Transnational Associations

Transnational Associations is a unique bilingual journal whose aim is to deal with major current problems within the perspective of international nongovernmental organizations. It is intended to provide a forum for authoritative information and independent reflection on the increasing role played by these organizations in the international system, and on its philosophical, political, economic or cultural implications.

The approach is intrinsically disciplinary, and calls for both specialist expertise and practitioner experience in transnational association matters. Transnational Associations provides background information about the actions and achievements of international associations, and insight into their interactions with intergovernmental organizations. It covers a wide range of topics, among which social organization, humanitarian law, scientific cooperation, language and culture, economic development, to cite just a few.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UIA, clarifies general awareness concerning the association phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, informs associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them. Contributors to the journal review include association officers, research workers and specialists of association questions who engage only themselves.

Founded in Brussels in 1907 as the Central Office of International Associations, the UIA became a federation under the present name in 1910 at the 1st World Congress of International Associations. Activities were closely associated with the Institut international de bibliographie, which later became the International Federation for Documentation. Its work contributed to the creation of the League of Nations and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (the predecessor of UNESCO). During the 1920s, the UIA created an International University, the first of its kind.

The UIA has consultative relations with UNESCO, UNECOSOC, and ILO. It collaborates with FAO, the Council of Europe, UNITAR, and the Commonwealth Science Council.

Associations transnationales est la seule revue traitant des grands problèmes contemporains dans la perspective des organisations internationales non gouvernementales. Elle se propose d’apporter des éléments d’information provenant des sources les plus autorisées, propres à susciter une réflexion indépendante sur l’affirmation du rôle joué par ces acteurs dans le système international et sur les aspects philosophiques, politiques, sociaux et culturels de cette évolution.

La visée adoptée est essentiellement interdisciplinaire et fait appel au savoir comme à la pratique des spécialistes du champ d’action des associations transnationales. Les documents, articles et études publiés par Associations transnationales traitent également des liens établis entre celles-ci et les organisations intergouvernementales. Les domaines couverts s’étendent aux problèmes de société, au droit humanitaire, à la coopération scientifique, aux questions linguistiques et culturelles, au développement économique ou à tout phénomène affectant la vie de ces associations.

Le programme de la revue, conformément aux lois de l’UAI, vise à éclairer l’opinion sur la signification de la dimension associative des relations internationales, notamment en informant les associations au sujet des questions qui relèvent de leurs domaines ou affectent leurs intérêts communs. Les textes des auteurs publiés par la revue (dirigeants d’associations, chercheurs et spécialistes des questions associatives) n’engagent que leur opinion.

L’UAI a été créée officiellement en 1907 à Bruxelles au cours du premier congrès mondial des associations internationales. Ses fondateurs, le Sénateur Henri La Fontaine, prix Nobel de la Paix 1907 et Paul Otlet, Secrétaire général de l’Institut international de bibliographie, avaient mis sur pied en 1907 l’Office central des institutions internationales, qui devait devenir la Commission internationale de documentation. En 1914, elle regroupait 230 organisations, soit un peu plus de la moitié de celles qui existaient à l’époque. L’UAI devait sans cesse, dans l’esprit de ses fondateurs, les aspirations internationales et les idées de paix qui animaient ces associations et qui allaient aboutir en 1920 à la création de la Société des Nations.

L’UAI a obtenu le statut consultatif auprès de la TECOSOC, de l’UNECE et de l’OI. Elle collabore avec l’UNITAR, la FAO et le Conseil de l’Europe. Elle entretient des relations générales et ponctuelles avec les organisations régionales.
The Road From Rio
NGO Policy Makers and the Social Ecology of Development
by Charles A. Reilly *

Can private associations generate the information and incentives needed to make markets and governments socially and environmentally responsible?

For decades, the terms of debate about development and the environment have been frozen in stereotypes. Economists running the development business have forgotten about citizens, imagining them as the object of, rather than partners in, the enterprise at hand. Preoccupied with the fate of jaguars, butterflies, and orchids, conservationists have often seen the people who live in wilderness areas as intruders on idealized nature rather than an integral part of the ecosystem. The development business has not been eminently successful, while government-managed nature parks in Africa and South America have not slowed the loss of forest cover or endangered species. Fatigue has set in, North and South, just when the environmental challenge confronts humanity with a stark set of choices. The economic rewards that come from the intensified production of industrial society may have reached the point of diminishing returns, threatening to consume the very resource base that stokes its factories and sustains life itself. If the planetary ecosystem is reaching the threshold of its ability to sustain modern technologies and the social systems that accompany them, who will bear the sacrifice of slower economic growth?

Some propose answering that question in terms of justice and empowerment. Robert Bellah (1991), for instance, says that without justice, broadly defined as "giving what is due to both people and the environment," a sustainable social and natural ecology is impossible, "endangering everything we have received from our ancestors and threatening to leave nothing but violence and decay [for] our children and grandchildren."

Others, such as economist Deepak Lal (1990), respond that the belief that one can choose between equity and efficiency is "a chimera." Imposition of extraneous values on production retards the economic incentives and the free flow of information needed to generate wealth. A modern economy is too complex to be governed by decree, and markets and privatization are the only feasible alternatives.

Yet when a former economist at the World Bank reasons that "the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable" (Report on the Americas, 1993) and that nations in the South might earn needed cash by storing industrial waste generated in the North, one feels a nagging doubt that markets are equipped to adequately measure such a transaction. Is there an alternative to the bleak choice between a cold-eyed state and a blind market?

The question becomes even more complicated when one realizes how environmental issues have eroded conventional notions of sovereignty. Mexican sewage pollutes U.S. beaches. Irrigation of U.S. farms reduces the Colorado River to a salinized trickle by the time it reaches Mexico. The industrialized nations ban dangerous pesticides at home but export them to the South, only to find carcinogenic runnings on imported fruits and vegetables. Commuters in Dallas, Texas, release chlorofluorocarbons from their auto air conditioners that deplete the ozone layer, while campesinos burning the Amazon rainforest jeopardize the world's oxygen sink.

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro last year was supposed to tackle such questions. This article will briefly examine what happened there and then explore the thesis that the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at the Global Forum, which many treated as a sideshow, may be key to forging the links between environmental and social policy making needed to promote sustainable development.

Breathing Life into Sustainable Development

Developmentalists and environmentalists are joining ranks under the common banner of "sustainable development" as awareness grows that they are pursuing interrelated goals rather than competing in a zero-sum game (Stone, 1992; see Review on page 44 of this journal). Yet both often overlook the missing word — democratic — that binds the term's two words together and

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makes "sustainable [democratic] development" a workable proposition.

UNCED arrived at a pivotal moment in history, when the end of the Cold War and a rising tide of democratization gave birth to calls for a New World Order. Defining the basis for that order, however, has raised difficult questions. If the old ideologies seem outmoded, the conditions that generate social upheaval are not. Can new democracies, and perhaps the idea of democracy itself, survive and flourish if the poor are excluded and protection of the natural resource base is not consolidated and secured for future generations?

As we have seen, the planet has grown very small. The line between North and South has blurred. Elites in developing countries are bridgeheads for the North, and urban explosions such as the one last year in Los Angeles involving racial and ethnic immigrant minorities reflect conditions in the South even when they occur in the heart of the North. The extent to which the poor and the organizations they form are permitted to enter the policy arena, particularly on social and environmental issues, may well determine whether the world becomes livable for its impoverished majority and remains livable for those who are better off.

When UNCED opened in Rio last year, the eyes of much of the world were not directed toward that question but toward matters of state. Would all of the leaders come? Would they agree to a unified position?

To be in Rio, however, was to see and feel something quite different. For nearly two weeks, Rio resembled a Greek city-state in which citizens from around the world tried to interact with and influence their political leaders. Representatives of indigenous peoples — from the Americas to Australia to Asia to Africa — gathered in a park they called Kari'oka (a Tupi Indian word meaning "house of white," which has now become a nickname for the people of Rio de Janeiro). There they built a four-story thatched structure, without metal nails or scaffolding, in which they ate, slept, and discussed their common belief in the sacredness of the Earth and the common threat facing their way of life from the loss of land and habitat. Scientists met at the Federal University to discuss models for measuring the planet's health and what might be done to improve it. German, Japanese, and other business men set up shop, at a site near UNCED's "Earth Summit" headquarters, to exhibit the new "green and clean technologies" they had developed for sale. Finally, at the Global Forum, an estimated 25,000 representatives from 9,000 NGOs and citizens movements set up their soapboxes to debate how the need for development could be reconciled with the needs of the environment, and submit petitions for action to the assembly of states at the Earth Summit.

UNCED did not conclude with any grand consensus. As diplomats boarded their planes to fly home, many of the official agreements they had signed seemed hollow. Conventions on climate and biodiversity were ratified by most heads of state, but the United States, the leading energy consumer and biotechnology producer, abstained. Agenda 21, an omnibus workplan for merging environmental and developmental action by the international community, was drafted by the UNCED Secretariat and signed by national leaders, although few financial resources were committed to implement its 39 chapters of nonbinding recommendations. A U.N. commission would be created to promote sustainable development, and the World Bank would continue as steward of the Global Environmental Facility to the dismay of critics familiar with the Bank's prior history of funding dams and other large projects that adversely affected grassroots populations and the environment. Although the orthodox development strategies of import substitution, fiscal incentives, maximal economic growth, and nontraditional agricultural exports were widely indicted for their environmental costs, structural adjustment policies remained in place and nations from Honduras to the Philippines were still under pressure to "cash in" their natural resource base to service their international debts.

The state, in fact, seemed everywhere in retreat, unable to implement a grand strategy to promote sustainable development even if one had been hammered out. Governments in the South were downsizing and privatizing, while those in the North were reluctant to fund new initiatives in the midst of a global recession. A new force, however, did emerge in Rio to help fill the vacuum.

Celso Lafer, then Brazil's foreign minister, called attention to this phenomenon on the eve of
UNCED. In an interview with Jornal do Brasil, he said:

"Today... the theme of environment is not in the hands of the slate [but] in the hands of society. The whole world is concerned. Besides the Global Forum, NGOs are participating in the Earth Summit itself to a greater degree than in any previous conference."

Events at UNCED confirmed Lafer's observation. At the Global Forum, NGO delegates avoided the paralysis afflicting the Earth Summit, formally and frankly discussing how issues intertwined. Everything was on the table: how the dangers from overdevelopment and overconsumption parallel those of underdevelopment and population growth, how trade-offs must be made between equity and growth. Panels, seminars, and informal discussions also allowed participants to share knowledge of how concrete experimentation in grassroots projects around the globe might form the basis for new models of action. It would be an exaggeration to say that a consensus on policy was reached, but there was growing agreement that new thinking was required and that new alliances had to be forged within nations and across national borders to formulate and implement those ideas.

One indication of how such "intermestic" networks might form and function within and across the boundaries of national civil societies was evident in the democratization of information taking place at Rio. NGOs there were linked through fax machines, computer networks, and other alternative media to wider social movements at home and around the globe. An electronic nervous system was wiring civil societies to each other and creating the possibility for new flexibility in socially based problem solving that could resolve the seemingly irreconcilable concerns of both Robert Bellah and Deepak Lal.

Sizing Up the Potential of NGO "Supercitizens"

The myriad private associations of civil society have blossomed throughout Latin America and the Caribbean during the past two decades to fill the social space opened by the democratization of the state they have helped bring about. NGOs range from base groups in villages and barrios; to grassroots support organizations (GSOs) that provide training and technical assistance to community managed projects; to membership organizations (MOs) that draw upon local, regional, national, and even international constituencies; to specialized development institutions that focus on thematic, advocacy, research, or fiduciary activities.

As the web of civil society has spread and thickened, it has become impossible to fully map the interrelationships of its constituent strands. There is a need for new analytic tools to describe the dynamics of how development energy released in one strand can ripple through others or be muffled, and to evaluate the effectiveness of specific institutional actors, their methodologies, and their programs in promoting bottom-up development. We do know that GSOs, MOs, and specialized NGOs have become linked, singly and in combination to wider social movements that they often anchor or lead in campaigns to establish democratic, developmental, or environmental reforms. Like the agrarian populists and the suffragettes in the United States at the turn of this century, NGOs and social movements are having a profound structural and policy impact on the political systems of Latin America and the Caribbean, even when that does not translate directly into public office.

NGOs have taken the lead in creating innovative projects in nonformal education for adults and children, microenterprise credit for the informal sector, agricultural extension, community-based primary health care, self-help housing, cooperative marketing schemes, the defense of human rights, and other areas. Most of these projects have occurred at the margins of society, among the poor and other disadvantaged populations who receive inadequate public social services or none at all.

These projects are often more effective than the government programs that are available, because they are user-friendly. Most NGOs have consciously adopted methodologies designed to break the "passivity of the poor" and to replace the patron-client relationships that have traditionally dominated Latin American society.

They seek to mobilize local resources for community development by encouraging self-help initiatives. Effective MOs and GSOs rou-
tinely assure participation, accountability, and access to decision making by their memberships and beneficiaries. There is minimal red tape because there is minimal bureaucracy separating managers from people in the field.

This creates several comparative advantages for NGOs in designing effective projects in sustainable development. First, recognizing and rectifying mistakes is easier, when the learning loop is short — when planners and implementers are the same people. In Guatemala, for instance, ALTERTEC has pioneered the introduction of "regenerative agriculture" to small-scale farmers. The GSO project enlists a few farmers with strategically located plots who are willing to test organic techniques for enriching soils, controlling insects and fungi, diversifying food and cash crops, and cultivating medicinal plants. As participants bring in higher yields than their neighbours at lower costs for inputs, others join. Involving farmers in the agricultural research process produces knowledge of how harvests can be increased or sustained in particular microclimates and eco-niches without endangering water supplies or wildlife through unnecessary application of agrochemicals, provides a platform for effective agricultural extension through farmer-to-farmer contacts, and is generating a feasible alternative for Guatemalan campesinos leery of the high-risk, nontraditional-export-crop schemes being pushed throughout the country by bilateral and multilateral agencies.

This low-cost, people-intensive model stands in dramatic contrast to the centralized, publicly funded agricultural research stations and extension services whose work is seldom geared to the needs of campesinos and that too often result in lovely demonstration farms from which technology never transfers. It also echoes the findings of other GSOs in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile (Bebbington, 1991).

Much of the promise NGOs show for designing effective environmental policies stems from their familiarity with the social ecology of the locality in which they function. The best NGOs often work in a relatively circumscribed locale with a highly specific population. Although NGOs eventually tend to specialize in one task or a set of associated tasks, their close connection to life at the grassroots makes them aware of the integrated nature of development. Their programs and policies are often ambitiously holistic, intended to produce beneficial side effects by attacking interrelated problems simultaneously. This ability to adapt to complex situations and the changing demands of their memberships and beneficiaries can uncover new opportunities and lead to surprising innovations.

The Empresa de Consultoría en Ecotecnología (ECOTEC), also in Guatemala, specializes in environmentally appropriate technologies that meet the needs of the poor. ECOTEC designs prefabricated housing systems that are affordable and earthquake resistant as a result of years of experimentation and tinkering. Its engineers have recently devised a fuel-efficient ceramic oven that is intended to dramatically improve the health of women and children, generate jobs, stretch the budgets of low-income families, and help save tropical forests. Thirty artisans are being trained to produce and market the stoves in five areas of the country. Ovens can be modified for use in either urban or rural households, reducing indoor pollution and eliminating the open-fire cooking that strains women's backs and causes cataracts and respiratory problems. The $16 stove pays for itself in three to four months by slashing fuel consumption 39 percent. By the time it reaches its intended beneficiary target population of 60,000 families, the stove will have helped conserve wood supplies equivalent to 600 square kilometres of forest.

While such accomplishments are notable, NGOs remain small entities. Are they adaptable enough to scale up their projects to benefit more people? One clue is provided by the Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes (ACJ) in Guatemala. ACJ was originally founded to provide "welfare" assistance to 24,000 people relocated after the 1976 earthquake. The Asociación eventually used the legitimacy it had acquired from years of work in the barrios around Guatemala City to start an ambitious program to improve public sanitation and halt soil erosion that threatened the area with mudslides and contaminated water supplies. Using seedlings obtained from the government, ACJ mobilized its membership and conducted a public education campaign that resulted in the reforestation of several barrancas, or gulches, around the municipality. To see barren and garb- age-strewn gullies become green again is visually satisfying, and the transformation is environment-
tally beneficial, but Guatemala City has at least 50 more barrancas waiting to be reclaimed.

**Public Laboratories or Shadow Governments?**

As development-oriented NGOs have demonstrated their efficiency, flexibility, and innovativeness, some analysts and donor agencies have begun to wonder if they might eventually replace the state in providing certain public services. What makes such speculation tempting is the formation of regional and national NGO networks and consortia throughout the hemisphere at the same time that resource-strapped governments are cutting services and privatizing many of their functions.

Such speculation seems unfounded. First, NGOs are not manufactured robotically. They are handcrafted by individuals and groups responding to their own life experiences and the problems of their communities. Although many NGOs are led by social entrepreneurs who instinctively seek to build coalitions, others are more encapsulated, concentrating on delivering services locally.

Second, the extent of NGO networks and the development strategies they pursue vary by country, affecting their ability to muster resources and coordinate policies. Some networks have evolved along sectoral lines, others are more territorial. In Central America, consortia appeared in the early 1980s, often induced by outside funders. In South America, NGO associations have gradually evolved in tandem with democratizing states, both of them shaped by the constraining reality of structural adjustment and fiscal austerity. Mexico's NGOs and social movements are characterized by their uneasy coexistence with the neopopulist programs of the government, such as the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad.

Finally, NGO resources fall far short of the demand for public services. A recent survey of more than 100 of Brazil's largest NGOs, accounting for about 10 percent of the sector, revealed a combined annual budget of some $28 million and a total staff of 2,660 — hardly a surrogate for the country's largest metropolitan governments.

If NGOs are unlikely to swallow the state, will the state swallow them? In Brazil and Chile, where NGO sectoral integration is well-advanced, the government has established agencies whose stated purpose is to "coordinate" public and private social development efforts. Domestic oversight is obviously a prerogative of national government, and the large volume of funds from the North being brokered to the South through NGOs — estimated by the World Bank to exceed $4 billion annually — cannot help but spark public sector interest.

Yet if oversight becomes an attempt to manage public and private development efforts from the top, there is a danger of "instrumentalizing" NGOs. That is, NGOs would become service delivery vehicles for state policies or would be used as an insurance policy to fill in the gaps opened by structural adjustment. In Chile, many NGOs are already being hired by regional and municipal governments to provide services like primary health care or skills training — raising questions about whether nonprofit contractors dependent on state funding can continue to voice the grievances of the poor.

Privatization of inefficient state enterprises makes eminent sense; abrogation by the state of its primary social and environmental obligations would be cavalier. NGOs alone cannot make up the social and environmental deficits, and it would be a waste for them to try doing so since their primary strength is not in administration but in innovation. They are social laboratories for inventing and testing new policy ideas for solving previously intractable problems. The test NGOs face is not their ability to replicate projects exponentially, but their ability to help transfer and refine project models into public programs.

That is, NGO networking can play a role not only in sharing information within the sector, but also in forming coalitions and mobilizing public opinion to make government agencies work better, alone or in partnership. This has become increasingly important with environmental issues. Environmental NGOs have been multiplying throughout the hemisphere in recent years, but, with some exceptions like the GLADES or IFOAM-LA networks, they have been reluctant to join established networks or form their own. In May 1993, Fundación Natura of Ecuador hosted a meeting of 40 NGO representatives from Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
to discuss NGOs and international decision making. As a result of contacts made at the Global Forum and UNCED, assimilation of environmental and developmental NGOs into larger networks seems likely to accelerate.

This is significant since the climate for social and environmental policy making in Latin America is undergoing a sea change. State-woven safety nets have never worked for a majority of the hemisphere’s people, and they increasingly fail the middle classes as well. Radical retooling, joint ventures, and self-provisioning are becoming the order of the day. National government is decentralizing, spinning off responsibilities to provinces and municipalities. Democratization has opened up bargaining space for both the middle and lower levels of the social pyramid. Social and environmental policy will increasingly emerge from negotiated pacts that reflect issue-specific coalitions of differing interests and values — much of it carried out for the first time in public view.

Incremental and pragmatic, diversified and decentralized, it will reflect democracy’s progress and hasten its consolidation. State influenced but not state monopolized, the policy process will be fluid and, like life itself, full of contradictions.

Forest, Countryside, City

The mechanics whereby NGOs help make and implement policy to promote sustainable development vary from nation to nation, and increasingly within states as governments decentralize. What can be said is that an all-or-nothing approach has traditionally prevailed as elites and revolutionaries have struggled to possess the state — with continuity being neither the rule nor the expectation in the public policy cycle. NGOs that are committed to serving marginalized groups and to protecting the environment tend to be much more persistent in pursuing reforms than the regimes they try to influence, ensuring that the pursuit of sustainable development becomes rooted in society itself and survives for the long haul.

One way to better understand the promise and pitfalls of this process is to examine how innovative NGO projects have sparked policy reforms in three ecologically zones: forest, farmland, and the city.

Forest: Among the most promising models for helping preserve tropical forests are the extractive reserves pioneered by the Conselho Nacional de Seringueiros (CNS) and the Instituto de Estudos Amazônicos e Ambientais (IEA) in Brazil. The reserves are recently established, but their roots stretch back to 1978, when a young research anthropologist named Mary Allegretti first visited Acre State on a field trip. Shocked by the poverty of the people she met, Allegretti left her university post to start a school to help Amazonian rubber-tappers improve their conditions. It soon became apparent that their struggle was inseparable from the struggle to save the ecosystem around them, which was unraveling under the onslaught of clear-cut logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, and cattle ranching that followed accelerated colonization of the area.

As rubber-tappers organized themselves to break the hold of local creditors, set up independent marketing channels, and secure their traditional access to the forest and protect it from outsiders, they created CNS and elected Chico Mendes as their leader. Allegretti founded IEA in 1986 to provide technical support and to inform the public, in Brazil and overseas, of the rubber-tappers’ plight. Mendes became an international symbol of efforts to defend the rainforest. When he was murdered by a cattle rancher in 1988, IEA helped CNS mobilize its membership and join with international environmental NGOs, concerned Brazilians, and national legislators to legally establish 14 extractive reserves, covering some 3 million hectares.

These reserves make rubber-tappers, indigenous natives, and river people stewards of the rainforest, giving them an economic stake in the preservation of habitat through the harvesting of renewable products. To diversify their income base, rubber-tappers now pick and shell Brazil nuts, which are being used in Curitiba to manufacture CHONK — the country’s first environmentally supportive candy bar. Markets for “trail mixes,” high-energy foods for backpackers and other outdoor enthusiasts, are also being opened up by socially concerned entrepreneurs in the United States and Europe.

To ensure that technical support remains available to Amazonian groups in the future, IEA has streamlined its administrative management to cut overhead and is broadening its domestic fund-
raising base to reduce dependence on interna-
tional donors. To ensure that its message is firmly
rooted among policy makers and the Brazilian
public, IEA has moved its main office to Brasilia
while maintaining three field offices in the Ama-
zon region; publishes an ecodevelopment news-
letter, and regularly contributes to “Rede Verde,”
an environmental radio program aired on 104 sta-
tions throughout the region.
Key to establishing the extractive reserves
has been IEA’s ability not only to mobilize inter-
national and domestic support for the rubber-tap-
pers, but to apply it at the level of local, regional,
or national government where it has greatest
leverage. Today, the Instituto not only maintains
ties with Northern and other Brazilian environ-
mental NGOs, but is a member of the NGO
monitoring committee for the World Bank’s Glo-
bal Environmental Facility and monitors UNCED’s Protocol on Forests and other Atlantic
rainforest agreements.
Numerous other efforts are under way in
the hemisphere to assemble coalitions to preserve
woodlands. Several lessons can be gleaned from
comparing these experiences. First, the people
who inhabit a forested area must be organized to
speak with one voice in managing it. Efforts to
save the pine forests of the Sierra Juárez in
Oaxaca, Mexico, were hampered when environ-
mental NGOs from the North sponsored, per-
haps with the best of intentions, conflicting pro-
grams in the same region, awakening animosities
between and within local communities and mak-
ing it more difficult to establish pristine wilder-
ness preserves or to create sustainable community
forestry enterprises (Bray, 1991). With support
from the IAF and the World Wildlife Federation,
local GSOs have played a key role in mediating
the conflicts and strengthening community-
based-sawmills that are learning to use selective
logging and value-added processing to boost fam-
ily incomes without disrupting the area’s unique
ecosystem.
The experience of resin-tapper cooperatives
in Honduras underlines the notion that strong
community organizations acting as gatekeepers to
the forest are prerequisite for sustainable social
forestry enterprises (Stanley, 1990). The efforts of
babassu palmnut gatherers, many of them tenant
or subsistence farmers, to organize production
and marketing MOs which maintain access to
wild palm groves in Maranhao State, Brazil, sug-
gests that the extractive model is applicable to sec-
ondary tropical woodlands as well. If the Socie-
dade Maranhense de Defesa dos Direitos
Humanos and other peasant MOs succeed in
showing that the rural poor of the state can com-
bine sustainable subsistence agriculture with babassu harvesting to prosper in the transitional
areas they inhabit, small farmers will be less likely
to push on into the virgin Amazonian forest
beyond.
Farming: Earlier in this article, NCO
models for promoting regenerative agriculture in
Guatemala were discussed. Because these organic
methodologies are labor intensive and the bene-
fits from composting and terracing accumulate
with successive harvests, campesinos must have
secure land tenure to see the rewards of their
investments. Land tenure has also been a key vari-
able in the emergence of a cinturón ecológico, or
greenbelt, around Lima, Peru. This promising
new model views the metropolis and its surround-
ing countryside as a single socioecological system,
whose survival and health depend on policies that
recognize the interdependence of its rural and
urban residents and the need for environmental
conservation.
The origin of this idea can be traced to poet
and environmentalist Antonio Andaluz, who
founded the Instituto Tecnológico Agrario
Proterra (PROTERRA) in 1983 to help rural
communities develop through careful manage-
ment of their natural resources. PROTERRA
began work in the Lurín Valley south of Lima,
and soon realized that for small-scale farmers to
adopt organic technologies they would need title
to agrarian reform lands and improved access to
government credit. PROTERRA helped draft
new national legislation to reform and simplify
the land-titling process, and inspired formation of
a national organization to represent the interests
of peasant families.
This experience convinced Andaluz that
the government was underutilizing its resources
and that organizations working with the poor
needed to coordinate their efforts for maximum
results. PROTERRA launched Operación Tábano,
or Operation Gadfly, to build a coalition of inter-
ests among campesino MOs, GSOs, research-
oriented NGOs, university scientists, and govern-
ment agencies to maximize Peru’s potential for
sustainable agriculture. Operación Tábano was instrumental in crafting new legislation to create the cinturón ecológico around Lima. The bundle of policies enacted into law is designed to improve farmers’ access to credit and markets, protect Lima’s endangered water supply, and provide a greenspace around the city to reduce air pollution, while helping to stem the flow of rural migrants into a city already unable to generate enough jobs and basic social infrastructure for the poor barrios mushrooming around its periphery.

In catalyzing these policy reforms, PROTERRA helped spur formation of Red Ambiental, an environmental network of 77 organizations responsible for devising a national conservation strategy. Last year, Antonio Andaluz attended UNCED as part of Peru’s delegation to the “Earth Summit” and shared PROTERRA’s experience with colleagues at the Global Forum.

City: Perhaps one of the most important developments at the Global Forum was the spotlight thrown on urban environmental problems. Many countries in the South are now more urbanized than those in the North, and their populations are more affected by inadequate sewerage and water systems, the lack of landfills for solid and industrial wastes, and rising levels of air pollution from smokestacks, wood stoves, and the internal combustion engine than by disappearing forests.

In fact, these are not separate concerns. Saving woodlands and controlling urban-generated air pollution are interrelated factors in reducing the danger of global warming since plant life removes carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels. The Instituto de Estudos, Formação e Assessoria em Políticas Sociais (POLIS) has helped introduce a new policy reform that is enabling several of Brazil’s cities to address the first side of that equation by upgrading their mass transportation infrastructure.

Rapid urbanization during the past two decades has brought 75 percent of Brazil’s population into urban areas, outstripping available public transportation. Automobiles and buses carry 85 percent of the load, and emissions of gasoline, gasohol, and diesel fumes are choking many of the nation’s cities. Bus fares barely cover operating costs despite high riderships and ticket prices (following the onset of the national recession in 1987, round-trip tickets equaled up to 35 percent of the daily minimum wage, and in Sao Paulo, jammed buses carried an average of 13 people per square meter during peak traffic hours). Subsidies from municipalities have had to pick up the slack since constitutional reform in 1988 decentralized state authority, making transportation a responsibility of municipalities. POLIS, a research NGO specializing in urban issues, has helped devise a new way for cash-strapped city governments to finance improved transportation systems. To take advantage of their new authority to raise revenues locally, POLIS proposes that municipalities enact a transportation tax on commercial, industrial, and service enterprises. The tax, which adapts features of the virement transport initiated by the French to overhaul the Paris transport system in the early 1970s, is designed to be flexible: Before a municipality adopts the tax and sets rates, POLIS conducts preliminary socioeconomic studies to determine the level of investment needed and the ability of the local private sector to finance it. Firms with fewer than 10 employees are exempted to minimize the burden on small firms and to reduce the costs of administering the fee. Discounts of up to 20 percent are offered to firms that stagger work hours to help cut rush-hour traffic, and to firms that provide employees with housing at or near their work sites.

All funds are earmarked for investments in transportation infrastructure, such as roads, traffic signals, new buses, terminals, and garages, in planning and management of the system, including programs to conserve fuel; and in maintenance and inspection. As investments in infrastructure decline in importance, fees can be diverted to subsidized ticket fares.

Disbursement of funds is controlled by a municipal transportation council comprised of mayoral appointees, public transportation workers and owners, and local business people. The council is designed to ensure that democratization takes root at the local level and that present and future municipal administrators will consult with agents of civil society in planning and monitoring transportation services.

The system is up and running in Diadema and under judicial review in Campinas, two important cities in Sao Paulo State, and is being considered by several other municipalities.
POLIS is promoting the plan through meetings with local authorities, industrial and business leaders, labor unions, and federations of neighbourhood associations throughout Brazil, initiating dialogues to refine the proposal and to see how improved transportation services can raise economic productivity, increase access to jobs for residents of low-income favelas, and make cities more livable.

Democracy and Sustainable Development

The Irish poet Seamus Heaney says that the public task of a poet is to “summon the energy of words.” Iconoclastic development economist Albert Hirschman (1970) affirms the importance of “voice” in allowing all sectors of society to participate in their own governance and in the formation of policies that determine the quality of their lives. NGOs and social movements are inspiring poor communities throughout the hemisphere to become more self-reliant and productive. Secondary citizenship in private associations is becoming convertible into primary citizenship that makes governments, particularly at the local level, more responsive and creative.

As antagonisms between the state and NGOs ebb, development donors will have to explore how the dwindling supply of aid can best be channelled. The environmental arena offers considerable promise, both for energizing the normative energy latent in Latin America and for tempering the harshness of neoliberal orthodoxy. Words of caution, however, are in order. Among the many NGOs that gathered in Rio were a fair number of “NGO-lites,” hastily formed environmental organizations with no proven constituency or track record, whose primary purpose seemed to be cashing in on a new development fad. Donors and environmental NGOs from the North would be well advised to heed the experience of the social forestry enterprises in Oaxaca discussed earlier in this article, and seek partners in the South that have strong local ties and are committed to forming self-reliant community organizations and networks. It should also be remembered that investments in nonformal health programs, women’s programs, and even self-help housing technologies, such as ECO-TEC’s in Guatemala, can have spin-off effects that help protect the environment.

The United States government recently ratified the treaty on biodiversity on the first anniversary of UNCED. Biodiversity and socio-cultural diversity are codependent, and the distribution of economic benefits derived from the former must be reflected in the latter. Indigenous peoples in Central America and in the Amazon region of South America are organizing to register their claims to ancestral forests that they have inhabited for centuries. Sometimes, as in the extractive reserves of Brazil or the nature park established by the Kuna Indians of Panama, society must recognize that conservation is best served when it is managed by marginalized populations. Income-generating projects there will not always pay for themselves in the short term because they require long-term investments in organization building and market development.

Of course our challenge is not just to achieve greater equity among the present generation, but to achieve democracy across generations. To paraphrase World Bank economist Herman Daly, environmental issues have dealt the future into the distributional equation. The state will not wither away, and markets must not be allowed to recognize the long-term costs of production only when scarcity is irreversible. The NGO policy inventors that have been discussed in this article have one thing in common: They have shown the ability to forge multiclass alliances domestically and internationally in ways that bring the poor to the bargaining table and into the marketplace. In doing so, they help ensure that the needs of everyone’s children and grandchildren will be heard as well.
References


Civique, civil ou servile ? *

par Robin Gaudite

Monsieur le Président,
Madame de Koster, Saskia et Joujse de Koster,
Madame le Secrétaire général,
Mélanes et Messieurs,

TOUJOURS d’abord, je vous prierai de bien vouloir m’excuser de prendre la parole en anglais et non en français. Il m’est arrivé une fois, il y a 30 ans, de faire une conférence en français. C’était à Tunis, et je parlais des mouvements de jeunesse en Grande-Bretagne. Je n’oublierai jamais la scène qui gagnait progressivement le visage de l’ambassadeur britannique assis au premier rang à mesure que je prononçais péniblement mon allocution, ni l’extinction de voix dont j’ai ensuite souffert pour avoir prononcé tous ces r en me raclant la gorge. Aujourd’hui, je ne vous infligerai pas, non plus qu’à moi, de telles épreuves. Mais c’est avec humilité plutôt qu’avec orgueil, et en éprouvant un sentiment de gratitude à votre égard, que j’utiliserai ma langue natale. Du moins m’efforcerai-je de parler clairement pour être compris de tous.


Le terme "civique" est le plus approprié. C’est dans cet esprit que j’en viens au titre de mon exposé et au sujet de notre réflexion. Mon but n’était pas d’être obscur. A Prague en novembre dernier, lors de la Conférence du Centre européen, fondations, j’ai discuté en anglais tout au moins, une tendance à utiliser presque indifféremment les expressions société civile et société civique. J’ai constaté aussi à la Chambre des Lords et à Strasbourg. Y a-t-il une différence? Est-elle importante? Lequel des deux adjectifs est le plus approprié?

Le terme «civique», en anglais comme en français, renvoie à tout ce qui a trait au citoyen en tant qu’il habite avec d’autres un lieu donné: ses droits, leurs devoirs, leurs devoirs, leur devoirs, leur devoirs, leur devoirs...
les attributs de la ville où ils vivent; ainsi, un lieu de réunion sera un centre civique et, en anglais, une marque d'honneur pourra être appelée « civic crown » et les défenseurs de la cité « civic guard ». En d'autres termes, ce qui est « civiques » est étroitement et strictement rattaché à la cité antique et aux agglomérations des temps modernes; une société « civique » s'intéressera davantage aux parcs et jardins situés à proximité du centre ville qu'au rôle du citoyen dans la société. 

« Civil » a un sens plus large dans les deux langues. En anglais, cet adjectif est assez fréquemment utilisé au sens de « courtis », plus souvent qu'en français où l'on dira volontiers : poli, gentil, correct. Mais pour ce qui est de la signification plus générale de ce mot, les deux langues se retrouvent: le dictionnaire français, en parlant de « ce qui concerne les citoyens », se fait l'écho du dictionnaire anglais, qui propose « pertaining to the community » par opposition au sens plus limité de « civil », « pertaining to the citizens ». Dans les deux langues, le terme sert à distinguer les affaires civiles des affaires militaires ou religieuses. Anglais et français associent aussi davantage de termes à « civil » qu'à « civique » pour désigner certains aspects de la vie: le français oppose droit civil et droit pénal, droits civils et droits politiques, et parle d'ingénieur civil, d'emploi civil, de civil et droit pénal, droits civils et droits politiques, tandis que les anglais opposent le droit civil et le droit pénal, droits civils et droits politiques, et parlent d'ingénieur civil, d'emploi civil, de mariage civil et de guerre civile. En anglais aussi, on parle de civil law, de civil marriage et de civil war, ainsi que de civil engineer (par opposition au génie militaire), de civil servant (probablement pour la même raison), de civil liberty, civil disobedience et civil défense.

À l'issue de cette incursion pourtant brève dans la linguistique, il apparaît donc clairement que le terme « civil » est plus large et qu'il peut même être considéré comme englobant le terme plus étroit de « civique ». Le doute n'est pas permis: c'est de la société civile que nous parlons.

L'expression « société civile » est intéressante à bien des égards. Tout d'abord, elle est positive. Toutes les autres formules envisageables sont négatives ou insuffisantes: des organisations non gouvernementales, des activités non lucratives, le secteur tertiaire (sans parler du quatrième pouvoir), même des expressions comme « secteur bénévoles », volontiers utilisée en anglais, ou « vie associative » en français, ont un sens trop étroit, ne serait-ce que parce qu'elles sont propres à une certaine culture. Des termes tels que « charity » (œuvre philanthropique) en honneur dans les pays anglo-saxons, ou encore « fondation », usité sur le continent européen, sont indispensables pour désigner les concepts précis auxquels ils se réfèrent, mais ils sont encore plus étroits par rapport aux phénomènes que nous cherchons à cerner.

Car la « société civile » englobe toutes ces notions, et bien d'autres encore. Elle désigne ce que nous, ensemble, accomplissons de leur propre initiative sans aucune intervention d'une autorité supérieure, pour le bien commun et le plus souvent indépendamment de toute affiliation ou infodation directe à un parti politique. A priori, la société civile ne s'intéresse pas aux relations de pouvoir, quoique elle puisse à l'occasion s'élérer contre une concentration excessive des pouvoirs ou contre des abus de pouvoir, d'où qu'ils viennent. Dans les pays socialistes, la résurgence lente et sociable mais résolue de la société civile a joué un rôle essentiel dans les spectaculaires révolutions de 1989 ; au moment voulu, les réseaux de soutien mutuel et de communication étaient là pour galvaniser les peuples et renverser des gouvernements qui avaient tenté sans succès d'étouffer l'esprit d'initiative des citoyens.

La résurgence de la société civile en Europe centrale et orientale a une signification historique particulière et reste d'une importance décisive. Les nouvelles démocraties qui s'y sont créées ne s'y maintiendront pas davantage sans elle que les démocraties existant ailleurs ne survivaient en l'absence d'une société civile florissante et indépendante. Mais il est aussi bien évident que par tout dans le monde et quel que soit le contexte politique, la société civile connaît un sursaut d'énergie et un regain d'activité depuis quelques décennies. J'évoquerai ici les premiers résultats, qui commencent tout juste à être connus, d'une étude internationale de longue haleine que vous connaissez peut-être déjà, car elle est importante. L'étude comparative du secteur non lucratif John Hopkins est le fruit des réflexions de son directeur, Lester Salamon, de l'Université John Hopkins à Baltimore. Dans le cadre de ce projet, des équipes de spécialistes en sciences sociales sont à l'œuvre sur tous les continents pour analyser la nature et le développement de la société civile, ou du secteur non lucratif comme ils l'appellent moins étiqueté. Il a fallu tout d'abord mettre au point des définitions qui soient applicables dans
le monde entier, identifier des catégories devant permettre ensuite d'analyser les organisations et activités de la société civile, et enfin dégager ces critères indispensables à la survie et à la prospérité de la société civile. Les travaux se sont ensuite engagés simultanément sur tous les continents et j'espère que le docteur Salamon décidera d'en rendre publics les résultats pour l'Europe dans le courant de cette année à Strasbourg. Ce qui va suivre maintenant est tiré de ses conclusions. Il a par exemple constaté en 1982 qu'aux États-Unis, 65 % des organismes bénévoles avaient été créés depuis 1960. Il, en France, terre d'élection des associations et bastion de la notion de solidarité, les associations se constituaient au rythme de 10 à 12 000 par an en 1960; or au cours de la seule année 1987, plus de 54 000 ont vu le jour. En Grande-Bretagne, quelque 4 000 organisations philanthropiques sont créées chaque année; entre 1980 et 1986, elles ont vu leurs recettes augmenter de 220 % — il est vrai que leurs recettes brutes totales ont peut-être diminué un peu depuis. Une progression comparable est décelable dans d'autres pays d'Europe occidentale. En Europe centrale et orientale, le développement souterrain de la société civile a été un facteur important dans les révolutions de 1989. Depuis lors, ce secteur a pris son essor en dépit de problèmes pratiques énormes. En Hongrie, 6 000 fondations et 11 000 associations environ étaient déjà enregistrées au milieu de 1992, et un phénomène analogue a été observé dans les autres pays anciennement communistes. Dans l'ex-Union soviétique, l'ancien gouvernement a réduit sa propre participation à des actions de bienfaisance. Une loi pour les associations sociales a été créée en 1986 — afin de traiter les initiatives des citoyens en action efficaces. Ce puissant mouvement qui se fait sentir dans le monde entier, s'il est encore négligé, suffirait à nous convaincre que partout, le dynamisme, l'ampleur et l'importance de la société civile sont en progression — alors même que le docteur Salamon le souligne aussi, «un recul... de multiples formes plus traditionnelles de participation, telles que l'exercice du droit de vote, l'identification à un parti politique et l'adhésion à un syndicat». Le docteur Salamon signale «une évolution encore plus spectaculaire». J'ai moi-même en l'occasion de constater l'importance de la société civile en Afrique, particulièrement dans les pays à parti unique. Au Zimbabwe, alors que je recherchais des organismes bénévoles à qui apporter une aide dans l'apprêt-independance, je rencontre d'abord le Ministre du travail et des affaires sociales. «Pour quoi ne pas nous donner l'argent à nous?» me dit-il. «C'est nous qui gouvernons ici, c'est nous qui faisons tout:». Cet homme fut par la suite emprisonné pour corruption; quoi qu'il en soit, il me fallut lui expliquer nos objectifs en des termes adaptés à sa vision du monde. «Ce que nous voulons, répondit-il, c'est encourager la population à agir de concert dans le but d'aider les citoyens à être plus actifs». Il a par exemple constaté en 1982 qu'aux États-Unis, 65 % des organismes bénévoles avaient été créés depuis 1960. Il, en France, terre d'élection des associations et bastion de la notion de solidarité, les associations se constituaient au rythme de 10 à 12 000 par an en 1960; or au cours de la seule année 1987, plus de 54 000 ont vu le jour. En Grande-Bretagne, quelque 4 000 organisations philanthropiques sont créées chaque année; entre 1980 et 1986, elles ont vu leurs recettes augmenter de 220 % — il est vrai que leurs recettes brutes totales ont peut-être diminué un peu depuis. Une progression comparable est décelable dans d'autres pays d'Europe occidentale. 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sont celles du droit romain ou civil, surtout appliquées sur le continent européen, et la common law, qui s'est étendue à l'ensemble du monde anglo-saxon. Les Anglais ne sont jamais parvenus à conquérir l'Ecosse, où les deux systèmes sont plus ou moins imbriqués, puisque le droit écossais dérive encore du droit romain mais que les pratiques administratives britanniques, en vigueur dans tout le royaume depuis l'unification de 1707, découlent de la tradition anglo-saxonne. Dans les îles britanniques, la tradition anglo-saxonne est en honneur en Angleterre, au Pays de Galles et en Irlande ; mais elle a aussi gagné les États-Unis et l'ensemble du Commonwealth, si bien qu'on la retrouve au sein de la majorité des pays francophones.

L'une et l'autre, ces deux grandes traditions non seulement incarnent, mais permettent même d'identifier, la société civile. On pourrait parfois aller jusqu'à les percevoir comme rivales à cet égard ; mais il est préférable de les considérer comme irremplaçables dans le contexte qui leur est propre, et de conclure que c'est seulement lorsque l'on les prend ensemble — y compris dans leurs incompatibilités — que l'on peut vraiment comprendre ce qu'est la société civile.

Pour mettre en évidence les différences et les complémentarités entre ces deux traditions, j'évoquerai tout d'abord la notion anglo-saxonne de fiducie (trust). Selon certains, cette notion trouve son origine à l'époque des croisades. Lorsqu'un homme songeait à partir en croisade et envisageait par conséquent d'être absent pendant plusieurs années, il confiait ses biens et ses responsabilités à un voisin ou un parent restant sur place. Afin de s'acquitter de ces responsabilités, ce dernier se voyait conférer la pleine propriété des biens et la faculté d'exercer les mêmes pouvoirs sur les biens et les personnes à lui confiés que le croisé aurait lui-même exercé s'il était resté sur place. Pour avoir acquis ces responsabilités, ce dernier se voyait conférer la pleine propriété des biens et la faculté d'exercer les mêmes pouvoirs sur les biens et les personnes à lui confiés que le croisé aurait lui-même exercé s'il était resté sur place. Ce droit de propriété et ces pouvoirs étaient censés s'exercer de manière totalement désintéressée, dans l'intérêt exclusif du propriétaire absent, des personnes à sa charge et de ses affaires, sans que celui qui en faisait usage en sorte d'obtenir un quelconque profit. Que ce soit véritablement ou non l'origine de cette notion (le point est encore débattu), nous avons là un modèle historique parfait pour la comprendre. Elle a été étendue à ceux qui étaient chargés de faire respecter les volontés des défunt et ainsi à certaines situations commerciales. C'est un facteur qui contribue encore au succès de Londres en tant que place financière et commerciale, et l'on tente actuellement d'introduire un concept analogique sur les marchés financiers français.

C'est à partir de ce concept de fiducie que la notion anglaise d'œuvre philanthropique (charity) a gagné en ampleur et en importance. À l'époque des Tudors, les hommes qui avaient fait fortune dans les grandes entreprises commerciales de la fin du 16e siècle voulaient mettre en place une sorte de fiducie charitable d'un nouveau genre : la reine Elizabeth I s'efforçait de favoriser ces initiatives. Des fiducies éthiques et fonds destinés aux pauvres donnaient alors lieu à de nombreux abus. Si la misère n'était pas soulignée grâce aux fonds qui avaient été institués à cette fin, les pauvres risquaient de se révolter — et une série de mauvaises récoltes dans les années 1590 avait aggravé ce danger. De plus, c'était une époque de sécularisation, dans la période qui avait suivi la Réforme, l'autorité et le pouvoir ecclésiastiques avaient été rogés, et il fallait plus de soins que le service public et les services sociaux devaient être assurés par l'Église. La première loi sur les pauvres, qui a été promulguée en 1545, a conféré à l'État la responsabilité de soulager la pauvreté et instauré, pour répondre aux besoins sociaux, un partenariat entre l'État et les citoyens riches, entre fonds publics et contributions bénévoles.

C'est dans ce contexte qu'a été promulguée, sous sa forme définitive, la fameuse loi sur les œuvres de bienfaisance de 1601. Elle avait pour objectif double d'interdire les abus et de définir ce qu'était l'activité de bienfaisance — en d'autres termes, de fixer ce qui relevait de la bienfaisance et ce qui n'en relevait pas. C'est dans cette énumération des œuvres de bienfaisance qu'apparaît la notion vaste et généreuse de bien public : non pas simplement soulager la pauvreté, soigner les malades, marier les jeunes filles pauvres et autres actes charitables qu'on s'attend à voir cités, mais aussi la formation d'apprentis, la construction de ponts, l'entretien des routes et autres tâches entreprises «pour le bien de la collectivité» ainsi que Lord MacNaughten les a décrites par la suite. Les biens dévolus à ces œuvres seraient considérés comme placés dans des fiducies philanthropiques protégées par la loi d'une éventuelle mauvaise gestion, de tout abus et...
de toute ingérence — même de la part de la reine. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, quiconque place de l'argent dans un fond fiduciaire pour un objectif précis peut être assuré que celui-ci ne sera pas détourné et qu'il sera utilisé aux fins spécifiées. Cela n'est pas seulement vrai pour le prospère homme d'affaires de l'époque des Tudor, mais aussi pour le citoyen ordinaire qui verse de l'argent à une œuvre de bienfaisance ou qui entreprend avec d'autres une tâche d'intérêt public. Le droit anglais ne fait aucune différence entre la fondation née de l'initiative d'un homme riche et le denier de la veuve. Ce sont là une tradition et une loi d'importance capitale dans les sociétés anglo-saxonnes. On a pu les négliger, en abuser parfois, ou encore les diluer en mettant trop l'accent sur les avantages fiscaux et pas assez sur le statut juridique; elles n'en restent pas moins un concept juridique et social d'une grande importance pratique et un lien entre les citoyens: dire «It's for charity!», c'est proclamer que ce n'est pas pour moi, que c'est pour le bien commun et que cette contribution personnelle, quelque forme qu'elle revête, sera protégée par une loi séculaire.

Des traditions et lois tout aussi anciennes, tout aussi importantes tant du point de vue théorique que du point de vue des échanges quotidiens entre citoyens et des initiatives communautaires, existent ailleurs en Europe et dans le monde, mais sous des formes tellement différentes ! En France et ailleurs sur le continent, l'un des concepts les plus importants est celui d'association. La vie associative est l'un des aspects les plus positifs et les plus séduisants du paysage français qu'il parvient à englober avec la même assurance de l'histoire et des institutions françaises qu'il ignore de propos de l'Angleterre; mais j'y pèse qu'un auditoire tel que celui-ci voudra bien pardonner mes lacunes et prêter l'oreille à mes questions. La révolution de 1789 a aboli la royauté et sécularisé l'État, mais elle a préservé la relation directe qui existait entre l'État et l'individu. Celle-ci subsiste aujourd'hui. Cette relation excluait la création de corps intermédiaires (qui sont un élément essentiel de la vie et de la politique anglo-saxonnes) — de même, paradoxalément, que l'Église protestante se refuse à placer le prêtre entre le croyant et son Dieu. En France, ce n'est qu'en 1901 que l'État a officiellement concédé aux citoyens le droit de s'associer, dans leur intérêt propre et dans celui d'autrui, et de constituer des groupes pouvant se doter d'un statut juridique, agir en toute indépendance au nom de leurs membres et avoir avec l'État des rapports en tant que corps constitués et non en tant qu'individus. La situation ainsi créée est très différente de celle qui existe dans les pays anglo-saxons. Dans ces pays, c'est l'obligation de l'organisation qui détermine son statut juridique et non la forme qu'elle se donne. Si ses buts sont uniquement caritatifs, il n'y a donc qu'œuvres philanthropiques, qu'elle prenne la forme d'une fiducie, d'une association, d'une société de droit privé ou d'un organisme créé par mandat de la Couronne. Mais pour que ses objectifs soient caritatifs, ils doivent être fondamentalement désintéressés, ses mandataires ou ses membres doivent en faire partie non pour leur propre avantage, mais pour le bien commun; l'Association of Long-distance Haulage Contractors (Association des entrepreneurs de transports routiers), créée en toute légitimité pour promouvoir les intérêts de ses membres, ne saurait relever de cette catégorie. Or une telle distinction est indispensable dans la tradition en honneur sur le continent. Les associations sont précisément conçues pour «défendre des intérêts particuliers, qu'il s'agisse de ceux de leurs membres ou de ceux d'autrui. La Fédération routière internationale est bel et bien reconnue comme une organisation non gouvernementale internationale dotée du statut consultatif auprès du Conseil de l'Europe, au même titre que la Conférence des Églises européennes, Caritas, Amnesty International et Interphil. En effet les associations, tout comme les coopératives et les organisations financières mutuelles, relèvent de l'économie sociale, large concept qui rassemble toutes les entités n'agissant ni sous la houlette de l'État, ni dans le but d'en retirer des avantages personnels, mais à des fins de soutien mutuel, d'initiatives communes et d'intérêt collectif. Ainsi donc, dans la tradition du droit romain, les associations font partie intégrante de la vie politique alors que les organismes philanthropiques anglo-saxons sont explicitement tenus de ne pas avoir d'objectifs politiques. Les anglo-saxons se défient de l'idéologie et ne veulent pas que leurs organisations politiques se déguisent en œuvres de bienfaisance. Sur le continent, on ne comprend pas cette distinction. Au Conseil de l'Europe, c'est précisément à l'organe politique qu'est l'Assemblée parlementaire, par l'Intermédiaire de la Direction.
des affaires politiques, que sont rattachées les organisations non gouvernementales internationales qui, comme il est d'usage, se réunissent cette semaine en même temps que l'Assemblée parlementaire afin de débattre d'objectifs politiques généraux aussi bien que particuliers. Dans la tradition de la common law, tout objectif politique est explicitement banni — mais qu'il me soit permis de corriger d'emblée un malentendu fort répandu : en droit anglais, les organismes philanthropiques ne sont en aucun cas écartés de l'action politique en tant que telle. Mais leur activité politique doit manifestement servir leurs objectifs altruistes, elle ne doit être subordonnée à aucun parti et elle ne doit pas prendre une telle ampleur qu'elle domine effectivement l'organisation. Je me souviens d'une manifestation organisée par Shelter, l'organisation nationale des sans-logis, devant le 10 Downing Street Mme Thatcher, qui y habitait à l'époque, en fut fort mécontente et, par l'intermédiaire du Ministère de l'intérieur, je fus avisé, en ma qualité de Chief Charity Commissioner, qu'il devait être mis fin à ces actions déplaisantes et déplacées. Les autres commissaires et moi-même statuâmes que les membres de cette organisation avaient agi de manière tout à fait acceptable et étaient restés dans les limites prescrites par la loi ; ils avaient, par tous moyens à leur portée, appelé l'attention sur le triste sort des personnes qu'ils défendaient ; sans cacher les «Maggie déhors, vive Kinnock» — et s'en étaient tenus, ce jour-là, le lendemain et les jours suivant à leur tâche essentielle, qui était de venir directement en aide aux sans-logis — sans cesser bien entendu de conseiller au gouvernement de prendre des mesures pour défendre leurs bénéficiaires dans l'arène publique.

Il en va de même, dans la tradition anglosaxonne, en ce qui concerne les fondations, la loi ne faisant aucune différence entre une fondation et une association philanthropique. Sur le continent, la différence est en revanche marquée. La notion de fondation est encore plus difficile à accepter en France que celle d'association. Tout d'abord, elle est contraire au principe selon lequel les héritiers ne sauraient être privés de leur héritage par un acte qui ne prendra effet qu'après le décès de son auteur. En second lieu, d'après ce que j'ai compris, créer une fondation pour un objectif à caractère public équivaut à usurper une fonction de l'Etat. Avant la révolution, les rois ont toujours contrôlé très étroitement la création des fondations qui, après la révolution, ont purement et simplement été rejetées inextensibles. Ce n'est que depuis peu que la France a commencé à élabore un régime juridique d'ensemble pour les fondations, mais il reste aux pouvoirs publics à préciser les critères de leur constitution et notamment à fixer un seuil financier élevé de manière à en limiter efficacement le nombre. La reine Elizabet I aurait jugé cette démarche contraire au but recherché et d'ailleurs, elle n'est absolument pas universelle dans les pays de droit romain : la Hollande compte une multitude de fondations puissamment soutenues par l'Etat cependant qu'en Allemagne, il existe des liens particulièrement étroits entre les tâches incombant à l'Etat ou au Land, la contribution du secteur bénévole à l'accomplissement de ces tâches et l'indépendance des fondations privées. Il est étonnant de voir à quel point les nouvelles démocraties d'Europe centrale et orientale s'appuient sur ces multiples principes pour faire revivre chez elles la société civile, à partir de leurs propres traditions historiques.

Cela étant, qu'allons-nous faire, à l'échelle européenne, de ces différences et points communs si précieux ? Nul doute que ce que nous
accomplissons sur notre continent aura des effets dans le monde entier, comme c'est toujours le cas lorsque l'on touche à la société civile. Trois tâches difficiles nous attendent : premièrement, nous comprendre mutuellement ; deuxièmement, énoncer les principes sur lesquels devra se fonder la société civile ; troisièmement, contribuer à la renaissance de la société civile dans les nouvelles démocraties d'Europe centrale et orientale. Il m'est impossible d'aborder tous ces aspects cet après-midi, mais je dois dire qu'après la réflexion dérivant dans ces trois domaines. Du moins s'agissant de quelques commentaires sur les projets effectivement constatés jusqu'ici. D'intéressants débats ont eu lieu, des programmes ont été entrepris et il y a eu beaucoup de résultats positifs. Mais s'agissant du cadre juridique ou même de la discussion menée à ce sujet, je ne vois que deux réalisations concrètes : d'une part la Convention européenne sur la reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des organisations internationales non gouvernementales, élaborée au sein du Conseil de l'Europe, et d'autre part le statut des associations européennes, un instrument juridique que prépare actuellement la Commission de Bruxelles.

Le statut élaboré à Bruxelles est assez différent dans sa conception. Son objectif est simple : permettre aux organisations non gouvernementales internationales d'exercer une activité dans d'autres pays. Ouverte à la signature en 1986, elle est entrée en vigueur en 1991. Elle ne peut porter effet que si elle est ratifiée volontairement par les États membres. Sept d'entre eux l'ont signée à ce jour : l'Autriche, la Belgique, la Grèce, le Portugal, le Royaume-Uni, la Suisse et, tout récemment (en novembre dernier), la Slovénie. A cette réserve près, elle est pleinement et immédiatement applicable, sans que les organismes intéressés aient à prendre quelque mesure que ce soit, et ce non seulement dans l'ensemble des pays membres du Conseil, mais dans les autres pays parties à la Convention. Cet instrument se fonde sur une présomption de légitimité et s'appuie sur les législations nationales, sans qu'il y ait besoin de prendre aucune mesure que ce soit, ni dans les législations, ni dans la pratique, la constitution ou la gestion des organisations elles-mêmes.
Mais on est aussi amené à exprimer quelques doutes, voire de graves inquiétudes. Tout d'abord, la façon dont le statut proposé a commencé à être élaboré montre qu'il y a eu confusion entre la fin et les moyens. Lorsque le problème de l'accès au marché unique a été soulevé pour la première fois, une interprétation ou réinterprétation du Traité de Rome a officiellement été proposée, qui tendait à lui faire dire ce qui, manifestement, il ne disait pas. L'expression « organisations sans but lucratif » figurant à l'article 58 du Traité fait manifestement référence au critère des objectifs poursuivis, et l'intention de cette clause est d'exempter ces organisations des contraintes du droit des sociétés. Ce faisant, elle les exclut également des avantages consentis aux sociétés, notamment l'accès au marché unique. En vertu de l'interprétation proposée, l'expression «organisations sans but lucratif» n'aurait plus voulu dire ce qu'elle disait, mais aurait désigné des organisations ne participant pas à l'activité économique; on remplaçait ainsi le critère de l'objectif poursuivi par celui de l'activité déployée et l'on asseytissoit d'un trait de plume une multitude d'associations, d'œuvres philanthropiques et d'organisations bénévoles à toutes les complexités du droit des sociétés, alors qu'elles se considéraient jusqu'alors comme relevant d'une catégorie toute différente. Lorsque l'on se rendit compte que cette interprétation aurait des conséquences imprévues, on envisagea un statut unique pour les coopératives, les mutuelles et les associations. Ayant ensuite conscience qu'un seul statut ne pourrait convenir à des entités aussi différentes, on proposa trois statuts distincts, étant entendu qu'ils seraient promulgués tous ensemble ou pas du tout.

A l'heure actuelle, le projet de statut de associations comporte encore plusieurs dispositions qui conviendraient davantage à des organisations à caractère commercial qu'à des organisations bénévoles œuvrant pour le bien public. Bien qu’inspirée par d’excellentes intentions, je ne crois pas que cette procédure constitue un bon moyen de légiférer dans un domaine aussi délicat, aussi important et où les traditions sont si ancrées dans les diverses sociétés qui composent l’Europe. Mais un motif d’inquiétude encore plus vif surgit si on examine certaines des hypothèses qui sous-tendent ces propositions ainsi que les débats qui ont tout récemment eu lieu au Parlement européen. Il est tout à fait souhaitable de renforcer la confiance placée par le public dans le secteur bénévole, et d’exercer un certain contrôle pour veiller à ce que des critères et normes essentiels soient respectés. J’ignore si les gouvernements ont bien saisi tout ce que suppose cette partie du statut. Mais je sais par l’expérience que qut acquise au Royaume-Uni combien il est difficile de mettre en place et surtout de tenir un registre des organisations dans un secteur aussi fluctuant et divers que la société civile. Mais ce qui me préoccupe ici, c’est la question de savoir qui établira et interprétera ces critères. En Angleterre et au pays de Galles, les critères sont fixés par un droit séculaire qui défend le citoyen et protège ses dons, et ces critères sont interprétés non par les gouvernements, mais par les tribunaux. Ce n'était pas à Margaret Thatcher de décréter si Shelter était une organisation d'utilité nationale; et elle n’a pas pu prendre ni même influencer la décision concernant la question de savoir si les membres de cette organisation avaient agi légitimement en manifestant devant sa porte. Or l’hypothèse qui sous-tend le statut envisagé pour les associations européennes est qu’il appartiendra aux gouvernements et à la Commission des Communautés européennes de décider si les activités que nous déployons dans la sphère publique en tant que personnes privées sont ou non d’intérêt général. Les décisions des pouvoirs publics en la matière sont nécessairement influencées par des considérations politiques immédiates, et c’est la raison pour laquelle je crains pour l’indépendance du secteur bénévole et de la société civile en général. Cette inquiétude n’est apparue encore plus fondée lorsque j’ai pris connaissance d’une recommandation faite lors de la présentation d’une résolution sur les fondations et l’Europe, dont le Parlement est actuellement saisi; selon cette recommandation, certaines fondations pourraient, à la lumière des projets réalisés et de résultats obtenus et après consultation du Parlement, se voir conférer le titre « d’utilité européenne », non à titre permanent mais sous réserve de réévaluations périodiques. Telle qu’elle a pris corps dans sa dernière version en date du 8 décembre dernier, cette proposition s’exprime comme suit: « il conviendrait d’élaborer un code de conduite à l’usage des fondations d’utilité européenne qui permette d’éviter les inconvénients connus des biens de main-mort et des corps intermédiaires, l’accumulation de... »
richesses, et de ce fait de pouvoir, de ta part d'institutions susceptibles d'échapper au contrôle des pouvoirs publics et au jugement d'opinion».

Rien ne saurait mieux illustrer le choc des cultures et la richesse qu'engendré leur multiplicité que ce que nous vivons à ce moment de notre histoire. Il est bien évident que cela ne va pas sans quelques inconvénients, mais on discerne mal qui en pâtira tant que l'on n'a pas rencontré l'expression « institutions susceptibles d'échapper au contrôle des pouvoirs publics». Les citoyens devraient toujours avoir la possibilité d'échapper auxdits pouvoirs publics : c'est précisément la raison d'être de la société civile. Aussi bienveillants que soient nos maîtres, nous avons besoin de préserver notre autonomie d'action.

Il n'en est pas moins vrai que ces propositions sont présentées dans un esprit de solidarité et d'initiative commune impeccablement européen, et qu'elles ont pour but de renforcer le statut et l'efficacité des fondations en particulier et de la société civile en général; les motifs et la légitimité de leurs auteurs sont au-dessus de tout soupçon, et il faut espérer que leurs objectifs seront atteints. Mais cela ne doit pas nous empêcher de voir que les autorités sont en train de prendre des décisions et de passer des jugements qui sont en réalité la prérogative des citoyens. Ce n'est pas aux politiciens et bureaucrates du moment de décider de ce qui est de notre intérêt en tant que citoyens, c'est à vous et moi de choisir, en nous fiant à nos propres jugements et perceptions et par référence à des critères plus profondément enracinés et beaucoup plus anciens que les modes et exigences du jour, même formulees de la manière la plus idéalist; dans l'immédiate il est regrettable, aussi que le professeur Merle l'a souligné, « que l'Europe, terre d'élection du mouvement associatif, ait été source de pouvoir se situant hors du champ de l'Etat. Il parlait de la création d'un réseau d'institutions et d'organisations autonomes dotées non pas d'un seul mais d'une multitude de centres et par conséquent peu vulnérable aux attaques d'une force unique se présentant sous la forme d'un gouvernement ou d'un parti. » En un sens, ajoutait-il, la société civile se suffit à elle-même. Elle n'a apparemment pas besoin d'Etat. Ces perspectives nous donnent fort de la conception de l'Etat, et de l'individu dans ses rapports avec l'Etat, qui est en honneur en France, et j'hésite à les évoquer devant vous; mais il faut bien en parler si l'on veut atteindre le premier des objectifs que j'ai cités, à savoir la compréhension mutuelle.

C'est sur cette pensée que je m'arête; j'espère vous laisser dans un état d'incertitude et d'expectative, décidés à vous battre pour les principes qui fonderont une société civile florissante et vigilants à l'égard des puissances qui pourraient lui porter atteinte.

Si seulement Henri de Koster était parmi nous aujourd'hui pour débattre de ces questions et nous aider à y voir plus clair dans le labyrinthe de nos pensées et de nos expériences ! Mais j'espère que ce modeste exposé aura un peu servi à honorer et à garder présent dans notre mémoire le souvenir d'un homme remarquable et d'un grand Européen, et à préserver chez ceux qui lui survivent un peu de cette capacité de réflexion et d'action qui ont fait de sa vie cette œuvre puissante, efficace et bonne.

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Globalisation, civil society, solidarity *

(Part II)

by Peter Waterman

4. Global solidarity as ethic

Here I want to deal, in particular, with the ethics of international solidarity in the era of globalisation. My initial position here is neatly expressed by Collier (1992:87):

«The whole planet has become a shared world, even for those who never leave their village. Thus, a tie which is both real and universal has arrived; not yet in the form of a real collectivity embracing humankind, but of real relations of mutual dependence through the sharing of the world; and it is from just such relations... that values and obligations arise.»

An understanding of a contemporary solidarity ethic requires, first, however, a consideration of the historical problems towards developing such.

4.1. Socio-historical problem

Solidarity, it has been somewhere said by Rajni Kohli, is the forgotten term in the Western trinity. Reference here is to the holy-trinity - if not holy - trinity of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. It was a 19th-century French social revolutionary, Pierre Leroux, who gave quasi-religious force to 'solidarity' as the doctrine that would unite it (Billington 1980:312). Yet, 'fraternity' came to the fore. For the apparent cosmopolitan and non-sexist brotherhood of blood and battle (57-71). Even Pierre Leroux, who gave quasi-religious force to solidarity, had, by the late-19th century, increasingly to refer to a national and statist solidarity ethic that values and obligations arise. This was the state-defined nation or bloc. The wars over the Malvinas/Falklands, the Persian Gulf; in East Europe and Central Asia, show this to be a continuing reality.

It is because, however, many of these conditions are also changing that it is today at least possible to conceive of ties both universal and real. But the conceiving or reconceiving of such is problematic also.

4.2. Philosophical problems

One major contemporary philosophical challenge here is the widespread current condemnation of 'foundationalism,' 'totalisation,' 'universalism,' 'essentialism,' 'rationalism' and, any 'grand narratives' that offer universal statements of reality, value and obligation, based on initial assumptions or arguments about the universe, nature, man, society, etc. Such grand narratives are those that have descended from Judaism and Christianity, from the European Enlightenment, Liberalism and Socialism - the sources of most internationalist doctrine. They are suspect for presenting a particular 'story' as general truth, and for imposing this truth on others (and an always excluded outsider or enemy - the Other). There are 'right' and 'left' versions of such criticism, sometimes directly.

* The first part of this study appeared in Praemun-ri International Review, 2:1994.

1 Billington (1980:312) misleadingly suggests that Pierre Leroux 'coined the word solidarity'. This despite his own reference to Hayward (1959) who reveals its presence in pre-Revolutionary French jurisprudence and suggests its basis in Roman and Greek law. Hayward, on the other hand, attributes the use of the French 19th-century revolutionary sociology doctrine and practice. This is, however, because of his interest in the origins of solidarism. Solidarism, however, is not to be written off. Solidarismo being a significant national corporate trade-union tendency today at least in some Central American countries.

2 Which explains the popularity and ease with which the ethos of international collaboration of World War II years was repudiated into its opposite. The international collaboration was largely an echo of the wartime alliance of states against Nazi Germany. Once this broke up, the traditional ideological conflict between the Western unions (and even between the American and European unions) again came to the fore. For ideologically inscriptions to this period see (Koch-Brugmann 1988: MacShane 1992, Weber 1988).
On the right we can find criticism that is both more forthright and more extreme. I am thinking in particular of the position of Richard Rorty, which has the advantage (for us) of directly posing local 'solidarities' and Western 'cosmopolitanism' against - respectively - universalist notions of common humanity and 'emancipation'. Considering solidarity, Rorty argues that those Europeans who hid Jews from the Nazis during World War Two did not primarily do so on the universalist humanist grounds that they were 'fellow human beings' (Rorty 1989:190) but for more parochial reasons - that the helpers shared some more local, real or direct identity with those they aided. He likewise argues that it is more politically and morally persuasive to urge attention to the misery of American blacks because they are 'our fellow human beings'. The point is that our sense of solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed are thought of as 'one of us', where 'us' means something smaller and more local than the human race. (1989:191)

As far as cosmopolitanism is concerned, Rorty evidently considers that it is represented in and by the West, requires extending, and that it implies that the 'pre-literate native' (1991:218) should be invited to accept the political institutions and philosophical language of the West. For a dialogue to occur does not - as humanist universalists may suggest - first require the emancipation of said non-Western natives. And whilst the West should remain open to new information and values that might come from such contact, this does not imply any abandonment of Western values or discourse procedures. In Rorty's own particular words:

"We cannot leap outside out Western social-democratic skins when we encounter another culture, and we should not try [...] for there is no supercultural observation platform to which we might repair [... We] want narratives of increasing cosmopolitanism, though not narratives of emancipation. For we think that there was nothing to emancipate [...] There is no human nature which was once, or still is, in chains." (212-3)

It would be easy to dismiss this argument as representing the self-satisfaction and self-interest of those rich white American males satisfied by novelist Tom Wolfe (1989) as 'the masters of the universe'. It would be little more difficult to point out the literally amoral and self-contradictory nature of its logic. Yet not to research its empirical assertions, given that many (most?) Europeans and US whites may have well defined their anti-racist activities precisely in abstract humanitarian terms - religious or humanist! I prefer, however, to take Rorty's statement as presenting, in philosophical terms, the attitudes of many of the 'slaves of the universe' also, at least where and when traditional religious, secular or socialist universalism and humanism loses out to the ethics of national, ethnic, religious, class, familial or individual self-interest. I also recognise it as presenting, in extreme form, lines of argument that are either shared by left post-modernists or adjusted to by them. In so far, in other words, as the arguments of Rorty undermine, or provide vapid evidence of the failure of, the old logical, ethical or social grounds for international solidarity, we need to provide new ones. I propose to do this by considering in turn the grounds
...morphology, and to allow these others a place in philosophical conversation. At the same time, however, she notes that in insisting that these others respect the rules of such conversation, she concludes that despite its appearance of allowing space for many voices in the conversation, the effect of this idea is to stifle back in the Western nation-state, as well as its productiveness in particular. Collier recognises that Marxists have tended to argue for an ethical universalism either despite or as the self-interest of the working class. He is concerned to escape the horns of this dilemma for the contemporary Marxist universalist: that is, of appearing either as a 'shameless collective egoist' (76). He does so on the basis of what he calls Marx's relational ontology. For Marx, he argues, society is not a collection of individuals, a group or organism, but a network.

-Such a network - 'society' - is not a count-noun. It does not make sense to ask how many societies there are in the world - nor is there only one society. There is society - not societies or a society. Society is an open-textured network, which can be divided in various ways for the purposes of description and analysis, but these divisions are always more or less artificial. (82)

The ethical implications of this understanding are that it is the lattice of all the relationships within which one is ensnared that are the source of values and responsibilities. Relating to others is to be understood not so much as something we do as what we are. Collier's position, again, would seem to allow us to see that in so far as global society exists, it provides a source of values and responsibilities to be weighed against those coming from membership of a nation-state, class, ethnic group, etc. It is, for Collier, the worlds we share with others that provide the social basis for morality. Whereas existence in the world of the market...
may push us in the direction of individualism and egoism (or to splitting and opposing ego-
ism and altruism); we also exist in other social worlds, which allow us to be moved by the
needs of significant others.

Collin's next move is a historical one. He argues that in 1600 there were only mini-
mal relations between the peoples of England and India, and that this therefore provided an
equally minimal basis for any sense of mutual obligation. But today even those who live in
villages exist in one shared capitalist world:

-Emancipation from the world market can only be achieved by sharing in the collective
power of humankind over planetary resources, and so passing from a universal tie which is only that of interdependence, to one
that is also one of joint management of that interdependence, collective self-direction. This
is made much the more urgent by the second, ecological aspect of the shared world...» (87)

Convincing as we might find this argument, attractive as we might find the vision
offered, we have to recognise, with Rorty, that we cannot leap outside our Western liberal,
bourgeois, social-democratic (read: Marxist, feminist) skins when enunciating our new uni-
versalism, and that there is, indeed, no super-
cultural observation platform from which to
enunciate it. We have to also reassure Alain
Lipietz that we are not visiting another Euro-
porean universalism on the world. This requires
us to recognise: 1) that there are others who
(having failed to read Rorty) still feel they need
emancipation; 2) that a condition for concep-
tualising and creating global solidarity is glo-
bal dialogue between ourselves and 'ourothers';
and 3) that such a dialogue implies relevant
procedures.

From emancipation to emancipations
and back. If a contemporary cosmopolitanism
is to mean more than an invitation from Rorty
to mount his mono-cultural observation plat-
form, we must recognise that it belongs to
those who are, or feel, emancipated. And there-
fore allow for those who still feel a need for
such. It is possible to do this without repeating
traditional myths about an original condition
of freedom, an essential human nature, homogenous human needs and desires, or a
future condition of perfect freedom. We can do
this by reconnecting Liberty (emancipation)
with Equality and Solidarity, in other words, by
connecting it with conditions that allow others
to emancipate themselves.

In a discussion of modern and post-mod-
ern understandings of emancipation, Jan Ned-
eerveen Pieterse (1992c) argues that the latter
highlights autonomy as aim, the network as
preferred organisational form, and self-limita-
tion as a mentality. The problem is, he says,
that such a minimum definition of emancipa-
tion can match that of chauvinism, fundamen-
talisms and other particularisms: «emancipa-
tion, by such groups, may therefore appear no
different (to the rest of us?) than a change of
elite. This suggests, for Nederveen Pieterse,
the necessity for a contemporary articulation of
emancipation with 1) a 'democratic universa-
lism' or 'radical democracy' (he is here citing
Ernesto Laclau), and 2) some general notion of
human emancipation:

-It follows that emancipations plural
must in some fashion refer to emancipation in a
general sense: not every process of empower-
ment is emancipatory. A working definition... is that emancipation refers to collective actions
which seek to level and disperse power, or seek to
install more inclusive values than the pre-
vailing ones.» (32)

The way to avoid this implying a dis-
guised return to a singular and totalising eman-
cipation is to recognise that the development of
a general sense of emancipation requires a cer-
tain attitude toward, and dialogue with, others.

The needs and voices of others. Nancy
Fraser (1986) is interested in 'a discourse ethic
of solidarity', which she also characterises as an
ethic of discourse for social movements. She
points out that means of interpretation and
communication (vocabularies for pressing
claims, the idioms for communicating needs,
the narrative conventions for constructing individual and collective histories, the paradigms of argument considered authoritative for judging competing claims, etc) cannot be value-neutral. These means of interpretation tend to express the experiences, interests and self-images of dominant social groups. In the case of the West the dominant vocabularies constitute people as rational, self-interested individuals, engaged in exchange with others in utility-maximising relationships. Such a standpoint is characteristically that of white European male bourgeois property owners. She argues that this vocabulary can hardly express relationships of ongoing dependency, such as that of mother and child, nor account for such experiences and feelings of connection as exist in ‘more extended networks of community and solidarity’, as are to be customarily found in the subcultures of the subordinated. The latter are going to be hindered from participating on equal terms with the dominant groups in communicative interaction:

«Unless they were to contest this situation and organise to win a greater measure of collective control over the means of interpretation and communication, it would appear that members of subordinated groups would have only two options: they could either adopt the dominant point of view and see their own experiences repressed and distorted; or they could develop idiolects capable of voicing their experience and see these marginalised, disqualified and excluded from the central discursive institutions and arenas of society. Or they could do both at once.» (Fraser 1986:426)

Given this situation, and assuming there is a desire to surpass it, what is necessary is the replacement of a ‘monological ethic’ by a ‘discourse or dialogical ethic’. The latter implies: recognition of the unequal relationship to the dominant means of interpretation; making such means themselves a matter of negotiation; and allowing the subordinated to propose alternatives to such. Fraser here provides an effective critique of, and alternative to, precisely such a monological ethic as that represented by Rorty. And, for that matter, her argument suggests how, globally, one could avoid any left-wing Rortyism.

Fraser goes further, proposing not only a form of discourse but a content for it - a solidarity ethic. And, whilst she develops her argument in relationship to the women’s movement, she herself argues that it is equally appropriate to other social movements of the subordinated or excluded. She also considers it necessary to avoid basing her ethic on either the ‘individual’ or ‘humanity’:

«Here one would abstract both from unique individuality and from universal humanity to focalise the intermediate zone of group identity. The most general ethical force of this orientation would be something like this: we owe each other behaviour such that each is confirmed as a being with specific collective identifications and solidarities. The norms governing these interactions would be norms of collective solidarities expressed in shared but non-universal social practices.» (428)

The reference here to group identity and shared practices provides a further defence against universalistic and humanistic moralising.

Supposing we are agreed that: 1) globalisation processes provide the ground for a realistic contemporary universalism; 2) this is understood as related to specific emancipatory projects of a democratic orientation; 3) this requires both principles of solidarity and procedures for the development of such. At least two moves are still necessary. One is to turn these general philosophical principles into political statements. The other is to specify them in a manner relevant to potential collective actors of a quite specific nature - for example, semi-skilled white male factory workers in industrialised capitalist democracies.

4.3. Political problems

The question that arises here is of how a movement from an old understanding of inter-
nationalisation (as in Waterman 1988) to the new one of globalisation might influence an understanding of solidarity.

Perhaps I can demonstrate this by responding to recent Marxist writing that directly or indirectly addresses questions of international solidarity. One such is that referred to above, by Andrew Collier (1992) on ‘Marxism and universalism’. The second is that of Stuart Corbridge (1991), who is concerned with the claims of distant strangers. That of Collier is quite classically Marxist (though explicitly non-teleological in nature), that of Corbridge is explicitly ‘post-Marxist’. That of Collier is explicitly addressed to the working class; that of Corbridge is not. That of Collier is implicitly dependent upon imperialism theory; that of Corbridge is aware of and open to the globalisation model of Giddens. Yet both present the issue of ethical universalism and global responsibility solely in terms of North and South, as if this were the only relevant axis, as if universalism were primarily a responsibility, and as if it were so only for the North. Despite, in other words, sensitivity to internationalisation processes, and considerable originality in their handling of ethical universalism, such arguments are restricted by traditional liberal, humanist or Marxist assumptions. Sometimes it is, indeed, difficult to identify which of these discourses is the disabling one. This difficulty is, no doubt, due to the extent to which dependency theory itself incorporates traditional Western political and religious dualities (rich v. poor, guilt v. innocence; the West v. the Rest), and the extent to which it has fed back into the dominant Western - increasingly the dominant global - discourses opposing North and South. Let me respond to Collier’s argument, since this is, in large part, an old internationalisation discourse that has landed Collier back on the horns of binary oppositions from which he initially appeared to have escaped. He is here assuming the real-universal contradiction. And this leads him to also reproduce the moralistic attitude Western socialists have traditionally had toward Western workers. It is, significantly, a common, longstanding - and no doubt global - attitude of the moral middle-class towards the material poor.7

Our previous analysis of globalisation enables us to see the position of workers rather differently. In the first place, we can see globalisation as a multi-faceted, multi-levelled and multi-directional process, affecting all people in all parts of the world, although evidently in different ways and with different effects. One crucial aspect is, as we have seen, that of the changing and moving nature of work internationally, this creating highly changeable, differentiated and interdependent working classes. Workers in the West are less secure and less homogeneous than they have been for many decades. But this can also mean less isolated from workers in other countries, or from other local social identities and concerns. Struggle against the effects of globalisation is, as we have seen, something confronting women, ethnic

7 There are other limiting assumptions in Collier’s paper. One is the archaic assumption that ‘counter-revolutionary class locations’ apply to ordinary workers in neo-imperialist countries - rather than to middle-class wage-earners like himself (see Wright 1976:37). A last one is that he, as author, does not form part of the same analytical and ethical tradition. Projecting himself, in traditional bourgeois academic fashion, as a disembodied intelligence and the articulator of an advanced morality, these are all reproachable shortcomings, but not fatal ones. I live in hope that critics will say the same of shortcomings of mine.)
minorities, socialists, and people in the South and East as well as the West. In so far as the worker has other identities, interests and aspirations (as she always has had) - as urban resident, as churchgoer, as gay, as species being - these are also being challenged by globalisation. In other words, the real and inevitably particular worlds of workers are increasingly invaded/interconnected/interdependent.

The need for solidarity in this globalised world does not, furthermore, have to primarily confront the Western worker as a moral responsibility. I mean this in several senses. In the first place, since the worker is no longer conceived of as the privileged revolutionary subject she cannot be conceived of as having a primary moral responsibility for internationalism. Recognition of this can reduce tension. In the second place, in so far as interdependency is a global condition, any appeal to such a responsibility must be addressed to workers and labour movements also in the non-West (although the nature of the appeal would have to be relevant to the local experience and possibilities). This can also reduce the moral demands on and expectations of Western workers and movements. In the third place, in so far as we recognise that globalisation is equally a condition and a recognition, appeals to workers from above or outside (and these will continue) can be increasingly expressed in terms of stimulating worker self-activity, exploration, imagination and creativity. Global solidarity can thus be increasingly expressed in terms of stimulating worker self-activity, exploration, imagination and creativity. Global solidarity can thus be increasingly expressed in terms of stimulating worker self-activity, exploration, imagination and creativity.

5. Conclusions: for internationalist intellectuals

Putting myself within my subject matter is not done for the sake of either self-praise or self-flagellation. It is certainly done for the sake of a personal stock-taking. And it is also done in the spirit of Giddens’ specification of the appropriate disposition in the face of globalisation - that of ‘radical engagement’ (2.3 above). In view of some criticism of Giddens’ failure to demonstrate the basis of or political implications of his argument, I have found a recent collection on US psychologists’ responses to global challenges (Staub and Green 1992) both enlightening and encouraging. It reads almost as if it were a direct response to Giddens. But it is the more hope-giving because this is not the case. The work rather represents the response of socially-committed professionals to the world of global risk, to a world in which there is (thanks to nuclear weapons, ecological and other threats) no Other. The need, one contributor argues, is to move humanity from a genocidal to a species mentality. He does not so much preach this as practice it. He reveals that this move is, in our globalised world, not so much a moral requirement as a practical need. He suggests that one can become a species being without abandoning one’s local or personal identities (Staub and Green 1992:26-7). Another contributor recognises the contribution that non-Western - in this case Buddhist - psychology can make to overcoming the negative or ineffective attitudes to global threats (68-9) - what Giddens would call ‘pragmatic acceptance’, ‘cynical pessimism’ and ‘sustained optimism’. I find that this work not only enables me to feel less isolated in my own efforts but also suggest how intellectuals in other fields and other countries could respond to the threats (and, indeed, promises) of globalisation. But now to the matter of how I have tried to do this.

The case to which I will refer is that of international labour communication in Peru, a study I carried out, with the assistance of a Peruvian colleague, in 1986 (Waterman and Arellano 1986, Waterman 1992). This was an exploratory study of the ‘transmission and reception’ of international labour information, carried out between other preoccupations, during a seven-week period, and with minimal conceptual and methodological means. The
study nonetheless came up with quite surprising findings. for my Peruvian colleagues as well as myself. One was on the transmission side: the dramatic drop in the amount and breadth of international (and international labour) coverage in the pro-labour press in Peru in 1986, compared with Labor, a famed labour paper produced in Lima in 1928-9. Another was on the reception side: the nonetheless extensive and varied knowledges, amongst workers and union officers, of labour and unions in South, West and East, their varied sympathies for these, and their definite interest in more information concerning the daily-life issues facing workers and unions abroad. A third was on the relationship between the information transmitters and the information receivers, since the expressed interests of the workers and unionists were hardly addressed by the local socialist media. One of the conclusions of the initial report was subtitled, 'towards a collective worker knowledge on international labour':

«We have not concealed our own values in this piece, nor our particular sympathies. But we do not wish to repeat a traditional socialist procedure which implies that our particular knowledge and values are superior to those we have interviewed. We would rather consider that they are different, coming from people of another class, with a different training, background, technical qualifications, life changes, interests ... What the findings prompt us as my paper to recognise a potential collective worker consciousness on international issues in Peru. It would be difficult, on the basis of the evidence, to argue that a collective worker consciousness already exists here. We have seen a variety of knowledges and attitudes and interests between and within unions. But this individualised or small-group awareness represents, it seems to us, an unused resource, a potential that once released - or, rather, collected - might develop its own dynamic. It is, surely, in facilitating such a development, rather than as permanent intermediaries and interpreters that professionals can best contribute to a new labour internationalism.» (Waterman and Arrelano 1986:49)

So much for a case, the political conclusions of which seem broadly compatible with the ethic specified above.

But what of the experience? This is one that makes me: 1) realise my privilege in gathering international information and developing solidarity ideas; 2) aware of my responsibility for making these available to others, and taking relevant solidarity action; and 3) conscious of my need for much more intensive dialogue with not only those I was directly studying but also relevant others.

Let us start with privilege. I could not get funding for this project from my Institute and thus had to pay my own way (using my vacation allowance), and take advantage of the generous invitations and hospitality of Peruvian friends and colleagues. For me this was a voyage of discovery and self-discovery, as painful and frustrating in some ways as it was stimulating and fruitful in others. Being in Peru gave me the possibility and necessity of improving my meagre knowledge of Spanish. It required me to develop some familiarity with Peruvian history and society. I came into contact with the Peruvian trade-union movement, with Peru's extensive network of NGOs, its socialist and feminist intelligentsia. I was introduced to the Jose Carlos Mariategui (1894-1930), the 'Peruvian Gramsci', editor of Labor, with his Marxist ideas on proletarian internationalism and his cosmopolitan insights into internationalisation and communication. I first heard of Flora Tristan, in her two emanations - as an early-19th century French-Peruvian socialist, feminist and internationalist, and as the name of a major Peruvian feminist NGO, deeply involved in global networks of interdependency and solidarity. The research report was published in The Netherlands and Peru. These presumably confirmed or advanced my privileged position as an academic specialist on international labour communication.

What of responsibility? I had hoped that the findings would be fed back into some kind of participatory action research project in Peru, but this was not to be, and I doubt whether
many, if any, of those I studied have had access to the Peruvian research report. On the other hand, I did eventually manage to feed ideas developed during this research into an article on the new labour internationalism, published in the South African Labour Bulletin (SALB) (Waterman 1991). Since these ideas were challenging both to the South African unions (with which SALB is intimately connected), since the journal is widely read in South Africa and widely respected internationally, and since putting them in a relevant form and getting them published required considerable effort on my part, this is something in which I take some pride. I was also pleased to be able to introduce the South African labour movement to Mariategui, and to present them to him not as Saint Jose Carlos but - historically - as someone also a prisoner of his international insights. Then, in early 1992, Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) Maoist fundamentalists assassinated Maria-Elena Moyano, Peru's best-known 'popular feminist', Deputy Mayor of Lima's largest squatter settlement, Villa El Salvador. And, in late 1992, they assassinated Pedro Huilca, General Secretary of one of Peru's largest union federations, the CGTP. 9

Beyond feelings of immense regret, rage and frustration there now arose questions of the relevance of my ideas on a collectively-developed labour internationalism: 1) to a country so isolated by globalisation (yes, this is included in the model), so turned in on itself; 2) of which the legal left is still seeking nationalist solutions to problems shared by near neighbours and distant strangers; 3) of which the powerful terrorist left evidently considers its isolation from any significant movements at home and abroad as demonstrating its unique role as a source of the coming revolution, first national then international. Well, I have to conclude that, whatever the relevance of my ideas to the new global solidarity in general, they have little or none to Peru. Which is evidently why, in 1986, no one was interested in collaborating in the longterm research-action project I was proposing. It was no less Zukunftsmusik (music of the future) than Collier's appeal to the British proletariat to realise its need for universal human emancipation through common ownership of everything.

So let us, lastly, consider my needs as revealed by this case: that is the needs of an academic specialist on internationalism who is also an internationalist academic. I need, in the first place, a broader and deeper understanding of specific societies, their social forces, their particular experience of the old internationalisation and the new globalisation, their (potentially) internationalist activists, their (hypothetically) internationalist masses. It is this last information I most need, given that I am most interested in the problem of facilitating the global solidarity awareness and activity of these. Here the circle is complete - although one would like to hope for a virtuous spiral rather than a vicious circle. For I cannot myself take relevant action, not propose such to workers, unless and until they are willing and able to express themselves.

All this implies the necessity, also, for a research-action methodology relevant to the development of the new global solidarity. But I feel I have fulfilled one responsibility by writing this paper. The rest must be left for later - or for others.
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NGOs State Relationship in East Africa: Development Versus Sovereignty

by Hamid Osman Ahmed

Research Problem

The task undertaken by foreign Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the developmental process in Africa is highly significant, in the face of an ever increasing degree of underdevelopment (politically, economically, socially, environmentally and so on).

The NGOs as private and popular agencies, are on the demand (and will remain so for a long time to come) in East Africa, where official aid from the developed countries is on the decline. Their activities involve a number of development aspects (relief, health, education) and in certain cases (e.g. Somalia) their presence is essential for the survival of the whole community. Research on NGOs, therefore, is important as well as useful.

The theme of this research is the relationship between the foreign NGOs and the national state in East Africa, with special reference to the Sudan. A survey of previous studies showed that little work has been carried out on this particular aspect of the NGOs. The main emphasis is on the social and organizational aspects not the political ones (Adams, 1989; Ahmed, 1989; Drabek, 1987; Walker, 1987; and Whittington, 1988). There is always a strong tendency to confine research to the level of province or district, away from the central government (Abdel Ati, 1991; Adam, 1989; Adams, 1989; Ahmed, 1989; Ayers, 1987; Herson, 1989; Mustafa, 1985; and Wensley, 1988). Therefore this research may fill a gap in the existing literature on the subject. By itself, however, this is not a satisfactory promise. Let us, then, turn to identify the research problem, stating the main research questions, including the general theoretical framework within which questions are asked, and the main variables to be investigated.

The presence of foreign voluntary agencies and NGOs in East Africa is not a new phenomenon. It goes back to the time when colonial powers expanded their rule to the region. The desire to spread religious teachings was behind the introduction of the early voluntary work in the region. For example, the first foreign voluntary agency to come to the Sudan, in 1904, was the Protestant Church Mission. Though their initial intention was religious, the agencies soon actively engaged themselves in a number of social services to the local community.

At this stage, however, voluntary agencies posed no serious problems to the ruling authorities of the colonial powers, namely due to the inherited understanding between the two parties. The activities of the agencies, moreover, were extremely limited.

Limited or otherwise, the activities of the foreign voluntary agencies began to face completely new type of problems following decolonization and the emergence of the national state. To the nationalist elite, now in command of the state machine, foreign voluntary work is a form of interference in internal affairs and a “fifth column” of leaving colonial force. In Sudan, only three years after independence, i.e. in 1959, the military regime expelled the voluntary agencies working in the country.

By the 1970s, however, the need for strong presence of the non-governmental organizations in Africa, especially in East Africa, became apparent. The national state failed to fulfill a comprehensive model of development that would meet the moral and material needs of the people. Civil wars, inter-state conflicts, political repression, drought and famine caused huge problems that the national state would not solve without external assistance. For example in Sudan, following the announcement of famine in 1984/85 the country started to receive an increasing number of NGOs (reaching over 100 in 1988), with varying sizes, different philosophies, objectives and types of programmes.

As the size and scope of work has become bigger and bigger and more and more complex, shifting from emergency to development, the relationship between NGOs and the national state becomes tense and strained. The question for the national state is no longer, as it was during 1960s, a matter of external interference: it is a matter of NGOs taking over the very duties of the state. To the state, the issue of sovereignty (a term generally meaning supremacy, power and influence) is not only the attainment of independence from foreign rule. To the state, NGOs should take into consideration that three areas should be respected as domains of the state. These areas are: central authority, territorial entity, and bureaucracy. As for central authority, NGOs may deal with various segments of society but on the condition that...
the final say rests within the state and not within
its components. All measures are taken to consoli-
date central power, whether in the hands of par-
liament, party, military command or leader. As
for territorial entity, the state claims an exclusive,
sharply defined unit of political territory. Respect
of frontiers, therefore, is essential. As for bureau-
cracy, the national state, having promoted an
already strong state machine left by colonial
powers, makes sure that no other forces would
attempt to complete with it, particularly if these
forces were foreign. In this respect, issues relating
to the army and organs of the central government
are of paramount importance as far as the state is
cconcerned. In short, the state is an adamant ado-
vate of the concept of sovereignty.

In contrast, NGOs are highly critical of the
concept of sovereignty, to them, the above claims
(by the state) are unrealistic and incompatible
with international law. The obligation to assist th e
needy is superior to all other considerations. As
far as NGOs are concerned, they are carrying out
noble work and cooperation from the recipient
state should make itself available. According to a
report by an NGO in 1985, "it soon became clear
that the local relief were not succeeding. Firstly,
the local authorities had no grasp of the severity of
the disaster surrounding them. Few government
officials had the will or ability to travel far outside
their towns. Added to that they did not command
the necessary resources to effectively tackle the
problem" (Walker, 1987, P. 7). Thus, the govern-
ment’s regulations and measures against NGOs
could mean insensitivity, lack of appreciation,
insufficiency or even corruption (Abdel Ati, 1991, P.
2). Having identifying the research problem let us
specify the hypothesis to be tested.

Research Hypothesis

In theory, sovereignty is a doctrine which
may be viewed from completely antagonistic posi-
tions, depending on differences in historical
experience, ideological belief, social values, politi-
cal stand or economic condition. Depending on
initial observation of the state — NGOs relation-
ship, we have formulated three hypothesis, to be
tested in the research.

The first research hypothesis is that: mis-
understanding between the state and NGOs is
basically due to contrasting interpretations of the
concept of sovereignty by the two parties. Gener-
ally speaking, the states’ interpretation is rigid
whereas that of the NGOs is flexible. In this
respect the assumption that the flexibility (or for
that matter the humanitarian intentions) of
NGOs are assets enabling them to perform better
than governmental agencies will be challenged.
According to that assumption, "as they (NGOs)
are inspired by primarily humanitarian consider-
tations, they are free to act in many situations and
regulations governing them, could find them-
seves prevented from acting or delayed in their
action, however sympathetic they will be" (Mat-
thews, 1976, P. 97). This framework of analysis
could explain the situation in Europe or America
where all types of voluntary organizations do not
meet any difficulties or restrictions in dealing with
the state. In the case of East Africa, where the state
is weak and vulnerable, all types of restrictions
and measures are needed.

The second hypothesis is that: the nature of
the state (e.g. military or civilian) is significant
variable in the state — NGOs relationship. Here, a
model explaining state — NGOs structural link
will be critically evaluated. The model designed
by Abdel Ati of the Geography Department at
Khartoum University, was adopted to explain
"the NGOs’ relationship with the Governmental
establishment" in the Red Sea Region, Sudan
(Abdel Ati, 1991). Abdel Ati noticed that a distinct
3 — level pattern of relationship emerged between
the Sudanese government system and NGOs
(Ibid, P. 36). At the top level national central gov-
ernment (in Khartoum or abroad); at the middle
level, the national province commission stands
parallel to the NGO provincial office; and at the
bottom level, the national local council stands
parallel to the NGO field office. Abdel Ati, how-
ever, concluded that, "the nature of the relation-
ship being just exchange of information at the top
level without nothing to disagree about, the relation-
ship between NGOs and the government system is
generally smooth. At the bottom level the rela-
tionship is also smooth. The conflict between the
two systems appear to be always at the middle
level (emphasis added)” (Ibid, PP. 9-10).

A number of reservations may be raised
against Abdel Ati’s conclusion. Firstly, as his
main concern was with middle and bottom levels,
Abdel Ati made no investigation at the top level. Secondly, in reality the three levels are highly integrated, a point ignored in the paper. Thirdly and more importantly, Abdel Ati’s model, designed in 1988, failed greatly to explain the development in the relationship between the two parties only one year later, when the military government, taking power in 1989, introduced severe measure against the NGOs. These measures led to a very strained relationship between the state and the NGOs at all levels, especially at the top level. The heart of the matter, therefore, is not the type of levels - it is the type of government in question. In this case, the civilian government (1985-1989) had adopted a concept of sovereignty far flexible than the one adopted by the military government ruling the country since June 1989, with strong support from radical Islamic civilians.

The third hypothesis is that: the higher the degree of understanding between an NGO and the state over sovereignty, the lower is the degree of conflict between them. Most of previous studies treated the NGOs as one unit, making no distinction on the basis of philosophy, state of origin, type of activity and so on (Abdel Ati, 1991; Abu Ouf, 1990; Bratton, 1990; and Matthews, 1976). It will be argued that there is a real distinction between different NGOs, a distinction of great significance for the explanation of the state - NGOs relationship. Whether the NGO in question is Christian Aid or Islamic Call will be an important variable in this research. Finally, let us move to provide a concise description of research methodology.

Research Methodology

In the hope of addressing the research's problem and hypothesis (specified above), the research is divided into two major parts, the first part, about a quarter of the whole investigation, is devoted to theory. The doctrine of sovereignty is to be thoroughly examined, in an attempt to contribute to the debate between its advocates and its crisis. This is the best method for a better understanding of the conflict and cooperation between NGOs and the state in East Africa in general and Sudan in particular. Books and articles, the main source of this part, are of limited availability in the Sudan. Their study at an adequate research centre (mostly abroad) is a priority.

The other major part of the research, devoted to empirical investigation, is designed around the three variables of sovereignty: central authority, territorial entity, and bureaucracy. The main question of the research (and hypothesis) will be addressed under each of these sub-divisions, or say chapters. Factors affecting the relationship (cooperation or conflict) between NGOs and the state are divided up among the three variables. Some of these factors are: aid, drought, famine, relief, development, religion, nationality, civil war, the army, funds, salaries, labour, information and measures. Due to its empirical nature, the second part of the research is mainly based on data and information from primary sources, namely government official documents, NGOs reports, newspapers, and interviews. Fortunately, all sources of data are available and there is no problem in having access to them. In fact, the researcher has already either acquired some of the documents or reviewed them. Documents are complete and in good condition. They are placed in offices of ministries, NGOs and the National Record Office. The main analytic method to be employed is the study of these documents, comparing and contrasting their content.

The findings of the research, scheduled to be completed in 12 months, are to be published in book form, in English and Arabic versions. It is hoped that the findings may provide a modest contribution in understanding the issues relating to the NGOs and to the state, and may also open up new avenues of research. The findings are hoped to be useful for teaching purposes at university and post-graduate levels. Finally, certain issues of public policy may be clarified in some way by the research findings, particularly the increasing misunderstanding between NGOs and the state.
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EC-NGO Cooperation (Part III)
Evaluation of EEC-NGO cofinancing in relation to institutional support for grassroots organisations in developing countries *
by Geneviève de Crombrugghe, Francis Douxchamps, Nikita Stamp

4.3. Factors influencing the success or failure of a redefined partnership

4.3.1. Greater openness

Complete openness between partner organisations is of course impossible. They do not meet often or for long enough to achieve that. But there is a threshold of openness beneath which the notion of partnership is no longer applicable.

Some Northern NGOs generally fail to reveal much about themselves. Their priority concern is to become acquainted with their Southern partner, to understand how it works, and to discuss its needs in order to provide it with the most appropriate aid.

But it is equally important for the Southern partner to know what kind of Northern organisation it is dealing with, so that it can make the decision whether it wishes to take on that organisation as a partner or look for some other (13).

Here are some of the themes which should form the basis of an exchange, there may of course be others, suggested by either partner:

— conception of development
— internal functioning, mode of decision making;
— precise responsibility of each of the interlocutors in their organisation;
— funding sources and reliability thereof;
— actions already completed in the region and in the relevant field of intervention;
— relations with other partners.

One Italian NGO generally collaborated with one partner for three to five years. But it does not leave the partnership without having negotiated continued funding for the partner through some other aid organisation. One Elementary way of establishing the beginnings of a partnership is to exchange annual reports on a regular basis. Annual reports from the South reach the North regularly, but North-ern NGOs very rarely send their annual reports to the South. When Southern NGOs request reports and information, they do in general receive them, though often in incomplete form. But several Southern NGOs spoke of their frustration in this regard.

Financial openness should function North-South as well as South-North. The Southern NGO should be well-informed about the resources of its Northern partner, about the origin of its resources, the way in which it raises funds and the reliability of these methods. In the spirit of partnership, it is desirable that the Southern NGO be aware of the cofinancing contract between its Northern partner and the latter’s cofinancing source. It would thus be aware of the total amount of the project, including the sums devoted to administration in Europe, to follow-up and to assessments as well as to development education. The Northern NGO should also know the full range of resources of the Southern organisation, its self-generated revenue, its subsidies, the loans obtained from other donors and its debts if any. This does not always occur.

One Indian NGO which counts among its activities small productive workshops provides its Northern partner with accounts in which only expenses are mentioned. Income does not appear.

Openness should be practised between all the Northern partners of a Southern NGO. This is a basic condition if efficient coordination of the different partners is to be achieved at openness between them should help them to understand why they have chosen to collaborate with the same Southern partner, when they frequently have very widely divergent development options.

Often, when the representatives of a Northern NGO visit their partners, they stay too short a time for the Southern NGO’s representatives to feel able to ask all the questions they would like to ask. Not knowing how their partner will react to these questions, they often prefer not to ask them, in the fear that there would not be enough time to explain their concerns if the Northern NGO were offended or astonished at the questions. One Southern NGO speaking support for failures expressed its astonishment at finding out locally that their Northern partner, with which it had collaborated for 5 years, had just committed itself to funding an organisation in a neighbouring village which was also...
active among fishermen. We then asked the Northern NGO what its norms were in this field. It replied that it could not discuss with all its partners in a particular region whether or not it should collaborate with a new partner in the same region. The NGO considers that it has the right to finance partners between whom there is antagonism. To warn the other partners in advance would merely exacerbate the antagonism, it suggested.

This attitude is indicative of the limits that certain Northern NGOs set on their partnership with Southern NGOs.

4.3.2. Eliminating welfarism

Many European NGOs have inherited aid structures based on the idea that the wealthy North is responsible for an unjust situation; this leads to feelings of guilt and thus to aid for the poorer communities of the South. Fund-raising from the European public implicitly maintains this message in many cases.

Today welfarism is very widely criticised in the discourse of the NGOs and is being replaced with the notion of partnership. Though their practices have evolved, we noted that many traces of paternalism and of unilateral power relations remain; these distort the partnership relations which NGOs in any case find difficult to establish. The problems of openness cited above are an illustration.

4.3.3. Creating solid links through contracts

The foundation of the partnership relation is the common goal. It should be expressed in a mutual commitment contract which would guarantee that the efforts of both parties are oriented towards the same common objectives.

The rules of collaboration between the two partners should be set out in a detailed contract, specifying the rights and obligations of each and the sanctions applicable where either party fails to respect clauses of the contract.

Here are some of the points which should be set out in these contracts (the list is indicative, not comprehensive):

- communication of annual accounts by a certain date;
- negotiation deadlines for the continuation or ending of the collaboration;
- the type of messages which can be used in development education;
- the type of technical support which can be requested;
- a schedule for sending reports and accounts;
- a schedule for sending funds;

The contract cited at 4.2.6 has been working for the last year on a contract with the coffee producers benefiting from the new trademark. The contract will specify the rights and obligations of each partner. This illustrates the complexity of this type of contract and the kind of attention that the Northern and Southern partners will have to bring to its drafting.

The contract can only succeed if both partners have already reached a certain degree of mutual acquaintance, in the spirit of openness recommended above. This mutual knowledge is what guarantees a viable contract, which takes into consideration the needs of both and makes the most of their mutual capacities and advantages in the achievement of the goal they have set.

The contract must be binding on both partners and any modification should be conditional on the agreement of both parties.

In the discourse of many Northern NGOs, the notion of "trust" appears; this apparently excludes the possibility of contractual obligation. Such trust is of course necessary, but it often covers very ambiguous situations. Sometimes the Northern NGO is unaware of many of the activities of the Southern NGO. Just as often, the Northern partner does not dare to express its complaints and limits itself to pretexts which allow it to delay, and even cancel certain commitments. In the worst cases, the Northern NGO hides its partner's errors in the name of this "trust". By then there is no common goal. In the long term, the so-called service rendered is counterproductive and its effects are the opposite of those expected.

One European NGO supports a peasant association in Mali by financing pump installations. The useful life of the equipment is extremely short because the association is unable to manage it properly. The European NGO invokes the argument of trust and non-intervention and limits itself to seeking new funds to replace the pumps.

However, sanctioning the Southern organisation by withdrawing funding is often a dispro-
portionate reaction. Excessive punishment (breaking off relations in this case) produces an embittered state of mind which hinders the assimilation of lessons and is unfavourable to further learning processes.

43.4. The training needs of Northern NGOs

Over the last decade, the professional level of those working in the NGOs has changed. Originally, the main quality required in staff was a massive amount of goodwill and commitment to the development cause, sometimes going as far as entirely voluntary work. Today, NGOs tend to look for staff with a strong background in socio-economics or indeed politics, who can take stock of the issues of partnership and are looking for original solutions to stimulate the development of Southern organisations and their quest for independence and autonomy.

Till now, training specifically for people working in NGOs has been in rather short supply. But it would be worthwhile to encourage NGOs to continue the training of their staff with a view to their mastering the issues of partnership. We note here the initiative of an English body, INTRAC, several of whose partners are from the NGO milieu, and which offers training courses for the representatives of Northern organisations and their quest for independence and autonomy.

4.4. Modes and sources of funding in Northern NGOs

Visits to 25 NGOs in 8 European countries allowed us to note interesting specificities of the various national systems of cofinancing.

— In Holland, access to cofinancing was limited to two organisations in 1965, three in 1970 and has been limited to four since 1980. These organisations receive a substantial overall donation and also have access to a project by project cofinancing budget. The other NGOs have to go through one of the four major organisations to have access to project by project cofinancing. This policy has limited the number of NGOs in Holland. The significant private contribution of the Dutch to NGO, to which we referred at 4.1.1, is scarcely if at all used by the four major NGOs. The NGO sector without access to cofinancing therefore has more funds than the four major NGOs, but little is known about its activities. The four major NGOs are in almost permanent contact with the Ministry of Foreign Aid and have considerable influence in the establishing of development policies. Their methods of intervention and their methods of work are known to and recognised by the authorities.

— In Germany, six organisations, two of them religious, and four political, receive substantial overall donations, representing around 90% of government cofinancing. A hundred other NGOs, operating project by project, have access to the remaining 10%. The Ministry of Cooperation makes available to the latter a consultancy which helps them to formulate their requests and to draft their reports and accounts.

— In Denmark, the authorities have just introduced five-year programme funding for the four main NGOs. Access to cofinancing for the other NGOs is rapid and efficient. Applications are normally processed within one or two months and the funding level is generally 100%.

— In the UK, 50% of cofinancing is allocated to the five major organisations in the form of overall donations. The other organisations have access to project by project cofinancing.

— In Italy, project by project cofinancing, which is very slow and unreliable, has recently been subject to important political constraints. In addition to this, the Ministry makes an overall donation to each of the three federations of NGOs of around 1 million ECU. The federations are responsible for allocating the moneys to the NGOs for their projects according to a well defined schedule of conditions.

— In Belgium, both overall donations and framework-financing for five year programmes are being introduced. They are granted to NGOs which satisfy certain criteria relating to size and experience. 13 NGOs have been selected for this kind of financing. The others have access to project by project cofinancing, whose procedures have proved to date extremely slow.
In France, framework-financing is being considered and soundings are being taken. Two mutual funds (NGO and Ministry) intended to finance initial studies and assessments have been operational for the last two years.

In Spain, NGOs are entitled to apply for cofinancing for five projects per year, but may apply for a further three projects if these are presented by a consortium of NGOs.

Our knowledge of the American and Canadian cofinancing systems, acquired through secondary sources and experience, leads us to note the following aspects:

In Canada, the cooperation authorities fund actions of NGOs acting together in consortiums to deal with a particular theme or intervene in a given region. The decision-making bodies for the allocation of these funds to the consortiums include member NGOs, representatives of the authorities, and representatives of the partner NGOs from the Southern region or thematic network with which the consortium is dealing. The Canadian authorities practice framework-agreements with some NGOs, and also directly fund the projects of grassroots groups in Southern countries, through embassy funds and microprojects.

In the USA, the proportion of the public aid budget granted to NGOs is constantly rising. The policy of USAID is clearly oriented towards the institutional development of US NGOs, with a view to helping them to change their role from one of offering services to one of developing Southern institutions. With this in mind, it offers them the means to improve their professional capacities. The NGOs have access to various categories of subsidy, in particular the funding of programmes (75% cofinancing), “partnership grants” (overall grants made with a view to mid-term collaboration with certain NGOs acknowledged for their serious approach and achievements), and classic project cofinancing, including “matching grants” (50% cofinancing for certain countries only), which is only one among many possibilities. Most of the money going through the NGOs is allocated by the local branches of USAID in Southern countries to US NGOs but some is allocated to Southern organisations.

Most cofinancing services are aware of the fact that if they do not want to increase their staff considerably, they will be forced to delegated a share of their traditional functions to the NGOs with which they work, or at least to some of these. When a cofinancing service is confident that certain NGOs are capable of selecting partners and projects rigorously and coherently, it feels able to hand over funds without first undertaking a detailed investigation of the viability of the partnership or the proposed action. It can then grant a framework-finance or a substantial overall donation and concentrate its attention on the functioning of the Northern NGO, its methods and results, rather than on every project proposed.

The notion that cofinancing services have of the work done by NGOs varies from country to country and determines certain rules. For example, most countries believe that NGOs should have an audience which is regularly informed about development actions and which supports these actions financially. In other countries, this requirement is more flexible, and some NGOs or projects can be 100% funded by the state. This is the case in Germany, Denmark and Holland. The major NGOs of these states have close relations with their government’s senior authorities in the cooperation field, and take part in many discussions about development policy. They are, as it were, partners for the cooperation services. They contribute a different way of intervening in the field, which it would be difficult for bilateral cooperation to emulate. They might be said to complement the range of actions undertaken by bilateral cooperation.

In Italy and Spain, NGOs can serve to implement certain bilateral cooperation programmes. These actions are 100% financed by the authorities. They substantially upgrade the budgets of the NGOs. Thanks to these programmes, some small NGOs quickly grow to substantial size.

The place of cofinancing in the EEC

The scale of Community cofinancing for European NGOs is extremely variable. In the NGOs we visited, EEC cofinancing in 1991 contributed, as a percentage of total budget, between 0.5 and 45%; the major NGOs received only a very small percentage of their budgets. However, this small percentage often represented a larger
sum than the higher percentages granted to the smaller NGOs.

In EEC cofinancing, a substantial part of the available funds goes to a small number of NGOs, while the other NGOs share out the remainder in the form of smaller allocations. The following table gives an overview of the position in 1991 in the 12 EEC member states:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EEC Cofinancing in 1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total EEC contribution in thousands of ECU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

If the CEC wishes to change the rules of its cofinancing, it is important that it first undertake a detailed analysis of the way in which its aid is currently used. It would be necessary to know what kind of NGO is the main beneficiary of the cofinancing budget and to study the financing needs of these NGOs. The CEC funds represent only a small proportion of the sums available to European development NGOs and should therefore be directed to the places where they can do most good or be best used.

One European NGO which receives the totality of its funding from its government in the form of substantial overall donations covering 100% of the cost of its development actions is not attracted by the prospect of EEC cofinancing. It occasionally applies for it, mainly in order to maintain contact with Brussels and with the policy of support for NGOs which is developing there. The small overall donations from the CEC intended to help it maintain funds for rapid intervention are of no advantage to it, as they involve excessively high administrative costs.

For most NGOs, the attraction of EEC cofinancing depends on how difficult they find access to national cofinancing, how reliable and quick it is, and on the size of their own resources.

Harmonising cofinancing conditions with NGOs

The study of and contacts with European NGOs clearly show that progress should be made in the direction of a harmonisation of the cofinancing rules of the EEC with the different cofinancing systems of the member states. What direction this harmonisation should take we shall leave open for now. A major step forward, though perhaps a rather hypothetical one, would be negotiation between the Commission and member states with the aim of adopting a certain number of basic principles and common norms. We shall briefly develop these aspects in the next chapter.

V. Diversification of aid-financing mechanisms

We have several times, in the course of this study, emphasised the need for credit to be used as a mode of financing aid and for the use of donations to be avoided where support is given to activities intended to be profitable.

An awareness of this need has led many actors in the field of development to seek in the traditional finance market funding mechanisms till then scarcely if at all used in the development aid sector.

Among the mechanisms used today are bank guarantees, venture capital companies, leasings, debt equity, etc. A description of a series of experiments with these mechanisms can be found in an annex.

In the context of our missions, six experiments relating to the use of three of these mechanisms were observed. There can be no question of drawing definitive conclusions about the use of these mechanisms from such small samples. But visits in the field did allow us to identify a certain number of limitations which it would be worth studying in greater depth.

5.1. International bank guarantees

In this mechanism, capital deposited with a Northern bank is used to guarantee the loans of a
sum than the higher percentages granted to the smaller NGOs.

In EEC cofinancing, a substantial part of the available funds goes to a small number of NGOs, while the other NGOs share out the remainder in the form of smaller allocations. The following table gives an overview of the position in 1991 in the 12 EEC member states:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total EEC contribution to NGOs from EEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiary NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of NGOs receiving 50% contributions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total EEC contribution</th>
<th>Number of NGOs</th>
<th>Number of NGOs receiving 50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18,408</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5,953</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15,426</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12,818</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10,989</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7,409</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>2,182</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1,523</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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5.1. International bank guarantees

In this mechanism, capital deposited with a Northern bank is used to guarantee the loans of a
Southern bank, loans going either directly to beneficiaries or to a support organisation or grassroots organisation which provides credits to the beneficiaries.

When the credit is granted directly to the beneficiaries, it is found that the various actors and in particular the local bank no longer feel responsible. For the bank, it is indeed easier and less expensive to draw on the guarantee than to seek to recover suspected bad debts.

This situation generally leads to a rapid erosion of funds, a fortiori if the bank increases the value of the loan without assuming the risk.

One Latin-American bank opens a credit line 70 times greater than the guarantee. If the level of non-reimbursement is 70% the guarantee is completely eaten up.

Thus a system must be developed which makes both beneficiaries and banks responsible. This means a guarantee system which forces the bank to make efforts to recover the money.

In some cases, the bank lends to a support organisation which plays the role of financial intermediary. The system does not favour the support organisation, which undertakes the application and follow-up work without receiving from the bank, whose work is thus reduced, a preferential interest rate. If the support organisation is to avoid too high an interest rate for its beneficiaries, the differential between the bank lending rate and that of the organisation's loans will not allow it to cover its running costs unless the guarantee is fairly substantial, which is rarel y the case. On the other hand, the beneficiary has a greater sense of responsibility since the support organisation generally requires a guarantee for the credit which it grants.

One Chilean NGO received two international guarantees from a Swiss foundation. This guarantee allows the organisation to obtain credit from a local bank at 2.8-3% interest a month and thus leaves it a very small margin (it lends to the beneficiaries at 3.3% per month) to cover its running costs.

Whatever system is used, international guarantees are complex mechanisms for both support organisations and beneficiaries; neither know how to work with banks, and they tend to find out at their own expense, or at the guarantee's expense. These mechanisms thus require a methodological support which is not at all widely available today.

5.2. Venture capital companies

This mechanism consists in creating a company whose object is to invest its capital in small enterprises which have good prospects of becoming profitable. The company generally takes a minority share in the small company. It does however have the right to influence strategic decisions. The company also offers help to small entrepreneurs. After a specified time, when once the enterprise can fend for itself, the venture capital company sells its shares and reinvests the capital in other start-ups.

The first problem facing this form of financing is profitability. When venture capital companies work with small enterprises, their running costs are relatively high, since they must identify, follow up, and assist those to whom they loan.

The revenue of venture capital is solely dependent on the profitability of the capital invested in the small enterprises. It is therefore necessary to possess a very high capital/running costs ratio if investment is not to be confined to the most profitable sectors.

Moreover, this system requires that the small enterprise be quickly capitalised, that is, that the projects funded should themselves very quickly become profitable, and this is not in general a characteristic of the marginalised sectors which it is a priori desirable to support.

The second kind of problem facing the venture capital company in the small enterprise sector is of socio-cultural kind. The model is based on the principle of capital- and thus power-sharing. But the small entrepreneur identifies very strongly with his enterprise and is unwilling to share ownership of it, even temporarily, and all the less willing to share it with persons from a different socio-cultural background.

5.3. Leasing

The general principle here is that of leasing with the option, at the end of the hire term, of purchase for a low residual value.

In the context of development actions intended to be profitable, a support NGO or federative organisation can for example purchase equipment that meets small entrepreneurs' need for the modernisation of production tools in cases where the latter do not have the necessary capital.
As the organisation in question retains title till the term of hire has expired, it does not need major guarantees and can reallocate the equipment where the hirer defaults. In many countries, it could also benefit from substantial fiscal advantages (tax-free imports, etc.).

For their part, the entrepreneurs can maintain a more reasonable capital/debt ratio than if they resorted to a loan.

In the example that we were able to examine in Zimbabwe which is still at the design stage a federative organisation would use the interest on an international guarantee (which would not itself be converted into the local currency) in order to fund a leasing system. The beneficiaries would pay 5% of the purchase price monthly for two years. At the end of this period they would be able to purchase the equipment at 2096 of its original value, or at its net accounting value. The system would theoretically finance 75% of the payments going to top up the fund and 25% on running costs. In this particular case, the Southern organisation should be able to arrange the import of the equipment via its donors, thus enjoying tax exemptions and reductions (14).

For a system of this kind to succeed, the equipment leased must significantly enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the beneficiary companies, and the repayment schedule must be strictly observed.

In the case noted above, it may be that the predicted level of non-repayment (5%) is too optimistic.

5.4. Concluding remarks

We must underline the fact that these analyses cannot pretend to exhaustivity. They simply indicate that these new mechanisms are promising but comprise certain limitations and are, in general, difficult to implement.

There is a risk that many organisations, thinking that they have discovered a promising new methodology, will commit themselves to these financial mechanisms without having first learnt from the positive and negative experience of the pioneering organisations. To avoid repeated failures, it is vital that the experience acquired with these mechanisms be systematically shared and discussed.

It is important to note that these mechanisms are only appropriate to organisations that work in productive sectors or activities whose profitability is sufficient to repay the investment cost relatively quickly. Too many organisations are involved in marginal economic activities, whose profitability is too low; this is one of the reasons why many rotating funds are quickly eroded and do not achieve their goals.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations for EEC cofinancing

This chapter contains a certain number of recommendations and lines of thought for the Commission of the European Communities.

The ideas put forward are only firm recommendations in the case of overall support for Southern organisations (Chapter 12), which was the main purpose of this work.

They are more in the nature of proposals as regards:

— classic project by project cofinancing;
— contractualisation of relations with Northern NGOs;
— direct funding of Southern organisations;
— rationalisation of the systems of cofinancing.

These are themes which do not explicitly form part of the subject of this study. But it transpires that the different problems are substantially interrelated, and that it is particularly difficult to make any recommendations about Southern organisations without the equivalent recommendations for Northern NGOs occurring to one. It is, for example, absurd to propose continuous and flexible funding for Southern organisations unless the Northern NGOs enjoy the same advantages. We therefore deemed it necessary to draw up a more comprehensive picture of the directions which systems of development funding via NGOs should take.

6.1. Maintaining the cofinancing modes for overall support for Southern organisations (Chapter 12)

Four years after it was launched, Chapter 12 is still not sufficiently used. After enquiries conducted with the European NGOs, it seems that the main reason for this underuse is as follows:
— insufficient understanding of Chapter 12 on the part of some of the Northern NGOs, and a fortiori by the great majority of the Southern NGOs, which are often very badly informed by their Northern partners about the various possibilities of cofinancing;
— divergent interpretations and incorrect understanding of the conditions of the Chapter 12 by the various agents of intervention;
— too short a duration (even though it is implicit that the cofinancing can be renewed every two years, something many NGOs had not grasped) in the context of the attempt by the Southern NGOs to work out long term programmes;
— too high a monetary outlay for many Northern and Southern NGOs, given that attribution of monetary value to services rendered is not allowed;
— requirement that the Southern organisation have been active for a minimum of five years;
— no provision for the funding of public education programmes;
— no provision for consortiums of several NGOs;
— the difficulty that many Northern NGOs have in deeming their Southern partners sufficiently reliable in the context of a procedure which is new to them;
— the doubts felt by the executives of many Northern NGOs about the eligibility of their partners for a Chapter 12 cofinancing, in relation to the term “grassroots organisations” used in the text of the general conditions.

As regards the Southern organisations, we have seen that the support NGOs and the federative organisations are still often forced to work case by individual case, in the rigid and restrictive context of “projects”, without any possibility of long term planning. Project financing may make it easy to obtain the means to fund their services to beneficiaries, but they still often find it difficult to fund their own internal functioning. For these organisations, which have many funding sources and whose programmes of activity are integrated (sometimes over the long term), the funding of a project, that is, a part of its activities, presents various kinds of administrative and management problem (the implications for their mode of intervention were discussed in 3.1);
— the overheads of these organisations are still difficult to cover;
— they are required to keep separate accounts for each project and each funding source, as well as to draft specific financial reports, in each case reflecting a part of their activities. This forces the organisation into a form of arduous and often useless mental gymnastics; the documents that satisfy the requirements of their donors are rarely of any service for internal management. Moreover, it diverts the organisation away from efficient cost accounting, covering the whole of its activities and encourages it to take certain steps to ensure that its accounts add up;
— this situation can thus cause accounting distortions which can affect the efficiency with which the organisation is managed, while the administrative overload is yet another administrative cost that many NGOs find it difficult to afford;
— moreover, this often produces delays in the transmission of reports to the funding source, and consequently in the latter’s disbursements;
— the Southern organisations therefore suffer from a lack of continuity in the funding of their actions.

The Chapter 12 funding mode is based on the funding of a percentage of the overall budget of the Southern NGO. Its procedures allow the NGO’s activity reports, accounts and balance sheet to be accepted as achievement reports. Chapter 12 does therefore answer a need which was widely expressed during our field missions. It undoubtedly represents a considerable step forward in the conditions of cofinancing relative to the way in which Southern organisations function.

But the following points, which came up during our missions in the field, should also be taken into account:
— Chapter 12 cofinancing has generally been used to cover the day to day running costs of organisations;
— it has rarely been used for material or human investment in organisations, still more rarely to improve the efficiency of an organisation’s working;
— it has therefore been used rather in a short than in a long term perspective;
— consequently, the problem of the institutional reinforcement of the NGO sector in the South remains, and the problem of the long term independence and autonomy of Southern organisations has not been resolved.
• Scheduling

A general programme of the activities of the Southern organisation for the period of the cofinancing should be required, as well as a general budget forecast for the first year. This would demonstrate the Southern organisation's capacity to realise medium-term planning. The schedule and the budget would be brought up to date at the point at which cofinancing started (15), and would thus form a useful instrument for measuring the efficiency of the organisation and its results.

• Reports

The requirement that the Southern organisations supply annual reports (activities, modes of decision-making, running accounts, balance sheet, and auditor's report) must be enforced.

• Continuity of support

The institutional development of Southern organisations is a long process, which must be considered in terms of long-term planning. We saw at 3.4 that the financial autonomy of these organisations should be considered rather in terms of diversification of funding sources than of the quest for self-financing at any cost. Chapter 12 cofinancing will contribute to the financial autonomy of Southern organisations if it is linked to an improved use of resources in relation to the development objectives pursued by the organisation. This being the case, provision for the renewing of Chapter 12 cofinancing should be retained (the conditions are described later). It is however important to pay particular attention to the speed with which organisations grow subsequent to a Chapter 12 funding: this should be cautious and controlled, taking into account the increase in recurrent costs.

• Assessment

An assessment/audit should be scheduled before the last year of cofinancing, which would allow for negotiation concerning renewal over the course of the last year (16). The contract of aims will constitute the basis of the terms of reference of the assessment/audit.

• NGO financial contribution

The rule specifying that the financial con-
distribution to be made by the NGO must be in monetary form is justified; and monetary valuation of contributions in kind should continue to be excluded. It is difficult to see how a Northern NGO can financially support a Southern organisation other than by transfers of money, or how it could give a monetary value to the work of its European staff in support of the Southern organisation.

It is also justifiable that monetary valuation of contributions in kind should be excluded from the financial contribution made by the Southern organisation (which may come from its own contribution or from that of other funding sources). Chapter 12 is used to finance the expenses of the organisation on the basis of its budget; and these expenses are essentially financial in kind. Besides, the financial justification is made via the operating account within which the organisation cannot of course place a monetary valuation on its contributions in kind (17).

In general, it is important that, with Chapter 12 cofinancing, the minimum percentage of financial contribution on the part of the NGO should be similar to that for classic projects. This is currently the case, though this percentage would have to diminish for classic projects if monetary valuation of the contributions in kind of the Southern or Northern NGOs were to be excluded from the budget. If it is not intended to single out Chapter 12, it is vital that one modality should not be more financially advantageous than others.

• Administrative costs

There is no justification for the Northern NGO receiving a higher percentage of administrative fees for a Chapter 12. The cost of real, regular technical or methodological support in the field by the Northern NGO's staff (something which rarely occurs) is more than compensated for by the marked reduction in administrative work as such (no achievement or financial reports to be drafted).

• Seniority of Southern organisations

Taking into account the findings of our mission in the field, it seems reasonable that organisations less than five years old should have access to Chapter 12 cofinancing. Eligibility conditions could then be as follows: 3 years of legal existence, 3 years of activity reports, and the previous year's account audited by independent auditors.

• Development education

It would be worth introducing a provision for financing public education programmes under Chapter 12; such programmes are as justifiable in this framework as in that of projects.

• Title of Chapter 12

It is important to end the ambiguity concerning the title of this modality. In practice, it turns out that Chapter 12 has been almost exclusively used by Southern support NGOs. It is particularly apt for this kind of organisation, and for federative grassroots organisations with service functions. On the other hand it should not be used for first-degree grassroots organisations until they have developed a function of services for their members. We therefore recommend that the title should become “Reinforcement of support organisations in the South”.

• Promotion of Chapter 12

Finally, an effort should be made to promote Chapter 12. This should clarify the rules and explain the advantages and the development options underlying this modality. The effort should be directed toward not only Northern and Southern NGOs but also to the desk officers of the VII/B/2 Unit. The underuse of Chapter 12 can be largely attributed to the fact that it is little understood, even by the Northern NGOs, and to erroneous interpretation of its principles and procedures.

Nevertheless, we have noted that Chapter 12 does not provide any solutions specific and overall to the problem of the institutional development of the non-governmental sector in the South. The general objective of actions to be supported in that perspective should be the reinforcement of the position of the sector relative to other local institutional systems: in short, empowerment. The Commission should therefore support the identification of appropriate measures and perhaps adapt its cofinancing rules. The actions themselves should mainly fall under the categories of concertation and collaboration within the non-governmental sector and with
other local actors (governments in particular), the creation of a supply of services appropriate to the NGOs, and médiatisation of their work. For example, on a case by case basis, and taking into account the situation of the country and the other cofunded actions, the possibility should be examined of:

- studies to allow the non-governmental sector of a Southern country to elaborate an appropriate strategy of institutional development;
- studies to identify the supply of services for the organisational development of a specific country or region;
- local centres which would give training sessions inside organisations, with the aim of helping them to improve their performance on the basis of their current state;
- programmes to identify, and support for, promoters of NGO networks with a regional rather than a local institutional bias;
- South-South NGO networks, NGO coordination and collaboration between NGOs at local, regional, national or even international levels;
- the médiatisation of the work of the whole of the non-governmental sector in the South through mass-media (tv, radio, etc.).

6.2. Considerations about the conditions of cofinancing of “classic” projects

It transpires from study of the applications that many classic cofinancing projects are in fact for institutional support of Southern partners. While recommending that these projects should be systematically oriented towards Chapter 12 (even when they comprise support for only one part of the Southern organisation’s programme of action), it seems worthwhile to put forward a number of lines of thought as to the modalities of project by project Community cofinancing which should become the preferred mode of funding for grassroots initiatives.

- The processing of applications by DG VII/B/2 could be differentiated according to whether they are presented by financing or operational NGOs. For financing application, processing would concentrate on the local implementing organisation and its results. For the applications of NGOs operational in the field, processing would concentrate on the project itself, on the action as such.

This way of working might make the management of applications more fluid and rapid. The establishment of an exhaustive register of Southern organisations which have benefited from cofinancing, regularly updated and accessible to the entire Unit, would favour exchanges between desk officers about applications concerning one and the same Southern organisation, and would thus facilitate the processing of applications.

- The desire for greater openness in EEC proceedings has been expressed by Northern NGOs, so that they know what stage of processing an application has reached, and can react rapidly during processing to smooth out obstacles and thus shorten the approval time.

- To increase openness vis-à-vis the South, it would be worthwhile for applications to be jointly presented by the two partner NGOs (North and South) and for the cofinancing contracts to be sent to the Southern partners by the Commission, even in cases where the European NGO has sole legal responsibility. A solution should be sought for the language problem that may occur with applications. The contract would be sent in the Community language spoken in the Southern organisation’s country.

- The phase of identification concerns both i. the establishing of links between a Northern NGO and a Southern organisation with a view to establishing contractual relations, and ii. the identification as such of development actions to undertake. In cofinancing agreements, funds are often provided for the a posteriori funding of tasks leading to identification. But as many NGOs do not have the means to finance this phase in advance, they limit themselves to the first stage. Thus the recommendation is again made that a fund be created for the identification of development actions. This could draw on the experience of the French “Fonds d’Etudes Préalables” (FEP), which operates in this way, or a similar experiment in Denmark. This fund should be financed by the NGOs and EEC together; the share each would take in the finance need not be considered here (in France, the authorities supply 75% and the NGOs 25% of the resources). It would be topped up each year according to the sums expended. In France, the grant-making mechanism itself guarantees the seriousness of the application, as it implies in-depth analysis of the pro-
posed study and a decision taken by a joint
NGO/authorities committee.

The attribution of monetary value to local contribu-
tions and to the NGO’s contributions in kind
poses extremely complex problems in the finan-
cial justification of the action, since it cannot be
objectively verified and is something of an invita-
tion to abuse, excess and arbitrariness. It might
therefore be best to confine the budget of the
action to monetary contributions, and present
valuations as a separate category. This would
imply increasing the percentage admissible for
the Community contribution, but probably also
of the percentage assumed by the NGO (the real
sums remaining the same). It should however be underlined that the finan-
cial valuation of the contributions of the ONG
and grassroots groups in vital, as it has a peda-
gogic significance which is indispensable to
appropriation of the project by, and motiva-
tion of, the beneficiaries. The practice should there-
fore be promoted, but a standard method, adapt-
able to the different situations to be encountered,
would certainly be useful.

— In the context of contractual long-term partner-
ship relations with Northern NGOs, Southern
organisations demand regular and long-term
visits by the latter in the field; they also want rep-
resentatives of the Southern organisations to be
able to travel to the North, so that there can be no
ambiguity and no misunderstandings about
either action or relationship. Similarly, there is no
provision for follow-up among the admissible
costs. The EEC should continue to accept and
include provisions of entities in the budget for these expenses in projects submitted.

— The EEC should accept, for classic projects, the
same mode of financial and accounting justification as
for Chapter 12, that is, on the basis of the opera-
ting accounts and balance sheet of the organisa-
tion. Some of the Southern organisations visited had adopted this system for all their funding
sources, whatever the system of cofinancing used
for obtaining the funds. The evaluation of the per-
centage of the action cofinanced by the EEC
would be performed in the same way as for Chap-
ter 12, by stating that the NGO component had
put the same sum into the action as the EEC. The
financial and accounting justification should be
approved by independent accountants, chosen in
common by the three parties, on the basis of a

— In the framework of cofunded actions, the func-
tioning of Southern NGOs networks, the decen-
tralised offices of Northern NGOs, the round-
tables held between the funding sources of a
single Southern organisation, etc, should be per-
imable some form of cofinancing. The same holds
for the various new roles of the Northern NGO in the
context of redifined partnership (and more par-
ticularly of actions taking place in European
countries).

— Several erroneous interpretations, failures to
comprehend or doubts were observed concerning
the formulation of the conditions of cofinancing. Over
and beyond what concerns the procedures, it
would be worthwhile to articulate the more “phil-
osophical” aspects (principles underlying condi-
tions, explanations of purpose) and the more
practical aspects (operational directives, presenta-
tion schemas, examples, etc.) separately. This
could be presented as one document (in which
the three aspects would appear for each point of
the conditions), or in three fascicules for
example, in the form of the presentation of the

— It would be worthwhile studying in greater
depth the real percentage of running costs incurred
for projects presented by financing NGOs or
operational NGOs, so as to determine if variable
percentages should not be accepted for cofinanc-
ing, depending on the type of NGO or action
degree of follow-up necessary).

— Reports concerning evaluation of cofunded pro-
jects made by the NGOs themselves should
always be sent to the Commission, even if the
evaluation itself was not cofunded.

— If this proposal turned out to be unworkable, the
Commission should at least accept that finan-
cial reports be presented as overall reports, without
being divided up into the NGO and EEC shares,
and local and other contributions. It should be
acceptable for documentary proof of locally made
expenditure on the action to be kept at the head-
quar ters of the Southern organisation for at least
five years, and made available to the funding
sources during that time should a verification be
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required.
Belgian cofinancing system: exposition of the grounds and principles of the King’s report, legal rules in the Royal Decree, and administrative directives.

— It would also be worth organising information and clarification meetings with the NGOs in each member state, so as to eliminate all ambiguity.

— On the other hand, the preparation and interpretation of the conditions of cofinancing should be taken up in briefings and working sessions with the desk officers of the applications, to ensure that criteria used and methods of processing the applications are uniform.

— Finally, an independent study with the goal of identifying the criteria advanced to justify the rejection of projects would allow, on the one hand, to see if the criteria conformed to the philosophy of this Community development instrument, and on the other to establish a list of refusal criteria for the use of the desk officers.

The various improvements of the project by project cofinancing system which we have just proposed should, we believe, considerably facilitate the task of the desk officers of both Commission and NGOs, and allow them to respond in more appropriate fashion to the needs of grassroots organisations in the South. In the two following sections, we present two new cofinancing formulas which could also improve the functioning of the EEC system in relation to objectives of development in the South. These propositions refer to the signing of contractual agreements of several years duration with Northern NGOs and to the direct funding of Southern organisations.

6.3. Direct financing of Southern organisations

We saw in 3.4.1 that the desire for a more direct relationship with the Northern public funding sources was expressed by several NGOs visited during field trips for this work. This mode of financing is, moreover, practised by several bilateral cooperations: Canada, Switzerland, USAID, and French embassy funds; and by the EEC itself with Chilean NGOs, and, in ACP countries, with Microprojects and the implementation of components of EDF projects by local NGOs, etc. Analysis of these experiences should of course continue.

The aspiration to direct contact with Northern public funding, which was particularly strong in Africa is, it seems, explicable by the desire to limit the number of financial intermediaries and deal directly with a funding source present in the country (the EEC delegation). Southern organisations see in this system a potential economy of time and human and financial expenditure (administrative tasks, fund-seeking measures, reduced delays in financing, etc.).

Practically speaking, how could the EEC set about direct financing? It should immediately be emphasised that the prospect of direct financing of a Southern organisation by Brussels is not a realistic one. It would also run counter to the basic choice made by the EDF in the matter of funding of actions initiated by the communities of the South, that is, the decentralisation of decision-making to Delegation level for Microprojects and Decentralised Cooperation.

This implies that line 37.5010 (cofinancing of Northern NGOs’ development actions) would not be the most appropriate to this modality of development cofinancing. In ACP countries, the experiment could be made of using the budgetary possibilities offered by Microprojects and Decentralised Cooperation. For non-ACP countries, a new budgetary line would be needed.

A certain number of “local countries”, in which a high volume of cofinancing was traditional, and in which it would therefore be worthwhile setting up a coordinating structure, should be chosen for the first, experimental implementation.

It would not make sense for the EEC to fund Southern NGOs in the absence of:

— an expanded role for EEC Delegations;

— the creation or selection of a body which would serve as an interface between the Delegations and NGOs. This body would have to be autonomous in relation to the local administration. Its main functions would be the processing of applications and following up projects;

— the establishment of an steering committee or joint commission comprising representatives of the NGOs, the local authorities and the EEC, as well as independent persons involved in the development of the country which would analyse the applications and advise the decision maker (National Authorising Officer, Delegation) (18).


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Consideration should be given to the best method, through investigation of the cost-benefits of the various formulas of cofinancing development action by NGOs (via the usual chain: Northern NGO-Southern NGO-grassroots group, and decentralised offices of Northern NGOs financing actions through direct grants of their own funds) and of the experience of Microprojects Units (Chad, Swaziland, Zambia, Uganda, etc.). The cost-development benefit ratio would be the determining factor in this choice.

It is important to pay the greatest attention to a problem that has already been noted during field trips, and which is likely to grow more serious in the future: the existing and latent conflicts between support NGOs and grassroots organisations concerning their unequal access to funds. In order to avoid support NGOs monopolising direct funding if it were instituted, some proportion of the budget should be set aside for initiatives deriving from grassroots groups. Grassroots organisations would then be able to choose how to satisfy their technical needs, and this would modify the balance of strength between such groups and the support NGOs (19). In ACP countries, one possibility would be for the Microproject instrument to be used exclusively for projects initiated by local collectivities (despite the opening up to NGOs of this instrument written into Lomé IV) and for support NGOs to be channelled toward the Decentralised Cooperation budget. For non-ACP countries, given that these particular cooperation instruments do not exist, a criterion would have to be determined which would ensure that both NGO projects and grassroots initiatives were funded.

In the case of overall support for the full range of an organisation’s activities, the requirements could be the same as for Chapter 12.

(19) The EDF “Kivu” programme worked in this way: a grassroots organisation would contact the programme’s implementation unit with an action proposal. If the proposal was rejected, the candidate organisation was insufficiently competent to execute the proposal, the programme would propose the additional funding of an action of support, or training by a technical or social engineering NGO chosen by the grassroots organisation. A tripartite contract defined this agreement.
Les relations entre l'UNESCO et les organisations internationales non gouvernementales


13.14 Coopération avec les organisations internationales non gouvernementales

13.141 Coopération avec la communauté des organisations internationales non gouvernementales, et notamment nouvelles modalités de coopération financière

La Conférence générale,
Se référant à l'article VI des Directives concernant les relations de l'UNESCO avec les organisations internationales non gouvernementales et à la section B de la décision 140 EX/4.1 du Conseil exécutif,
Rappelant ses résolutions 13 C/6.61, 16 C/22 et 26 C/13.2 concernant les relations de l'UNESCO avec les organisations internationales non gouvernementales,
Rappelant guarnier les décisions 140 EX/4.1, section B paragraphe 3 (f), et 141 EX/7.4 du Conseil exécutif relatives à la coopération financière entre l'UNESCO et les organisations internationales non gouvernementales,
7. Adopte, en matière de coopération financière entre l'UNESCO et les organisations internationales non gouvernementales (ONG), les critères suivants :
(a) l'organisation considérée est-elle au premier plan dans sa discipline, sa spécialité ou son domaine ? (Compétence);
(b) l'organisation s'efforce-t-elle d'être représentative à l'échelon international et dans la composition de ses organes directeurs? (Représentativité/extension géographique);
(c) le siège de l'organisation se trouve-t-il dans une région sous-représentée pour ce qui est des ONG qui s'engagent dans une coopération avec l'UNESCO? (Décentrailisation);
(d) le programme de l'organisation complète-t-il utilement les activités des champs clés de programme ? (Efficacité/complémentarité);
(e) l'organisation contribue-t-elle de manière significative au rayonnement de l'UNESCO, ainsi qu'à la diffusion de ses idées et objectifs? (Relations publiques/efficacité et crédibilité des réseaux);
(f) dans quelle mesure les principales activités de l'organisation sont-elles représentatives du point de vue international et ont-elles un effet multiplieur? (Représentativité des principales activités);
(g) constate-t-on un élargissement progressif de ces activités à d'autres régions du monde ? (Décentralisation);
(h) l'organisation se rend-elle bien compte de la grande diversité des conceptions de sa discipline dans le monde entier? (Cette question pourrait s'appliquer, par exemple, aux différences de système social ou aux différences dans la nature et la pratique des arts.) (Diversité culturelle et sociale);
(i) les programmes destinés à compléter ceux de l'UNESCO font-ils régulièrement l'objet d'un examen attentif? Il s'agit là d'une conception plus exigente et moins restrictive que celle qui consiste à essayer d'évaluer les programmes des ONG surtout d'après la contribution qu'elles apportent à l'exécution du programme de l'UNESCO (si précieuse que puisse être cette contribution) (Evaluation et complémentarité/enrichissement mutuel);
(j) le secrétariat ou le conseil d'administration de l'organisation recevra-t-il suffisamment de collaborateurs nouveaux, relativement jeunes et de premier plan? (Renouvellement des décideurs et personnels, échanges et innovations)
2. Réaffirme les principes suivants :
(a) des subventions ne seront accordées que dans un nombre limité de cas, et en premier lieu dans le but d'aider de nouvelles organisations internationales établies à l'initiative ou sous les auspices de l'UNESCO;
(b) l'aide financière ne sera accordée que pour une période limitée et ne constituera en aucun cas un engagement permanent de part de l'UNESCO;
(c) de façon croissante, l'assistance financière sera fournie sous forme contractuelle pour des tâches directement liées au programme de l'UNESCO;
(d) sauf circonstances exceptionnelles, l'aide financière ne sera accordée qu'en vue de compléter les revenus que l'Organisation tire d'autres sources;

(*) Sur le rapport de la Commission C à la 27e session plénière de la Conférence générale.
3. Décide que :
(a) les subventions actuelles disparaissent;
(b) de nouvelles subventions seront octroyées uni-
quement à un nombre limité d'ONG nouvelle-
ment créées ou commençant à coopérer avec l'UNESCO, y compris à l'initiative ou sous les
auspices de cette dernière, choisisset prioritaire-
ment selon leur localisation géographique (pays
en développement) et qui pourraient bénéficier
(d'une subvention pour une durée limitée et non
renouvelable (deux à quatre ans), en vue de pro-
mouvoir le démarrage/développement de leurs
activités directement liées aux domaines priori-
taires de l'UNESCO,
(c) toutes les subventions jusqu'ici octroyées aux
ONG seront transformées, à partir de l'exercice
biennal 1996-1997, et selon le cas,
— soit en contrats, comme il est stipulé dans les
Directives concernant les relations de l'UNESCO
avec les organisations internationales non gover-
nementales,
— soit en un accord-cadre, pour une durée égale à
celle du Plan à moyen terme, qui permettrait (i)
de confier à certaines organisations fédérées large-
ment représentatives, compétentes et efficaces
l'exécution de tâches inscrites dans le pro-
gramme; et (ii) d'appuyer un soutien aux initia-
tives qu'elles prennent et qui sont complémen-
taires de celles de l'UNESCO,
4. Décide également, après avoir pris connaissance
des recommandations du Conseil exécutif, que le
montant total des subventions accordées aux
organisations internationales non gouvernementales,
— soit en accord-cadre, pour une durée égale à
celle du Plan à moyen terme, qui permettrait (i)
de confier à certaines organisations fédérées large-
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tives qu'elles prennent et qui sont complémen-
taires de celles de l'UNESCO,
5. Approve les activités proposées en vue de la
mise en œuvre du programme spécial de soutien
aux ONG, de même que les principes et critères à
appliquer en vue de l'attribution des fonds alloués
cà ce programme;
6. Invite le Directeur général :
(a) compte tenu des crédits approuvés, à verser
lesdites subventions, conformément aux disposi-
tions de l'article VI des Directives concernant les
relations de l'UNESCO avec les organisations internationales non gouvernementales,
(b) à mettre en œuvre les activités dans le cadre du
programme spécial de soutien aux ONG selon les
principes et critères énoncés aux paragraphes 11 à
13 du document 141 EX/24;
(c) à appliquer les nouvelles modalités retenues
lors de l'élaboration du Projet de programme et
de budget pour 1996-1997 (28 C/3), et à soumettre
au Conseil exécutif, à sa 146e session, ses proposi-
tions en la matière.
13.142 Coopération avec les organisations internationales
non gouvernementales concer-
nant les domaines d'action prioritaires de
l'UNESCO

La Conférence générale,
Se référant au document 141 EX/24, où il est pro-
posé d'affecter un montant de 743.000 dollars des
Etats-Unis au programme spécial de soutien aux
ONG qui ne reçoivent pas de subventions,
Prenant note en particulier du montant proposé de
175.000 dollars à répartir par le secteur des
sciences exactes et naturelles au profit d'activités
menées par ces ONG dans différentes régions,
Considérant la décision prise par la Conférence
générale de privilégier l'Afrique, les femmes et les
pays les moins avancés dans les programmes de
l'UNESCO,
Précisant que par le fait que la répartition par région
du montant susmentionné de 175.000 dollars n'est pas spécifiée,
Invite le Directeur général, lors de la mise en
œuvre de la décision 141 EX/7.4, à spécifier la
répartition de ces fonds par région et à procéder
aux ajustements nécessaires dans ces affectations
de telle sorte que 40% au moins des fonds affectés
au domaine des sciences exactes et naturelles et
des autres fonds prévus au titre du programme
spécial de soutien aux ONG allètent à la région
Afrique, qui compte un grand nombre des pays
les moins avancés.

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New Institutional Needed

It is now widely recognized that we must make the rescue of the environment the central organizing principle in our lives if we want to avoid irreparable damage to the planet's life support systems. However experience shows that political will, not simply good ideas, are needed. A number of excellent proposals to make the UN system more effective and accountable are currently being circulated and discussed. Yet the gap between what urgently needs to be done and the policies still being pursued is vast. National governments, caught up in trying to appease special interest groups, have proven unwilling to implement the reforms needed to make the UN system more effective in dealing with environmental concerns.

The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) offered NGOs unprecedented access, but their input was ignored. Environmentalists were widely “consulted” on the new European Community directive on packaging, but not one of their proposals have been included in the final text. Similar experiences can be cited from other international bodies.

New Institutional Needed

What this makes clear is that internal reforms are not enough, there is the need for the creation of new institutions that protect the global environment. Just as different organizations represent us as citizens and producers, we need a strong voice to represent us as members of the planetary eco-system. How can we find workable arrangements to manage the transition to a sustainable world order? How will sufficient public pressure be mobilized to ensure that changes that enable protection of the global environment are both “for real” and for the common good?

My experience over the past 12 years with the Right Livelihood Awards (“Alternative Nobel Prizes”) and The Other Economic Summit (TOES) has convinced me of the value of “shadow institutions.” By providing new role models and giving prominence to “alternative values” — “shadow institutions” can be the first step towards introducing community values at the international level.

I suggest the creation of a “People’s Council for Global Sustainability” to ensure that the long-term implications of human activity are accounted for. The function of the Council would be to pronounce on urgent issues of planetary survival and equity. The Council would develop “environmental adjustment program” to ensure that countries pay their environmental debts to one another. The Council would codify and enforce treaties and conventional environmental rights. It could promote a global crash program of energy conservation and mandate product efficiency standards and have the power to impose fines and sanctions on members who fail to implement their commitments. An independent court could be set up under its auspices to try crimes against ecological security. In short, the Council would restore the balance between who we really are and what we are doing to ourselves, our neighbors, and the planet.

Democratic Legitimacy

Only a democratically elected institution can have the legitimacy and be given the power to set fair ecological boundaries for human activities.

For practical reasons this could mean an assembly elected by some form of proportional representation which would then elect the Council Executive. Such elections could take place region by region or continent by continent. For example, Europe would elect a European Sustainability Council which in turn would send members to the Global Council. Similar elections could be organized in North and South America, Australia, the Pacific and Africa. Given the size of the population in Asia, there would probably have to be several regional Councils.

In the spirit of the global community, candidates for election should be but just one nation’s representative. Candidates would need to obtain a minimum number of signatures in several countries in order to qualify. Considering our children’s stake in an unaltered environment, the voting age limit for these elections should be lowered. The Council’s term of office should exceed that of national parliaments to enable it to take a longer-term view. To fulfill its tasks, it would require independent financial resources, for example, the right to levy certain taxes on pollutants and armaments.

Part of UN Family

The new Council should be part of the UN family, which has so far been missing one institution based on popular sovereignty next to those based on nation states (General Assembly, Security Council, Special Agencies) and on wealth (World Bank, IMF). UN
organizations already working towards global sustainability, especially the UNEP and UNDP, could be linked to the Council, providing expertise and experience.

The Peoples’ Council would be no world government. While its decisions would be felt in many areas, its power would be akin to those of an independent central bank set up to ensure economic rectitude. While it would set standards and be able to intervene directly in emergencies, the council would not have absolute power. Rather, it would be charged to enforce agreements freely entered into. To ensure accountability, it could be made subject to the Hague Court.

Opinion polls show that the environment is the one issue where large majorities recognize that national sovereignty is illusory and are prepared to support a strong international organization. In the UK, a 1992 Gallup poll found that nine out of ten favored setting up an international body to solve environmental problems. Much sovereignty has already been ceded to corporations and to various international bodies, such as the EC, GATT, etc., without concern for popular will.

The basic question is simple: Will we continue to demand in vain that the ruling order changes its spots? Or will we focus our energies to create another order— a true global community.

Jacob von Uexkull

Spanning the GLOBE: Coalition of Legislators Seeks Environmental Balance

With the new realities of the post-UNCED world in mind, members of the Global Legislative Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE) came together in November 1993 in Lisbon, Portugal, for their first General Assembly meeting since the Rio conference. Founded three years ago by U.S. and European legislators, GLOBE International is a nongovernmental organization composed of parliamentarians from the U.S. Congress, the Japanese Diet, the European Parliament, and the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies. The organization now has more than 80 active members and affiliate offices in Brussels, Moscow, Tokyo and Washington, D.C.

The purpose of GLOBE is perhaps summed up in the message that the GLOBE International President Albert Gore, U.S. Senator and Vice President-elect, sent to the General Assembly in Lisbon: “As the elected representatives of the people, it is our task, and indeed our obligation, to forge practical, equitable and lasting solutions to the environmental and development challenges confronting our planet—the greatest we have faced in human history.”

“The road from Rio will be neither short nor easy,” said Gore. “It is, however, a road we will travel together.”

Indeed, as Earth Summit participants navigate the road, the need for accurate environmental information, consensus-based action by environmentally literate political leaders, and closer cooperation between governments is increasingly apparent. Toward that end, GLOBE endorses and organizes two international General Assemblies each year at which member legislators review international developments, hear presentations on emerging environmental issues, and conceive innovative approaches to environmental lawmaking for application in their own legislatures. In addition to the conferences, GLOBE provides members with a continuous flow of timely information and analysis on environmental topics through tailored research reports, newsletters, calendars of key dates for international environmental events, and GLOBE-sponsored briefings by embassy officials, academics, nongovernmental organization and corporate environmental experts.

Having worked actively throughout the UNCED process to ensure the success of the Rio negotiations, the General Assembly in Lisbon focused on the special role of parliamentarians and legislators in implementing Agenda 21 and the other accords achieved at the Earth Summit.

First steps taken in Lisbon included the preparation of Action Agendas (statements of
commitment and guidelines for legislative action) for ratification by the full membership. GLOBE Action Agendas are consensus-based documents designed to serve as models for members and other leaders worldwide as they draft legislation to address international environmental issues. Action Agendas were drawn up in Lisbon in a number of areas, including: biodiversity and endangered species; energy and climate change; environmental equity; forest preservation; hazardous wastes; nuclear testing; ocean and marine life protection; reform of international financial institutions; and UN reform. "GLOBE members are united in a policy framework for active followup to the Earth Summit," said The Honorable Takashi Kosugi, President of GLOBE Japan. "It is my belief that by working in this cohesive group, we are able to take innovative approaches and encourage other decisionmakers to follow our lead." Professor Nikolai Vorontsov, President of GLOBE Russia, stressed the importance of prompt action by governments on behalf of the environment. "The Russian government, the new U.S. administration, and the entire world now have a chance to finally move into the post-Cold War era and re-orient the massive financial and scientific expertise, previously invested for military purposes, toward environmental goals." Though GLOBE is a nonpartisan organization, several of the members at the Lisbon meeting welcomed the outcome of the U.S. election. U.S. Congressman Jim Sheuer, founding President of GLOBE International and leader of the GLOBE USA delegation in Lisbon, said most members are "optimistic and, in fact, delighted that our GLOBE International president will be the Vice President of the United States." In the three years since its founding, GLOBE has dramatically enhanced interaction between leaders from Brussels to Tokyo, from Washington to Moscow. We believe the organization's ability to educate and develop personal relationships between environmentally concerned legislators from different countries, cultures, and political systems is unequalled, and perhaps its most important contribution.

In the near future, the GLOBE network will be expanded to include elected leaders from other industrialized and nonindustrialized countries. Parliamentarians in Africa, Asia, Australia, Canada, and South America have indicated an interest in joining the coalition.

Patrick R. Ramage, Director, GLOBE USA
For more information, contact: Patrick R. Ramage, Director, GLOBE USA, 409 Third St., S. W., Washington, D. C. 20024; phone: 202-863-0153.

(Concordare, Winter 1993)

The dilemma of indigenous NGOs dependency versus self financing

The Ethiopian Red Cross and local religious groups have been involved in providing relief and welfare services for several years in different parts of the country. Initially both the international and local NGOs were involved, largely with emergency relief programmes to curb suffering caused by natural aid manmade disasters. Assistance included the provision of shelter, food, clothing and medicine for the victims. During the famines and during the periods following there were large movements of people around the country. Families sometimes became split and children separated from parents, with the result that there was an urgent need for orphanage. Several indigenous NGOs established themselves to run institutions to care for the basic needs of orphans at that time. The children were admitted into orphanages and given food, medical care, education and clothing. A few NGOs initiated community based child care programmes (e.g. sponsorship, foster care etc.).

Moving to development
Development work later succeeded rehabilitation for most NGOs. Some NGOs still handle welfare, rehabilitation and development components simultaneously in their programme. Virtually all NGOs depend on external grants to carry out their programmes.

Who decides what NGOs do?
In some cases NGOs programmes reflect strongly their donors' influences, as some donors are specifically interested either in relief or rehabilitation work. A common problem that many NGOs experience is that many Northern donors wish to support only projects and not institution building and maintenance efforts.
NGOs need to seek donors that extend assistance for integrated rehabilitation and development projects.

How far can NGOs finance their own activities?

NGOs can obtain funds through project cost recovery from the community — or by running their own income generating activities or by local fundraising. Some of the factors limiting self financing include the level of poverty and “backwardness” among the communities with which an NGO works. For example a high level of illiteracy amongst women might result in little or no participation of communities in project activities. There are also few Government policies to guide NGOs in developing small scale income generation activities for self financing.

Fundraising, whether from the benefiting community, or from other sources, needs clear objectives, good public relations and information. Honest financial management and ensuring the confidence of the beneficiaries by involving them in the planning and implementation of the project is vital.

It is questionable whether NGOs have the capacity to handle income generating activities within the context of their normal management machinery. It is important to have a separate unit of the organisation to run effective programmes through capacity building and strengthening organisation and management of the institution. That is where genuine partnership with donors is required.

Events in Eastern Europe are reducing northern Aid flows to Africa. NGOs in Ethiopia need to develop channels of local resources for their activities. Developing self reliant capacities is even more urgent as phrases like “donor fatigue” gain increasing weight in development aid circles.

Indigenous NGOs need funding partners who are willing to commit themselves to a medium to long term relationship and who can respect the values and identities of the communities they wish to assist.

Is income-generation compatible with helping the poorest?

NGOs are involved in activities that meet the basic needs of poor communities, which are unlikely to be capable of making a profit. Activities that are of an income generation character might be considered by some donors as leading NGOs to a loss of interest in the welfare of poorest section of society. It is much easier to raise income or cost recovery from the slightly wealthier sections of the community.

The other problem is that many donors show little interest in funding self financing income generation activities for organisations even though they are designed to ensure self reliance of the indigenous NGOs or the long term sustain ability of the long term project.

Dependency on external support

This means that indigenous NGOs are likely to remain dependent on international donors indefinitely. At the same time some donors have continued to support a specific target group or counterpart in a locality for a long period without really evaluating the impact of the projects. Few donors have established a phasing out principle in programme implementation as well as in extending assistance with the result that some voluntary development organisations have become 100% dependent on donors fund for indefinite period of time.

As the flow of aid diminishes, such organisations will find it hard to survive without disrupting their ongoing development programme. In order to avoid dependency, we should start to mobilize funds locally or develop small scale income generating activities to finance themselves.

A new role for donors

We look to donors to demonstrate a more convincing commitment to institution building by funding administrative and structural infrastructure costs, especially where the NGOs have reasonable grounds for such requests. Support in this area is regarded as crucial to institution building or to develop self financing capacity for indigenous NGOs.

Institutional strengthening and capacity building

It might be worthwhile if more donors could revise their policies to include institutional strengthening, capacity building and income generation in their guidelines for project funding so that the counterparts can stand on their feet to promote relief, rehabilitation and development with communities as needed. Otherwise the question of dependency and self financing is going to remain a dilemma for indigenous NGOs.

Kassa Botissa,
Programme Coordinator, Redd
tel: 15 28 46
(CRDA News, December 1993)
Trade Unions and Globalization

Globalization is a new and trendy catchword. Some have welcomed it, seeing it as a chance for easy opportunities and expansion. Others, and they are in the majority, view globalization as a trend which leads to a decline in living and working standards and as an excuse for the increased exploitation of workers.

But what is it really? In the simplest terms, globalization, or rather global competition, can be explained as a phenomenon of cross-border movement of capital, managerial skills and technical expertise in pursuit of extra profit. Its advance in recent years has been made possible partly due to rapid developments in telecommunications.

This sounds good for business. If modern facilities provide us with chances to increase profits, they should be taken. For workers, however, the question is not that of profits but of the survival of both themselves and their families.

Business follows a simple philosophy of profit and profits increase where the costs of production are kept low. Costs are lower where wages are suppressed, standards of safety and health inferior (thus their observation is misused), and laws regarding employment exist at all. So global companies move their factories, production and profits from "regulated", labour-oriented economies to "unregulated" ones with unprotected labour. In order to attract foreign capital, governments are trying to lure the global competitors with lower and lower wages and lower and lower terms and conditions which lead to greater hazards for all.

**Suppressed trade unions**

In some Asian countries, for instance, the economic growth recorded over the last decade has brought about good financial and physical infrastructure, modern telecommunications services and a fairly well educated and skilled workforce. In other words, almost ideal grounds for setting up a business. Of top of these attractive conditions, foreign companies entering the region find local wages depressed to levels which do not reflect the workers' high productivity. This is so because authoritarian governments have suppressed the genuine trade union movement in their countries, boasting about the unique "Asian" model for industrial relations (read "docile" workforce). In some cases, not only are trade union rights suppressed but so are other fundamental human rights. This results in slave or semi-slave labour, child labour and other medieval forms of employment.

Certainly, a workforce that only takes one week of annual leave a year or does not take it at all and has to work 50 hours per week, is more "productive" to company owners than workers who work under human conditions and enjoy modern social benefits. In many "attractive" countries, the safety and occupational health regulations are set at levels far below those which have been established in the industrialized economies, following a protracted union struggle. Unfortunately even these low standards are often not being enforced. This leads to loss of lives in major industrial accidents on construction sites, in factories and in mines. Yet capital, both foreign and domestic, does not seem to care. As the Chairperson of the Workers' Group of the ILO Governing Body, Bill Brett, has observed, "capital and organizations care about their balance sheet and not about people."

**Transnational have no homeland**

The process of moving capital cross-border is a very dynamic phenomenon and capital will seek to produce wherever costs are lowest. The transnational companies, acting in globally competing markets, rarely feel any attachment to a particular host country. They will move their.

Korea, then to Malaysia, then to the People's Republic of China and so on. They are always looking for cheaper labour and less stringent laws. Therefore no government — no matter how attractive their offer — can rely on long-lasting arrangements with transnational companies.

**Competing with forced labour**

Capital is fleeing to cheaper regions. Yet governments in industrialized economies, faced with growing unemployment, as in Europe, for instance, want to stop the capital from moving to other countries. How can this be done? By offering the global competitors similar conditions to those they would find elsewhere. They do it by introducing "deregelation" laws, flexibility and some other code-named pieces of legislation which in practice mean nothing else but depriving the trade union movement of its prerogatives. This in turn makes the continuous downward spiral of wages and social components of workers' remuneration possible. Yet even this is often not enough because workers in Europe, or New Zealand for instance, will still face competition from companies using
forced labour in China or child labour in Thailand, no matter how “deregulated” industrial relations may become. Can such a competition be won?

Trade unions can go global too

In order to halt this destructive trend trade unions must also develop global strategies. This can be established by forging global links in the first place. Trade unions should organize their communications networks along similar lines to the multinationals. We must be able to exchange information across borders and act swiftly on it. We have to press our national governments to pass legislation that embraces international labour standards. We do not have to develop them, they are already there. Basic ILO Conventions and Recommendations are the best guidelines for trade unions for national campaigns. Once legislation is passed it is then up to the trade unions to assume the role of watchdog over the implementation of the provisions. If forced labour is banned in those countries where it still exists, the multinationals will have less incentive to move their capital there. Trade unions have many allies. In every country society needs internationally recognized standards that guarantee its rights and freedoms. We have to start building a global pro-labour coalition.

Trade union rights must be observed

The precondition for global trade union action is that trade unions are free to act, that any worker can join any trade union of his/her choice, and that there is no interference from government or employers in the functioning of trade unions. In other words, we have to see to it that fundamental trade union and human rights are universally observed. These freedoms lay the foundations for effective trade union action. Trade unions are not against global competition. It can be beneficial to workers. On one condition, that this competition is carried out in a fair and just way. There will always be a diversity between regions and conditions of production differ across countries. But this diversity and resulting comparative advantage of certain countries cannot be based on the non-observation of minimum basic international standards. Fair competition in business will take place when workers worldwide can organize and demand decent wages and working conditions. They must be free to do so without fear of being dismissed, blackmailed, imprisoned or tortured. Once they assert their rights — and these rights are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Conventions and in many other documents setting international standards — incentives for cross-border movement of capital will become less distorted.

In the next few years, the IFBWW will be holding a number of regional seminars on the issues related to the globalization. The outcome of those seminars will serve as a basis for the development of a common trade union position on globalization problems in the IFBWW sectors.

(From Building and Wood, 1/1994, International Federation of Building and Wood Workers)

Congrégations religieuses

Le « Centre for Voluntary Organisation » (CVO) à Londres a mené une étude sur les congrégations religieuses en tant que composantes du système social mondial. Un rapport en a été publié par Margaret Harris sous le titre « Care by Congregation ». L’introduction de l’ouvrage souligne le fait de la redécouverte de l’action bénévole comme élément central de l’économie du social. Cette redécouverte a mis en vedette les agences de service, les groupements d’aide mutuelle et les organisations communautaires. Par contre, les congrégations religieuses ont été largement oubliées, en dépit du rôle historique qu’elles ont joué comme pourvoyeurs d’aide sociale. L’ouvrage commence à rétablir l’équilibre. L’étude se base sur les résultats d’une enquête auprès de l’Église catholique, de l’Église anglicane, des Pentecôtistes et auprès d’une synagogue. Signalons ici que l’UAI avait, dès 1983, créé une section spéciale dans sa base de données et son Yearbook of International Organizations réservée aux « ordres religieux, fraternités et mouvements ». L’UAI avait considéré que les structures, les buts et l’action de ces groupements leur méritaient une place dans la vie « organisationnelle » internationale.

* Care by Congregation » by Margaret Harris. Working Paper 15, Centre for Voluntary Organisation, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE. £5.95
OMS
La récente décision de rétablir les relations a été prise en reconnaissance « d u grand respect dont jouit l’AMM au sein de la communauté médicale et du changement de circonstances » (en Afrique du Sud).
En accueillant la décision du Conseil de l’OMS, le docteur Ian Field, secrétaire général de l’AMM, a dit : « nous organisaions ont collaboré étroitement dans le passé et cette décision fournit l’occasion de rétablir cette coopération à un moment où les services de santé sont particulièrement à rude épreuve. »
(Communiqué)

Voluntary choices
What makes a voluntary organisation special? More specifically, what makes voluntary bodies different from private companies bidding for government money to run services in the emerging purchaser-provider markets of social services, health and education? Both voluntary organisations and the private sector are struggling with these questions as we move into the Government’s new world. All social service provision, for example, is supposed to be contracted out eventually. The voluntary organisations are examining their independence as they become increasingly dependent on Whitehall subsidies. For example, one of the big child charities agrees to run the proposed secure accommodation for disturbed young offenders, how can it criticise such policies in future? Already reporters find some voluntary organisations refusing to comment on important public issues “because, to be frank, we have a bid in”. The private sector is grumbling about an uneven playing field with voluntary non-profit organisations, supported by many volunteers, able to win contracts on the cheap. Now a Home Office research report — linked to the Guardian — is proposing that charitable status should be removed from the voluntary sector and its organisations divided into two: non-profit service providers totally subsidised by the state, which would receive tax exemptions if they achieve ministerial targets; and smaller campaigning bodies receiving no state subsidies, existing on foundation funds and individual donations.
Voluntary organisations initially sold themselves on their flexibility, readiness to experiment and lack of bureaucratic structures. But the new study shows many of the bigger voluntary organisations already recreating familiar corporate diseases, with senior staff more interested in pay, status and “company” cars than the clients the organisations was set up to serve. Superficially, separating the two types of activities is attractive. But some of the best voluntary organisations — like Nacro, the NSPCC and RSPCA — achieve both. Moreover, funding is only one component. Undoubtedly something needs to be done to protect the independent campaigning role of voluntary bodies, even if separation is too mechanistic. We are only in shallow waters at present. The markets are just emerging, although Whitehall’s controls over voluntary organisations have been increasing over two decades through new forms of funding. Performance indicators would only increase ministerial powers — but then the report shows many voluntary organisations falling short. A tighter rein should be acceptable, so long as the new structures promote the sector’s key qualities — responsiveness and community ties — and allows them to speak out.
(The Guardian, 6 Oct. 1993)
The presidents of the five Central American countries signed a trade pact late October 1993 to breathe new life into the 32-year-old Central American economic integration process and to further lower trade barriers in the isthmus.

Meeting in Guatemala City, the chiefs of state of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, signed the Protocol of Guatemala which would permit the free flow of goods and labor, and harmonize customs services in the region.

The protocol updates the terms of the Central American Economic Integration Treaty, signed in 1960. Turmoil in the region over the past two decades had interrupted Central America's once-rapid march toward integration and regional cooperation.

The Guatemala treaty will enter effect when it is ratified by the legislatures of three of the signatory countries. Panama also attended the summit meeting and signed the protocol as an observer. It is expected to become a full participant in the pact at a later date.

The Guatemala summit was the fourteenth among the Central Leaders, since 1986. A ruling by the Central American Court of Justice, issued as the summit got underway, forced some last-minute readjusting of the parts of the protocol, but participants said reaching the goal of free trade on the isthmus was never in doubt.

The Court ruled that the Protocol of Guatemala should deal with economic matters and avoid pronouncements on political and social issues. It also decreed separation among the Central American Economic System (SIECA) and other regional integration entities such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and the Central American Monetary Council.

(UNAS Trade News, Nov. 1993)

The main purpose of Latin Bonet is to promote the development of biotechnology and electronic communications in Latin America. It facilitates computerized analysis of nucleic acids and proteins or scientists through Internet, Intranet or other means of remote access, diffuses data on ongoing research.

CUNet is a cooperation project between institutions of the Caribbean region. It is part of the Hemispheric-Wide Inter-University Scientific and Technological Network of the Organization of American States (OAS), which aims to create an academic, scientific, technological and research network to integrate the countries of the region. In the first phase, it calls for the exchange of data through electronic mail between CUNet members and the rest of the world. CUNet is coordinated by OAS and the Corporation for the National Academy, Scientific and Research Network, of Puerto Rico (CRACIN), in collaboration with the Universidad de Puerto Rico.


(Études Romandes, citées dans UNEP, Vol. 4, No. 7, 1995)

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Les cités historiques ne doivent plus être des villes-musées. Les experts s'accordent — le chef Marcel Junius, secrétaire général de la nouvelle Organisation des villes du patrimoine mondial, ainsi que le maire de cette ville, Jean-Paul Young, le Geneva Secretary of the World Methodist Council, who represented the Council at the meeting, this important development comes following a long history of moving together. The convergence came when the European Council of the United Methodist Church decided most of its work would now find its place in the proposed European Methodist Council, as did the European Commission on Mission, which for many years was a forum for practical cooperation between mission boards of the various Methodist churches in Europe. In 1990 the British Methodist Church began to think along these terms and the decision was made that it was urgent for the Methodist churches in Europe, in the words of the new secretary, Dr. Siegfried Lodewig, “to grow ever more closely together”.

The countries and areas where Methodist bodies are found in Europe are: Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Middle and Southern European countries, countries of Northern Europe, Portugal, Spain and Italy. The constitution of the European Methodist Council states that “churches represented in the Council also belong to other bodies, for example the Conference of European Churches, and the World Methodist Council”, and that “membership in the European Council is intended to complement all existing relationships”.

A council pulling together all of the Methodist churches in European countries has just been established in a meeting 6-12 September 1993 in Hermst, Germany. According to Mr. Ralph C. Young, the Geneva Secretary of the World Methodist Council, who represented the Council at the meeting, this important development comes following a long history of moving together. The convergence came when the European Council of the United Methodist Church decided most of its work would now find its place in the proposed European Methodist Council, as did the European Commission on Mission, which for many years was a forum for practical cooperation between mission boards of the various Methodist churches in Europe. In 1990 the British Methodist Church began to think along these terms and the decision was made that it was urgent for the Methodist churches in Europe, in the words of the new secretary, Dr. Siegfried Lodewig, “to grow ever more closely together”.

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Le 7 février 1994, M. Mohammed Bedjaoui a été élu président de la Cour internationale de justice. Il a dit à cette Cour depuis le 15 mars 1982, nièce le 6 février 1988, M. Bedjaoui a occupé une série de postes importants dans la vie internationale.

L'UIA a l'honneur de compter M. Bedjaoui parmi ses membres et lui adresse, à cette occasion, ses vives félicitations.
Transnational Associations

Some items in recent issues:

- Transnational actors in the international system
  - Les acteurs transnationaux dans le système international

- The recognition of the legal personality of INGOs
  - La reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des OING

- Latin American Associations
  - Les associations latino-américaines

- INGOs' vision of education for Peace
  - L'éducation pour la paix selon les OING

- New social movements
  - Les nouveaux mouvements sociaux

- Cooperatives in today’s world
  - Les coopératives dans le monde contemporain

- Voluntary work
  - Le travail volontaire

- Cooperation between INGOs and IGOs (Unesco, World Bank, HCR, EU, OECD)
  - La coopération entre les OING et les OIG (Unesco, Banque mondiale, HCR, UE, OCDE)

- INGOs’ view of environmental problems
  - Les OING et les problèmes écologiques

- Humanitarian aid and humanitarian law
  - L'aide et le droit humanitaires

- Europe 1993

- Language in a transnational perspective
  - Langue et transnationalité

- Civil Society and the State
  - La société civile et l'Etat
Forthcoming topics:
Dans les prochains numéros :

- Compulsory Unionism
  La syndicalisation obligatoire

- Peace Building Resources for Palestinians and Israelis
  La construction de la paix dans le cadre israélo-palestinien

- Local Development Brokers
  Les courtiers locaux du développement

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Commande à envoyer directement à / Order to be sent directly to:
UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS INTERNATIONALES
Rue Washington 40 - B-1050 BRUXELLES, Belgique - Telex 65080 INAC B - Fax (32 2) 646 05 25

Order Form:
Bon de commande:
Name: .................................................................
Address: .............................................................
D Payment enclosed D Virement fait à votre compte n° __________
D Payment made to your account n° __________
D Invoice required D Veuillez envoyer une facture
Date: ........................................................................
Signature: ................................................................

Methods of payment:
Mandat international à notre compte-chèque postal n° 0004504690-70 à Bruxelles ou virement en francs belges auprès de la Générale de Banque compte n° 250450823-55 Agence Majorel, 1050 Bruxelles.
Genève: Compte n° 4721413 90 à l’Union de Banques Suisses.
Köln : Konto n° 1.0672721.95, Generalbank & Co., Christophstrasse 33.
London: Account n° 04552534, National Westminster Bank Ltd, 1 Princes Street,
Method of payment:

Bruxelles: Compte-chèque n° 000-0034699-70 à l’Union des Banques Suisses.


Geneve: Compte courant n° 472.043.30 Q à l’Union des Banques Suisses.
