

Transnational Associations

The review of the Union of International Associations



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Associations transnationales

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Transnational Associations *Associations transnationales*

Transnational Associations is a unique bilingual journal whose aim is to deal with major current problems within the perspective of international nongovernmental organizations. It is intended to provide a forum for authoritative information and independent reflection on the increasing role played by these organizations in the international system, and on its philosophical, political, economic or cultural implications.

- The approach is intrinsically interdisciplinary, and calls for both specialist expertise and practitioner experience in transnational association matters. *Transnational Associations* provides background information about the actions and achievements of international associations, and insight into their interrelations with intergovernmental organizations. It covers a wide range of topics, among which social organization, humanitarian law, scientific cooperation, language and culture, economic development, to cite just a few.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UIA, clarifies general awareness concerning the association phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, informs associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them. Contributors to the journal review include association officers, research workers and specialists of association questions who engage only themselves.

Founded in Brussels in 1907 as the Central Office of International Associations, the UIA became a federation under the present name in 1910 at the 1st World Congress of International Associations. Activities were closely associated with the Institut international de bibliographie, which later became the International Federation for Documentation. Its work contributed to the creation of the League of Nations and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (the predecessor of UNESCO). During the 1920s, the UIA created an International University, the first of its kind.

The UIA has consultative relations with UNESCO, UN/ECOSOC, and ILO. It collaborates with FAO, the Council of Europe, UNITAR, and the Commonwealth Science Council.

Associations transnationales est la seule revue imitant des grands problèmes contemporains dans la perspective des organisations internationales non gouvernementales. Elle se propose d'apporter des éléments d'information provenant des sources les plus autorisées, propres à susciter une réflexion indépendante sur l'affirmation du rôle joué par ces acteurs dans le système international et sur les aspects philosophiques, politiques, sociaux et culturels de cette évolution.

La visée adoptée est essentiellement interdisciplinaire et fait appel au savoir comme à la pratique des spécialistes du champ d'action des associations transnationales. Les documents, articles et études publiés par Associations transnationales traitent également des liens établis entre celles-ci et les organisations intergouvernementales. Les domaines couverts s'étendent aux problèmes de société, au droit humanitaire, à la coopération scientifique, aux questions linguistiques et culturelles, au développement économique ou à tout phénomène affectant la vie de ces associations.

Le programme de la revue, conformément aux buts de l'UIA, vise à éclairer l'opinion sur la signification de la dimension associative des relations internationales, notamment en informant les associations au sujet des questions qui relèvent de leurs domaines ou affectent leurs intérêts communs. Les textes des auteurs publiés par la revue (dirigeants d'associations, chercheurs et spécialistes des questions associatives) n'engagent que leur opinion.

L'UIA a été créée officiellement en 1910 à Bruxelles au cours du premier congrès mondial des associations internationales. Ses fondateurs, le Sénateur Henri La Fontaine, prix Nobel de la Paix 1913 et Paul Otlet, Secrétaire général de l'Institut international de bibliographie, avaient mis sur pied en 1907 l'« Office central des institutions internationales » auquel l'UIA succéda sous la forme de fédération. En 1914, elle regroupait 230 organisations, soit un peu plus de la moitié de celles qui existaient à l'époque. L'UIA devait incarner, dans l'esprit de ses fondateurs, les aspirations internationalistes et les idéaux de paix qui animaient les associations et qui allaient aboutir en 1920 à la création de la Société des Nations.

L'UIA a obtenu le statut consultatif auprès de l'ECOSOC, de l'UNESCO et de l'OIT. Elle collabore avec l'UNITAR, la FAO et le Conseil de l'Europe. Elle entretient des relations générales et ponctuelles avec les organisations régionales.

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Globalisation, civil society, solidarity (Part I)

by Peter Waterman*

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Abstract: Contemporary radical-democratic theorising on 'globalisation' can surpass traditional discourses on development/dependency, interdependency or imperialism, without necessarily ignoring the processes these connote. Globalisation is here understood as multi-determined (by the market, surveillance, militarisation, industrialism, patriarchy, informatism, racism). Globalisation processes imply that hegemony no longer rests in a single territorial site (national, regional, bloc), any more than it rests with a single subject (the international capitalist class), on a primary determinant (economic, military), or level (the state-national). Globalisation processes sharpen the contradictions of high modernity, giving rise to democratic and pluralistic social movements which point beyond our present-day situation. But they also give rise to authoritarian social movements attempting to reject or escape modernity. Globalisation provokes

international and extra-territorial identities as it does local ones, these being of different and often mutually contradictory natures. It implies the increasing centrality of the global level and global instances, and therefore the possibility and necessity for development of a 'global civil society' as a space for democratic struggle within multiple global terrains. The new democratic social movements therefore also operate globally. Their struggle is both cause and effect of a variegated, democratic and pluralistic global culture, itself in tension with a globalised (i.e. capitalist, Western, sexist, racist, etc) one. Globalisation creates a world (that can increasingly be experienced as) both real and universal, thus allowing for a universalism that is more than faith or obligation, a global solidarity that is more than a merely imagined community.

1. Introduction: a new worldview

This paper makes reference to recent critical and radical writings in order to develop the concepts of 'globalisation', 'global civil society' and 'global solidarity'. The new problematic, it will be argued, is not centrally that of relations between nations, nationalities, states or blocs, nor of people or peoples so identified. It is of global processes and structures that reduce the centrality previously accorded the state-nation in emancipatory thought and action (Billington 1980:57-71). Or, to put it another way, relations between nations, nationalities, states and blocs (and of people and peoples so defined) will now be placed within a world - and a discourse - wider and deeper than those of nation and state, of nationalism and statism.

The old concept of internationalism could be adequately represented on a two-dimensional map, because it depends on a planar understanding of space - of space as place. For the old internationalism, the projected future is one in which the crossing of borders leads to the surpassing of the differences previously marking and distinguishing such places, to the 'annihilation of space by time' (Karl Marx, cited Massey 1991:24).

Within the new worldview, the locale does not disappear. But the notion of place is informed by an understanding of space, with this term itself being understood socially rather than territorially. The new universalisation is brought about not so much by the breaching of physical boundaries as by the penetration of a multiplicity of social spaces.¹ The new terrain of reflection and struggle is indicated by the concept of 'globalisation' (Part 2), the new institutional framework by that of 'global civil society' (Part 3), the new movement ethic by that of 'global solidarity' (Part 4).

2. Globalisation: The world according to Giddens

There has recently been a veritable explosion of interest in globalisation and related problems or concepts amongst humanist, socialist or radical-democratic authors (Albrow 1990, Anderson 1990: Part 5, Boulding 1990, Colliet 1992, Giddens 1990, 1992, Gurtov 1988, Hall, Held and McGrew 1992, Harvey 1989, Held 1991a,b,c, 1992, King 1991, Massey 1991, Nederveen Pieterse 1992a,b,c, Robertson 1990, 1992, Sklair 1991, Tehranian and Tehranian 1992, Walker 1988).²

figures 1, 2 and 3. The paper is dedicated to those in New York, Amherst, Binghamton, Oakland, San Francisco and Los Angeles who enabled me, late 1992, to see globalisation at work within the USA, to experience their friendship and hospitality, to discuss solidarity, and to contribute with them, modestly, to the creation of a global civil society.

1 An illustration would be the collapse of the Communist system. This did not begin with the breaching of the Berlin Wall but with its economic, political and - above all - informational and cultural circumvention. And when the Berlin Wall eventually was breached, this was because the logic that inspired its construction had already been condemned and ridiculed in the public imagination and undermined by a multiplicity of spontaneous and creative mass activities (such as travelling as tourists to

try that had no wall). These mass understandings and acts were inspired by new implicit views of the world. These overlap with mine only in part. By trying to turn my - also largely implicit - ideas into a new 'worldview' the hypothetical possibility of a public dialogue arises. For a more elegant and complex formulation of the issue here, see that of Arjun Appadurai below.

2 Of these works the most useful one, in many respects, is that of Hall, Held and McGrew (1992), of which I will be making much use in this paper. Both impressive and significant, at least to me, is the extent to which a work on modernity concentrates on globalisation. This is addressed explicitly in only

Rather than surveying this burgeoning literature I am going to concentrate on the argument of Giddens (1990). This is because of its complexity (not to be confused with a fashionable obscurity), its depth (underlying analysis of globalisation with that of modernisation and modernity), its elegance (in using one basic model to cover a multiplicity of areas and levels) and its political engagement (address to an alternative future - and to the social, political and psycho-social forces for achieving such). Giddens' argument, moreover, bears at least a family resemblance to a number of other multi-dimensional approaches to globalisation that are, like his, concerned with its contradictions and its possible surpassing or transformation.³

2.1. *Radical modernity*

Giddens offers a synthetic view in which modernisation is understood as the result not of one exclusive or primary force (e.g. capitalism) but of the interrelation of several. He identifies these four interdependent and mutually determining dimensions as 1) capitalism, 2) industrialism (the created environment), 3) administrative power (control of information and social surveillance), and 4) military power.

Giddens sees our contemporary period and process not as a 'post-modern' or even a 'post-industrial' one but rather as representing a 'radicalising of modernity':

Its most conspicuous features - the dissolution of evolutionism, the disappearance of historical teleology, the recognition of thoroughgoing, constitutive reflexivity, together with the evaporating of the privileged position of the West - move us into a new and disturbing universe of experience. If the 'us' here still refers primarily to those living in the West itself - or more accurately, the industrialised sectors of the world - it is something whose implications are felt everywhere. (52-3. Original stress)

2.2. *Globalisation*

The four interdependent institutional aspects of modernity provide the basis for the four interlinked dimensions of globalisation.

They are 1) the world capitalist economy, 2) the international division of labour, 3) the nation-state system, 4) the world military order. The first of these is characterised much as in the customary terms of Marxist political-economy: the worldwide spread of commoditisation, the creation of a working class, the power of transnational to operate autonomously and accumulate internationally. Secondly there is the global division of labour, understood by Giddens in terms of geographical specialisation and differentiation. This, again, has ambiguous consequences, leading simultaneously to differentiation and mutual interdependence, implying both the global spread of machine technologies or scientific agricultural production, and threats to the global environment. Since the third of these dimensions is seen as independent from capitalism, the nation-state system is seen as something other than an executive of executives of capitalist classes. The nation-state is seen as the sovereign controller of a certain territory, as the creator and guardian of national culture. But its increasing interaction with others in the general nation-state system is considered deeply ambiguous, implying a simultaneous push/pull process, in which collaboration can imply (e.g. through UN recognition) both a confirmation and a loss of individual sovereignty. Although, fourthly, there are self-evident linkages between the military order on the one hand, the state and capital on the other, Giddens again treats the global military order as distinct, and identifies the globalisation of warfare in several senses. He begins with the military blocs, both strengthening and reducing the autonomy of constituent armies. He continues with the globalisation of arms production and sales, arguing that even the possession of nuclear weaponry is not confined to the economically advanced states' (75). He concludes here with the increasing global spread and scale of wars.

Giddens appends to his quadrilateral figure the process and effects of cultural globalisation, seen as a 'further and quite fundamental aspect' (77), underlying each of the four aspects of globalisation. The transformation of the technologies of communication is thus not sim-

one of seven long chapters but it is present, at least implicitly, throughout.

The work also represents a commentary on a number of authors I was already familiar with, as well as on a series previously unknown to me. In so far as I specialise on bibliography in this area, the existence of such a body of unfamiliar literature is simultaneously depressing and exhilarating. The book is a reaching text of the Open University in the UK, and is marked by a high level of coherence between, or cross-reference amongst, the authors, with extensive additional readings, these often being from virtually unobtainable sources. One cannot, finally, fail to be impressed by a 1992 publication that contains a number of 1992

references! Modern left analysis of globalisation may have begun 15 years earlier with Alan Wolfe (1977), and a pathbreaking chapter entitled *Globalising Contradictions*. A very different kind of work, which I only had access to as I was completing this paper, is that of Robertson (1992). Given that it appears to be the latest book on globalisation, it must receive at least a footnote. Subtitled *Social Theory and Global Culture*, this book is one that has not even an index reference to multinationals (even the cultural ones) or to social movements (even their cultural aspects), thus contrasting with authors mentioned in Endnote 4. It doesn't have much to say about 'actually existing' global cultures, either, for that matter, being apparently much more interested in sociologists of culture than in cultures! On the other hand, Robertson does make one aware of the extent to which sociology

ply an accompaniment of the other processes but a condition for them.

2.3. *Alternative social forces*

Giddens identifies a series of dispositions in the face of the risks implied by a globalised modernity, these being understood as individual and/or socio-political in nature. The first is 'pragmatic acceptance', the second 'cynical pessimism', the third 'sustained optimism', the fourth 'radical engagement' (134-7). 'Pragmatic acceptance' implies a concentration on survival in a world considered largely beyond control. 'Sustained optimism' is the disposition of the Enlightenment, the belief that reason, science (or, for that matter, providence) will ensure the infinite continuation of progress, and that solutions can and will be found to any of the world-threatening scenarios presented by doomsday thinkers. 'Cynical pessimism' is another manner of dealing with a dangerous or undesirable process or future, and implies either inaction or depression. Finally, there is radical engagement, by which I mean an attitude of practical contestation towards perceived sources of danger. Those taking a stance of radical engagement hold that, although we are beset by major problems, we can and should mobilise either to reduce their impact or to transcend them. This is an optimistic outlook, but one bound up with contestatory action rather than a faith in rational analysis and discussion. (137)

Giddens, who apparently identifies with this orientation, concludes that its 'prime vehicle is the social movement'.

Giddens relates each of four types of social movement to each of his four institutional dimensions of a globalised modernity. The first two are 'old', in the sense of being related to earlier periods of capitalist development. Thus, against capital accumulation and a capitalist world economy there is posed the labour movement. And against surveillance, as expressed internationally in the nation-state system, there are posed democratic movements, whether of the bourgeois, nationalist or contemporary human-rights types. Unlike tradi-

tional Marxists, Giddens considers surveillance and the nation-state system as providing a distinct site of struggle, and the movements related to these as distinguishable from that of labour. Whilst the next two movements are new, Giddens recognises their earlier roots. Against the industrialisation of violence, and the world military order this implies, is posed the peace movement, concerned with the control or abolition of institutionalised violence - particularly as the latter has become a global threat. Against industrialism, problems of the created environment, and the inequalities of the international division of labour, he poses the ecological movement.

2.4. *A realistic utopia*

Since Giddens sees our present civilisation in terms of a 'radicalised modernity', 'post-modernity' would be a surpassing of the earlier-mentioned institutions and processes. Such a post-modern civilisation is characterised in terms of a need for models (plural) of 'utopian realism'. Giddens here both approaches and distances himself from Marx. He proposes a contemporary equivalent of Marx's attempt to identify both tendencies immanent in the existing global system and transformatory global forces. Like Marx, he does not present a detailed plan of a desired future society but he does indicate the broad 'contours of a post-modern order' (164) and 'the dimensions of a post-scarcity system' globally (166). Each of these relates to his quadripartite models of modernisation and globalisation. Thus, the post-modern order implies: 1) the surpassing of markets in a post-scarcity system; 2) the humanisation of technology; 3) a multifaceted democratic participation, and 4) demilitarisation.

Extrapolated to the global level this implies: 1) a socialised (not socialist) economic system; 2) planetary ecological care; 3) a coordinated global order, and 4) the transcendence of war. Giddens also proposes an appropriate theoretical orientation for such a transformation:

It must be sociologically sensitive - alert to the immanent institutional transformations which modernity constantly opens to the

has been a product of globalisation and producer of 'globalisation'. He has an interesting discussion of Albro's (1990) five stages in the history of sociology: universalism (Saint-Simon, Comte, Marx), national sociologies (connected with academic professionalisation, mostly in industrialised capitalist countries), internationalism (post-World War Two, with its US and Soviet universalisations), indigenisation (thirdworldist), and globalisation (contemporary). Robertson offers a thought-provoking typology of possible globalisation models, cast in *gemeinschaft/gesellschaft* (community/society) terms (78-9). He allows more space than most globalisation theorists to feminism (105-8). But his most interesting and original chapter, at least for me, is that addressed to The Search for Fundamentals in Global Perspective' (Chapter 11). This forcefully raises the issue of new reactionary, fundamentalist or conservative social movements - and internationalisms. The latter have not yet received in my work the attention they evidently deserve.

3 A point made, at least implicitly, by Anthony McGrew in the Open University collection (McGrew 1992:69). In interpreting Giddens I have been further provoked and helped by Simon Bromley's (1991) review of four major socialist works on postmodernism. Bromley, however, gives Giddens' treatment of globalisation little direct attention and considers his book 'for the most part' empty of political relevance (145). I consider it richly suggestive and, in so far as it is not detailed, I think it is possible to work out implications. I will try to

future; it must be politically, indeed, geopolitically, tactical, in the sense of recognising that moral commitments and 'good faith' can themselves be potentially dangerous in a world of high-consequence risks; it must create models of the good society which are limited neither to the sphere of the nation-state nor to only one of the institutional dimensions of modernity; and it must recognise that emancipatory politics needs to be linked with life politics, or a politics of self-actualisation.

The distinction in the last part of this quotation corresponds roughly to the traditional one between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. By 'emancipatory politics' is here meant liberation from inequality or oppression. By 'life politics' action which surpasses the denial of the Other, and which provides conditions for the fulfilment of the needs of all.

2.5. Aspects and implications

1. Time-space stretching.

Giddens rejects the notion of 'society' as the proper subject of sociology, in so far as society is traditionally identified with the nation-state - this being rarely theorised or interrogated (13). He rather proposes as subject matter that of how time and space are bound in a particular social system. The nation-state is here seen historically, as not only representing a novel social structure with distinctly defined borders, but also as a particular form, level or moment of a continuing 'time-space distancing' (14). The process of separation of space from place (*locale*) is essential to modernisation:

In pre-modern societies, space and place largely coincide, since the spatial dimensions of social life are, for most of the population, and in most respects, dominated by 'presence' - localised activities. The advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction. In conditions of modernity... locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them. (19)

As a process that continues apace today it is also one that begins to question the significance of the nation-state as a society. However, this evidently does not imply the disappearance of the nation-state, the locality, or of face-to-face relations. The process by which significant relations are 'disembedded' from the locality is complemented by a 're-embedding' of such distanced relationships in the locale.

Globalisation, according to Giddens, is and always has been an essential characteristic of modernisation and modernity. It has, moreover, always had contradictory implications. The contradictory effect of globalisation is shown in the possibility of its both moving identification beyond the nation-state and of strengthening pressures for local autonomy or cultural identity. This argument would seem to allow for the existence of regionalism/separatism and ethnic or religious affirmation, which can also lean in anti- and post-modern directions.

2. The relation -with and to the Other.

Reference to the global is not so much an implication or endpoint as the underlay of Giddens' argument throughout. He is also sensitive to the 'other' - the identity or identities so often negated, repressed or forgotten in traditional universalising discourses. He recognises that even movements and strategies that explicitly recognise such others this can be redefined in divisive ways (163). So how does he himself deal with the prioritised others of contemporary progressive discourses - the 'non-Western' and the women?

In specific recognition of his own concentration on the industrialised capitalist world, Giddens asks whether modernity (and his own post-modern radical utopia) is a Western project (Chapter 6). In terms of the impact of the nation-state and capitalist production, he answers in the affirmative. In terms of globalisation he implies that it cannot be, given that we are talking of forms of interdependence and awareness that are a response to the earlier-mentioned impact. And with respect to the permanent critical self-reflection fundamental

to the dynamic of the system, he responds with a qualified affirmative:

Discursive argumentation, including that which is constitutive of natural science, involves criteria that override cultural differentiations. There is nothing 'Western' about this if the commitment to such argumentation, as a means of resolving disputes, is forthcoming. (176)

Whilst this general orientation might seem to provide space for non-Western perceptions, affirmations and demands, Giddens provides no examples of or references to such. We will have to confront this issue in the section on solidarity below.

Whilst the non-West receives at least a couple of pages, women (and feminism) receive but a footnote (161-2). Here Giddens admits the 'conspicuous absence' of feminism from his quadripartite model of social movements, whilst recognising the challenge of feminism to all past and present forms of social order, as well as to thinking about an alternative civilisation.

3. *Social democracy and socialism.* Giddens does not see social movements as the fount of all transformatory wisdom nor the sole source of this power. He speaks of contradictions between the demands of the oppressed, the beneficial changes that can be brought about by the 'differential power held only by the privileged' (155), and even of those brought about unintentionally. Whilst he does not specify or exemplify - far less theorise - here he also considers public opinion, business corporations, national governments and international organisations as 'fundamental to the achieving of basic reforms', stating that

Sympathy for the plight of the underdog is integral to all forms of emancipatory politics, but realising the goals involved often depends upon the intervention of the agencies of the privileged. (162)

In a 1992 article directly reflecting on the possible future of socialism, Giddens pro-

poses to reformulate socialism today to express humanity's common concern for the stewardship of its resources. Socialism... would no longer be regarded primarily as an alternative method of managing and distributing the fruits of industrial production... The 'one way' of producing an economically effective, yet reasonably just, economic order within national states is social democracy, a workable mix of market and limited state economic intervention. (Giddens 1992:60. Original stress)

Giddens then relates this national-level formula to the global post-scarcity economic order mentioned earlier.

2.6. *Radicalised -modernity as a complex, globalised information capitalism?*

The Giddens model would seem to provide an adequate underlay for my general argument. Yet it is important to treat it as a point of departure rather than one of arrival. It is also worthwhile suggesting other ways of understanding a globalised modernity, its dangers, its discontents and its possible surpassing. Below I will consider in turn: 1) the formal model; 2) the subordination of information/culture, the non-West, and women; 3) Giddens's particular(istic?) view of space and time; 4) his problematic relationship to capitalism; 5) his equally problematic one to socialism.

L. The formal model: weight beyond -words. Let me start with the most formal but also the most striking part of the argument, the quadripartite model of modernity, globalisation, social movements, their aims, and a realistic post-modern utopia, as presented in Figure 1. Any such model, particularly if it can be represented graphically, carries a weight that goes far beyond words. Anthony McGrew (1992:69-74) suggests that globalisation theories fall into two camps, the uncausal (e.g. Capitalism, Technology, or Patriarchy) and the multicausal (as offered, e.g., by Sklair 1991» Ekins 1992). This may not be the most significant distinction but the implications of each bear consideration. A formal problem with uncausal models, it seems to me, is not simply

do this later. A commentator more sympathetic to Giddens is Stuart Corbridge (1991:26-30). Likewise, Corbridge evidently considers the encounter

between a contemporary Marxism and Giddens a productive one. Corbridge, unfortunately, does not discuss the implications of Giddens for social movements globally but remains locked within the discourses of development and aid, something I will also return to later. Robertson (1992) devotes a chapter to Giddens, and rightly points to the peripheralisation of culture within his model. He further considers that Giddens fails to provide empirical evidence for his 'politics of self-actualisation' (145). Evidence, here again, seems to lie in the mind of the reader. I know of, and can add, plenty of evidence to what Giddens suggests in outline. By dismissing Giddens' 'institutionalist' approach to globalisation, Robertson merely puts his own 'culturalist' one in question.

4 Amongst those emphasising the cultural dynamics of globalism are the contributors to the volume edited by Featherstone (1990). These tend to see cultural globalisation as intimately related to that of capitalism. But for Bergesen (1990), pre-capitalist culture provided the conditions for the creation of the modern inter-state system and therefore, presumably, for capitalist globalisation. For Leslie Sklair, the 'culture-ideology of consumerism' is one of the three defining characteristics of globalisation (Sklair 1991:72-81). Walter Truett Anderson (1990: Part 5) presents global civilisation as so far representing a show one can watch rather than a civilisation in which all do, or might, participate (232-3). Understanding culture in its broadest sense, as knowledge, we can find Manuel Castells (1992:207) talking of a 'new informational mode of development', suggesting that 'knowledge' is replacing capital and labour as the source of productivity (206).

5 The three-part triangle and spectrum turn out on closer inspection to be binaries also. East-West-South actually suggests opposition/attraction on each of the three axes. The insertion of a 'semi-periphery' into the other figure turns a binary opposition into a spectrum but no more undermines the polar logic of the original than would the addition of a 'semi-core'.

their reductionism but their accompaniment (explicit or implicit) by equally reduced opposites: capital/labour, capitalism/socialism, patriarchy/matriarchy(?). And also perhaps their consequent invitation to either simple endorsement, or equally simple negation. Multifactor models lack such magical qualities and invite addition and subtraction, or other qualification. Here are some questions, addressed to the Giddens model: what is being included/excluded, and why? if four, why not five or three? are the four actually equivalents, equally autonomous, interdependent and determining, as such a diagram suggests?

2. *Sub-ordinations.* Important forces, institutions, contradictions, movements and counter-discourses either excluded or reduced to others would be those related to information/culture, to the non-West and the non-men.

Giddens does not, firstly, give information/communication/culture any autonomous role, treating the increasing centrality of information simply as something underlying his four complexes and processes. This means that the former show up neither as autonomous, nor as significant in terms of (global) social movements, nor amongst the characteristics of an alternative (world) order. Such a subordination is implicitly or explicitly questioned by those who deal with 'culture' or 'information' as either the prime characteristic of contemporary (post, high) modernism, or as the cutting edge of capitalist modernisation and globalisation.⁴

Reviewing a number of writers on information and the current transformation of capitalism globally, John Allen (1992:182) insists that one thing they all agree on is precisely 'the central importance of knowledge and information in the transition' - even if the question of what the transition is to remains unclear or disputed. The diagram he presents of the movement from an industrial to an information capitalism, is not incompatible with the image of a radicalised and globalised modernity suggested by Giddens. Let us consider the matter further. Mark Poster (1984, 1990) offers us the concept of a 'mode of information', making explicit ref-

erence to Marx' mode of production. He does not propose the abolition or dissolution of the former concept. He rather proposes that one can - as with the mode of production - use it as a significant way of looking at history. Furthermore, he suggests, the 'mode of information' is now at least as central to social processes as the mode of production (Poster 1990). Poster argues that one can no longer assume, as did Marx, that people working on things is the 'basic paradigm of practice' (1984:53). He further suggests that in the age of information capitalism, historical materialism 'finds its premise in power that is the effect of discourse/practice' (54). Complementary to this argument would be that of Alberto Melucci (1989:205-6) who considers struggles around information (revealing what is concealed, interpreting what is revealed) as one of the central characteristics of new social movements in contemporary 'complex' society.

The case would seem to be strong for the identification of information itself as an autonomous source of dominating power, and therefore of contradiction, discontent, social protest, and of an alternative democratic and pluralist order.

Does not the Giddens model, further, simply make North/South contradictions disappear? A strength of Giddens is precisely the undermining of such traditional binaries of radical international relations theory as Imperialism:Nationalism, North:South, West:East, the Three Worlds, Centre-Semiperiphery- Periphery, etc.⁵ Some of these have been, or are being, dissolved by social transformation rather than theoretical introspection. Thus the East, or Second World, of Communism has largely self-destructed, and an increasingly diversified and fractured Third World has been hastened to both logical and socio-political doom by the disappearance of the Second. But is not the conceptual death of such structures/ideologies as imperialism/ nationalism, North/South somewhat premature? The recent work of Susan George (1992) simultaneously confirms the old binary oppositions and subverts them. Third World debt (exemplifying Northern/

South exploitation/domination) is here presented as a boomerang, inflicting environmental, drug, tax, unemployment, mass immigration and war damage/threats on the North (or at least the peoples thereof). Consider the admittedly protean concept of imperialism, taking two familiar appearances, those of military intervention and economic domination. As David Slater has said (talking of the disappearance of imperialism in radical-geographic thinking), such an absence is strangely out of touch with the geopolitical realities of world power. Prior to 1989, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War, the strategy of low-intensity warfare waged against Nicaragua, and the bombing of Libya were only some of the more overt and obvious examples of an imperialism which is hardly 'undermined' or moribund. (Slater 1992:314). And, as Slater further implies, in so far as there is no recognition of the specificity of the (otherwise protean) South, nationalist movements there may be understood only within the traditional framework of an 'ethnocentric universalism' (307).

One binary opposition that Giddens does not seem to overcome is that between modernity and...pre-modernity?...tradition? In so far as one neither addresses the Third World, nor discusses its theorists, may one not implicitly perceive this world area as the depository of tradition? And its anti-modern movements as not simply re-actionary but reactionary? Latin-American thinkers have conceptualised their own situation in terms of 'mixed times' (Vargas 1992:196-7), referring to the simultaneous experience of the pre-, the modern, and the post-. Vargas herself draws on the writings of Calderón (1987, 1988), concerned, significantly, with how to think about modernity without ceasing to be Bolivian/Indian. Without entering further into this literature, it occurs to me that it raises questions about how we consider modernity/globalisation more generally. 'Mixed times', should perhaps be comprehended not as a particular moment, nor at a particular place, but as an essential part of our new worldview. In this manner we can see how it is that pre-capitalist or pre-colombian experiences or memories in Latin America speak to

post-capitalist projects in Europe - as they do. And how we can see both liberal/socialist internationalism and contemporary global solidarity projects prefigured in the Christian ecumene (Tenbruck 1990:198). A contemporary Radical Modernity, and future Realistic Utopias, should therefore be seen less as alternative mappings than transparent overlays, through which earlier epochs can be seen, have to be accounted for, and make their marks.

In like manner we should consider 'globalisation' not as replacing 'imperialism/nationalism', or even 'East/West' but either over- or underlying them. One could begin to address the problem by giving the terms more value-loaded and meaningful, titles. These could be such as: a) world capital extraction/accumulation; b) ecological despoliation;⁶ c) hegemonic regimes; d) military/ police repression. Such terms would seem to allow for what is customarily handled in the traditional terms but without the logical singularity, historical permanency and geographical fixity the previous ones implied.

What of gender, women's movements and feminist strategy in the Giddens model? In his feminist footnote Giddens speaks of gender only in terms of feminism as a political movement. He further implies that the oppression of women predates modernity, that feminism provides a major source of critique of modernity, and that feminist movements are 'complex and crosscut the institutional dimensions of modernity' (162). That the problem predates, that it is implicitly non-institutional, and that the movement crosscuts, seems hardly enough reason to exclude it from a model containing other pre-modern elements (surveillance, military) and other problematically institutional ones (industrialism). In an early critique of capital and class reductionism in world-system theory, R.W. Connell (1984) identifies the reconstruction of gender, sexuality and domestic life as one of the three crucial aspects of capitalist internationalisation. More recently we find Sylvia Walby (1992:33) arguing that race, class and gender are the key mutually determining systems of modernity - nationally and internationally. She thus implicitly questions a model

6 Giddens' 'internacional division of labour' seems in any case an eccentric way of expressing the global implications of industrialism, itself specified in terms of the created environment.

that excludes not only gender but also race/ethnicity.⁷ The case for identifying women, gender and sexuality within the figure is implicitly made by Giddens himself when he recognises the importance of the feminist movement and thought. It is not necessary to see 'patriarchal capitalism' as the name of the global game. But it is necessary to see the repeated and differentiated manipulations of sex-gender relations, the multifarious subordinations of women and sexual minorities, as both characteristic of modernity and a source of growing discontent with it (the same could be obviously be said for race/ethnicity).

7 Regrettably, I have been able to find neither a feminist critique nor a feminist alternative to contemporary globalisation theory. Hall, Held and McGrew (1992), with its male-voice editorial and authorial choir, hardly mentions gender. Grant and Newland (1991) seem to be more concerned with getting gender into interna-

tional relations theory than getting women out of them. Runyan and Peterson (1991) seem likewise more intent on breathing feminist life into 'realist' international relations theory than in creating an alternative to such. And Cynthia Enloe (1990), whose work represents the most powerful feminist critique of commonsense understandings of international relations, addresses herself explicitly neither to globalisation nor to theory more generally. For an interesting comment on such feminist theories, see Robertson (1992:105-8).
8 A similar point was also made to me by Argentinean social-movement specialist, Elizabeth Jelin, who, whilst herself evidently sympathetic to earlier versions of my argument, wondered what it could mean to that majority of the poor in Buenos Aires who never move beyond a five kilometer radius from their homes. We will have to address this crucial problem.

3. *A particularistic universalisation of time and space?* Giddens' notion of time/space distanciation and its ambiguous effects is one of several recent attempts to understand the experience of modernisation/globalisation. A related one is that of Harvey (1989), although he uses the term 'time-space compression', which he also sees as accelerating at particular moments in the cycle of capitalist accumulation. McGrew (1992:68) generalises these in terms of two inter-related dimensions, 1) scope or stretch and 2) intensity or deepening. One similarity of both the Giddens and Harvey accounts is recognition of the relationship of space/time stretching/compression to a eurocentric universalism and hence a eurocentric globalisation project. There appears to be another similarity, an apparent acceptance of such as a universal, unavoidable, irreversible and unchangeable process - even if one with deeply contradictory and even dehumanising implications. The first problem with such an assumption is identified by David Slater (in a critique of Harvey rather than Giddens):

Meaning, including the spatial, is socially constructed. Hence the deployment of a particular universal concept such as 'class' or 'capital' or 'gender' outside a consideration of the discursive constructions which gives these concepts different meanings in different societies, will disguise the particularity being given to the 'universal'. (Slater 1992 :318)

The point is generalised by Doreen Massey (1991), whose treatment suggests the need for a differentiation according to class, ethnicity and gender as well as 'world'. Her argument is not only that different social groups and individuals are differently placed in relation to time-space compression but that some have more 'initiative' whilst others 'receive' and yet others are 'imprisoned'. I will pick out three of her categories (which could in any case be infinitely extended). There are 1) those who are in charge of time-space compression and able to get most advantage from it - corporate investors, film distributors and currency dealers, the jetsetters and emailers; 2) those who have both contributed in one sense but are imprisoned in another - slum-dwellers of Rio, who may be a source for both global football and global music but may never have been to downtown Rio (or, it occurs to me, to the UNCED global ecology conference in Rio);⁸ 3) a group on the fringe of the first category, including those Western academics and journalists 'who write most about it' (Massey 1991-26). Massey's third category - which needs to include many 'Southern' intellectuals ('Westernised' or not) is important for two reasons: 1) it enables us to see that theories of space-time compression are not ineffable emanations of social science but reflections/expressions of people occupying specific subject positions; 2) it enables those in such positions (including myself) to relate their experiences/ideas to those of the second category - which is what Massey herself is evidently attempting to do. Massey also recognises the way in which feelings of insecurity can lead people (including the right and left people) to a hypostatized notion of the locale as a bounded and unchanging space with a fixed meaning, identified with an equally unambiguous sense of community. She questions all these assumptions: locales are not so bounded; they are not unchanging; they have no fixed meaning; they do not necessarily coincide with community:

On the one hand communities can exist without being in the same place - from networks of friends with like interests, to major religious, ethnic or political communities. On

the other hand, the instances of places housing single 'communities' in the sense of coherent social groups are probably - and, I would argue, have for long been - quite rare. Moreover, even where they do exist this in no way implies a single sense of place. (28)

She herself suggests the possibility for conceiving locales as meeting places - today as a consciousness of links that make each site a complex of the local and the global. What would seem to follow from all this would be a radical politics of global time and space that 1) criticised the exploitative and repressive implications of globalisation, 2) differentiated itself from dominant projects and conservative or merely—defensive alternatives, 3) proposed differentiated strategies for localities and categories, 3) made such different interests/aspirations visible and brought them into dialogue with each other.⁹ Such an orientation is at least implied in the work of Chhachhi and Pittin (1991) when they recognise the limitations imposed on women workers' self-organisation by time (its availability), place (location of work/struggle) and space (the psychological or strategic room for manoeuvre, negotiation and challenge).

⁹ The theoretical basis for a radical global politics of time is provided by Jeremy Rifkin's *Time Wars* (1987). Rifkin considers this struggle to be the 'primary conflict in human history'. It is certainly a vital one. He sees it also as cross-cutting traditional conflicts between Right and Left (a classical spatial metaphor). Faster, he argues, does not mean better, it only means more efficiency for those who stand at the top of the social hierarchy. The growing tension between natural or body time and what he calls artificial time, is now being increasingly challenged by movements that say, at least implicitly, 'slow is beautiful'. He spells out political implications for the workplace (235-6) as well as for other domains.

6. *The problematic relationship to capital and labour.* Simon Bromley (1991:143) identifies an ambiguity in Giddens' argument in so far as the latter has four analytically distinct forces yet also appears to prioritise capital and the nation-state (e.g. Giddens 1990:62). I would myself be inclined to argue that even if one was to accept Giddens' quartet, the most dynamic force is that of capital accumulation. It would be paradoxical if this should not be recognised in the epoch of 'Berlin, Baghdad, Rio' (Lipietz 1992). The visible hand of the market colours the transformations that these names evoke. This is so even if 'Berlin' is taken to signify the crisis of statist socialism, 'Baghdad' the crisis of statist populism, 'Rio' the crisis of global ecology. What is crucial to the still-vague Western ideas of a New World Order is primarily an extension of the market (plus competitive party politics, the ideology of possessive individualism, the culture of consumerism). Industrialism, administrative,

patriarchal and military power have already been well established in East and South. Missing has been the unrestricted role of the market. The notion of a modernity that is not essentially capitalist, in other words, seems more suited to a pre-1989 period in which there existed a 'Socialist' and 'Third' World than to our present one.

If Giddens appears to both want to eat his capitalism and still have it (and even if he does not), perhaps one can propose a more positive solution. It would seem possible to suggest a primacy to capital accumulation in the process of globalisation, without any simple determinacy, and without prioritising the labour: capital or imperialist: nationalist contradictions. We would then have a model of capitalist modernisation and globalisation, but in which this is increasingly dependent on management - of information/communication/culture, of ecology, of the military, of relations between genders, ethnicities, 'worlds'. In so far as one recognises the interdependency of these (or other spheres), in an increasingly intensive and delicately-balanced set of operations, and in so far as one recognises that dominating power is expressed at all levels within each, there can and need be no prioritisation of struggle areas or levels. Weak links in the circular chain of a complex, globalised and informatised capitalism are no longer limited to a particular territorial site or position, nor to a specific social relation or contradiction. Nor can they be definitively identified by rational activity before the event. They are rather to be found by social movements, separately, in dialogue and alliance. And, as Giddens' suggests, they will rather be found by radical engagement related to contestatory action than by ratiocination.

It might seem churlish to criticise Giddens' model of capitalism for its lack of specificity, since - in a book of under 200 pages - the three other lines are traced in no greater detail. But if one believes that capitalist accumulation is the most dynamic of the four forces, it is necessary to specify the nature of its current global transformation. I believe it is possible to do this without undoing the Giddens model.

Indeed, the nature of this change is one that may give it added force. And this specification is, in any case, necessary if we are to understand the possible future of global labour solidarity.

I will draw on Alien's (1992) overview of the debate on post-industrialism and post-Fordism, since this follows on his discussion of information and addresses the global economy. I will do this selectively, thus offering a limited image only of the transition. The nature of this is, in any case, disputed between theorists and recognised by a number as ambiguous. I believe, further, that the rapidity of changes in the amount of waged work; in its nature; in its separation by labour market; in the balance and distribution of such nationally, regionally and globally; and in the nature of its products - that all this suggests the necessity for radically rethinking labour movement strategies, from the local to the global level. Let us spell this out.

The key to the contemporary transformation of the capitalist economy and waged work is the leading role played by knowledge and information. In the form of information technology, or computerised equipment (both in production and as product), it is connected with a reduction in the total demand for labour, a shift in control within the labour process from the machine operator to the technician, from economies of scale (mass production) to those of scope (batch production for 'niche' markets), from production to services, to decentralisation of production (whilst retaining central managerial or financial control), and to networking relations between such central controllers. Some see this leading to a new polarisation, 1) within national labour forces (skilled, secure, white, male versus unskilled, part-time/temporary, non-white, female), and 2) between an informatised North and an industrial (or at least partly-industrial) South. Such an image might suggest possibilities for a new kind of class-like alliance nationally and internationally. But others see this process as simultaneously undermining an identity based on labour and creating the basis for the new cross-class social movements (questioning the continuing subor-

dination within, and enslavement by, work, the nature of products, the ethic of competition, consumerism, growth, etc).

Alien raises two interesting questions here, one relating to the increasing interpenetration of development and underdevelopment, the other the implications of unevenness in a world in which cities or national economies increasingly become interchangeable sites for production, finance and services:

Alongside the financial and commercial practices of New York and London, for example, we find the sweatshops and outworking practices that are more often associated with Third World economies. Yet they are not opposing developments and nor are they unrelated. There is no simple equation of finance with post-industrialism and the informal practices often undertaken by a migrant workforce with pre-industrialism. On the contrary, they are part and parcel of the same global economic forces which are eroding the identity of the West as the 'Rest', as it were, move to the centres of the modern world. (202)

And:

If national economies increasingly become 'sites' across which international forces flow, with some parts of a country passed over by the new growth dynamics, then the new uneven global order will very likely be characterised by more than one line of economic direction within and between countries. (202-2)

The major question is the following: what possible basis or role is there for a labour movement - locally, nationally, regionally and globally - in a world in which wage labour is being destroyed, de-structured, re-structured, imported and exported, and in which any notion of a 'working-class culture' is being undermined not only by repeated changes in the amount, type and site of labour, but also in its consumption patterns and lifestyles? I have elsewhere argued (Waterman 1993a) for a 'social movement unionism', in other words for

a unionism that not only allies with the new social movements but incorporates their demands, and which responds to their new organisational forms and practices. This proposal recognises that those who labour for or under capitalism do not only exist for and identify with wage labour and as wage labourers, but that they are also urban residents, women, have ethnic or racial identities, need peace, a healthy environment, etc. I have also proposed a strategy for a 'new labour internationalism' which expressed related principles for cross-national relationships (Waterman 1988). What is, perhaps, still necessary is a more direct address to wage-work, its changing nature, and changing experiences of this.

It would seem to me an error to suggest some kind of 'post-industrial', 'post-Fordist' strategy for 'New Times' (Hall and Jacques 1989), based on current changes and current experiences of labour, or - given its current disaggregation - on particular national or international segments/layers thereof. The new model, in any case, does not imply the disappearance of the old one. It can, in a country like India, even co-exist with bonded labour. Nor does the new model imply the disappearance of domestic labour. It would seem to me that what is here called for is a new understanding of work under a capitalism that is - admittedly - increasingly informatised and globalised. This means developing a strategy that will not be outdated by the rapidity of movement in the labour process, the product or the site. Nor by the possible appearance of yet newer models, yet more complex syntheses of ancient, old, modern and 'post-modern'. Here are three proposed elements of such a strategy, addressed respectively to 1) hierarchy and authoritarianism within waged work, 2) the nature of work as a multifaceted human activity, 3) space-time compression as it affects the above.¹⁰

1. *Struggles against authoritarianism within the wage-labour situation* are traditional to the labour movement, expressed in terms of 'workers' control', 'workers' self-management' or 'workers' participation'. Recent writing here, however, is taking these beyond

the traditional framework by recognising the crisis of socialist strategies, by taking a truly international comparative perspective (including, for example, tropical African experiences and South African union policy), or by making connections between labour demands and those of the new social movements (see Bayat 1991, and the review article of Webster 1991). The work of Bayat is exceptional not only in its historical and international scope, or its reference to the new technology, but in its address to democracy more generally, its awareness of the new social issues and movements, and its response to a range of contemporary literature on alternative social models. Bayat does not see democratisation within work as confined to 'advanced' countries or workers. He suggests the following possibilities even within the Third World: 1) 'natural' workers' control in the petty-commodity sector; 2) the democratisation of cooperatives; 3) state-sponsored forms resulting from worker pressure; 4) union attempts to influence enterprise management and national development policy; 5) efforts of plant-level unions to counter employers' attacks resulting from changing industrial structures (172). Bayat suggests not only the revival of the intimate early relationship between the labour and democratic movements. He also suggests a little-explored terrain for international labour/socialist solidarity activity.

2. *Liberation from work* is the strategy of Gorz (1989) - who seems to believe there can be no such humanisation within it as suggested by Bayat. Gorz has produced a challenging critique of the ideology of work that dominates the international trade-union movement as much as it does the capitalist (or statist) media. This ideology holds that 1) the more each works, the better off all will be; 2) that those who do little or no work are acting against the interests of the community; 3) that those who work hard achieve success and those who don't have only themselves to blame. He points out that today the connection between more and better has been broken and that the problem now is one of producing differently, producing other things, even working less. Gorz distin-

¹⁰ The first two arguments below are taken from Waterman 1993a.

guishes between work for economic ends (the definition of work under capitalism/statism), domestic labour, work for 'oneself' (primarily the additional task of women), and autonomous activity (artistic, relational, educational, mutual-aid, etc). He argues for a movement from the first type to the third, and for the second one to be increasingly articulated with the third rather than subordinated to the first.

Gorz points out that, with the new technologies, it will be possible within a few years, in the industrialised capitalist countries, to reduce average working hours from 1,600 to 1,000 a year without a fall in living standards. Under capitalist conditions, of course, what is likely to happen is a division of the active population into 25 percent of skilled, permanent and unionised workers, 25 percent insecure and unskilled peripheral workers, and 50 percent semi-unemployed, unemployed or marginalised workers, doing occasional or seasonal work. If the trade unions are not to be reduced to some kind of neo-corporatist mutual-protection agency for the skilled and privileged, they will, Gorz argues, have to struggle for liberation from work:

The liberation from work for economic ends, through reductions in working hours and the development of other types of activities, self-regulated and self-determined by the individuals involved, is the only way to give positive meaning to the savings in wage labour brought about by the current technological revolution. The project for a society of liberated time, in which everyone will be able to work but will work less and less for economic ends, is the possible meaning of the current historical developments. Such a project is able to give cohesion and a unifying perspective to the different elements that make up the social movement since 1) it is a logical extension of the experience and struggles of workers in the past; 2) it reaches beyond that experience and those struggles towards objectives which correspond to the interests of both workers and non-workers, and is thus able to cement bonds of solidarity and common political will between them; 3) it corresponds to the aspirations of the ever-growing proportion of men and women who

wish to (re)gain control in and of their own lives.

Gorz shows no awareness of the existence of a world of labour outside the West. But, in case it should be thought that struggle against wage labour is the privilege only of 'labour aristocrats' in industrialised capitalist welfare states, it should be pointed out that it is with the struggle for the eight-hour working day that the international trade-union movement was born in the 1890s, and that similar national or international strategies have been proposed within Latin America (Sulmont 1988) and the USA (Brecher and Costello 1991). The importance of Gorz' argument lies precisely in its rooting within international labour movement history and contemporary union concerns, and the explicit connections made with the new social movements - or, if you like, with those interests and identities of workers that unions currently ignore or repress.

3. *A labour strategy on time-space compression.* In so far as we recognise space-time compression as a crucial implication of a capitalist modernity, neither enthusiastic welcome, resigned acceptance nor angry denunciation would seem adequate. What would seem to be needed is specific labour-movement strategies. Labour has traditionally had explicit strategies on time and implicit ones on space (in so far as it argued for regional industrialisation, housing and urban services or planning, and even for national protectionism). But restrictions of working hours have often been literally traded for cash or other benefits (Brecher and Costello 1990). And remaining state-endorsed limitations on capitalist control of these have been seriously undermined by neo-liberalism and globalisation. In so far as there are strategies of dominant forces (military, industrial/environmental, administrative, as well as capitalist) for particular space-time compressions, there need to be alternatives from labour (and other social movements). Some such issues are implicitly being raised around the USA-Canada-Mexico Free Trade Area, a project which proposes a single space for capital and goods but separate ones for people and peoples. Some labour and associ-

11 The case I have in mind is a successful strike against 'outsourcing' at the Lordstown plant of General Motors in Ohio, USA. As one commentator pointed out:

For a union to specify which plant will take the brunt of a sales slump is unprecedented and seems likely to accentuate - rather than alleviate - rivalry between competing workforces. It could well put a dent in future efforts at international solidarity. (Slaughter 1992:5)

12 Not, therefore, in a country like the United Kingdom. I recently scanned a wide national and international range of revolutionary socialist publications in a British bookshop - a depressing experience. There were so many of them, so like each other, with so little to say, especially about the proletarian and socialist internationalism that each claimed to best understand and truly represent. One of them was presenting a carefully sanitised image of Peru's Shining Path Communists - itself a demonstration of what happens to a socialism that isolates itself and its followers from other social movements and socialists nationally and internationally. The papers reminded me of a riddle: 'It sits in a corner and gets smaller and smaller. What is it?' The answer in this case is 'a group of r-revolutionary socialists with a journal'. An alternative image

might be the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland. In the wonderland of revolutionary socialism the last thing to disappear is the newspaper...and its doctrine on the inevitability of international proletarian revolution.

ated democratic movements are beginning to question 'fast-track' decision-taking and the consequent movements of capital, industry and labour (but not of best-practice working and environmental conditions). An explicit awareness of time-space compression might, for example, help US autoworkers avoid the adoption of strategies which are not only based on a narrow spatial identity (US) and therefore possibly hostile to relevant others (Mexico, Canada), but which seem likely to be rapidly circumvented by a capitalism whose timing and freedom of movement here have been checked only at one place/time."

4. *Getting from social-democracy to a realistic utopianism.* Giddens does not relate his social-democratic strategy to 'actually existing social-democracy', nationally or internationally. Nor does he explain how historical social democracy - both a significant creator and creature of the modernity and globalisation he criticises, can itself become a major political means for its surpassing. Adam Przeworski (1985) says of national social democracy that it has done much to civilise capitalism but that transforming it is another matter entirely. No more can be said of international social democracy, nor of international projects inspired by such, like the Brandt Report (Elson 1983) and the Brundtland Report (Visvanathan 1991). On the other hand - and to the evident chagrin of revolutionary socialists - social democracy is still around, in West, East and South, whilst revolutionary socialism appears largely confined to restricted parts of the South. These are former dictatorships having limited mass familiarity with revolutionary socialism locally and/or knowledge of state socialism abroad - such as Brazil, the Philippines or South Africa.¹² So socialists need to take social democracy as seriously as they need to take liberal democracy. Whatever its crimes and errors (such as its truly miserable record on colonialism), social democracy never permitted itself to be dominated by the 'pie in the sky if you try' socialism of its left competitors. It has retained or gained considerable mass following and influence, and it provides a contestable terrain for democratic socialists and social movements. Finally, as the

socialists of Brazil, the Philippines or South Africa attempt to come to terms with globalisation, many of them may be drawn to social democracy also.

This does not mean that one need accept Giddens' vision of social democracy - or revision of socialism - as humanity's 'common concern for the stewardship of its resources' (1992:60). This is, surely, less a socialist than a humanist or ecological aspiration, and then of such an ethereal nature that one hopes contemporary humanists or ecologists will reject it for something with more teeth. An alternative would be to preserve the intimate relationship of socialism with the issue of labour, and therefore with the labour movement. But then to place this movement, with its ideology and institutions, in a dynamic and constructive relationship with others. This seems to be the vision of John Mathews (1959), in dealing with the new social movements and labour in Australia. In a more global view of a transitional Strategy, Mary Mellor (1992) offers something slightly different. She attempts a synthesis between ecology, feminism, socialism (and a personal spiritualism). In both cases, a route is suggested from a recognisable empirical here to a desired Utopian there. It may be that, in looking for such a route, various radical democratic movements will also reinvent the meaning of socialism. Self-identified social democrats will certainly contribute to the search. But, given the current condition of both socialism and social-democracy, it would seem wiser to commit ourselves, here also, to contestatory action rather than faith in rational analysis.

3. Global civil society

3.1. *A global civil society?*

Here I am going to expand on the line of the Giddens model that addresses itself to administrative power and the struggle against it at the global level. I am concerned in particular with a 'coordinated global order', under-

stood as the institutional requirements of a new kind of global order. I use 'institutional' in a broad sense, to refer not simply to organisations such as a hypothetically-reformed United Nations, but also to the principles necessary to ensure the growing response of such organisations to what we could initially describe as the non-state, non-capitalist sphere.

I will again consider the argument of a particular writer and then discuss it with the help of other literature. But first I need to both defend and explain my use of 'civil society' at the global level. There are in existence other terms, which may seem less eurocentric or more specific to the global. Less eurocentric would be 'third system' (Nerfin 1986, Friedmann 1992:3,6), applied to both national and international levels. Less eurocentric and more specific to the global level would be the Transnational Non-Governmental Organisations (TRANGOs) of Johan Galtung (1980). I find, however, such terms too much tied to particular organisational forms (NGOs in the first case, an individual membership base in the second). Recognising the European and even West European origins of 'civil society', I would nonetheless consider that globalisation has 1) tended to universalise the phenomenon, 2) tended to give it a new anti-capitalist content, 3) caused it to be thus increasingly applied at the global level! Let us consider this further.

The concept of civil society relates traditionally to the city- or nation-state and has developed alongside or against it throughout European history. In the bourgeois and popular struggles against authoritarianism (domestic or foreign-imposed) the concept tended to 1) include the market and domestic sphere alongside voluntary associations and public spaces, and 2) be given a positive and anti-state connotation. The term fell out of use in liberal/reformist and socialist/revolutionary discourse at a period in which the first considered the 'autonomous individual' adequately represented through competing parties and parliamentary democracy, and the second considered the 'masses' as represented through a revolutionary party and the dictatorship of the

proletariat. In both cases, people were in fact obliged to see themselves in (or reduce themselves to) the identities indicated in order to feel represented. This has been an increasing problem for discriminated ethnics, women, immigrants, and for other communities of affect or interest, whose identities and aspirations might cut across party or nation-state lines. Use of the term revived, firstly in Eastern Europe and Latin America, as those protesting against Communist or capitalist dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s sought an expression for the active citizen self-expression and self-organisation they considered a necessary condition for and guarantee of a democratic polity. It was picked up in an India in which both state and left modernisation ideologies and strategies were running out of steam. And also in a Western Europe in which liberal democracy (also in its advanced social-democratic versions) was seen as decreasingly representative (or increasingly empty), in which labour and socialism were losing popular appeal, and in which new social movements and citizen initiatives were raising new issues in new, extra-parliamentary and non-party ways.

Contemporary left usage tends to see civil society as both a non- or anti-capitalist and a non- or anti-state sphere - sometimes including households as well as new social movements, voluntary associations and public spaces. At times, particularly under repressive regimes, civil society is given a simply positive valuation and posed in equally simple opposition to the state - representing oppression, manipulation and alienation. More nuanced argument recognises the interpenetration of the spheres of civil society, market and state. It also recognises the complex and contradictory nature of civil society, in so far as this is understood as including the patriarchal family, religious fundamentalism, racism and other bodies and forces that may 1) be quiet independent of capital and state but 2) be neither democratic in operation nor pluralistic in orientation. (Frankel 1987:202-6, Friedmann 1992, Keane 1988a, b, Kothari 1984,1986, Sikoska 1989).

In using the concept 'global civil society'

I am obviously suggesting that there is some such entity as a globalised capitalism and a global state-order to which it relates, and against which it is posed. Such an understanding is also beginning to find political expression, in some cases in explicit opposition to the (combined) operations of global capital and inter-state organisations (Hamelink 1990, Howard 1992). In so far as the term may nor here be even minimally theorised, it requires some specification.

We cannot, to begin with, simply pose a global civil good against a global capitalist/statist evil. We need to do at least two other things. One is to consider the role of civil society (local, national, global) in struggles in and against those instances of the present global order identified by Giddens, and thus in the creation of his 'coordinated global order'. We must, secondly, recognise civil society as a contradictory and contested terrain, and therefore the need for the democratisation of global civil society. Let us see how such matters are handled by one writer paying increasing attention to the topic.

3.2. A 'cosmopolitan order' according to Held

David Held, who in two previous items has discussed the implications of globalisation for democracy (Held 1991a, b), has now conceived the problem of global democratisation in terms of a 'cosmopolitan order' (Held 1992).

Democracy, for Held, requires first of all the intimate articulation of two processes, the reform of state power and the restructuring of civil society. He here understands civil society in terms of what I might call 'bourgeois civil society' - a civil society under capitalist conditions of private capital ownership and its consequent inequalities. Such an understanding implies that civil society is seen not simply as a structure but as a process - of what I might again call 'the civilisation of society' (the stress being on the word civil). To the hypothetical post-state-socialist question, 'Is it possible to build democracy in one country?', the answer of Held is clearly 'no'.¹³

[D]emocracy can result from, and only from, a nucleus, or federation, of democratic states and societies. Or, to put the point differently, national democracies require international democracy if they are to be sustained and developed in the contemporary era. Paradoxically, perhaps, democracy has to be extended and deepened within and between countries for it to retain its relevance in the 21st century (11)

Furher recognising the decreasing spatial fit between decision-making and the national constituency in liberal democracies (they take decisions affecting unrepresented others; they are affected by decisions made by other national and international instances) Held proposes to show 1) that national-level democracy requires democracy within and between international bodies and relations, and 2) that this is blocked by the 'deep structure' (22) of a) the nation-state system, and b) by the addition to this of the United Nations system. Given this blockage, he proposes his own third alternative system.

The two first models provide essential historical background. The first, the Model of Westphalia is drawn from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It expresses the emergence of a world of sovereign states, which settle disputes bilaterally and by at least the threat of force; which are involved in a low-level of cooperation; which put national interest above any other, and which accept the logic of the principle of effectiveness, that is, the principle that might eventually makes right in the international world - appropriation becomes legitimation. (24)

The UN Charter Model does not so much replace the Westphalia Model as add to it an understanding of the multiplicity of international links, of rights of individuals and peoples (even without states), and pressure to solve conflicts through peaceful means. However, the de facto domination of the inter-state system in 1945 by a small number of powerful nation-states was built into the UN in terms of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, thus leaving the organisation exposed to pres-

13 The traditional question (referring to the dispute between Stalin and Trotsky) was 'Is it possible to build socialism in one country?'. In the East Europe of the Stalin era there were both optimistic and pessimistic replies: 'We don't know: no one has ever tried', or 'Yes, but it's better to live in another one'.

14 Elsewhere, Held (1991a: 153) has distinguished two types of international agency. The first is the technical, efficient and non-controversial, providing simple extensions to services offered by nation-states - such as the International Telecommunications Union. The second type, occupied with key questions of global resources, have been highly politicised, like the UN, World Bank, etc. It is interesting to note that it is precisely the ITU that is identified for its undemocratic control over information policy by Hamelink (1990). Held points out that industrial bodies have recently changed their status within the ITU from being observers to members of its key consultative committees. In a globalised world, bodies like the ITU cannot, in other words, be simple extensions of nation-states, nor efficient (except by their own dubious criteria), and they only remain uncontroversial until their immense power, and the collusion within them of powerful states and multinationals, is revealed by such campaigns as that proposed by Hamelink (1990):

What I propose is the setting up of an international coalition of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) that are active in such fields as human rights, consumer protection, peace, gender, race, communication, research and the environment. The main purpose of such a coalition should be to define and articulate civil concerns in the appropriate multilateral fora [...]

A first step in the civil initiative would be the convening of an international conference of interested INGOs... This conference would begin to formulate a Charter for the Protection of Citizen Concerns in Global Communications.

sure from its most powerful (or richest) members. Reform of the UN system, says Held, might be of some value, but it would still inevitably reflect the logic of the inter-state system and all its inequalities, and continue to minimise the role of 'transnational actors, civil associations, non-governmental organisations and social movements' (31). It would not, furthermore, meet the strains that globalisation (which Held understands more or less in the terms of Giddens) is placing on the Westphalia and UN systems. These stresses give rise to three requirements:

first, that the territorial boundaries of systems of accountability be recast so that those issues which escape the control of a nation-state - aspects of monetary management, environmental questions, elements of security, new forms of communication - can be brought under better democratic control. Secondly, that the role and place of regional and global regulatory and functional agencies be rethought so that they might provide a more coherent and useful focal point in public affairs. Thirdly, that the articulation of political institutions with the key groups, agencies, associations and organisations of international civil society be reconsidered to allow them to become part of a democratic process - adopting within their very modus operandi, a structure of rules and principles compatible with those of democracy. (33)

Held's Cosmopolitan Model of Democracy stresses three elements. The first is the necessity for representative regional or continental (e.g. African) parliaments, transnational referenda of relevant constituencies on major transnational issues, the opening to public scrutiny and democratic control of inter-governmental and functional bodies.¹⁴ The second is the entrenchment of civil, political, economic and social rights in national and international parliaments or assemblies, so as to specify the extent and limits to democratic decision-making. The third is the necessity for either a reformed UN or a complement to it, in the form of an assembly of specifically democratic nations, given equal voice (thus surpassing a UN which includes undemocratic states and in

which some states are given superior rights). Held continues on the implications of his model for international civil society:

A democratic network of states and civil societies is incompatible with the existence of powerful sets of social relations and organisations which can, by virtue of the very bases of their operations, systematically distort democratic conditions and processes. At stake are, among other things, the curtailment of the power of corporations to constrain and influence the political agenda...and the restriction of the activities of powerful transnational interest groups to pursue their interests unchecked (through, for example...the enactment of rules limiting the sponsorship of political representatives by sectional interests, whether these be particular industries or trade unions). (35. Original emphasis)

It may be understood to follow from all the above that Held does not consider problems of global governance can be solved through grassroots democracy alone, for the questions have to be posed: which grassroots, and which democracy?...Grassroots movements are by no means merely noble or wise...Appeal to the nature of inherent goodness of grassroots associations and movements bypasses the necessary work of theoretical analysis. (38)

5.3. Community, citizenship, culture

I would have thought, again, that Held provides an adequate specification for my present purposes. But this may simply be a manner of saying that his is one of the first adequate presentations of the matter. So let us, again, take it as such a beginning and tease out some of the possible implications and problems. I will begin with the key words 'order' and 'cosmopolitan'.

1. *Order or community?* In a symposium around the idea of an 'alternative world order' (2 Magazine 1991), a number of questions were raised about the concept. Stephen Shalom wondered whether the concept 'order' did not suggest a centralisation of power which

would then be granted and controlled from the top.¹⁵ He proposes that decentralisation be a fundamental principle of any alternative to the present world order. Decentralisation, for him, is not simply a matter of instituting the 'participation in proportion to how much one is affected principle' (97). It is also a matter of decentralisation tending to imply more participation, initiative, experimentation and diversity.

For John Brown Childs, in the same symposium, the problem was again with the word 'order', with its implication of 'hierarchical elite-dominated command-systems' (97). He considers that the fundamental concept for the project should be 'planetary community'. This would, for him, evidently be a community of local communities.¹⁶

The resilience of local groups can be the elemental stuff from which will grow a real community that can resist the deadening hand of international uniformity used to maintain the power of the few. This said, we still are left to wrestle with the classic dilemma of how to form unity with, rather than against, the real diversity of peoples. (98)

Indeed we are: the problem here is possibly the absence of a concept of global citizenship - a matter we will return to below. It would, however, seem to me that the challenges to an overly political or institutional orientation may justify my own preference for a focus on 'global civil society'.

2. *Cosmopolitans or global citizens?* In an earlier definition of cosmopolitanism (Waterman 1988:295-6) I tried to suggest its multiple ambiguities. I pointed both to its European bourgeois origin (implying a class- and ethnocentric universalism) and its articulation with earlier Christian universalism and later socialist internationalism. I also connected it with an elitist internationalism, whether of a capitalist or socialist variety. Such a critique is given much added weight by Ulf Hannerz, so much weight, indeed, that I feel I may

now have to consider the cosmopolitanism of socialist internationalists as more problematic than heretofore. Hannerz distinguishes the cosmopolitan from the migrant, the tourist and the stranger. He considers cosmopolitanism to imply both a certain orientation and a certain competence - both of which seem to me to imply education, wealth and power:

A...genuine cosmopolitanism is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity...At the same time, however, cosmopolitanism can be a matter of competence... There is...cultural competence in the stricter sense of the term, a built-up skill in manoeuvring more or less expertly with a particular system of meanings and meaningful forms [...] In its concern with the Other...[c]osmopolitans can be dilettantes as well as connoisseurs, and are often both at different times. (Hannerz 1990:259)

Whilst Hannerz treats cosmopolitanism in relationship to a globalised culture, Bart van Steenberghe (1992) deals with it, at least implicitly, in relationship to the global more generally. He also offers an alternative to the cosmopolitan. Steenberghe considers four types of hypothetical global citizen, the 'global capitalist', the 'global reformer', the 'environmental manager' and the 'earth citizen'. Whilst I might not wish myself to reduce the concept of the cosmopolitan to that of the global capitalist, it is clear that the global capitalist finds a historical and ideological predecessor in the cosmopolitan:

[T]he present global capitalist...sees himself as a global citizen, with a certain global lifestyle. His guiding image is that the world is becoming unified around a common business elite, an elite that shares interests and experiences, comes to have more in common with each other than it does with the more rooted, ethnically distinct members of its own particular civil society [...]The result seems to be a denationalised global elite that at the same

15 The problem has found political expression in current debates about the European Community.

This has been trying to manage it, from the top, by using the concept of subsidiarity incomprehensible to most outside its own charmed circles. So far use of this term seems to have only increased public suspicion of the 'Brussels Bureaucracy'.

16 One needs, on the other hand, to guard against the notion that all wisdom, energy and transformatory power is concentrated in the locality. In John Friedmann's concept of 'alternative development', the focus is on the local territorial community, but he himself warns us that small

and local is not necessarily beautiful (Friedmann 1992:139-43).

time lacks any global civic sense of responsibility. (14)

Van Steenbergen's 'earth', or 'global ecological', citizen represents not only a contrasting but also, I would say, a post-modern type (in the sense of Giddens):

[E]cological citizenship emphasises the importance of the planet as breeding ground, as habitat and as lifeworld. In that sense we could call this type of citizen an earth citizen who is aware of his [sic] organic process of birth and growth out of the earth as a living organism. This is based on the notion of care, as distinct from the notion of control. The development of citizenship from the city, via the nation-state and the region to the globe is here not just a matter of an increase in scale. With the notion of the 'earth citizen' a full circle is made. The citizen is back to his [sic] roots; the earth as Gaia, as one's habitat. (17)

This account, once again, would seem to suggest the need for a central focus on citizenship and thus on civil society.

3. *Global culture as the ground of global order/community.* Here is a problem for myself as well as for Held. In so far as any economic or political system presupposes some kind of common language, commonly understood symbols and meanings - in other words a culture - what is the culture common to either a cosmopolitan order or a global civil society? Mike Featherstone (1990) argues that the existence of a unified global culture (on the nation-state model) is impossible, since to contemplate this on the global level means imaginatively to construct an 'outside' to the globe, a sphere of global threat captured only in the pages and footage of science fiction accounts of space invaders, inter-planetary and inter-galactic wars. In addition the transnational cosmopolitan intellectuals (serving which masters we might ask?) would have a long way to go to rediscover, formulate and agree upon global equivalents to the ethnic. (11)

There are various ways in which the mat-

ter might be reconceived. In the first place, one can imagine (indeed describe, as van Steenbergen and many others have done) a culture or cultures which are not primarily territorial, or not primarily linguistic, in nature (Islamic, socialist, female or feminist). In the second place, one can increasingly recognise the 'outside global threat' intra-terrestrially, as science fiction increasingly becomes science fact. One evident global threat is the ecological one, increasingly the stimulus to the development of a global community of ecologists, whose mutual debates and agreements increasingly penetrate the more general public consciousness worldwide.

What of the somewhat pathetic 'transnational cosmopolitan intellectuals', with no master to serve, no ethnic to which they can refer? Given the increasing centrality of knowledge and information to a globalised modernity, it is not necessary to assume that its bearers serve masters (or, if feminists, mistresses). Some thinkers even see the knowledge class or elites as themselves the new masters of the universe (Frankel 1987). I would see Featherstone's category, or something like it, on a cultural avant-garde model (not a political vanguardist one), hypothetically involved in a democratic dialogue or dialectic with mass communities (of territory, interest, affinity), again hypothetically becoming globally aware. Do intellectuals need an ethnic or even a language? Only, perhaps, if one only conceives them on the model of Featherstone, as those operating primarily through the written or spoken word. There are other intellectuals, such as those artists whose stock in trade is global synthesis and syncretism, and who are also involved in the complex and contradictory process of creating various kinds of global communities. This is clear in the case of popular music, as when Reebee Garofalo (1992) not only shows rock as a medium for mass movements cross-nationally (from London to Rio and Peking) but as a music of global awareness or protest (from the Band Aid Concert to the Mandela one).

The matter of global culture must not be simplified.¹⁷ Arjun Appadurai (1990) is

17 This is the mistake of Samir Amin (1988) who, between the Scylla of Eurocentrism and the Charybdis of Thirdworldism, pleads for a 'Truly Universal Culture'. The nature of this can evidently be found by examining the tea-leaves of neo-Marxist political economy. Nor only does political-economy tell us that 'Socialism is at the end of this long tunnel' (152), but the 'primary contradiction' of neo-Marxism tells us that: 1) the initiative for the creation of a socialist universal culture rests with people in one world area only, the peoples of the periphery (149); and 2) that their route to the socialist universalist stage lies beyond an unavoidably nationalise 'national popular democratic' one! Amin's problem seems to be that, whilst fascinated by Europe, its socialist thinkers, labour and social movements, he has a manichean, imperialism-fixated, world view. This requires him to find universal emancipatory agency amongst the masses of the periphery (the actual political beliefs and behaviour of whom he hardly even refers to). He thus reproduces a myth of the revolutionary peripheral masses every bit as romantic as that of the noble savage of the 18th century European imagination. His message is therefore more likely to appeal, for better or worse, to romantic intellectuals of the centre or periphery than the prosaic masses of either.

extremely thought-provoking here. Working with an understanding of modernisation and globalisation close to that of Giddens, he proposes to look at the complexity of global cultural transformations in terms of five 'imagined worlds', which do not necessarily move in parallel nor necessarily come together. They are: a) ethnoscapas, of moving persons and groups, such as guestworkers, tourists, refugees, exiles; b) technoscapes, the increasingly rapid and intense movements and conjunctions of technology, themselves determined by increasingly complex balances between money flows, access to low- and highskilled labour, political conditions; c) finanscapes, the increasingly rapid and complex movements of currency, stock and commodity speculation; d) mediascapes, both the capacity to produce and disseminate media, and the world images created by them; and e) ideoscapes, understood as the ideologies of state-oriented politics, whether of the dominating or the counter-movements. The suffix 'scape' is intended to indicate that these are not social givens but views much influenced by the historical, linguistic and political situation of the individuals or groups involved. Indeed, says Appadurai, these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part by their own sense of what these landscapes offer. (296)

Let me expand a little on the ideoscape, since it is the one that comes closest to Held's cosmopolitan order and my global civil society. Appadurai sees contemporary ideoscapes as composed of varying combinations of an Enlightenment worldview - with terms like freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, and the master-term democracy - increasingly detached from such a common core as they might have classically had:

Thus 'democracy' has clearly become a master-term, with powerful echoes from Haiti to Poland to the Soviet Union and China, but it sits at the centre of a variety of ideoscapes...This creates ever new terminological kaleidoscopes, as states (and the groups that seek to capture them) seek to pacify populations whose own ethnoscapas are in motion, and whose medias-

capas may create severe problems for the ideoscapes with which they are presented. The fluidity of ideoscapes is complicated in particular by the growing diasporas (both voluntary and involuntary) of intellectuals who continuously inject new meaning-streams into the discourse of democracy in different parts of the world. (301)

The implications of all this for Appadurai, finally, are ambiguous, though not without hope. For whilst the twin ideas of the Enlightenment, the 'triumphantly universal' and the 'resiliently particular' (308) can cannibalise one another, the dialectic of sameness/difference can also open up the world, as shown by 'the growth of a wide range of progressive, transnational alliances' (ibid). Even more is this possibility open if one recognises that ideoscapes are also produced by non-statist intellectuals and movements. And that, as argued earlier, intellectuals are privileged in terms of geographical mobility and capacity to visualise, interpret and represent. Intellectuals (understood as technical, artistic, professional, political, scientific, etc, specialists), therefore do not have to await the creation of a common world culture as the basis for a new kind of political community or order, they are inevitably and simultaneously involved in creating this complex and multifaceted culture. The question of the nature of their relationship with the masses in post-ethnic, master-less, and - for that matter - post-mass, world will be dealt with in part below.

4. *Who whom - on a world scale?* The question to Held here is: who is speaking to, for, or about whom, in proposing an alternative world order? In one sense it is obvious and therefore irrelevant: Held is a British academic - presumably white, definitely male, certainly leftwing, possibly middle-aged - writing in an academic journal largely read by Held look-alikes - though with the occasional youth, non-white, non-male, non-Anglo-Saxon drawn in. In another sense the question is highly relevant, because of the problem of agency. One can assume a sympathy of Held with the marginalised, impoverished, discriminated and alien-

18 The problem is revealed in this presentation of the matter by 'alternative developmentalist' John Friedmann (1992:166).

even if he does not serve the Bank.
It does not come as a surprise...that the World Bank has created an office dealing with environmental questions and has begun to assess its projects in environmental terms and even to make loans for environmental education-Or that it is concerned with such questions as 'making the poor credit-worthy'...And the World Bank is not alone in its receptivity to the concerns of an alternative development...Although mainstream economic doctrine continues to prevail, it is increasingly being challenged. In truly dialectical fashion, the counter-hegemonic model must work its way into the mainstream and there begin the long process of transforming both the mainstream and

itself.
Now, I discovered, whilst still a Communist, that 'dialectical processes' were the Communist word for God. I am not at all sure that I like dialectical processes that hover over events, blessing them, rather than underlying emancipatory attitudes and informing transformatory strategies. That the World Bank adapts itself to the ecological movement is an indication of the strength of the latter, but also creates a major continuing problem for it.
19 It is curious that workers and/or unions should become the disappearing, absent or negative Other of 'alternative', 'radical-democratic' and 'post-modern' discourse (see Friedmann 1992, Hall, Held and McGrew 1992). Or perhaps it is not curious at all. A critique of this kind of dismissal by 'post-industrial Utopians', such as Gorz and Bahro is made by Frankel (1987:206-226).

aced. And some kind of identification with the social movements that attempt or claim to articulate their demands. But in so far as these are not specifically addressed (in the sense of being spoken about, to or with) two problems arise. One is the possibility of the ideas being first picked up, incorporated and turned around by those intellectuals who do serve such masters of the universe as the World Bank (currently involved in much greenwash on the environment).¹⁸ The other possibility is that of an abstract utopianism, of producing a future unrelated to existing movements and their possibilities.

These are both real dangers with respect to Held (as to Giddens and, of course, myself). Let us consider them in turn. 1) Speaking to: if proposals are addressed to democratic global movements, responded to by them, and then picked up and responded to by the multinationals or inter-state agencies, this is part of a difficult but unavoidable learning process for the movements concerned. 2) Speaking about: major, fundamental and longterm projects, such as democratising the UN, or a democratic UN alongside the old one, require reference to what global civil society (however it may be defined) is presently doing with respect to the UN and its agencies. I suspect such organisations and movements are simultaneously doing or proposing many different things. I am not sure that the two possibilities mentioned by Held feature prominently amongst these (although they may well do). I suspect that a model coming closer to their current behaviour is that of Johan Galtung (1982). Galtung, uses the language of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs - the UN, the World Bank), international non-government organisations (INGOs - such as nation-state based international union bodies) and transnational non-government organisations (TRANGOs, on the model of international individual-membership professional associations). He sees the present

global dynamic as coming increasingly from the last type, which he understands as existing in 'socio-functional' rather than territorial space. I have made criticisms of his model (Waterman 1989) but what I appreciate is Galtung's suggestion of 1) moving attention from the IGOs to the TRANGOs and 2) of a continuing dynamic between the three. Galtung's mode! seems to be primarily oriented toward the self-empowerment of civil society and social movements, whilst allowing for the continued existence of the IGOs and INGOs, as well - no doubt - as their reform under pressure from outside and below. I do not see this model as necessarily incompatible with that of Held. But its putative address does seem to differ.

5. *What about the workers?* One point on which Galtung and Held seem to coincide is in a negative - or should one say merely a non-positive? - attitude toward trade unions. Indeed, both bracket them with corporations, Held presenting the unions here as a potential obstacle to representative democracy globally.¹⁹ This is not only regrettable, it is also paradoxical, particularly given the long trade-union experience in the International Labour Organisation - just such a standard-setting institution as Held (1992:35) seems to recommend as a model. One can only assume that Held is considering unions in their common Western appearance (and even self-presentation), as interest organisations of particular groups of workers, or of workers generally but understood in a particularly narrow way. This, however, is an appearance that has little relationship to either the known past, or a possible future, or to those present places, times or forms in which unionism manages to link itself with broader social concerns - or is seen by broader social categories to encapsulate its concerns. We need not labour (no pun necessarily intended) the point: it is made at length in the book to which this paper is intended to contribute.

Les gens et les organisations qu'ils se donnent *

(2 partie)

Efficacité des ONG

LES ONG ont certainement renforcé leur action au cours des dernières années. Tant leur financement que le nombre de personnes auxquelles elles s'adressent ont augmenté de manière impressionnante. Selon une évaluation grossière, au début des années 80, les activités des ONG s'adressaient à 100 millions de personnes vivant dans des pays en développement — 60 millions en Asie, 25 millions en Amérique latine et près de 12 millions en Afrique. Actuellement, ce chiffre atteint probablement près de 250 millions et il devrait continuer à progresser considérablement au cours des prochaines années.

Il faut toutefois étudier les activités des ONG dans une certaine perspective. Les mouvements de fonds en provenance des ONG et des gouvernements de l'hémisphère nord vers le Sud ont augmenté. Mais les 7,2 milliards de dollars mentionnés plus haut pour 1990 ne représentent qu'une faible proportion du montant total des transferts de fonds du Nord vers le Sud : soit 13 % du montant total des contributions nettes au titre de l'aide publique et 2,5 % seulement du montant total des ressources transférées aux pays en développement. Même si les ONG triplaient leurs dépenses d'ici à l'an 2000, celles-ci n'atteindraient pas 20 % du montant total de l'aide publique. Toutefois, si l'aide publique au développement stagne ou même régresse en termes réels, ce pourcentage sera alors plus élevé.

Il est difficile de juger de l'efficacité des ONG, que ce soit en termes d'amélioration du rendement, de soulagement de la pauvreté ou de participation accrue. Les ONG elles-mêmes ou les organismes indépendants n'ont réalisé que très peu d'analyses systématiques. Toute évaluation générale de l'impact des ONG ne peut donc se fonder que sur des données incomplètes. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudierons les points suivants:

1. La lutte contre la pauvreté
2. L'accès au crédit pour les pauvres
3. Les activités destinées aux plus pauvres
4. L'apprentissage de l'autonomie par les groupes de population marginalisés
5. La participation des femmes
6. L'aide d'urgence.

La lutte contre la pauvreté

On juge souvent les ONG sur leur capacité à améliorer le niveau de vie des populations pauvres et l'histoire des ONG regorge de belles réussites. Des fermiers sans terre ont pu en acquérir. Des agriculteurs produisent davantage de denrées alimentaires. On a foré des puits et implanté des puits tubes, vacciné des enfants contre certaines maladies meurtrières. C'est ainsi, et dans d'autres domaines encore, que les ONG ont transformé la vie de millions de personnes de par le monde.

Les résultats sont impressionnants. Au Zimbabwe, les groupements d'agriculteurs soutenus par *Silveira House* ont multiplié par sept ou par dix leur production agricole; cela a permis aux fermiers de ne plus se contenter d'une agriculture de subsistance pour s'orienter vers des cultures de rapport, ce qui contribue à leur insertion dans l'économie monétaire. Au Burkina Faso, les Groupements Naam aident 160.000 personnes à développer leur communauté et à protéger l'environnement (encadré 8). Au sud de l'Inde, les *sangams* (fédérations) de pêcheurs du district de Kanyakumari ont contribué à élever de manière significative le niveau de vie des communautés de pêcheurs en améliorant la pêche et en contournant les commerçants, ce qui a permis aux collectivités d'être récompensées comme il se doit de leurs efforts.

Mais il y a également eu des échecs. Une évaluation des activités génératrices de revenus appuyée par la Fondation Ford en Afrique à la fin des années 80 est arrivée à la conclusion que « trop peu de succès avaient été remportés pour qu'on puisse en parler, surtout en termes de durabilité une fois l'intervention terminée ». De même, vers le milieu des années 80, une étude des projets ayant reçu le soutien de la Communauté européenne a révélé que même les projets sélectionnés pour cette analyse parce qu'ils avaient « remporté des succès » ne répondaient en fait pas aux critères d'évaluation dans un nombre surprenant de cas. Sur les sept micro-projets visités, six d'entre eux rencontraient de sérieux problèmes.

Y a-t-il davantage de succès que d'échec? Nul ne peut vraiment le dire.

Il apparaît seulement que même les populations qui ont bénéficié de projets couronnés de succès restent pauvres. Les interventions menées par les ONG ne permettent généralement pas aux

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Burkina Faso - les Groupements Naam

Les Groupements Naam ont débuté en 1967 dans la province de Yatenga au Burkina Faso, dans le but de ranimer les associations traditionnelles de partage des tâches. L'idée, à l'origine, est de permettre à la collectivité d'accumuler un surplus de production et de l'investir dans le développement communautaire.

Pendant la saison des pluies, le groupement concentre essentiellement ses activités sur les potagers, dont les produits sont vendus au marché, et sur la culture du millet, du coton, du sésame et des arachides sur les parcelles communautaires. Pendant la saison sèche, les activités sont plus principalement axées sur la fabrication de savon, la production textile, l'élevage et la construction de fours à faible consommation d'énergie. Après provision pour amortissement et constitution du capital nécessaire aux nouveaux investissements, les bénéfices sont partagés entre les membres du groupe.

Les Groupements Naam organisent également diverses activités collectives, notamment le creusement de fossés, la construction de petits barrages et de réservoirs pour conserver l'eau de pluie, ainsi que l'entretien des forêts communautaires. Ces groupements encouragent également la pratique du spon et les activités culturelles et ils gèrent des programmes d'alphabétisation.

En 1989, on comptait près de 2.800 groupements rassemblant au total plus de 160.000 membres. Leur devise est « un développement sans danger ».

populations d'échapper à la pauvreté structurelle, mais elles adoucissent véritablement les formes de pauvreté les plus aiguës. Cela peut sembler un succès modeste, mais pour ceux qui ont reçu de l'aide, il peut être significatif. Si les populations sont libérées du souci quotidien de chercher à joindre les deux bouts, ou si elles ont un peu d'argent à consacrer à autre chose qu'à acquérir des denrées de première nécessité, elles se retrouvent dans une meilleure posture pour se consacrer à l'étape suivante de leur lutte pour améliorer leur niveau de vie.

Toute évaluation des résultats obtenus par les ONG devrait également tenir compte des conditions dans lesquelles elles opèrent. Comparées avec les donateurs de l'aide publique (dont on ne connaît pas non plus le taux de réussite), les ONG entreprennent des tâches beaucoup plus ardues dans des milieux très peu hospitaliers. En Afrique, où le revenu par habitant est en train de chuter à peu près partout, si les ONG peuvent aider les populations à garder un revenu stable, c'est déjà un succès considérable. De plus, les ONG disposent de très peu d'argent — moins de 60 cents par bénéficiaire, selon une étude hollandaise.

De plus les avantages retirés des activités des ONG peuvent souvent être indirects. Les interventions menées par les ONG qui ont été couronnées de succès peuvent encourager d'au-

tres organismes à suivre cette voie et à tenter la même expérience ailleurs. Au Zimbabwe, l'expérience des groupements *Silveira House* a été prise comme modèle par le gouvernement pour lancer une initiative de développement rural sur tout le territoire du pays. Les succès remportés par les ONG peuvent également pousser d'autres groupes à se constituer, ce qui produit un effet cumulatif entre les diverses communautés et au-delà, comme ce fut le cas au Bangladesh et à Sri Lanka (encadré 9).

L'accès au crédit pour les pauvres

L'un des principaux moyens utilisés par les ONG pour compenser les échecs du marché a consisté à accorder des crédits. Les pauvres sont souvent considérés comme de mauvais risques en termes bancaires et les banques ne sont que rarement préparées à leur prêter les petites sommes dont ils ont besoin.

De nombreux plans de crédit appliqués par les ONG ont relevé le défi en adaptant les initiatives traditionnelles d'auto-assistance, connues sous le nom de *susu* au Ghana et de *cheetu* à Sri Lanka. Au Bangladesh, le plan traditionnel *sambaya* s'est développé pour devenir un programme autonome connu sous le nom de Mouvement Swanirvar. Une grande initiative de crédit, qui est aussi l'une des plus connues, a également été lan-

cée au Bangladesh: il s'agit de la Banque Grameen, qui a acquis une réputation internationale grâce à l'application d'un plan de crédit rural efficace (encadré 10).

Ces mesures se sont souvent révélées extrêmement efficaces — s'adressant aux groupes de population les plus pauvres et leur accordant de petits prêts bon marché. Les taux de remboursement ont également été très élevés, dépassant souvent les 90 %. Cela a prouvé aux banques qu'elles pouvaient fort bien traiter avec les pauvres, dont le problème était de ne pas avoir accès au crédit.

Cependant, dans certains cas, les coûts administratifs étaient si élevés que, ce qui devait être des « fonds renouvelables » sont restés tributaires des subventions des donateurs. Parfois également, trop de prêts ont été accordés à la consommation plutôt qu'à l'investissement.

Un sujet de préoccupation essentiel pour les ONG est que leurs interventions, qui sont pourtant en général utiles, rentables et efficaces, ont peu de chance de devenir une source majeure de financement pour les pauvres. Au Costa Rica, où la *Fundación Costarricense de Desarrollo* est une source importante de crédit pour les populations défavorisées, les ONG ne fournissent que 0,2 % du montant total du crédit. Au Bangladesh également, même les activités impressionnantes entreprises par la Banque Grameen ne représentent que 0,1 % du montant total du crédit national, et celles de toutes les ONG du pays que 0,6 % (tableau 2).

TABLEAU 2

Pourcentage du crédit avancé par les ONG par rapport au montant total

Pays	Année	% du crédit avancé par les ONG
Kenya	1990	1,6
Banladesh	1990	0,6
Costa Rica	1992	0,2
Philippines	1990	0,1

Le but n'est pas ici de critiquer les résultats obtenus par les ONG, mais de faire un résumé lucide de la situation. Les ONG ne sont pas en mesure de remplacer les gouvernements ou les marchés commerciaux dans le domaine de l'accès au cré-

dit. Donc, l'un des principaux rôles des ONG dans ce domaine devra consister à faire pression sur les gouvernements afin qu'ils modifient leur politiques et l'ordre de leurs priorités.

Les activités destinées aux plus pauvres

Les ONG arrivent souvent à atteindre des groupes de populations que les gouvernements ont de la peine à aider, en offrant une assistance aux populations des zones rurales où les services publics sont généralement peu développés ou inexistantes. Mais beaucoup se concentrent maintenant sur les zones urbaines, notamment au Bangladesh, au Chili, en Afrique du Sud et en Zambie.

Il est toutefois difficile de savoir si elles atteignent ceux qui vivent dans l'extrême pauvreté. Si les programmes gouvernementaux et les programmes d'aide publique échouent généralement pour ce qui est d'aider les 20 % de la population les plus démunis, on peut supposer que les interventions menées par les ONG n'atteignent pas les 5 à 10 % les plus défavorisés. Il pourrait s'agir par exemple, des malades et des personnes âgées, de ceux qui n'ont que très peu d'actifs, qui sont peu instruits ou pas instruits du tout — ainsi que de la proportion élevée de familles dirigées par des femmes. Ces groupes de population sont souvent dispersés et il est difficile de les regrouper, et comme ils vivent fréquemment dans des régions éloignées et d'un accès difficile, les atteindre peut s'avérer très onéreux. Dans l'ensemble, il est plus facile aux ONG de s'adresser aux groupes de population relativement pauvres qu'aux plus démunis.

Lorsque les ONG agissent dans des zones rurales, il leur est plus aisé d'aider ceux qui possèdent une terre fertile. En Gambie, les ONG qui participent au programme d'innovation agricole et de mise à l'essai des technologies se concentrent sur les agriculteurs à revenus moyens, et au Kenya, une ONG locale qui exécute un projet de création de parcelles agroforestières, financé par la Fondation Ford, ne s'adresse que rarement aux représentants des ménages les plus pauvres.

Mais de nombreuses interventions sont spécifiquement dirigées vers ces populations. Les ONG d'Amérique latine et d'Asie du Sud en particulier ont souvent coopéré avec des ouvriers

ENCADRE 9

Sri Lanka - Mouvement Sarvodaya Sharamadana

Le Mouvement *Sarvodaya Sharamadana* a été fondé à la fin des années 50 sous la direction éclairée d'A.T. Ariyaratne afin d'intégrer les familles de castes inférieures dans la vie ordinaire du pays. Son personnel compte aujourd'hui plus de 7.700 membres, et ce mouvement couvre 8.000 villages (plus d'un tiers du territoire de Sri Lanka) situés tant dans les régions singhalaises que tamiles. Le mouvement s'inspire de la philosophie bouddhiste et des idées de Gandhi. Il a pour objectif d'aider les populations à mobiliser leurs propres ressources, particulièrement leur main-d'œuvre, en leur proposant des formes de participation et d'autonomie respectant les traditions culturelles du pays.

Il dirige toute une série de programmes générateurs de revenus, gérant notamment des boutiques de batik et de couture, des ateliers de réparations mécaniques et de menuiserie, ainsi que des presses et diverses activités destinées aux fermiers. Sur le plan social, il exécute des programmes destinés aux sourds et aux handicapés, des programmes de secours et de rééducation (notamment pour les victimes du conflit ethnique), ainsi que des programmes de nutrition destinés particulièrement aux enfants d'âge préscolaire.

Une étude récente portant tant sur les villages bénéficiant de l'aide du mouvement que sur d'autres villages de la même région, a montré que les premiers devraient se révéler capables de surmonter leur apathie et leur méfiance envers autrui beaucoup plus facilement que les autres. La méthode adoptée par le mouvement, qui fait appel à la participation, a favorisé une nouvelle orientation, qui devrait permettre aux populations de contourner les structures peu égalitaires associées aux temples, aux comités d'entraide et aux partis politiques.

Le mouvement a également commencé à agir au niveau national. Lors de séminaires et de discussions de groupe avec des avocats, la police, des représentants du système judiciaire et divers groupes d'action, il remet en question l'idée d'un développement purement économique et milite pour qu'une priorité plus élevée soit accordée aux problèmes humains.

ENCADRE 10

Bangladesh - La Banque Grameen

La Banque Grameen du Bangladesh est l'une des expériences les plus concluantes en matière d'élargissement du crédit en faveur des populations déshéritées sans terre.

Elle a débuté en 1976 dans le village de Jobra. Le professeur Muhammad Yunus a constaté qu'il était impossible aux populations sans terre d'obtenir des crédits auprès des banques commerciales puisqu'elles ne pouvaient pas offrir de garanties. Par conséquent, il a décidé de garantir personnellement les prêts bancaires accordés aux pauvres. Cette décision a été largement couronnée de succès : le taux de remboursement s'est révélé supérieur à 99 %. Il avait donc prouvé que les banques pouvaient sans risque traiter avec les pauvres.

En 1983, ce projet s'est transformé en banque à pan entière. Le Gouvernement bangladaise a fourni 60 % du capital initial effectif et les emprunteurs ont fourni le reste en confiant leurs économies à la banque. Au début, le soutien de la communauté internationale était considérable, mais la dépendance envers le financement étranger a reculé, passant de 83 % à 60 %.

La grande nouveauté consiste à former des groupes de cinq personnes et à demander à chacune d'entre elles de garantir le remboursement du prêt d'un des quatre autres membres du groupe. Le président de chaque groupe participe à une réunion hebdomadaire avec un employé de la banque afin d'examiner la situation. Cet ensemble de facteurs : garanties collectives, supervision étroite et pression exercée par les autres membres du groupe, a contribué à garantir un taux de remboursement extrêmement élevé (actuellement proche de 95 %).

En 1991, la Banque Grameen offrait ses services à plus de 23.000 villages grâce à ses quelque 900 succursales. Près d'un million de familles ont eu accès au crédit. Le prêt moyen est d'environ 60 dollars et son taux d'intérêt (16 %) est net de bonification. Les prêts servent généralement à fournir un capital de départ, et ils ont permis de créer un nombre considérable d'emplois, particulièrement pour les femmes des zones

Les emprunteurs doivent également déposer un taka par semaine sur leur compte d'épargne. En 1991, cette épargne forcée a permis d'accumuler 962 millions de takas, ce qui représente 62 % de l'encours des prêts.

agricoles sans terre. L'un des moyens d'atteindre même les plus pauvres est d'entreprendre une activité qui s'adresse à l'ensemble de la population d'une région donnée, comme par exemple les divers projets Feu de Camp dirigés par le Groupe du Zimbabwe et le Fonds mondial pour la nature dans la vallée du Zambèze, qui ont pour but de générer des revenus pour l'ensemble de la population adulte grâce à la chasse et aux soins prodigués aux espèces sauvages.

L'apprentissage de l'autonomie par les groupes de population marginalisés

Dans la plupart des pays en développement, c'est davantage la mauvaise répartition des ressources qui est responsable de la pauvreté que la pénurie absolue. La volonté des ONG d'aider les populations à accéder à l'autonomie est en partie un reflet de cette réalité, et leurs interventions aident parfois véritablement les pauvres à résister aux élites locales et à revendiquer leurs droits. Dans ce cas, il est probable qu'ils se heurtent à l'opposition des autorités ainsi qu'à celles des intérêts locaux les plus puissants.

Le droit à la propriété foncière a été la

source des conflits les plus violents. Dans de nombreux pays, notamment en Asie et en Amérique latine, les ONG ont défendu le droit des minorités à la propriété foncière, exercé des pressions sur les gouvernements pour que les paysans sans terre puissent en acquérir et pour qu'ils entreprennent des réformes agraires. En Equateur, des fédérations indiennes se sont créées pour aider les populations autochtones à obtenir un titre de propriété pour leurs terres. Cela n'a pas seulement contribué à les aider sur le plan matériel, mais également à renforcer leurs communautés et à combattre le mythe de l'infériorité sociale et intellectuelle des Indiens.

Dans de nombreux pays, les ONG ont aidé les populations des régions rurales à acquérir une certaine autonomie en formant des associations. Par exemple, au Zimbabwe, le regroupement des associations en réseaux a contribué à renforcer leur efficacité (encadré 11).

La participation des femmes

Jusqu'au début des années 80, les interventions des ONG, comme celles des autres organismes de développement, ne tenaient pas compte des iné-

ENCADRE 11

Zimbabwe - Organisation des Associations rurales pour le progrès

L'Organisation des Associations rurales pour le progrès est une ONG locale qui opère au Zimbabwe et chapeaute les groupements locaux, dont chacun comprend entre 5 et 30 familles rurales. Ce sont souvent des groupements traditionnels de partage des tâches qui ont réussi à survivre au paternalisme et aux pratiques racistes de l'époque coloniale. Cette organisation leur fournit des fonds et leur offre une assistance technique, mais ce sont les groupements et leurs associations régionales qui prennent les décisions importantes.

La plupart des membres de ces groupements sont des fermiers, c'est pourquoi l'organisation concentre principalement ses activités sur la génération de revenus dans le secteur agricole. Toutefois, au cours des dernières années, elle a également entrepris des activités dans les secteurs de l'éducation, de l'assainissement et des services de vulgarisation, et plus récemment, de la sécurité alimentaire et de l'assistance en cas de sécheresse. Les projets exécutés actuellement comprennent la construction de moulins et de systèmes d'irrigation, la création de jardins, de clubs de couture et d'épargne, ainsi que l'élevage et l'horticulture.

L'organisation opère actuellement dans trois provinces du Zimbabwe. En 1990, elle employait 60 personnes directement, disposait d'un budget annuel d'environ 1 million de dollars et chapeautait plus de 1.000 groupements (80.000 familles) qui avaient eux-mêmes formé 16 associations régionales.

Le Gouvernement, qui agit dans les mêmes secteurs que l'organisation, se contente essentiellement de fournir des services, alors que l'organisation favorise la participation et la mobilisation sociale.

La méthode préconisée par l'organisation a été étudiée par d'autres groupes opérant au Zimbabwe, car celle-ci semble avoir intégré avec succès la prestation de services efficaces au mouvement populaire local.

galités liées au sexe. Bien qu'un petit nombre de projets et de programmes destinés aux associations locales de femmes aient toujours existé, les besoins spécifiques des femmes dans les programmes généraux de lutte contre la pauvreté ont souvent été laissés de côté. Actuellement, les ONG sont plus conscientes de ces problèmes et s'efforcent souvent de les faire figurer dans leurs initiatives en y incluant des volets spécifiquement destinés aux femmes. Ces mesures sont dues en partie aux pressions exercées par des mouvements féminins toujours plus puissants dans de nombreux pays en développement. De plus, certaines ONG ont été créées spécifiquement dans le but de renforcer le pouvoir des femmes dans la famille et dans la société.

Au Cameroun, l'Association des réseaux de femmes regroupe 50 groupements de femmes. Elle mène des campagnes d'alphabétisation et procure aux femmes une assistance pratique sous d'autres formes, notamment en créant des coopératives pour écouler les produits que les villageoises ont amené au marché et qui restent invendus à la fin de la journée. L'Association organise également des séminaires et des conférences visant à faire connaître les problèmes de ces femmes au niveau national.

Au Kenya, le Mouvement Ceinture Verte, qui s'attaque aux problèmes conjoints de la dégradation de l'environnement et de la pauvreté, encourage les femmes à adopter des mesures de restauration des sols et l'utilisation d'engrais naturels. Avec l'aide de 50.000 femmes, il a planté 10 millions d'arbres au Kenya. Ce mouvement, qui s'attache à satisfaire les besoins des femmes des familles les plus pauvres, a créé des centres de formation afin d'améliorer les possibilités d'emploi pour les femmes.

Les ONG de plusieurs pays se concentrent sur des activités militantes en faveur des femmes. L'Alliance des femmes costariciennes offre des services juridiques et de santé à plus de 4.000 femmes disposant de revenus faibles. Mais elle fait également campagne pour l'amélioration de la condition des femmes pauvres et publie des informations sur des questions juridiques et de santé, ainsi que sur le problème de la violence à l'égard des femmes.

Malgré cela, trop nombreux sont les projets exécutés par des ONG qui ne s'attaquent pas encore aux coutumes discriminatoires à l'égard

des femmes. Parfois, la tentative de faire figurer les problèmes de discrimination liée au sexe dans les projets n'a été que superficielle et n'a rapporté que peu d'avantages aux femmes. Dans d'autres cas, le succès des projets a été éclipsé par des forces sociales plus puissantes.

L'aide d'urgence

L'un des principaux atouts des ONG est leur capacité de réagir rapidement et efficacement en cas de situations d'urgence. En fait, une proportion élevée d'ONG se sont créées pour lutter contre les situations d'urgence issues de la famine, des guerres ou des tremblements de terre et ce n'est que plus tard qu'elles ont étendu leurs activités pour favoriser un développement à long terme. Les ONG possèdent cinq atouts principaux en cas de situations d'urgence et dans le cadre de l'aide d'urgence:

1. *Alarme en cas de catastrophes* — grâce à un réseau de contacts étendus sur le terrain, les ONG sont bien placées pour attirer l'attention de la communauté internationale sur les situations d'urgence existantes ou imminentes, ce qui est vital lorsque les gouvernements minimisent la gravité des situations d'urgence ou excluent l'intervention des organismes bilatéraux et multilatéraux. Les ONG font souvent un usage pertinent des médias auxquels ils font appel dans ce but — tel a été notamment le cas lorsqu'un cyclone a ravagé le Bangladesh en 1971, que la sécheresse s'est abattue sur l'Etat de Maharashtra en Inde en 1974, que la famine a frappé l'Ethiopie au début des années 70 et lors de la crise qui a éclaté en Afrique subsaharienne entre 1984 et 1985. Leurs efforts spectaculaires peuvent également attirer l'attention de la communauté internationale; tel fut le cas d'*Oxfam* qui, en 1979, a affrété un bateau, l'a chargé de nourriture et de matériel médical et qu'il a pris la mer à Hong Kong pour se rendre à Kompon Som au Cambodge.

2. *Plaidoyer en faveur d'une action internationale* — Après avoir fait prendre conscience des dangers, les ONG peuvent faire pression sur les gouvernements et les organisations internationales pour qu'ils augmentent leurs ressources au titre des situations d'urgence, parfois dans le cadre d'accords internationaux. Les organismes de la Communauté européenne ont, par exemple, fait pression sur la Communauté pour qu'elle accroisse

l'aide alimentaire accordée à l'Afrique, qui est passée de 1,5 million de tonnes en 1990 à 2,1 millions de tonnes en 1991.

3. *Réaction rapide*— Libres des contraintes bureaucratiques et politiques, les ONG peuvent habituellement agir beaucoup plus rapidement que les organismes publics. De plus, comme elles sont moins exposées aux pressions politiques, il leur arrive d'agir dans des pays où les pouvoirs publics interdisent les interventions menées par un gouvernement et par des organismes multilatéraux, comme ce fut le cas au Cambodge à la fin des années 70 ainsi qu'en Erythrée et au Tigré au début des années 80. En Somalie, lorsque le pays a été déclaré récemment en situation d'urgence, certaines organisations telles que la Croix-Rouge, *Save the Children*, CARE, *Concern* et Médecins sans frontières sont restées après le départ des organismes internationaux, même pendant les périodes où les combats étaient les plus violents. Aujourd'hui, elles sont en majeure partie responsables de la distribution de nourriture, en coordination avec le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge qui envoie près de 20.000 tonnes d'aliments par mois et gère 800 cuisines qui nourrissent plus d'un million de personnes.

4. *Coopération avec les organisations locales* — L'aide d'urgence est généralement mieux gérée par les organisations locales, qui connaissent bien les besoins à satisfaire au niveau local. Les ONG ont pu utiliser leurs contacts à bon escient, ce qui a permis de stimuler les capacités des groupements locaux dans les cas où cela s'avérait nécessaire. Dernièrement, au Soudan, le Conseil des Eglises du Soudan était la seule ONG autorisée par le gouvernement à visiter les bidonvilles urbains qui entourent Khartoum; les ONG de l'hémisphère nord ont utilisé cette filière pour envoyer des fonds.

5. *Préparation aux catastrophes* — Lors des catastrophes, ce sont les pauvres qui sont généralement le plus durement frappés, les populations vivant sur des terres de faible rendement exposées aux inondations ou dans des maisons en torchis qui s'effondrent lors des tremblements de terre. Les ONG locales peuvent faire en sorte que les populations pauvres soient mieux préparées et anticipent ces problèmes. Au Bangladesh, les coopératives Ganges-Kobadak contrôlent la construction de digues pour prévenir ce danger. De plus, l'importance accordée par les ONG à la participation

et à l'apprentissage de l'autonomie renforce la capacité des collectivités de se redresser plus rapidement après une catastrophe. Il serait toutefois faux de croire que l'action des ONG en cas de catastrophe est toujours bénéfique. Des problèmes peuvent surgir si les activités des divers organismes sont mal coordonnées ou si elles emploient un personnel inexpérimenté, comme ce fut le cas lors de la sécheresse qui a frappé la province ougandaise de Karamoja à la fin des années 70. Dans certains cas, lorsque les ONG étrangères se sont présentées, elles ont sapé les efforts des autorités et des organismes locaux; ce fut le cas au Mozambique à la fin des années 80.

Le fait que les travaux des ONG ne sont soumis qu'à de faibles évaluations constitue un autre problème courant concernant leur action lors des situations d'urgence; ainsi les mêmes fautes sont commises à chaque fois.

L'avenir des ONG

Plusieurs ONG de l'hémisphère nord, et un nombre toujours plus élevé d'ONG du Sud se sont réunies pour échanger leurs points de vue sur certains problèmes, tels que la crise de l'endettement, le commerce international, l'ajustement structurel, l'environnement, les femmes dans le contexte du développement et la paix. Elles emploient ou chargent souvent des économistes ou d'autres spécialistes d'étudier ces questions, d'écrire des rapports détaillés et de produire du matériel utilisable dans les campagnes d'information.

Les ONG sont reconnues aujourd'hui par les populations, les gouvernements et dans le monde des affaires comme des représentants légitimes, qui ne se contentent pas de faire pression sur leurs propres gouvernements et entreprises, mais participent également à divers rassemblements internationaux. Il apparaît également que le mouvement des ONG a incité divers protagonistes à réexaminer leurs politiques, notamment les conséquences de rajustement structurel sur les pauvres. Elles ont également poussé certaines multinationales à modifier leur comportement, par exemple dans le cas de la commercialisation des substituts du lait maternel et de l'utilisation d'engrais et de produits pharmaceutiques dans

les pays en développement. A l'époque du Sommet planète Terre, qui s'est déroulé à Rio de Janeiro en juin 1992, lors du plus grand rassemblement de leur histoire, les ONG ont exercé une pression constante sur leurs gouvernements pour les forcer à modifier profondément leur politique.

Le nombre de personnes dont le sort dépend des ONG est relativement faible, mais en progression constante: 250 millions, ce qui représente moins de 20 % du 1,3 milliard de personnes vivant dans la pauvreté absolue dans les pays en développement. Selon des prévisions optimistes, ce taux devrait être proche de 30 % à la fin des années 90.

En ce qui concerne la lutte contre la pauvreté et les prestations en matière de services sociaux, il est probable que l'action des ONG restera essentiellement complémentaire à celle des autres acteurs. Leur action visant à démontrer le fonctionnement de modèles participatifs à suivre par les gouvernements sera probablement plus utile, tout comme les pressions qu'elles exerceront sur les pouvoirs publics, tant au Nord qu'au Sud, pour les encourager à se concentrer davantage sur le développement humain des populations les plus défavorisées de la planète. Une fois encore, elles joueront un rôle plus important en prouvant qu'il est possible de lutter contre la pauvreté, plutôt qu'en s'attaquant elles-mêmes à ce problème sur une grande échelle. Tel sera également le rôle vital que les ONG devront continuer à jouer à l'avenir.

Encourager la participation signifie s'attaquer intelligemment aux besoins ressentis par les populations et les collectivités — et le faire de manière à répondre à ces besoins sans pour autant assumer toutes les responsabilités. Le risque d'accorder trop d'importance à l'efficacité des prestations et trop peu à l'amélioration de la participation ne doit pas être sous-estimé. Cette tendance pourrait se renforcer dans la mesure où les ONG servent de filière pour la distribution et l'utilisation des fonds publics. Les départements du secteur public chargés de l'affectation de l'aide sont habitués à exiger des résultats quantitatifs et des rapports réguliers, et ils doivent accepter le fait que les projets exécutés par les ONG doivent se voir accorder un traitement quelque peu différent.

Il est également possible que les ONG «écrément» d'une certaine manière le secteur public. Dans certains cas, elles offrent des salaires

plus élevés au personnel local et drainent hors de la fonction publique ses fonctionnaires expérimentés. Ce phénomène, qui existe déjà au Mozambique et en Ouganda, a toutes les chances de s'étendre.

Ces problèmes sont bien connus de la communauté des ONG. Ce «mal qui se propage», dont elles ont conscience depuis plusieurs années déjà, a été évoqué maintes fois lors de leurs réunions. Alors que leurs responsabilités deviennent plus lourdes et que leurs activités se développent, elles relèveront sans aucun doute ce nouveau défi avec l'énergie, la créativité et l'engagement qui les qualifient.

Le nombre toujours croissant d'organismes et d'ONG prouve à l'évidence que les populations du monde entier exigent de participer davantage à l'édification de la société civile.

Cette exigence devrait se faire plus pressante au cours des années à venir. Une fois lancés, les mouvements démocratiques sont difficiles à arrêter — ils acquièrent un rythme et un élan qui leur sont propres. Les populations mieux éduquées, plus aisées et plus actives élèveront la voix pour demander une participation accrue à tous les processus qui affectent leur vie, et pour exiger que les gouvernements, les marchés et toutes les institutions de la société civile satisfassent leurs besoins réels.

L'emprise des anciens régimes autoritaires peut encore perdurer et ils peuvent continuer d'user de méthodes répressives. De nouvelles formes d'intolérance peuvent soudain se porter sur le devant de la scène et s'emparer du pouvoir. Mais l'histoire ne va pas dans leur sens. La tendance générale à la décentralisation du pouvoir, à la diffusion des informations et au partage des idées ne pourra pas être inversée. Le génie n'est plus prisonnier de sa bouteille.

Si les Etats veulent survivre, ils devront établir de nouvelles relations avec leurs peuples. Les gouvernements qui ont été capables d'agir avec intelligence et souplesse ont réussi à conserver leur pays intact. Les autres n'ont pas réussi à le faire et leurs Etats sont soumis à une pression grandissante.

La participation accrue des populations n'est pas une vague idéologie fondée sur les bonnes intentions d'une poignée d'idéalistes. C'est devenu un impératif, une condition de survie.

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EC-NGO Cooperation (Part II)

Evaluation of EEC-NGO cofinancing in relation to institutional support for grassroots organisations in developing countries *

by Geneviève de Crombrughe, Francis Douxchamps, Nikita Stampa

3.1. Limitations on the ways in which the non-governmental sector in the South can intervene

3.2.1. Support NGOs and federative organisations

We shall not go into detail here about the support work in the field undertaken by the NGOs and federative organisations; this subject has been dealt with in a document of methodological orientation prepared for the Commission (5). The present study constitutes a continuation of that work. We shall confine ourselves to noting that these organisations gradually adopt a strategy of responding as flexibly and aptly as possible to the more or less organised demands and initiatives coming from the grassroots level. The responses they devise must therefore depend to a considerable extent on local contexts and developments therein; these, in their turn, are sometimes linked to the international context. Instead, in this chapter, we shall be looking at the relations that exist between the ways in which these organisations function and intervene and the ways in which they are funded.

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(5) Supporting development action, from identification to evaluation, op. cit.

Characteristics of mode of functioning

Of the 27 Southern organisations encountered during our field studies, 20 were support NGOs, 6 federative organisations, and one was a body coordinating development organisations.

These organisations were of local, regional and sometimes even national scale. In very large countries, national organisations often face problems of cost and time related to travel.

One organisation that we visited was designed to cover the whole of Botswana. In Botswana the population is sparse and widely distributed, which makes complete decentralisation of the organisation's activities very difficult. It could nevertheless solve a part of the problem this causes by opening at least one decentralised office in the North of the country.

Where these organisations undertake different kinds of activity, they are generally divided into specialised departments accountable to a single management. Interaction between departments is nevertheless the rule at the structural level and frequent in the field.

One African NGO has a support role in the digging of wells and in agricultural diversification. But, as a result of requests made by villages to its management, it is the cultural/training department which makes the first and then accompanies the specialised services.

Sectorial specialisation can nevertheless have unwanted effects.

In another African NGO, a structural reform of the organisation had replaced geographical responsibility for managers with sectorial responsibility (training, credit, education, technical support). This new organisation chart seemed more logical and better structured, but the result was to make the managers less responsible towards the grassroots groups they dealt with.

It is clear, nonetheless, that after a certain number of years, support NGOs tend to specialise in a particular area of activity. Another possibility is that the different specialist departments of an NGO become autonomous.

Many support NGOs are created and managed by strong, charismatic personalities. It must be noted that these persons tend to impose their ideas on the organisation as a whole. There is

EEC Cofinancing in 1991

	Total EEC contribution in thousands of ECU	Number of beneficiary NGOs	No of NGOs receiving 50% NGOs of that state
Germany	18,408	32	4
UK	5,953	43	7
Italy	15,426	38	11
France	12,818	38	8
Belgium	10,989	26	5
Spain	7,409	9	2
Holland	2,182	6	2
Ireland	1,523	3	1
Luxembourg		8	1
Greece	654	2	1
Denmark	514	3	1
Portugal	483	3	1

nothing wrong with this in itself, and it may have a positive effect in that these leaders impart their dynamism and energy to the organisation as a whole. But it can also lead to problems for two main reasons :

— the negative impact on the organisation when they depart (sometimes to take up a governmental role);

— the very vertical management style.

We did indeed find that in practice the working of these organisations was relatively hierarchical, and this was linked with some incapacity to delegate responsibility. Even if the executives of the organisation are regularly consulted and associated with decisions, problems arising in the field tend systematically to be referred back to the central management, which is often perceived as the only authority competent to take non-routine decisions.

The office of the director of one NGO visited was besieged every morning by peasants seeking answers to problems related to actions taken by the NGO; these problems should have been dealt with at another level.

In contrast, a federative grassroots organisation in Jamaica clearly separates the responsibilities of each level; members' problems are dealt with in their grassroots organisations; the latter bring them up in discussion at second or third degree bodies if they are of general interest.

The annual budgets of these organisations are extremely variable (from 50,000 ECU to 300,000 ECU; these two cases are both Latin American organisations) as is the level of staffing (between 3 and 120 persons, for the same Latin American organisations). Nevertheless, the notion of percentage running costs in the total budget clearly does not have the same significance in Southern organisations as in the Northern NGOs, to the extent that the major part of their budget is spent on running costs for activities in the field, on overheads and on investments costs for the structure.

A growth in size and an increase in professionalism were visible in almost all the organisations we visited. In theory, this should make them more competent, but there is some danger of their distancing themselves from, or growing out of reach of, their members or the beneficiaries of their actions.

The level of remuneration of the staff is often high relative to the average levels of salary in these countries for these functions. The consequences are very positive. Highly motivated and competent staff can generally be recruited in this way. However, in this way the NGOs become attractive to the political elite or members of the civil service who have lost their jobs during structural adjustment programs, and who contrive to enter the NGO without necessarily evidencing any competence or motivation for grassroots work. NGOs currently constitute a veritable employment sector in the South.

The systems of financial management established are for the most part rigorously applied: accounting is computerised; some organisations use systems of cost accounting by department or funding source; overall budget comparisons are effected quarterly or sometimes monthly; some organisations practise external and sometimes internal audits; most have their accounts audited by an independent body; however, some organisations use justificatory accounting systems, set up in response to external requirements and unsuitable for efficient management.

The three NGOs visited in one Africa country have their accounts audited by a trustee, who also has a training and management support role; these three NGOs all use cost accounting by department for the local expenses and revenues relating to the relevant actions.

The number of financial partners of the organisations encountered varies between 1 (one African and two Asian NGOs) and 15 (one African NGO). The number of financial partners is clearly related to the size of the organisation, the smaller NGOs having a smaller number of funding sources.

As regards the percentage of local financing of actions and of self-generated income (beneficiary contributions, self-financing activities, local "sponsorship", etc.), the information gathered is not very meaningful. The rate varies between 1 and 65%, but on the one hand the scale and situations of the organisations are very various, on the other the methods of calculation and of accountability are heterogeneous.

For example, some organisations assign a monetary value to cash contributions from the beneficiaries.

and use an invoicing system to integrate these contributions into their accounts; others avoid any form of valuation.

One Latin American NGO not only finances 30% of its budget by invoicing its services, but finances a further 35% of this budget thanks to dividends from a portfolio of shares donated by a "patron" company.

Hardly any of these organisations were able accurately to predict their future resources, as too few of them had succeeded in establishing sufficiently stable and durable relations with their financial partners. This fact has considerable repercussions upon the organisations' capacities to coherently schedule their middle term activities and the corresponding expenditure.

Two African NGOs had nevertheless set up a strategic programme of activities for three years, and had succeeded in obtaining a simultaneous three-year commitment on the part of their different financial partners, and in this way had ensured medium-term continuity.

The main objective of the self-financing policy of the Latin American NGO previously mentioned was the improvement of its medium and long term planning. 75% of its funding derives from local resources, over which it exercises greater control and which constitutes a guarantee for the future.

In contrast with received ideas, most of the organisations we visited are independent of the North when it comes to internal decisions, in particular in defining their strategies and implementing actions.

One Chilean NGO has ensured a considerable margin of freedom relative to its foreign backers; it proposes goals which it has itself identified in combination with its local partners, and then invites foreign NGOs to take part. Their critical comments are invited, but they are not entitled to dictate local policy.

One African NGO cannot do anything of the kind, as it depends by its very nature on a diocese, which is able to impose decisions on it.

There is no legal provision for NGOs in Cameroon. Two NGOs visited there thus turned out to be associations defined by European law; their governing bodies comprised a majority of Europeans.

Of course, autonomy cannot be measured simply in relation to the North: constraints are often local and political.

For example, the staff of a Peruvian organisation that we visited was under threat in its activities from the local guerrilla forces.

In India, the government can freeze the accounts in which NGOs' external subsidies are deposited if the latter engage in activities the government considers "subversive".

The beneficiaries of actions are all too rarely involved in the decision-making of support NGOs, and mechanisms of consultation and direct participation should be further developed. Since support NGOs are less integrally linked to the beneficiaries of their actions, they cannot be relied upon to continue with their support for a given group, and have less opportunity to assess the impact of that support; information does not necessarily reach the hierarchy in the way that it does in a grassroots organisation. In the second degree grassroots organisations, the decision-making process is obviously very different: the (main) authority is the members' general assembly, or whatever does duty for this.

In general, our evaluations led to the conclusion that non-governmental organisations in the South are competent agents for the exploration of new directions and for the implementation of innovations. They are also indispensable as a means of marginalised communities making themselves heard and expressing their views in Southern societies. On the other hand, it was noticeable that they when they undertake their own production projects with a view to financing themselves, they are rarely successful; their personnel are often well trained, but have little practical experience in economic activities.

Constraints related to sources and methods of funding

The fact that many of the organisations are financially dependent on the North means that they are subject to the constraints imposed by international cooperation system(s). In this regard, our visits in the field suggested that the organisations are mainly faced with two major kinds of problem:

- planning their resources;
- negotiating capacity.

The funding strategy adopted by many Southern organisations derives from their intervention strategies: they have opted for a methodology involving support for self-promotion (mainly in Africa) or for initiatives from the community. This strategy, which allows local resources to be

mobilised more easily; requires considerable powers of adaptation to the social milieu. Classic funding methods, on a project by project basis, hamper this strategy and cause the Southern organisations considerable difficulties.

— Time-lapses in granting aid

The rural communities of the third-world integrate innovations at their own pace. This is an inevitable constraint on development. The time-scales of international cooperation are necessarily different, since they refer to programmes and projects on which expenditure must be justified. There is therefore a constant danger of putting the cart before the horses, of forcing initiatives through, skipping intermediate stages, and causing incomprehension or undesired effects. On the other hand, when funding is really necessary, that is, when it would be timely, a long waiting-period frequently follows as applications are examined, decisions taken, and aid disbursed, etc...

— The right to trial and error

In many cases, the rigidity of funding procedures means that a single type of result is expected, and a single type therefore allowed; any other would be considered a failure. In fact, the capacity to reverse direction, to question what one is doing and reorient one's action, even if the objective is not attained, should be considered a positive result. Moreover, the choice of this objective must itself often be questioned as the action proceeds. Clearly, development is not a linear process whose stages can be accurately planned. It is essential that organisations and individuals in the South be granted the right to make mistakes; it is equally essential that the instruments required to exercise this right be placed in their hands (follow-up and assessment). Many Southern organisations consequently suggest that sanctions be instituted, and applied to those who abuse the latitude which they demand.

— Selectivity in the choice of beneficiaries

Projects, and expected results, on which the granting of further funds often depends, force support organisations to become selective in their choice of beneficiaries, and to work only with groups where there is a guarantee of rapid and visible results being obtained. These are not

always the poorest groups or those most in need of help.

— Scheduling and budgetary constraints

While great rigour of approach is required if local realities are to be understood, in scheduling actions, great flexibility is needed. Where progress is initiated there are risks too, and it is the subsistence of the peasant or craftsman and of his family that is a stake. He may, following his own logic, change his mind or reorient his strategy at any moment; he cannot therefore respect a schedule which antedates the beginning of the action by several months. In development, it seems, the unforeseen is the rule rather than the exception. The support organisation and the funding chain as a whole must therefore be able and willing to adapt the project to the changing constraints and demands of the beneficiary milieu, since this is a determining factor in the success of the action.

3.1.2. Grassroots organisations

We have seen that grassroots organisations find their "raison d'être" in a specific project common to a group of people. The needs of this type of organisation are various :

- methodological and technical support;
- management and organisational support;
- information and exchanges;
- training;
- funding of their actions.

This type of organisation normally has a voluntary basis, and its running costs, covered at least in part by members' contributions, are normally relatively low. "Institutional" funding, intended to cover the running expenses of the organisation (structural running costs) is not necessary, at least for a group whose activities have just begun.

On the other hand, flexible funds, not assigned to a particular item of the budget or a specific activity, are particularly appropriate to the funding of grassroots groups (6). These organisations must continuously adapt to the conditions and priorities in the field, and their scheduling capacity is relatively low.

The flexibility on the funding side must be balanced by enhanced rigorouslyness in follow-up and assessment; it must also be accompanied by

(6) This applies only to the way in which the financial report concerning the action should be presented, and would not free the applicant NGO from the need to draw up a detailed budget.

an increased sense of responsibility on the part of the beneficiaries. It is vital that this form of funding should not be subverted and allowed to become a means of obtaining easy money via lax control on the part of the funding source. The need for gradual incrementation in making funds available, according to the stage of development of the group, is another constraint on funding modes for grassroots organisations.

In view of the constraints implied by the way in which grassroots groups work, it seems necessary to modify certain of the Community conditions for "project by project" cofinancing (see 6.2). This formula seems to us the most apt for funding grassroot initiatives.

It is worth noting that the voluntary work of members, on which the actions undertaken by such groups depends, often makes their availability for individual activities problematic. It is difficult to suggest that work within these groups be remunerated, as remuneration is often thought of as making the new employee into a kind of civil servant, or as theft pure and simple! A response to this problem was observed in one African NGO:

So that they can devote more time to their respective tasks, the executives of this organisation have been equipped with agricultural machinery. Half of this sum takes the form of a subsidy, half of it is an interest-free loan, to be repaid, over three years, into the association's fund.

3.1.3. Provisional conclusions

It follows from this analysis that one should plan and schedule precisely and rigorously only those things which do not depend on the initiative of the beneficiaries, only those things which are external to the community (for example the schedule of the disbursements and of training course, etc.).

It is for such reasons that the NGOs and federative organisation in the South request that their financial partners take responsibility for the totality of their activities, via a percentage of their total budget. It would then be the business of the Southern organisation to share out the resources it possesses on the basis of requests from the community it serves.

One Cameroon NGO noted the advantages this mode of funding would bring it:

— it allows the NGO to develop an integrated rather than a sectorial approach to its actions;

— it allows the funding sources to support this overall approach on the part of the NGO;

— it allows transfers to be made between budget items as needed; in this way, it is no longer necessary to return moneys where not all the planned expenditure has taken place, which currently happens where funding is specifically allocated;

— it allows the NGO to adapt to the needs of the community, and not be bound to a number of objectives that have to be accomplished at any cost within the framework of a subsidy broken down into specific allocations;

— it allows the NGO to implement a long-term strategy over several years;

— it should allow the NGO to strengthen its own international functioning.

As we have seen, several of the advantages of overall or non-allocated funding are of a kind to allow the support work of the NGOs and the federative organisations, as well as the implementation itself by the grassroots groups, to be more flexible and better adapted to the situation of the beneficiary community. Other advantages relate to improvements in the functioning of the organisation itself and thus of its internal organisation. We shall see in the next chapter that it is possible in this way to contribute to the institutional development of the non-governmental sector in the Southern countries, and this should be one of the priorities of international cooperation.

3.2. Desirability of institutional development of the non-governmental sector in the South

Strengthening institutions has long been an important consideration in development policies. In the aftermath of independence in Africa and Asia, the emphasis was on strengthening the institutions of the state, and on helping to improve the educational levels and professional abilities of the civil service.

With the passage of time, studies have shown that the success of the development policies implemented did not depend exclusively on sturdy state institutions and competent civil servants. This is all the more true when in many

countries these institutions have undergone a drastic loss of efficiency and the public sector is in a state of deliquescence. Success in development policy requires taking into account not only a whole range of factors internal and external, but also a whole series of actors. In this perspective, NGOs have gradually come to be recognised as actors able to contribute significantly to the success of development policies and projects. Southern NGOs, for their part, have become aware of the importance of institutional strengthening for the success of their strategies of autonomy and partnership.

The main arguments in favour of institutional development are generally of operational import : the resources made available for a project must favour the emergence of dynamic and continuous processes leading to improved living conditions for the beneficiaries of the actions. In this perspective, competent and efficient structures are indispensable.

As regards the NGO sector, a more recent argument is political in kind; in the context of democratisation or the transition to democracy in many Southern countries, especially in Africa, NGOs as institutions have an increasingly important role to play in civil society. They have the potential to counterbalance the temptation toward authoritarianism, stimulating, reinforcing and relieving the communities' changing mentalities and attitudes.

Moreover, most bi- or multilateral agencies show a marked interest in the institutional development of the non-governmental sector in the South, as this is often seen as a vital and urgent need if cooperation in favour of development is to be viable.

In what exactly would "institutional" development of the NGO sector in the South consist? It may be helpful at this stage to clarify the terms we use. An *institution* is a set of durable rules established in order to satisfy collective interests, and by extension, a body seeking to maintain them : an *organisation* is a structured association of people who are pursuing determinate common goals.

We should therefore talk of *institutional development* when changes are planned in the social structures of a society, for example, via the NGOs, and of *organisational development* when changes are expected within the organisations themselves (7).

This distinction has of course certain implications as to what should be done in relation to the NGO sector of Southern countries in the matter of development aid. The goal would be the emergence of an institutionalised NGO sector that is, a sector sufficiently sturdy, acknowledged and powerful to further social change in Southern countries. To reach this goal, it is vital to promote a change in relationships within the NGO sector, so that it becomes a coherent force. In the same way, it is equally necessary that there be North-South dialogue, so that the policies and strategies of aid are made more favourable to the work of the NGO sector in the South.

Clearly, if the goal of institutional development in the NGO sector in the South is to be reached, the sector must consist of efficient well-managed, competent organisations with well-trained staff etc. Support for Southern NGOs, as planned in the Community cofinancing system, must be considered one of the means by which institutional development of the sector is to be arrived at. What resources, allocated by what methods, are needed? What are the needs, and what conditions should be imposed? These are themes of the following sections.

3.3. Factors of success and failure in supporting the non-governmental sector in the South

The objective of the funding currently termed "institutional support" should rather be the organisational strengthening of the NGOs, this being one of the ways of promoting the institutional development of the sector.

In what would the organisational reinforcement of the Southern NGOs consist ? One answer is this: it should be a continuous process tending to improve the performance of an organisation in relation to its goals, its resources and the environment to which it belongs. Does Chapter 12-style funding favour the strengthening of organisations according to this definition? This is the question we shall try to answer.

The principle underlying Chapter 12 of the general conditions of the EEC is one of granting cofinancing on the basis of a percentage of the overall budget of the Southern NGO, that is, for its activities as a whole and for the working of the

(7) We should of course note that many non-governmental

organisations, in the North as well as the South, have become true institutions in their own countries and even

at international level.

organisation. This constitutes a major advance in the field of cofinancing rules, one which partly answers a concern voiced by the overwhelming majority of the Southern organisations encountered during this research. "Partly", because the duration of the cofinancing is evidently too short for medium-term scheduling, even though the two year (renewable) maximum was a logical condition in the context of the experimental launching of this modality of financing.

In practice, it has been observed that the majority of Chapter 12 cofinancings have served only to cover running costs for a given period. Of the seven organisations that we visited who had received Chapter 12 cofinancing, five had used it for the financing of their overall budget, with some small investment sometimes included; one project went towards real estate investment and shares in limited companies associated with the NGO; one project allowed the beneficiary NGO to be capitalised; none was used for the development or organisational reinforcement of the organisation.

This is probably because there are no conditions in Chapter 12 relating to results demonstrating the improved efficiency of the organisation itself. It is therefore vital that hereafter this overall funding should be designed as an *investment in the organisation* (material or human), rather than as simply a way of meeting the organisation's running costs.

To this end, it would be best to establish in Chapter 12 cofinancing an "*aims contract*" relating less to the NGO's activities than to the improvement of its own organisational efficiency and thus to its results. The areas in which the internal improvement effort should be concentrated belong to the field of "enterprise management". The English body INTRAC (8), in seeking to apply these concepts to the non-governmental sector in the South, specifies ten areas of the internal working of the NGOs on which institutional reinforcement should concentrate :

- the operational mode or mode of intervention of the NGO, that is, the way in which the NGO proceeds to realise its development intentions;
- general administration;
- the funding of the organisation;

- financial management;
- internal communication;
- the form in which decisions are made;
- personnel management;
- the way in which a sense of responsibility is inculcated into the executives as a whole;
- the degree to which environment and context are taken into account;
- methods of follow-up/scheduling/evaluation.

There are, however, two reasons to be wary in applying these concepts; they are very close to Western models of organisational operation, and their appropriateness to the South must therefore be determined.

It should also be emphasised that organisational reinforcement is not an end in itself. The basic objective in improving organisational efficiency is the more rational use of available resources, and thus in turn, to offer better assistance to the beneficiary grassroots groups. Better internal functioning should allow the support organisation to economise and thus to allocate more of its resources to the support of grassroots groups.

The formulation of coherent improvement goals requires a great deal of analysis, assessment and self-examination. Quantitative and qualitative goals should be determined by the NGO, perhaps in consultation with, and using the methodological help of, its Northern partner(s). It is true that NGOs might be discouraged by the workload required to specify the funding necessary for aims contracts of this kind. To avoid any such deterrent effect, the following should be borne in mind:

- It is essential that the Southern beneficiary organisations should be freed of the administrative tasks specific to the cofinancing they have obtained, such as activity and financial reports exclusively relating to the cofunded action (9). The formula of financial justification practiced in the context of Chapter 12 should therefore be generalised for the different kinds of cofinancing and for all funding sources, private and public. Similarly, the organisation should be assured of continuity of funding; this would free it, for the period in question, of the long and arduous work of seeking financial resources. The principle is thus that funding should involve durable relations, and that the ending of these relations

(8) Alan Fowler with Piare Campbell and Brian Pratt: *Institutional Development and NGOs in Africa: Policy Perspectives for European Development Agencies*. INTRAC, April 1992.

(9) This does not, of course, mean that the reports are useless, but that their principal objective must be the improvement of the results of the organisation and of its internal management. Similarly, the obligation to keep funding sources informed remains fundamental, were it only to ensure follow-up.

should be a matter to be negotiated between the three partners.

— Clearly, the substantial work of internal analysis and assessment necessary prior to an application would assist the progress of and help to dynamise the organisation; it would certainly be a more positive factor than the constant interruption of activities so that funds can be sought and so that complex financial reports can be drawn up which are often useless to the organisation.

Reaching goals of organisational reinforcement also requires a wide variety of external support for the different categories of NGO internal functioning. This will of course have implications for the role of the Northern NGOs in respect of the actions and organisations they support in the South.

It is also important to *make clear the risks* involved in the institutional and organisational development of the NGOs and federative organisations in the South. These risks are of various kinds.

— Abundant resources might cause an anarchic proliferation of the organisations which compose the NGO sector. The effects of this would be felt up and downstream. On the one hand, there might be hypertrophy of the NGO sector relative to its representativity and social legitimacy; that is, NGOs with no social commitment and incompetent to undertake participatory actions might come into being. On the other hand, where there would be a major increase in the recurrent costs of organisations, without any assurance as to the future.

— Given the disastrous economic and financial situation of the majority of developing countries, there is a risk that organisations give priority to the funding of their own structures rather than to their activities.

Still, one African NGO faced with this problem chose not only to increase the percentage of the monetary and material contributions of its beneficiaries to an affordable extent, but also to reduce its personnel.

— Given the state's withdrawal from fundamental areas of economic and social activity, there is a danger of an accentuation of the current tendency, in which NGOs take over the abandoned activities, or are given responsibility for them by bi- or multilateral bodies. NGOs thus find them-

selves replacing the state in areas in which they have little experience. This situation might foment rivalry and competition between NGOs, as well as animosity on the part of the civil servants with whom they would have to cooperate. This also poses the question of the coherence of policies and above all of the long-term viability of these actions, which, when all is said and done, remain the state's responsibility: coordination with the administration must remain the rule.

Practical and effective partnership between an NGO, peasants and government employees in Ethiopia allowed a region to move from agricultural deficit to agricultural surplus within four years.

These reservations are no less relevant for federative organisations. There is, theoretically, less danger of them gradually adopting a strategy of institutional survival at all cost, rather than one of accomplishing the tasks for which they were created; they are participatory in their functioning, and any "institutional" tendencies of this kind could be halted by their members, nevertheless, if such mechanisms, which are not present in the support NGOs, do not work, then the situation could be more serious than in the case of the latter. Such a situation would induce a sense of mistrust in the members, a reduction in commitment to the organisation, and would put a severe brake on the association process.

From the point of view of financial management, the risks are greater than the support NGOs. Acquisition of abundant resources is a destabilising factor; it can cause difficulties in the decision-making process, and set up struggles for power and factional struggles between disparate interests. Financial autonomy is therefore all the more necessary for this kind of organisation, and in the next chapter we describe the ways in which it can be achieved.

In two organisations assessed, in Zimbabwe and Botswana, conflicts of interest came to light relating to the allocation of credits to member groups or organisations. The credits are allocated by the banks, but a decisive recommendation is given by a decision-making body of the second degree grassroots organisation. The members of the organisation are therefore not merely those who decide whether credits should be granted but those to whom they are granted. Internal political manoeuvring is therefore possible and accusations of favouritism were reported.

Concerning first degree grassroots organisations, one fundamental reservation should be made about the financing of their actions. The actors in development aid are unanimous in thinking that the productive and/or commercial activities of the grassroots organisations can no longer be financed by donations, as this funding method does not either motivate or lead to a sense of responsibility. It often produces unwanted side effects and ambiguous behaviour (accepting the funds/rejecting the actions). Moreover, it is rarely possible to set economic activity in train through subsidies at grassroot level. Thus credit mechanisms should be most widely used, and few exceptions made. Credit financing for revenue-generating activities has several substantial advantages :

- it subordinates the grassroots directly to the laws of economic activity;
- it is a further factor in the assumption of responsibility;
- it also allows the funds allocated to be used again, and thus multiplies their effect and sets up an economic and social dynamic at local or regional levels especially when the interventions are concentrated in one geographical area.

But the crucial point about the funding of grassroots groups are the need, on the one hand, for great *flexibility in the allocation and use of funds*, and on the other for *follow-up/assessment*. Thus whatever mode of funding is chose and however many intermediaries there are, every funding source should ensure that long-term evaluation will take place. And it is at this level that one of the problems arises with direct funding by Northern public funding sources or Northern NGOs of first degree grassroots organisations in the South.

Having thus sketched out a strategy for the strengthening of the non-governmental sector in the Southern countries, we shall, in the next section, deal with the sources and modes of funding required if Southern organisations are to strengthen both their own internal functioning and their activities.

3.4. Sources and modes of funding of Southern organisations

The harsh economic climate which the non-governmental sector must face in the South, along with its dependence on limited external

funding, are constraints on its autonomy and sometimes even threaten its viability. Sources of public funding increasingly often require of Southern organisations that in the long term they develop perspectives of autonomous functioning.

The question of autonomy is seen in its true significance in the context of Chapter 12-type overall funding for Southern organisations; these sources of funding assume for a necessarily limited period the running costs which the organisation will somehow or other itself have to assume.

Nevertheless, the criteria to be considered in relation to the continuation of funding of this kind must of course be linked to the way in which the institution manages the funds it receives, and more importantly, to the kind of activity that it performs. The length of the institutional support is probably not the most important consideration. In the case of long-term support, the issue of financial autonomy must be raised rather in relation to the beneficiaries (who cannot be aided, trained or supported indefinitely) than to the support organisation (who can perfectly well perform work which has to be repeated for other beneficiaries). In the long term, the income-flow to the beneficiaries will have to come from their own activities and less from external structures.

It is at all events best not to put all one's eggs in the one basket and *diversification of funding sources* is an absolute priority for this sector. Yet it is too often the case that the quest for funds takes up too much of the time of the executives of these organisation, sometimes to the detriment of the organisations' functioning. It is therefore important that the diversification of their sources of funding should be gradual. The present chapter is intended to detail the different funding sources which can facilitate this process.

3.4.1. Funding from the North

Support NGOs and federative organisations

The first stage of diversification, especially for the support NGOs, is of course to *increase the number of their funding sources*. But excess should be avoided; there should not be so great a number of partners as to require excessive resources for the

management of relations and thus inhibit true partnership. As a general rule, it should be considered unhealthy if more than one third of the current budget of an organisation comes from one and the same partner.

During our missions to Africa, several organisations expressed their desire to obtain *more direct access to the sources of public funds in the North*. This is a difficult issue and needs to be approached carefully, not least because other organisations (mainly in Latin America and Asia) were against this form of funding.

If the goal is to make Southern organisations independent of Northern NGOs, this form of funding does offer advantages. But there are also potential disadvantages :

— the requirement that Southern organisations conform to the general order of intergovernmental relations (with the attendant risk of political interference) might limit their scope and the autonomy with which they plan their activities;

— the loss of the support of the Northern NGOs, in particular in follow-up and assessment, but also in meeting administrative needs;

— the danger of excessive funding, which could cause a growth crisis among these organisations;

— the lack of long-term partnership relations with funding sources, since this kind of funding often takes the form of selective short-term support; the danger of Southern organisations being used as an instrument by which other people's policies are implemented;

— the potential for conflict with local government which might tend to see these organisations as foreign agents and use this argument against them within the community at times of crisis.

The interest in direct funding on the part of the African NGOs is mainly the consequence of a disappointment felt about the practical application of the notion of partnership. The argument is that the Northern NGOs all have their own approaches and requirements in cooperation and this is a source of delays and constraints. They also think that the argument that Northern NGOs offer them a kind of moral protection and guarantee them a certain autonomy in relation to the local authorities does not just apply to NGOs. They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they would enjoy the same kind of protection if they were directly funded by public sources in the North.

Those who oppose this funding method believe that, as things are, the funding sources have insufficient resources to be able satisfactorily to attend to follow-up where funding has been direct. Moreover, if these public sources had to take the necessary steps and put aside resources for this purpose, their costs would be probably be higher than those of the Northern NGOs who undertake this task today. The percentage of administrative costs in the overall aid budget could therefore increase.

The demand for direct funding is directly proportional to the quality of the organisations' relations with Northern NGOs and with the competence of the latter in their role as intermediaries. It therefore raises the problem of the role of the Northern NGOs, which we will deal with in Chapter IV. It also raises another problem : how would this role of the Northern NGOs be financed if direct funding of Southern organisations were implemented ?

Grassroots organisations

As the Northern NGOs have gradually withdrawn from direct implementation in the South, grassroots organisations have gradually lost their traditional direct access to Northern funding. This is explained by the fact that the management of cooperation and follow-up/assessment relations, which is absolutely essential in support of grassroots organisations, is increasingly entrusted to Southern support NGOs.

In some countries, this situation has led to relatively serious conflicts of interest between the support NGOs and the grassroots organisations. Given their inferior access to funds, the grassroots organisations are often disadvantaged in this context. To modify the balance of forces, it would be possible to give to the grassroots organisations rather than to the Southern NGOs the means to finance the technical and methodological help that they need. This would give them a choice and thus a stronger negotiating position in their dealings with support NGOs.

One grassroots organisation which wanted to plan its activities was offered the help of an expert by its federation. It would have had to pay part of his fees. It refused the federation's choice and instead picked someone with whom it had already worked; who knew the area and the

local languages, since this guaranteed quicker and more appropriate support.

The issue of direct funding also arises in relation to first degree grassroots organisations. This form of funding is in fact already used for some Embassy funds and in particular through the EDF's Microproject system. It could be used still more in the future with the implementation of decentralised EEC cooperation.

The implementation of a mode of direct funding is subject to certain constraints inherent in these organisations, which were described in Chapter III. These were, in essence, the need for their actions to be supervised, and their need for flexible and gradually increasing funds. It is not easy - and is inevitably very expensive - for a Northern source of public funds to reach the necessary level of knowledge about the organisations that it finances and the development of these organisations.

Moreover, direct funding causes grassroots organisations the difficulty of administrative, financial and institutional management of cooperation relationships. Most such organisations do not possess the structure necessary to assume this kind of relationship. Experience has in some cases suggested that these management requirements can distract the executives of grassroots organisations from the goals for which the organisation had been founded, and can therefore have serious repercussions on the social dynamic of the group.

There are, however, some attractive formulas of direct funding of grassroots organisations. They are based on the principle of credits guaranteed in kind by the grassroots group. They also rely on close cooperation with the local support organisations.

In Bolivia and Peru, two Funds were set up by the Canadian Cooperation Ministry to finance the productive activities of grassroots organisations. This was mainly by credit. The plan provides for a percentage of the value of the credit (maximum 10%) to be allocated to support activities implemented for the most part by local support NGOs. The two funds are co-managed by representatives of the local authorities and of Canadian aid, and in the Bolivian example, by representatives of NGOs. The management of the fund is entrusted to a relatively autonomous technical team.

The management of credit funds is rarely

entrusted to an ad hoc autonomous structure, though this is probably the most satisfactory form of management. The credit is mostly handled by a support NGO, a federative grassroots organisation, or even by an ad hoc committee of the group itself. There are a few cases in which banks directly grant the credits; banks are not very relevant for the sectors envisaged, which generally cannot offer sufficient guarantees (see Chapter V). A study of the advantages and disadvantages of the various different systems would make it possible to decide which are the best.

For obvious reasons, credit managed directly by the Northern NGO is to be avoided.

Let us also note that, where credit is concerned, it is very important to establish from the first, with all the parties concerned, what use will be made of funds reimbursed.

3.4.2. Local funding

Even though local funding is difficult to find, it is an important part of the long-term financial viability of Southern organisations. Such funding may come from various sources.

— *Governmental funds:* Southern states rarely have the money to finance the actions of NGOs, and when they do, tend to use it for political ends. However, when organisations take on, even on a local basis, a public service which is the state's province (health, education...), it is vital that they establish working relations with the state, preferably on a financial basis.

In Zambia, as long as there has been consultation in advance, the state is committed to funding the cost of a teacher for every school built by a grassroots organisation. The latter appeals for external funding, NGO and other, for aid with the building of the school

— the economic development of some Southern countries has allowed the emergence of relatively substantial financial and industrial groups. These groups are insufficiently used as potential sources of direct funding of social actions. Certain experiments have shown that there are considerable possibilities in this field.

In Colombia, a major family concern thirty years ago allocated a proportion of its shares to the creation of a foundation for the economic and social development of deprived communities in the region. Subsequently, this system has become quite widespread in Colombia.

In Zimbabwe, NGOs working with the handicapped contrive to obtain local financial resources from the public and from companies.

The following example, by way of contrast, is also relevant :

In one programme in India, people from a privileged background set up social projects with money from international cooperation without making any attempt to obtain resources from their own class.

Prudence is nevertheless required with private funding, as it sometimes happens that the organisation's decision-making process is interfered with. It also goes without saying that the possibility of private funding depends on the wealth of the middle and ruling class of the country, and that the absence of well-off classes is a major impediment to private funding in many Southern countries.

Local contributions can also come, in more modest degree, from ex-inhabitants of a village or region who have access to resources in the urban community where they live. These contributions are generally linked to ancestral cultural traditions, which are strongest in Africa. It is an open question whether such practices will survive in the context of ever more rapid urbanisation and the acculturation process which follows.

More specifically, in grassroots organisation, it is vital that a part of the funds, in the form of contributions or savings, should come from the organisation's members. This part should however be calculated on the basis of the community's real financial capacities, and not on the basis of a percentage fixed in the abstract, as Northern funding sources (public and private) all too often require.

3.4.3. Resources related to the organisation's activities

These are income which the organisation obtains in the course of activities which are part of its object and "raison d'être" as a support NGO or federative grassroots organisation.

These activities can be divided schematically into three categories :

- activities not intended to make money;
- activities intended to be make money;
- granting of credit.

Activities not intended to make money

In this category of social activities we find, for example, technical support, health care, education, etc. It is inconceivable that these activities should in themselves generate sufficient revenue to cover their overall costs (they almost never do this in the North). If profitability were to become an object, the original social purpose of the organisation would necessarily be affected. In these cases, then, the object is *to reduce the running deficit* by means of optimal management of resources.

When considering the financial autonomy of institutions working in these sectors, we should be careful to note that these institutions should not have to seek financial autonomy. Their financial viability must be sought above all by diversifying their sources of finance. The quest for their own income in order to cover the organisation's running costs does however allow such institutions to take on board a new logic in which the efficient management of resources becomes a significant preoccupation. But there is a danger that the quest for self-financing may become a veritable dogma for these organisations; it is the direction in which they are pushed by some sources of funds.

It is, nonetheless, important that these organisations generate some revenue, by invoicing for services performed in the course of their activities. Even if the invoicing of services cannot be very high, because of the financial predicament of the group with which the organisation seeks to work, it is very important. It places a value upon the work performed and allows both the motivation of the beneficiaries and the evaluation of the services performed by the institution.

In Cameroon, one NGO which organises training courses requires that groups choose their representatives on the courses and pay a part of the cost of the course (the remainder is paid for by the NGO). Since this practice was implemented, the training staff have noted a greater motivation on the part of the students and better results from the training. The groups have become much more insistent that their representatives pass on the knowledge that they have gained.

The difficulty here is that very few NGOs are able accurately to determine their running costs and still less the cost of the services they sup-

ply, so that their invoicing can be very arbitrary (10).

Activities intended to make money

In this second class of activities, we shall place economic activities undertaken by the Southern organisations in the context of support for beneficiary groups or their members : the production or sale of goods, marketing services, etc...

It is important here to distinguish support NGOs from grassroots organisations. Unlike the grassroots organisations, the support NGOs have only a passing role in this kind of activity, since it is not their place to change into productive or marketing companies. Thus the implications for these two types of organisation in profit-making activities are different, as are the resources they can expect from them.

As regards the support NGOs, the resources that they obtain from these activities are rarely a significant contribution to the institution's financial autonomy. Strictly from the point of view of their support role, we might even say it is not desirable that they should be. The support NGOs' role is to support the beneficiary groups in realising an economic activity. When once that activity can be wholly assumed by the groups, in particular, once it is profitable, the support NGO should withdraw and turn its attention to other groups. This means that during an initial period, these activities can be subsidised in order to allow the beneficiaries gradually to adapt to market conditions.

In Peru, one NGO supports a group of small textile entrepreneurs in setting up direct exports to the USA. Success in these exports requires a learning process, and involves risks which the entrepreneurs cannot wholly assume during the initial phases. The NGO therefore agrees, for the duration of this initial phase, to accept a payment (in the form of a commission on sales) which does not cover the cost of organising the export service.

Such subsidies can clearly not be of infinite and the quest for a profitability threshold must be a priority. To calculate this threshold, the NGOs should include the total costs of the department which takes on this activity (not forgetting to allocate in its costings a sum for total running costs !). It is, besides, important for an organisation undertaking a service of this kind to maintain a separate set of accounts for it.

It is regrettable that all too often the support NGOs which take on marketing services make little effort to associate the beneficiaries with the structures which perform these services. The beneficiaries are therefore just users of the service, and this poses problems for its long-term viability.

In Bolivia, one NGO created a company offering marketing services for the goods produced by producer organisations which enjoyed its support in the form of credit or training. Ninety per cent of the capital of this company belongs to the NGO. The beneficiaries themselves have no share in the company; they will therefore be dependent on a commercial intermediary in which they have no decision-making rights.

As for the grassroots organisations, we have emphasised in this chapter how important financial autonomy is, especially when they undertake commercial activities. It is thus obvious that incomes from these activities should constitute a growing part of their financial resources, though the macro-economic climate in which these productive activities are taking place cannot be ignored.

Granting credits

If we confine ourselves to a purely financial approach, credit should be profitable. But it seems best to us to present credit here separately. In the logic of development, credit is also an instrument of economic and social promotion of marginalised groups. Under these circumstances it can be completely justified to grant credits in conditions where the total cost of the money, the administration of the credit, and non-recovery cannot be covered. However, someone must assume the shortfall. The Southern countries States have very largely failed in this department in the recent past (of the innumerable bankruptcies in "agrarian banks") and can no longer take up the shortfall. International aid has often to meet this need.

The fact that credit can be subsidised does not mean that credit organisations should be freed of the ground rules of correct financial management. In this respect, we should emphasise the importance of working with a certain "critical mass" of credit, that is, with a sufficient volume of credit to cover the greatest possible of administrative costs. The proliferation of NGOs undertaking credit activities is regrettable. It would be much

(10) If they could determine costs, they would probably be shocked by how high these often are.

more rational (and in the long term viable) to create entities specialising in the granting of credit to certain sectors of the community.

In Bolivia, a foundation with a capital of \$4m intended for marginalised communities is managed by a team of 8 people. Assistance for the beneficiaries is subcontracted to support NGOs. The value of this support varies between 5 and 10% of the total value of the credits. This structure is today financially autonomous.

In Lima, Peru, an NGO granting credits to small urban companies has three financial instruments for the implementation of its activities: a funding department, a cooperative savings-bank, and a venture capital company. The NGO makes available to its three units a total capital not exceeding \$300,000. A staff of twelve persons works directly or indirectly with these instruments. Moreover, the running costs of these independently managed and separately located units are thus multiplied threefold. Under these conditions, the units do not come close to financial autonomy, nor could they without sacrificing their original objects.

It may be worth adding that in Lima there scores of NGOs offering credit in the same sector, with levels of capitalisation even lower than those cited...

It should also be added that the creation of entities specialising in credits would have the merit of avoiding the interference that frequently occurs in the support NGOs and federative organisations between the management of credit funds (and thus of repayment) and support activities (training, technical assistance...). Practice shows that these two functions are often incompatible within a single organisation. One alternative we have observed in the course of this work is the resort to traditional banking institutions, despite the limitations this implies (see Chapter V).

Finally, in relation to credit, it is vital to contrive anti-inflation measures to avoid funds being eroded and repeated further external subsidies being required. Loans could for example be indexed against a foreign currency, or on a locally calculated index. In such cases it is important to base one's calculation on the whole set of relevant prices (the movement of input prices, the price of the product, etc), taking into consideration the activity for which the credit was granted.

For example, in Bolivia, the indexation of credits granted for the production of potatoes on the price of potatoes was unjust, because there is a seasonal fluctuation in their price in addition to inflation. Indexation on

the price of fertiliser was more appropriate, though not completely satisfactory.

3.4.4. Resources generated by self-financing activities

These are resources obtained by revenue generating activities undertaken by support NGOs or grassroot organisations, where these activities are not directly related to their objects.

With the incitation of their funding source, or in the quest for autonomy, many Southern NGOs attempt self-financing activities. The danger with such activities is that they are likely to take up much of the institution's energy and cause it to relegate its original objects to second place. Moreover these activities often require competences and forms of organisation that NGOs frequently do not possess.

In too many cases, these activities consume not only human energy but the resources of the institution. It is not unusual to discover the absurd situation in which the institution finances the "self-financing" activities and not "vice-versa"!

At all events, it is vital to separate this kind of activity from the rest of the structure, at accounting and even at institutional levels.

In Peru, one NGO had developed several activities intended to help self-financing. Aware of the fact these had to be managed in a different perspective, the NGO therefore created several dependent companies. Unfortunately, despite this juridical separation, the financial input and contributions in kind of the NGO were not properly accounted for. It is therefore impossible to establish the extent of the NGO's real investment in these companies.

Self-financing activities that could be promoted — Consultancy services. This kind of activity has both advantages and disadvantages for Southern organisations. Advantages include guaranteed profitability (the work is generally very remunerative), the intellectual benefit (accruing to both consultant and "consultée") through comparison with other organisations and other countries, and the possibility of inculcating in the funding source a better notion of the meaning and reality of the conditions in the field. Among the disadvantages are the fact that the organisation can thus be

deprived of its best qualified personnel for relatively long periods, if not indeed definitively.

— Renting parts of its premises not used by the NGO, to the extent that this activity remains relatively simple.

— The bestowing on the NGO of a capital sum whose interest would be used to finance its activities. To avoid the frequently encountered problem of the devaluation of the local currency, it has been suggested that NGOs might create a central investment institution which would manage an mutual international fund.

In Jamaica, one local NGO has an investment fund placed at its disposal by a European NGO using EEC Chapter 12. This fund, invested in safe, profitable, local shares, generates sufficient funds to finance a third of the budget of the NGO. Unfortunately, the capital has been seriously eroded by inflation, though the parallel increase in interest rates has till now permitted the generation of sufficient profit for its goal to be accomplished. However, in view of the fact that lack of capital constitutes a major obstacle in developing countries, it seems a pity that a large sum should be immobilised with no other aim than the generation of interest. Thus we should specify more closely the use that should be made of capital, because at least two methods are possible.

— The first would be to invest the capital in ethical investments linked to development activities (The Ecumenical Cooperative Development Company in Holland, Fonds Commun de Placement and SICAV of the French CCFD, Epargne Cigale in Belgium, etc.); the second would be to use the fund as a guarantee for loans made to productive activities in the Southern countries.

Investments of this kind do not offer optimal profitability, but they nevertheless constitute a more consistent choice in the general allocation of a cooperation budget.

— It would also be possible to place the capital with local institutions specialised in the management of capital entrusted to them by NGOs, to which they guarantee an income.

One Colombian financial NGO, which has a social purpose but which is at the same time a commercial company, offers NGOs a form of management of their funds called "Permanent fund with quid pro quo". It works like this: for each monetary unit invested, the financial NGO adds a half-unit and ensures the efficient management of the money (productive investments in Colombia,

loans to local companies, etc). Seventy per cent of the interest on the capital is paid out to the NGO which deposited it, the remainder being reinvested to avoid decapitalisation through inflation and to allow the capital to grow a little. The funds are, as the name suggests, permanently invested with the financial NGO.

IV. Strategies for reinforcing and funding the non-governmental sector in the North

4.1. Characteristics of the modes of intervention practised by the non-governmental sector in the North

4.1.1. The working of the Northern NGOs.

Resources

The 25 Northern NGOs encountered during the course of this study all possessed a professional projects department and had the capacity to follow up the activity of their partners in the field. They were organisations interested by the possibility of Chapter 12 financing, or liable to be so interested as they already practised certain forms of organisational support. Most of them were funding organisations; four of them were operational (or mixed) organisations with their own projects in the field.

The 25 NGOs covered a wide range of sizes. Their annual budgets fell between 1 and 100 million ECU; seven of them had a budget of over 50 million ECU and nine a budget of less than 5 million ECU.

The CEC project cofinancing budget (line 37-5010) stood at 100 million ECU in 1991. Some of the big NGOs have an annual budget equivalent to or even higher than the total cofinancing budget of the CEC. At the other end of the scale, many European NGOs had budgets below 1 million ECU.

The resources of the NGOs were composed of public and private contributions. Taking the CEC member states together, private contributions represented two thirds of the funds available and public contributions one third. All the variants exist in this field: one NGO was funded

100% by public funds and another 100% by private contributions. The statutes of some NGOs determine the maximum percentage of public funds in their budget. In one NGO visited, this was fixed at 10%.

By way of illustration, it is of interest to note that the level of private contributions to developing countries varies on a scale between 1 and 50 in the different Community members. According to a 1990 report (11) prepared by the Liaison Committee (based on OECD statistics), this annual private contribution by head varied in 1986 between 0.19 ECU in Italy and 9.77 ECU in Holland (see 4.4).

Obviously, these disparities register traditions, enrooted habits, and different regimes of tax breaks, but little is known about the motivations of the various public donors, the continuity of their contributions, and the use of the funds they provide. It would be interesting to have a clearer notion of the place that development NGOs occupy in the civil societies of the EEC member states, and thus to gain a clearer understanding of their access to the private resources of their countries. The OECD will next year undertake a study of the resources of the Northern NGOs which should document this little-known aspect of the NGO sector.

Running Costs

In the NGOs we visited, the budget managed by each project manager at the headquarters was between 300,000 and 1,200,000 ECU. These figures should be treated with caution, as several NGOs depend heavily on existing local networks, generally those of the church, and others have decentralised offices in many of the countries in which they work. Many of the project managers aimed to visit their projects at least once a year, but many noted that they were not in fact able to do so and visited their projects only once every two or three years.

The way in which work and management is organised allows some NGOs to be more "productive" than others. It seems that the big NGOs can make scale economies (12). Moreover, NGOs which receive a substantial part of their budgets from private donors are particularly careful to keep administrative costs, and thus levels of paid staff, as low as possible.

The percentage of the budget consumed by running cost also varies widely. Here, we should distinguish two kinds of costs, those concerned with the management of projects, and those concerned with fund-raising and informing the public. If we take into account only the management of projects, the rates declared are between 4 and 8% of the total budget, the lowest rates being those of the NGOs which raise most of their funds from the general public.

These percentages are not unambiguous. The classification of running costs varies from one organisation to another. This probably explains at least in part the very low levels announced by NGOs who make a point of maintaining the lowest possible administrative costs as part of their appeal to the public. It seems likely that realistic, inclusive administrative costs are around 7% for the big organisations and around 10% for the smaller.

The level of salary paid to the staff of Northern NGOs is mostly towards the lower end of the European salary scale. This has some influence on staff recruitment and turnover in the Northern NGOs. (In Southern NGOs the situation is reversed, and salaries are often high relative to the national average.)

Size of the Projects

Variation in the number and size of projects is considerable. Though our information on this subject is incomplete, it seems worth mentioning certain interesting cases. One large NGO starts more than a thousand new projects a year throughout the world, of which the majority (70%) cost less than 25,000 ECU. Another spends an average 300,000 ECU on each project.

The average scale of the projects is a component part of the NGO's intervention policy. Some big NGOs make major contributions to a small number of partners, while other large NGOs spread their resources over a very large number of partners. This affects the role played by the NGO in relation to their Southern partner. Generally speaking, if the contribution is a large one, the NGO is more involved in the life and problems of the partner, the partnership is more intense, and there is sometimes a danger of the NGO exercising too great an influence. For small NGOs, the amounts devoted to each intervention

(11) The Cofinancing Systems in the European Community. Jappe KOK. HIVOS, 1990.

(12) A study of a sample 30 American NGOs showed average running costs of 11%, whereas in the second biggest NGO in terms of funding volume, they were only 4%.

are necessarily much smaller, and a major commitment to their partner may result from relatively small contributions.

For many NGOs, the small ones in particular, the temptation is to let themselves be guided by their very real interest in requests coming from a great number of partners. This leads them to take on more and more partners till the point at which they can reasonably expect to ensure follow-up has been passed. This poses a dilemma of course. As we said earlier, for Southern NGOs, it is good to have several partners so as not to rely excessively on any one, and because each partner can bring its own contribution and the benefit of its ideas. But for the Northern NGOs, it is important not to spread themselves too thin, but to give priority to particular partnerships and the healthy exchanges that these produce. There is an optimum point, but it is difficult to reach, for both Southern and Northern NGOs.

Number of Countries in which the NGO Acts

Some small NGOs operate in a small number of countries - one NGO visited worked in only one country. Most are aware of the fact that it is unhelpful to increase the number of countries in which they act, and are even considering reducing the number, or concentrating their efforts in certain regions of the countries where they act. The big NGOs currently work in very many countries, but there were signs that almost all the organisations visited were questioning the wisdom of this and thinking of reducing the number of countries in which they act, of concentrating on particular areas. This can be considered an important element if follow-up is to be intensified without excessive cost increases.

One major British NGO is currently considering changing the scale of its interventions and is developing a strategy of regional approaches to certain themes such as health.

4.1.2. Constraints relating to funding mode

The "classic" project by project cofinancing mode is criticised by NGOs and cofinancing departments in most European countries. We have seen (Chapter 3.1) the disadvantages that Southern actors discern in that method. Here is a

brief enumeration of the main disadvantages that Northern NGOs detect in it (see 6.5 for public cofinancing departments).

— assessment of applications is very slow. In some countries, the processing-time can exceed one year;

~ the high workload involved in presenting applications, reports and accounts. These are often unrealistic, given the time elapsed before funding becomes available; moreover, the system requiring separate accounts for the money sent and the originals of all the invoices to justify expenditure is not an efficient form of control;

— there are often problems with the Southern partners, who find it hard to schedule their activities coherently, given the uncertainty and delays in obtaining funding;

— there are risks for the Northern NGOs which sometimes commit themselves to projects without any assurance that they will obtain cofinancing for them.

4.2. The need for a redefinition of the roles of the non-governmental sector in the North

Since the colonial period, associations and other voluntary bodies in the North have been involved in development aid for Southern countries. This involvement has grown, and the structures of the associative world have developed to the point where they can be counted as institutions in the sense defined at 3.2. In Northern societies, the NGOs have become reliable and trusted actors in the field of development aid. In certain circumstances, they can influence the political decisions of their own government.

The NGOs are nonetheless going through an identity crisis today, which relates in part to the rapid growth of the non-governmental development aid sector in the South. This development has led certain multi- and bilateral funding sources increasingly to look for direct collaboration with Southern NGOs.

We noted, in Chapter III, that one of the striking facts about this development is the increasingly strong structuration of Southern civil society. Faced with this development, the Northern NGOs have adapted their intervention modes and have, for the most part, turned themselves

into funding NGOs, thus leaving the Southern NGOs to undertake the support work they had previously themselves undertaken. This conversion to funding necessitated a complete redefinition of the role of the NGOs in the North.

The idea of partnership was basic to this redefinition. It was necessary to leave behind the donor-beneficiary relationship and set up relations based on mutual trust and the pursuit of common goals. Unfortunately, the notion of partnership remained very vague. It is often a new label applied to practices and working methods which have changed very little. In extreme cases, the role of Northern NGOs tends to be limited to that of a financial and administrative letter-box.

In the South, voices were raised to express disappointment about this change. The fact that the Southern "partners" are now seeking direct funding is one of the symptoms of the unease that has gradually built up.

The brevity and the nature of our visits to Northern NGOs did not allow us comprehensively to identify the reasons behind this change. It seems likely, however that the difficult financial context in which these NGOs find themselves is an important explanatory factor, since it may lead the executives of NGOs to give priority to the strengthening or survival of their own institution.

The harsh financial context is caused by :

- an increasingly large number of NGOs sharing a limited total of funds (public and private);
- the fact that the constraints and conditions imposed by public cofinancing sources are logical in the context of public funding but are sometimes ill-adapted to the conditions of NGOs.

Despite these difficulties, to remain consistent with their policy of reinforcing initiatives deriving from Southern communities, the NGOs of the North must contribute unequivocal, well thought-out, and appropriate aid to the institutional development of the Southern NGO sector and to the organisational reinforcement of the NGOs that compose it. To attain this end, they will have to define, in concertation with their partners and on the basis of their partners' requests, a strategy of support for the process now occurring, and this implies a new orientation for their support.

Many more or less innovatory experiences show that there exist fields of cooperation

between NGOs North and South in which mutual contributions are possible and in which the term of partnership is restored to its primary sense :

- methodological and technical help for the organisational development of the Southern NGO;
- financing the Southern NGOs needs in relevant areas (training, external consultancy...);
- circulating relevant information, support for the networking of partners meeting the same problems, and for collaboration between Southern NGOs;
- support for the creation of ad hoc service centres for the NGOs at local, national, or regional levels;
- methodological support for redefinition of relations between support NGOs and grassroots organisations;
- promoting concertation between the various funding sources of a particular Southern partner and the partner;
- lobbying, notably for the modification of rules governing funding from public funding sources;
- development education.

These fields of cooperation are unquestionably the area within which the Northern NGOs should redefine their objects and strategies, if they are to stimulate change in their relations with the Southern organisations. For greater clarity, we shall divide these fields of action into different kinds of partnership using an ad hoc terminology.

4.2.1. Methodological partnership

Theoretically, the Northern NGOs have a long experience of numerous partnerships in different areas of the globe on projects which often have similar methodologies and goals. This experience constitutes a considerable asset that the Northern NGOs should put to work in offering quality methodological support for their Southern partners. It is regrettable that the advice offered by the Northern NGOs is, generally speaking, both quantitatively inadequate and mediocre in quality. Many of the Southern NGOs that we visited were facing quite obvious problems but were not engaged in critical dialogue with, or receiving the appropriate support, from the NGOs which were funding them.

The most common and most direct form of methodological support are the activities of follow-up and assessment. But as we have seen, these activities are for the most part undertaken by the Northern NGOs unsystematically and are often no more than administrative follow-up. In most cases, it is recommended that they invest more resources in these activities.

Several formulas for intensifying partnerships exist. Local or regional offices all allow regular contact with the various partners working in similar contexts. There is also a German system called "Berater auf Zeit", that is, an independent person who "accompanies" the Southern institution, making regular methodological support visits.

Another way of sharing the wealth of experience is the organisation of thematic meetings between different Southern partners.

Recently, a Belgian NGO and a Swiss foundation organised a seminar in Latin America on the different funding mechanisms of grassroots organisations developing productive activities. This seminar brought together many of these NGOs' partners, as well as other Southern institutions which had set up innovative funding mechanisms.

In the context of methodological partnership, exchanges should be encouraged (South-North, North-South, and South-South), of NGO members, in particular on the basis of short duration training programmes.

One Italian NGO rotates its staff regularly between field projects and the central offices of the NGO. There are thus always citizens of third-world countries, who have worked on their projects, occupying (for a few years) management roles in the Rome offices.

Some Northern NGOs invited representatives of their Southern partners to work for long periods in their Northern organisations and to help them consider, from their fresh perspective, the limitations inherent in the way in which the Northern NGO works.

One important element of both methodological and financial partnership is direct or indirect support for the creation in the South of departments specialised in organisational development support (as defined at 3.2).

With the funds and support of the NGOs which finance it, a federation of peasant associations took on three accountants to train and supervise its member organisations. When this task was nearly complete, the need appeared for independent auditors who knew the

sector well and could satisfy Northern auditing requirements. An agreement was reached for the three accountants to found their own chartered accountancy. The same mechanism had already led to the creation of a technical studies bureau.

4.2.2. Technical partnership

This and financial partnership constitute the "natural" partnership between Northern and Southern organisations.

The technical and cultural environment of the Northern NGOs constitutes an advantage which they can put to work for their partners by sharing with them technical knowledge less readily available in the South.

But the Northern NGOs cannot confine themselves to simply transferring technology. The transfer must be based on an appropriate concept of technology which brings to bear on the socio-economic reality of the South the technical know-how of the North.

This kind of partnership can take concrete form in the presence of the Northern "experts" in the field. But there are other less interfering options: short term missions can be sent, there can be cooperation with specialised centres, and the often crucial lack of documentation in the South can be remedied.

The role of the Northern NGOs is also to encourage and organise technical exchanges South to South.

One European NGO several years ago financed a visit by Ghanaian craftsmen to Indian craftsmen in Kerala so that they could learn from the wealth of small-scale technologies adapted to agriculture that had been developed in Kerala.

4.2.3. Partnership for development education

Education development is surely one of the most important tasks of the Northern NGOs. By means of informing the public about the context in which their Southern partners work, they can attempt to produce changes of behaviour in the North at various levels of society which would favour the interests of the deprived communities of the South.

Many Southern organisations complain

that they are insufficiently if at all associated with the work of the Northern NGOs in this field; they are not even kept informed.

It would be best if the Southern partners were not simply used as "raw material" for the creation of development education teaching materials but were associated with the design of such materials.

An association for the creation of film-strips organised production workshops in Bolivia with Bolivian children to allow them to express their experience of the coca problem in their country. There were two objectives: firstly to introduce the children to this form of artistic expression secondly to create teaching materials in order to inform the European public about the problem of "drugs and development".

A Caribbean women's group chose theatre as their means of expressing and discussing social problems encountered by marginalised communities rural and urban; performances are followed by workshops. The method also helps to generate communication with Northern countries: the European or US tours of this group have become a powerful instrument for the education of the public.

These examples show how development education is also an opportunity for South and North to learn from one another.

Development education should also allow communication professionals from the South a greater share in the creation and diffusion of documents about the reality of life in developing countries.

A report on urban conditions in Senegal broadcast by the francophone radios of Belgium Canada France and Switzerland was cooperatively made by a Senegalese association and a European association specialising in communication.

4.2.4. Partnership in lobbying

The Northern NGOs have a decisive role to play in influencing political decisions taken in the North so that they favour the deprived communities of the South. It would be logical for the NGOs to associate representatives of these communities with their activities in this field.

This form of partnership can be implemented by Southern representatives taking part in international forums, by common manifestos being drafted or by direct contact with pol-

itical decision-makers. These things are not yet common. For example, the Southern grassroots organisations and NGOs are not as such associated with the work of the NGO-EEC Liaison Committee.

One African NGO that we visited expressed the desire for debate with the Northern public finding sources about the rules of cofinancing and for Southern organisations to be invited to take part. While acknowledging the usefulness of reports that presented the point of view of Southern organisations to the North the NGO felt that the stakes involved for development justified the institution of real concertation involving Northern and Southern NGOs.

4.2.5. Thematic partnership

Thematic partnership means setting up partnership relations between Northern and Southern associations which work in similar areas in their respective countries (réintégration of marginalised communities in cities, support for peasant structures...).

The exchange of information occurs in a favourable context: the financial side is partly eliminated in this relationship and the staff of the Northern association are perceived less as teachers and more as people sharing similar experiences.

Moreover, this kind of partnership allows Southern people to get an idea of everyday reality in the North, of the advantages and disadvantages of the societies of developed countries, and to obtain a more realistic vision of the future of their own structures.

This partnership can be implemented by mutual visits, continuous information exchange, etc.

French and Senegalese regional agricultural associations maintain this kind of exchange relations. Mutual visits allow experience and sometimes techniques to be exchanged.

4.2.6. Commercial partnership

After repeated appeals from their Southern partners, some Northern NGOs became aware of the fact that many of their partners' economic problems arose because they could not sell their production and were thus related to direct access to markets.

It is of course primarily a local problem, and Northern NGOs can bring to the field their technical and methodological support in the attempt to end the isolation of the producers, put them in contact with potential clients, and train them in commercial management. But for many products, the problem also requires a response from the North in terms of researching possible export outlets and commercial promotion; it is therefore a potential field of intervention for Northern NGOs.

For several years, this field of intervention has been exclusively occupied by "alternative business" associations, selling third-world products in specialised shops. Though these actions have considerable impact in educating the public, they remain very limited both from the economic point of view and in their impact on beneficiary producers, who can only sell small quantities of their products through these outlets.

Recently, some initiatives have been taken to overcome these limits.

Thus in several countries innovative systems of marketing coffee and cacao on a large scale have appeared. These systems are based on cooperation with European companies selling products directly bought from organisations of small producers in the South at a fair price. The products are sold under a trademark supplied by the Northern foundation.

There is no doubt that these initiatives are a significant response to the problems of marketing of which we have spoken. Nevertheless, such systems are based on the principle of the solidarity of the Northern consumer, and are specific both in the type of product concerned and in the kind of marketing provided.

The other prospect for the Southern organisations is to integrate wholly with the traditional mechanisms of international trade and, there again, the Northern NGOs can help.

Some NGOs have already attempted to play the role of commercial representative for their partners by making contact with buyers or organising their partners' representation at commercial fairs.

These actions all too often remain small-scale, as they do not have the support of the appropriate structures; one-off by nature, they sometimes evidence an amateurism which is incompatible with this kind of activity. It appears

however that some NGOs have the capacity to engage in more structured action in this field.

Several European NGOs have supported financially and logistically the creation of an international marketing company whose shareholders are mainly small café producers in Latin America and Africa. One of the goals of this society is to create agencies of commercial representation in Europe and the USA. The task of these agencies is on the one hand to undertake promotion and sales management work in relation to European and US buyers on the other to inform the producers about the evolution and demands of the market. These companies are managed by professionals with experience of the international coffee trade.

It should be noted that this type of action in relation to marketing opens the door towards a true partnership to the extent that the beneficiaries' contribution may even include a financial element.

In the systems described above the producers commit themselves to paying a commission on sales so as to participate in the funding of the structure in Europe. This form of partnership takes the institutional form of a real participation by the beneficiaries in the decision-making bodies of the foundations (General Assembly Board of Directors).

In the case of the international company the producers will gradually become the sole owners of the European commercial representation agency.

4.2.7. Financial partnership

This is, of course, the most common form of partnership. We have said that it is unhealthy for financial relations to be the only link bringing together the Northern and Southern partners. Some NGOs have however chosen funding mechanisms (which we describe elsewhere) allowing for relations which develop a greater degree of partnership.

In this field, the investment society format is particularly advantageous, as it involves the participation of both partners at the same decision-making level.

A Belgian NGO established with its Peruvian partner a venture capital company (see 5.2) to support small companies in the urban sector. The two NGOs thus share the capital of the company and powers of decision within it (the Peruvian NGO has a majority). The Belgian NGO is represented on the Board of Directors by its local representative.

In general, if the purely financial relationship is taken on by some third party (banks in the case of international guarantees, alternative finance organisations...) it becomes easier to obtain balanced relations between the partners.

4.2.8. Concluding remarks

Description of these different forms of partnership suggests three important observations :

The first concerns the fact the different modes of partnership are important elements in the contractualisation of relations between Northern and Southern actors : they are a way in which the mutual requirements to which the partners are entitled can be specified.

The second observation is related to the fact that for the most part, these modes of partnership constitute a way out of the usual donor-benefi-

ciary relations, in so far as the financial component is not the only basis of the relationship.

The third observation concerns the adaptation of the conditions of cofinancing to forms of partnership which require significant funding for activities in Europe, activities which are not necessarily in the field of development education. Even if actions of this kind have a very real impact in the South (the example of commercial partnership is particularly indicative), their funding by public funding sources could become difficult or even impossible if the rules of cofinancing were strictly applied. It would therefore be worth considering the various forms of partnership during the forthcoming revision of the conditions of cofinancing, and to look into the possibilities of cofinancing actions in the North by European NGOs, in association, of course, with the activities of Southern organisations (see Chapter VI).

La sanction des atteintes aux droits humanitaires commises dans l'ex-Yougoslavie

par Marcel Merle*

Faut-il engager des poursuites pénales contre les auteurs des crimes commis en violation des droits humanitaires, à l'occasion des combats qui se poursuivent depuis deux ans sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie ? Et, dans l'affirmative, peut-on espérer que ces poursuites aboutiront à des sanctions individuelles ?

Malgré les initiatives prises en ce sens par les Nations Unies, la réponse à ces deux questions n'est pas aussi simple qu'on le souhaiterait.

Certes, de nombreux actes criminels ont été commis. Beaucoup de témoins de bonne foi l'affirment, et les protagonistes eux-mêmes en conviennent — au moins lorsqu'il s'agit de dénoncer la partie adverse. Ces crimes ne peuvent être qualifiés de "crimes de guerre" au sens des Conventions de La Haye, puisqu'il ne s'agit pas d'un affrontement entre États. Mais les Conventions de Genève de 1949 et leurs Protocoles annexes de 1977 ont étendu le bénéfice de la protection du droit aux victimes de toutes les situations de violence armée, y compris des guerres civiles qui se déroulent à l'intérieur des frontières. Le droit "humanitaire" tend donc à se confondre avec celui qui régitait autrefois les seules guerres internationales. A ce titre se trouvent prohibés toutes atteintes aux droits des populations civiles et tous abus (tortures, exécutions sommaires etc...) dans le traitement des combattants.

Ces interdictions ont servi de fondement à l'intervention sur le terrain de la Croix Rouge, du Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés et des Organisations humanitaires. Mais elles ne sont pas assorties, par les textes en vigueur, de sanctions appropriées contre les auteurs ou les responsables d'actes criminels. Seuls les États sont qualifiés pour exercer des poursuites pénales contre les auteurs des infractions commises sur leur territoire - ce qui ne fournit, dans le cadre d'une guerre civile en cours, qu'une faible garantie d'impartialité.

On objectera que les dirigeants du

régime national-socialiste ont été jugés et condamnés, après la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale, par le Tribunal international constitué à Nuremberg. Mais ce Procès a-t-il valeur de précédent ? Sa validité avait été contestée, à l'époque, par les défenseurs du sacro-saint principe "Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege". Or si les actes incriminés, à l'époque, constituaient bien des infractions au droit international, aucune sanction pénale n'était prévue à l'encontre de leurs auteurs. Seule l'énormité des crimes et l'ampleur des réactions de l'opinion publique expliquent qu'on ait pu passer outre, pour la circonstance, au principe fondamental de la non-rétroactivité des peines.

Or le Procès de Nuremberg n'a pas fait jurisprudence, parce qu'il est testé un acte isolé et sans lendemain. Malgré des années de délibérations, les Nations Unies ne sont jamais parvenues à élaborer le statut d'une Cour criminelle internationale devant laquelle pourraient être traduits les auteurs de crimes de guerre ou de crimes "humanitaires".

C'est la raison pour laquelle il a fallu, de nouveau, improviser. Le Conseil de sécurité a adopté, le 22 février 1993, une Résolution (N° 808) "décidant la création d'un Tribunal chargé de juger les violations du droit humanitaire". Ce Tribunal a été doté d'un Statut, par une Résolution (837) du 25 mai 1993, et d'un siège fixé à La Haye. Ses membres ont été élus selon la procédure prévue par les Statuts, et la nouvelle juridiction peut maintenant fonctionner. Le problème est-il pour autant résolu ?

Sur le plan des principes, on doit regretter le recours à un Tribunal "ad hoc", dont la compétence est expressément et strictement limitée au traitement du cas yougoslave.(1) Le caractère discriminatoire des mesures prises à l'encontre des seuls belligérants "yougoslaves" n'affaiblit-il pas la valeur morale et le caractère exemplaire de cette initiative, alors que tant d'infractions au droit humanitaire ont déjà été ou sont encore commises sous nos yeux dans beaucoup d'autres pays ? Alors qu'il aurait fallu

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(1) "Le Tribunal est créé pour juger les personnes présumées responsables de violations graves du droit humanitaire sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie depuis 1991. La décision ne concerne pas l'institution d'une juridiction pénale internationale en général ni la création d'un Tribunal pénal international de caractère permanent, questions donc sont saisies la Commission du droit international et l'Assemblée générale qui les examinent activement" (Déclaration du Secrétaire général de l'O.N.U., 3 mai 1993)

avoir le courage de doter enfin le droit humanitaire d'un appareil répressif permanent et universel, la création de ce Tribunal apparaît plutôt comme le reflet de la mauvaise conscience des Occidentaux (et spécialement des Européens), d'autant plus soucieux de proclamer un droit qu'ils sont impuissants à le faire respecter.

Sur le plan pratique, la mise en œuvre des poursuites présuppose la main mise préalable sur les suspects (d'autant plus que le jugement par contumace est exclu catégoriquement par les Statuts). Or les dirigeants des trois factions en présence sont à la fois les responsables présumés des crimes commis par leurs troupes et les interlocuteurs

avec lesquels on discute interminablement à la table des conférences. Dans ces conditions, seul le sort des armes pourrait trancher le point de savoir quels sont ceux des négociateurs d'hier qui deviendraient les prévenus de demain — à moins qu'une miraculeuse solution de compromis n'assure aux représentants de toutes les parties une immunité de fait qui priverait la justice de sa proie.

Face au drame qui se joue sur le terrain, le déploiement de l'arsenal juridique ressemble à ce que les stratèges désignent sous le nom révélateur de "gesticulation". Or on ne joue pas avec les règles de droit sans compromettre leur efficacité immédiate et leur crédibilité pour l'avenir.

Le Tribunal pénal international créé par la Résolution 808 du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU

par Gaétan Di Marino *

LES événements qui se déroulent actuellement dans l'ex-Yougoslavie viennent d'avoir une répercussion particulièrement importante en droit pénal international.

Depuis le Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg (institué par l'accord de Londres du 8 août 1945) et le Tribunal militaire international de Tokyo (institué par la proclamation du 19 janvier 1946), juridictions ad hoc créées pour juger de grands criminels de guerre à la suite de la deuxième guerre mondiale, il n'avait plus été fait appel à des juridictions de ce type pour réprimer les auteurs d'infractions internationales par nature, c'est-à-dire selon la définition de Monsieur le recteur Claude Lombois, les auteurs de « comportements illicites qui portent atteintes aux fondements de la société internationale elle-même » (1).

Il y avait bien eu à partir de 1966 le Tribunal de Stockholm, dit « Tribunal Russell » du nom du philosophe britannique qui en fut l'instigateur; mais les formations qui sous ce titre examinèrent tour à tour les événements du Vietnam, ceux d'Amérique Latine, les atteintes à la liberté du travail en République fédérale allemande, et le sort des extrémistes dans ce même pays ne présentaient aucun des caractères fondamentaux que doit revêtir une juridiction digne d'une telle appellation. D'une part, ces formations n'émanaient d'aucune autorité souveraine et d'autre part, elles manquaient de l'objectivité et de l'impartialité requise pour toute institution judiciaire (2). Le Tribunal permanent des peuples qui, en juin 1979, devait succéder au Tribunal Russell s'inscrivait dans la ligne de son prédécesseur et présentait les mêmes faiblesses. En un mot, il s'agissait d'instruments à vocation essentiellement politique, bien loin des préoccupations de rigueur animant les juristes, même s'il y eut parmi les membres de ces formations quelques juristes éminents.

C'est donc près d'un demi-siècle après la réunion du premier tribunal pénal international, que la machine juridictionnelle pénale se trouve relancée au niveau international. Cela s'est fait par étapes, sous la houlette de l'ONU, à la suite des révélations faites par les médias et par différents organismes quant à des violations caractérisées des droits de l'homme dans le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie (épuration ethnique suivie de-

xodes et d'atteintes graves aux droits de la personne: tueries massives, ou viols organisés).

Le conseil de sécurité a commencé par adopter le 13 juillet 1992 une résolution 764 rappelant que: «toutes les parties sont tenues de se conformer aux obligations découlant du droit humanitaire international, et en particulier des conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949, et que les personnes qui commettent ou ordonnent de commettre de graves violations de ces conventions sont individuellement responsables à l'égard de telles violations».

Le 13 août suivant, par une résolution 771, le conseil de sécurité: «exigeait notamment que toutes les parties et les autres intéressés dans l'ex-Yougoslavie, ainsi que toutes les forces militaires en Bosnie-Herzégovine, mettent immédiatement fin à toutes violations du droit humanitaire international».

Le 6 octobre de la même année, le conseil de sécurité, par une résolution 780, demandait au secrétaire général de l'ONU de: «constituer d'urgence une commission impartiale d'experts chargée d'examiner et d'analyser l'information fournie en vertu des résolutions 771 et 780 (1992) ainsi que toutes autres informations que la commission d'experts pourra obtenir, en vue de fournir au secrétaire général ses conclusions sur les violations graves des conventions de Genève et les autres violations du droit humanitaire international dont on aurait la preuve qu'elles ont été commises sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie».

Ce processus devait aboutir le 22 février 1993 à l'adoption par le conseil de sécurité de la résolution 808 décidant la création d'un tribunal pénal international: Le conseil de sécurité: «se déclarant une nouvelle fois gravement alarmé par les informations qui continuent de faire état de violations généralisées du droit humanitaire international sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie, notamment celles qui font état de tueries massives et de la poursuite de la pratique du «nettoyage ethnique». Constatant que cette situation constitue une menace à la paix et à la sécurité internationales,

1. Décide la création d'un tribunal international pour juger les personnes présumées responsables de violations graves du droit humanitaire international commises sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie depuis 1991,

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Le texte qui suit a paru précédemment dans la *Revue internationale de droit pénal*, vol. 63.

(1) Claude Lombois, *Droit pénal international*, Edition Dalloz, p. 35, n° 33.

(2) *Ibidem*, p. 95, n° 84.

2. Prie le secrétaire général de soumettre le plus tôt possible à l'examen du Conseil de sécurité, et si possible au plus tard soixante jours après l'adoption de la présente résolution, un rapport analysant cette question sous tous ses aspects, comportant des propositions concrètes et, le cas échéant, des options, pour la mise en œuvre efficace et rapide de la décision.

3. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question ».

L'adoption de la résolution 808 visait à court terme à dissuader les criminels de guerre de poursuivre leurs agissements, les représentants des différents états membres ont beaucoup insisté dans les déclarations faites à la suite de ce vote sur cet effet dissuasif immédiat. Cet objectif a clairement été repris et diffusé par les médias (3).

Restait cependant à mettre concrètement en place la juridiction ad hoc dont la création venait d'être décidée. Par une résolution du 25 mai 1993, le conseil de sécurité de l'ONU a complété à cet égard la résolution 808 prise quelques mois plus tôt. Le statut du tribunal *ad hoc* est désormais fixé par 34 articles adoptés par le conseil de sécurité. On ne retiendra ici que certains points de ce statut. Les onze juges qui composeront ce tribunal seront élus par l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU à partir d'une liste de personnalités dressée par le conseil de sécurité, elle-même établie sur la base de propositions émanant des états membres. On rappellera à cet égard que le Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg était composé de 4 juges désignés respectivement par les quatre grands, à savoir: les Etats-Unis, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'URSS. Le Tribunal militaire international de Tokyo était quant à lui composé de 11 juges désignés par les Etats-Unis, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'URSS, la Chine et six autres pays alliés des quatre grands.

Le procureur sera désigné par le conseil de sécurité sur proposition du secrétaire général de l'ONU. Au Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg, le parquet était tenu par 4 magistrats désignés respectivement par les quatre grands.

En dehors des juges proprement dits, ce tribunal comprendra une équipe de 373 personnes et le coût de fonctionnement de cette juridiction avoisinera pour la première année, aux dires des experts, 30 millions de dollars prélevés sur le budget de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU.

Au plan des sanctions, on notera tout d'abord que la peine de mort est exclue. Il y a là une différence essentielle par rapport au statut appliqué à Nuremberg et à Tokyo où dans le premier cas, 12 condamnations à mort ont été prononcées et 10 exécutées et dans le second cas, 7 condamnations à mort ont été prononcées et exécutées. On soulignera par ailleurs que rien n'a été prévu à l'encontre de l'Etat qui refuserait de coopérer, ce qui dans le cas d'espèce, peut ne pas être une hypothèse d'école.

Cette dernière observation revient à poser le problème plus général des difficultés de mise en œuvre de ce nouveau Tribunal *ad hoc*. La situation en effet est tout à fait nouvelle et n'a rien à voir avec le contexte qui a présidé au fonctionnement du Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg. Cette juridiction a siégé une fois la guerre terminée, à l'initiative des puissances victorieuses, à l'encontre de criminels de guerre de la puissance vaincue et occupée et sur le territoire de cette puissance vaincue et occupée. Le tribunal pénal international *ad hoc* créé par la résolution 808 va sans doute entrer en fonction alors que le conflit n'est pas terminé, bien loin de la Yougoslavie puisque son siège se situera aux Pays-Bas, et entend juger des criminels de guerre d'une puissance que l'on ne peut à l'évidence considérer comme vaincue ou occupée.

Par ailleurs, un certain nombre de criminels déjà désignés comme tels par certains Etats sont des responsables politiques de haut niveau et des interlocuteurs permanents des organisations ou Etats à l'origine de la création de ce tribunal *ad hoc*.

Enfin, comme on n'a pas manqué de le relever à plusieurs reprises, pour juger les criminels de guerre, encore faut-il les arrêter et les faire comparaître devant la juridiction du jugement, ce qui n'est pas aisé en l'état actuel de la situation. A cet obstacle de fait, s'ajoute un obstacle de droit: le tribunal *ad hoc* ne pourra, en l'état des statuts adoptés, prononcer aucun jugement en l'absence des accusés.

La difficulté de la tâche concernant les criminels de guerre de l'ex-Yougoslavie illustre si besoin était l'ampleur du problème posé par la création d'un tribunal pénal international permanent. Certains en préconisent la création depuis 1945. Gageons que l'expérience du tribunal *ad hoc* prévue par la résolution 808 apportera sa pierre à ce délicat édifice.

(3) Cf. par exemple, *Le Monde*, mercredi 24 février 1993, p. 3.

1992

Geographical distribution of international meetings by continent, country and city

Répartition géographique des réunions internationales par continents, pays et villes

Introduction

For the past 44 years, the Union of International Associations has undertaken, for the benefit of its members, statistical studies on the international meetings that took place worldwide in the preceding year.

The statistics are based on information collected by the UAI Congress Department and selected according to very strict criteria maintained over several years, this enabling meaningful comparison.

Meetings taken into consideration include those organized and/or sponsored by the international organizations which appear in the "Year-book of International Organizations" and in the "International Congress Calendar", i.e. : the sittings of their principal organs, congresses, conventions, symposia, regional sessions grouping several countries, as well as some national meetings with international participation organized by national branches of international associations. Under this latest category are included meetings which are not collected systematically but which have been brought to our knowledge and which meet the following criteria :

- minimum number of participants : 300
- minimum number of foreigners : 40 %
- minimum number of nationalities : 5
- minimum duration : 3 days.

Excluded from the UAI figures are : purely national meetings as well as those of an essential religious, didactic, political, commercial, sporting etc... particularly numerous at the inter-governmental level and taking place mainly at the headquarters of the large IGO's in New York, Geneva, Rome, Brussels, Vienna...

This is an indicative survey made following the researches compiled by the UAI Congress Department and using the current available information from international organizations.

Explanation of figures : * = ** + ***

* Total of international meetings.

** Number of international meetings organised/sponsored by international organizations

*** Number of national meetings with large international participation

Introduction

Depuis 44 ans, l'UAI a établi à l'intention de ses membres, un relevé statistique des réunions internationales tenues dans l'année écoulée.

Les présentes statistiques reflètent la courbe ascendante du nombre total des réunions internationales et sont basées sur des données recueillies par le Département Congrès de l'UAI et retenues selon les critères spécifiques décrits ci-dessous.

Sont prises en considération, les réunions organisées et/ou patronnées par les associations internationales reprises dans l'« Annuaire des Organisations Internationales » et dans l'« International Congress Calendar, c'est-à-dire : les assises de leurs principaux organes, congrès, sessions régionales (groupant plusieurs pays), symposia, colloques, etc... ainsi que certaines réunions nationales à large participation internationale, organisées par les branches nationales les OING. Sous cette dernière catégorie sont comprises les réunions spontanément portées à notre connaissance et qui remplissent les critères suivants :

- nombre minimum de participants : 300
- nombre minimum d'étrangers : 40 %
- nombre minimum de nationalités : 5
- durée minimum : 3 jours.

Sont exclues des statistiques : les réunions nationales, cérémonies/manifestations à caractère essentiellement religieux, didactiques (cours), politiques (fôires, salons), sportif (compétitions, tournois...) ainsi que les réunions très limitées dans la participation ou spécifiques : sessions régulières de comités, groupes d'experts, etc... particulièrement nombreuses au niveau inter-gouvernemental, ces réunions se tiennent généralement au siège même des grandes OIG à New York, Genève, Bruxelles, Rome, Vienne...

Il s'agit d'une situation typique établi sur base des recherches compilées par le Département Congrès de l'UAI.

Explication des chiffres : * = ** + ***

* Total des réunions internationales

** Nombre de réunions internationales patronnées/organisées par des organisations internationales

*** Nombre de réunions nationales à large participation internationale

	*	**	***				*	**	***
AFRICA									
ALGERIA	4=	3+	1				224=	172+	'A
BURKINA FASO	8=	8+	0						
CAMEROON	10=	10+	0						
COTE D'IVOIRE	19=	18+	1						
Abidjan	17=	16+	1						
EGYPT		58=	50+	8					
Cairo	49=	45+	4						
Others	9=	5+	4				38=	32+	6
ETHIOPIA		6=	6+	0					
GHANA		12=	12+	0					
Accra	12=	12+	0						
KENYA		43=	42+	1			22=	18+	4
Nairobi	38=	37+	1						
Others	5=	5+	0						
MOROCCO		27=	23+	4			17=	12+	5
Marrakech	9=	9+	0						
Rabat	11=	8+	3						
Others	7=	6+	1				22=	20+	2
NERERIA		19=	18+	1					
Other	24=	22+	2						
SENEGAL		21=	19+	2			10=	9+	1
Dakar	3=	3+	0						
Others									
SOUTH AFRICA		22=	15+	7					
TANZANIA UR		10=	10+	0					
TUNISIA		18=	15+	3					
Tunis	14=	13+	1						
Others	4=	2+	2						
ZAMBIA		7=	6+	1					
ZIMBABWE		23=	23+	0					
Harare	19=	19+	0						
Others	4=	4+	0						
OTHERS		89=	83+	6			7=	6+	1
		399=	364+	35			7=	6+	1
AMERICA									
ARGENTINA		63=	42+	21					
Buenos Aires	48=	30+	18						
Others	15=	12+	3						
BOLIVIA		12=	12+	0					
BRAZIL		121=	106+	15					
Rio de Janeiro	63=	53+	10						
Sao Paulo	19=	17+	2						
Others	39=	36+	3						
CANADA									
Montréal	74=	52+	22						
Ottawa	15=	12+	3						
Quebec	25=	23+	2						
Toronto	40=	33+	7						
Vancouver	27=	24+	3						
Others	43=	28+	15						
CHILE									
Santiago	26=	22+	4						
Others	12=	10+	2						
COLOMBIA									
COSTARICA									
S.José	14=	14+	0						
Others	4=	3+	1						
CUBA									
La Habana	14=	9+	5						
Others	3=	3+	0						
DOMINICAN REP									
Santa Domingo	20=	18+	2						
Others	2=	2+	0						
ECUADOR									
Quito	7=	7+	0						
Others	3=	2+	1						
GUATEMALA							9=	6+	3
HONDURAS							10=	8+	2
JAMAICA							16=	16+	0
MEXICO							64=	57+	7
Acapulco	10=	10+	0						
Cancun	10=	10+	0						
Mexico City	26=	23+	3						
Others	18=	14+	4						
PANAMA									
PERU									
PUERTO RICO							6=	6+	0
TRINIDAD=TOBAGO							11=	10+	1
URUGUAY							20=	17+	3
USA							982=	713+	269
Anaheim	14=	10+	4						
Atlanta	22=	13+	9						
Baltimore	16=	11+	5						
Boston	17=	8+	9						
Boulder	10=	8+	2						
Chicago	44=	33+	11						
Dallas	18=	12+	6						
Denver	8=	7+	1						
Honolulu	11=	7+	4						
Houston	17=	12+	5						

				*	**	***				*	**	***
Las Vegas	14=	8+	6									
Los Angeles	15=	10+	5									
Miami	18=	14+	4									
Minneapolis	10=	8+	2									
New Orleans	33=	19=	14									
New York	60=	51+	9									
Orlando	40=	30+	10									
Phoenix	10=	7+	3									
Pittsburg	13=	10+	3									
San Diego	28=	16+	12									
San Francisco	51=	37+	14									
Washington	109=	81+	28									
Others	404=	301+	03									
VENEZUELA				37=	29+	8						
Caracas	27=	22+	5									
Others	10=	7+	3									
OTHERS				46=	43+	3						
				1762=	1357+	405						
ASIA												
BANGLADESH				8=	7+	1						
CHINA				71=	59+	12						
Beijing	41=	35+	6									
Others	30=	24+	6									
HONGKONG				86	= 54	32						
INDIA				104	= 82	22						
Madras	10=	10+	0									
New Delhi	51=	44+	7									
Others	43=	28+	15									
INDONESIA				39=	33+	6						
Bali	9=	8+	1									
Jakarta	18=	14+	4									
Others	12=	11+	1									
ISRAEL				60=	36+	24						
Jerusalem	37=	24+	13									
Tel Aviv	8=	5+	3									
Others	15=	7+	8									
JAPAN				248=	136+	112						
Chiba	12=	5+	7									
Kobe	11=	6+	5									
Kyoto	39=	28+	11									
Nagoya	12=	6+	6									
Osaka	13=	6+	7									
Tokyo	74=	51+	23									
Yokohama	23	12	1									
Others	64	22	4									
JORDAN									10=	8+	2	
KOREA R.									31=	27	4	
Seoul	28	25	3									
Others	3=	2+	1									
MALAYSIA									54=	44	10	
Kuala Lumpur	40	32	8									
Others	14	12	2									
NEPAL									12=	12	0	
PAKISTAN									17=	14	3	
PHILIPPINES									34=	32	2	
Manila	27	26	1									
Others	7=	6+	1									
SINGAPORE									112=	56	56	
SRI LANKA									21=	21	0	
TAIWAN (Rep of)									22=	18	4	
THAILAND									51=	46	5	
Bangkok	41	38	3									
Others	10	8+	2									
VIETMAN									7=	7+	0	
OTHERS									31=	24	7	
									1018=	716+	302	
AUSTRALASIA												
AUSTRALIA									106=	79	27	
Canberra	10	8+	2									
Melbourne	18	14	4									
Perth	5=	2+	3									
Sydney	31	24	7									
Others	42	31	1									
FIJI									4=	4+	0	
NEW									3=	3+	0	
NEW ZEALAND									25=	23	2	
Auckland	13	12	1									
Others	12	11	1									
OTHERS									11=	6+	5	
									149=	115+	34	

EUROPE				* ** ***			
AUSTRIA				244=	193+	51	
Graz	16=	12+	4				
Innsbruck	19=	12+	7				
Salzburg	13=	8+	5				
Wien	161	135+	26				
Others	35=	26+	9				
BELGIUM				323=	298+	25	
Antwerpen	24=	15+	9				
Brugge	15=	13+	2				
Brussels	184=	176+	8				
Gent	10=	10+	0				
Leuven	15=	13+	2				
Louv-la-Neuve	10=	10+	0				
Lüttge	19=	16+	3				
Others	46=	45+	1				
BULGARIA				19=	15+	4	
Sofia	9=	9+	0				
Others	10=	6+	4				
CYPRUS				14=	11+	3	
CZECHOSLOVAKIA				120=	115+	5	
Bratislava	13=	12+	1				
Praha	81=	78+	3				
Others	26=	25+	1				
DENMARK				196=	131+	65	
Aalborg	23=	14+	9				
Aarhus	13=	11+	2				
København	100=	66+	34				
Others	60=	40+	20				
FINLAND				148=	117+	31	
Espoo	16=	13+	3				
Helsinki	57=	45+	12				
Tampere	14=	13+	1				
Turku	9=	6+	3				
Others	52=	40+	2				
FRANCE				789=	581+	208	
Bordeaux	14=	14+	0				
Cannes	10=	10+	0				
Lyon	24=	19+	5				
Montpellier	18=	17+	1				
Nice	31=	22+	9				
Paris	407	260+	14				
Strasbourg	95=	80+	15				
Toulouse	7=	5+	2				
Others	183=	154+	29				
GERMANY				544	384+	16	**
Berlin	101	83	18				*
Bonn	20=	15	5				^
Dresden	9=	8+	1				
Düsseldorf	14=	9+	5				
Frankfurt	18=	15	3				
Hamburg	34=	20	14				
Hannover	9=	6+	3				
Heidelberg	9=	7+	2				
Karlsruhe	20	9+	11				
Köln	18	9+	9				
München	62=	37	25				
Stuttgart	15	8+	7				
Others	215	158	57				
GREECE				88=	88+	0	
Athens	51=	51	0				
Others	37=	37	0				
HUNGARY				100=	87+	13	
Budapest	85=	74	11				
Others	15=	13	2				
ICELAND				15=	14+	1	
IRELAND				58=	49+	9	
Dublin	44=	38	6				
Others	14=	11	3				
ITALY				359	285+	74	
Bologna	13=	8+	5				
Firenze	35	24	11				
Genova	22=	16	6				
Milano	18=	10	8				
Pisa	9=	8+	1				
Roma	58	55	3				
Torino	8=	7+	1				
Trieste	41	40	1				
Venezia	17	16	1				
Others	138	111+	37				
LUXEMBOURG				G.	30=	25+	5
Luxembourg	30=	25	5				
MALTA				31	28+	3	
MONACO				25	16+	9	
NETHERLANDS				380	253+	12	
Amsterdam	115=	67	48				
Delft	13=	13+	0				
Den Haag	48=	41	7				
Maastricht	28=	17	11				
Noordwijk	29=	27	2				
Noordwijkerhout	18	9+	9				
Rotterdam	35=	17	18				

Organizations in Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council

1. Under the chairmanship of Robert Harris, First Vice-President of CONGO, a meeting of some 60 CONGO members (and approximately half a dozen NGOs not members of CONGO) was held in Geneva on September 13, 1993. Nearly 80 organizations had responded to the CONGO questionnaire sent on August 11, with some 60 indicating that they would participate in a facilitating mechanism to prepare the World Summit for Social Development (WSSD) - March 1995).

2. Mr V. Petrovsky, Director General of the UN Office at Geneva, expressed appreciation for the growing and inevitable cooperation between the UN and NGOs. This reached particular peaks at and around major UN Conferences, but was most importantly a daily and weekly phenomenon. He called for particular input for the WSSD and the UN's 50th anniversary in 1995. Petrovsky underlined that social and economic development should not be separated but be increasingly mutually reinforcing. No country was now separated but be increasingly mutually reinforcing. No country was now spared from social and economic tensions, and the breadth of these issues underlined the overall role of the entire UN system in meeting interlinked global and national challenges. It was more and more essential to harmonize approaches to these problems, and NGOs with their wide, deep and varied expertise were essential partners in attaining new world social stability.

3. Mr Petrovsky added a footnote that as a result of non-payments by governments, the UN was close to bankruptcy, and he hoped NGOs would also do what they could to help in this area. This was picked up from the

floor in terms of NGOs working with and exerting pressure on public opinion to oblige governments to meet their commitments.

4. Mr Petrovsky has appointed Thérèse Gastaut, the Secretary General's spokesperson in Geneva, as Chair of the UN Geneva Task Force to coordinate the UN's 50th anniversary. He acknowledged that the UN system had more to do to improve system-wide coordination on all issues. He urged NGOs also to think over ways of improving their own coordination, giving the continually increasing numbers being linked with the UN system.

5. As a basic approach to all these matters, one participant recalled the view that it was impossible to solve tomorrow's problems with the tools of yesterday. Questions were raised as to whether or not the WSSD should not follow, rather than precede, the 1995 mid-term review of the World Summit for Children and the Fourth World Women's Conference.

WSSD

6. Robert Harris recalled the background Geneva briefing the Ambassador Juan Somavia on July 13, and the documentation distributed through ECOSOC. He reported good prospects for cooperation and mutual reinforcement between NGOs and the UN. USG responsible for the WSSD, Mr Nitin Desai. The latter was eagerly awaiting the establishment of an NGO coordination mechanism, and would facilitate its work. Harris urged a flexible and open approach to the functioning of such a mechanism, leading perhaps to a Forum and other events at the WSSD itself. He thanked ICSW and ICVA for the

initiatives they had already taken, including the issuance of a newsletter for the WSSD.

7. Comments from the floor included:

— the need for a Coordinating Committee to have a proper secretariat.

— the desirability that local arrangements in Copenhagen be in the hands of a broad group of Danish NGOs (Harris explained that the Danish UNA, which had been designated as national NGO focal point by the Danish government, saw its mandate only in the context of input from the Danish NGO constituency)

— the importance of national NGOs in all countries setting up national committees for WSSD, especially in developing countries, since results at the national level were the key of the success of the WSSD

— should there be (perhaps rather than a CONGO Coordinating Committee) a sort of "International Facilitating Committee" for the WSSD bringing in coalitions of NGOs based on sectors of activities, though it might be preferable to leave the business sector to themselves (which the business sector may in any event choose to do)

— the value of working closely with the UNDP network whose field offices covered the largest number of countries of the UN system

— the need to ensure that Eastern European countries in transition be fully integrated into WSSD preparations

— since the majority of the world's poor are women, and the success of development depends on women, there must be a special role for women in WSSD preparations, especially at national level

— the time between now and the WSSD — 18 months — is very short, and this lends urgency to a CONGO initiative on coordination

- NGOs would need to be aware of the many parts of the UN system that felt they had a key role in preparing the WSSD, and that these might not all fit easily into a UN coordination mechanism; it would be important therefore for the CONGO Coordinating Committee to take the initiative to contact directly these various organs of the UN system

— noise is one of the greatest social pollutions and should figure on the agenda

— the CONGO Committee might designate a liaison officer — preferably from the South — to serve at the Danish UNA office

— the WSSD should concentrate on solutions to the causes that bring about social disintegration and social evils, and not simply be a talkshop condemning consequences: in this context the existing CONGO committees should have a substantive input, and might themselves get together to endeavour to affect the content

— UNRISD offered NGOs the results of its research — mostly south-oriented — to help in preparations for the WSSD

— attendance at the WSSD itself, while important, was not of the same long-term significance as work on the social issues that should be the focus of concentration now and in the future after the Summit.

8. Harris stated that the views expressed would be taken into account by the CONGO Board on October 22, together with the similar session in New York on October 21.

ECOSOC review of relations with NGOs

9. Robert Harris recalled that ECOSOC's July session had

decided to set up a Working Group to conduct this review and present proposals to ECOSOC, having sought the opinion of the ECOSOC governmental

Committee on NGOs. It was essential that NGOs be consulted as this process develops, and the experience of NGOs — themselves coalitions of national NGOs — should be utilized and built upon to the maximum. CONGO would have to be especially alert in defence on the interests of NGOs, and be open to the views and needs of other non-CONGO NGOs.

10. The basic text resulting from the ECOSOC deliberations is E/1993/80. The UNOG representative pointed out the complications that arose when INGOs registered for UN events and their national affiliates also registered, sometimes under their own name and sometimes on behalf of the INGO (also occasionally without the knowledge of the INGO HQ).

11. The question of NGO representation to the UN had facets that concerned procedures and criteria to determine representativity, but also the whole issue of democracy and its inherent defects and potential. How to reconcile all these facets was a challenge for CONGO throughout the review process but also on an ongoing basis.

12. It would be important in the review process to not only highlight the diversity of NGOs but underline how important this diversity is to the resolution of all the issues confronting the world.

13. The meeting asked the First Vice-President to put together all the CONGO formal and informal position papers of the past twelve months, particularly those since mid-March 1993, and to work with the CONGO President to make interventions at several levels in New York and Geneva (governments, UN Secretariat,

NGOs) at the earliest possible moment to influence the deliberations of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs and the open-ended Working Group.

14. The meeting also asked that INGOs contact their national affiliates, to bring the same points to the attention of their own governments.

UN 50th anniversary

15. Thérèse Gastaut, Director of the UNOG Information Service, spoke first of the UNOG Open House being organized on UN Day 1993, for which full NGO participation was sought. Turning to the 50th anniversary, she said it was important to use the occasion to develop and mobilize public opinion in favour of the goals of the UN, to create a type of UN lobby nationally. The dates of 26 June (Signature of the Charter in San Francisco) and 24 October (UN Day) would be highlights, though it was intended to make

year-long. Gillian Sorensen had been named USG in charge of the 50th anniversary preparations, which would be financed by extra-budgetary contributions. Some ten national committees for the anniversary had already been set up.

16. In addition to putting emphasis on substantive work (education, health, employment etc.) of the UN system, to facilitating happenings and commemorative events, the UN would take advantage of the fact that 1995 is the International Year of Tolerance. Gastaut hoped — indeed expected — that NGOs would participate to the full: she took for granted that CONGO as such would be associated in some organized way, that INGOs would highlight their diverse activities, and that national NGOs will find ways to stimulate public opinion.

17. Among comments from the floor were
— the roles that could be played by former UN employees, by young people (who will have their own conference in San Francisco), by the metropolis of London (where the UN started work for almost a year before being installed in New York), and by CONGO (which might need to concentrate on a few areas to make

an impact and not disperse energies)
— the commemoration should go together with democratisation of the UN, and with a critical look at what activities the UN is undertaking in the world today, including why so many governments are not paying their dues: NGOs must treat the UN as "our organization"
— the UN by its creation and

existence had brought into existence new concepts and practices in international law, and this should be taken into account for the 50th anniversary.
18. The Geneva celebration will be end June/early July 1995 and it is intended to be open to the public. The UNOG Task Force will be ready to work with CONGO in the preparations.

Cyril Ritchie

CONGO and the World Summit for Social Development

1. A CONGO consultation on the World Summit for Social Development (WSSD) was held in New York on October 21, 1993, with some 70 NGO representatives present. Rosalind Harris, President of CONGO, introduced the topic and called on Roben Harris, First Vice-President, to conduct the meeting. Robert Harris explained that as a result of the CONGO Board decision on July 2, 1993, he had sent an enquiry to CONGO members (see item 4 below) and held a consultation in Geneva on September 13.

2. Jacques Baudot (Coordinator for WSSD in the UN Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development) outlined the background and preparatory process for the WSSD. He underlined the basic concern to establish what concepts should form the basis for future social development, which required an examination of concepts that had been taken for granted for some time. New world trends such as globalization had also to be examined to see to what extent they advanced social development. Many topics dealt with throughout the UN system — human rights,

the disabled, employment, workers' rights, and many others — were facets of social development, and the WSSD would have to look at the role of the UN machinery and its future rationalization. The WSSD would not necessarily change the world but to achieve results it was essential to have full cooperation among governments and NGOs.

3. Robert Harris declared that the WSSD provided the opportunity to put the human being at the centre of development and to move further to eliminate poverty in the world. The fact that the Summit was in Denmark was producing a coming-together of Danish NGOs and he urged that this be paralleled at the INGO level. At a meeting of 100 Danish NGOs, they had set up a Steering Committee of 9 NGOs to serve as liaison for all NGO activities. The WSSD would be at the Bella Conference Centre, near the airport, but this complex was only large enough to house the governmental delegations. The Danish NGOs were exploring possibilities (including university premises) for NGO activities. The Danish NGO Steering Committee would have an office functioning as from the end of 1993, and was

asking the Danish government for some \$2.5 million to cover preparatory costs and NGO Forum activities during the Summit.

4. The enquiry to CONGO members had produced around 100 replies and among the main suggestions were
— the participation of developing country NGOs
— the importance of frequent and full circulation of information
— participation by NGOs throughout the whole preparatory process

— the need for a nucleus NGO committee to assist NGO input
— common NGO statements on separate themes relevant to the Summit (the disabled, women, education, indigenous peoples).

5. NGOs that had already taken initiatives in relation to WSSD include
— ICVA and ICSW on information circulation and an advance NGO Forum in 1994
— ICFTU and the several international trade union bodies
— ICSS and the academic, scientific and research communities.

6. In the discussion of substantive aspects of the Summit

the following were among points made

- the WSSD Secretariat *would* welcome spontaneous contributions from NGOs and other institutions on the issues that the Summit would deal with

- the WSSD Secretariat has asked governments to establish national focal points to prepare the Summit and had asked governments to consider including NGOs in this machinery

— the links among the several UN Conferences and Years (Environment and Development, Human Rights, the Family, Population and Development, Women) had to be emphasized as components of a strategy on social development and social integration (the latter needing to be promoted in a context of democracy and justice)

— indeed, the most significant group that provided a link among all the themes of the Summit was

women and the importance of their integration at every level of preparation could not be underestimated

— the follow up to the WSSD should be planned from now on throughout the preparatory phases.

7. In the discussion of procedural aspects of the Summit the following were among points made

— the Summit would follow UN rules and NGOs would have access: there would of course be access for non-profit NGOs but also for profit-making groups under a formula yet to be defined

— the September 1993 DPI NGO Conference on Social Development provided excellent input not only for the NGO preparations but also for governments and the WSSD Preparatory Committees

— procedures had yet to be devised to enable NGOs to have

statements and documents circulated at and between Preparatory Committees

— the notification to NGOs on procedures for accreditation to the PrepComs and the Summit had been issued by the UN.DPCCSD on 24 September 1993 and could be obtained from the WSSD Secretariat (for NGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC) or from the NGO Unit (for other NGOs)

— there should be further CONGO briefings prior to the PrepComs and between them, as appropriate

— the CONGO Board (meeting on October 22) would be asked to make decisions on the core structure that would be needed at NGO level to harmonize and stimulate NGO initiatives; this would include a secretariat, a newsletter and of course funding.

Cyril Ritchie

Girl guides come to the rescue of UN refugee body

The United Nations — under fire for being inefficient, corrupt and out of touch — has enlisted the aid of 8.5 million girl guides to help it brush up its act.

By striking a deal with the World Association of Girl Guides in London, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has achieved a more than 2,000-fold increase in the number of hands it has available to tackle the world's growing refugee problem.

"There has been a lot of UN-bashing in the last few months, some of it warranted some of it not", said Sylvana Foa, the UNHCR spokeswoman. "But when the girl guides put their

minds to something — watch out." The agency's 3,000 staff, based in Geneva and in field offices throughout the world, can now draw on armies of young females from 128 countries to help them deal with the world's 18 million refugees.

Every troop, said Ms Foa, would do something different. Some had agreed to rustle up peace packs containing crayons, blackboards, notebooks and school material to send to homeless children.

Some would raise funds for soap and detergent. Others could combat racism and xenophobia against refugees by making friends

with them, she said.

Ms Foa said the girl guides were an "enormous untapped resource".

But what, someone asked, about the boy scouts?

"If the boy scouts want to come in on this one we'll have to see", said a slightly thrown Ms Foa. It was the girl guides who had originally approached the UN with the idea.

"Besides, when I was a kid the girl guides sold cookies and knitted ugly scarves," she said. "Now things have moved on."

Edward Luce in Geneva
(*The Guardian*, 22/9/93)

Où tracer la ligne de démarcation entre la politique et l'action volontaire ?

Du 27 au 29 janvier 1994, des hommes politiques et leaders d'organismes sans but lucratif se sont rencontrés à Strasbourg pour examiner le thème « Philanthropie + démocratie: les fondations et les associations, comment peuvent-elles améliorer la qualité de la démocratie ? »

La première réunion, organisée par Interphil en coopération avec l'Institut International pour la Démocratie, s'est déroulée dans l'immeuble du parlement européen sous la présidence de Nina Belyaeva, activiste des droits de l'Homme, Moscou. Doeke Eisma, parlementaire néerlandais qui a récemment exposé les irrégularités du Fonds de Développement Social, a souligné que la transparence est la meilleure garantie démocratique pour contrôler l'emploi de fonds mis à disposition par les secteurs public et privé. Tout en étant d'accord, les représentants des ONGs redoutent néanmoins que la crainte d'abus pourrait freiner la générosité du public. Plusieurs exemples de l'Europe de l'Est (Bulgarie, Croatie, Russie) ont illustré l'importance de l'action

privée pour la démocratie. Viktor Bulgakov, ancien interné du Gulag, a exposé l'œuvre de l'organisation «Mémorial» en faveur des victimes de la répression politique. Un expert anglais, Perri Six, a critiqué les restrictions qu'imposent les pays du common law contre le lobbyist politique, privant ainsi ces organisations de leur liberté d'expression.

Le 28 janvier 1994 la «Conférence Henri de Koster» a été prononcée au Cercle européen par Robin Guthrie devant un auditoire composé d'ambassadeurs, d'hommes politiques et de hauts dirigeants européens, parmi lesquels Madame Catherine Lalumière, Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe. L'orateur a prononcé l'adjectif « civil » pour toute activité volontaire. L'Etat doit fournir un cadre juridique pour cette activité, mais pas s'y mêler. Après avoir loué la Convention n° 12 du Conseil de l'Europe, laquelle assure à une ONG siégeant en pays A sa reconnaissance automatique en pays B, l'orateur s'est montré moins enthousiaste à l'égard du statut d'association européenne,

proposé par la Commission de Bruxelles qui part de l'hypothèse que les Etats et la Commission gardent un pouvoir de contrôle sur le secteur associatif.

Le dernier jour, les participants ont été salués à Kehl en Allemagne par Ewald Eisenberg, Professeur à l'Institut pour l'administration publique. Le Professeur Dánica Purg de Slovaquie a demandé aux ONGs de faire un effort pour mieux comprendre leurs usagers en utilisant des techniques de marketing commercial. Eli s'est montré sceptique à l'égard du va et vient en Europe orientale de conseillers ouest-européens et américains, souvent peut au courant des différences entre les pays de l'Est.

Pour plus d'informations sur cette rencontre, organisée du 27 au 29 janvier 1994 par Interphil, association internationale pour la promotion de la philanthropie et qui fêtera bientôt ses 25 ans au service du monde associatif, s'adresser à:
M. Cyril Ritchie,
Interphil, Genève,
fax 41 22 734 7082.

New... Creations... New... Creations... New... Creations... New... Creations... New...

Lé 31 juillet 1993, face à la multiplication des persécutions contre les intellectuels (Algérie, Turquie, ex-Yugoslavie, Iran), plus de 150 écrivains du monde entier appelaient à la création d'un Parlement international des écrivains. Parmi les premiers signataires, Adonis, Giorgio Agamben, Jorge Amado, Paul Auster, Maurice Blanchot, Pierre Bourdieu, Patrick Chamoiseau,

Jacques Derrida, Mohamed Dib, Carlos Fuentes, Edouard Glissant, Juan Goytisolo, Gunter Grass, Claudio Magris, Edgar Morin, Octavio Paz, Salman Rushdie, José Saramago, Anton Shammas, Susan Sontag et Antonio Tabucchi. « Il est question, écrivaient les signataires, d'affirmer ce que le présent a d'intolérable et l'exigence intraitable de libérer l'invention démocratique, ses phrases, ses images,

ses symboles. En ce sens, les écrivains du monde entier sont fondés à se constituer en parlement — en un lieu de parole — qui fasse droit à toutes les formes fi à toutes les défenses de cette affirmation ». En novembre 1993, une soixantaine de membres de ce Parlement se réunissaient à Strasbourg dans le cadre du Carrefour des littératures européennes. Ils y réaffirmaient * la nécessité d'une structure

internationale» capable d'organiser une " *solidarité concrète* " avec les écrivains menacés et d'être un lieu de réflexion sur " *de nouvelles formes d'engagement récusant toute allégeance politique et toute opération purement médiatique* ". Trois mois plus tard, le Parlement international des écrivains, qui comprend désormais plus de 300 membres, se dote d'un organe exécutif, le Conseil mondial des écrivains, composé d'Adonis, Pierre Bourdieu, Breyten Breytenbach, Jacques Derrida, Carlos Fuentes, Edouard Glissant, Toni Morrison, et présidé par Salman Rushdie. Elu pour deux ans, chaque président rédigera un texte qui servira de charte le temps de son mandat. Selon le poète libanais Adonis, il faudra que cette nouvelle institution trouve sa propre " *efficacité* ". D'autant que le Conseil mondial des écrivains n'entend pas se substituer aux organisations déjà existantes comme le Pen Club ou Amnesty International. Mais Pierre Bourdieu insiste sur l'indispensable " *autonomie* " d'une telle association, et Jacques Derrida appelle de ses vœux un " *style nouveau* " d'intervention. Un des premiers projets de ce Parlement serait de créer, à l'image de Strasbourg qui en a pris l'initiative, des " *villes-refuges* " pour les écrivains en danger. Une manière, selon Edouard Glissant, de renouer avec l'idée médiévale d'une " *citoyenneté de ville* ". Le Conseil mondial des écrivains, qui devrait s'élargir à une trentaine de membres, se réunira du 28 septembre au 2 octobre prochain à Lisbonne. Y devraient être définis plus précisément son programme et ses moyens d'action.

A. de G.
(*Libération*, 10 févr. 1994)

Conseil mondial des écrivains.
Coordinateur: Christian Salmon,
73, rue du 22-Novembre,
67000 Strasbourg.

The WorldTel concept was born in 1984 when the Maitland Commission in its report *The Missing Link* examined a proposal for establishing in the longer-term an organization to promote the development of telecommunications worldwide (WorldTel).

The need for development of telecommunications on a worldwide basis has been extensively discussed and its importance has been stressed repeatedly in international fora. However, in spite of several attempts, the gap between the industrialized and developing world has kept on widening reaching at present an unacceptable level. The prospects for improvement without dedicated international effort are very slim.

At the same time, there is tremendous potential available in the world markets for undertaking development tasks on a commercial basis as investments in telecommunications are highly remunerative. To tap the available resources and channel the efforts towards constructive activities, one possibility would be the creation of an international organization dedicated to telecommunication financing to be run on a commercial basis, providing returns on investments for the investing community and generating a profit margin. This organization would be charged with the task of promoting rapid expansion of telecommunication facilities where required and bring about a more equitable order of development.

A pre-feasibility study conducted by McKinsey and Company outlined that those who may have interest in WorldTel investment include governments, international organizations,

multinational companies, banking institutions, private investors, manufacturers and telecom operators.

WorldTel is to act as a multinational (not purely intergovernmental) funding and development organization to promote telecommunication growth and expansion on a worldwide basis. It will have no institutional linkage to the ITU.

The findings of the prefeasibility study were presented on 27 October 1993 in New York to a representative group of prospective investors consisting of 40 participants of whom 17 were from banking institutions including the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank; other participants were telecom operators and equipment suppliers.

The meeting recognized the desirability of creating a financing and development organization such as WorldTel. Given the necessary and vital role that such an institution could play in assisting telecommunication development in developing countries, it was agreed that the next step should be to undertake a feasibility study to produce a business plan.

A special initiative emerged from a three-day meeting of NGOs from several countries held in April 1993 in El Canelo de Nos, Santiago, Chile, convened jointly by the International Council for Adult Education and the South American Peace Commission.

The deliberations resulted in the formation of the People's Alliance for Social Development, a grouping which will organise regional consultations of NGOs, people's organisations and social movements in different

pans of the world to promote the following themes:

- equity and social justice;
- strengthening civil society;
- rights of participation and good governance;
- focusing on structural causes of poverty rather than blaming victims;

— pluralism and social tolerance of cultural identity leading to development for and by the people i.e. sustainable human development.

The following organisations act as focal points for regional activities:

Arab Region : El Taller, Tunis.
Asian-Pacific Region : PRRM - Philippines Rural Construction Movement, Quezon City;
ASPBAEW - Asian-South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education;
APPROTECH Asia; Fundación El Taller.

African Region : AALAE - African Association for Literacy and Adult Education, Nairobi, Kenya.

European Region : IRED - Innovations et Réseaux pour le Développement, Geneva, Switzerland.

Latin American Region : IOCU - International Organisation of Consumers Unions, Santiago, Chile.

North American Region : ICAE - International Council for Adult Education, Toronto, Canada.

Contacts : Secretariat, South American Peace Commission, P.O. Box 16085, Correo 9, Providencia, Santiago, Chile.
Tel: +56-2-235 71 17;
Fax: +56-2-2360279.

International Council for Adult Education, Centro El Canelo de Nos, P.O. Box 2-D, San Bernardo, Chile.

Tel: +56-2-857 17 80;

Fax: +56-2-857 11 60.

International Council for Adult Education, General Secretariat, 720 Balhurst St, Suite 500, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S2R4.

Tel: +1-416-588 12 11;

Fax: +1-416-5885725.

*

At the tenth anniversary meeting held in Trieste by the Third World Academy of Sciences, Pakistan was asked to host a summit of Third World heads of state.

The main object behind the summit is to set up a global network of science and high technology and to establish twenty centres in different parts of the Third World to promote work in genetics, solar energy, information technology, super conductivity and lasers. It is learnt that 17 heads of state have so far shown their willingness to attend the summit. It will also give Pakistan the chance to become the headquarters of the global network to be set up as a result of the proposed summit.

(Muslim World, 11.12.1993)

*

Lors du «2^e Colloque agro-alimentaire de la Francophonie» tenue du 24 mai au 2 juin 1993 à Saint-Hyacinthe (Québec), Canada, le texte portant sur le projet de création de l'Association Francophone pour l'Avancement des Technologies en Transformation des Aliments (AFATTA) a été adopté. Des représentants de cette Association

sont présents en Belgique, au Bénin, au Burkina-Faso, au Cameroun, au Canada, en Côte d'Ivoire, en France, au Gabon, en Guinée, au Laos, à Madagascar, au Mali, à l'île Maurice, au Niger en Roumanie, au Rwanda, au Sénégal, en Tunisie et au Viet-Nam.

L'objectif de cette Association est de favoriser une coopération culturelle, scientifique et économique entre les pays francophones, et en particulier

transformation des aliments.

AFATTA, 3600 boulevard Casavant Ouest, Saint-Hyacinthe (Québec), Canada J2S 8E3.

(Bull. de l'Institut Int. du Froid n° 6, 1993)

*

A new "East-West Organization and Management Project" has been established by Milieukontakt, the Dutch organization, to increase the organization and management skills inside the environmental movement in Central and Eastern Europe and to reduced bottlenecks to the movement's future development. The project will help NGOs analyze their main organizational problems, develop approaches to addressing them in local social and cultural contexts, set up management expertise within these environmental NGOs, and ultimately train trainers to transfer this expertise. The project will be initiated in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics.

For information, contact : Jan Haverkamp, Milieukontakt Oost-Europa, P.O. Box 18185, NL-1001 ZB Amsterdam, The Netherlands, phone: (31 20) 639-2716; fax: (31 20) 639-1379.

Transnational Associations
Associations transnationales

46th year
46^e année

Some items in récent issues : <i>Parmi les thèmes traités récemment :</i>	Issue number : <i>Numéros :</i>
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Europe and Latin America 1992 <i>Europe et l'Amérique latine 1992</i>	6/1991, 1/1993.

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- NGO Policy Markers and the Social Ecology of Development
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- NGO/State in Africa
Les ONG et les Etats en Afrique
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