem is recognised as gravely threatening the whole world.

It is to that rare person, the philosopher-king, that one must turn for an honest and considered

view. One such person is Vaclav Havel. Writing, several years ago, in the isolation of his prison cell, Havel observed that 'the crisis of today's world is a crisis of human responsibility, and, hence, a crisis in human identity adding that behind this crisis was turning away from Being and, consequently, a crisis of the absolute line of genuine responsibility' (Havel, V., 1972)

If Havel's diagnosis is right, which I believe is the case, the result is a state of anarchy and chaos; for a crisis of the absolute line of genuine responsibility leads, sooner or later, to anarchy, as Paul Johnson discerned in his recent history of the twentieth century, and a crisis of human identity leads, sooner or later, to chaos.

It is, therefore, that state of anarchy and chaos which has set in motion the 'unravelling of society' and which is at the root of the negative side of the movement of people.

Originally the crisis of the individual, this crisis has been transferred or projected into the behaviour of human groups which are being alienated from themselves. Tracing the process of alienation, Havel concluded by noting

(by now) the behaviour of the social group, of various establishments and of whole societies has become utterly self-serving, alienated many times over from the original ideas and has degenerated into the realities of existence-in-the-world'; and, of course, at the same time it still persists in operating in the name of the original - and long since betrayed - ideals.

One consequence of this alienating process, Havel observed, is the enormous conflict between words and deeds so prevalent today; every one talks about freedom, democracy, humanity, justice, human rights, universal equality and happiness, about peace and saving the world from nuclear apocalypse and protecting the environment and life generally - and at the same time, every one - more or less, consciously or unconsciously, in one way or another - serves those values or ideals only to the extent necessary to serve himself or herself. The world becomes a chess board for the cynical and utterly self-serving 'inter-play' of interests.

Although at the time Havel was writing in Czechoslovakia - and was one of the very few who had even an inkling of the collapse of a regime which, in his country, appeared to be

firmly anchored to society (one in three carried a party card) - he was a man of a wide culture and experience who had a greater range of reference than his own country and, by and large, was also referring to the contemporary world. He saw that global interdependence was complex and existed in the intellectual and psychic spheres as well as in political and economic affairs: Thus, what the 'zeit geist' was in great cosmopolises like New York, Paris and London, was at least as significant for the future of countries like Chile, Nigeria and South Korea as the state of the formers' stock exchanges. He also understood, as even Napoleon understood at the apogee of his power, that the spirit was more important in the end than the sword. As Napoleon exclaimed in a conversation in 1808: «Do you know what I admire most in this world? It's the total inability of force to organise anything. There are only two powers in the world - the sword and the spirit. By spirit I understand the civil and religious institutions ...In the long run, the sword is always beaten by the spirit.»

Today, even the cloak of falsehood and hypocrisy, which has usually covered ruthless self-serving, has been brushed aside as it is openly proclaimed, as 'an objective law rooted in human nature', that international life, at least, is about power and survival, not about justice and solidarity, and that the science of foreign policy has nothing to do with ethics or law. In such a view, which has particularly been associated in modern times with such thinkers as Hans Morgenthau and the 'political realist' school of thought, a state of anarchy is a basic principle of international relations, and, thus, its concomitant, chaos, justifies the primary emphasis being placed on organised violence, not on organised peace.

Inevitably, the consequence of this theory - or principle - of anarchy, which has largely governed contemporary international relations, especially at the level of the great powers, is the state of chaos which we have today and which now widely goes under the name of 'the new world disorder.'

With the collapse of values and order in society, civilisation is now being reduced rapidly to the primitive state of the jungle, so that for an

increasingly large section of the world's population life is, as Thomas Hobbes said it was in an 'unorganised' society, 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.'

In his inimitable way, Hobbes spelt out bluntly the consequences of this state. He said:

To the war of every man, against every man, this is also consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place. When there is no common power, there is no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues...It is also consequent to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no thine and mine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it.

Such a state of ill-being can only mean that a society is locked into a process of disintegration (or unravelling). For, in the natural order of things, the loss of a sense of Being is, ultimately, the loss of community; and the loss of an absolute horizon of genuine responsibility is, ultimately, the loss of restraint on reckless self-serving. At bottom, it is the case that Plato thus stated: 'If one is not, then nothing is.' And with the process of self-destruction goes the loss of power; and with the loss of power goes the loss of law and justice, as Hobbes observed.

The negative side of today's movement of people provides a good illustration of these truths; for the countless victims of human irresponsibility who are forced today to leave their homes are both the sign and source of social disintegration: and their subsequent inability to find another home is yet a further unravelling of society.

The question is whether the present crisis is a periodical one or whether it is a more basic one occurring at the end of a civilisation. I am inclined to believe that it is the latter, as the 'Death of God' has already been proclaimed in Western society. In my view, such a proclamation heralds the disintegration of a civilisation, for a civilisation exists as an expression of a principle of Being which enables human beings to surmount self-serving by uniting them in a transcendent effort for a common good. Consequently, the rejection of that principle entails sooner or later the demise of the united effort.

The movement of people is a phenomenon of particular interest to historians of civilisations.

Those, like Arnold Toynbee, who see a civilisation as a human effort governed by cyclical laws of life and death tend to see the movement of people as a mark of the last period of a civilisation, although it may also mark other periods in different ways.

In a cyclical theory of civilisation, the West can be considered as moving out of its Period of Trouble into a Period of the Universal State, the last period before a final collapse brings about a period of Interregnum.

In his study of the emergence of meaning in history, Harvey Coles observed of the Time of Troubles:

That title of (this) period adequately indicates the rapid accumulation of revolutions, civil wars and intellectual revolt that accompanies the working downward through the social order of the rejection of authority. By this time the religious inspiration is fast losing its cosmic status and begins to sink towards the level of a mere group loyalty. The shaking-off of its influence as a social force is seen in the rise of agnostic and atheistic philosophies as substitutes of theology. There is continued material expansion in wealth and territory as the powerful exploit their opportunities. The selfish nature of their aims and methods, however, tends to increase the social break-up, involving as it does an indifference to the interests of others, especially those opposed to exploitation.

Resentment may finally flare up in the revolt of the lowest classes of society, whose organised adherence to the generally accepted principle of self-interest comes to threaten the stability of the entire social order.

Of the succeeding period of the Universal State, Harvey Coles has observed:

Apprehension in the air, the ancestral religion now a sub-cosmic force, and philosophy a failure as a substitute social cement, there seems to be at the end of the period of troubles only one course to be taken if authority, such as is left, is to survive to check the disintegration...On the very verge of break-down, therefore, the society rallies its remaining power of socialisation in consenting to the creation of universal totalitarianism...The suppression of civil strife creates an atmosphere of peace and security in which the society can enjoy an Indian summer of

material splendour in spiritual squalor. Beneath the surface the disintegration continues and towards the end is only with increasing difficulty, held in check at moments of crisis. Invasion by the swarming peoples of other societies also lapsing into interregnum contributes to the collapse. (Coles, H., 1978)

The long process of disintegration of civilisation as central to the present world community as the Western one is inevitably the cause of great distress to many; for it is marked not only by the chaos of self-alienation but also by the revival in the growing power vacuum of unresolved disputes and dormant ambitions and resentments. Generally, it is the cause of profound disorder and widespread violence, which, after the final collapse of the civilisation, can last for the several centuries of a new Dark Age. In such disorder and violence, entire peoples can be tossed around like so much flotsam and jetsam.

If the diagnosis of the present state of anarchy and chaos as civilisational decline is correct, then the general trend of events is answering to profound laws of the human psyche and cannot easily be altered, even by the most drastic political measures. In the last section of this paper, however, I shall consider whether a spiritual and moral recovery is possible so that the decline of a civilisation can be arrested and a renewed vitality obtained. Of course, no cyclical theory of civilisation can dismiss the possibility that external invasion at any time can end the existence of a civilisation.

The Anglo-Irish poet, W. B. Yeats, wrote of the terrible process of social disintegration which he saw taking place in the world of the thirties - with the loss of communication, the erosion of beliefs and values, the spread of anarchy and chaos and the powerlessness before the forces of destruction:

*Turning and turning in the widening gyre  
The Falcon cannot hear the falconer.  
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;  
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,  
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed and everywhere  
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;  
The best lack all conviction, while the worst  
Are full of passionate intensity.*

I am struck how widespread today is the belief that the grave problems of society have their

roots in the spiritual and moral state of society. Gone, almost entirely, is the fashionable complacency and optimism of a few years ago.

Suddenly, the world has taken on, once again, a darkening light. While it is still taboo, more or less, to talk of such matters in political and bureaucratic circles, no such reticence is known to the media. For example, the 15 February 1995 International Herald Tribune carried a centre page article in which the author, referring to the American domestic situation, commented:

I am increasingly struck by two phenomena: the first is the growing sense that America's major failings are not political or economic but moral. The second is the discovery that the most successful programs are those that are driven, even if only tacitly, by moral and spiritual values.

In attributing its 1995 Man of the Year Award to pope John Paul II, Time Magazine stated: 'In a year when so many people lamented the decline in moral values or made excuses for bad behaviour, Pope John Paul II forcefully set forth his vision of the good life and urged the world to follow it. For such rectitude - or recklessness, as his detractors would have it - he is Time's Man of the Year.'

Even in political circles, the current 'buzz' words is 'chaos', and the in-issue is 'the management of chaos'. For example, the 'management of chaos' was the subject of a major meeting of the US Institute for Peace in early 1995-

However, I note that 'chaos' is still largely seen in such circles as the disorder which exists outside the Western world and as essentially 'political'. In my own view, serious social disorder today is not the unique attribute of the non-Western world, and the disorder is only the consequence of the anarchy which is, fundamentally, spiritual and moral, and which, moreover, has a social and economic dimension as well as a political one.

#### **Solution: the critical factor**

If the diagnosis is correct that the cause of the present problem of the increasing negative side of the movement of people as well as of the other major problems is the state of anarchy and chaos in the world, it should follow logically that the solution of this problem is the transfor-

mation of this state into one of justice and solidarity.

Such limited measures as a fractional increase in international aid, better early warning systems, more timely preventive diplomacy, a further increase in the scale and number of peace-keeping operations and improved relief are inadequate, even inappropriate. Worse, they can be seriously harmful if they feed the illusion that the actual cause of the problem is so superficial that such measures are sufficient. A fortiori, any suggestion that such marginal bureaucratic issues as obtaining more money, employing more staff more effectively, improving data bases, developing technical training programmes and strengthening public relations, are really significant is unreal, even irresponsible. One has the impression at times that all the emphasis placed on plans, programs, policies, mechanisms, brainstorming etc. is to cover the vacuum of underlying values and principles.

It is the vacuum of underlying values and principles concerning justice and solidarity which is at the heart of the problem today. The world is in disorder because there is a lack of justice and integrity. It is injustice and the incoherence of irresponsible self-serving which has brought society to the point of disintegration, and band-aid measures are now wholly insufficient to deal with today's problems. If they are presented as sufficient, band-aid measures are rightly rejected as a denial of justice and solidarity, and 'humanitarianism' rightly becomes a dirty word for those who believe in justice and solidarity.

Given the gravity of the present world disorder, the issue of adequate and appropriate counter-measures must be a critical factor; for it would be folly to allow the present disintegration of society to continue, either through indifference to, or through ignorance of, this issue. There is an apt African proverb that he who conceals his disease cannot expect to be cured.

In the case of the problem of the negative side of the movement of people, it should honestly be said that if there is no sufficient effort made to solve this problem, by, basically, a comprehensive and coherent approach to the underlying cause, the problem can only continue to worsen rapidly, to the point where it escapes all

meaningful control and it largely renders vain even efforts to palliate suffering. In some parts, this point has already been reached.

Catastrophic situations like that of Rwanda will continue to occur, with increasing frequency and greater apocalyptic proportions. In a growing vortex of disorder and violence, the qualities of humanity and benevolence will inevitably be eroded to the point where the prompting of fear and self-preservation become dominant. For some time, now, this erosion has been proceeding apace. In the present state of anarchy and chaos, lip-service to protection is increasingly meaningless, not to say dishonest, so little relation does it have to the reality in so many parts of the world. Relief, too, will become even more inadequate than it is now to meet the global need, as the scale and number of emergencies grow and the means and ability to meet the need prove increasingly limited and insufficient. National insecurity, too, will grow as the negative side of the movement of people becomes a major, if not the major, threat to international peace and security.

Faced with the present problem of the negative side of the movement of people, the international organisations will be gravely irresponsible if they do not draw attention to the issue of the cause of the present unexpected and rapidly growing world crisis and the insufficiency of measures which do not deal with the cause and if they do not admit honestly to their incapacity today to deal adequately with the demands of protection, solution and relief. It will also be gravely irresponsible to ignore or deny the threat to international peace and security which this problem poses today. States and peoples need to hear the truth; not to be lulled into a false state of security which can only prove ultimately to have been a fatal mistake.

The continuing decline of Western civilisation, and the resulting spread of anarchy and chaos throughout the world, cannot be arrested for long by political and military measures alone, such as greater cooperation within a civilisational bloc and with those deemed to be friendly, preventing the escalation of local inter-civilisational conflicts into major inter-civilisational wars and limiting the military expansion of those blocs considered to be rivals.

Fundamentally, the decline is due to the loss of 'core' beliefs and values: physical power alone cannot 'organise' society. As with the human organism, the deterioration of the mind is inevitable followed by the deterioration of the body. It is, therefore, in the regaining of a comprehensive and coherent body of 'core' beliefs and values that recovery is possible and the spiritual force acquired to sustain action which is constructive, not destructive. As Edmund Burke observed, 'freedom and not servitude is the cure for anarchy.'

The proclamation of the Jewish prophet Isaiah is as true as ever; *Zion will be redeemed by justice, And her penitents by integrity.* '

Today, not a few voices are being raised to proclaim this truth to the world before it is too late. Is a conversion to justice and integrity possible at this time; or is a radical change on a global scale to satisfy the basic human needs impossible?

The answer to this question, which is fundamental to the issue of solution, must depend on whether or not our choice is the Way of Life or the Way of Death. It is the age-old choice facing Man. It is, therefore, not a question of possibility, but one of desirability.

As Vaclav Havel recently remarked: 'People today know that they can only be saved by a new type of global responsibility. Only one small detail is missing: that responsibility must be genuinely assumed.'

That being said, however, the assumption of genuine responsibility entails a radical change of life style as well as of ways of thinking. The 'small' detail is fundamental. It must be asserted that the stirring of people today, or what Harvey Coles called the swarming of people, makes our age different from any other, and by itself it is posing acutely the question of basic choice: is the new age to be one, finally, of organised peace, that is, justice and solidarity, or is it to be, finally, one of organised violence meaning power and survival. The pressure of events does not seem to allow an indefinite postponement of a decisive choice.

The present scientific and technological aspects of war, which are increasingly global as the attempts to retail existing monopolies of weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction

inevitably prove futile, have already largely rendered impractical the use of force to settle disputes. In rejecting von Clausewitz's classical definition of war as nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means, Andre Sakharov said: 'A thermonuclear war cannot be considered a continuation of politics by other means. It would be a means to universal suicide.'

Already, the grave concern of the major powers to prevent the mass movement of people in the course of conflict within areas which are especially 'sensitive' to them has come up against their even graver concern to avoid a major escalation or spread of the conflict.

A 'civilisation of love' is within our reach. (By 'love' I mean here 'wishing well of the other.'). Especially is it so if it is seen as the price of survival. While Man has a tendency to learn by the hard way, the instinct of self-preservation, which in all species of animal is a collective instinct as well as an individual one, is capable of producing a radical change in the way of thinking and acting in order to ensure survival.

At the national and regional levels, there have already been remarkable acquisitions in recent times of equality and justice, and despite recent negative trends, these acquisitions will not be lightly surrendered.

At the international level, Montesquieu's famous maxim: 'the various nations ought to do, in peace, the most good to each other...without detriment of their genuine interests, reflects, even more today than two hundred and fifty years ago, a spirit of benevolence and enlightened self-interest which is more widespread and powerful than modern political realists have assumed.

However, Man is unpredictable: 'this glory, jest and riddle of the world,' as Alexander Pope called him. It has been said that Man cannot give himself to a purely human plan for reality, to an abstract ideal or to a false Utopia. As a person, he can give himself to another person or to other persons, and ultimately to God. A man is alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and to live the experience of self-giving and of the formation of an authentic human community oriented to his final destiny, which is God. (Pope John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus*.)

The question of transcendence and self-giving

and of the formation of an authentic human community is especially critical to the problem of the negative side of the movement of people, which is threatening to escape completely existing human capacity for control and where it is precisely the absence of self-giving and community which is both a sign and source of the problem.

Undoubtedly, a major obstacle to a Western recovery at the present time is the harmful separation and alienation of theology from philosophy and science in the minds of so many people. Over the last three hundred years, Faith has gradually been detached from Reason in the dominant Western mode of thinking. This fragmentation has widened enormously in scope so that even branches in many different areas of thought or science are largely separated from one another. It has reached a point where knowledge appears as a vast and confusing mosaic of ideas amounting to no coherent overall picture. Paradoxically, as science has become more technical and mathematical, so have the general and perennial issues become more persistent.

In the last few decades, there has been the beginning of a rapprochement between the three, not least due to the re-assertion of the question 'why' as an irrepressible expression of man's basic need to know the meaning of his existence. Until recently, much of modern science had largely neglected this question, mainly on the ground that it fell outside the area of scientific enquiry; and modern philosophy had largely tended to dismiss it as meaningless, considering, in some cases, the analysis of language of the last remaining task of Philosophy. Caught in the tightening grip of scientific positivism as it increasingly became technical and mathematical, the social sciences have focused on the question of 'what' to the point where the critical question of 'why' has almost entirely been ignored and where, finally, the wood has become lost from the trees. Now, there is a growing sense, especially among ordinary people, of the need for a comprehensive and coherent view of life which is universally understandable. There is also a growing sense of the need for a transcendental dimension to life.

It is not impossible, therefore, that Western civilisation will renew itself by a re-discovered sense of Being and, consequently, by a return to

an absolute line of genuine responsibility; if only for the reason that people will become increasingly convinced of the truth of Andre Malraux's prophecy that if the twenty first century is not an age of faith, it will not be.

The effort for renewal is already gathering strength, far more significantly, perhaps, than is generally recognised; above all, around the extraordinary personality of Pope John Paul II, who, more than anyone else, can validly claim to be a world spiritual and moral leader, however disputed some of his views may be. Moreover, this pope is reaching out to other religious leaders, as in the remarkable assembly in Assisi a few years ago when representatives of the world's main religions gathered together to pray for peace.

This pope has recently said: 'I am convinced that the various religions, now and in the future, will have a pre-eminent role in preserving peace and in building a society worthy of men...Openness to dialogue and to cooperation is required of all people of goodwill.'

Indeed, a role for the world's religious leaders inevitably becomes not only necessary but also critical when, as is now happening, religious fundamentalism grows in the disintegration of any sense of community and is exploited for self-serving ends, threatening peace and security. In this situation, these leaders alone can moderate passions by invoking beliefs and values which transcend unreasoning intolerance and blind hatred. For these leaders to be locked into the logic of power and survival is to betray at the deepest level their proclaimed beliefs and values: it is to reject genuine openness to dialogue and cooperation.

If there is any issue, today, which is likely to effect a radical change to justice and solidarity, it must be the movement of people. There is no issue which impacts more strongly and directly on society than the movement of people. Its negative side has been at the origin of major international developments throughout this century, from the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Charter of the United Nations and beyond. The notion of aggression is more closely linked to the movement of people than to any other issue.

Of all the enormous possibilities which William McNeill discerned in the stirring of peoples, none could compare with the integration of peoples, which will certainly happen,

one day or another, one way or another, but which will best happen gradually and peacefully.

It is in this general context that the solution of the particular problem of the increasing negative side of the movement of people should be approached. Since the problem of the increasing negative side is, essentially, its aggressive, disorganised, coerced or illegal character, its solution is, essentially, increasingly rendering movement peaceful, voluntary, orderly and lawful.

As a basic first step towards solving this problem, the human reality should become the focus of concern, not power or systems. Solution lies, essentially, in the amelioration of the human condition. The approach should be centred on the human being and on his or her basic rights and well-being.

Up to now, the international focus has not been on the human being but on power and survival or on systems and projects. The present rhetoric of 'humanitarianism' has served to conceal self-serving action. Despite its false and hypocritical claims, humanitarianism has not been about justice and solidarity, but about oppression and violence. It has been a tool by the rich and strong to continue to dominate the poor and weak.

In a civilisation of love, the approach should be, as Augustine of Hippo said, 'the service of the other', not the love of ruling. It is not easy, of course, to focus on the human being at a time when not only is political 'realism' the dominant influence on foreign policy but also when disorder and violence exist on such a scale that security is the uppermost public concern; but to yield to pressure to put the self-serving interest of the group first and to give undue weight to a narrow security concern can only lead either to ignoring longer-term considerations or to tackling problems in a way which, even in the short-term, compounds the difficulties for society as well as for the individual.

To understand the human reality, however, it is necessary to have, first, a comprehensive and coherent framework of values and principles. Without such a framework, reality cannot be evaluated: it is only a great confusion. However, in the context of the movement of people, such a framework is largely lacking today. In the case of internal migration, for instance, there is no

framework; and in the case of illegal trans-frontier migration, the early attempts to create a framework were blocked by a strong negative reaction which concentrated only on sovereignty. There is still no adequate framework on movement in the wake of aggression or the use of force, in regard to such actual issues as settlements, usually following the confiscation of property, compulsory population transfers and exchanges and mass de-naturalisation, invariably a preliminary to mass expulsion. And the traditional framework for coerced movement is obsolete: never one favouring justice and peace since it was largely centred on the institutionalisation of exile, it is fundamentally unbalanced and, consequently in conflict with state interest and practice today.

Basically, it has been because there has been a lack of any, or of any adequate, framework that thinking on the negative side of the movement of people has been so confused - and confusing - and action so ineffective and counter-productive. It has been a major error to neglect 'policy' and to stress 'operations'; for Georges Bernanos' maxim is profoundly true: 'if thinking without action is not much, action without thought is nothing at all'.

Moreover, to stress 'operations' and to neglect 'policy' is inevitably to reduce the recipients of relief to the servitude of dependence on hand-outs. They cease to be the subjects of rights and they become the objects of the charity, often very self-serving, of others. For some time now, this has happened; the prophecy of Bernard Kouchner to the advent of 'Charity Business' has already been largely fulfilled.

A framework of values and principles should now be put into place. It should be comprehensive and coherent. The totality of the human problem should be addressed, not just certain parts which have been chosen, basically, on the basis of immediate factional interest. For instance, it is irresponsible to highlight internal displacement but ignore internal migration. Also, it is no less irresponsible to ignore trans-frontier movement in time of conflict and concentrate only on movement in time of peace. It is absurd to pretend that the movement of people should be seen in a 'purely humanitarian, and non-political' way.

The framework will certainly have to be put together from various parts developed in different fora. For this reason, a common source, that is human rights, should be used, and coordination and harmonisation achieved. A haphazard patchwork of different and conflicting values and principles will not only damage the whole but also the parts.

The framework should concern, basically, the human being, his or her rights; and it should concern all relevant aspects of the human situation, before and after movement as well as during movement. It should reflect the fact that a human being has an identity and a future as well as immediate needs.

The framework should be consonant with general values and principles and situated within a general framework of policy. It should be dynamic and forward looking, concerning itself above all with actual or immediately foreseeable human needs. It should be free from the chains of obsolete thinking.

The construction of such a framework will be no easy task. First of all, it will require a genuine conversion to justice and solidarity, renouncing power and survival, and a firm commitment of integrity. Almost certainly, it will not be possible, at the formal level, since the immediate reality is far removed from benevolent theory, but it may be possible, at an informal level, within an organisation which is genuinely committed at the top to justice and solidarity. If an organisation is not so committed, it would be better not even to try to construct such a framework. There has already been too much decent and hypocrisy.

Also, language should be reformed to make it an honest and serious means of communication serving genuine human ends. It should cease to be a means for deceiving and oppressing people, as George Orwell so clearly saw. 'War is peace/Freedom is Slavery/Ignorance is Strength.' In no other area is language so debased as in that of the movement of people. For instance, in the area of refugee policy there is no 'key' term which is clear and with a generally agreed meaning. Everything is opaque and confused. This is due, basically, to subjective interest having consistently been placed before objective principle.

Care of the person requires that thinking and action become holistic and integrated, not as in

the past, fragmented and separated. This is not only a matter of elementary justice but also of political necessity. 'Humanitarian' should no longer be broken off from 'political' on the basis of a separation, as a matter of principle, of effects from 'causes'. Justice requires that 'effects' and 'causes' be not arbitrarily separated in this way, for the issue of responsibility for a harmful situation is one that concerns profoundly human well-being. Moreover, there is no necessary antithesis between 'humanitarian' and 'political', for, as an art, 'polities' is about human well-being.

As a doctrine, 'humanitarianism' is not about justice and solidarity, but, to the contrary, is about power and survival. It is the pure product of 'political realism', and has more to do with the thinking of people like Machiavelli, Adam Smith and Karl Marx than with the great line of philosophers from Aristotle to the present day who have insisted on the human ends of government. In any responsible analysis, 'humanitarianism' is morally pernicious and politically disastrous. So meaningless is the word 'humanitarian' that it has not only escaped all effort of satisfactory definition, which is scarcely surprising, but also it is now being used to cover such matters as the conduct of war such as 'humanitarian bombing', and the creation of national military forces, principally for intervention in 'spheres of influence' for example a 'humanitarian intervention force.'

In any case, it is unsustainable that with the United Nations, for instance, there should be a 'political' side and 'humanitarian' one, as if there were no one organisation but two at least. The decision-making powers of the two principal political organs of the United Nations are formally binding on the entire organisation: They are unifying principles of the 'organisations' action.

It is also quite false and hypocritical to maintain that 'humanitarian' bodies, unlike 'political' ones that are apparently wholly given over to self-serving, are in contrast devoted entirely to human well-being. Such a claim bears no relation to reality, and reminds one of La Rochefoucauld's maxim:

'Self-interest speaks all manners of tongues and plays all manner of parts, even that of dis-

interestedness'. (L'intérêt parle toutes sortes de langues et joue toutes sortes de personnages, même celui de désintéressement).

What is necessary, today, is a conception of 'polities' as, first of all, the art or science of government as a means to securing or obtaining individual and collective well-being. While the word may retain its other meaning of the reality of relations within or between governing entities, that meaning should not eclipse or destroy the use of the word in its primary sense, so that it is clear that there is not only a human reality but also a human ethic which should govern conducts. That ethic should be at the base of any notion of the Rule of Law.

As Charles de Visscher observed some forty years ago:

(The hour) challenges us to recognise the limits which in our day the dependence of international law on the historical forms of power distribution sets to its effectiveness, and to seek in the human ends of power the moderating principle that may develop aspirations to international collaboration. Every renewed recognition of the foundations of power stimulates a renewal of values, every return to the realities holds promise of effectiveness.

The approach to the solution of the problem of the increasing negative side of the movement of people, therefore, should be based on a perception of the human ends of power as the moderating principle of actual power distribution that may develop aspirations to international collaboration. Any other principle, especially that of power and survival, can only block the

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development of genuine international collaboration.

Vision and leadership are more necessary today than at any other time to solve this problem. The challenge is enormous: it is nothing less, as the UN Secretary-General has recently said, than to rethink collective social responsibility and to draw-up a new social contract.

First, however, there must be a genuine conversion to justice and a commitment to integrity. Without them, essential conditions for solution are lacking. This conversion and commitment must come from the top.

Openness and honesty at the top are absolutely necessary. The actual human reality should faithfully be reflected, and responsible warnings given of the consequences of neglecting this problem. In particular, a frank picture should be given of the serious limitations of existing means and resources and a serious and considered opinion given of what is actually needed to deal with today's crisis.

Even if the call for greater responsibility is heeded, the immediate future is one of 'menace, violence and extremism, requiring fierce vigilance, strong leadership, moral and physical courage.'

If the challenge should appear too great, the difficulties insurmountable and the reality too oppressive, comfort should be drawn from the saying of Archimedes, which was cited at the end of Time magazine's man article on the last Man of the Year Award.

"Tell me where to stand and I can move anything."

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## Conclusion

by Raymond J. Smyke

In the 1950s and 1960s North Africans and Southern Europeans were eagerly recruited by Germany and France for their automotive and construction sectors, and by the Swiss hotel and tourist industry. The economic bubble burst in the 1970s with the first oil crisis, but family reunification continued. The need for low skilled labourers gave way to the current demand for a technically skilled work force. The children of these early arrivals are the first wave of new Europeans. EU statistics show that the natural growth rate in all countries is below replacement levels. Put simply, not enough babies are born to sustain current populations levels and to keep numbers from declining. Politicians and planners know this, they are aware that immigrants in modest numbers are vital to state survival. A provisional summary suggests: 1) Immigration makes good economic sense, but psycho-social adjustment is difficult for both the incoming and the host communities. 2) Jobs make the difference and there may be fewer to go around. 3) Hostility against foreigners does not appear to deter immigration. 4) Poles of attraction for people on the move have always existed. In the 21st Century, Australia, Europe, and North America will grow as target regions for immigration. 5) The dream of economic self-improvement is a powerful motivation to seek a better life elsewhere. 6) With international mechanisms unable to control the movement of people, it seems logical and important to create solutions at the local and state level.

### *Fact vs Fiction*

Substantial effort has been expended to help immigrants. Authorities at all levels are generous in providing funds to enhance interpersonal and community relations. Indeed, measured by the number of programmes, the amount of money, and the positive approach made by the European Union, the Council of Europe, national governments, NGOs, churches, trade unions, school-parent associations, boy scouts, girl guides and civil society in general, it is a wonder that more progress towards minority integration into local communities has not been made.

The reality is different. Bolstered by objective evidence, significant progress is being made. The same domestic constituency that fought hard for the fair and correct treatment of asylum seekers is gradually shifting its considerable influence towards changing indigenous perceptions towards

new arrivals. *The real problem, as Ranaweera points out, is a reluctance on the part of organised immigrant associations to admit that anything is better.* This negative and adversarial posture is felt to be the only way to achieve results. Attitude change is almost always painful, yet, admitting publicly that some progress in integrating newcomers has been made, will help move the whole process away from the problem towards the solution.

At the level of public institutions, if on the one hand, the state is generous in provision of funds, and public servants like the police and others take courses in sensitivity training to understand other cultures; while on the other hand, immigrants spend thousands of hours in voluntary work to accommodate, assist, try to resolve, and defuse delicate situations by interfacing with public authorities - one may legitimately ask: Why isn't this gigantic cooperation working?

The fact is that it is working. Policy makers, immigrants, journalists, researchers, teachers, and the public at large should be made aware of the tremendous efforts that each one is making. They should be encouraged to understand their own positive impact on state renewal through integration. Indeed, sufficient good will exists in almost every country, and at almost all levels, to carry out a *joint public service - immigrant association evaluation* of existing cooperation - as a logical step to consolidate mutual understanding. As some of the authors point out, people in general can be educated by both immigrant associations and by public authorities on the positive work being done.

The struggle for national consensus on refugee and immigration policy may no longer be as important as it was. Experience in the political arena shows that single national issues of any kind have a limited lifetime. Moving up on the national agenda is a more crucial question: will European attitudes change sufficiently for the society to become mixed? Put another way, refugees and immigrants - the new Europeans - are adapting, but will the indigenous people accept the new Europeans?

The answer in this study is definitely yes. Historically, Europeans are a mixed people unified in culture, race and religion. The Movement of People brings different cultures, races and religions into the mix, creating a new paradox. Once unified in our sameness, we are now unified in our differences.

*Morges, 29.03.01*

## NGOs and the art of lobbying

A case study of the Netherlands and Convention n° 124

by Frits Hondius\*

### Introduction

The Oxford Concise Dictionary defines a lobby as "large hall open to public used esp. for interviews between members & outsiders". In a wider sense, 'lobbying' refers to any activity by concerned members of the public to win over a decision maker to a particular view or course of action.

We will not enter into the debate in Charity Law countries (notably Canada and England) about the dividing line between charity and politics. The broad international consensus is that it is legitimate for NGOs to lobby for a just cause as long as this does not involve them in the conquest of political power.

The mission of many international NGOs includes lobbying *i.e.* advocating public policies in favour of their cause. At the international level this may entail supporting treaty-making within intergovernmental fora. Two recent examples: the vigorous role of a human rights coalition when the Convention establishing an International Criminal Court was being negotiated in Rome (1998) and the campaign at present in progress of ecological NGOs to save the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.

Once a desired treaty has been solemnly concluded between States this is not more than a first step. The vital next question is: will States ratify? And when a treaty has been ratified, will States suck by their promises? Campaigns for ratification and implementation must be conducted both internationally and at the national level.

Every country being different, there is no universal recipe on how to lobby. It may be interesting, however, to note how NGOs in the Netherlands are working in favour of a treaty for which the UIA has campaigned since the mid-1950s: the European Convention on the recognition of the legal personality of international non-governmental organisations (European Treaty Series N°124). The preparatory work for this Convention was carried out by a Council of Europe Committee of experts chaired by Henri Teissier du Cros of the French Conseil d'Etat. It was signed in Strasbourg on 24 April 1986 and has been ratified by Austria, Belgium, France,

Greece, Macedonia, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Cyprus has signed the treaty and is considering ratification. In the preparation of the treaty, the UIA has played important role: the late Secretary General Georges Patrick Speeckaert assisted the Committee of experts with precious advice. This example shows the usefulness of associating NGOs with intergovernmental work. An NGO can contribute to the work at no or little cost its accumulated experience and documentation.

It can never be predicted with certainty if and when a country will join a treaty. It is an act of its sovereignty for which it cannot be held to account by the international community, but solely by its own citizens, press, parties and parliament. It is possible, however, to speculate on the reasons which may have motivated ratification by the States mentioned above: Austria and Slovenia because of their geographical and political position between Eastern and Western Europe, Greece because of the presence in its territory of many foreign archaeological institutions, Macedonia because of the relief activities conducted in and from its territory by international NGOs and Portugal because of the statutory role of NGOs within the framework of the North-South Centre in Lisbon. The four remaining countries have ratified mainly because they host numerous international NGOs: Belgium 743, U.K. 672, France 573 and Switzerland 266. It is important for NGOs to enjoy in their country of seat full legal security thanks to favourable conditions offered by Convention N° 124. For the countries concerned this Convention is a mighty magnet which helps to attract new international NGOs into their jurisdiction.

The Netherlands too have a large NGO population, *i.e.* 324, which is more than Switzerland, and it pursues an active policy of acquisition of new international organisations, both intergovernmental and non-governmental. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has opened for this purpose an office of the 'Representative of the Host Country to International Organisations'. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that the Netherlands have so far failed to include Convention n° 124 in their welcoming basket for NGOs. For this reason, a

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*Transnational Associations*  
4-5/2001, 253-256

number of NGOs launched in 1998 a campaign in favour of such ratification. This campaign has born its first fruit: a reluctant admission by the Netherlands Government, originally not interested in the Convention, that non-ratification would send the wrong political signal to the world of NGOs. But the campaign cannot be considered closed before by ratifying the Convention the Netherlands has translated its words into action.

The campaign rests on four pillars: NGOs, politicians, the press and monitoring the bureaucracy.

### **First pillar: likeminded NGOs**

Since the Convention applies to *international* NGOs, it was essential to set up for lobbying purposes a coalition of international NGOs established in the Netherlands. Moreover, as the Convention has been concluded within the Council of Europe, it was also important to mobilize in the first place NGOs having consultative status with the Council. In the Netherlands these are for example Europa Nostra, United for Intercultural action or the World Association of Women Entrepreneurs. But apart from NGOs having a special tie with the Council of Europe there are many other important NGOs in the Netherlands, such as for example the International Fiscal Association or the International Statistical Institute. A list of the latter group of NGOs was obtained from the UAI Secretariat.

The campaign organiser wrote on 10 July 1998 to all these NGOs, explaining the Convention and inviting them to join. Many NGOs reacted favourably and confirmed that ratification of the Convention would facilitate their work. One NGO reported that the failure of the Netherlands to ratify had resulted in the denial of tax privileges by a neighbouring State which is a party. Several respondent NGOs are networks (e.g. United for Intercultural Action which has more than 360 members) so that ratification by one host country will produce effect in many other countries. Only one NGOs replied that while it was in sympathy it could not join the campaign because its membership included government officials. Other NGOs having officials in their membership did not share this reservation.

Following these contacts, the author of this article was mandated by a representative sample group

often important "international NGOs to address on 1 October 1998 a letter to the Government of the Netherlands, pleading in favour of ratification. It pointed to the tremendous economic importance and prestige of NGOs for a host country and to the moral duty for every country to support NGOs at the level of international law.

Two existing NGOs networks joined the action in their own name The Association of Foundations in the Netherlands (FIN), representing more than 100 large foundations such as the Van Leer Foundation, the Juliana Welzijnfond or the European Cultural Foundation wrote to the Government on 28 September 1998 that non-ratification put them at a disadvantage. They mentioned the manifold difficulties encountered by their activities abroad, such as bureaucratic obstruction, punitive taxation and kafkaesque registration procedures.

Interestingly, a third coalition, the NGO-EU Network for development aid, did not even have to do any lobbying itself vis-à-vis the Netherlands government. It was informed of the campaign by the the Minister for Development Cooperation, who evidently sympathised with them. The roles were reversed: a Minister campaigning with the NGOs! The explanation for this is clear. For the execution of development aid the Minister is heavily dependent on the cooperation of NGOs. Consolidating the legal position of NGOs hosted by the Netherlands will reinforce their capability in developing countries.

### **Second pillar: politicians**

On 4 November 1998, Professor Eric Jürgens, member of the Netherlands Senate and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, joined in. He addressed a question in Parliament to the Government calling attention to the importance of the Convention N° 124 and to the legitimate desire of the NGOs in the Netherlands to see it ratified. The importance of questions in parliament lies not only in the weight of the parliamentary fraction to which the politician concerned belongs but also in the fact that question and answer are made public.

On 30 November 1998 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jozias van Aartsen, gave the standard reply from the point of view of domestic law

of the Netherlands: since that law already provides for the recognition of foreign NGOs, ratification was not needed. This answer completely overlooked the other side of the medal, *i.e.* the considerable difficulties which Dutch NGOs encounter abroad. Realizing this snag, which is particularly sensitive in foreign affairs, the Minister decided to ask his colleague the Minister of Justice for a second opinion...

### **Third pillar: monitoring the bureaucracy**

On 27 May 1999, Mr Benk Korthals, Minister of Justice, asked the State Commission on Private International Law to give an opinion on the Convention. The author of this note addressed a memorandum to the Commission arguing that whilst recognition of the legal personality of international NGOs is undeniably a matter for private international law, it is also very much one of public international law. Domestic legislation can be changed any time by parliament. It does not have the same status and force as an international treaty, ratification of which is a solemn undertaking by a State before the international community of States.

A sub-committee of the Commission composed of three distinguished university professors gave its opinion on 29 February 2000. After repeating the well-known argument that domestic law is in full conformity with the Convention and having made some critical comments on its content, the report ended with a surprise: «Non-ratification might be interpreted as a wrong political signal with regard to the attitude of the Netherlands vis à vis NGOs».

Fortified by this conclusion, the Ministry of Justice informed all concerned on 14 March 2000 that the Netherlands now intended to ratify.

### **Fourth pillar : the press**

No lobbying without publicity. Under national and international human rights laws, NGOs enjoy the freedom of opinion, expression and information.

The choice of media and forms of communication depends on the urgency of the matter at issue and the degree of consensus or controversy.

In the present case, the finalizing of an international agreement on the status of international NGOs is not a matter of extreme urgency. It is a process that has taken half a century to mature. Nor is there substantial opposition. Rather, the problem is the laziness of States. On several occasions, lastly on 2 June 1998, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe called on the member States of which it is itself composed to ratify the Convention.

For the moment, the author confined his publicity efforts to professional fora. In 1998, he addressed two international conferences in the Netherlands on the subject and in July 2000 he contributed a leading journal article to «*Stichting en Vereniging*» in which he expressed amazement at one of the Governments arguments against ratification, *i.e.* that the legal norms incorporated in this Convention were already part of Dutch internal law. Conformity with an international treaty is never an impediment to, but on the contrary a precondition for ratification. Dutch internal law prohibits torture or cruelty to children but this has not prevented the Netherlands from signing the UN conventions on those subjects. As to the criticisms of the State Commission about the Convention's content, the author asked the question why the Netherlands had not raised such objections during the negotiating stage of the Convention. At this late stage they *served* no more useful purpose.

Since the campaign moved forward reasonable well within the circuit of international organisations and of professional journals, it was not necessary at this stage to seek publicity in the general media. Such a step could be reserved for a later stage in case the Netherlands would drag its feet with regard to its promise to ratify.

The organisers of the campaign are keeping a careful record of the glowing praise which Dutch statesmen are heaping in public on international NGOs, for example at the opening ceremony of the Centennial of the commemoration of the First International Peace Conference in The Hague on 18 May 1999, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs said, in the presence of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: 'The contribution of civil society has become crucial, the work of NGOs is indispensable as a complement to the work of policymakers.' Or when on 28 May 2001, the Minister of Development Cooperation,

Eveline Herfkens, emotionally exclaimed during the opening session of the II<sup>nd</sup> Global Forum against Corruption "...NGOs, we salute you!"

Civil society organisations will not fail to remind political leaders of their words when they are not seen to translate them into action.

### **Patience and perseverance**

The Art of Lobbying combines patience and perseverance. There are always more parties to convince of one's arguments than one anticipated. The admission of an opponent that he or she has been won over by our arguments must be treated with respect, not with shouts of victory. As the late Lord Finsburg said during a meeting in 1991 at the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development : "Patience is part of progress".

On the other hand, an advocacy campaign must be built on perseverance. We remember a hectic NGO lobbying campaign in an East European country in 1996 against an alleged legislative injustice. A few years later, we could hardly find anyone who remembered the campaign or what it was about. It lacked perseverance.

In the present case, the announcement made by the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands that Convention N° 124 will be adhered to does not spell the automatic end of the lobbying campaign. More than a year has passed without a sign of ratification. The possibility of a repeat or reinforcement of some or all of the campaigning steps described above should remain on the agenda.

## Book Reviews

## Bibliographie

*Foundations*, by Frits Hondius and Tymen J. van der Ploeg, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2001, 87 pages.

From a comparative point of view, Frits Hondius and Tymen J. van der Ploeg present the different elements of the law pertaining to foundations and charities and discuss the variety of methods used to solve the problems surrounding the protection of property set aside for public benefit. In this work, whose contents is identical to that of Volume XIII, Chapter 9 of the *International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law* (Instalment 35, 2000), they also describe clearly how Anglo-American trusts and corporations can be foundations in the form of a legal person in civil law.

The comparative perspective adopted by the authors covers the legislations of more than thirty countries. Although these can have the same goals in many ways, the methods of attaining them appear to be remarkably different in other ways. Equally relevant to the conceptual framework set up for the legal analysis of foundations, the reference to cultural backgrounds appears to have a special importance in defining what is good for man, society or human nature. The varying purposes of foundations in different places and histories take a renewed significance when these operate beyond the conventional nation-wide basis and are considered within a broader international context. Being confronted with what is "useful to the community", foundations are challenged to consider mankind as a whole in such fields as peace, the protection of

the environment or human rights. In doing so, they may prove to be both a unique field of legal experimentation and a new player in the formation of international law.

Born in 1927, Frits Hondius studied Dutch law at the University of Leyden. After a period at the bar, he was lecturer at the law faculty of the Vrij Universiteit of Amsterdam and received his doctoral thesis in civil law and voluntary organisations from the same University. He was later substitute judge at the country court of Harlem and senior fellow in international philanthropy at the Institute for Policy Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. Since 1992, he has been professor of civil law (especially in the fields covering partnerships and business, companies), Deputy Secretary General at the Commission internationale de l'état civil, Member of St. Cross College, Oxford, and Chief Trustee at the Europhil Trust.

Born in 1947, Tymen van der Ploeg studied Law at the University of Leyden. He was lecturer at the Vrij Universiteit of Amsterdam, from which he received his Doctorate in Law, substitute judge at the country court of Harlem, senior fellow in international philanthropy at the Institute for Policy Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. Since 1992, he has been professor of civil law at the Vrij Universiteit of Amsterdam.

P. Ghils

*NGO Rights and Responsibilities. A New Deal for Global Governance*, by Michael Edwards, London: The Foreign Policy Centre in association with NCVO, 2000, 46 pages.

The rise of the NGO movement in international relations has generated conflicting views about its significance in world politics: should it be considered as a powerful democratising force or as a damaging threat to political representation? In this pamphlet, the author confronts the unprecedented success enjoyed by some recent NGO campaigns - from debt relief to land mines - with the "NGO-

bashing" which, since the battle of Seattle, has become a favourite pastime - as government officials, business and the media question the right of 'armchair radicals' to speak for the worlds poor. Basing his analysis on a number of specific sectors (with an emphasis on the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO), Michael Edwards argues that the debate needs to move beyond the blame-game over the failures of international

governance and that NGOs should work out what the new rules of the globalisation game are. Which may be trickier than suggested, and the rules may be deprived of much of their substance, if the "equal participation in molding the regimes of the future" granted to NGOs remains corseted by the all-pervasive dogma of "fair trade and investment". Another crucial dimension of NGOs' new role is their accountability and representativity. Instead of simply dismissing their critics as ill-informed and self-serving, the author says, the former should take seriously the need to build their legitimacy. However, the terms of this institutional shift remain unclear if the question of NGO representativity is *not* one of "the most

important questions", while at the same time the principle of "equal voice and representation" is supported. The author's proposals suggest practical ways to make these IGOs (and others, such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR) more effective and inclusive by channelling NGO energies democratically and to the genuine benefit of those excluded from the fruits of global progress. The UK Foreign Policy Centre is an independent think-tank committed to developing innovative thinking and effective solutions for international issues. Michael Edwards is Director of Governance at the Ford Foundation. He was previously Senior Civil Society Specialist at the World Bank.

P.G.

## Activités menées par le secrétariat de l'OMC avec les ONG

L'article V:2 de l'Accord de Marrakech invite le Conseil général à "conclure des arrangements appropriés aux fins de consultation et de coopération avec les organisations non gouvernementales s'occupant de questions en rapport avec celles dont l'OMC traite".<sup>1</sup> Conformément à ce mandat, le Secrétariat a été chargé par le Conseil général, dans les Lignes directrices pour les arrangements concernant les relations avec les organisations non gouvernementales, adoptées en 1996, de jouer "un rôle plus actif dans ses contacts directs avec les ONG ... Cette interaction ... devrait être développée par différents moyens, entre autres, l'organisation ponctuelle de symposiums sur des questions spécifiques en rapport avec l'OMC, des arrangements informels qui permettraient de recevoir les renseignements que les ONG souhaiteraient mettre à la disposition des délégations intéressées pour consultation et le maintien de la pratique antérieure consistant à répondre aux demandes de renseignements d'ordre général et de séances d'information sur l'OMC".<sup>2</sup>

Pour atteindre les objectifs énoncés dans les Lignes directrices de 1996, le Secrétariat a envisagé des activités qui pourraient être menées avec les ONG au cours des mois précédant la quatrième Conférence ministérielle ainsi qu'à la Conférence elle-même qui se tiendra à Doha. Comme par le passé, l'objectif fondamental de ce programme d'activités est de faciliter et d'encourager un débat de

fond constructif avec les ONG sur des questions relevant du mandat de l'OMC.

Activités spécifiques prévues d'ici à la quatrième Conférence ministérielle

I. Dialogues avec les ONG et sessions d'information organisées à leur intention dans le cadre de l'OMC

"Dialogues en petits groupes avec les ONG à l'heure du déjeuner:

Les représentants des ONG qui ont publié des études ou des rapports sur des questions liées au commerce qui relèvent du mandat de l'OMC peuvent être invités au Centre William Rappard pour avoir un échange de vues informel sur leurs travaux avec les délégations intéressées et des fonctionnaires du Secrétariat. La sélection serait effectuée par le Secrétariat, mais les Membres sont priés d'indiquer les ONG qui pourraient être invitées.

"Dialogues ouverts" en petits groupes sur des questions précises:

Des dialogues spécifiques informels seront organisés sur des questions intéressant les ONG qui relèvent du mandat de l'OMC; y participeraient des représentants des ONG, des Membres et du Secrétariat. Ils réuniraient un nombre relativement limité de personnes pour faciliter une discussion de fond. Lorsque cela est possible, ils pourraient coïncider avec des réunions de l'OMC consacrées à des questions intéressant les ONG. Pour s'assurer la présence des représentants des ONG n'ayant pas leur siège à

Genève, en particulier ceux qui viennent des pays en développement, des dialogues pourraient être également organisés à l'occasion de réunions d'autres organes internationaux à Genève auxquelles les ONG participent.

"Sessions d'information à l'intention des ONG:

Des sessions d'information seront régulièrement organisées à l'intention des ONG après les réunions de l'OMC présentant de l'intérêt pour ces organisations, y compris les sessions du Conseil général sur la préparation de la Conférence qui se tiendra au Qatar.

II. Participation des ONG aux séminaires techniques organisés par le Secrétariat de l'OMC à Genève

On étudiera les moyens de permettre aux représentants des ONG intéressées de participer aux séminaires techniques que le Secrétariat organise pour les Membres (par exemple le Symposium sur les services relatifs au tourisme qui a eu lieu récemment),

III. Organisation d'ateliers autonomes par le Secrétariat de l'OMC

On envisage la possibilité d'organiser un ou plusieurs ateliers autonomes portant sur des questions présentant de l'intérêt pour les ONG et relevant du mandat de l'OMC. Ces ateliers pourraient être organisés aussi bien au niveau régional qu'à Genève et devraient, chaque fois que cela est possible, compléter les activités nationales des Membres. Les ateliers organi-

1. Article V:2 de l'Accord de Marrakech insistant l'OMC.

2. Paragraphe 4 des Lignes directrices pour les arrangements concernant les relations avec les organisations non gouvernementales adoptées le 18 juillet 1996 (WT/L/162, 23 juillet 1996).

ses à Genève seraient très probablement de plus grande envergure que ceux qui le seraient au niveau régional. Les ateliers de ce type seraient, conformément à la pratique antérieure, organisés sous la propre responsabilité du Secrétariat.

Plus grande place accordée aux ONG sur le site Web

Le Secrétariat continuera d'utiliser son site Web pour diffuser des renseignements au sujet de l'OMC, annoncer des manifestations et des activités, engager le débat et, d'une manière générale, faire mieux connaître nos activités concernant les ONG et les rendre plus transparentes. Les activités prévues ou en cours sur le site Web sont notamment les suivantes:

"Conversations en ligne: Un forum de discussion électronique interactif a été créé il y a deux mois. Il permet aux personnes et organisations intéressées de participer activement à des discussions et d'en engager. Pour cibler davantage le débat, le Secrétariat de l'OMC prévoit d'organiser des forums thématiques d'une durée déterminée. Cela se fera si possible en collaboration avec d'autres organisations internationales et avec le concours de divers experts (universitaires).

"Notes d'information des ONG: Les notes d'information des ONG sur les activités en rapport avec l'OMC continueront d'être publiées sur le site Web de l'OMC. Pendant la période précé-

dant la Conférence qui se tiendra au Qatar, leur nombre devrait augmenter. De plus en plus de notes d'information sont déjà mises à disposition en format téléchargeable. En outre, elles seront classées par sujet pour plus de commodité.

"Nouvelles des ONG": Le Secrétariat étudie la possibilité d'utiliser la page ONG de son site Web pour afficher temporairement des exposés et déclarations des ONG sur des questions relevant du mandat de l'OMC. Ces documents devraient traiter de questions d'actualité.

"Bulletin des ONG: Le Secrétariat publie un bulletin mensuel contenant des renseignements sur l'OMC et sur les travaux et activités du Secrétariat de l'OMC présentant de l'intérêt pour les ONG.

"Utilisation du site Web pour la préparation de la Conférence de Doha: Le site Web sera un outil capital pour diffuser des renseignements sur l'organisation logistique et les procédures d'accréditation à l'intention des ONG qui assisteront à la quatrième Conférence ministérielle.

Activités auxquelles les ONG participeront à la réunion de Doha

Le Secrétariat poursuivra l'élaboration d'un programme d'activités que suivront les ONG pendant la réunion de Doha. Il le fera en consultation avec les Membres et les ONG intéressés. Les activi-

tés envisagées sont notamment les suivantes:

I. Sessions d'information quotidiennes de caractère général à l'intention des ONG

Le Secrétariat de l'OMC informerait une ou deux fois par jour les ONG accréditées de l'avancement des travaux de la Réunion ministérielle. Des dispositions seraient également prises pour que les Ministres ou fonctionnaires des Membres qui souhaitent communiquer des informations aux ONG puissent le faire.

II. Sessions d'information sur des questions spécifiques à l'intention des ONG

Des sessions d'information axées sur des questions spécifiques seraient également prévues pour les ONG accréditées, sessions auxquelles prendraient part les directeurs et/ou fonctionnaires du Secrétariat de l'OMC concernés. Le thème de ces sessions d'information serait choisi en fonction de l'état d'avancement des travaux de la Réunion ministérielle et des intérêts exprimés par les ONG.

III. Ateliers organisés par le Secrétariat de l'OMC

Des ateliers seraient organisés par le Secrétariat de l'OMC sur des questions présentant de l'intérêt pour les ONG. Ils auraient lieu au Centre des ONG et seraient ouverts à tous les participants à la Réunion ministérielle de l'OMC.

*OMC, WT/INF/30, 12 avril  
2001 (01-1905)*

## Lamy briefs civil society contacts on upcoming WTO ministerial

EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy on Thursday briefed EU civil society organisations on the European Commission's preparations for the upcoming World Trade Organisation Ministerial meeting in Qatar this November.

The briefing took place at DG Trades fifth general meeting with civil society organisations in the framework of the trade policy dialogue. Commissioner Lamy chaired the meeting. Other topics included briefing on his role in the preparation of a sustainable development strategy for the

European Commission.

Lamy welcomed the quality of debate in the civil society dialogue meetings during the past few months, and emphasised was open to suggestions as to how the process could be further improved. Participants responded with proposals that will be taken up if possible.

A full report of the meeting will be made available shortly on <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/des00.htm>

The General meeting was also used by a number of organisations

to post an open letter to Commissioner Lamy stating their opposition both to the dialogue process and the European Commission's stance on WTO and trade policy.

For the text of this letter and the reply, go to: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/whats\\_new/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/whats_new/index_en.htm)

*European Commission, Trade DG, Information Unit Email: [eis@cec.eu.int](mailto:eis@cec.eu.int) WWW: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade> Fax: +32-2-296-9854*

## Les associations absentes des statistiques

S'il est en France un secteur d'activité méconnu et mal aimé de la statistique publique comme privé, c'est bien le secteur associatif. Evalué en 1998 à environ

800 000 associations, employant 1 400 000 personnes salariées et l'énergie - jamais comptabilisée - de bien plus de bénévoles, son "économie non lucrative", productrice de services, d'idées nouvelles et de lien social ne trouve pas sa place dans le champ de vision des services de l'Etat. En 1999, à l'occasion des Assises nationales de la vie associative, Lionel Jospin soulignait pourtant le rôle et le dynamisme du secteur associatif, qui compte vingt millions de membres. De son côté, la Cour des comptes soulignait la méconnaissance du poids économique du secteur associatif sur le plan

statistique, internet est en passe de donner à ce secteur un souffle et une efficacité nouvelle : les associations militantes en font déjà un large usage pour diffuser de l'information ou organiser des mobilisations d'opinion transfrontalières. Pour les associations de solidarité avec des pays ou des causes du Sud, c'est le moyen privilégié d'échanges avec leurs interlocuteurs. Quant aux grandes fédérations d'associations, elles utilisent le Réseau pour resserrer les liens avec leurs représentants locaux, eux-même disposant, grâce à la Toile, d'une information plus riche (près d'un million et demi de sites personnels à la fin de l'année 2000).

A la question des moyens et indicateurs statistiques nécessaires pour rendre compte de l'impact

des NTIC sur l'économie, un très récent rapport du Conseil national de l'information statistique (CNIS) répond en ignorant complètement le secteur associatif. Alors que la question posée comportait explicitement la référence au secteur associatif, le mot "association" n'y figure même pas... Parmi les problèmes posés figure le devenir d'initiatives - réussies - développées par de petites associations avec de faibles moyens, et dont l'extension à un véritable service public à l'échelle nationale et la pérennité requièrent des moyens qui dépassent ceux des associations créatrices.

*Contact : Michel Elie, responsable de l'Observatoire des usages de l'Internet (OUI) [oui@internet-equitable.org](mailto:oui@internet-equitable.org) (Le Monde, mercredi 18 avril 2001)*

## The bill's on me, says Berezovsky

A fugitive tycoon becomes a civil libertarian maybe.

*Remember Boris Berezovsky?* Once accused of personally undermining Russian democracy, he has just reinvented himself as a champion of civil liberties and founding father of a new opposition to President Vladimir Putin.

The tireless Mr Berezovsky, now hiding in Western Europe from a criminal investigation, is ready, he says, to share \$25m among 163 Russian organisations championing causes from press freedom to women's rights. Already a television channel that he owns, TV-6, has given shelter to the journalists who left the independent NTV channel after its recent takeover by friends of the the Kremlin. Now TV-6 seems likely to become while it can the voice of the new opposition that Mr Berezovsky says he will form and finance.

Well indeed. Is this the former Kremlin power-broker, known mostly for political intrigues and murky business deals? It is, and when Mr Berezovsky last week called a press conference by video-link from southern France to name the lucky 163, he explained why: Mr Putin, whom he helped bring to power, is going back on his promises of further reform, and is squeezing Russia's still weak attempts at a plural society. Some cynics wonder.

Mr Berezovsky is amassing other people's moral capital just as he used to amass the real stuff a few years ago. Nor does he show any remorse for the unsavoury habits of his past. He cheerfully admits that when he used his shares and influence in the biggest national television channel, ORT, to bring Mr Putin to power, the image of journalism was destroyed so that reforms could continue. And for

those who may still have doubts, he avers that all his actions were deliberate and correct.

The recipients of Mr Berezovsky's cash say the importance of their cause justifies accepting it. The museum housing the archive of the Soviet Union's most famous dissident, Andrei Sakharov, has taken \$3m. His widow, Yelena Bonner, argues that oligarchs come and go, but the dissidents' legacy stays. So why not take the money to support it?

Pessimists reply that the name of Berezovsky has become a bad word in Russian. Promoters of real democracy in Russia have so far had little clout and less money, but lots of moral authority. Now they will be better off, but tagged as Berezovsky-sponsored in a business where good name is everything.

*May 17th 2001 | MOSCOW  
From The Economist print edition*

## Vocations humanitaires

Malgré la reprise économique enregistrée en France, l'engouement pour l'action humanitaire dans ce pays ne se dément pas. Selon les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) représentées par Coordination Solidarité urgence développement (SUD) qui en fédère 107, le flux de candidatures reste stable. Le sondage effectué en mars 2001 par Le Monde à l'occasion du Train de l'emploi confirmait bien l'attirance qu'éprouvent les jeunes diplômés pour ces métiers, puisque 15 % disaient vouloir exercer dans l'hu-

manitaire.

Et si certaines ONG ont pu craindre une baisse des candidatures de jeunes, happés par les entreprises privées, la situation se rétablit aujourd'hui.

Face à la reprise économique, les jeunes constatent qu'ils ont plus de possibilités professionnelles qu'avant et peuvent se consacrer à l'humanitaire sans compromettre leur carrière.

La stabilité d'un important volume de candidatures (10 000 par an en tout en 1998 selon Coordination SUD) cache cepen-

dant un changement profond du monde humanitaire ces dernières années. Les formations se sont multipliées depuis le début des années 1990. La liste des DESS et DEA mais aussi de DU (diplômes universitaires) est impressionnante, sans parler des formations de niveau inférieur, des stages courts et pratiques et des modules insérés dans des programmes d'écoles type HEC ou Sciences-Pô.

Ainsi la faculté de droit et de science politique d'Aix-Marseille a créé en 1998 un DU de juriste internationaliste de terrain, ouvert

de préférence aux titulaires d'un bac + 5 ayant déjà un an d'expérience. Accueillant vingt étudiants, il leur permettra d'effectuer du droit appliqué : rapports sur les violations des droits de l'homme, enquêtes sur des massacres, supervision d'élections... La création de ce DU, qui répond à la "valorisation croissante du droit dans l'action humanitaire, n'a rien enlevé" au flux de candidatures reçues pour le DESS aide humanitaire internationale, pré-

vention, urgence et réhabilitation, organisé par Aix-Marseille depuis la rentrée 1994, explique Marie-Josée Domestici-Met, professeur agrégé en droit public et directrice de ces deux diplômes. Ce DESS, premier du genre créé dans ce domaine en France, qui "a été la matrice d'un réseau européen" de diplômés créés dans sept pays, a fait l'objet de 400 dossiers de candidatures en 2000 pour 40 places, tandis que le DU, plus récent, en a reçu 60 pour 20 places. Ce foi-

sonnement des formations illustre un "mouvement de professionnalisation de l'action humanitaire. Les ONG recherchent des personnes toujours plus formées, avec toujours davantage de maturité, parce qu'elles ont de plus en plus de comptes à rendre aux financeurs. Le budget global de l'aide humanitaire en France a atteint environ 4 milliards de francs en 2000.

(*Le Monde*,  
mardi 17 avril 2001)

## Scientists should disclose their financial interests, and let the world decide what to think about them

"Scientists at the McDonald's Centre for Obesity Research suggest that eating a hamburger a day actually reduces cholesterol levels." Well, we made that up. However, this kind of company-backed research is becoming more common, and is undermining the fragile trust in science held by a public that has been fed a few too many whoppers.

There is good reason for concern. Encouraging private money for science not only gives the boffins more resources; it also creates a useful incentive for them to press on in their quest for truth in ways that will yield measurable benefits to humanity. Unfortunately, money can also create an enticement to stretch the truth somewhat. Several studies have shown that researchers with a financial interest in the outcome of their work tend to publish conclusions that are, oddly enough, positively aligned with their affilia-

tions. That may not surprise cynics — or indeed economists. But it would be a sad thing for science if its sponsors were able to dictate the outcome of research.

The editor of the *British Medical Journal* recently protested strongly against the donation of money by a tobacco firm to a British university (see article). Yet last year, he defended the right of the journal to publish research sponsored by tobacco money. This creates a puzzle. If tobacco-sponsored research is acceptable, as long as it passes the bar of peer review, surely the sponsorship of research centres by tobacco companies should be acceptable, too?

Some publications, such as the *American Thoracic Society's journal* and the *British Journal of Cancer*, refuse outright to publish tobacco-sponsored research. This is a consistent position, but a dangerous one. Scientific journals are not meant to serve as arbiters of the

morality of particular industries. They are meant to publish good research. But as companies increasingly pay researchers' grants and expenses, how can journals sift out the unbiased from the biased?

The answer is, they cannot. All they can do is to report whatever conflicts a scientist discloses, and take his word that the list is complete. This is not as naive as it sounds. Science has always relied on trust. When researchers submit a paper to a journal, they must vouch that they performed the research they say they did, that they followed experimental protocols correctly, and that they did not tamper with the data or the analysis. It ought not to strain the limits of credibility to ask them to own up to their sources of income too. Science has always had to cope with conflicts of interest. The most awkward one a researcher can face is his own interest in the correctness of his hypotheses.

Donald Kennedy, the editor of *Science*, points out that scientists often come to believe so strongly in the validity of their theories that they cease to examine them objectively. But this loss of objectivity is overcome by the efforts of other researchers, who are properly sceptical in their outlook. Eventually,

faulty ideas are discarded and sound ones prevail.

Achieving truthful science depends not on the eradication of bias but on its gradual correction. Printing disclosures of interests, publishing only research that passes rigorous peer review, and then letting the readers decide for

themselves whether the research is worthy should be enough. The vigilance of rival scientists, which is up to catching even the tiniest flaws in experimental design, will surely detect any omissions of interest that occur.

*(From: The Economist print edition, May 17th 2001)*

## NGOs: new gods overseas

On Earth Day in April 2001, a crop of protesters against gm plants will scatter turf and turnips across the streets of Europe's cities. In Quebec, Canada, an "anti-capitalist convergence" against free trade in the Americas will attract Nike-wearing youths to kick in the windows of McDonald's, a burger chain. The activists' year will start in January, at the World Economic Forum's meeting in Davos, Switzerland, and continue through the year with more Seattle-style whistle-blowing wherever television cameras lurk.

This is the extreme side of a growing, and generally positive, phenomenon: influential activists and their ngos. Non-governmental organisations will become more numerous, prominent and powerful in 2001 than ever before. Now, 30,000 international ones exist; 50 years ago there was just a handful. Domestic ones are counted in the millions: there were almost none ten years ago in Russia, now there are 65,000; in America, 8% of workers are employed by some sort of non-profit group; in Zambia, they sprout up so quickly that newspapers explain "how to spot a fake NGO." As trust in political par-

ties and companies declines, as governments funnel more money through charities and as the Internet gets cheaper, the numbers will grow even faster.

In poor countries they will multiply especially fast. An NGO is an efficient tool with which to harvest donor money. Rich governments have lost their appetite for handing over cheques to poor, corrupt and dictatorial regimes. So they hand them to ngos instead. And not only money passes hands. In 2001 large numbers of expatriate (usually white) workers will be dispensing the aid and giving assistance. A white person representing a European government in, say, Africa (or an American official in Latin America) may be labelled a colonialist. But someone working for an NGO has less such baggage.

Many of these organisations are political institutions: they have an agenda. They also have an eye on publicity. In the wars, accidents, natural disasters and world summits of 2001, they will jostle ever more fiercely before the cameras. Some of the best advice and analysis of the year's Balkan troubles in and around Serbia especially will come from specialists like the International Crisis

Group, whose reports fly ever thicker and quicker through the ether. The flags and landcruisers of relief agencies will be prominent at floods and man-made famines in parts of Africa and southern Asia. Where mundane, but just as deadly, poverty strikes, aid groups will get more money for their work: between 1994 and 1997 the European Union's aid spending via ngos rose from 47% to 67% of the relief budget. The upward trend will continue.

Far harder to measure is their power. On some issues (gm foods, animal rights, global warming, racism) they will set the agenda for public debate. They will be particularly active at the world conference on racism in South Africa in September. In the lead up to the Rio-10 conference in 2002 (a decade after the world's environmental conference in Brazil in 1992), green groups will shift attention from current topical issues, such as poor-country debt, to rich-country concerns such as the depleting ozone layer. One sign of clout is how much annoyance they will cause. Australia's touchy foreign minister, Alexander Downer, for instance, has berated activists supporting Aborigines for ignoring

the "primary role of democratically elected governments and the subordinate role of non-governmental organisations". Russia, Serbia, Mexico, Zimbabwe and many other African nations routinely weigh in against groups they see as threats or as agents of western imperialism.

Globally, the bigger ones such as Oxfam, Care, Médecins Sans Frontières, Greenpeace and Amnesty are already more influential than some smaller governments. They have large budgets and highly skilled staff. (Some, such as Bernard Kouchner of Médecins Sans Frontières, and Olesegun Obasanjo, formerly of Transparency International, flit between jobs in government, in the UN and in ngos.) Some will try to broker peace deals, most likely in civil wars such as Sudan's, Sri Lanka's and Sierra Leone's. Others will learn to work closely with armies, especially during disasters. They will also get a greater say in the UN: some

already want to exert their influence to help pick new heads of UN agencies.

Idealism + Cash = Activism  
Governments and political parties may retreat yet further: international networks of single-issue ngos already mimic multi-issue political parties. But the more interesting development to watch in 2001 will be relations between ngos and businesses. Here lie the greatest rivalries and attractions. As brands become more important to companies, ngos' power grows accordingly. Oil companies know - think of Shell in Nigeria - how bad publicity hurts business. In Sudan a Canadian oil company, Talisman, now tries to work with local ngos to avoid accusations that it is helping to fuel the civil war. Monsanto and Greenpeace will clash more over modified foods in 2001, as will ngos and arms exporters in Eastern Europe. Animal-rights activists have already turned on corporations and their directors.

More responsible ngos now talk of codes of conduct. They know that their own brands and images are vulnerable too.

But clever businesses will attempt to co-opt ngos. Already some businessmen, such as Bill Gates and George Soros, wield money and power in the voluntary sector. Fund-starved volunteers rarely resist such munificence, even if large donations from a single source threaten independence. In aid, private flows of capital to poor countries already massively outweigh official aid: expect more private investors to team up with aid-ngos (with good reputations) in emerging markets. Despite the clashes on Earth Day, at the G8 and the next meeting of the World Bank, ngos will be needed ever more as partners in the coming years; and they, in turn, will need private money. Welcome to the real world.

**Adam Roberts**  
*(The Economist web edition,  
May 2001)*

## Call for an open Europe

Following the publication of "Essays for an Open Europe" <<http://www.statewatch.org/essays.htm>> (by Tony Bunyan, Deirdre Curtain and Aidan White) the EPJ and Statewatch are inviting civil society groups and individuals to sign up to support a call to the EU institutions for a democratic and accountable "Open Europe" on access to documents. To support the call either e-mail your name, group/organisation/position, postal address (a full list

of those supporting the call will be put on the web but no contact details will be included) and any comment you would like to make. Alternatively, register on-line (or print form) at <<http://www.statewatch.org/secret/call.htm>>.

Our code: a model code of access to EU documents for civil society: Statewatch has proposed a code of access that would truly "enshrine" the citizens' right of access to documents and meet the commitment in article 255 of the

TEC. It is based on the existing rights of citizens under the 1993 Decision on public access to documents as improved by cases taken to the European Court of First Instance and Ombudsman, current "best practise" in the operation of the code by the institutions and proposals that have emerged in the current positions of the institutions that would improve access

<<http://www.statewatch.org/secret/ourcode.htm>>.

## Developments on the proposed code of access

French Presidency bequeaths Sweden a "poisoned chalice": At the meeting of COREPER (the body comprising the permanent representatives of the 15 EU governments in Brussels) on 18 December the French Presidency of the EU presented its final draft of the Council's common position on access to EU documents. The dilemma for the new Swedish Presidency (from 1.1.01) is how far it can reverse the current "consensus" among the EU member states and meet its own commitment to meaningful freedom of information. The article notes that each draft produced by the French was worse than the previous one. "Solana Decision" extended to cover justice and home affairs,

trade and aid: The "Solana Decision" of 26 July 2000 introduced the principle of excluding all documents covering foreign policy, military and non-military crisis management. In incorporating the Decision into the new code this blanket exclusion was then replaced by different procedures for "sensitive documents". However, the latest draft of the EU Council common position on the draft code extends the concept from "security and defence" to all areas of EU activity including justice and home affairs (policing, immigration, asylum, customs and legal cooperation), trade and aid etc. Chair of EP Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights

expresses concern over Council's draft common position: Graham Watson has written to the Council of the EU expressing strong concern that it has not even considered the EP's report on the draft code and furthermore, that the Parliament may reject the Council's common position. (Includes full-text of Council draft common position dated 1.12.00).

*Statewatch news and announcements, 18 January 2001*  
nfo@statewatch.org  
Statewatch: monitoring the state and civil liberties in Europe  
office@statewatch.org  
tel: 0044-(0)20-88021882  
fax: 0044-(0)20-88801727

## Documents européens

Il sera désormais plus aisé pour les citoyens européens d'avoir accès aux documents des trois institutions européennes : le Parlement européen, le Conseil et la Commission. Ces derniers mois, la présidence suédoise a

mené, à un rythme soutenu, la question de la réglementation européenne en matière de transparence et un accord de principe est à présent intervenu entre les États membres, la Commission et le Parlement.

Pour suivre l'actualité de la Présidence suédoise :  
<http://www.eu2001.se>

*(Fondation Roben Schuman  
La lettre  
Lundi 30 avril 2001 Numéro : 027)*

## Les associations et l'Europe en devenir

Extrait du discours de Mme Nicole Fontaine, présidente du Parlement européen, Bruxelles, Parlement européen, le 19 février 2001, en clôture de la Conférence sur le centenaire de la loi de 1901: "Les associations et l'Europe en devenir"  
"Lorsque vous avez exprimé le souhait de tenir au Parlement euro-

*péen cette Conférence qui associe la célébration du centenaire de la loi française de 1901 sur les associations, à une réflexion prospective sur le rôle du monde associatif dans une Europe en devenir, j'ai été particulièrement heureuse de la signification de cette initiative.  
[...] Le caractère national que la loi de 1901 a eu à son origine est*

*largement dépassé. Elle a eu un effet boule de neige sur de nombreux autres pays européens dont les législations se sont inspirées, chacune en la déclinant avec ses propres spécificités.  
Si cette loi a su, comme les autres lois nationales dont elle a été l'initiatrice, traverser un siècle entier sans devoir être retouchée dans ses*

principes fondamentaux, c'est avant tout parce qu'elle assurait de façon appropriée l'organisation législative d'une liberté publique essentielle qui devait être protégée des fluctuations des alternances politiques.

[...] La présence ici de nombreuses associations qui viennent de tous les pays de l'Union européenne et des pays candidats atteste, s'il en était besoin, de la dimension européenne du mouvement associatif et de sa vitalité dans toute l'Europe.

Pour le Parlement européen, le dynamisme du tissu associatif est un élément fondamental de l'équilibre et de la vigueur de la démocratie. Ces millions d'associations, qu'elles soient petites ou grandes, qui imbervent tous les secteurs d'activités, politique, professionnel, social, environnemental, économique, familial, coopératif, éducatif, sportif, ... sont à tous les niveaux de la société. Les aiguillons irremplaçables des institutions et des pouvoirs qu'engendrent et installe le système essentiellement représentatif, et de ce fait, souvent lointain, sur lequel fonctionnent nos Etats.

[...] Dès son élection au suffrage universel, le Parlement européen s'est préoccupé de la manière dont il pouvait et devait soutenir cet incomparable potentiel d'énergies, de dévouement bénévole, d'imagination sociale créatrice, de réponse rapide aux nécessités face auxquelles les Etats ne réagissent pas ou ne réagissent qu'avec lenteur. Il s'est écarté de toute tentation unificatrice qui ne pourrait qu'être contraire à la notion même de liberté d'association. Notre objectif constant a été triple : hisser vers le haut, par la référence aux législations nationales les plus avancées, les dispositions propres à favoriser à travers toute l'Union, l'épanouissement de la vie associative, offrir un cadre européen

souple aux associations qui ont une activité transnationale ou désirent s'engager dans cette voie, soit pour déployer leur activité à l'échelle européenne, soit pour être mieux entendues des institutions communautaires - multiplier dans tous les domaines des programmes originaux dont le financement communautaire est de nature à encourager les initiatives innovantes.

C'est dans cet esprit qu'en 1987, l'Assemblée s'est prononcée à la quasi-unanimité, en faveur d'un statut européen de la vie associative qui serait, non pas imposé, mais offert aux associations qui le souhaiteraient. J'avais eu l'honneur d'être le rapporteur de cette première initiative forte.

[...] Permettez-moi, à ce stade, de porter témoignage à toutes ces associations qui, depuis quarante ou cinquante ans accompagnent la construction européenne et que nous englobons dans cet acronyme peu élégant d'ONG. Qu'elles aient pour objectif de promouvoir l'idée européenne ou qu'elles expriment des intérêts professionnels, syndicaux, familiaux, ceux des consommateurs ou des écologistes, toutes sont indispensables au progrès de la société européenne. Elles ont souvent révélé et assumé, bien en avance, les besoins et les aspirations du corps social au niveau de l'Union européenne. Certaines sont présentes institutionnellement à travers le Comité économique et social, un beaucoup plus grand nombre sont depuis longtemps les interlocutrices de la Commission, voire du Conseil, elles sont toutes des partenaires avec lesquels le Parlement européen souhaitait collaborer.

Dans la décennie des années 90, le Parlement a approfondi le projet dont il avait adopté le principe en 1987, examinant les trois proposi-

tions de statut, que lui présentait la Commission, sous l'impulsion de leur rapporteur que je salue très amicalement : Marie-Claude VAYS- SADE : l'un pour l'association européenne, le second pour la société coopérative européenne, le troisième pour la mutualité européenne.

Le projet de statut d'association européenne visait à offrir un cadre approprié qui, non seulement garantisse la sécurité juridique des associations à vocation européenne et celle des tiers, mais en même temps donne aux institutions européennes des assurances quant à la légitimité et à la légalité de leurs interlocuteurs.

Le Parlement était naturellement favorable à cet ensemble de textes. Avec vous, je regrette infiniment qu'ils soient toujours sur la table du Conseil depuis 1993, dans l'attente d'une position commune entre les gouvernements des Etats membres, ce qui est un point de passage obligé avant leur adoption conjointe par le Parlement et par le Conseil.

Pourquoi ce blocage qui suscite l'incompréhension et l'impatience justifiées du monde associatif devant tant de lenteur ? Le conflit porte sur la question de la participation des travailleurs au processus de décision.

L'horizon, je l'espère, est désormais dégagé depuis qu'en décembre, au sommet européen de Nice, les quinze se sont enfin décidés à franchir le pas d'une entente sur cette même question qui bloquait aussi depuis trente ans l'adoption de la directive instituant une société européenne. Le statut d'association européenne a désormais des chances de voir le jour. Mais notre pression conjointe ne sera pas inutile.

L'adoption d'un statut d'association européenne illustre deux débats fondamentaux que nous allons devoir mener impérativement dans les années qui viennent.

*Où bien l'Union européenne est essentiellement un marché unique et les Etats doivent conserver leur totale indépendance dans les domaines qui ne lui sont pas directement liés, notamment en matière de politique sociale. Ou bien l'Union est aussi, et plus fondamentalement, une Communauté d'Etats et de peuples, qui doivent tendre vers une harmonisation des conditions de vie et de travail de l'ensemble des citoyens européens. Sous cet angle de vue, tôt ou tard, de manière ou d'une autre, toutes les questions qui les concernent en commun, relèveront d'une forme de compétence communautaire. [...] tout le monde sent bien qu'une question essentielle a été esquivée : c'est celle du type d'Europe future que nous voulons, et plus précisément du degré d'intégration que nous considérons comme nécessaire pour faire de l'Union européenne une grande puissance, non seulement économique, ce qu'elle est déjà, mais aussi politique, à la mesure de la population qu'elle représentera dans le monde, c'est-à-dire près d'un demi milliard*

*d'hommes et de femmes d'un continent européen totalement réuni.*

*Nous devons en particulier repenser l'articulation entre Us souverainetés qui resteront propres à chaque Etat et les souverainetés volontairement partagées entre eux, entre les compétences exercées au niveau de l'Union et celles qui le seront au niveau national, à la fois étatique et décentralisé. C'est l'objet premier d'une constitution européenne, qui soit enfin lisible par les citoyens, et dont l'idée a fait son chemin en peu de temps au point qu'elle semble être désormais acquise.*

*Une telle constitution devra bien entendu intégrer les droits fondamentaux de tous ceux qui vivent sur le sol de l'Union, et son préambule en serait alors la charte des droits fondamentaux qui a été proclamée à Nice et dont la préparation s'est effectuée de manière exemplaire avec la participation très étroite du monde associatif.*

*[...] Le Parlement européen pèsera de tout son poids pour que sa préparation ne soit pas seulement de nature intergouvernementale.*

*comme ce fut le cas, à tort, pour celle du traité de Nice au résultat insuffisamment ambitieux. Cette préparation doit être très à l'écoute directe des aspirations et préoccupations dominantes des citoyens, qui ont considérablement évolué de façon positive à l'égard de l'Europe au cours des dernières années, et le Parlement européen recommandera aux gouvernements des Etats membres que la méthode qui sera décidée au Conseil européen de Laeken en décembre prochain, s'inspire de celle très ouverte qui a présidé à l'élaboration de la charte des droits fondamentaux.*

*C'est dire combien Us associations que vous représentez doivent y avoir une place de premier plan, à la fois parce qu'elles sont Us catalyseurs de proximité des aspirations Us plus fines de la société, et parce qu'elles sont les relais irremplaçables sans lesquels les plus beaux desseins qui sont forgés au niveau des institutions européennes ne peuvent parvenir jusqu'aux populations et recueillir leur adhésion dynamique.[...]*

## Marshall Center Paper #3

### Cooperative Security: new horizons for international order

by Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka.

Marshall Center Paper #3 provides two views on Cooperative Security. Richard Cohen presents a compelling and highly original Cooperative Security model.

Michael Mihalka broadens the analysis and traces its history.

These contrasting essays explore the prospects for a new era of international relations, characterized by reassurance instead of

deterrence, cooperation as opposed to confrontation, and mutual benefit in place of unilateral advantage.

Contact: [www.marshallcenter.org](http://www.marshallcenter.org)

## Ranking of NGOs

The Planning Commission of CAF-India completed its study on the grading/ranking of NGOs in early 2001. The study report is available under 'NGOs' at <http://planningcommission.nk.in>.

There were apprehensions, particularly from scholars of South Africa, that such ranking would not help the Voluntary Sector. However, the objective was to have a methodology for rating NGOs and to help well-established ones, by providing funding to them from donors on a

green channel or a fast track. How good is the Methodology adopted in above referred study for ranking of NGOs is for others to suggest. The study gave scores to 1342

NGOs, who responded out of 7,500 NGOs, whom a questionnaire was circulated. Scores were based on four domains:

A. (indicators related to legal entity).

B. (staffing-mainly gender and representation of professionals among the staff).

C. (income profiles) and  
D. (indicators related to governance, accountability and transparency).

*For further details on the study, contact Mathew Cherian: (mathewe@nde.vsnl.net.in or mathewe@ccfmail.org).*

*From: International Third Sector Research <ISTR-L@YorkU.CA>  
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## European Year of Languages 2001

*Glossary of NGO terms*

-Call for participation-  
The European Year of Languages 2001 (EYL 2001) is being organised by the Council of Europe and the European Union, with the participation of 47 States, aware of the importance of language skills for mutual understanding, freedom of expression, democracy, employment and mobility. In the framework of this campaign, The Europhil Trust has undertaken to update a 'Glossary of Terminology in the field of charities, foundations and other

non-profit organisations' which was published in 1977 by Interphil and has proved very useful for translators, governments, lawyers and universities. However, since 1977 the world has not stood still and been enriched with new terms not used then such as 'civil society', 'network', 'facilitator' or 'empowerment'. All those interested to join and benefit from this project are cordially invited to contact us at the address below. You will receive the list of terms covered by the 1977 edition to which you may suggest additions.

The editors envisage adding brief sections for some other languages in which certain terms unique to those languages can be covered, such as *vie associative or fondation abritée (French)*, *(Ruslan)*, *Spendewesen or Gemeinnützigkeit (German)*, *derecho de fundación (Spanish)*, *fonds-op-naam (Dutch)*, etc.

*Contact: Europhil/EYL 2001, do Paul Bater, 11 Chalfont Court, 236 Baker Street, London NW1 5RS, UK  
Fax + 44 207 224 0015  
paulbater@eudoramail.com*

## New... Creations... Plans... New... Creations... Plans... Nev

### Espace culturel européen

Le rapport de Giorgio Ruffolo présenté au Parlement européen PES, I) propose la création d'un "espace culturel européen". Pour cela, les Etats membres doivent consacrer 1% du montant global des ressources publiques à la création, l'expression et la diffusion artistique. En outre, les députés souhaitent qu'un observatoire européen de la coopération culturelle soit créé. Ce rapport sera examiné en septembre.  
[http://www.europarl.eu.int/press/index\\_fr.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.int/press/index_fr.htm)

Conférence "Société civile organisée et gouvernance européenne"

CES européen, Bruxelles - 8 et 9 novembre 2001

Les 8 et 9 novembre prochains, le Comité économique et social européen sur "Le rôle de la société

*civile organisée dans la gouvernance européenne*".

Les participants débattront des différents thèmes du Livre blanc de la Commission sur "La gouvernance européenne". Cette conférence leur donnera l'occasion de réfléchir *aux moyens d'assurer une participation effective de la société civile organisée* et d'améliorer la visibilité de la contribution des acteurs économiques et sociaux à la gouvernance de l'Union européenne.

*Elle permettra également de préciser le cadre institutionnel de développement d'une société plus inclusive, plus participative et donc plus démocratique*, en conformité avec les ambitions du Livre blanc.

Cette manifestation constituera dès lors un apport au débat sur l'avenir de l'Europe.

Cette conférence fait suite à la Convention de la société civile organisée au niveau européen d'octobre 1999. Elle réunira les représentants

des différentes composantes économiques et sociales organisés au niveau européen : représentants des employeurs, des travailleurs, des agriculteurs, des PME et des professions libérales, des consommateurs et des défenseurs de l'environnement, des associations familiales et des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) à vocation sociale, etc. Seront en outre présents des représentants d'organisations de la société civile des pays candidats à l'adhésion.

Communiqué de presse N°  
78/2001,  
Bruxelles, le 3 juillet  
2001

*Les journalistes désirant assister à la conférence sont les bienvenus. Pour toute information complémentaire et pour obtenir un exemplaire du programme, veuillez vous adresser à Patrick Fève au secrétariat du CES (par téléphone au + 32 2 546*

*9616*  
*ou par courrier électronique :*  
*patrick.feve@esc.eu.int)*

Transnational Associations  
*Associations transnationales*

53<sup>rd</sup> year  
 53<sup>e</sup> année

Some items in recent issues: <i>Parmi Les themes traites récemment :</i>	Issue number: <i>Numéros :</i>
Transnational actors in the international system <i>Les acteurs transnationaux dans le système international</i>	2/1999, 6/1999 2/2000, 3/2001
The recognition of the legal personality of INGOs <i>La reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des OING</i>	3/1986, 3/1990 5/1990, 3/1995
Cooperation between INGOs and IGOs <i>La coopération entre les OING et les OIG</i>	1/1997, 2/1999, 6/1999, 6/2000.
Social movements, trade unions and coopératives <i>Mouvements sociaux, syndicats et coopératives</i>	6/1996, 3/1997 5/1999, 1/2001
Social and economic development <i>Développement économique et social</i>	1/1996, 4/1996, 4/1998, 5/1999.
Environmental problems <i>Les problèmes écologiques.</i>	4/1995, 2/1996, 3/2000, 2/2001.
Humanitarian aid and humanitarian law <i>L'aide et le droit humanitaires</i>	2/1994, 2/1996, 2/1999, 2/2001.
Language, communication, education and gender <i>Langage, communication, éducation et égalité des sexes</i>	2/1998, 1/1999, 6/1999, 2/2000.
Civil Society and the State <i>La société civile et l'Etat</i>	4/1998, 1/1999, 4/2000, 2/2001.
Internationalism in Science <i>Science et transnationalité</i>	6/1997.
Latin American and North-American Associations <i>Les associations latino-américaines et nord-américaines</i>	6/1989, 3/1990, 1/1993, 4/1996.
African Associations <i>Associations africaines</i>	4/1995, 1/1996, 2/1996, 1/1999,
European Associations <i>Les associations européennes</i>	6/1999, 2/2000, 3/2000, 6/2000.
Arab Associations <i>Associations arabes</i>	1/1998, 6/1999 2/2001
Asian Associations <i>Associations asiatiques</i>	2/1997, 6/1999

Some authors / ont publié dans nos colonnes :

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# Transnational Associations

## Associations transnationales

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**Published by/Publié par**  
Union of International  
Associations (UIA)  
(founded 1910)  
Issn-0020-6059

rue Washington 40,  
1050 Bruxelles (Belgium)  
Tél. (02) 640 18 08-  
640 41 09  
Fax (322) 43 61 99  
E mail: uia@uia.be  
http://www.uia.org/uia-  
pub/pubtrane.htm

**Editeur responsable**  
Jacques Raeymaeckers  
rue Washington 40  
**1050 Bruxelles (Belgique)**  
Tél. (02) 640 18 08-  
640 41 09  
Télécopie: (322) 643 61 99

**Subscription rate**  
BF 1.780, or equivalent per  
year (6 issues) + postage  
BF 270.

Abonnement: FB 1.780 ou  
équivalent, par an 6

numéros) + Frais de  
port  
FB 270.

Method of payment

Bruxelles: Compte chèque  
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