Transnational Associations
Associations transnationales

Transnational Associations is a unique bilingual journal whose aim is to deal with major current problems within the perspective of international nongovernmental organizations. It is intended to provide a forum for authoritative information and independent reflection on the increasing role played by these organizations in the international system, and on its philosophical, political, economic or cultural implications.

The approach is intrinsically interdisciplinary, and calls for both specialist expertise and practitioner experience in transnational association matters. Transnational Associations provides background information about the actions and achievements of international associations, and insight into their interrelations with intergovernmental organizations. It covers a wide range of topics, among which social organization, humanitarian law, scientific cooperation, language and culture, economic development, to cite just a few.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UIA, clarifies general awareness concerning the association phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, informs associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them. Contributors to the journal review include association officers, research workers and specialists of association questions who engage only themselves.

Founded in Brussels in 1907 as the Central Office of International Associations, the UIA became a federation under the present name in 1910 at the 1st World Congress of International Associations. Activities were closely associated with the Institut international de bibliographie, which later became the International Federation for Documentation. Its work contributed to the creation of the League of Nations and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (the predecessor of UNESCO). During the 1920s, the UIA created an International University, the first of its kind.

The UIA has consultative relations with UNESCO, UN/ECE/ECOSOC, and ILO. It collaborates with FAO, the Council of Europe, UNITAR, and the Commonwealth Science Council.

Associations transnationales est la seule revue traitant des grands problèmes contemporains dans la perspective des organisations internationales non gouvernementales. Elle se propose d’apporter des éléments d’information provenant des sources les plus autorisées, propres à susciter une réflexion indépendante sur l’affirmation du rôle joué par ces acteurs dans le système international et sur les aspects philosophiques, politiques, sociaux et culturels de cette évolution.

La visée adoptée est essentiellement interdisciplinaire et fait appel au savoir comme à la pratique des spécialistes du champ d’action des associations transnationales. Les documents, articles et études publiés par Associations transnationales traitent également des liens établis entre celles-ci et les organisations intergouvernementales. Les domaines couverts s’étendent aux problèmes de société, au droit humanitaire, à la coopération scientifique, aux questions linguistiques et culturelles, au développement économique ou à tout phénomène affectant la vie dans ces associations.

Le programme de la revue, conformément aux buts de l’UIA, vise à éclairer l’opinion sur la signification de la dimension associative des relations internationales, notamment en informant les associations au sujet des questions qui relèvent de leurs domaines ou affectent leurs intérêts communs. Les textes des auteurs publics par la revue (dirigeants d’associations, chercheurs et spécialistes des questions associatives) s’engagent que leur opinion.

L’UIA a été créée officiellement en 1910 à Bruxelles au cours du premier congrès mondial des associations internationales. Ses fondateurs, le Sénateur Henri La Fontaine, prix Nobel de la Paix 1913 et Paul Otlet, Secrétaire général de l’Institut international de bibliographie, avaient mis sur pied en 1907 l’‘Office central des institutions internationales’ auquel l’UIA succédait sous la forme de fédération. En 1914, elle regroupait 230 organisations, soit un peu plus de la moitié de celles qui existaient à l’époque. L’UIA devait incarner, dans l’esprit de ses fondateurs, les aspirations internationalistes et les idéaux de paix qui animaient les associations et qui allaient aboutir en 1920 à la création de la Société des Nations.

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Globalisation and social change
(Part II)

by Jan Aart Scholte*

Globalisation and production

Capitalism has developed in a world-systemic context for centuries, but contemporary globalisation has taken its footloose character to new lengths. Many activities of surplus accumulation are now organised supraterritorially, in global factories, global financial markets, global information and communications networks, and global consumerism. Thus far the overall result of these developments has been to intensify accumulation and significantly to increase the powers of capital over labour, including some particularly adverse repercussions for women.

Global factories are industrial processes organised across the world, largely irrespective of the immediate physical environments of installations or the distances between corporate headquarters, research centres, design units, fabrication points, assembly lines and consumer markets. With the growth of this supraterritorial production, an estimated 25 per cent of cross-border merchandise trade now consists of intra-firm transactions within global companies (UNDP 1994: 87). Moreover, the global factory is mobile and can fairly readily relocate in response to shifts in costs of production. Hence, for example, a significant number of assembly plants, especially in the textiles, automotive and electronics sectors, have in recent decades moved from Western Europe, Japan and North America to export processing zones (EPZs) in East and South East Asia, Mexico and the Caribbean (Grunwald and Flamm 1985).

At a deeper level, globalisation has brought a shift in the relative balance of channels of accumulation away from mercantile and industrial capital towards finance, information and communications capital. Money and messages are the sorts of commodities that circulate fastest and in largest quantities through global hyperspace. The last thirty years have seen huge expansions of the eurocurrency markets, round-the-clock round-the-world share dealing, insurance transactions and other financial services (O’Brien 1992). In addition to hosting more traditional financial activities, interlinked ‘global cities’ have since the 1980s become cyberwonderlands of computer-generated financial derivatives that have become ever more disconnected from primary commodities and manufactures. In aggregate, the monetary value of financial flows across state borders is now fifty times greater than that of merchandise trade (Spero 1990: 50). This growth, both absolute and relative, of finance capital has been greatly facilitated by supraterritorial flows of information and communications, especially through computers and telephones. In turn, data and images have themselves become commodified as never before. In the context of globalisation, much contemporary accumulation has centred on education, data processing, telecommunications, mass media and publishing sectors. Indeed, by 1990 nearly half of wage earners in France, the UK and the USA were engaged in some form of information processing (Castells 1993: 17).

Through supraterritorial production and distanceless communications, globalisation has also figured centrally in the impressive spread and intensification of consumer capitalism in recent decades (Featherstone 1991: chs 2, 8; Sklair 1995). With consumerism, much accumulation transpires through large-scale rapid purchase and disposal of commodities in a frenzied pursuit of novelty and instant gratification. Many of the objects of this hedonistic mass consumption are globally manufactured, packaged, distributed and marketed: IKEA furniture, Nike sportswear, Sony hi-fi, Armani perfumes, Swatch timepieces, Heineken beers, Camembert cheese, Nintendo computer games, and so on. Today’s shopping centres and duty-free stores, where to be is to spend, are in large part global emporia. Other objects of consumerist desire have emerged directly from the technologies of globalisation, for instance, in the seductions of tourism, the self-indulgence of video games, the fantasies of television and cinema, and the ephemeral pleasure of CDs. To this extent global capital has helped to foster a throwaway culture and the intensified ecological degradation to be described later.

Global capital — in the industrial, financial, information and communications sectors — has on the whole been more centralised capital. The last fifteen years of globalisation have gone hand in hand with a flurry of corporate

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(1) See further Scholte 1997a, 1997b.

takeovers, mergers and collaboration agreements, particularly in the context of regional integration projects in Western Europe and North America. Large-scale privatisation, of nearly 7000 enterprises worldwide between 1970 and 1991, has also often contributed to the expansion of global conglomerates, while at the same time giving states temporary revenue with which to meet some of the costs of global restructuring (UNDP 1993: 5). In this era of concentration, the largest five companies in the respective markets account for 70 per cent of world production of consumer durables, 60 per cent of air travel, over half of aircraft production, over half of electronics and electrical equipment, at least half of PCs, over 40 per cent of global media, a third of chemicals, and some 30 per cent of world insurance sales (Harvey 1995: 194). Although the global corporate giants are by no means all-powerful, increased concentration has contributed to increased inequality and exploitation.

For one thing, global capitalism has in several ways operated to the detriment of much of the South. To this extent globalisation has had the character of a new imperialism, the latest twist in long-standing world-systemic dynamics of underdevelopment. On the one hand, the rise of supraterritoriality has bypassed much of the South, increasing its marginalisation and poverty in the present-day political economy. Global factories, global financial markets, global information networks, global telecommunications and global consumerism have mostly developed in North America, Western Europe and the Pacific Rim (including a number of newly industrialising countries, or NICs). The Souths share of transborder investment has declined, and surpluses resulting from global capitalism have accrued mainly in the triad and in Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and South and Central Asia. Between 1960 and 1991, countries with the richest 20 per cent of the world's population increased their share of world income from 70.2 to 84.7 per cent, while countries with the poorest fifth of the world's population saw their proportion diminish from a minuscule 2.3 to an almost imperceptible 1.4 per cent (UNDP 1992: 36, UNDP 1994: 63). Nor have unprecedented capacities for global organisation and management been exploited to prevent the current undernourishment of one-seventh of humanity, some 800 million people in all (UNDP 1993: 12). On the contrary, eurocurrency loans have saddled populations in much of the South with crippling transborder debts, now standing at over $2 trillion. To ensure repayment, institutions of global governance such as the IMF and the World Bank have sponsored stabilisation programmes and structural adjustment policies that have generally made the poor of the South even more destitute, with cuts in subsidies, imports, wages, jobs, health services, education programmes and infrastructure development.

Indeed, global capital has generally encouraged a growth of income inequalities between rich and poor the world over. For one thing, global financial markers have allowed the wealthy of the South — physically resident in the periphery but very much 'located' in the core of the (supraterritorial) political economy - to accumulate surplus at historically unprecedented levels. At the same time, marketisation in former communist-ruled countries, largely globally generated, has hugely widened disparities of wealth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics. Increased polarisation of incomes has marked the North, too. In the USA, for instance, unprecedented growth in global trade and investment during the 1980s can be linked to a decline in earnings for 80 per cent of the population and a rise of 16.5 per cent in real terms amongst the top ten per cent (Agnew 1994a: 270-1). Similar trends have unfolded in other OECD countries, albeit not as starkly (Ghai 1994: 30-2).

This growing inequality has been reflected in and encouraged by the reduced power of labour in global capitalism. For one thing, the expanding financial, information and communications sectors have generally required smaller workforces than extractive and manufacturing enterprises. In addition, as already mentioned, mobile global factories have moved many assembly lines to the low-wage NICs. On both of these counts globalisation has contributed to large-scale structural unemployment in the North. In South as well as North,
labour has been constrained to accept conces-
sions in pay and conditions in the name of glob-
al competitiveness. Moreover, the growing 
supraterritorial ‘service industries’ have relied 
substantially on low-waged ‘flexible’ temporary 
and part-time workers, who generally lack wel-
fare benefits and union protection. Globalisa-
tion has therefore been integral to the transition 
to a ‘post-Fordist’ regime of accumulation (Lip-
ietz 1987; Harvey 1989). The Social Charter of 
the European Union represents a rearguard ini-
tiative to temper this deterioration in working 
conditions, but no such provisions are contem-
plated elsewhere.

The costs of both reinforced imperialism 
and increased labour exploitation under global-
isation have tended to fall disproportionately 
on women. The weakened workforce has also 
been a more feminised workforce. In Western 
Europe, for example, the past quarter-century 
has seen male jobs (generally more highly paid 
and unionised in old industrial sectors) decline 
by one million while female employment (gen-
ernally poorly paid and ‘flexible’ in new service 
sectors) has grown by thirteen million (Keegan 
1994). Over roughly the same period, women 
in Asia and Latin America have occupied some 
1.5 million jobs (up to 90% of the workforce) 
on the assembly lines of global factories (Lim 
1990: 101). That said, the ‘opportunity’ of 
tedious, low-waged, unprotected work in EPZs 
has only been available to a small proportion of 
women in the South. Moreover, recent years 
have brought signs of a remasculinisation of the 
labour force as, for example, the maquiladoras 
factories in Mexico have become more automat-
ed and it is assumed that only men can handle 
heavy machinery (Runyan 1996: 240). Every-
where, both North and South, waged employ-
ment for women has generally entailed a double 
or even triple burden of continuing to perform 
unremunerated household tasks and subsis-
tence agriculture at the same time (Peterson 
and Runyan 1993). Meanwhile structural 
adjustment in the context of globalisation has 
brought a general feminisation of poverty in 
both the South and the former communist-
rule countries. On the whole women have 
borne a greater share of the job losses, cuts in 
provisions have been withdrawn. In spite of 
notable emphasis in some quarters of global 
governance during the 1980s on the issue of 
Women in Development, by the early 1990s 
only six of ninety-six national governments in 
the South made explicit reference to women’s 
issues in their economic policies (Vickers 1991: 
10).

On the whole, then, contemporary glob-
alisation has sooner reinforced than challenged 
the capitalist mode of production and has in 
certain ways exacerbated exploitative conse-
quences of surplus accumulation. Supratenori-
ty has increased the mobility of capital, 
altered patterns of commodification, accelerat-
ed rates of commodity circulation, and height-
ened fluctuations and unpredictability attend-
ing processes of accumulation. Global 
capitalism has substantially weakened the posi-
tion of labour and has greatly undermined what 
was known as ‘the left’. Recent decades have 
seen the development of a self-conscious and 
institutionally organised global capitalist class, 
but no substantial reorientation of this kind has 
yet emerged amongst labour. Indeed, after sev-
eral decades of accelerated globalisation neoliberal 
s have triumphantly consigned socialism to 
the dustbin of history, and major political ini-
tiatives and innovations would be required to 
prove them wrong.

Globalisation and governance

Much as globalisation has stimulated 
reconfigurations rather than the end of capital-
ism, the rise of supratenority has to date 
sooner repositioned the state than triggered its 
dissolution. National governments have seen 
their scope for initiative and manoeuvre vis-a-
-vis both capital and one another considerably 
reduced in contemporary times of globalisa-
tion. This trend has encouraged, and been rein-
forced by, large-scale privatisation and deregula-
tion worldwide over the past fifteen years. 
Concurrently, however, globalisation has stimu-
lated certain processes of reregulation, espe-
cially through multilateral channels. Yet the 
resulting frameworks of global governance have
proved to be more a threat to democracy than a threat to the state. Given that the state has been quintessentially territorial, many observers have suggested that globalisation would sound its deathknell. Already in 1957, John Herz predicted that nuclear weapons, with their disregard for sovereignty, signalled the state’s demise, while Charles Kindieberger declared a decade later that the state was, in the face of expanding transborder capital, ‘just about through’ (Herz 1957; Kindleberger 1969: 207). Yet such globalist arguments have mistakenly supposed that globality replaces territoriality, when in fact, as emphasised above, it supplements preexisting spaces and creates a more complicated, four-dimensional geography of social life. We might therefore expect globalisation to alter patterns of governance, but these shifts need not involve a dissolution of the state.

Indeed, for the moment there is little sign that globalisation is leading either to a centralised, universal, sovereign world government, in tune with cosmopolitan visions, or to world-scale anarchical governance through local communities, as promoted by some radical ecologists. With the exception of a few countries like Somalia, the state is proving to be highly robust during the present period of globalisation. In fact, many states have during recent decades increased their personnel, budgets and interventions. New information technologies — so central to contemporary globalisation — have greatly enhanced the state’s surveillance capacities. True, the ‘new world order’ of the 1990s has seen numerous fragmentations and reconfigurations of states, as well as a host of disputes over territorial boundaries; however, the state itself, as a social structure, has in most instances not been fundamentally undermined.

That said, globalisation has brought several important changes to the position of the state in social relations. First, sovereign statehood, always to some extent mythical, is now indisputably untenable. A state’s claims to exercise ultimate and absolute authority over a particular territory are empty when global factories, global financial markets, global information flows, global broadcasting, global regulatory regimes, global coalitions, global knowledgable forms and global ecological changes utterly disregard customs posts. In global space, power relates chiefly to control of flows rather than control of places, and in this respect sovereignty has become irrelevant as well as illusory. Second, warfare — military struggle between states for territorial occupation, historically one of the state’s principal activities — has arguably been discouraged in the more intensely globalised parts of the world as supraterritorial interests have gained greater sway. States today more often deploy armed force for internal suppression (Haiti, Indonesia) or to bolster another state under threat of collapse (Lebanon, Liberia) than for external territorial conquest. Two-thirds of the world’s states have recently used their armies against peoples that they claim as citizens (Nietschmann 1994). Third, in the present period of globalisation the survival of the state has become partly contingent upon serving supraterritorial flows, at times possibly to the detriment of traditional, territorially circumscribed constituencies.

The state’s accommodation of global forces has frequently entailed some form of deregulation of economic activity, especially during the 1980s. The removal, through the GATT/WTO and various regional customs unions, of numerous state-imposed trade barriers has facilitated both global-scale production and the concentration of global capital. In addition, many state controls on banking, stock markets and foreign exchange transactions have been relaxed to appease global financial markets, whose cyberspace cannot be effectively regulated at a national level in any case. As already mentioned, many states, socialist as well as corporatist, have reduced workers’ protection, welfare services, corporate taxation and anti-monopoly measures in order to entice global companies that might otherwise locate elsewhere. In consequence of such cuts, many poor and otherwise marginalised people have been compelled to turn more to informal arrangements rather than to the state for personal and group security (Cox 1994: 22).

Such reductions of state interventions, as well as the aforementioned spread of privatisa-
tion, have been encouraged by global capital and also more particularly by neoliberal policy prescriptions emanating from key institutions of global governance including the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD and, by the early 1990s, even UNCTAD (Overbeek 1993; Williams 1994: 191). In contrast, the more Keynesian noises emitted by, for example, the ILO and UNDP have gained comparatively little hearing. Meanwhile a number of transborder thinktanks, including the World Economic Forum (founded in 1971), the Trilateral Commission (1973) and the Group of Thirty (1979), have been influential non-state purveyors of neoliberal formulas (Gill 1994).

Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that, in the emerging global era, business should take on the responsibilities for social welfare and social reform that were previously invested in the territorial state. ‘The new way of business’, they suggest, offers some of the most positive and powerful possibilities for solving world problems (cf. Harman and Horstmann 1990). In this vein proposals have even been made to create a ‘global chamber of companies’ alongside the UN General Assembly of states. The mood of recent years has favoured notions of consumerist global democracy, where customers (rather than citizens) would vote with their pocketbooks (rather than their ballots) for companies (rather than governments) that provide the best and cheapest goods (rather than guarantee human rights) in a global market (rather than a national state) (cf. Ohmae 1990).

However, it is far too early to conclude that such full-scale marketisation is a necessary or permanent consequence of contemporary globalisation. After all, some states have undertaken only limited deregulation, and the past few years have witnessed electoral reactions against rampant neoliberalism in North America and several countries of Europe. We could well be experiencing the recurrence of what Polanyi called a ‘double movement’, where a phase of liberalisation propelled by capital eventually prompts a process of reregulation driven by civil society, in the present case largely through a dual expansion of global governance and global social movements (Cox 1994).

Contemporary globalisation has indeed entailed a marked growth of supraterritorial regulation through multilateral institutions. These bodies were originally dubbed ‘international’ organisations to reflect their character as arenas for interstate consultation and coordination. However, in recent decades many have increasingly shown attributes of supranational agencies with increased initiative and influence in formulating global policies. Global conferences have been a regular feature of the political calendar since the early 1970s, and each year between 1990 and 1996 saw at least one UN-sponsored ‘world summit’ concerning a pressing global problem such as ecological degradation, human rights violations or population growth. Mention has already been made of structural adjustment policies devised and implemented through the IMF, the World Bank and other global economic institutions. Meanwhile the Bank for International Settlements has undertaken increased surveillance of global financial flows, particularly after the debt crisis of the 1980s, several transworld share price collapses and continual upheavals in the foreign exchange markets. The GATT/WTO has greatly expanded its scope of global regulation through the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds. Recent years have also seen a proliferation of United Nations humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, with generally greater impact if still frequently with unhappy results. The UN furthermore provided assistance and supervision in some ninety elections between 1990 and 1994 (Findlay 1995: 49).

This growth of global governance by no means spells the end of the state, and institutions such as the Group of Seven meetings (dating from 1975) and the Council of Ministers of the European Union retain a decidedly intergovernmental form. However, the new multilateralism of global regulation works through, shapes and sustains states at the same time that it is (partly) moulded by them.

The growth of global governance has also been fed by an emergent global civil society, that is, by a proliferation of human networks that organise and mobilise on a supraterritorial basis, sometimes ignoring the state altogether (Lipschutz 1992). The Union of International
Associations recently counted 15,000 active non-official transborder institutions (UIA 1995: 1670-1), and innumerable additional grassroots bodies address global issues while being based within a single country. The ranks of so-called nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) with consultative status in the United Nations Organisation have expanded from 270 in 1972 to over 1300 in 1993 (Drake 1994: 265). On increasing, albeit still a minority of occasions, contemporary politics sees local groups bypass the state to connect with transborder coalitions, who in turn promote global norms that may eventually produce changes in state legislation. Innovative strategies of this kind have been noteworthy in movements to advance environmental conservation, human rights, disarmament, the position of women and the protection of indigenous peoples. Meanwhile, the general neglect of transborder activism by trade unions has arguably compounded their widespread decline during the present period of globalisation.

Taken in sum, the developments described in the preceding paragraphs have worrying implications for democracy. Much global governance unfolds in utter secrecy, and is subject neither to formal public scrutiny nor even to extensive press coverage. Direct elections to multilateral agencies are unknown except in the case of the European Parliament, whose competences are severely restricted. Quota-based votes in the Bretton Woods institutions and the veto in the Security Council flagrantly violate the principle of equality, and the practice of one-state-one-vote in other institutions likewise distances the citizen from decision taking. Nor has the growth of supraterritorial social movements given contemporary globalisation much of a democratic foundation. Global civil society, such as it is, remains for the most part the domain of a small, North-centred, propertied constituency. Lacking the requisite funds, language fluency and organisation for effective participation in global politics, the dispossessed are absent from bodies such as the Trilateral Commission and figure at best peripherally in most transborder campaigns for social change. On the whole we have seen only the beginnings of a sorely needed reconstruc-
tion of the theory and practice of democracy to take account of globalisation and the crisis of the public space that it has in various ways deepened (McGrew 1997). We have barely recognised, let alone begun to address, the issue of global citizenship.

Globalisation and ecology

As in regard to production and governance, so too with respect to ecology contemporary globalisation has on the whole stimulated rearrangements rather than full-scale reconstruction in the world system. The rise of supraterritoriality has woven various global strips into the latticework that interconnects humanity and nature, so that the biosphere as well has acquired certain place-less characteristics. The new (anthropogenic) global ecology has variously both enhanced and undermined material welfare in recent decades, while its long-term implications for both the human species and life on earth generally remain a subject of considerable doubt and worry. Certainly globalisation has been one of the principal impulses behind the rapid growth of environmental politics since the 1960s, and global ecological matters have stimulated a good part of the previously discussed expansion of supraterritorial governance. Taken in sum, however, these developments have not answered the hopes of radical environmentalists and produced a structural transformation of approaches to nature. On the contrary, globalisation has sooner deepened the worldwide hold of industrialism and its associated cults of consumption and growth.

Globalisation has given social ecology certain distinctly supraterritorial qualities. It is not only that global phenomena have made major impacts on local ecologies, e.g., the disaster at the pesticide plant of the global company Union Carbide at Bhopal in 1984, to name but one example. In addition, human-induced changes have arisen in the global biosphere, with dynamics that are to a significant degree divorced from place and distance. For instance, various forms of pollution — including radioactive fallout, acid rain, chemical discharges into
rivers, and ocean dumping of toxic wastes — take no heed of state boundaries. Each of these flows has at least doubled in magnitude worldwide over the past forty years. Likewise, the human population on the planet doubled between 1950 and 1987, and is on course to top six billion before the turn of the century. Given prevailing social practices, the human species — only one amongst millions — is currently appropriating nearly two-fifths of the earth’s terrestrial net primary production (total food resource), leaving the remaining sixty per cent to be shared amongst all other forms of life (Vitousek 1986). Not surprisingly in this light, the rate of species extinction around the planet has rocketed upwards. Different authorities have calculated that an average of anywhere from 20 to 200 species are dying out each day in the late twentieth century (Myers 1993: 179; GACGC 1995: 32). Much of this loss of biodiversity has been due to accelerated clearing of tropical forests across the continents in recent decades, to a present pace of between 8.5 and 20 million hectares per annum. Already only half of the earth’s tropical tree cover of pre-industrial times remains (Barbier 1991: 140-2; Porter and Brown 1991: 14; Swanson 1991: 195). Planetary stocks of various nonrenewable natural resources have also undergone significant depletions as, for example, world energy consumption (measured in metric tons of coal equivalent) rose 4.5 times between 1950 and 1985. Vastly increased industrial production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) significantly thinned the earth’s stratospheric ozone layer during the 1970s and 1980s, especially above Antarctica, where a seasonal reduction of over forty per cent was recorded between 1977 and 1984 alone and a near-complete ‘hole’ appeared in 1987 (Roan 1989; Thompson 1992: 75). Together, worldwide increases in CFC discharges, fossil fuel combustion, deforestation, other vegetation losses, and emissions of methane and nitrous oxide all helped to enlarge proportions of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As a result, according to estimates of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published in 1990, the global mean temperature is set to rise at a much-accelerated rate of around 0.3°C per decade (Paterson 1992: 159). Finally, the emergent fields of biotechnology and genetic engineering provide new sources of possible further global ecological shifts as we enter the next century.

This multifaceted globalisation of social ecology has had mixed welfare effects. For the moment, hugely intensified human exploitation of nature has allowed gross world product to grow considerably faster than world population (Porter and Brown 1991: 5). The environmental economist David Pearce even suggests that ‘by “forcing” adaptive and technological change, population growth may actually increase the prospects for rising GNP per capita’ (1991: 133 – his emphasis). However, the composition and distribution of this growth has on the whole greatly favoured the North over the South, and the rich over the poor. Poverty has in turn spurred much further ecological damage, for example, through deforestation to gain land for subsistence agriculture and through accelerated resource depletion to enhance export earnings, often in order to repay eurocurrency debts. Other detrimental effects of global ecological change are less discriminating, e.g., increased skin cancer from ozone depletion and respiratory problems from acid rain, although differential access to health care reaffirms an inequality between the poor and the wealthy here, too.

Undoubtedly much of humanity suffers under the uncertainty and fear that has attended the globalisation of ecology. Ulrich Beck has spoken in this regard of a new, borderless ‘risk society’ (1986: 36-41). True, events have to date largely disproved the more alarmist visions of ‘the population bomb’ and limits to growth’ propagated through best-selling paperbacks when issues of global environmental change first rose to prominence several decades ago. However, major worries persist about whether the biosphere can cope in the longer term with vastly increased human numbers and their greatly expanded appropriation of nature. Our understanding of the character, timing, magnitude, locational distribution and severity of effects of developments such as climate change and loss of biodiversity remains very limited
and tentative, but much of what is known gives ample cause for concern. With globalisation we have come to live under a spectre of ecocide, however exaggerated or understated our anxieties may prove to be.

In any case the material impacts of global ecological developments — and worries about what they might entail - have contributed significantly to a rise of environmental politics over the past quarter-century. Prior to the 1960s 'conservationism' generally involved small-scale, narrowly circumscribed initiatives to protect particular endangered species or habitats. However, during that decade issues such as transboundary pollution and global resource depletion encouraged the emergence of a new 'environmentalism' that ranged more widely, probed more deeply and pressed more insistently for far-reaching changes in human relations, both within society and with the biosphere as a whole. By the early 1980s over 15,000 environmentalist groups were active worldwide, and their memberships, staffs and budgets have expanded at unprecedented rates since then (UNEP 1982: 46).

Environmentalists have in the process encouraged several of the aforementioned shifts in political practices that can be related to globalisation. For one thing, many activists have campaigned through global organisations, whether supraterritorial bodies such as Greenpeace or through transborder coalitions such as the Pesticides Action Network, encompassing around 350 groups in over fifty countries (UIA 1993: 1356). Second, although various Green parties have been launched since the early 1970s, environmentalist campaigns have mostly been pursued outside electoral politics, and many have engaged with the state only secondarily, if at all. Third, while circumventing the territorial state, many environmentalist groups have linked up with official multilateral agencies. For example, the Environment Liaison Centre, created at Nairobi in 1974, was by the early 1990s maintaining communications between the United Nations Environment Programme and over 8000 NGOs (Thomas 1992: 27–8). Similarly, the European Environmental Bureau in Brussels, also set up in 1974, was two decades later connecting 128 organisations with a combined membership of more than twenty million to the European Union institutions (UIA 1993: 490). The Environment Forum at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment attracted 400 participants and set the precedent for NGO involvement in such global meetings. Twenty years later nearly 10,000 civic groups attended a Global Forum at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and negotiated several dozen ‘alternative conventions’ alongside the governmental texts (Grubb 1993: ISO; UNDP 1994: 87). To sustain day-to-day collaboration, a number of global governance agencies have accorded consultative status to various environmental NGOs.

Indeed, ecological globalisation has provided one of the principal spurs to the growth of supraterritorial regulation in recent years (Caldwell 1990; Sand 1990). Around 130 states created specialised environment agencies between 1971 and 1985 (McCormick 1989: 125), but it was generally recognised that they could not tackle global ecological questions on their own. Most of the major multilateral organisations have developed environmental policies since the 1970s, and a string of global conferences have formulated action plans in regard to all key ecological issues. By the end of the 1980s the global biosphere figured on the agenda of the G7, Non-Aligned and Commonwealth Summits, and even in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT (Porter and Brown 1991: 155–7). Contemporary globalisation has gone hand in hand with an exponential growth in international environmental law, with a tripling of multilateral agreements in this area between 1970 and 1988 alone (UNEP 1989). Among the more notable measures have been the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979 and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985, both with subsequent strengthening protocols, and the Conventions on Climate Change and Biological Diversity signed at the Earth Summit (Flinterman 1987; Benödtz 1991; Grubb 1993).

Impressive though the rapid globalisation of social ecology and its political-economic consequences have in many respects been, the structural transformation potential of these
developments, as nurtured in parts of the environmentalist movement, has to date been little realised. True, ecological globalisation has encouraged certain shifts in social thought. There has been some reduction in prevailing tendencies to separate society and nature, some redefinition of security to incorporate ecological as well as military concerns, some attention to notions of intergenerational ethics, and some increase in global consciousness generally. Popular metaphors of ‘spaceship earth’ and the ‘global commons’ have their origins in ecological concerns of the mid-1960s.

On the whole, however, contemporary globalisation has sooner spread and reinforced than dismantled practices of industrialism in the world system. Automation has been integral to, and much advanced by, the emergence of a supraterritorial realm of social relations, and the predominant response to global ecological risks has been to look for further technological fixes. Thus, for example, mechanisation of agriculture through the Green Revolution, promoted largely by global agencies, is meant to overcome the challenge of world population growth. Together, recycling and improved techniques of prospecting and extraction are meant indefinitely to postpone the exhaustion of nonrenewable resources. Replacements for CFCs are meant to save the ozone layer. Meanwhile globalisation has contributed significantly to the suppression of cultures (for instance, of many forest dwellers) that engaged with nature differently. Ever since the Stockholm Conference, the focus of global governance has been on ‘environment and development’. Nine principal multilateral agencies issued a joint declaration in 1979 that economic development was essential to the alleviation of all major environmental conundrums (McCormick 1989: 157-8).

Hence what protesting environmentalists have identified as the problem, the authorities have generally presented as the solution. There is little sign that radical asceticism is gaining ground on the previously described global culture of hedonistic consumerism. The (supraterritorial) ideology of growth remains as entrenched as ever, albeit that it has since the late 1980s often been wrapped in an eco-friendly jargon of ‘sustainable development’.

Globalisation and identity

Globalisation has unsettled the self as well as nature. Supraterritoriality has for the most part not, as cosmopolitans would hope, furthered the development of a universal sense of self and community. The process has had heterogenising as well as homogenising effects, so that the new geography has its own complex patterns of in-groups and out-groups. Moreover, the recent rise of Supraterritoriality has often reinforced rather than weakened that long-standing focus of collective identity, the nationality principle, with its emphasis on difference, opposition and exclusion. At the same time, however, globalisation has contributed to certain shifts in the character of nationhood, such as some relaxation of ties between nation and territory and between nation and state. In addition, various non-national identities have flowered alongside national identifications in the context of globalisation. The result has been a general increase of fluidity and perplexity in the person’s sense of self.

The construction of identity has proceeded rather differently in global as opposed to territorial domains. With instantaneous worldwide communication, people have gained an unprecedented degree of intimacy with all parts of humanity. Television, global factories, mass air travel and the like have brought the ‘outsider’ ‘inside’ as never before. In addition, global relations have induced a widespread increased consciousness of Earth — and not just one or the other plot of land on it — as home. Yet this is by no means to suggest that cosmopolitanism has won the day. Apart from occasional acts of spontaneous worldwide charity in response to one or the other catastrophe, globalisation has yielded no growth of note in solidarity with humanity as a whole. Like other ‘domestic’ situations — within a household or a country — life inside the ‘global village’ is organised around qualified affinities and loyalties, conflict and violence as well as community. True, by effectively removing the distance that previously separated cultures, globalisation has facilitated certain homogenising tendencies in contemporary world history. For one thing, the process has promoted, and...
depended upon, the worldwide adoption of
communication, information processing and so on. At
the same time, countless artefacts and rituals
have gained planetary currency: the business
suit, the English language, the shopping basket
and many of its contents, the traffic light and
'stress' (the word has in the past several decades
surfaced in all major languages). Global inter-
dependence has involved significant — if not
necessarily complete — transworld convergences
of technical, legal and ethical standards. In
addition to these more directly observable
forms of homogenisation, the growth of global
space has facilitated the spread and reinforce-
ment throughout the contemporary world sys-
tem of broadly similar structural transforma-
tions like those being described in the present
text. In the process we have seen much cultural
suppression and even extinction, as supraterrи-
torial forces have marginalised and over-
whelmed various minority languages, customs
and social structures. In those circumstances, as
Cox remarks, 'tradition' tends to survive only
insofar as it is 'assimilated as folklore in a glob-
al entertainment industry' (1994: 15). Indeed,
to the extent that people have been pulled into
the maelstrom of globalisation, many place-
bound distinctions of self and other have nar-
rowed and blurred (Mlinar 1992).

However, globalisation is not a singular
process of complete and irreversible homogeni-
sation. For one thing, as previously stressed,
locality survives alongside globality, so that
supraterritorial phenomena are mediated
through and translated into a local context at
the same time that they intervene in and
remould that circumstance. Thus IMF/World
Bank structural adjustment policies have had
varying consequences between, say, Indonesia
and Zambia. A global product may be put to
diverse uses according to the reception point:
successful marketing often depends on the
principle of 'global localisation' (Ohmae 1990:
10). Likewise, audio-visual productions are
often appreciated quite differently by different
parts of a global audience, and direct satellite
broadcasters have discovered that they need to
cater programming to a diversity of local tastes.
Indeed, mass media technologies have even

served to promote difference, for example, in
helping to reinvigorate a previously waning
Bedouin identity in Egypt (L. Abu-Lughod
1989). In a word, then, globalisation cannot be
simply equated with homogenisation (Appadu-

On the contrary, globalisation has often
stimulated increased affirmations of distinctive
territorial identities and sharpened efforts to
exclude the other. Closer contact with the 'out-
sider' has frequently heightened awareness of,
and dedication to, place-bound differences at
the very moment that time-space compression
has been undermining territorial cultures. By
intensifying and accelerating the interpreta-
tion of religions, languages, customs, races and
histories, global-scale connections have made it
more difficult than ever clearly to differentiate
group identities, let alone to locate each of these
peoples in a territorial space of its own. In many
cases the increased proximity of the other has
led to more acute tensions between ethnic,
racial and religious groups. By calling into
question long-standing and deeply felt connec-
tions between identity and place, globalisation
has threatened to deprive most of humanity of
their principal, if often fragile and largely illu-
soory, sense of distinctiveness, group solidarity
and self-determination. Not surprisingly, then,
there is a sense in which the more distance has
disintegrated, the more people have tried to
make it matter. A framework of identity can be
as resistant to change as a mode of production.

In this way, and contrary to many expec-
tations, globalisation has frequently encour-
aged a revival of nationalism. The paradox
could have been anticipated. National identi-
ties have always developed through contact
with, defence against and exclusion of the other
in the name of preserving a purported primor-
dial essence of self and community. So in the
context of contemporary globalisation, too,
people have on multiple occasions appealed to
the principle of national self-determination in
reaction against the intrusions of global capital,
global governance, global ecology and global
communications. For example, there have been
calls across the world for purification of the
national language and tighter immigration
controls. Globality and nationality have been
anything but contradictory. Nationhood has proved to be a central pillar of global as well as territorial culture. Indeed, a number of contemporary nationalist campaigns — including those of the ANC, Fretilin, the PLO, Sikhism and SWAPO — have adopted global strategies to good advantage (cf. Anderson 1992).

Meanwhile numerous ties between national identity and the territorial state have loosened in the context of globalisation. Many members of immigrant communities have long distinguished between their nationality and their citizenship, but global communications have made it much easier to preserve a sense of national solidarity while being dispersed on a world scale. In fact more states have in recent years permitted dual citizenship: de jure in the case of Turkey; de facto in the case of countless officials who turn a blind eye to the "offence". At the same time a host of other new nationalism has blossomed in recent decades within states. By overriding sovereignty, globalisation has reduced the state's capacity to exclude minorities inside as well as foreigners outside. Substate nationalisms have proliferated throughout the world since the 1960s, amongst Eritreans, Slovaks, Québécois, Acehnese, Scots and Chechens, to name but a few (Halperin and Scheffer 1992). Meanwhile, in Fiji, Australasia, Lapland and the Americas, indigenous peoples have intensified their struggles for relative autonomy within their respective states. Like the European regions, they too have sometimes strengthened their causes through transborder solidarity, as Navajo aids Saami, for example (Anaya 1994). In various ways, then, the late twentieth century has experienced a new localism, regarded by Strassoldo as a search for enclaves of familiarity and intimacy at a time when globalising technologies expose the self to an infinity of places, persons, things and ideas (1992: 46).

In other respects, globalisation has encouraged an affirmation of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place. As already indicated in regard to the growth of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place. As already indicated in regard to the growth of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place. As already indicated in regard to the growth of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place. As already indicated in regard to the growth of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place. As already indicated in regard to the growth of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place. As already indicated in regard to the growth of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place. As already indicated in regard to the growth of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place. As already indicated in regard to the growth of supraterritorial identities, drawn from every place and no place.
tion has encouraged particular turns in oncol-
gy (e.g., an increased awareness of the world
context of social life), methodology (espe-
cially the rise of new literacies) and aesthetics. In
addition, the recent growth of a geography of
rootlessness has spilled over to shake epistemo-
logical foundations, in particular by feeding
challenges to dominant techno-scientific con-
ceptions of knowledge. Reactions to the result-
ing indeterminacy of truth have ranged from a
proliferation of fundamentalisms on the one
hand to the spread of an ultrarelativism that
abandons notions of validity altogether on the
other. Nevertheless, to date globalisation has
not dealt a fatal blow to rationalism, and indeed
in some respects has strengthened its hold on
contemporary minds.

Knowledge has always been highly
mobile across space and time, and its construc-
tion has throughout recorded history frequently
taken place in part by cross-cultural inter-
change. Several world religions have rested on
long-distance networks for several millennia,
and two hundred years ago the Enlightenment
emerged out of Europe-wide and transatlantic
dialogues. However, with contemporary glob-
alisation much knowledge has actually become
detached from time-space distances and has
'relocated' from places to flows. From a
supraterritorial realm, broadcasters like CNN,
publishers like Bantam, press agencies like
Reuters, film producers like the big seven of
Hollywood, journals like Time, and advertisers
like HDM have all played significant roles in
shaping popular consciousness at all manner of
sites simultaneously. E-mail, global journals,
multilateral research teams and transborder
conference circuits have forged supraterritorial
'epistemic communities' that figure centrally in
the construction of much academic knowledge
(Haas 1992). Copyrights and patents have
increasingly been secured in global law.

Growth in study abroad programmes, ´distance
learning', transnationally franchised colleges,
and global distribution of core textbooks have
shifted much formal education at least partly
into supraterritorial space. Aesthetics, too, have
gained certain place-less qualities, given the
instant availability across the world of various
types of music, dance, architecture, painting,
sculpture, literature, oratory, theatre, sport,
film, fashion, cuisine and other art forms.

Not only has knowledge been an object
of globalisation, but the process has also in sev-
eral ways redefined contemporary patterns of
awareness. For instance, in respect of ontology —
i.e., common understandings of the entities and
relationships that constitute reality - the rise of
supraterritoriality has encouraged growth in
what Robertson terms 'the scope and depth of
consciousness of the world as a single place'
(1992: 183). In academic circles this reconcep-
tualisation can be seen inter alia in the major
expansion of international studies since the
1960s, the growth of what might be called 'world historical sociology' since the 1970s, and
the proliferation of globalisation studies across
the humanities and social sciences in recent
years (Scholte 1993: 18-24; 1994: 3-4). In
everyday life photographs from outer space of
earth as one world (first published in 1966),
news bulletins, various household articles,
countless goods in the shops, and so on have
spread and deepened a cognizance of 'world
society', even if not of world community. More
broadly, practices of globalisation have tended
to alter understandings of space, time, structure
and agency in ways such as those described in
the present writing. Indeed, the revised ontol-
ogy of social relations outlined throughout
these pages is in large part a reflection of as well
as on globalisation.

The rise of supraterritoriality has also
had important repercussions for methodology,
that is, the processes by which people construct
knowledge. In the global circumstance much
more understanding is acquired via mass media
than previously was the case. As a result film-
makers, journalists, advertisers and disk jockeys
have come to rank amongst our principal
'teachers'. Moreover, while territorial commu-
nications have proceeded primarily through
verbal interchange, the technologies of globali-
sation have generally accorded a larger role to
images. The radio, computer, fax and telephone
still work mainly through words, but channels
such as television, cinema and video have great-
ly enlarged the visual dimensions of 'language'.
The attendant shifts in 'literacy' are potentially
as momentous as the rise of written communi-
cation was in a previous epoch. Already many people read the globalising world without a book. Through these new modes of communication, amongst other means, globalisation has furthermore promoted various changes in aesthetics. Like ontology and methodology, beauty too has shown a somewhat different face in hyperspace. For one thing, by being drawn simultaneously from everywhere and nowhere, global art is considerably more diversified and mixed. An evening’s entertainment in a global city can quite easily encompass an Ethiopian meal, a Russian play, transport by Korean car, with French chansons on the radio, in the company of a Brazilian companion in Indian dress. The rise of supraterritoriality has in addition contributed to the creation and/or spread of certain new art forms, including computer images, electronic music, the reflective office towers of global organisations, the glossy packaging of many global products, and so on. More generally, the hypermobile quality of globality has helped to endow speed itself with beauty, e.g., in the sensation of jet travel, the pulse of electronic music, the flurry of still motion on television and cinema screens, and the rapid turnover of consumer goods. The instantaneous character of global connections has perhaps also been mirrored in increased consumerist insistence on instant gratification, with concomitant reductions in the artistic appreciation of lengthy ceremony, if not of contemplation itself.

Indeed, globalisation has in some respects fed unease about the very nature and purpose of knowledge. Not only have ontology, methodology and aesthetics become unsettled, but the contemporary phase of time-space compression has moreover heightened doubts concerning the milking Enlightenment epistemology. In brief, this secular faith maintains that the human mind can employ objective scientific analysis to establish singular, precise, definitive truths which, through technical applications, will solve the problems of life and guide history on a linear, controlled, progressive course. This threefold formula of reason/truth/progress has never been universally or completely secure, of course, but globalisation has called it into question in new ways. As already indicated, recent global ecological developments have suggested that techno-scientific rationality may sometimes be a threat rather than a solution. Likewise, as previously seen, the technological achievements that underpin global capitalism and global governance have not brought unqualified progress in welfare and democracy. Meanwhile the globally induced confusions over identity described above have made self-knowledge less secure. In addition, by dissipating time-space barriers globalisation has multiplied and intensified cross-cultural encounters, thereby confronting rationalists with a stream of evidence that other viable lifeworlds are available, if not positively attractive. Concurrently the high speed and rapid flux of global relations have encouraged the impression that knowledge is ephemeral rather than fixed, while computers and audio-visual technologies have readily produced sensory overloads that undermine the conviction that reason can control the world. Indeed, by giving greater prominence to communication through image as opposed to verbal exchange, globalisation has given more reign to ‘irrational’ unconscious associations in human thought (cf. Lash 1990: ch. 7). In all of these ways, the growth of supraterritoriality has helped to create a situation in which, as Beck puts it, ‘science has lost the truth’ and ‘the project of modernity needs first aid’ (1986: 166, 179-80).

In some cases this crisis of reason has encouraged greater pluralism and creative ferment in the construction of knowledge. Even various champions of Enlightenment discourse now concede the principle that no metanarrative can provide the standard against which all forms of knowledge are to be evaluated. Many rationalists have shown greater readiness to listen to and learn from other, previously distant voices, and to relax hierarchies between ‘high learning’ and folk wisdom. In this way, as well as by fostering transborder networks of mutual support amongst subaltern groups, globalisation has helped to make more space for women’s histories, black consciousness, alternative medicines, lesbian and gay experiences, deep ecology and other formerly hidden truths. Some, in both academic and lay circles, have taken this
'postmodernist' journey in epistemology to a subjectivist destination. For them, consumerism, dislocated identity and ultrasepticism — each fostered by globalisation — have combined to produce an ethic of anything goes and moral indifference. Although few people have in practice taken anti-rationalist critique to the point of unqualified solipsism, widespread nihilistic tendencies are evident in the globalising world of the late twentieth century, and the general underdevelopment of an ethic of care suitable for global conditions is striking. The name 'Band Aid' — a momentary plaster — was sadly graphic in a sense that the musicians of 1985 did not intend.

At an opposite pole, others have responded to the indeterminacy of knowledge in global relations by erecting barricades of fundamentalism. Indeed, the contemporary period of globalisation has seen a proliferation of religious and secular knowledges that are rooted in claims of absolute and exclusive truth. All of the major world faiths have experienced upsurges of fundamentalism in recent years: e.g., in the right-wing stance of the present papacy; in Islamic revivalism of the Iranian Revolution and its reverberations from Trinidad to Indonesia; in the Jewish fundamentalism of many West Bank settlers; in the Hindu fundamentalism of the BJP; in revivals of Shinto and Sikh nationalism; and in countless evangelical Protestant movements across both hemispheres. Some of these campaigns have harnessed the technologies of globalisation to their cause, for example, through televangelism by satellite or through the Internet (Islamic Network) computer bulletin board. More deeply, however, contemporary religious fundamentalism may be seen, in part, as a reaction against the relativising maelstrom of globalisation and an attempt, with an insistence if not desperation that readily turns violent, to retain or regain fixed truth (cf. Robertson and Chirico 1985: 238-40; Robertson 1992: ch. 11). Other fundamentalist tendencies have arisen in secular knowledges, for instance, in contemporary management’s cult of efficiency and in dialogues of the deaf between positivists and postmodernists in the academy. In many circles, rationalism is the strongest fundamentalism of all.

Indeed, we should not overestimate the degree to which globalisation has undermined rationalist epistemology in the late twentieth century. Modern science has been one of the main forces behind globalisation, and it is by no means clear that the process will rebound to dethrone reason. On the whole religious/spiritual knowledge is decidedly marginalised in global capital, global governance, global ecology and many contemporary frameworks of identity. Tech no-scientific notions of ‘development’ have underpinned the predominant legitimating global ideology. The IMF and Nestlé are not renowned for listening and for celebrating pluralism. To the extent that conversations between differences have taken place in global space, the Enlightenment discourse has generally provided the ground rules for the dialogue. In sum, although globalisation has provoked increased concern about the consequences of modernity, the prevailing underlying conviction, even amongst most critics, remains that reason will see us through after all.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has sought to come to grips with one of the key trends in the contemporary world system. By making an additional, supra territorial dimension central to the lives of much of humanity, globalisation has been fundamentally altering the geography of social relations. This change in time-space conditions has in turn had manifold and far-reaching reverberations on the social order as a whole, affecting production, governance, ecology, identity and knowledge. Globalisation has in a variety of ways shifted channels of accumulation, processes of regulation, forms of human exploitation of nature, expressions of self and community, and modes of understanding. On the whole, however, the rise of supraterritoriality has not removed capitalism, the state, industrialism, nationhood and rationalism as central, interconnected structures of social relations. Thus while globalisation has constituted a revolution of geography, it has not amounted to a full-scale revolution of social structure - to date at any rate.
That said, globalisation has also injected considerable fluidity and flux into world social relations in the late twentieth century, accelerating history in uncertain and often contradictory directions. Capital generally moves faster and more erratically in the supraterritorial realm. Rapid swings in hypercompetitive global markets can eliminate jobs and fortunes in an instant. Overall, governance has become more fragmented across institutions and between local, country, regional and transworld levels. As a result, the locus of authority is frequently unclear. Supraterritorial ecological shifts have unfolded at speed and in poorly understood ways. In global space identity tends to be more plural and fluctuating, and knowledge less definite and secure. Hence, insofar as structural change arises from motion and tension, globalisation holds high transformative potential. Thus far, the rise of the global has for the most part produced change within continuity of social organisation, but scope for more radical historical breaks is also available.

Indeed, there is good cause to cultivate such possibilities with deliberate political action. As has been stressed throughout this discussion, globalisation has over the past three decades had a number of deeply disturbing consequences. In multiple respects the trend has meant not liberation, following neoliberal claims, but marginalisation and subordination. Globally networked elites have become the nouveaux riches of the late twentieth century whilst innumerable poor — South and North, East and West — have suffered income loss and destitution in the process of structural adjustment to the new geography. Intensified surveillance and a general lack of democracy in global governance have reduced the capacities of people across the world to make their own history. Globalisation has had multiple exclusionary effects, contributing to aggressive nationalisms and intolerant fundamentalisms as well as to the death of species and human cultures. By promoting fashions of money, consumption and growth, global markets have sooner deepened than alleviated the spiritual impoverishment of our times. On all of these counts recently prevailing trends in globalisation need to be confronted rather than celebrated.

However, as also suggested from the start of this writing, the prospects of globality are not wholly bleak. The limits of access and vision just noted are not inherent to global social relations, and already there are intimations that the unfettered neoliberalism of the 1980s may have passed. Moreover, contemporary history shows that supraterritoriality offers numerous possibilities for change that empower rather than disables. As we have seen, globalisation has provided occasions to redesign work, to rethink democracy, to reappraise humanity’s relations with nature, to reassess identities and to reconstruct knowledge. Indeed, by raising the profile of information and communication in social life, globalisation can encourage reflexivity and a more active, critical engagement with history. The resulting experiments in alternative technologies, organisations, ethics and lifestyles carry dangers of reinventing oppression, of course, but given the sorry state of the present we should not miss the opportunities for emancipation either. Already various global social movements have widened the representation of interests beyond the old corporatist triangle of business, government and unions. Already the end of sovereignty has encouraged a search for collective solidarities that will have greater substance than the ‘imagined community’ of the nation-state (Anderson 1991). Already the new geography is stimulating reconstructions of knowledge, such as that attempted in the present essay, which elude the twin traps of fundamentalism and relativism. Happier tales of globalisation are still ours for the making.


III. Mapping out a future for job creation and sustainable development

The Information Society does not threaten "the end of work" as extreme pessimists in Europe and the United States are inclined to argue. But it will change the nature of employment and erode many of the values derived from "one job, one employer" traditions. The Forum believes that if we manage the process of change in a timely and sensible way, then we shall see a more competitive, job-creating European Union.

As in Chapter Two, we have organised our thoughts and conclusions around six propositions:

1. The new information and communication technologies will eventually create more jobs than they destroy, but the speed of delivery depends on how well and quickly we can adjust to what will be very different working and social environments.

2. Teleworking will be the employment future for millions of people: it should not be feared, but it may need to be carefully regulated.

3. The new technologies look likely to make a real contribution to sustainable development, but there is no guarantee that they will.

4. The growth of markets for interactive services based on multimedia and other technologies will continue to be slow unless more is done to stimulate them.

5. Businesses and industries must form new partnerships with educators to ensure that the new and changing skills they require are being taught.

6. The regulatory framework is a key factor enabling us to make the most of the Information Society as soon as possible. Its development should be pragmatic with some regulations needed at EU level and others to be taken care of by the Member States.

Every effort should be made to create more public confidence on this point. Employment creation is now beginning to confirm the economic theory that productivity increases due to technical innovation lead to a virtuous circle of higher growth, longer prices, rising real wages and job-creation.

Job insecurity is now beginning to affect the middle classes.

Nevertheless, the new technologies are for the moment seen by most people as net destroyers of jobs - especially those that are low-skilled, boring, repetitive, mechanical, unpleasant and dangerous. They are also affecting highly-skilled work as their use in the service sector expands, and at the same time changing the nature of employment in the direction of part-time and home-working.

It is little wonder that in many countries such changes are widening traditional zones of job-insecurity to include the middle classes. This need only be a short-lived transitional process if we implement the necessary structural and institutional changes without delay.

Creating a more urgent and dynamic momentum is crucial, particularly within companies. They need to be much more aware of the opportunities that will open to them if they redesign and re-engineer their organisations. They must also respond to the need to launch new innovative services and products as well as re-examine methods of work and the duration of work. Only then can we look for a balance sheet of net job creation.

However, the Forum’s attempts to analyze the jobs outlook has been inhibited by the lack of a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon. We strongly urge that one be developed.

Far-reaching changes in the education and training systems are a basic requirement for exploiting the new technologies and raising competitiveness and job creation. In addition, the EU and the Member States must do more to encourage the development of markets for services and applications and to help people understand the human, social changes they are living through.


Companies are flattening their structures

These are not always comfortable: under intense competitive pressures companies are flattening their structures by wiping out managerial functions and placing their responsibilities closer to markets. As part of the same process, they are removing barriers to internal and external flows of information and concentrating power, information and decision-making at the top.

This re-engineering is mainly confined to large companies, leaving small and medium-sized enterprises well behind in their adjustment to, and use of, the new information technologies. In part, this is because the software and other instruments they need is expensive and scarcely adequate, partly because they lack information on the available technologies and markets and also because of the sector’s long-standing difficulties in satisfying its training requirements.

Recommendations to the Commission

14) Investigate the particular sources of job creation in Europe resulting from the Information Society, and the measures needed to maximise it: coordinate a set of national analyses and actions to demonstrate the ability of the Information Society to create jobs

15) Give a priority to promoting best practices by:
- identifying the best examples of job creation linked to the new technologies
- assessing current national and EU policies for disseminating knowledge of best practices
- recommending actions best suited for the promotion of best practices

16) Promote the development of a coherent conceptual framework by mandating a small team of economists and experts to analyze the economics of the Information Society, its functioning, potential and drawbacks.

Despite the risks of social isolation, people seem to want it

There is still much to be learned about the impact and implications of teleworking. It is an attractive and flexible means of taking work to people which could open up many new opportunities for employment. People seem to want it, even though its introduction in Europe is extremely slow.

In part, this may be due to the risks of social isolation and the creation of “ghettos” for women made possible by moving the work out of the office and into the home. Paradoxically, some demand for teleworking can already be traced to a desire among people to be able to live in and sustain small communities. In the Forum’s view, policy should seek to promote a mix of home and office teleworking.

The manifest advantages of teleworking are:
- individuals gain greater managerial and organisational control over their work tasks
- economic development gaps can be narrowed when work moves to distant regions, isolated communities and developing countries
- energy is saved and traffic congestion and pollution reduced when fewer people travel to urban and city centre work places
- work can be shared between home and office
- the possibility of work can be offered to some who are presently excluded e.g. child-rearing parents bound to the home, carers looking after elderly parents, some disabled

There may be a temptation to over-regulate by trying to extend all that is apparently relevant in current social legislation to teleworking

These are powerful attractions and public policy must facilitate, not obstruct the development of telework. Fundamental changes are implied in the organisation and management of work and in the relations between employer and employees, whether or not they belong to trace unions. There may well be a temptation to over-regulate by seeking to extend all that is apparently relevant in current social legislation to this new area without leav-
ing room for experimentation and development. A balance has to be struck between the need to allow markets to develop and the protection of those who are employed. In particular, attention will have to be given to:

(i) developing a statutory definition of telework
(ii) changes to labour law and collective agreements
(iii) health and safety regulations
(iv) rights of access to the home for employers and regulatory inspectors
(v) rights to trace union representation
(vi) the need for global standards to avoid "social dumping" - the International Labour Office's standards for homeworkers should be applied as minimum standards for teleworkers

The important role for the EU will be to coordinate the regulatory approaches of the Member States to avoid cross-border discrimination against employers and countries and legislative obstacles to trans-border teleworking.

Recommendation to the Commission
17) In order to adapt the social and legal framework to speed up the development of teleworking:
   • promote initiatives to create awareness about the opportunities it offers
   • establish a framework for achieving a wide social consensus in Europe and in a broader international context on how to implement transborder teleworking
   • encourage Member States to clarify the legal and fiscal status of various forms of teleworking
   • encourage the Member States to make a coherent adaptation of the social and legal framework and to promote teleworking experiments

3. The new technologies look likely to make a real contribution to sustainable development, but there is no guarantee that they will.

Sustainability is as important as human rights and democracy and, sadly, much less entrenched in our economic, social and political systems. It is a global requirement which can only be secured by global agreements and actions.

Sustainable development:
(i) implies a concern for future generations and for the long-term health and integrity of the environment
(ii) embraces concern for the quality of life (not just incomes growth), for equity between people in the present (including the prevention of poverty), for intergenerational equity (people in the future deserve an environment at least as good as the one we currently enjoy, if not better); and for the social and ethical dimensions of human welfare

Most experts do not think that sustainable development is realistically attainable without information technologies, but nor are they sure it is guaranteed with them. Much depends on the framework in which they are used. There is a risk of a "rebound" effect whereby they could stimulate new demands for material consumption. If this happens, sustainability will be lost and we shall be faced with chaos and confrontation.

The new technologies and their applications can contribute to sustainability by:
• their requirement for relatively small amounts of materials and resources in relation to the productivity improvements they deliver
• "dematerialisation" e.g. electronic banking where transactions are conducted without paper
• making Third World development less resource-intensive
• creating "smart" transport systems, less polluting and more efficient in performance and use of material resources
• reducing mobility (by means of teleworking/homeworking, retailing and entertainment applications) and congestion, pollution and energy consumption
• environmental monitoring by means of teleworking/home working, retailing and entertainment applications and congestion, pollution and energy consumption
Securing these benefits requires progress across a broad policy front at local, regional, national and global levels. It also means recognising that technology alone is unlikely to deliver sustainability unless accompanied by cultural and structural changes.

Recommendations to the Commission
18) Analyze the concept of sustainability and evaluate the impact of a shift to service-based economies. In particular:
   - gather and disseminate information on the impact on sustainability of the information and communication technologies
   - promote the use of the new technologies in a manner consistent with sustainability by encouraging such things as teleworking and teleconferencing

4. The growth of markets for interactive services based on multimedia and other technologies will continue to be slow unless more is done to stimulate them. With security of transaction problems steadily being dealt with by software development, there is an increasingly obvious imbalance between the rapid growth of new products for business markets and those applications and services available to the general public.

A critical mass to unlock private investment is still lacking. Demand from the public and from public administrations is still too weak to create a critical mass sufficient to unlock private investment to develop these new services. Given that initial returns on investment are likely to be low, many providers are looking to advertising to generate funds. However, the benefits to advertisers of on-line vehicles have scarcely been established and the incentives to use them may be slow to develop.

Generally, the Forum thinks that popular demand for on-line services is unlikely to emerge unless they are affordable and respond to actual needs. Their potential benefits must also be better understood. It will take even longer if we maintain the present slow pace of installation of wide band networks whose technical “muscle” is needed for rapid, high-quality transmission of sound, pictures and text.

In addition to greater efforts to raise understanding, public authorities still need to take initiatives that will encourage greater private sector investment and the emergence of product markets. Growth of services needs to accelerate at a much higher rate than overall economic growth. Some of the necessary initiatives are regulatory and are discussed in point 6 below. Others include:
   - reducing network transmission charges
   - using public procurement to stimulate software production and new services, notably in the areas of education and training and provision of public information and services based on public data bases
   - taking active measures to involve people in the design of services targeted at them

Recommendations to the Commission
19) The EU must create a regulatory framework which encourages industries, labour markets and consumers to gain the full economic and social benefits of the new information and communication technologies.

20) The Commission and Member States must manage infrastructure and service development by means of giving incentives to investment in new multimedia services and applications, orienting R&D programmes towards Information Society needs and developing a common understanding of universal access and universal service obligations.

21) Stimulate targeted trials to enable the start-up of new markets, explore possible social benefits and opportunities and to educate potential users
22) Research and study the effectiveness of aids and tax incentives for the development of the Information Society
23) Analyze the impact of conflicting market-pull and policy-push approaches to infrastructure development and the deployment of services
5. Businesses and industries must form new partnerships with educators to ensure that the new and changing skills they require are being taught.

We have to create new partnerships between entrepreneurs and educators.

This is by no means the first time this vital requirement for developing and maintaining competitiveness has been highlighted in an official report. Educational institutions have to equip the young with skills appropriate for the Information Society and attitudes favourable to lifelong learning. An important component of “The Lifelong Learning Society” will be the “Learning Company” whose computer-literate members and employees will be using their electronic access to knowledge and information to update their skills.

This vision needs emphasising because the framework needed will take a long time to achieve, and we do not see enough evidence that the issues are being strategically addressed by the Member States.

Recommendation to the Commission
24) Identify and disseminate good practice in the electronic integration of business organisations and integration between school communities, businesses and other partners

6. The regulatory framework is a key factor enabling us to make the most of the Information Society as soon as possible. Its development should be pragmatic with some regulations needed at EU level and others to be taken care of by the Member States.

The essence is to strike a balance which encourages the market while protecting vital public interests.

The priority is to create a regulatory framework which enables and stimulates everyone to reap the full economic and social benefits of the Information Society, from producers and carriers of content to end users. The essence of the task is to strike a balance which encourages market forces to lead the way but which also recognises that they cannot do the job alone. As we have already pointed out in this report, there are important matters of public interest to be promoted and protected so as to preserve pluralism, minority cultures and democratic rights.

Competition is a vital driving force and a guarantee of freedom of expression and pluralism. Media conglomerates must not be allowed to dominate, and the extent to which they are allowed to integrate vertically the production and distribution of content may threaten freedom and pluralism. Companies in control of infrastructure should not be able to use their positions as “gatekeepers” to discriminate in favour of their own services. The Forum is concerned that concentrations that may be very difficult to alter are already threatening pluralism and universal access.

The issue of intellectual property rights (IPRs) proved to be one of the most controversial and intractable dealt with by any of the Forum’s working groups. In general terms, the Forum is in favour of a high level of protection for authors and the holders of related rights.

Different approaches to protecting intellectual property rights

However, two different approaches emerged on how best to afford this protection: one group supported the continental European model of “droits d’auteur”, including its notion of moral rights; the second group favoured the Anglo-American system of copyright law which vests intellectual property rights in the user-producer. Further work will be needed in the next 12 months before we can reach any final recommendations and conclusions.

The regulatory issues we wish to see addressed in a coherent way throughout the EU include:

(i) media concentration. We are particularly concerned to prevent the establishment of monopolistic positions at national and EU levels based either on a high degree of vertical integration, or power to condition access to infrastructure, or both. We do not believe that public broadcasters should be subject to any media concentration rules.
(ii) clear definitions of legal responsibilities of the carrier and service provider.
(iii) the need for a new legal framework to
ensure open access to networks for content providers, fair transactions and to prevent anti-competitive behaviour
(iv) the need for clear and fair systems of consumer redress and compensation

Recommendations to the Commission
25) Create legal safeguards for competition at all levels of the information value chain to prevent the establishment of monopolistic positions which may restrict pluralism and the free flow of information, services and programmes. Such rules also need to address the phenomenon of vertical integration
26) Introduce regulations to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, especially by network "gatekeepers", and to ensure that navigational systems for using hundreds of different television channels are designed to be fair and non-discriminatory
27) Encourage and ensure the active participation of media organisations, including public service broadcasters, in the new technologies and services so as to protect cultural diversity, pluralism and democracy in the Member States

IV. Summary of recommendations
Towards the lifelong learning society
Recommendations to the European Commission
1) Establish what Member States are doing to introduce the new technologies in the public education and training sectors so that the Commission’s own activities and those of the Information Society Forum can coordinate with them
2) Examine the education and training implications of the EU’s range of Information Society activities and disseminate to educators a comprehensive and integrated view of the issues and initiatives

Recommendations to the European Commission
3) Mount research, pilot projects and public information campaigns with the following objectives:
   • to increase public awareness of the social consequences of change, highlighting dangers as well as opportunities
   • to examine how information technologies are used by individual consumers and to encourage their greater use, and in particular
   • to establish how best to ensure that people with disabilities have equal access to the Information Society

Recommendations to the European Commission
4) Promote a common legal framework
   • guaranteeing the citizen’s full rights of access to public information at acceptable cost
   • setting limits on the obligation of public authorities to supply information
   • defining the relationship between public and private investors
5) Encourage the standardisation process by concentrating on the functional specifications of communication systems and harmonised message formatting and user commands
6) Promote appropriate solutions for public services requirements through EU research and development and other programmes (e.g. INFO 2000) to speed up the interchange of data between Member States’ administration (IDA programme) and explore the concept of a “zone of free regulation” in which innovative initiatives can be tested which might otherwise be blocked by existing regulations. Rules on privacy and data protection must, however, be respected
7) Launch EU-wide awareness raising initiatives including public kiosks at which individuals can access on-line information, and a European Citizens’ Card. This could be multifunctional and carry a
range of information which must, however, be compatible with data protection and privacy requirements

8) Promote electronic tendering by fixing a percentage of all procurement which must be handled electronically.

**Equipping public administrations to provide online services**

**Strengthening democracy and individual rights**

**Recommendations to the Commission**

8) Establish an Information Action Plan to stimulate public awareness and wider participation in the democratic process at the European level.

This programme could include:

- A European Voter Information Project
- A European Consumer Information Project
- A European Social Chatter Information Project
- A European Business Hotline
- European Electronic Information Centres
- Providing affordable on-line access to all official EU documents
- Research into the current state of "electronic democracy" in Europe, focusing on how popular participation can be funded from private or public resources

10) Rights of access to public information should be guaranteed through common freedom of information laws in all Member States and harmonisation, where necessary, should be according to the highest prevailing standards of openness.

11) A legal framework is required to ensure:

- That existing laws and standards (and new ones where needed) which protect freedom of expression, defend cultural rights and reflect community values apply to all information services available for public consumption
- That the individual's right to privacy and anonymity is protected
- That information providers to the public are obliged to make known the origins and ownership of all material

12) Create rentable encryption procedures based on lodging the keys to encryption with independent and separately regulated public trust centres outside the mainstream of commercial activity. There will be a need for European guidelines for such procedures and European-wide certification arrangements.

**Towards a second Renaissance**

**Recommendations to the Commission**

13) An effective legal framework is required:

- To preserve and promote European cultures, in particular minority cultures, and to lend support to local initiatives in using the new media for expressing and developing culture and building communities
- To safeguard non-discriminatory, fair and transparent access rights for content providers to distribution systems
- To make available to all content providers market information gathered through control of the infrastructure they are using
- To create property rights in information transmitted via the networks
- To encourage the construction of communities of consumers.

**Job creation**

**Recommendations to the Commission**

14) Investigate the particular sources of job creation in Europe resulting from the Information Society, and the measures needed to maximise it. Coordinate a set of national analyses and actions to demonstrate the ability of the Information Society to create jobs.

15) Give a priority to promoting best practices by:

- Identifying the best examples of job creation linked to the new technologies
- Assessing current national and EU policies for disseminating knowledge of best practices
• recommending actions best suited for the promotion of best practices

16) Promote the development of a coherent conceptual framework by mandating a small team of economists and experts to analyze the economics of the Information Society, its functioning, potential and drawbacks.

Teleworking

Recommendation to the Commission and the Member States
17) In order to adapt the social and legal framework to speed up the development of teleworking:
• promote initiatives to create awareness about the opportunities it offers
• establish a framework for achieving a wide social consensus in Europe and in a broader international context on how to implement transborder teleworking
• encourage Member States to clarify the legal and fiscal status of various forms of teleworking
• encourage the Member States to make a coherent adaptation of the social and legal framework and to promote teleworking experiments

Sustainable Development

Recommendations to the Commission
18) Analyze the concept of sustainability and evaluate the impact of a shift to service-based economies. In particular:
• gather and disseminate information on the impact on sustainability of the information and communication technologies
• promote the use of the new technologies in a manner consistent with sustainability by encouraging such things as teleworking and teleconferencing

Markets for Services

Recommendations to the Commission
19) The EU must create a regulatory framework which encourages industries, labour markets and consumers to gain the full economic and social benefits of the new information and communication technologies.
20) The Commission and Member States must manage infrastructure and service development by means of incentives to investment in new multimedia services and applications, orienting R&D programmes towards Information Society needs and developing a common understanding of universal access and universal obligations.
21) Stimulate targeted trials to enable the start-up of new markets, to explore possible social benefits and opportunities and to educate potential users
22) Research and study the effectiveness of aids and tax incentives for the development of the Information Society.
23) Analyze the impact of conflicting market-pull and policy-push approaches to infrastructure development and the deployment of services

Partnerships between Educators and Entrepreneurs

Recommendation to the Commission
24) Identify and disseminate good practice in the electronic integration of business organisations and integration between school communities, businesses and other partners

Getting the regulatory framework right

Recommendation to the Commission
25) Create legal safeguards for competition at all levels of the information value chain to prevent the establishment of monopolistic positions which may restrict pluralism and the free flow of information, services
and programmes. Such rules also need to address the phenomenon of vertical integration.

26) Introduce regulations to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, especially by network "gatekeepers", and to ensure that navigational systems for using hundreds of different television channels are designed to be fair and non-discriminatory.

27) Encourage and ensure the active participation of media organisations, including public service broadcasters, in the new technologies and services so as to protect cultural diversity, pluralism and democracy in the Member States.

V. Future work

The Forum's work programme for 1996-1997 will be elaborated in detail during the summer of 1996 after discussions between its members meeting in plenary and subsequent exchanges of opinion with the European Commission.

However, we are already agreed that we shall give a high priority to identifying concrete examples of good or relevant practice across the broad range of social, economic and political issues with which we are dealing. In addition, the Forum’s working groups have identified a number of specific issues which they wish to examine. Provisionally, these point to an agenda for the coming 12 months which is likely to include:

employment and job creation
- where will the new-jobs come from in the Information Society and what will be their quality?
- how should companies restructure themselves to make best use of the new information and communications technologies?
- how to stimulate a better flow of venture capital for start-ups?
- guidelines for teleworking
- prospects for small and medium-sized enterprises, focusing on organisational and technical issues and how to develop new value chains

social and democratic values
- further study of masters relating to encryption, funding, regulation of content, application of common standards, reliability and quality of information
- what are the potential applications of the new technologies in the area of direct democracy and what are the implications?
- how best to protect intellectual property (the advantages and disadvantages of individual exploitation of rights versus collective exploitation), privacy and data?
- what are the consequences of speeding up the delivery of information and what possibilities will citizens have for greater participation in decision-making processes?
- study of how social systems can be better adapted to globalisation

consumer issues
- security of transactions, payments and information, consumer redress and representation and the need for independent regulation
- standardisation of applications and appliances for the disabled
- a study of the effects of the new technologies on purchasing and consumer behaviour

universal access issues
- how to marry access to networks and services with fairness, openness and affordability
- what progress is being made towards developing "user-friendly" access to networks and applications which respond to people's day to day needs

sustainable development issues
- what instruments could be used to promote sustainability and how should their proceeds be used?
• are the new technologies a prime enabler for sustainability or are they likely to produce a "rebound effect" of increasing consumption?
• what is the potential of the new technologies to induce "dematerialisation"

Public Administrations and Public Services
• how to create an information culture in public administrations and how should they be organised for the Information Society?
• how to review and exchange the most relevant experiences in applying the new technologies to the provision of information and services?
• what would be an appropriate common legal framework for the provision of public information?
• further examination of the concept of a "zone of free regulation"

Lifelong Learning
• what are the key basic skills for the 21st century?
• the economic and social importance of "Lifelong Learning" and the need to restructure education systems to enable the school, the home and the workplace to contribute more effectively how to stimulate the educational materials marketplace (and the communications infrastructure) as enablers for the development of good practice?
• what are the implications of shifting from teacher-centredness to learner-centredness?
• the need to develop a new role for the teacher, and the implications for the skills of other educational actors (parents and children, managers of companies, educational and cultural establishments such as libraries or museums)
• how to promote an awareness among SME managers of the need for continuous identification of areas in which their companies are short of skills and qualifications? How to help them to select or design suitable training measures for themselves and their staff?
• investigate the barriers to the Information Society's transition to the learning society, including the obstacles to a European market place for the provision of education and training

Culture
• how can cultural diversity within the EU be best protected?
• investigate the formation of "virtual communities". Why are they formed? What are the common values that bind them?
• what are the cultural implications of the new services?
• analyze the role that should be played by creators and cultural industries in the Information Society
• consider how to enforce and respect moral rights in line with the Berne Convention
• analyze the potential for integrating "static culture" (museums, art galleries, architecture and monuments) with the "dynamic culture" of data bases

The Future of New Services and Media
• examine the feasibility of the European Union supporting market studies and projects aimed at establishing the market potential of new services in Europe, and methods to measure their possible audience shares and to evaluate their interest for consumers
• examine the new multimedia and the consequences of interactivity
• look at the implications of the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and information services especially in terms of competition policy, regulation and consumer protection
• collect examples and best practices of the most advanced cases of individual adoption of the new technologies and their consequent impact on life style.
Introducing the Information Society Forum

The European Commission decided to set up the Forum in February 1995 in order to create a new and authoritative source of reflection, debate and advice on the challenges of the Information Society. Firmly believing that the new information and communications technologies must meet the needs of all citizens, as well as business, the Commission wanted opinions on policies and priorities from a broadly based group of representatives.

The 128 members of the Forum were appointed by the Commission, half on the nomination of the Member States and half selected by the Commission. They are drawn from five main fields of activity:

- users of the new technologies: industry (banks, retail, maritime etc), public services, consumer groups, small and medium-sized enterprises and the professions
- social groups: academics, employers organisations and trade unions, youth groups, regional and city representatives
- content and service providers: publishers and authors, film and TV producers, broadcasters, computer software producers and information service providers
- network operators: fixed telecommunications, cable TV, mobile and satellite operators
- Institutions: members of Parliament, of the Economic and Social Committee of the Committee of the Regions and the data protection Commissioner.

The Forum met in plenary session for the first time in July 1995 and decided to divide its membership into six working groups whose reflection and analysis would focus on:

- the impact on the economy and employment
- basic social and democratic values in the “virtual community”
- the influence on public services
- education, training and learning and in the Information Society
- the cultural dimension and the future of the media
- sustainable development, technology and infrastructure

Subsequent plenaries were held in January and June 1996.

The working groups met for the first time in September 1995 and then on three subsequent occasions in November 1995 and in March and May 1996.
We are at a particular stage in the development of the feminist movement. We are, undoubtedly, faced with new scenarios and new contexts for the development of the feminist proposal and we need to take them into account. Nevertheless, we do not have many answers but many doubts, questions, a few certainties, some intuition and an enormously rich practice that we must begin to analyze. The tendency to see two polarized positions in the movement hides the fact that both sides emphasize fundamental aspects of the reality in which we move and each warns about risks that are real, and in the face of which we need to develop strategies in one or the other sense. It is also possible that within each polarity there are also different nuances and differences that can further enrich our vision. Differences are very important because they allow us to question, redefine our practices and grow as a movement. It will be a challenge but it will also be enriching to discuss and visualize these differences, as well as the consensus and agreements on how to continue building a movement that is prepositive and subversive. I believe that all of these positions, emphases, and differences are substantial to the development of a vital feminist movement that is aware of what is going on around it.

The Feminist Gatherings have been a forum for political reflection and for planning strategies since their start. The VII Gathering is a privileged opportunity for us to evaluate what these past three years (that separate us from the VI Gathering) of intense feminist strategies in relation to the public-political sphere have meant. The call for the VII Gathering is a clear invitation to this reflection. Its importance is also evident considering that it is the second to the last gathering before the end of the century. It will be a discussion that we will start now but which, without a doubt, will keep us tied up and interconnected until the new millennium because it has to do with our own uncertainties and searching at the end of a century that has seen the feminist proposals stretch from one end of the planes to the other. Before moving on it might be worth highlighting some of the significant changes in the areas in which feminist actions and proposals have been developed in the past few years. The first change is that the feminist movement grew in many countries, confronting authoritarianism in both the street and the house, in an anti-democratic climate and/or with strong dictatorships that the movement undoubtedly helped to defeat. The existence of a potent, visible and mobilized movement, as well as the certainties of the 1980s that we wanted to change our oppression in society and in daily life, have given way to a period of greater uncertainty and to a movement that is more reflective and which is grounded in a realist Utopia. It is also more fragmented or with articulations that allow for more room and issues, and in which there is much more diversity.

The movement of the 1990s - faced with the processes of transition to or consolidation of democracy - has changed its way of existing, its logic, its dynamic and has started to stress new emphases. One of the most significant changes has been the modification of an anti-state position toward one of critical negotiation in relation to the state and the format international organizations. This has also meant a change in an autonomy that was defensive and a logic and dynamic that were confrontational (necessary in the first stages in order to gain affirmation and because of the continent’s dictatorships) toward a logic of negotiation based on a strong and prepositive autonomy that values dialogue.

The context in which autonomy is exercised has varied drastically in the past few years given the new complexities of social and political life and also the dynamic of world conferences, particularly on women. Our multiple interests as women have been placed in the public-political arena both nationally and internationally, and the experiences and proposals accumulated by the feminist movement in its different expressions and currents since the new wave began have been expressed. From an independent position, but one which is committed to the transformation of the lives of women in our societies, the autonomy of the movement appears more like a process that gains specific contents according to the strength of its articulation, ability to negotiate, its aspirations and the opportunities for trans-
formation that arise in a determined historic moment. An autonomous position is related to the choice of strategies for confrontation, negotiation and forming alliances in the here and now that implies greater power for women over their lives and circumstances at the physical, political, economic and cultural levers and which, in the long run, appears as a horizon for transformation, a world without exclusion or subordination for all people.

It is within these new contexts that the discussion about our differences can be framed and where we can locate the practices of the movement that have produced the greatest tension. For this, I believe it is important to move openly - but not only - into the discussion of what the Beijing experience and other conferences meant: What they meant to us as feminists, what they meant to the other expressions of the movement, including those sectors that remained on the margins or were opposed; what paths or risks the criticisms may raise for us; what purpose they served or will serve to modify at least some aspects of the multiple subordinations women are subjected to; and, above all, what do they mean to a long-term radical feminist agenda.

One way to begin the discussion might be dividing it into two large blocks for reflection: the current difficulties and the feminist agenda.

1. The current difficulties

A way of introduction

We can summarize some of the tensions in the movement into one large difficulty, feminist schizophrenia, but I think it would be better to talk about ambivalence in the most creative sense of the term. Schizophrenia means division and opposition, two unconnected movements in the same body or in the same space. Ambivalence implies search and connection, no absolute truths, no definitive judgments; the practices of women are in permanent ambivalence between subordination and rebellion, between the old that must be changed and the new that must be appropriated. Related to the presence of feminists in other spaces, ambivalence draws us to the sense of “ajenidad” that is used by the Italians - to be there while at the same time knowing that we are not from there. The ambivalence currently found in the movement in its different expressions has to do with politics and power, which have also been at the centre of the reflection-action of this period. Our reflection on this issue has been constant in the past and in a self-critical sense. Many of the difficulties from Taxco continue to surround us, but there are new ones that are sharpening the debate given the development of the movement in the most recent stage. Politics and power are expressed in other areas, in the ambivalence between institutionalization and autonomy. The difficulties rising from this ambivalence are related to funding, representation, the relationship between the specific and the global, and between the national and the regional-global. They are also expressed in negotiations and alliances the movement establishes in relation to new areas of action and negotiation (stases, international fora). Diversity - a complicated issue and reality in the movement - in all of its complexity has to crisscross this discussion.

Some of the more tenacious difficulties

- Funding: A significant part of the feminist movement has started feminist institutions or non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) that carry out their work with funding from international cooperation. Having NGO’s with a feminist orientation without a doubt has been important in attracting attention to the subordination of women, as well as generating alternatives to this subordination. Throughout the years this has generated a market - supply to receive funds and demand to move feminist proposals forward - to give products increasing impact, to generate projects that benefit other women, to launch initiatives to give us more visibility and a political profile, to begin initiatives to keep us connected, etc.
Funding has also brought us difficulties that have to do with the unequal access to resources, the risk of losing our autonomy, the weakening of traditional spaces of feminist organization, competition to receive more funds, which leads to a weakening of feminist solidarity, etc. This has led to the claim that there exist “economic and power interests within the movement,” an affirmation that we cannot simply disregard. We must analyze openly the processes that point to this and the processes that can neutralize them.

Concern over money in the movement is not something new but it has gotten worse because there is an economic crisis and there is less money available for feminist projects in the region (it appears that more emphasis is being placed on poverty - Africa - than on empowerment). The risk of putting autonomy and funding at odds with each other has not helped us very much. It is important to avoid a moralistic opposition between funding and autonomy. Instead we should stress a political perspective aimed at modifying the conditions that limit the autonomous movement of NGO’s, groups or feminist spaces, and discuss and promote new practices and alternatives for funding that are oriented toward giving visibility to the multiple strategies of the movement through its NGO’s, networks, coalitions and its different non-institutionalized groups.

The tendency of the feminist NGO’s has been to modify a historically unequal relationship - because of the decision-making power between agencies and the NGO’s - by stressing a more egalitarian relationship with the women from the agencies, many of whom also identify themselves as feminists. It is possible to work with them to highlight the more unequal and distorted aspects of this relationship and work together with them on how to share information, define priorities, locate supplementary funding or define untested mechanisms, such as involving the civil societies of the developed countries. At the same time, however, it is the political responsibility of the feminist NGO’s to look for new and untapped forms of funding that can come from our own region. In the “south” income is much more poorly distributed than in the “north” and we can look for mechanisms that allow us to achieve a stronger commitment of civil societies, and eventually the states, to the struggles of women.

Nevertheless, even in the cases where these alliances between women are not easily achieved it is possible to assume a position of autonomy.

An example that caused a lot of noise, as the Mexican women would say, was the funding received by USAID for the region’s preparatory processes toward Beijing. Without taking time here to discuss the imperialist character of this agency (in the end, all of them are in some way, but we consider them to be adjectives that tell us little about the current running of the globalized world), it is important to note that the movement committed to the process toward Beijing was not only able to modify the initial decisions of this agency in terms of organizational structures, people in charge, etc., but carried out a tenacious and permanent struggle to preserve the autonomy of the proposals and organization at all times.

Finally, it is worth insisting that every initiative aimed at supporting the feminist perspective should include these ethical elements: circulate information among ourselves; interconnect efforts; join initiatives; and make certain that all ethnic, geographic, issue-oriented “differences” have access to information and the ability to receive economic support for their proposals.

• Representation: This is a tenacious difficulty both outside the movement (the presence of women in positions within representative democracy is minimal in spite of their enormous presence and participatory ability in society) as well as within the movement where it is difficult to recognize and give legitimacy to those women in the movement who have greater access to the public sphere, the media or who hold office in the official sphere. It is important for us to analyze this second dimension, that within the movement.

This difficulty includes a series of tensions: between the specific and the general; between equality and difference; between individuality and collectivity; and between artic-
lated structures and flexibility. It will not be easy to overcome this now that we recognize the enormous diversity of expressions the feminist perspective can have and now that the movement is moving toward a policy of identities. It is a good start, however, to recognize that we are not equal, that we are not a unified movement, but that we represent the different expressions of struggles and proposals, resistance of women, which we want to make visible and work on in such a way as not become paralysed or isolated one from the other.

Now that we recognize this plurality of feminist voices and interests, this concert of different wills, how and under what conditions can we articulate it and how can it give legitimacy to the representation of differences from one to the other? How can we feel represented, how can we represent others, around what issues in the face of what issues? The "affidamento" of the Italian feminists continues to be a process we should look at. On the basis of an explicit discussion maybe an affidamento that is marked by boundaries, based on the here and now, temporal and eventually renewable, particularly as we "clean" the terrain of our recognitions, is possible.

The problem of representation and leadership is undoubtedly tied to the democratic perspective of the movement. A perspective that is not based on the old ideas of the movement (we are all equal, because I am a woman what I feel is worthwhile, consensus is democracy, etc.), but on the new conditions for growth and the complexities of the movement in its different expressions or in the new spaces where we need to act. We need to analyze these new conditions and scenarios in order to recognize the foundations for a possible "affidamento." Nevertheless, there are basic starting points that can help us with this reflection:

* Assuming that representation is a fundamental part of democracy, we need to feel free to explore some difficulties and ambiguous processes. An important lead is analyzing the need and difficulty of equating democracy with efficiency. It will be a constant tension because both things are needed to construct a movement. Recognizing that we are not all equal, that not all of us can do everything but that all us are necessary in our consensus and design, is a step forward. Another important step is revising the universal element that accompanies our "public" and "intellectual" actions and the lack of value society and the movement place on other experiences, understandings and abilities.

* How do we guarantee a process for feedback among leaders and the expressions of the movement that are recognized as such? How do we move forward a process of "calculating" leaders? There is a dimension of accumulated experience but there is also the responsibility of the movement that facilitated this experience. The work of education-communication are absolutely critical at this lever.

* How do we guarantee recognition of the needs and voices of other currents, expressions and diversities around the movement? How do we open new spaces not only to the new voices but also to the divergent voices where and over which issues they manifest themselves?

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The specific and the general: The interaction of different currents, the different areas of actions and issues for reflection.

The importance of articulating the specific and the general takes us back to the politics of identity and differences versus the universality of the feminist perspective. It is expressed in many different forms: at the level of the diverse ethnic, sexual, generational, geographic, etc., expressions. It is also expressed in the question of how to grow from the specific and issue-oriented contributions brought on by diversity while incorporating at the same time the global vision necessary to convert specific visions into political visions that include the multiplicity of meanings and processes of transformation. Examples of these are the relationships established with the academic current of the movement, or with the ethnic or generational currents. It is true that we do not want universalist visions, but we also need to recognize some universal values, a common denominator - a flexible and inclusive political project - related to what it is we want to transform. In this sense, maybe the universal-global might be both the ideology and the feminist agenda with its multiple expressions, in a determined historic period.
A variation of this tension is that estab-
lished between the networks and the rest of the
movement. The articulation between both
"spaces" is necessary and vital. The networks
have contributed enormously not only in pro-
ducing knowledge but also to the dynamic of
the movement. But the networks would not
have existed were it not for movement, in its
multiple expressions and interests; if we had
not organized the Gatherings, which tied us
together and gave us common ground to articu-
late our thoughts, proposals and interests. In
this sense, maybe the most significant aspect of
the networks has been their ambivalence and
the tension between their own agenda and the
global agenda. This ambivalence and tension
can be very creative and produced important
contents on many occasions because the global
does not advance without specifics that enrich
it, that give it content and allow it to have a
more complex vision of reality. However, it can
also limit this vision by generating a corporatist
view that is not articulated with a long-term
political perspective.

These are the risks of a movement that
accumulates experiences and wisdom, that gen-
erates a division of labour and that has to come
up with strategies to articulate visions, perspec-
tives and different points of view on how to go
about modifying the multiple forms of subor-
dination to which women are subjected.

The networks are fundamental in the
process of connecting the determination of the
different expressions of the movement in the
region. Nevertheless, these connections do not
come only from them, but from all of us. If we
accept a broader definition of what it means to
work in a network, we can see that all of the
expressions of the feminist movement in the
region constitute a large network (a political
domain identified by the specification of crite-
ria solidly defined by mutual relevance or
shared interest, according to Vicky Guzman); or
a domain that contains multiple articula-
tions, some of which are more visible than oth-
ers, with permanent dynamics of inclusion and
exclusion, and the permanent need for democ-
ratization and openness toward other expres-
sions and subjects in order to avoid becoming
an endogenous space.

In this way, "networking" is an effective
form open to growth. If it is a self-referencing
process or monopolized by only certain ideas it
will be difficult to create a collective sense of
acting on the differences - producing limita-
tions, in terms of impact, feedback, radius of
action, etc. - of isolated organizations.

**Negotiations and alliances**

There is a basic tension in analyzing this
difficulty: the reformism/radicalism opposition
that is expressed by the actions of the move-
ment itself, as well as in civil society and the
government.

Perhaps a first orientation refers to the
need to overcome the opposition between the
two terms or processes. If we overcome the old
tendency of analyzing the world and processes
through binary opposites we will have to recog-
nize that reforms and radical transformations
are part of the same process. One is a condition
of the other, at least in the feminist movement.

For women, modifying aspects of our subordi-
nation in the here and now will allow us to
move closer to formulating radical proposals
not only for ourselves, isolated, but for many
more women, thereby generating a "foundation"
that puts us on more equal footing to
unfurl the processes of autonomy and empower-
ment. This reformism cannot be accomplished
if we are missing a radicalness that nourishes it
and constantly pushes it along. That is, the rad-
icality of our proposals needs to take shape in
some aspects and in some form in the here and
now, not only to offer us feedback on the femi-
nist movement's ability to impact and trans-
form but to influence the living conditions of
millions of women whose lives may be a bit less
subordinated. Achieving gender justice in the
here and now in all the possible aspects is a
political responsibility of all feminists. Follow-
ing these same fines, holding on to radical pro-
posals without the possibility of negotiating
reforms is nothing more than fundamentalism.

Undoubtedly, an urgent discussion
between the different expressions of the move-
ment deals with what are the limits to our
agreements, what is negotiable and what in
non-negotiable for the different expressions of the movement; and what is our minimal political common denominator for recognizing and moving forward with our differences? On this foundation we can outline feminist politics, the points of the feminist agenda that interest all of us and on which points we can coordinate efforts and strategies.

This possibility of minimum or maximum agreements among us is fundamental because we are faced with multiple forms of power, in multiple levers and relations. We need a way of relating among ourselves that allows us to confront the dominant powers at all levels, including in our own spaces. The game of forming alliances within the movement is fundamental because it allows us to combine and complement knowledge, experiences, and skills. The radical changes proposed by the feminist movement in its different expressions need strategies for mutual reinforcement so that they have a greater chance of having an impact and achieving transformation.

Another fundamental discussion is addressing what are the limits to negotiation and alliances with other movements and other expressions of civil society, and, of course, with specific governments. The experience of Beijing showed us that it is possible to form alliances with some sectors or expressions of the governments (generally women) without compromising the movement by supporting authoritarian governments or losing the perspective of autonomy.

Certainly, we cannot have complete or constant answers to these questions, but reflections that serve as a guide for political action. The international

At the regional lever we have developed a creative articulation between the national and the regional levels that needs to be analyzed in light of this new vision. The networks are once again important here, as well as the six earlier Feminist Gatherings. This does not mean that there are no tensions that need to be addressed. They have manifested themselves at times in terms of geographic and sub-regional differences, or in competition between the new levers of development or experience of the feminist movement; in differences between the issue-oriented networks, between the networks and the national, sub-regional and even regional dynamics (and vice versa). We need to analyze the practices, as well as the prolonged tendency of the movement to look inward on itself and not to confront-share its feminist developments with what is happening in other regions and on other continents.

There are several points that need to be highlighted and reflected upon. Many of them are implicit in the struggles and strategies of women at the international lever but, as Peter Waterman states, need to be explicitly discussed.

Perhaps the first point that needs to be considered is that in spite of the fact that globalization is the international expression of the new information and service-oriented capitalism it does not simply represent an imperialist project but, instead, the first truly global society in which the women’s movement and other emancipation movements have the possibility — and necessity for the first time in history — to formulate their own alternative global projects.

This means, for example, overcoming the vision of the world in terms of binary opposites, such as the contents of the concepts “development” and “dependency,” in order to move toward a vision of the world in global emancipatory terms. Only in these terms can we see the national, regional and global as increasingly interdependent. If the processes of domination operate at all levers then an effective struggle for emancipation has to articulate the struggles happening at all these different levels.

A second aspect is understanding for the same reasons that we need to enrich our vision of international solidarity, seen simply as solidarity/inter-relation between nations or nationalities, recognizing the multiple and complex dimensions this global solidarity can take. In the international feminist movement the dominant notions of solidarity have been those of “identity” (global sisterhood) and/or of “substitution”, (in only one direction, like develop-
A more complex notion of solidarity includes a relationship of "complementarity," (contributions from different sources from different national or regional movements, for example), "reciprocity," (exchanging similar contributions among different expressions of the movement, for example), and "affinity," (among different expressions of the feminist movement with similar visions and desires, for example). All of these dimensions are present in our regional practices and it is worth setting aside space to analyze them.

Another important point is recognizing that today our movement, like all other emancipation movements with an international character, is a feminism of information that develops new ideas, values and images that are transmitted and connect us. As such, the feminist movement is not developed or articulated in a hierarchical or pyramid form, but is built in a decentralized, horizontal and flexible "networking".

The diversity difficulty

This is one of the oldest yet, at the same time, newest of feminist reflections. It is one of the most tenacious and complex knots, which is why this is only a first pass at discussing it. Within the movement it is still difficult for the majority expressions to stop thinking of difference as meaning "other"; as if "they" were the norm. Diversity and difference lead us to the inequalities among women, to other forms of subordination, to differences in access, and citizenship that is restricted at multiple levels. It also brings us closer to a more complex view of gender, a perspective that it more articulated and less exclusive. How do we avoid simply adding other forms of discrimination to gender discrimination without recognizing, as the black feminists point out, that racism (or any other discrimination) not only increases the experience of oppression but make it qualitatively different in form and content. In this sense, perhaps it would be better to talk about multiple identities in which one of them (not necessarily gender) at a determined historic moment has the flexibility to move forward a more profound questioning of all the systems of exclusion and discrimination - including gender - in one person. How do we avoid the recognition of difference becoming a good unto itself (there are differences that we do not want, that are not part of our Utopia of transformation), or leading us toward infinite fragmentation where the dynamics of representation and articulation do not make sense.

2. The radical feminist agenda

The radical feminist agenda belongs to no one and we are all contributing to it from our areas of action and reflection. Obviously, the radical agenda in this period needs to incorporate our experiences and the results from Beijing, in which a significant sector of the feminist movement participated. It also needs to incorporate, in a broad and open discussion, the knots and tensions that have already been mentioned and all of the others that feminists believe need to be addressed.

Because of this and within the framework of the knots and tensions already highlighted, I would like us to contribute to the agenda from two points of entry: the experience and tasks left us by Beijing, and our approximation to an ethic of solidarity.

Beijing

Where do we place Beijing in this concert of searches and ambivalence. Beijing was and is a "strategy" of a wide sector of feminists and feminist NGO's. It is NOT the feminist Utopia, but it helps us prepare the terrain to get there. Beijing is a "text" and a "pretext." It is a "multiple strategy" with a specific end: the elaboration and approval of the Platform. At the same time, and above all, it is a method: To make visible the feminist proposals in the here and now in order to articulate a political will in a broad sector of the movement, or in the multiple expressions of the movement, to have a tool to apply political pressure on governments and society, to generalize for all women the
minimum democratic initiatives needed to eliminate the most flagrant aspects of subordination.

We believe that Beijing is a "strategic agenda" of a broad sector of the region’s feminist movement in the here and now. Assuming that Beijing was the pinnacle of all the gains that feminists have made in earlier conferences, then making these gains reality is also part of the agenda.

Our radical agenda, however, goes further, incorporating those aspects that were not included in the PAM, despite the proposals and pressure applied by the international feminist movement. Among these are economic justice and sexual rights in two basic expressions: abortion and sexual preference.

For some, these were the issues that caused the most controversy in Beijing. All of them are “tips of the iceberg” of much more profound phenomena. The lack of economic justice not only effects the majority sectors - both women and men - in all the countries of the region, but also adds to the existing forms of discrimination: gender, ethnic, generational, etc. And in each of these dramatic situations women continue to be the poorest of the poor and those who have the least amount of room to confront these situations. This reality also forms part of the interests of women because it is a precarious, reduced, undervalued and painful scenario for their interests as citizens.

Abortion, for its part, is in some ways a symbol of the current condition of women because within this issue, perhaps like in no other, are concentrated the cruelest and most irrational forms of subordination and transgression of women's searches and resistance. On the one hand, it is a symbol of the archaic and obscurantist ideas surrounding women's sexuality, and, on the other hand, it is an expression of resistance without condition to a sexuality agreed upon and hypocritical.

To sum up this section, autonomy is achieved in two dimensions: in the ability to raise up our own agenda and an identity in the spaces for negotiation within the official public-political sphere; and in the ability to outline and move forward from civil society our own radical and subversive agenda (radical and subversive because it subverts the traditional agreement of our societies and the states, and because its resolution is central to any modification of the political-economic-cultural-ethnic logic of gender today).

This radical agenda constitutes a “feminist pole” that definitely contributes to making more visible the clear profile from which the movement can negotiate, pressure and form alliances in the official political sphere in order to implement the recommendations of the PAM.

Ethic of solidarity

These are some of the initial ideas I trope will enrich our discussion. From the ethical position we can deepen the discussion of a substantial aspect: solidarity. Various feminists have already started to reflect on this, putting forth a few ideas that can serve as foundations for us. Jodi Dean talks about reflexive solidarity, which is like a bridge between identity and universalism. She includes as a pre-condition the mutuel recognition of differences, overcoming the dualism of fixed definitions and positions, in order to look on the margins and in the areas at the limits of our concepts and discussions. It implies mutuel expectations and is based on the intuition that the risk of disagreement that accompanies diversity should be rationally transformed to offer a base on which to establish inter-subjective ties and commitments. It is a process for building, with political will, clear rules and accountability.

For her part, Nancy Fraser talks about the “ethics of solidarity,” alluding to the need - a political task in our language - to relearn the needs and hear the voices of others. Her proposal is based on the premise that in a collective, in a political setting, manners of interpreting and communicating are not neutral, they express the experiences, interests and self-images of the dominant groups or the currents of the strongest force that, at the same time, inhibit other voices and forms of participation in equal conditions. She proposes moving from a single ethical logic to a dual ethical logic that implies recognizing the inequalities of posi-
tion, access, forms of understanding and interpretation and negotiating alternatives.

Where do we fall in relation to this? How can we move forward an ethic of solidarity or reflexive solidarity among ourselves, toward the closest movement and toward the rest of the expressions of the broad movement of transformation that feminists are carrying forward in multiple spheres?

Well friends, these are some basic ideas that can help us structure the process of political discussion-reflection among us. I hope they excite you.

We thought that maybe this discussion could be organized in a workshop during the VII Feminist Gathering, something like the Workshop on the Radical Feminist Agenda. We could call the workshop “Feminist Odyssey 2001: Toward a Radical Feminist Agenda.”

I want to insist that these are only contributions to the discussion. If we manage to generate a good exchange of ideas, issues, opinions and differences in the months that separate us from the VII Gathering then we can make certain that our views are more complex. Let us add all of the issues you think are missing from these fines to the discussion. If you know of anyone else who is interested and willing to embark on this collective reflection, they are welcome.
Association News

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Canada: draft decision on non-governmental organizations

In its fifty-second session (Agenda item 60), the General Assembly, recalling the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its Article 71 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996 and decision 1996/297 of 25 July 1996, as well as the interpretative statement read by the Council President upon adoption of the latter decision, requests the Secretary-General to prepare and circulate no later than the end of its current session, for consideration and action by the General Assembly at its fifty-third session, a report on:

(a) Existing arrangements and practices for the interaction of non-governmental organizations in all activities of the United Nations system;
(b) The legal and financial implications of modifications in the current arrangements for participation of non-governmental organizations with a view to enhancing their participation in all areas of the United Nations system;
(c) The question of the participation of non-governmental organizations from all regions, particularly from the developing countries.

(UN Office at Geneva, 17 December 1997).

Vie associative

Le Comité préparatoire relatif à l’établissement d’une Cour pénale internationale a débattu du rôle du conseil de sécurité et de pouvoirs du procureur

Proclamant avec un esprit de compromis et beaucoup de créativité, les représentants gouvernementaux présents aux réunions d’août 1997 relatives à l’établissement d’une Cour pénale internationale (CPI) ont mis sur table des questions aussi délicates que celle du rôle du Conseil de sécurité et des enquêtes sur le terrain. Du 4 au 15 août, plus d’une centaine de délégations gouvernementales se sont réunies au siège des Nations-Unies pour la quatrième session du Comité préparatoire pour l’établissement d’une Cour pénale internationale.

L’ordre du jour de la session a été réparti entre deux groupes de travail: l’un traitant des questions de complémentarité et des mécanismes de saisine, et l’autre s’attaquant aux questions de procédures relatives à la CPI. Le Néerlandais Adrian Bos présidait le premier groupe de travail. Quant au groupe chargé des questions de procédures, c’est à Silvia Fernández, d’Argentine, qu’en revient la présidence.

De longs débats sur la complémentarité et les mécanismes de saisine ont fait clairement apparaître les désaccords quant à la nature et l’autorité mêmes de la Cour pénale internationale. En ce qui concerne la complémentarité, la discussion a porté sur l’article 35 du projet de statut relatif aux questions de recevabilité devant la CPI. Le préambule du projet de statut rédigé par la Commission de droit international tient que la Cour "doit être complémentaire des systèmes nationaux de justice pénale dans les affaires où les procédures de jugement requises seraient inexistantes ou inefficaces". Les notions d’inexistence et d’inefficacité donnant lieu à des interprétations fort différentes selon les États. Vu la diversité des points de vue, le texte finalement adopté peut être considéré comme une avancée majeure.

Sur la manière d’initier ou de "déclencher" une poursuite devant la CPI, un grand nombre d’États ne sont pas d’accord avec la proposition définie principalement par les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unis, selon laquelle il échut au Conseil de sécurité le rôle exclusif d’enclencher ou de prévenir une telle procédure. Seule une petite minorité d’États était entièrement opposée à ce que le Conseil de sécurité ait le pouvoir de référer une affaire à la Cour pénale internationale. En revanche, une majorité écrasante de pays étaient contre l’article 25(3) du statut, selon lequel l’instruction d’une affaire ne peut pas débuter sans l’accord du Conseil de sécurité si l’affaire est traitée par le Conseil au titre du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations-Unis. Ainsi l’article 23(3) permettrait à chacun des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de bloquer une enquête de la CPI.

Beaucoup d’États se sont indignés de ce que le pouvoir de contrôle exercé sur la CPI par un organe politique, tels que le Conseil de sécurité, pourrait nuire grandement à l’impartialité nécessaire à tout organe juridique indépen-
La Cour et le procureur pendant l'enquête sur le terrain n'ont eu de mal à accepter l'idée d'une chambre d'enquête qui contrôlerait le déroulement des opérations. Lors de conférences publiques et négociations concernant la CPI, les délégués à mettre un terme au débat sur la création du Conseil de sécurité, aussi devraient être dotés d'un rôle plus communément accepté parmi les États.

Le manque de temps a conduit les délégués à mettre un terme au débat sur la création du Conseil de sécurité, aussi. En revanche, les pays de "droit civil", comme la France ou le Portugal, ont fortement apprécié l'idée d'intervention d'une telle chambre ainsi que d'accorder un terme à la CPI et le procureur pendant l'enquête sur le terrain. Heureusement le nombre d'États occidentaux en faveur d'une cour effective augmenta à chaque étape de ce processus d'élaboration.

La Cour et le procureur pendant l'enquête sur le terrain n’ont pas de mécanisme permanent par lequel l’individu peut être rendu au tribunal. Cependant, ce sont des méthodes utilisées pour des situations, il est d'imposer des sanctions, un embargo ou d'utiliser la force militaire. Cependant, il est d'imposer des sanctions, un embargo ou d'utiliser la force militaire. Cependant, il est d'imposer des sanctions, un embargo ou d'utiliser la force militaire.

A l’heure actuelle, il n’y a pas de mécanisme permanent par lequel l'individu peut être rendu au tribunal. Cependant, il est d'imposer des sanctions, un embargo ou d'utiliser la force militaire. Cependant, il est d'imposer des sanctions, un embargo ou d'utiliser la force militaire. Cependant, il est d'imposer des sanctions, un embargo ou d'utiliser la force militaire. Cependant, il est d'imposer des sanctions, un embargo ou d'utiliser la force militaire.

Pourquoi a-t-on besoin d’une CCT ?

Le but principal de l'associ- et que de révision de l'acte d'accusation. Les États sont partagés à propos de la Coalition pour une CPI. Beaucoup d'États de traitement, le fait d'accepter l'idée d'une chambre d'enquête qui contrôlerait le déroulement des opérations alors qu'on travaillait les preuves.

Les États qui ont suivi l'idée d'une chambre d'enquête qui contrôlerait le déroulement des opérations alors qu'on travaillait les preuves.

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Citez-le. Le maintien de la paix internationale pourrait bénéficier grandement de la création d'une cour internationale. Les forces de la paix des Nations-Unies peuvent arrêter les massacres en se plaçant entre les parties en conflit. Cependant, comme nous l'avons vu en Somalie, Bosnie, Rwanda, Haïti et d'autres coins du monde, la haine qui anime les combats ne s'arrête pas avec un cessez-le-feu. Les cycles de violence continuent aussi longtemps que les peuples engagés considèrent que la justice n'a pas été rendue.

Travail en réseau et services non marchands

A l'heure d'Internet, des communications numériques et de multimédia, les nouvelles formes de travail en réseau constituent un atout pour les administrations publiques et les associations non marchandes. Ces technologies peuvent-elles être un vecteur d'amélioration des services aux citoyens? Pour répondre à cette question, il est nécessaire de définir ce qu'est le travail en réseau.

Deux idées clés

L'objectif de cette recherche, basée sur un important travail de terrain, est de rapporter à deux idées clés. La première est le concept de travail en réseau qui fait référence à la façon dont des technologies et organisationnels travaillent en réseau, c'est-à-dire en contact direct avec le client, la mise en réseau des informations de travail, et sur la qualité du travail.

Les activités concernées par le travail en réseau

Dans les activités d'avant-bureau, le travail en réseau permet à l'employé d'avoir accès à un dossier en ligne concernant chaque client. C'est la configuration minimale pour pouvoir parler réellement en réseau. Au-delà de ce seuil, de nombreux développements sont possibles. Le dossier en ligne peut s'enrichir de diverses informations utiles pour la relation avec le client, en harmonie avec le client, une branche où ils travaillent. Pour ce faire, il est nécessaire de définir ce qu'est le travail en réseau.

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Opportunité et pertinence pour les activités non marchandes

Largement répandues dans les services marchands, ces pratiques de travail sont-elles pertinentes pour les activités non marchandes ? Dans le cas des administrations publiques, le travail en réseau peut apporter une réponse partielle, aux défis qui traversent toutes les stratégies de modernisation des administrations publiques :

- Il améliore l’efficacité et augmente la productivité du travail en diminuant les tâches redondantes, en permettant l’accès en ligne à des bases de données, en contrôlant et en traçant les informations, en produisant automatiquement les documents utiles.
- Il améliore la qualité du service. Les dossiers sont traités plus rapidement, les ouïes sont plus courtes et autonomes, la communication s’améliore au sein des organisations, la qualification des travaillleurs évolue vers des profils moins administratifs et plus relationnels.
- Il favorise le développement du travail en réseau. Le réseau est un moyen qui permet d’améliorer significativement la qualité du service et les procédés de travail.

Le travail en réseau n’est pas une panacée capable de rencontrer tous les défis de gestion du secteur non marchand. Il doit être cependant des potentialités intéressantes en matière d’efficacité et de qualité de service. Des facteurs contextuels sont favorables à une diffusion plus large des pratiques de travail en réseau tandis que d’autres facteurs constituent des obstacles en puissance.

Des facteurs favorables au développement du travail en réseau

L’expansion d’Internet est incontestablement un incitatif à développer des pratiques de travail en réseau. Dans les administrations et les organisations non marchandes, les usages d’Internet permettent de lever une série de barrières techniques en matière de communication. Internet constitue un standard de référence qui permet de mettre en place des réseaux locaux de type intranet à un coût non prohibitif et sur base d’une infrastructure simple. Par ailleurs, beaucoup de citoyens, non seulement dans leur vie professionnelle, mais aussi dans leur vie privée, ont adopté de nouveaux modes de consommation des services (automatisme bancaire, assistance en ligne, etc.). Dans leurs relations avec l’administration publique ou certains services non marchands, ces citoyens ont de nouvelles attentes en termes de qualité de service.

Mais les activités non marchandes ne sont pas seulement confrontées aux nouveaux modes de consommation en vigueur dans les services privés. Elles sont aussi confrontées à une montée en pression de la concurrence au sein des activités non marchandes. D’une certaine manière, elles sont confrontées à la concurrence au sein des activités non marchandes. D’un autre côté, ces marchands, bien qu’ayant des atouts, ne sont pas sans défis : ils sont confrontés à une concurrence croissante et à la nécessité de développer des solutions innovantes.

La question des freins organisationnels est encore cruciale, mais elle est désormais visible dans de grandes organisations bureaucratiques comme les administrations publiques et les organisations non marchandes. Les organisations non marchandes rencontrent des obstacles en puissance.

Le travail en réseau n’est pas une panacée capable de rencontrer tous les défis de gestion du secteur non marchand. Il doit être cependant des potentialités intéressantes en matière d’efficacité et de qualité de service. Des facteurs contextuels sont favorables à une diffusion plus large des pratiques de travail en réseau tandis que d’autres facteurs constituent des obstacles en puissance.

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Les services publics sont, par ailleurs, dotées d'un parc informatique qui, sans ne pas être adapté aux technologies de réseau. À cette obsoléscence potentielle du maître et des locaux, il faut ajouter un effet pervers liés à l'accélération du changement technologique, que pose un réel problème de remboursement des investissements, de durée des amortissements et de coûts de conversion.

Les services publics sont, par ailleurs, contraints à des règles très strictes concernant la circulation et surtout l'interconnexion des données personnelles. On constate qu'un tiers d'un certain stade de développement du travail en réseau, deux formes de rationalité peuvent entrer en conflit. d'une part la protection des données personnelles et de la vie privée, et d'autre part, la transparence et l'accessibilité des dossier individuels afin d'améliorer la qualité du service. Cette situation devrait amener le législateur à réviser les équilibres et les arbitrages dans la réglementation "informatique et vie privée".

Dans un contexte de tout avec la clientèle, le secteur non marchand fonctionne avec des contraintes différentes du secteur marchand. Les entreprises marchandes obtiennent leur clientèle en offrant un produit ou un service à un prix compétitif. Mais les services non marchands, publics ou privés, s'adressent, en principe, à tous les citoyens. Les potentialités du travail en réseau doivent donc être considérées en tenant compte de certaines caractéristiques propres aux services publics. Le service doit être accessible à tous les citoyens concernés. On les constitueront rarement une population homogène. Le développement de services en ligne ou d'une administration à distance doit d'abord offrir des points d'accès aux ménages non équipés et d'autre part, coexister avec des modalités d'accès classiques.

Les problèmes et les démarches doivent être simples. La rationalisation systématique de la technologie peut en arriver à exclure certaines catégories de la population. Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un risque d'exclusion sociale. La technologie peut devenir elle-même un facteur d'exclusion.

Enfin, il s'agit de données personnelles, pour lesquelles la protection et la sécurité devront être garanties. Cette protection est organisée légalement, mais il subsiste des risques de compromis ou de fraude qui se manifeste particulièrement importants quand il s'agit de données personnelles.

L'accèsibilité, la simplicité et la sécurité devront être considérées comme des facteurs d'exonération plutôt que comme des contraintes. Le double objectif de qualité du travail et de qualité du service sera alors être atteint.

(La lettre EMERIT, Fondation travail-Université, Namur, 1er trim. 1993)
Des ONG ayant comme priorité la perpétuation et leur propre existence

On sait, grâce à Ralph Dahrendorf que la réussite du processus de transformation en Europe centrale dépend de trois conditions essentielles. La première, c'est la réalisation, puis la mise en œuvre d'une nouvelle constitution, ce qui, pour Dahrendorf peut aller très vite, en mois, voire en jours. La seconde, c'est le développement d'une économie de marché et d'une démocratie parlementaire. C'est un peu plus long, environ six ans aux yeux de Dahrendorf. La troisième condition, créacée aux yeux de Dahrendorf, c'est la maturation et le développement de la société civile, et certainement si elle n'est pas encore identifiée, elle ne devrait être nulle part abordée à ce stade de la transformation. Par exemple, TACIS, "l'assistance technique" aux pays de la Communauté des États indépendants (CEEI). Par "technique", il était entendue production de société civile et le commerce au sens littéral. Si vous présentez un projet à Bruxelles, on va sûrement vous demander ce que vous entendez par "technique", ou encore sous quel titre vous voulez identifier la société civile en Europe centrale et orientale.

Un exemple est de rédiger l'activité principale - une fois acheté l'ordinateur - est de rédiger des projets et de rapports financiers destinés aux financiers tels que l'Union européenne. Effectivement, j'ai vu croître de nombreuses ONG dont l'activité principale - une fois activité l'investissement - c'est de rédiger des projets pour la poursuite de leur activité ayant comme priorité la perpétuation de leur propre existence (...). La plupart des ONG étaient très faibles, peu encouragées, sont devenus totalement dépendantes de l'Union européenne ou des autres distributeurs de subventions. Elles vont devenir ouvrières en écrivant de projets et de rapports financiers mais ne cesseront plus le temps de développer des activités réelles dans leurs propres sociétés (...). Par personne ne semble s'inquiéter au contraire, les nouvelles démocraties qui émergent d'Europe centrale et orientale, des pays de l'Est. L'Union européenne elle-même, tous ont l'un et même horreur de voir cet univers clientérisé croître autour d'eux (...). On dit souvent que la société civile est un autre mot pour parler de la "famille des ONG"; donc, si dans une société démocratique, il y a beaucoup d'ONG, la société civile est forte. Simplement elle est faible. Mais si on adopte cette définition, une société dirigée par des groupes, sans État fonctionnant normalement serait une société civilisée. On parle beaucoup de la nécessité d'un bon fonctionnement de la société civile; cette notion ayant toujours un sens particulier. Si l'on doit exclure des ONG qui dérobent, que faire quant la loi elle-même est ruinée tout en étant des ONG, comme par exemple sous le communisme. Évidemment, les partisans de la société civile qui voudraient être en mesure de parvenir à cette situation, oui nous expliquer que nous entendons une société civile a besoin d’un "stat légitime" civilisé. Tout cela ne peut pas marcher sans droits et d'ailleurs, certains expliquent même que la société civile n’est qu'une autre forme d'État. Mais si l'on sait que cette situation se produit, alors peu importe au fond qu'elle n'est pas ou peu d'ONG dans une société de droit. En fait, c'est que la société civile a besoin d'un État.

En Aujourd'hui, la définition à la mode de la société civile serait plutôt : "un ensemble d'ONG capables de faire confrons à l'État, sans l'empêcher d'exercer ses fonctions de loi et d'ordre mais en l'empêchant d'atomiser la société. Les erreurs de la société civile et État sont en intrinsèques. L'État, la loi, sont supposées et offrent un cadre aux activités des institutions - des "OG" - et des ONG auxquels de son côté, c'est une société d'interaction entre OG et ONG. Bien entendu, un tel équilibre n'est pas possible dans tous les secteurs, en général par exemple l'État conserve le monopole de l'usage de la force (ce qui est le cas du communisme, mais il y a beaucoup d'ONG). La société civile est forte. Simplement elle est faible. Mais si on adopte cette définition, une société dirigée par des groupes, sans État fonctionnant normalement serait une société civilisée. On parle beaucoup de la nécessité d'un bon fonctionnement de la société civile; cette notion ayant toujours un sens particulier. Si l'on doit exclure des ONG qui dérobent, que faire quant la loi elle-même est ruinée tout en étant des ONG, comme par exemple sous le communisme. Évidemment, les partisans de la société civile qui voudraient être en mesure de parvenir à cette situation, oui nous expliquer que nous entendons une société civile a besoin d’un "stat légitime" civilisé. Tout cela ne peut pas marcher sans droits et d'ailleurs, certains expliquent même que la société civile n’est qu’une autre forme d’État. Mais si l’on sait que cette situation se produit, alors peu importe au fond qu’elle n'est pas ou peu d'ONG dans une société de droit. En fait, c'est que la société civile a besoin d'un État. 

Pourtant on a très vite assermenté que toute la société civile est forte. Sinon elle est faible. Donc, si dans une société donnée, il n'y a pas de société civile, cette notion méconnaît la nature du bon fonctionnement d'un État, qui est une condition essentielle. En tout cas, quelle que soit la nature et l'ampleur de la société civile, cette notion est inacceptable. La société civile est une autre forme d'État et ONG, bien entendu, on ne peut pas exclure des ONG qui dérobent, que faire quant la loi elle-même est ruinée tout en étant des ONG, comme par exemple sous le communisme. Évidemment, les partisans de la société civile qui voudraient être en mesure de parvenir à cette situation, oui nous expliquer que nous entendons une société civile a besoin d’un "stat légitime" civilisé. Tout cela ne peut pas marcher sans droits et d'ailleurs, certains expliquent même que la société civile n’est qu’une autre forme d’État. Mais si l’on sait que cette situation se produit, alors peu importe au fond qu'elle n'est pas ou peu d'ONG dans une société de droit. En fait, c'est que la société civile a besoin d'un État. 

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Les mouvements sociaux et la plupart des ONG fondent leurs activités sur des valeurs. En général une société est basée sur un système de valeurs (...). L'ensemble de ces valeurs peut être à mes yeux qualifié de "religion civile". C'est une "religion" non imposée par des institutions religieuses, une religion de la communauté des citoyens. Je l'appelle ainsi parce qu'elle n'est pas attachée à un État, et que la majorité des gens y croient vraiment. Je défends même qu'une société ne peut survivre en tant que communauté sans une "religion" appropriée.

Enfin en ce qui concerne, même si j'aime beaucoup les ONG, je préfère rester militant.

Mirek Jan Faber

Involves civil society, says Michael Strauss

The EU's Economic and Social Committee (ESC) brings together representatives of a range of actors in civil society - trade unions, employers and consumers... to scrutinise European Union policies and offer a view of the content of the partnership, as well as improved access to Lomé funds, arguing that these changes...
...are long overdue. He believes that more pressure should be applied to ensure "good governance" - which he sees as necessary for a more stable investment climate. Mr Strauss' comments come in the wake of a recent ESC poll of the social partners which drew replies from 10% of those contacted. 16% of respondents revealed they had not been consulted in the drawing up of their local National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) under the Lomé Convention. According to Mr Strauss, this means that ACP countries have been "depriving themselves of a lot of expert advice and goodwill. Participation of civil society in the affairs of the state", he believes, "is central to the functioning of government. The term 'civil society' may be particularly fashionable nowadays but our interviewee points out that the ESC has been lobbying for civil society to play a bigger role in ACP-EU relations for the past two decades. He acknowledges that ACP states are wary of losing control of the purse strings - a throwback to the colonial era. We should remember that in the post-war period, African independence movements were supported by the European left. And many of Africa's leaders went to universities where they were instructed by the socialist idea of the time. As a result, they tend to support the view that the state should play a central role in the economic affairs of a country - much more so than in many other socialist thinking. The Lomé IV mid-term review showed how reluctant governments are to give up central control and to offer scope for more effective participation by economic and social interest groups."

Michael Strauss believes that much greater effort should be made to promote decentralised cooperation, where he points out, accessing funds is difficult. In the ESC members' poll, 75% were aware of the budget line for decentralised cooperation, but only 29% had actually applied for money, and the majority of applications were turned down. Under the present rules, it is up to the ACP governments to design the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs). What we are suggesting is that if the decentralised cooperation component of the proposed NIP is not sufficient, the EU should not agree to it. It must be significantly more than at present. He also believes that the new system of decentralisation in two branches, set up for the Eighth European Development Fund (EDF) under the Lomé IV mid-term review, should be used to enhance the participation of civil society. The second tranche, he suggested, should only be released if there has been significant progress in the decentralised cooperation. More generally, he argues that the EU should not agree to an NIP if it feels that the ACP government in question is not spending enough on civil society. Without such measures, Mr Strauss believes that the record of participation of civil society in ACP-EU relations will remain disappointing. Mr Strauss is convinced that more money should be allocated directly from the Community budget for training and modernisation to enhance the effectiveness of the social groups. This would enable us to help these groups without the approval of governments, many of which are reluctant to sanction such aid.

**Poverty**

Michael Strauss echoes the views of many other individuals and groups when he says that a new cooperation agreement must focus on alleviating poverty - which he sees as the main cause of political instability. He recommends more funds for health and education and calls in particular for resources to medical personnel and teachers. He also wants a rethink of Europe's agricultural policy which, he says, hampers production in developing economies. The industrial revolution in Europe came about by channelling surplus funds from agriculture into industrial growth. I suspect that the same sort of development is necessary in many developing countries. They must pursue an agricultural policy which enables farmers to invest in expansion and to generate a sufficient surplus to invest in the wider economy. Mr Strauss offers two explanations for why this has not happened so far. In the first place, farmers have not been properly remunerated having been forced, for decades, to sell their produce to state marketing boards. The second problem, he says, is a lack of coordination between development and agricultural policy in the developed world.

**Good governance essential**

Mr Strauss takes the view that for development to succeed, it must be indigenous. Europeans must find it useful to produce goods at home, but at the moment, they are prevented from doing so. This is partly because the political and economic situation is too uncertain. For our interviewee, good governance is, therefore, a key element. The EU could do more, he feels, arguing that it should be included in the list of "essential elements" (currently set out in Article 5 of the Convention) alongside respect for human rights, democratic principles and rule of law. The freezing of any of these elements can lead to an aid freeze or other sanctions against an AC...
ACP state. For Mr Strauss, good governance entails "promoting legitimacy, accountability and competence in the process of government, and transparent financial housekeeping. A government running taxes from its citizens must show what the resources are being used for. When a country fails to explain how its own funds are being spent, there should be a big question mark as to whether scarce Community aid resources should go to them."

Other recommendations include a clamp down on tax breaks on 'bribes' paid abroad, and prosecution in EU member states of those involved in grand corruption in a third state. Mr Strauss applauds moves by the 29 member Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to establish a treaty on this subject. EU countries should be encouraged to incorporate the provisions of such a treaty into their domestic legislation, he feels, noting that some governments are persuaded to back projects which are of more interest to the promoter than to the people they are supposed to be serving. He also wants efforts to stamp out smaller-scale corruption, for example, by insisting on a fair wage for civil servants when structural adjustment programmes are conceived: 'If civil servants are receiving a pittance, the whole system is open to bribery'. He continues, 'in some countries, you can hardly do anything - from obtaining a driving licence to installing latrines in slum areas - without a bribe."

Concern over delegation cuts
Michael Strauss thinks that more attention needs to be given to improving the European Commission's project management, particularly in the wake of recent cuts in overseas personnel. These, he says, have left EU delegations more understaffed than many national diplomatic representation and international organisations. The hiring of more local staff to administer projects could help make up the shortage, he suggests, but he is clearly unhappy about the trend. 'If cooperation is to work, it means a multitude of small applications. It doesn't make sense if everything has to be referred back to Brussels for approval. There must be sufficient staff in the countries concerned.' Finally, Mr Strauss believes that EU delegations should make themselves more accessible to the public. In their replies to the ESC's survey, a number of respondents said they had met people from the delegations, but that they had seemed "remote". As he put it, "there is an impression that some of them feel more at ease with other diplomats than when meeting people with mud on their boots."

Speaking from what he admitted was his own "limited experience", he expressed concern about the "great variability of the delegations." He continued: "Perhaps the method of recruitment and conditions of service should be changed. We should consider whether it might be better to have, as it were, a separate EU foreign service corps."

(World n° 165 - september-october 1997)
Often the subjects on the agenda of the summit were the same as those featured at the Centre. The theme of CHOGM: "Trade, Investment and Development: The Road to Commonwealth Prosperity" was mirrored by discussions and exhibitions demonstrating the contributions from the non-governmental sector, including a special display on fair trade. The Heads of Government addressed the need for an effective solution to the global problem of anti-personnel mines while, at the Centre, the Red Cross stand featured a video game on the horrors of such devices, attracting large numbers of people. Oxfam, too, was convinced that it had been able to progress the 'small arms agenda' - its campaign against the proliferation of guns and small weapons - through its involvement in the Centre. All this was possible thanks to the initiative taken by the Royal Commonwealth Society and the Commonwealth Liaison Unit UK for non-governmental organisations. Starting work immediately after the previous CHOGM in Auckland in 1993, they involved the NGO community and encouraged them to think about the summit and plan events around it. Ambitions grew as the programme expanded. It became evident that a central venue was needed for NGOs to hold their meetings, exhibitions and for networking, so the British Government was persuaded to fund the hire of the Assembly Rooms for a week, with the Society in charge - and every space was filled. Edinburgh City Council was central to the planning from the beginning, and produced an exciting six-month programme of special events and activities called 'Commonwealth Edinburgh 97'; something no city had done before. For the first time as a summit the people's Commonwealth demonstrated its strength, vitality and relevance. 'It was brilliant and should be replicated in appropriate ways at future CHOGMs,' said one participant.

Priscilla Scarlott
Director, Commonwealth Affairs and Commonwealth Liaison Unit of the Royal Commonwealth Society (Currents)

Publications

Le travail en réseau dans les administrations publiques et les services non marchands par Hélène Raimond, Gérard Valenduc et Patricia Vendramin, FTU, Namur 1998.

Le rapport de synthèse, qui comprend un résumé du cadre d'analyse et des études de cas ainsi que les conclusions générales, est disponible sur demande à la Fondation Travail-Université (64 pages, 300 FB + frais de port). Fax +32-81-725128, E-mail: pvenramin@compuserve.com

MEZZO, a brand new international publication, covers many of the burning issues that young people raised in response to the "Generation 97" survey on friendship, love, early marriage, contraception and pregnancy, carried out by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) among over 600 respondents, aged 14 to 24, in 54 countries worldwide. Presented in a modern and upbeat, youth magazine format, MEZZO provides clear, reliable and unbiased information not only on contraception, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS, abortion, sexual abuse and homosexuality, but also on love, friendship and all aspects of sexual relationships, as well as personal rights and responsibilities.
Regardless of their different cultural backgrounds and upbringings, young people, all over the world, have a lot in common: they go through the same physical and often emotional changes throughout adolescence and when facing up to their sexuality, and they think and worry a lot about relationships and sex. Meanwhile, many studies clearly show that, being open and teaching young people about sex, does not automatically encourage them to be sexually promiscuous; on the contrary, it often delays the onset of young people entering into sexual relationships.

Published to coincide with "Contraceptive Awareness Week" in the UK (19 February 1998) MEZZO is available in English, French and Spanish through IPPF's family planning associations (FPAs) in over 150 countries worldwide, and soon on the internet - http://www.ippf.org/mezzo

New... Creations... Plans... New... Creations... Plans... New...

Le président du Conseil régional de la Lombardie, Giancarlo Morandi, lors de son discours d'inauguration à la première conférence Régions-Parlement européen, a rappelé que "l'objectif très astreignant que Morandi, qui était aussi coordonnateur de la Conférence des présidents des parlements régionaux, s'est fixé lors de l'ouverture de la conférence qui s'est tenue à Milan le 5 décembre, qui a réuni dans la salle du Conseil de la Lombardie plusieurs représentants des assemblées des "Quatre Moteurs pour l'Europe". Comme l'ont démontré les différents interventions, la méthode intergouvernementale a permis à l'Union d'atteindre un résultat décisif, malgré les efforts déployés par les différents gouvernements. Le déficit démocratique de l'Union se traduit donc par une crise de la participation à la vie politique, qui touche activement les représentants locaux du gouvernement. Il faut donc dépenser les limites de la méthode intergouvernementale, en reconnaissant un rôle constituant au Parlement européen, qui est le seul représentant légitime des citoyens européens.

La conférence de Milan s'est ouverte par les discours du secrétaire national du Mouvement italien de la liberté, Guido Mantovani, et de Maria Teresa Coppola Sassu (présidente du Parlement européen), qui est le seul représentant légitime des citoyens européens. Le président du Conseil régional de la Lombardie, Giancarlo Morandi, lors de son discours d'inauguration à la première conférence Régions-Parlement européen, a rappelé que "l'objectif très astreignant que Morandi, qui était aussi coordonnateur de la Conférence des présidents des parlements régionaux, s'est fixé lors de l'ouverture de la conférence qui s'est tenue à Milan le 5 décembre, qui a réuni dans la salle du Conseil de la Lombardie plusieurs représentants des assemblées des "Quatre Moteurs pour l'Europe". Comme l'ont démontré les différents interventions, la méthode intergouvernementale a permis à l'Union d'atteindre un résultat décisif, malgré les efforts déployés par les différents gouvernements. Le déficit démocratique de l'Union se traduit donc par une crise de la participation à la vie politique, qui touche activement les représentants locaux du gouvernement. Il faut donc dépenser les limites de la méthode intergouvernementale, en reconnaissant un rôle constituant au Parlement européen, qui est le seul représentant légitime des citoyens européens.

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cives régionales européennes" a été exposé par Ovidio Sanchez Diaz, président de la Junta General de la Princesse des Asturies tandis que Guido Podestà, vice-président du Parlement européen, a parlé du "Rôle du Parlement européen pour une Europe unie et démocratique".

Et c'est Jo Leiney, président de l'Union européenne des fédéralistes et membre du Parlement de la Sarre, qui a conclu la séance.

La réunion de Milan se pose comme la conséquence naturelle de la Conférence des présidents de l'Assemblée et des Conseils régionaux et des Provinces autonomes qui a eu lieu à Reggio de Calabre (16-17 juillet 1997). La conférence de Reggio avait approuvé un programme pour la Constituante européenne où l'on invitait le Parlement européen, en tant que seul représentant légitime des citoyens européens, à élaborer une procédure démocratique de réforme de l'Union européenne, basée sur la reconnaissance du pouvoir constituant des citoyens européens, et en liaison étroite avec toutes les expressions de la souveraineté populaire.

Les Régions, avec les autres pouvoirs locaux - communes et provinces - ont un intérêt particulier à appuyer le processus constituant européen. L'intégration européenne a provoqué un transfert de pouvoirs: du haut (l'État) au bas (les citoyens), pour que l'on puisse ajouter un lien fondamental de problèmes, et vers les bas (des citoyens aux gouvernements locaux) pour que les raisons qui, au XIXe siècle, ont favorisé et dans certains cas provoqué la centralisation administratives, cessent finalement d'exister.

La résolution du déficit démocratique de l'Union ne représente pas seulement un objectif politique d'une importance capitale pour tous ceux qui veulent vraiment construire l'Europe des citoyens, mais c'est aussi une exigence vitale pour les organismes locaux. En effet, les politiques régionales et structurales de l'Union européenne, qui ont contribué de façon significative à la réduction des déséquilibres territoriaux en Europe, risquent avec l'élargissement de l'Union de se trouver à nouveau plongées dans un cycle de redistribution, en particulier en ce qui concerne les régions les plus dévastées. Une union plus ample doit affronter le problème de la répartition des ressources, à l'échelle de l'Union, en définissant un nouveau cadre institutionnel qui, en accord avec les exigences des citoyens européens, puisse répondre à leurs besoins et attentes.

On dit souvent que l'Union européenne doit devenir plus transparente, plus démocratique et plus proche des citoyens. II est toutefois très difficile qu'une méthode décisionnelle liée au critère de l'unanimité, comme la méthode intergouvernementale, puisse remettre en question le droit de veto. Il faut donc dépasser les limites de cette méthode en reconnaissant un rôle constituant au Parlement européen, seul représentant légitime des citoyens européens.

Si l'objectif spécifique de la première Conférence Régions-Parlement européen a été d'encourager le Parlement à reconnaître le pouvoir constituant des citoyens européens, son véritable but est de réussir à organiser une Conférence entre toutes les régions européennes et le Parlement; cette grande Conférence représentait une sorte de pré-constituante, qui pourrait décider les lignes directrices de la nouvelle Constitution européenne.

(Bulletin européen, Nov. 1997)
Encyclopedia Plus: Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential

On a single CD-ROM, Encyclopedia Plus contains the text of over 3,000 pages of the renowned 3-volume book:

- Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential including the new volume on Actions, Strategies and Solutions
- Encyclopedia of World Problems
- Encyclopedia of Human Development

The CD-ROM technology greatly enhances search and cross-referencing capabilities. Encyclopedia Plus is another product of the Union of International Associations which for over 85 years has served as a clearing house for information on the activities and concerns of international organizations. This unique 3-volume reference work is a comprehensive sourcebook of information on recognized world problems, their interconnections and the human resources available to analyze and respond to them.

The CD-ROM is divided into five main infobases:

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2. Human Development Infobase: There are some 4,400 individual entries (in the human development infobase). They document the diversity of approaches to human advancement in the light of different cultures and spiritual traditions. Entries are hyperlinked to indicate developmental pathways between them. They are also related to over 3,200 constructive and destrucative values in the values infobase, themselves in a network of 23,000 hyperlinks.
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4. Strategies Infobase: The strategy infobase profiles almost 29,500 strategies and action proposals responding to world problems or enhancing particular values or modes of development. In similar fashion to the problems infobase, the strategy entries cross-reference each other through over 91,000 hyperlinks. In addition they show links both to world problems and international organizations which are employing or advocating them - making a total cover of over 126,600 hyperlinks.
5. Bibliographic Infobase: There are over 12,000 bibliographic cross-references to entries in the other four preceding infobases.

The hyperlinks, between the problems, strategies, values and human development infobases enable the user to explore a higher level of relationships between these dimensions.

It is equally simple to click between the five infobases on the CD. Hyperlinks exist also between certain entries in different infobases - for example between strategies, the organizations concerned with them, the problems they address and reference publications on the subject.

In practice this means that users can explore the complex networks of relationships between world problems, human development, values, action strategies and organizations through almost a quarter of a million hyperlinks.

Vicious Problem Cycles: A cycle is a chain of problems, with each aggravating the next - with the last looping back to aggravate the first in the chain. 2,873 such problem loops are identified on the CD.

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- Further features: Indices, Boolean operators, Function, History function for search queries, Bookmark, Note and Highlighter function, and clustering of hits into sorted groups
- Printing/Export: DOS: no printing facilities; Windows/MAC: no restrictions
- Software: Folio Bound VIEWS™ 3.1a
- Interface: Microsoft Windows, Windows’95, Macintosh
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- Citizen's initiatives on sustainable consumption
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- Towards a transdisciplinary university
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