


Transnational Associations

The review of the Union of International Associations



1/94

Civil Society
in East Central
Europe

La politique
européenne
de développement
vue par les O.N.G.

Revue bimestrielle
Janvier, février 94
Bureau de dépôt Bruxelles X

Associations transnationales

La revue de l'Union des associations internationales

Transnational Associations

Associations transnationales

Transnational Associations is a unique bilingual journal whose aim is to deal with major current problems within the perspective of international nongovernmental organizations. It is intended to provide a forum for authoritative information and independent reflection on the increasing role played by these organizations in the international system, and on its philosophical, political, economic or cultural implications.

The approach is intrinsically interdisciplinary, and calls for both specialist expertise and practitioner experience in transnational association matters. *Transnational Associations* provides background information about the actions and achievements of international associations, and insight into their interrelations with intergovernmental organizations. It covers a wide range of topics, among which social organization, humanitarian law, scientific cooperation, language and culture, economic development, to cite just a few.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UIA, clarifies general awareness concerning the association phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, informs associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them. Contributors to the journal review include association officers, research workers and specialists of association questions who engage only themselves.

Founded in Brussels in 1907 as the Central Office of International Associations, the UIA became a federation under the present name in 1910 at the 1st World Congress of International Associations. Activities were closely associated with the Institut international de bibliographie, which later became the International Federation for Documentation. Its work contributed to the creation of the League of Nations and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (the predecessor of UNESCO). During the 1920s, the UIA created an International University, the first of its kind.

The UIA has consultative relations with UNESCO, UN/ECOSOC, and ILO. It collaborates with FAO, the Council of Europe, UNITAR, and the Commonwealth Science Council. It is one of the research institutes in the network of the UN University.

Associations transnationales est la seule revue traitant des grands problèmes contemporains dans la perspective des organisations internationales non gouvernementales. Elle se propose d'apporter des éléments d'information provenant des sources les plus autorisées, propres à susciter une réflexion indépendante sur l'affirmation du rôle joué par ces acteurs dans le système international et sur les aspects philosophiques, politiques, sociaux et culturels de cette évolution.

La visée adoptée est essentiellement interdisciplinaire et fait appel au savoir comme à la pratique des spécialistes du champ d'action des associations transnationales. Les documents, articles et études publiés par Associations transnationales traitent également des liens établis entre celles-ci et les organisations intergouvernementales. Les domaines couverts s'étendent aux problèmes de société, au droit humanitaire, à la coopération scientifique, aux questions linguistiques et culturelles, au développement économique ou à tout phénomène affectant la vie de ces associations.

Le programme de la revue, conformément aux buts de l'UIA, vise à éclairer l'opinion sur la signification de la dimension associative des relations internationales, notamment en informant les associations au sujet des questions qui relèvent de leurs domaines ou affectent leurs intérêts communs. Les textes des auteurs publiés par la revue (dirigeants d'associations, chercheurs et spécialistes des questions associatives) n'engagent que leur opinion.

L'UIA a été créée officiellement en 1910 à Bruxelles au cours du premier congrès mondial des associations internationales. Ses fondateurs, le Sénateur Henri La Fontaine, prix Nobel de la Paix 1913 et Paul Otlet, Secrétaire général de l'Institut international de bibliographie, avaient mis sur pied en 1907 l' "Office central des institutions internationales" auquel l'UIA succéda sous la forme de fédération. En 1914, elle regroupait 230 organisations, soit un peu plus de la moitié de celles qui existaient à l'époque. L'UIA devait incarner, dans l'esprit de ses fondateurs, les aspirations internationalistes et les idéaux de paix qui animaient les associations et qui allaient aboutir en 1920 à la création de la Société des Nations.

L'UIA a obtenu le statut consultatif auprès de l'ECOSOC, de l'UNESCO et de l'OIT. Elle collabore avec l'UNITAR, la FAO et le Cotisai de l'Europe. Elle entretient des relations générales et ponctuelles avec les organisations régionales. Elle est l'un des instituts de recherche du réseau de l'Université des Nations Unies.

Sommaire 1/1994

Les gens et les organisations qu'ils se donnent
(Rapport mondial sur le développement humain 1993, PNUD)
Page 2

Learnings for the Future of Inter-Faith Dialogue (Part II)
by Anthony J.N. Judge
Page 15

The rebirth of civil society : the development of the
nonprofit sector in East Central Europe and the role of the
Western assistance
by Daniel Siegel and Jenny Yancey
Page 23

La politique européenne de développement vue par les
ONG
par Guido Dumon
Page 42

EC-NGO coopération
by Geneviève de Crombrughe, Francis Douxchamps and
Nikita Stampa
Page 46

Association News
Vie associative
Page 56

Book Reviews
Bibliographie
Page 60

Les gens et les organisations qu'ils se donnent

N'OTRE perception du monde se forme et s'enrichit des interactions avec nos semblables dans le cadre de petits groupes sociaux, d'abord au sein de la famille, ensuite avec les habitants de notre rue, puis éventuellement de notre quartier ou de notre village. Les groupes de ce type servent également des objectifs politiques, car les populations obtiennent généralement de meilleurs résultats en tant que groupe qu'en tant qu'individu.

Toutefois, lorsque les individus quittent ces groupes, ils découvrent soudain que le monde extérieur est régi par des principes très différents et que la plupart du temps les décisions sont dictées d'en haut. Que ce soit dans le cadre des services sociaux, sur les marchés ou dans la vie civile et politique, les individus sont plus souvent exclus des prises de décisions que priés de donner leur avis.

Ce problème est partiellement d'ordre pratique. De nombreux aspects de la vie moderne ne peuvent être confinés au cadre de la famille, du village ou de la rue. Leur complexité et le nombre prodigieux de personnes concernées limitent les possibilités d'interactions personnelles. L'intrusion de valeurs commerciales n'est pas étrangère à cette situation : de nombreux biens et services, qui étaient autrefois acquis grâce aux échanges mutuels au sein de la collectivité, se monnaient désormais.

Puis vient le temps où les pays adoptent les institutions d'une société civile — un système judiciaire équitable, un système exécutif responsable, une presse libre et des traditions de transparence, de responsabilité et de droiture dans le comportement. L'action de groupe est souvent nécessaire pour permettre à ces institutions d'évoluer et pour s'assurer qu'elles répondent aux aspirations des populations à une participation réelle.

Mais les gouvernements des pays en développement découragent souvent une telle participation. Se fondant sur une philosophie du développement allant du sommet de la pyramide à la base, ils ont généralement concentré leurs activités sur la fourniture de nourriture, de services ou de biens, plutôt que de donner aux populations pauvres les moyens de se prendre en charge. Pour ces gouvernements, le développement est quelque chose à faire pour les populations. Cette attitude a contribué à étouffer de nombreuses

initiatives locales, à les faire échouer au lieu de les encourager et de les développer.

Mais les choses changent. De nombreux groupes communautaires ont réussi à attirer l'attention et à forcer le respect des gouvernements des pays en développement. L'énergie de ceux qui les ont formé et les solutions créatives qu'ils proposent ont contribué à convaincre les gouvernements de la valeur de la participation des groupes communautaires. Les donateurs également, découragés par les mauvais résultats de l'aide publique en général, utilisent davantage les filières non gouvernementales pour distribuer leurs fonds. Le résultat à été une explosion de mouvements participatifs dans la plupart des pays en développement.

De par leur nature même, les organisations communautaires qui sont à la tête de ces mouvements sont difficiles à classer et à analyser. Ce rapport se réfère à deux grands types d'organismes : les organisations populaires et les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG).

Les *organisations populaires* peuvent être définies comme étant des organisations démocratiques qui représentent les intérêts de leurs membres et sont responsables devant eux. Elles sont généralement créées par des personnes qui se connaissent déjà ou qui partagent une expérience commune, et leur existence ne dépend pas d'une initiative ou d'un financement extérieurs. Dans les pays en développement, elles sont généralement petites, agissent au niveau local et leurs structures sont souples. Mais elles ne se limitent pas toujours à agir au niveau local : elles peuvent s'étendre ou s'agrandir pour passer du niveau local au niveau régional et même national, formant alors des réseaux de groupes communautaires, des associations professionnelles ou encore des syndicats.

Les *organisations non gouvernementales* (ONG) peuvent être définies comme étant des organisations bénévoles qui opèrent en collaboration avec d'autres et souvent pour leur compte. Leurs travaux et leurs activités portent sur des thèmes et s'adressent à des groupes de population extérieurs à leur personnel ou à leurs membres. Les ONG établissent souvent des liens étroits avec les organisations populaires et jouent fréquemment le rôle d'organismes de prestation intermédiaires pour les conseils techniques ou le soutien financier. Mais sur le plan de l'organisation, les

* Le texte qui suit est extrait du chapitre V du *Rapport mondial sur U développement 1993* du PNUD, reproduit avec l'autorisation de l'éditeur. La 2^e partie paraîtra dans le n^o 2/1994 d'*Associations transnationales*. © Ed. Económica, 1993.

ONG peuvent se révéler très différentes des organisations de base, car leur hiérarchie bureaucratique n'a pas les caractéristiques démocratiques ou ne respecte pas les mêmes critères de responsabilité de leurs actes face à leurs membres que les groupements populaires.

La distinction entre ces deux types d'association n'est pourtant pas rigide. Nombreux sont les groupes qui pourraient raisonnablement appartenir aux deux catégories.

Les organisations populaires dans les pays en développement

L'idée de créer une organisation de base naît généralement dans l'esprit des individus, comme par exemple les groupements d'auto-assistance qui se sont créés en Asie et en Afrique subsaharienne, où un groupe de personnes s'unissent pour partager leurs tâches, obtenir des crédits ou acheter des marchandises en gros, ou encore pour favoriser et mettre au point des méthodes agricoles plus viables (encadrés 1 et 2). L'élan peut encore être donné de l'extérieur, lorsque, par exemple, une personne dynamique reconnaît les besoins de la collectivité et suggère des solutions (encadré 3).

Parfois les groupements se créent pour pallier l'échec du gouvernement concernant la création d'infrastructures ou la fourniture de services. Le projet de construction publique de logements du Caire est né vers la fin des années 70 de la négligence prolongée du gouvernement envers les quartiers pauvres. L'objectif n'était pas uniquement de créer des logements, d'améliorer l'approvisionnement en eau et les systèmes d'égouts, mais également d'encourager le gouvernement à fournir ces services (encadré 4).

Dans d'autres cas, c'est la manière d'agir du gouvernement qui pousse les gens à se constituer en groupes. La brutalité policière, l'oppression politique ou simplement la détérioration des libertés civiques ont prouvé la nécessité dans la plupart des pays de protéger les droits de l'homme en créant, par exemple, des organismes tels que l'Action sociale et l'Organisation paysanne au Zaïre.

Les organisations populaires peuvent également naître de l'incapacité du marché à offrir aux gens les biens et services nécessaires. L'Association des femmes de profession libérale en Inde est un exemple frappant de la manière dont des populations pauvres et désavantagées peuvent affermir leur pouvoir de négociation grâce à une action collective (encadré 5).

ENCADRE 1

Groupements autonomes d'agriculteurs

Les agriculteurs du monde entier se sont toujours regroupés dans le cadre d'associations autonomes — en particulier pour se partager la tâche. Les voisins, par exemple, peuvent venir un jour décidé à l'avance, pour aider un agriculteur à travailler sa terre. Ils ne sont pas rémunérés, mais ils sont nourris, et chacun d'entre eux peut demander aux autres de lui venir en aide.

Dans le cadre d'accords plus rigoureux, les agriculteurs peuvent effectuer un roulement pour s'entraider à préparer la terre avant les semailles. Cette forme de coopération, très répandue en Afrique, s'appelle *nhimbe* ou *janganu* au Zimbabwe, *owe* et *are* dans la partie occidentale du Nigeria, *moba* au sud-est du Ghana.

Des groupements autonomes, réunissant généralement des personnes ayant des revenus sensiblement identiques, se sont également formés pour améliorer l'accès au crédit; toutefois, certaines personnes peuvent être membres de plusieurs associations si elles répondent aux conditions exigées. Ce genre d'association porte également divers noms : le groupe ethnique Yoruba du Nigeria occidental l'appelle *esusu*, on le nomme *susu* au Ghana, *ibimina* dans la partie septentrionale du Rwanda, *tonlines* ou *njangis* au Cameroun, *cheetu* au Sri Lanka et *sambaya* au Bangladesh.

ENCADRE 2

Mexique - Union de Ejidos Julio Sabines

Dans les années 70, des agriculteurs défavorisés ont immigré dans la région de forêt tropicale humide de Marques de Comillas, près de la frontière qui sépare le Mexique du Guatemala. Les nouvelles méthodes d'agriculture, combinées avec l'élevage de troupeaux pratiqué par des groupes plus puissants, ont contribué à déboiser près de 40 % du territoire de cette région. En 1988, le Gouvernement mexicain a réagi en interdisant totalement l'abattage des arbres.

Cette interdiction a provoqué une réaction violente chez ces fermiers représentés par l'*Unión de Ejidos Julio Sabines*. Ils se sont réunis plusieurs fois avec des représentants d'organismes publics pour discuter de l'érosion des sols, des inondations provoquées par les crues des rivières, ainsi que des variations enregistrées dans les précipitations suite au déboisement. Ils ont également parlé des conséquences du réchauffement de la planète, certains agriculteurs faisant remarquer que si la communauté internationale voulait qu'ils arrêtent de couper les arbres, elle devrait leur offrir certaines compensations.

Toutefois, la majorité des participants ont accepté de coopérer avec les organismes publics pour tenter de trouver des méthodes d'agriculture durables et chercher d'autres sources de revenus.

Au cours des quatre dernières années, ils ont réussi à mettre au point de nouvelles techniques agricoles, tant pour les cultures vivrières que pour les cultures commerciales, utilisant des engrais naturels, sans recourir à une extension des superficies. Ils cultivent également des produits forestiers destinés à la vente et élèvent des animaux de la forêt.

Le gouvernement leur a fourni des services médicaux et pédagogiques, il accorde un soutien aux collectivités indiennes et il a créé un groupe spécial d'étude chargé du développement communautaire.

Grâce à l'adoption de ces mesures, la forêt tropicale est utilisée tout en étant protégée, et la communauté locale est florissante.

ENCADRE 3

Pakistan - Projet pilote d'Orangi

Orangi, un quartier périphérique de Karachi, la plus grande ville du Pakistan, s'est développé rapidement et abrite actuellement plus de 700.000 habitants.

Akhter Hameed Khan est arrivé à Orangi en 1980. C'était un dirigeant éclairé, doté d'une expérience considérable en matière d'organisation d'activités communautaires autonomes, car il avait participé antérieurement au projet Comilla exécuté au Bangladesh. Il a découvert que les logements étaient délabrés, les installations d'assainissement et de drainage déficientes, les problèmes de santé de plus en plus aigus, et que la population était en proie à de fréquentes épidémies.

M. Khan était convaincu que la meilleure manière de s'attaquer aux problèmes d'Orangi consistait à éviter de faire appel à l'aide extérieure et à renforcer la capacité de la population locale à prendre son destin en main. Le Projet d'Orangi s'est concentré sur cinq secteurs :

- L'acquisition d'installations d'assainissement bon marché.
- La construction de logements bon marché.
- La création de centres d'emploi pour les femmes.
- L'exécution de programmes sociaux destinés aux femmes.
- L'enseignement scolaire.

Les résultats ont été spectaculaires. Le programme d'assainissement dessert 28.000 familles, qui ont construit environ 130 kilomètres d'égouts souterrains et plus de 28.000 latrines. Elles ont consacré 30 millions de roupies (1,2 million de dollars) à ce programme, puisées dans leur économie personnelle, le coût unitaire étant de 66 dollars par maison d'habitation, soit environ un quart de ce qu'il en aurait coûté aux autorités locales pour l'exécuter.

Il est impossible d'avoir ne serait ce qu'une estimation du nombre d'organisations populaires. Un phénomène aussi souple et dynamique ne peut figurer dans les statistiques. Mais certains chiffres sont éloquentes :

- Le Kenya possède à lui seul 23.000 associations féminines.
- L'Etat de *Tamil Nadu* en Inde compte 25.000 organisations locales dans ses registres.
- Le *Bangladesh* possède au moins 12.000 groupements locaux qui reçoivent un soutien financier de la part des autorités locales et du gouvernement central (et bien d'autres qui n'en reçoivent aucun).
- Aux *Philippines*, 18.000 ONG sont enregistrées, dont au moins les deux tiers peuvent être classées dans la rubrique des organisations populaires, telles, les associations communautaires ou les coopératives.
- Selon les données de l'OCDE, les pays en développement ne comptaient pas moins de 20.000 ONG dans les années 80, un chiffre qui semble être bien inférieur à la réalité; le chiffre réel est probablement plus proche de 50.000 ou même supérieur.
- Le répertoire des ONG de l'OCDE possède des informations sur plus de 2.500 ONG opérant dans les 25 pays de l'OCDE en 1990, alors que ce chiffre n'était que de 1.600 en 1980.

Les plus grandes organisations populaires, tant dans les pays industrialisés que dans les pays en développement, sont les syndicats, qui offrent l'exemple le plus significatif de participation populaire sur le lieu de travail. Sur le plan individuel, les travailleurs ne peuvent pas faire grand-chose pour influencer leurs employeurs, mais quand ils s'allient à l'ensemble de la main-d'œuvre — et menacent en dernier ressort de se mettre en grève — l'employeur n'a pas d'autre choix que de les écouter et d'arriver à un compromis.

Les syndicats n'ont pas été étrangers à la vague de démocratisation qui a déferlé dans les années 80. En Amérique latine, les syndicats qui s'étaient créés en Argentine, en Bolivie, au Brésil, en Equateur et en Uruguay (et plus récemment au Chili) ont souvent été activement opposés à la dictature. En Asie également, les syndicats ont joué un rôle dans le processus de démocratisation : en République de Corée, un mouvement de grève organisé dans les années 1986-87 a été à l'origine de nombreuses réformes démocratiques.

Il va de même pour l'Afrique, où les syndicats ont joué un rôle extrêmement important, compte tenu de leur petit nombre, dans le mouvement qui a mené au multipartisme. Au Mali, en 1981, l'Union nationale des travailleurs maliens a appelé à la grève sur tout le territoire du pays pour faire tomber le gouvernement, et son secrétaire général est devenu vice-président du gouvernement de transition, ce qui a permis à une administration civile d'accéder au pouvoir en 1992. En Zambie, le Congrès des syndicats était à la tête de l'opposition au gouvernement à parti unique en place à l'époque, et au cours des élections libres qui ont suivi sa chute, son chef a été élu président du pays.

En Europe orientale et en Union soviétique, les nouvelles associations de travailleurs — Solidarité en Pologne, Padkrepa en Bulgarie, Fratia en Bulgarie, les comités de grève des mineurs en Union soviétique — ont favorisé le mouvement vers la démocratie.

Organisations non gouvernementales dans les pays en développement

Les ONG couvrent un large spectre, regroupant aussi bien des organisations locales aux structures relativement souples que des fédérations nationales ou des réseaux internationaux. Les problèmes auxquels elles s'attaquent peuvent aller de la protection des droits fondamentaux d'un groupe ethnique particulier à toute la mosaïque des problèmes de développement.

Parfois les ONG tirent leurs origines d'une organisation populaire, reprenant et diffusant ailleurs ses principes et ses idées. Elles peuvent encore être la somme de plusieurs organisations populaires qui s'unissent entre elles.

D'autre part, les ONG peuvent également être les antennes d'organismes plus larges, comme notamment les églises qui créent des ONG ou des groupes d'étude pour s'attaquer à des problèmes particuliers. Au Chili, l'Eglise catholique a créé le *Vicaría de la Solidaridad* pour dévoiler les atrocités perpétrées par le régime de Pinochet et accorder un soutien aux victimes. En Rhodésie, la Commission pour la justice et la paix a joué un rôle similaire sous le régime de Smith.

En d'autres occasions, un groupe de per-

ENCADRE 4

Egypte - Projet de logements sociaux du Caire

Khalafaway, comme de nombreux quartiers du Caire, s'est profondément dégradé dans les années 60, à la suite de la négligence prolongée du Gouvernement. Des systèmes d'égouts bouchés et des monceaux d'ordures exposés à l'air libre contaminaient l'eau de boisson et menaçaient sérieusement la santé de ses habitants.

Las de vivre dans des conditions insalubres, en 1978 le quartier de Khalafaway a mis sur pied un projet autonome visant à améliorer l'environnement. Avec leurs économies et l'aide de volontaires, les habitants du quartier ont remplacé les canalisations endommagées, débouché le système d'égouts, enlevé les ordures et organisé une collecte régulière des déchets. Ils ont également créé un jardin pour les enfants.

Trois ans plus tard, Wafaa Ahmed Abdalla, expert travaillant auprès de l'Institut national de planification du Caire, est venue à la rescousse. Elle a mis au point une méthode plus scientifique permettant d'améliorer les conditions de vie communautaires et elle a créé un programme de formation destiné à la population locale. Suite à ces efforts, cinq autres projets autonomes sont nés dans des quartiers de logements sociaux, permettant ainsi à 5.000 résidents d'améliorer leur cadre de vie.

ENCADRE 5

Inde - Association des travailleuses indépendantes

La *Self-Employed Women's Association* (SEWA) ou Association des travailleuses indépendantes est un syndicat regroupant des femmes de milieu défavorisé qui s'est créé à Ahmedabad, en Inde (en hindi, *sewa* signifie «service»).

La SEWA regroupe des femmes se livrant à trois catégories d'activités : les marchandes ambulantes et les colporteuses, les femmes travaillant à domicile, celles qui font un travail temporaire et participent à d'autres services. Bien que la SEWA ait été fondée pour répondre aux besoins des citadines, actuellement elle apporte également un soutien aux femmes des zones rurales qui travaillent dans le secteur de l'agriculture et dans d'autres secteurs.

L'objectif de la SEWA est de favoriser les activités qui permettent aux femmes d'améliorer leur revenu et leurs conditions de travail. Elle leur propose les services suivants :

- Des coopératives d'épargne et de crédit, qui offrent un capital de départ aux colporteuses, aux marchandes et aux femmes qui travaillent à domicile.
- Des coopératives de productrices, qui aident les femmes à obtenir de meilleurs prix pour leurs marchandises.
- Des cours de formation pour leur transmettre des compétences dans certains domaines, comme le travail du bambou, l'impression à la main, la plomberie, la menuiserie, la réparation des postes de radio, ainsi que la comptabilité et la gestion.
- Des services juridiques, pour permettre aux femmes de bénéficier des avantages offerts par la législation nationale sur l'emploi. Jusqu'à la création de la SEWA en 1972, le travail des femmes du secteur non structuré n'était reconnu ni par la loi, ni par la société.

La SEWA a également adopté un volet social. Il accorde une assistance à ses membres, grâce à un plan de protection des mères, il fait respecter les droits des veuves, procure des prestations de soins aux enfants et une formation aux sage-femmes.

sonnes partageant les mêmes idées fondent une nouvelle ONG pour s'attaquer à un problème national. Elles peuvent concentrer leur attention sur les problèmes des femmes comme, par exemple, le *Centro de Investigación para la Acción Feminina* qui, en République dominicaine, s'efforce d'améliorer la condition de la femme dans le pays (encadré 6). De plus, au cours des dernières années, de nombreux groupements se sont formés pour s'attaquer aux problèmes écologiques, tel le Forum Vert qui, aux Philippines, s'efforce de faire prendre conscience aux collectivités locales et au gouvernement de la nécessité de protéger l'environnement.

De nombreuses ONG se sont essentiellement attachées à donner aux populations un certain contrôle sur leur destinée. Bien qu'officiellement, les ONG exécutent des programmes ayant pour objectif d'améliorer la santé, l'alphabetisation ou l'agriculture par exemple, elles se préoccupent également de voir dans quelle mesure chaque projet contribue à offrir davantage de capacités d'action et d'expression aux populations. Elles se sont révélées particulièrement déterminées à encourager l'autonomie des populations pauvres et marginalisées : beaucoup affirment que les principaux intéressés à leurs travaux sont «les plus pauvres parmi les pauvres».

Pour réaliser ces objectifs, la plupart des ONG s'appuient sur des organisations populaires, leur offrant un soutien financier ou autre. Ces liens peuvent être établis de diverses

manières. Dans la plupart des pays d'Afrique, les ONG accordent habituellement une assistance aux organisations populaires déjà constituées, alors qu'en Inde et au Bangladesh, elles prennent souvent l'initiative de créer de nouvelles associations. En Amérique latine, les deux approches sont courantes.

D'autres ONG se contentent de mener des activités militantes, plaidant pour des causes diverses — en mobilisant les populations et en faisant pression sur le gouvernement pour obtenir certains résultats. Les droits de l'homme sont souvent au centre de leurs activités; tel est le cas par exemple du *Foro Nacional por Colombia* et de la *Federación Shuara* en Equateur.

Beaucoup d'ONG s'efforcent de jouer les deux rôles — accorder un soutien matériel et mener des activités de plaidoyer — avec la conviction que leurs liens avec les organisations de base leur procurent une source unique d'information et d'autorité. Par exemple, au Brésil, le *Comissao Pastoral da Terra* accorde un soutien aux groupements d'agriculteurs sans terre et défend les droits aux niveaux national et international.

Au plus haut niveau de coopération, les ONG se regroupent pour former des réseaux afin de présenter un front uni face aux autorités régionales et nationales et pour s'adresser aux organismes internationaux, tels que l'ONU. En Inde, dans chaque Etat on trouve des réseaux d'ONG tels que la Fédération des organisations bénévoles pour le développement rural dans l'Etat de Kara-

ENCADRE6

République dominicaine - *Centri de investigación para la Acción Feminina*

Le *Centro de Investigación para la Acción Feminina* (CIPAF) est une ONG de femmes qui s'efforce d'améliorer durablement la condition des femmes en République dominicaine. Elle tente de modifier fondamentalement certaines attitudes en organisant des programmes de recherche, d'éducation, de formation et d'information de la population. En mobilisant les énergies des femmes de la classe moyenne, elle a organisé 200 ateliers, offert une formation à plusieurs milliers de travailleuses et a fait paraître 31 publications.

Le rapport *Mujeres Rurales* est l'une des principales études réalisées par le CIPAF sur la condition des paysannes. Sa publication a été suivie d'une campagne d'information nationale destinée à faire connaître les conclusions de ce rapport et à encourager le Gouvernement à modifier de façon concrète sa politique. Le CIPAF prépare actuellement un rapport complémentaire sur les problèmes des femmes en zones urbaines.

Le CIPAF publie également un bulletin mensuel qui est reproduit dans un quotidien national, et a organisé des séminaires pour les femmes diplômées en République dominicaine ainsi qu'au Panama et au Honduras.

taka, ou l'Association des organismes bénévoles dans l'Etat de Tamil Nadu. Au niveau national, ces ONG sont regroupées au sein du réseau indien d'action bénévole.

Il faut cependant admettre que certaines ONG ne sont pas aussi totalement indépendantes du gouvernement qu'elles le prétendent. Parfois, elles ont officiellement un statut non gouvernemental, mais en pratique, elles ont des liens avec le gouvernement. Au Zimbabwe, par exemple, trois ONG sont intimement liées avec le parti au pouvoir: le Fonds présidentiel, Survie de l'enfant (qui est sous le patronage de l'ex-épouse du président) et le Groupe de développement du Zimbabwe (qui est sous la tutelle d'un des vice-présidents du pays). De même, aux Philippines, certaines ONG, connues sous le nom de GRINGO, sont étroitement liées au gouvernement; certaines d'entre elles ont été créées pour aider les dirigeants nationaux et locaux à réaliser leurs objectifs, d'autres pour bénéficier des fonds des donateurs étrangers qui exigent qu'une partie de leur aide passe par la filière des ONG. Bien que la grande majorité des ONG adoptent l'éthique du bénévolat et ne sont pas tournées vers

le profit, d'autres sont des entreprises commerciales à peine déguisées. En Inde, par exemple, en certain nombre d'ONG offrent des services de consultants (rémunérés) au secteur bénévole.

Dans certains cas, pour une ONG, le moyen d'agir le plus efficace est au niveau international, comme le prouve le succès remarquable remporté par *Amnesty International* et *Greenpeace* (encadré 7).

ONG de l'hémisphère nord agissant au Sud

Tous les pays industrialisés possèdent une gamme étendue d'ONG s'occupant de questions de développement et dont le nombre ne fait que croître. Ces ONG de l'hémisphère nord envoient également quelques fois des sommes importantes aux pays en développement. Certaines, comme des diverses organisations nationales de *Save the Children*, le font en plus de l'aide qu'elles dispensent dans leur pays d'origine. Ou, comme les organismes *Oxfam*, elles dépensent leurs fonds

ENCADRE 7

Activités militantes entreprises au niveau international par les ONG

La plupart des problèmes qui préoccupent les ONG concernent l'ensemble de la planète et peuvent souvent être résolus le plus efficacement par des ONG qui opèrent véritablement au niveau international. L'une des mieux connues et des plus respectées est *Amnesty International*. Par son activité qui consiste à recenser et à faire connaître inlassablement les violations des droits de l'homme, elle a amplement démontré la puissance de l'information en matière de protection des droits des individus et des groupes.

Amnesty comprend plus de 6.000 groupements de volontaires opérant dans plus de 70 pays. En 1990, grâce à la publication de rapports et à l'organisation de campagnes de lettres ouvertes, ces groupements ont permis au public de prendre connaissance du cas de 4.500 prisonniers et ils ont contribué à faire libérer 1.296 d'entre eux.

Une nouvelle organisation, *Transparency International*, se propose également d'agir sur la base d'enquêtes internationales et en faisant appel à la publicité, en identifiant et en divulguant les cas de corruption lors des accords commerciaux internationaux, et d'en étudier les conséquences sur les plans politique, social et économique. La mondialisation du commerce international représente un danger potentiel de corruption à grande échelle; le scandale de la vente d'armes par la compagnie *Bofors* en est un exemple frappant. Il est donc peu probable que *Transparency International* se retrouve au chômage.

Le Conseil de la Terre est un autre exemple d'organisme international tourné vers les problèmes écologiques cette fois, qui se livre à des activités militantes. Il est animé de l'esprit né à Rio lors du Sommet sur l'environnement, qui a révélé que la participation durable des populations aux prises de décision au niveau international est essentielle pour trouver des solutions aux problèmes écologiques. Il envisage donc de créer une tribune mondiale ouverte en permanence aux organisations non gouvernementales, où elles pourront débattre de la question d'un développement durable et des actions à entreprendre à cet égard.

presque exclusivement dans des pays en développement.

En moyenne, les deux tiers des fonds que les ONG de l'hémisphère nord réunissent en faveur du Sud proviennent de contributions privées. C'est en Suède, suivie de la Suisse, la Norvège et l'Allemagne, que les contributions privées par habitant sont les plus élevées (plus de 13 dollars par habitant dans les quatre cas). Entre 1970 et 1990, les subventions accordées par des ONG de l'hémisphère nord à des projets et programmes exécutés dans les pays en développement sont passées d'un peu plus d'un milliard de dollars à 5 milliards. Toutefois, ce sont les Etats-Unis qui réunissent la somme la plus élevée — 2,7 milliards de dollars en 1991, soit près de la moitié du montant total.

Les ONG de l'hémisphère nord servent également de filière pour les fonds publics. En moyenne, un tiers du montant total de leurs fonds proviennent des gouvernements, bien que les proportions varient profondément, allant de 10 % en Autriche, en Irlande et dans le Royaume-Uni à plus de 80 % en Belgique et en Italie. Entre 1970 et 1990, ce financement est passé de moins de 200 millions de dollars à 2,2 milliards (tableau 1).

TABLEAU 1

Pourcentage de l'APD distribué par la filière des ONG (% du total)

Suisse	19,4
Etats-Unis	11,1
Canada	10,8
Pays-Bas	7,0
Belgique	6,6
Allemagne (Ouest)	6,5
Suède	4,6
Italie	1,9
Japon	1,6
Royaume-Uni	1,3
France	0,3

Si l'on ajoute les contributions privées aux contributions publiques, le montant total des contributions versées par les ONG de l'hémisphère nord ou par leur truchement est passé de 1 milliard de dollars en 1970 à 7,2 milliards en 1990, ce qui, en termes réels, représente un taux d'augmentation deux fois supérieur à celui de l'aide internationale au développement. En fait, le

financement public des ONG de l'hémisphère nord s'est accru beaucoup plus rapidement au cours des 10 dernières années que le soutien financier dont elles bénéficient de la part du public.

De nombreuses ONG de l'hémisphère nord continuent à exécuter leurs propres programmes au Sud, comme, par exemple, CARE, *Plan International et World Vision* aux Etats-Unis, et *Action Aid, Save the Children et Oxfam* au Royaume-Uni. Mais la tendance qui se manifeste actuellement n'est plus à des interventions indépendantes, où PONG opère seule, mais plutôt à une collaboration avec les ONG et les organisations populaires des pays en développement. Au Royaume-Uni, cette tendance est courante au sein des ONG les plus puissantes, comme *Christian Aid* et CAFOD, comme pour NOVIB aux Pays-Bas et les organismes religieux d'Allemagne et de Scandinavie.

La plupart des grandes ONG de l'hémisphère sud sont très dépendantes de celles du nord en ce qui concerne leur financement. Les ONG du Nord désignent généralement ce phénomène sous le terme de «partenariat». Mais vue du Sud, leur relation est loin de l'égalité que ce terme semble suggérer.

Il est évident qu'une relation de partenariat est plus efficace lorsque le donateur et l'organisme bénéficiaire partagent un point de vue identique sur le développement. De plus, les relations sont plus faciles si les organismes de l'hémisphère nord envoient régulièrement des fonds et que ceux du sud sont prêts et capables de respecter les normes en matière de précomptabilité fixées par les donateurs de l'hémisphère nord.

En pratique, ces conditions ne sont pas toujours respectées. La grande question à laquelle on n'a pas toujours de réponse est de savoir qui a défini les priorités du développement au niveau local. Les organismes de l'hémisphère nord ne peuvent que rarement garantir un financement à long terme et ceux du sud sont contrariés par les exigences administratives qui leur sont imposées. Les organismes qui reçoivent de l'argent d'organisations de parrainage d'enfants, par exemple, doivent passer une bonne partie de leur temps à réunir quantité d'informations personnelles sur les enfants parrainés et emploient donc une grande équipe de «travailleurs sociaux» qui se consacrent à cette tâche.

Les organismes donateurs sont donc en mesure de poser les conditions de la relation. Elles peuvent se révéler pesantes ou légères, mais elles limitent toujours la liberté des organismes qui doivent les respecter.

De plus, au cours des dernières années, les gouvernements ont utilisé la filière des ONG de l'hémisphère nord pour subventionner celles du sud, ce qui est encore venu compliquer la situation. Bien que les gouvernements considèrent cette solution comme séduisante, ils ignorent souvent certaines incompatibilités fondamentales. Premièrement, en ce qui concerne le type de projets : les gouvernements préfèrent les programmes qui obtiennent des résultats tangibles; ils insistent donc surtout sur l'exécution de projets dans le domaine économique. Les ONG préfèrent au contraire les projets qui comportent des volets sociaux et politiques plus développés et permettent aux pauvres de prendre leur destinée en main.

Deuxièmement, ils sont en conflit sur la question du calendrier. Les gouvernements veulent que leurs fonds soient versés rapidement, c'est pourquoi ils n'aiment pas trop les analyses et les évaluations antérieures au projet. Les ONG, cependant, ne savent que trop bien que les projets qui font appel à la participation ne peuvent être mis en œuvre que progressivement, après que des évaluations soigneuses aient été réalisées et après consultation avec les populations concernées.

Conséquence: les ONG de l'hémisphère nord doivent convaincre celles du sud d'entreprendre des projets économiques susceptibles d'obtenir des résultats rapides, ce qui contribue à renforcer la tension entre les organismes donateurs et bénéficiaires.

Pour remédier à ces problèmes, comme constaté aux Philippines et en Thaïlande avec les ONG canadiennes, un dialogue entre les groupes d'ONG s'est établi et des consortiums en sont parfois nés, comme dans le cas du BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee — Comité pour la promotion rurale au Bangladesh).

Les ONG et la population

La participation est un principe fondamental adopté par pratiquement toutes les ONG.

Encouragent-elles également la participation dans la pratique? Il semble que généralement elles le fassent. De nombreuses études ont révélé que la participation était un trait dominant de leurs opérations. De plus, les gouvernements des pays en développement, tout comme les organismes donateurs, s'accordent pour affirmer que la participation est la caractéristique qui distingue principalement les ONG des approches «du sommet vers la base» adoptées lors de l'exécution de nombreux programmes publics.

Le soutien accordé par les ONG aux groupements populaires, où le contact entre les individus est la règle, est à l'origine d'un débat sans fin sur la forme que devraient prendre les interventions, avec parfois des résultats déconcertants. Au Bangladesh, dans les années 70, *Save the Children Fund (SCF)* a commencé à s'occuper des femmes et des enfants les plus pauvres des bidonvilles urbains. SCF voulait concentrer ses activités sur la vaccination et la planification familiale, mais le Comité des bidonvilles a rejeté cette approche, insistant sur le fait que le besoin le plus urgent à satisfaire était de créer des programmes de santé curatifs. C'est donc ainsi que le projet a débuté et ce n'est que deux ans plus tard que SCF a pu enfin s'attaquer à la prévention.

Mais il ne faudrait pas prendre pour acquis que les contacts des ONG avec les organisations populaires favorisent nécessairement la participation. Parfois, l'aide extérieure décourage la participation, ou va même jusqu'à la réprimer. C'est le cas lorsqu'une ONG se sent obligée d'obtenir des résultats concrets, en fait, de dépenser de l'argent rapidement. Aux Philippines, le Bureau de recherche et de développement des écosystèmes, qui est un organisme pratiquement autonome, coopère avec des organisations populaires locales afin d'améliorer la production agricole et l'élevage dans les régions montagneuses. Lorsqu'il n'existe pas d'organisation populaire, cet organisme encourage les populations à en former, essentiellement pour qu'elles puissent acquérir certaines techniques déterminées à l'avance.

Il est évident que des bénéficiaires potentiels peuvent être tentés de créer des groupements temporaires ou superficiels s'ils ont le sentiment que c'est un moyen facile d'obtenir davantage de biens et de services. Ils disent à PONG «ce qu'elle désire entendre» pour avoir accès aux ressources convoitées. Il existe également un danger de voir

des organisations populaires qui ont réussi à obtenir des fonds être récupérées par une élite locale désireuse de s'approprier les apports et de les utiliser à sa manière.

Il est impossible de savoir dans quelle mesure les ONG favorisent véritablement la participation. Toutefois, une étude récente réalisée par les Pays-Bas, qui tire ses preuves d'exemples pris au Brésil, au Burkina Faso, au Chili, en Inde, en Indonésie et au Zimbabwe, est arrivée à la conclusion que les ONG favorisaient largement l'autonomie, même si elles ne pouvaient pas en présenter de preuves quantitatives. Selon le rapport, les groupes de population étudiés «... se comportent plus souvent en partenaires dans les échanges de vues avec les organisations extérieures au village, ont le courage de porter plainte auprès des autorités locales, se déplacent plus librement et voyagent davantage. Ces changements peuvent sembler insignifiants, mais leur importance est essentielle pour les populations».

De nombreuses ONG ont appris que les efforts entrepris en faveur de la participation et de l'apprentissage de l'autonomie ne peuvent pas être dissociés de résultats économiques concrets. Ces efforts, s'ils ne s'accompagnent pas d'améliorations sur le plan économique, restent vains.

Un exemple : le programme *Development Education and Leadership Training*, qui a débuté au Kenya au début des années 70, a par la suite été adapté au Ghana, au Nigeria, en Sierra Leone, en Afrique du Sud et au Zimbabwe. L'approche adoptée par ce programme a pour objectif d'encourager les collectivités à utiliser la place qu'elles occupent dans la société et leur pouvoir pour initier les changements désirés. Mais si cet effort de prise de conscience ne s'accompagne pas de mesures permettant de satisfaire les besoins tangibles immédiats des groupements visés, il débouchera peut-être sur la frustration et la désintégration du groupe.

La nécessité d'obtenir des résultats tangibles est également un problème qui se pose actuellement en Amérique latine. Depuis de nombreuses années, le soutien accordé par les ONG aux mouvements populaires était un exutoire pour les aspirations démocratiques des peuples. Maintenant que celles-ci ont été reconnues dans la plupart des pays, les populations se concentrent davantage sur d'autres problèmes. Les populations pauvres et marginalisées actives

au sein d'organisations populaires exigent que les efforts visant à leur donner l'autonomie s'accompagnent d'activités qui répondent également à leurs besoins économiques et sociaux pressants.

Les ONG, tout comme les organisations populaires, reposent sur le respect et la promotion de certaines valeurs plutôt que sur le profit, et elles s'efforcent d'échapper à la bureaucratiation. Mais cela ne signifie pas qu'elles fonctionnent sur un mode participatif. Bien qu'elles soient ouvertes au débat et aux échanges de vues intérieurs sur de nombreux thèmes, certaines grandes organisations ont toutes les caractéristiques d'une structure bureaucratique conventionnelle.

Qui exactement devrait pouvoir participer à la gestion des ONG? Leurs administrateurs, leur personnel, les donateurs qui les aident ou les populations qu'elles soutiennent? Actuellement, l'ordre de priorité est probablement d'abord le personnel, puis les administrateurs, les donateurs et, en bout de liste, les bénéficiaires. De nombreuses organisations ne parlent pas de bénéficiaires, mais plutôt de «partenaires», bien que l'égalité de ce partenariat soit parfois sujette à caution.

Ces préoccupations sont si répandues que la déclaration de clôture d'un colloque organisé à Sri Lanka en 1992 et auquel ont participé des ONG et des organisations populaires, était la suivante: «les ONG doivent avoir pour objectif de s'efforcer d'accroître les capacités des organisations populaires à mieux traduire leurs propres préoccupations directement aux plus hauts niveaux».

Les ONG et le gouvernement

Les ONG ont des relations complexes avec les gouvernements, parfois axées sur la coopération, parfois conflictuelles, et souvent les deux à la fois sur des sujets variables.

La capacité des ONG à favoriser le développement participatif est fortement influencée par la nature du gouvernement. Là où les gouvernements sont forts et autoritaires, l'une des contributions majeures des ONG a été de maintenir en vie la démocratie fondée sur la participation. Dans de nombreux pays d'Amérique latine et aux Philippines sous le régime de Marcos, les ONG ont soutenu divers mouvements populaires afin

de s'opposer aux excès des régimes policiers et de lutter contre la pauvreté au niveau local.

Lorsque les gouvernements sont hostiles mais moins forts, les ONG ont maintes possibilités de favoriser un développement participatif en exécutant des projets sociaux et économiques. Si le gouvernement central n'exerce pas une surveillance trop vigoureuse, les autorités régionales et de district peuvent se révéler capables et plus désireuses de coopérer avec les ONG, surtout quand leurs interventions sont couronnées de succès et qu'elles bénéficient du soutien populaire. Le Zaïre, ces dernières années, entre dans cette catégorie.

Le cas de figure idéal semble être un gouvernement puissant qui se féliciterait de la présence des ONG, mais tel n'est pas nécessairement le cas. Les gouvernements forts ont une opinion bien établie sur ce que les ONG devraient faire, et ils les considèrent souvent comme des organismes devant combattre les carences des services sociaux, plutôt que de se faire les champions d'une autre forme de développement. Cependant, les ONG qui ont remporté des succès auprès des organisations populaires peuvent exercer une influence sur les approches adoptées par le gouvernement en matière de développement; tel est le cas en Thaïlande et en Zambie.

Au cours des dernières années, la question de savoir comment les ONG et les gouvernements devraient coopérer s'est posée avec plus d'acuité du fait de l'adoption largement répandue de programmes d'ajustement structurel. Les ONG du monde entier ont été sollicitées pour adoucir les effets les plus négatifs de ces programmes et assurer des services sociaux que les gouvernements n'arrivent plus à financer. Dans la plupart des cas, comme en Gambie, au Ghana, au Guatemala et en Ouganda, les ONG ont accepté de coopérer, souvent parce qu'ainsi elles se qualifiaient pour l'affectation de fonds publics et extérieurs. Dans d'autres cas — la Bolivie en est un exemple frappant — elles ont renâclé à la besogne. Mais dans les deux cas, les ONG ont été forcées de réfléchir pour voir dans quelle mesure leurs approches correspondaient ou, au contraire, entraînent en conflit avec la politique nationale. Les gouvernements de leur côté commencent à réaliser que les ONG et les méthodes participatives qu'elles préconisent ont un rôle à jouer dans le développement national.

La question primordiale qui se pose à l'heure actuelle est de savoir comment promouvoir au mieux les atouts et les intérêts tant des gouvernements que des ONG. Les gouvernements, qui constatent que les ONG élargissent leurs activités, voudront les surveiller et même les contrôler plus étroitement. Mais ils devront trouver le moyen de le faire sans annihiler les avantages qu'elles procurent, comme c'est le cas en introduisant par exemple des procédures trop lourdes, qui freinent leurs activités ou retardent la mise en œuvre rapide de leurs programmes. De même, les ONG reconnaissent de plus en plus que si elles ne veulent pas rester en marge du débat national sur l'approche participative du développement, elles doivent s'engager de manière plus constructive auprès des gouvernements.

Les gouvernements et (es) ONG doivent établir des contacts à trois niveaux : celui des ministères techniques au niveau central, celui des autorités locales, et auprès des instances nationales.

* *Les ministères techniques au niveau central* — Les ministères ont besoin de savoir ce que font les ONG et de mettre en place des mécanismes leur permettant d'utiliser les idées qui émergent des interventions des ONG et, si cela semble raisonnable, d'inclure les activités des ONG dans leur planification à venir. Ils doivent également encourager un rôle accru des ONG dans les secteurs auxquels le gouvernement ne participe pas.

Les ONG, de leur côté, doivent réaliser des évaluations plus rigoureuses de leurs projets, coopérer et coordonner plus étroitement leurs activités, fournir aux gouvernements davantage d'informations sur leurs activités et formuler des critiques et des propositions sur des questions politiques et législatives.

Dans de nombreux cas, il pourra se révéler utile de créer des organes de liaisons entre le gouvernement et les ONG. Il en existe déjà dans certains pays, aux Philippines par exemple, dans le cadre de la recherche agricole et en Tanzanie pour les questions sanitaires.

* *Autorités locales* — Les activités entreprises par les ONG sont souvent un défi pour les structures du pouvoir local. C'est en fait souvent le but recherché. Lorsque la structure du pouvoir local est élitiste et opprime les pauvres, les ONG essayeront d'impulser des changements. Mais cette attitude peut dévier et se transformer en

arrogance et en antagonisme envers les hommes politiques et les responsables locaux. Les ONG doivent être plus compréhensives face aux réels problèmes auxquels les hommes politiques et les responsables locaux sont confrontés.

De leur côté, les autorités locales ne doivent pas uniquement penser à éliminer ou à exercer un contrôle sur les ONG, mais plutôt considérer que la situation locale peut bénéficier de leurs interventions, au lieu de les regarder comme une menace pour les réseaux de pouvoir local. Il devrait être possible dans chaque district par exemple de créer une tribune qui permette à l'administration et aux ONG d'échanger des idées sur les problèmes de développement locaux et sur la meilleure manière de s'y attaquer.

• *Instances nationales* — Dans le passé, les ONG n'ont souvent eu qu'une influence limitée sur les débats nationaux concernant la forme et le contenu des stratégies de développement. Cela s'explique en partie par le fait que la plupart des ONG se sont concentrées sur l'exécution d'activités locales et n'ont établi que des contacts officieux avec les fonctionnaires du gouvernement, et parce que les gouvernements ont décidé de ne pas débattre de questions de politique générale avec les ONG. L'Amérique latine, où les ONG comme les organisations populaires ont joué un rôle significatif dans le mouvement démocratique, est une exception à la règle, tout comme les Philippines, où les ONG comptent pour un tiers des membres du Conseil des Philippines pour un développement durable, créé en septembre 1992 pour assurer le suivi national du Sommet planète Terre.

Mais les ONG connaissent également mieux les limites de ce qui peut être accompli au niveau local, et elles ont ainsi à cœur d'avoir davantage d'influence sur les débats nationaux. Il leur faudra pour ce faire présenter un front plus uni et consacrer davantage de ressources à leur représentativité au niveau national. Si elles réussissent à le faire, leur contribution actuelle au développement participatif au niveau local pourrait n'être considérée que comme une bataille relativement peu importante au regard de leur lutte beaucoup plus vaste pour élargir les possibilités de développement participatif au niveau national. En d'autres termes, l'influence indirecte des ONG est souvent beaucoup plus forte que leur

contribution directe. Des expériences spécifiques à certains pays sont décrites ci-dessous :

• Le *Bangladesh* dispose d'un secteur d'ONG parmi les plus étendus de la planète et aussi l'un des plus diversifiés. Personne ne connaît leur nombre exact, mais au début des années 90, 12.000 groupements au moins recevaient un soutien financier et technique. Plus de 550 ONG locales étaient inscrites à l'Association des organismes de développement, et plus de 300 ONG nationales et étrangères recevaient des fonds de l'étranger. Près de 100 millions de dollars provenant de sources extérieures sont distribués aux ONG (soit près de 5 % du montant total de l'aide). La plupart de ces ONG agissent au niveau local et sont petites, mais certaines d'entre elles emploient des milliers de personnes.

Les ONG du Bangladesh qui, selon les estimations, atteignent entre 10 et 20 % des populations pauvres, se concentrent généralement sur les populations défavorisées des zones rurales en entreprenant toute une série d'activités, qui sont axées à la fois sur les secours d'urgence et sur le développement à long terme. L'accès au crédit a généralement été au centre de leurs préoccupations et elles ont favorisé les activités génératrices de revenus.

La plupart des ONG ont pour objectif de permettre aux populations de prendre leur destinée en main, notamment aux femmes; ces activités ont souvent été couronnées de succès. Dans certains cas toutefois, les groupements se sont désintégréés et de violents affrontements ont eu lieu lorsque les programmes exécutés par les ONG encourageaient les populations à affronter certains niveaux du pouvoir local.

Les relations entre les ONG et le gouvernement sont complexes et contradictoires. D'une part, on les encourage à « suppléer ou à compléter les programmes publics de développement ». Mais les gouvernements les ont parfois considérées comme une menace, sapant leur légitimité et entrant en compétition avec eux pour l'affectation des fonds accordés au développement, et ils ont alors réagi en plaçant des obstacles sur leur chemin, notamment en adoptant des procédures d'inscription et d'agrément restrictives.

Au Bangladesh, les ONG ont une influence réelle sur la politique de développement du gouvernement et celui-ci a nommé certains dirigeants d'ONG de premier plan à des postes importants

de conseillers. Cela peut être considéré comme une reconnaissance de la valeur des ONG, ou comme une manière de museler une opposition possible.

• Le Chili a vu le nombre de ses ONG proliférer dans les années 70 plus rapidement que tout autre pays d'Amérique latine, en réaction directe à la répression du régime militaire. Un nombre élevé de fonctionnaires de rang intermédiaire ou élevé ont été obligés de quitter le gouvernement. Certains ont été exécutés et d'autres sont partis à l'étranger, mais bon nombre d'entre eux se sont reconvertis dans le bénévolat, devenant membres d'ONG ou en créant de nouvelles, soutenues par l'Eglise et financées par une injection massive de fonds étrangers, d'origine gouvernementale ou non.

Le mouvement des ONG fonctionnait de deux manières. C'était le point de ralliement de l'opposition politique au gouvernement, ce qui a donné naissance à un déploiement de mouvements populaires. Mais c'était également un moyen d'atténuer les effets les plus désastreux de la pauvreté, quoique, là également, l'éducation populaire ait toujours été un aspect important du processus de lutte contre la pauvreté. Les ONG ont donc été capables de conserver les idéaux démocratiques.

Lorsqu'en 1990, un gouvernement démocratique a été élu, l'approche participative que les ONG avaient toujours préconisée est devenue un aspect important de la politique gouvernementale — en fait, de nombreux membres des ONG occupent actuellement des postes-clés dans le gouvernement. De plus, le gouvernement a accepté que les ONG jouent un rôle important.

Mais les ONG se retrouvent face à un dilemme. Auparavant, leur tâche était claire : elles étaient unies dans l'opposition au général Pinochet. Maintenant, elles doivent se chercher un nouveau rôle; elles ont en gros trois options. Certains groupements abandonneront probablement l'éducation populaire et le développement participatif pour se consacrer à la fourniture de services. D'autres, moins convaincus de la viabilité de la démocratie, garderont leurs distances avec le gouvernement. Quant au troisième groupe, il continuera probablement à encourager la participation au niveau local tout en s'efforçant de coopérer avec le gouvernement et d'influencer ses décisions.

Dans les années à venir, le Chili devrait être

un exemple intéressant de développement participatif, encouragé simultanément du sommet de la pyramide vers le bas par le gouvernement, et de la base vers le sommet par les ONG.

• L'Ouganda est l'un des pays les plus pauvres d'Afrique et, pendant pratiquement toute la période qui a suivi l'époque coloniale, il a été ravagé par la guerre civile et les luttes intestines. Depuis 1986, le gouvernement s'efforce de créer des institutions d'état capables de fonctionner. A leur côté, on trouve au moins 250 ONG locales et 24 ONG dont le siège est à l'étranger; leurs activités ont consisté essentiellement à fournir une aide d'urgence et à exécuter des programmes de santé. En 1990, des fonds étrangers d'une valeur supérieure à 25 millions de dollars ont été affectés aux ONG locales.

Le gouvernement a accordé un large soutien aux ONG et le contrôle qu'il exerce sur elles n'est généralement qu'administratif. Cela permet aux ONG d'avoir une liberté considérable mais, de ce fait, les services qu'elles dirigent sont souvent parallèles à ceux offerts par le gouvernement et parfois les deux se chevauchent. Cela implique également que, à l'exception possible des soins de santé, les ONG n'ont que peu d'influence sur la politique publique.

Le personnel est un domaine important où l'action des ONG se chevauche avec celle du gouvernement. Comme les salaires de la fonction publique sont trop bas, certaines ONG, notamment celles dont le siège est à l'étranger, ont «écramé» le gouvernement de certains de ses employés. D'autres ont «complété» les salaires des fonctionnaires, les éloignant ainsi des projets et programmes publics. Dans les deux cas, la conséquence est que les programmes des ONG se sont substitués aux programmes publics.

La plupart des ONG ougandaises épousent le concept de participation, mais cette option n'est pas toujours évidente en pratique. Il y a très peu de participation au niveau des programmes de secours d'urgence, ce qui peut éventuellement s'expliquer. Mais même au niveau des programmes de développement à long terme, les bénéficiaires ne participent que rarement à la planification et, en ce qui concerne reevaluation, les ONG (tout comme les organismes d'aide publique et les gouvernements des pays en développement) considèrent souvent qu'elles doivent rendre des comptes aux donateurs plutôt qu'aux bénéficiaires.

Learnings for the Future of Inter-Faith Dialogue

Part II : Insights evoked by intractable international differences

by Anthony J N Judge *

A. Scope of "faith"

ALTHOUGH Part I of this article, in the previous issue, focused on the Parliament of the World's Religions (Chicago, 1993) as a major inter-faith event, "faith" can usefully be understood in a broader sense than in relation to religion. Dialogue is a challenge in many arenas where the entrenched "beliefs", "faiths" or "religions" may correspond to political or ideological factions, philosophies, management styles, cultural biases, or even aesthetic preferences. During the Global Forum, on the occasion of the Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), this challenge was explored in an Inter-Sectoral Dialogue bringing together sectors such as science, religion, labour, industry, environment, and the like (1). Representatives of particular sectors may hold to their ideological faith as strongly as adherents of a particular religion. Dialogue in an inter-religious context may therefore have learnings for other arenas, as is true of the reverse. The point is best reinforced by Kinhide Mushakoji's study of *Global Issues and Interparadigmatic Dialogue: essays on multipolar politics* (2).

B. Exploring the future of "inter-faith" dialogue

Faced with the apparent success of the Parliament of the World's Religions (Chicago, 1993), and from the upbeat reporting in its *Sourcebook* (3) on the many past and present inter-faith initiatives, it might well be asked whether there are any doubts as to the appropriateness of inter-faith strategies and visions. What is to be made of the plethora of well-meaning declarations with no institutional consequences? There is a danger of these pious efforts becoming a dubious characteristic of the inter-faith movement. Is there not a severe danger of self-satisfaction and complacency — reinforced by somewhat desperate attempts at celebration of mutuality and consensus? Is there not a danger, characteristic of religious movements, of wallowing in hope in order to avoid addressing the knotty issues of their own relationships in new ways? This tendency can be manipulated by those who are basically content with the status quo and have no real vision for new patterns of relationship.

The organizers in Chicago were strangely lax in failing to produce any concept papers to aid discussion of the future of such events, including the envisaged institutionalization of the Parliament. The only efforts made in this direction were those collected for the *Sourcebook* (3). Typically these would be high on inspiration and low on the modalities through which reality could be given to such enthusiasm other than in the simplest sense.

The intent in the following paragraphs is to endeavour to reframe the challenge of dialogue by distinguishing forms which are essentially tokenistic or minimalistic from those which should be able to open up new possibilities. The difficulty is that the latter are easily obscured by the enthusiasms, low expectations and self-congratulatory nature of the former. Only through such distinctions does it seem possible to identify the genuinely new frontiers where pioneering work is called for and to envision the future possibilities and challenges in that context.

C. Attitudes towards dialogue

It is perhaps useful to cluster types of dialogue in terms of the following attitudes:

- (a) those groups who simply do not favour dialogue. In the case of spiritual or religious groups, this may follow directly from the sense that once one holds the truth, or is following the most appropriate path, interaction with those in error, or going in the wrong direction, can only be counter-productive.
- (b) those groups who favour minimalistic dialogue, possibly only to avoid being labelled as isolationists. This position is clearly important to groups concerned to leave some possibilities open, as well as to those anxious to position themselves in the best fight in relation to perspectives which might otherwise appear more attractive.
- (c) those groups who favour and initiate dialogue on their own terms in order better to demonstrate the prime role of their own belief system. Dialogue is then envisaged in two stages: establishment of a pattern of communication apparently characterized by symmetry and equality; then use of that pattern unilaterally to communicate the essential truths. This form of dialogue is favoured by Christian ecumenical movements and in Muslim invitations to dialogue.

* Union of International Associations

(1) Anthony J N Judge, *Configuring Globally and Contending Locally: shaping the global network of local bargains by decoding and mapping Earth Summit inter-sectoral issues* (Background document for the Inter-Sectoral Dialogue, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992), Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1992.

(2) Kinhide Mushakoji, *Global Issues and Interparadigmatic Dialogue: essays on multipolar politics*, Torino, Albert Meynier, 1988.

(3) Joel Beversluis (Ed.) *A Sourcebook for the Community of Religions*, Chicago, Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions (P O Box 1630, Chicago IL 60690-1630, USA; \$18.00 for non-USA orders).

(d) those groups who are content to engage in any dialogue process, but without any expectation that it should be especially challenging or that it should progress beyond peer bonding and celebrations of mutuality.

(e) those groups who believe that progress in the quality and challenges of inter-faith dialogue can lead to the emergence of new patterns of understanding and organization of relevance to society at large.

The Chicago event, as with many inter-faith, inter-sectoral and inter-cultural initiatives, seems to have responded primarily to those of Type (d), although (c) and (b) would necessarily have participated. Thus the advice on inter-faith dialogue in the *Sourcebook* responds to the needs of those in (d). The Bangalore meeting, which immediately preceded it, is more likely to have emphasized Type (e). It is ways of envisioning Type (e) forms of dialogue which are called for in order to move beyond enthusiastic celebration of underachievement

(4) David Bohm. *Unfolding Meaning*. Mickleton, Foundation, House, 1985.

(5) David Bohm. *Changing Consciousness: freeing ourselves from the social, political and environmental crises*. San Francisco, Harper, 1991.

(6) William N Isaacs. *Dialogue Project Summary*. Cambridge, MIT, The Dialogue Project, 1992.

(7) Carl R Rogers. *Freedom to Learn for the Eighties*. New York, Macmillan, 1983.

(8) M Scott Peck. *Different Drum: community making and world peace*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987.

(9) Richard Chasin et al (Eds). *One Couple, Four Realities: multiple perspectives on couple therapy*. Guilford Press, 1992.

(10) Leonard Swidler et al. *Death or Dialogue?: from the age of monologue to the age of dialogue*. London, SCM Press, 1990.

(11) Anthony J N Judge. *Liberation of Integration: universality and concord, through pattern, oscillation, harmony and embodiment*. Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1980.

D. Models of dialogue

The exploration of dialogue is becoming of increasing interest — indeed there is already a need for dialogue between the competing approaches to dialogue. The Quakers have long established the importance of "gathered meetings", although even they have critics concerned at a certain complacency. David Bohm (4, 5) and Patrick de Maré each initiated experiments in dialogue which have recently become a basis for a Dialogue Project at MIT. This project is concerned with "generative dialogue as collective creation". Its director, William Isaacs, usefully distinguishes this emphasis from those associated with other models of dialogue (6):

- "therapeutic" models using the group as the vehicle through which individuals may develop (David Bohm and Patrick de Maré)
- "community building" models designed to foster a sense of shared community and mutual understanding (as advocated by Carl Rogers (7) and Scott Peck (8)),
- "negotiation" models in which efforts are made to produce mutual understanding among people holding radically different perspectives (Chasin (9))

• "hermeneutic" models of social constructionists that focus on the ability to create reality through shared meaning construction through generative metaphor.

However what remains unclear (even for Type (e) above), is how different levels or qualities of dialogue might usefully be distinguished. Leonard Swidler and others, in their dialogue on dialogue conclude that "The differences among us are partly because we each have a very different 'feel' for the words involved, but probably even more because we were speaking of different stages in the dialogue and at times had different dialogue participants in mind." (10, p. 148).

E. Levels of dialogue

What does it mean when a dialogue becomes "deeper", more profound or more significant? This can perhaps best be explored through a metaphor that clarifies possible steps in the evolution of dialogue. There may be a case, taking an Eastern martial art like aikido as a metaphor, for distinguishing different levels of proficiency in dialogue — up to a "black belt" — and bearing in mind the progression of philosophical and attitudinal subtleties in responding to an "opponent" ! Shifting metaphors, perhaps there is a case for a dialogue equivalent to a "golf handicap" to constrain the undisciplined and to provide a "level table" (to use a phrase vital to a stage in the Middle East peace process).

Alternatively, a musical metaphor could be used in different ways. One way is to take the stages in the historical development of musical harmony as representing stages in the complexification and enrichment of dialogue as an exercise in social harmony (11). This could give rise to a sequence of levels such as the following:

Level 7: Singing in unison, based on scales (Ancient Greece)

Level 2: Use of any of 12 scale patterns of tones with characteristic functions (6th to 9th century)

Level 3: Acceptance of only simplest "perfect" harmonic ratios, allowing the addition of one or two exactly parallel voices, that later acquired melodic independence (9th century)

Level 4: Acceptance of other intervals and the development beyond 3-part scoring (12th to 15th century)

Level 5: Breakdown of the distinction between the 12 classical modes, foreshadowing the major/minor system (15th century)

Level 6: Focus on the keynote as the point of departure and arrival in a composition (16th century)

Level 7: Emphasis on expressive melodic line harmonically underpinned by a baseline generating forces upon which harmonies were built (17th century)

Level 8: Deliberate use of unresolved harmonies and of ambiguous chords (19th century)

Level 9:...

Is it possible that the Chicago efforts towards a global ethic were trapped in an understanding of harmony that dates back to Ancient Greece?

A related approach would be to consider a metaphor based on :

Level 7: Monotone (enunciation of single pattern of values, drowning out or ignoring all others)

Level 2: Competing monotones (recognition of discordant patterns of values)

Level 3: Responding tones (contrasting values responding to each other in some measure)

Level 4: Runs of tones... simple melodies (highlighting of sequences of values in resonance one with another)

Level 5: Isolated chords (harmonious value complexes and combinations)

Level 6: Sequences of chords (sequences of value complexes, providing a context for those of a more discordant nature)

Level 7:...

The focus is here on the Western concept of music. That of the East opens the ways to seeking parallels with developments in modes of awareness which can allow the presence of elements of an apparently higher degree of incompatibility.

In both cases levels are not "superseded" through such development. Each always has its value. But at the "deeper" or "higher" levels there is greater richness. The context for any item included from a "lower" level then becomes of greater significance. At the higher levels, it is how lower level contributions to the dialogue are combined with others that is more significant than the specific quality of that contribution. As with music, the power and genius of a piece of dialogue comes from the overall pattern of combinations. At the higher levels this may appear increasingly

chaotic, but is increasingly capable of holding the degree of order found in nature. Lower levels of dialogue tend to be mechanistic, where the higher levels depend on aesthetically significant patterns of associations. Of course, from a lower level, any pattern connecting elements of significance at a higher level would necessarily be a challenge to comprehension.

There is learning too in the way people cluster themselves in their appreciation of music. There are subtleties to which music enthusiasts respond, even to the point of being fanatically snobbish about them. There are varieties of popular music which arouse deep enthusiasm, however much they horrify others. The varieties of dialogue will cluster groups in this way also. "Classical" dialogue will have its place as a complement to "Popular" dialogue — and what of "Hard Rock" dialogue or "Country and Western"? It is no coincidence, in terms of this metaphor, that the values to which the young are exposed tend currently to be most effectively articulated through musical lyrics — and this includes the notions of peace and love so emphasized in the Chicago Parliament.

F. Mapping the inter-faith space

In some respects the richness of the Chicago 'Sourcebook' (3) makes for depressing reading. How is it that so many laudable groups have undertaken so many valuable initiatives with so little consequence — especially for such inter-religious conflicts as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kashmir and the Sudan ?

Each initiative seems to be undertaken without accounting for earlier or parallel initiatives. Granted this can all be seen as a case of many species in an evolving ecosystem of initiatives. But is there really no interest in mapping out that ecosystem a little more systematically? Where does each initiative "fit" on the inter-faith map ? What ensures the coherence of the relationships amongst certain initiatives and the isolation of others?

In music there is a case for discovering the range of notes and how they may be organized into octaves, chords and the like. The range of instruments and the kinds of sound they make can also be distributed onto a map. Is there not a

case for doing the same with the range of religions and spiritual disciplines — however challenging the task may be, and however crude the first maps might be ?

Such maps would make apparent the other "continents" and regions of spiritual experience of which each was relatively unaware. Distances and intervening "oceans" would mark the greater challenges to inter-faith dialogue — just as the length of trade routes has always marked the more challenging forms of trade. If the Chicago vision is for a United Nations of Religions, then a prerequisite is such a map of the world of spirituality to show the territories to be represented in such a global body.

There is much information from which to build maps of this kind. The editors of *Hinduism Today*, represented in the Assembly, devoted three years to work in this direction — and are adapting their work to sophisticated computer displays. As mentioned above, the database of the *Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential* (12) has extended the coverage to every possible spiritual and psychological discipline associated with human development. As with the history of maps, it is the art of putting together meaningful maps which needs to be explored.

It is with such maps that better "music" can be designed to articulate the patterns of inter-faith insights. With such maps, and a more humble attitude to the unexplored levels of dialogue, the challenges of facilitating more fruitful dynamics for a body like the Assembly can be explored — in order to ensure the integration of insights at a higher order of consensus.

G. "Levels" of dialogue

Efforts towards constructing such maps seem to have got stuck in distinguishing "levels", and in responding to the twin challenges of "syncretism" and "exclusivism", vital not only from a Christian perspective but also wherever an established school of thought is concerned at the dilution or adulteration of its hard-earned truths. There is also fascination with the nature of any "underlying unity" or of some "common ground" (10, 13). Thus David Lochhead (13), in considering the stages of inter-faith encounter, distinguishes the following progression :

- a condition of isolation (in which no alternative perspective is encountered)
- a condition of hostility (in which other perspectives are demonized)
- a condition of competition (in which the differences from other perspectives are stressed in order to establish their inferiority)
- a condition of partnership (in which differences are perceived as secondary to similarities, stressing underlying unity).

He sees these levels as continued through a series of progressively more refined approaches to dialogue :

- dialogue as a means of conversion (of the other, necessarily perceived as in need of converting), in which each essentially competes with the other
- dialogue as a negotiation, in which the aim is agreement, and the search for "common ground" (which may be reduced to a lowest common denominator, and is vulnerable to the accusation of syncretism)
- dialogue as the search for mutual understanding, without necessarily seeking agreement
- dialogue as integration, through which perspective is obtained on the weak points of one's own views and the strengths of the other's, with acquisition of facility in the categories of the other's framework leading to a more profound way of experiencing one's own
- dialogue as activity, in which those involved together discover forms of understanding which none had known before, namely a movement "beyond dialogue" in which there is mutual transformation.

It can be readily assumed that better dialogue would occur between those of greater maturity in their respective faiths. And indeed the above sequence bears comparison with Michael Jacobs (14) very useful review of the stages of faith as explored in a major research project by James Fowler (15), that drew upon the cognitive development work of Jean Piaget, the psycho-social development model of Erik Erikson (16), and the moral development scheme proposed by L. Kohlberg (17). Fowler's scheme gives seven levels; primal faith, intuitive-projective faith, mythic-literal faith, synthetic-conventional faith, individualistic-reflective faith, conjunctive faith, and universalizing faith.

Erikson's work, and those of his interpreters such as David Capps (18), see such stages as

- (12) Union of International Associations. *Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential*. München, K G Saur Verlag, 1994, 4th ed.
- (13) David Lochhead. *The Dialogical Imperative; a Christian reflection on inter-faith encounter*. London, SCM Press, 1988.
- (14) Michael Jacobs. *Living Illusions; a psychology of belief*. London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1993.
- (15) J W Fowler. *Stages of Faith: the psychology of human development and the quest for meaning*. San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1981.
- (16) Erik Erikson. *Identity, Youth and Crisis*. London, Faber, 1968.
- (17) L. Kohlberg. *The Philosophy of Moral Development*. San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1981.
- (18) David Capps. *Deadly Sins and Saving Virtues*. Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1987.

related to chronological age, although they are not necessarily age specific. It has been suggested that the ages of individual development are related to factors which can be applied more universally to the development of a mature society. To each of his ages corresponds a developmental challenge or dilemma which can be seen as related to some of the issues of dialogue noted above :

- oral-sensory age: trust vs. mistrust
- anal-muscular age: autonomy vs. shame
- locomotor-genital age : initiative vs. guilt
- latency age: industry vs. inferiority
- adolescence : identity vs. role confusion
- young adulthood : intimacy vs isolation
- adulthood: generativity vs. stagnation
- maturity: ego integrity vs. despair.

Jacobs' own stages of belief is a reinterpretation of the above into : trust and dependency, authority and autonomy, cooperation and competition, complexity and simplicity.

H. "Levels" as traps : beyond linearity

The level approach has been criticized by feminist scholars, notably Carol Gilligan (19, 20), for being gender biased in its uni-directionality. It is argued that women are less concerned with rules and more with relationships, with where actions might lead and with the history behind moral dilemmas. Emphasis on levels de-emphasizes the degree of connectedness experienced by women. Cognitively, levels may thus be seen as a metaphorical trap.

The need to see different "levels" as each providing its own valid framework, between which it is important to be able to shift flexibly, is stressed by another female scholar J Hemenway (21) in her description of four complementary faith frameworks. Jacobs endorses this principle although pointing to resemblances between such frameworks and the kinds of stage distinguished above. He stresses that her approach is not developmental in nature. There is no sense in which someone moves 'back' or 'forward' between stages that would imply a value judgement that one framework is more 'healthy' than another. He also points to the efforts of Don Cupitt (22) to produce a kind of non-linear "metro-map" interrelating 16 religious approaches.

For Jacobs, "if the wish for order draws us toward linear models, it is important to emphasize that at whatever stage a person is, especially in terms of their psychology of belief, none is any 'beter' or 'worse' than another. The only qualification to this is that within each stage some forms of belief appear to be more positive for psychological health than others." (p.52)

I. Mapping forms and opportunities for dialogue

There is the clear implication that dialogues of different quality and consequence could be associated with distinct conditions, whether considered as stages or frameworks. But the dangers of focusing on "higher level" dialogue, at the expense of others forms, derive from the failure to recognize the functions of each kind of dialogue and how they complement each other within society.

Jacobs points to the wide acceptance achieved by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (23), designed by two women based on the work of Carl Jung. This effectively provides a 4x4 square of 16 places denoting different categories of temperament (24). No developmental linear progression is suggested. Also arousing much interest is the framework of 9 conditions provided by the distinctly non-linear enneagram (25). Users are encouraged to work with the challenges of their own condition in relation to those of others they encounter, and to broaden their range of responses. A rich system was developed by the Institute of Cultural Affairs as an international community in which the idea of a never-ending journey between 16 conditions was emphasized (26). It is also appropriate to mention the remarkable significance attached to the Chinese *Book of Changes* (27) as perhaps the most sophisticated mapping of relationships between a variety of human conditions and dilemmas.

Clearly one of the most conveniently comprehensible forms of map, as a step beyond linearity, is a tabular presentation like that of Myers-Briggs. It is therefore worth speculating on the possibilities of representing the variety of opportunities for dialogue on a surface resembling the classical board game common to many cultures. Clues to the organization of such a mapping might be :

- (19) Carol Gilligan. In a Different Voice : psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, Harvard university Press, 1982.
 (20) Carol Gilligan et al. (Eds). Mapping the Moral Domain. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990.
 (21) J Hemenway. Four faith frameworks. Journal of Pastoral Care, 38, 1984, 4, pp 317-23.
 (22) D Cupitt. Life Lines. London, SCM Press, 1986.
 (23) Isabel Briggs Myers and Mary H McCauley. Manual : a guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, Consulting Psychologists Press, 1985.
 (24) Otto Kroeger and Janet M Thuesen. Type Talk. New York, Delta, 1988.
 (25) Helen Palmer. The Enneagram. Harper and Row, San Francisco, 1988.
 (26) Jon Jenkins (Ed). The Other World: a spirit journey. Brussels, Institute of Cultural Affairs, 1987.
 (27) Richard Wilhelm (Tr). The I Ching or Book of Changes. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950.

- board games like chess and draughts suggest ways of seeing relationships between "opposing" dialogue partners. The games constrain the ability of each to move in relation to the other. The "developmental" value of "levels" is still present, with notions of lines and angles of advance and retreat, advantage and disadvantage, challenge and threat, that are experienced in dialogue. Particular pieces or positions may be "lost" or "taken".

- such board games have been extensively used in Buddhist and related traditions as a complement to religious education. Players move over the board between conditions ("heavens", "hells", etc) in a manner somewhat similar to "snakes and ladders" (28). Here each position is uniquely identified, possibly by illustration, as are the inscribed pieces in a game such as mahjong or the areas of a mandala. The Transformation Game developed at the Findhorn Foundation is a recent innovation with related intentions.

- qualities of space occupation and encirclement are admirably represented in games such as go. The transformation and interpenetration of spaces is elegantly represented by some of the morphing drawings of M C Escher — a technique now highly developed on computers.

- one traditional presentation of the 64 different conditions identified by the *Book of Changes* is a square 8x8 pattern. It is worth recalling the number of studies that have explored the use of its binary coding pattern, notably in relation to the genetic code (29) and the specificity of certain key amino acids. Seemingly unrelated is the remarkable identification by Buddhists of the network of 64 possible philosophical viewpoints (30).

- the computer-based game of "life" has proved to be a very thought provoking illustration of how patterns emerge, grow, move, evolve and decay over a surface similar to that of the board games described above (31). This has been valuable in the study of chaotic systems.

J. Dialogue as flow and transition

To facilitate dialogue, there may be a very strong case for avoiding the trap of imposing a pattern of definitively labelled conditions. Part of the process of dialogue is working with the stereotyped labels that one side needs to attempt to impose on the other. Indeed much of the

manoeuvring for advantage in dialogue lies in the effort to "corner" the other in some pattern of labels through which he or she may be conveniently handled. One can speculate on the nature of a board game reflecting this. Those struggling with each other in the dialogue might for example "freeze" temporarily the significance of some board positions by consensus. More intriguingly in the absence of such consensus, other positions might be given double labels, reflecting both the positive connotations of the occupier as well as the negative connotations of the adversary experiencing that position as challenging his own.

Allusions have been made to the possible nature of such rule-shifting games in novels such as Herman Hesse's *Glass Bead Game*, or M A Foster's *The Game Players of Zan*. From such a perspective, each of the efforts to distinguish levels could be seen by dialogue partners as conceptual resources that could potentially be imposed on the board during the course of the dialogue. Such a dialogue then has the potential for being continually transformed between different kinds of game. The dialogue is refreshingly defined in terms of a set of transitional objects (32). Different "light" filters or logics can be used to view the game or communication space, just as different keys (or even scales) can be used for musical expression (33).

Other clues to representing the forms and challenges of dialogue are suggested by frameworks like the periodic table of chemical elements. This is organized into columnar "groups" and row "levels" which effectively identify cellular "elements" with particular qualities. It thus highlights the possibility of development from "lighter" to "heavier" elements, as well as the emergence of the electrochemically "positive" and "negative". Such terms are of course used to distinguish different kinds of dialogue. Of special interest is the implication that suitably distant positions might "strongly" or "weakly" interact to form more or less stable configurations based on strong or weak "bonds". Physicists and chemists have long pursued the possibilities of very heavy elements, whilst appreciating the role of the lightest in the sustenance of life. Some of the social implications of such an ordering have been explored by Ed Haskell (34). A framework based on this approach is used for the functional interrelationship of international organizations (35).

(28) Harish Johari. *Leela: the game of self-knowledge*. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
 (29) Martin Schonberger. *I Ching and the Genetic Code*. Aurora Press, 1992.
 (30) Bhikku Bodhi (Tr). *The Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views; the Brahmajala Sutta and its commentarial exegesis*. Kandy, Buddhist Publications, 1978.
 (31) Manfred Eigen and RUTH Winkler. *Laws of the Game; how the principles of nature govern chance*. New York, Harper, 1981.
 (32) D W Winnicott. *Playing and Reality*. London, Penguin, 1974.
 (33) Ernest G McClain. *The Myth of Invariance*. Boulder, Shambhala, 1978.
 (34) Edward Haskell. *Full Circle: the moral force of unified science*. New York, Gordon and Breach, 1972.
 (35) Anthony J N Judge. *Functional classification; a review of possibilities*. In: Union of International Associations. *Global Action Networks*. München, K G Saur, 1985, pp 1029-1047.

- (56) Meredith Belbin. *Management Teams: why they succeed or fail*. London, Heinemann, 1981.
- (57) Jon R Katzenbach and D K Smith. *The Wisdom of Teams: creating the high-performance organization*. Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1993.
- (58) Anthony J N Judge. *From Networking to Tensegrity Organization*. Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1984.
- (59) Stafford Beer. *Beyond Dispute*. New York, Wiley, 1994?
- (40) P W Stephens. *Physics and Chemistry of Fullerenes*. New York, World Scientific Publishing, 1992.
- (41) Ronnie Lessem and Fred Neubauer. *European Management Systems: towards unity out of cultural diversity*. London, McGraw Hill, 1993.
- (42) Richard Pascale. *Managing on the Edge: how successful companies use conflict to stay ahead*. London, Penguin, 1990.
- (43) Léon F. Seltzer. *Paradoxical Strategies in Psychotherapy: a comprehensive overview and guidebook*. New York, Wiley, 1986.
- (44) Bill Mollison. *Permaculture: a designers' manual*. Tyalgum (Australia), Tagari Publications, 1988.
- (45) Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. *Flow: the psychology of optimal experience*. New York, Harper, 1990.
- (46) Anthony J N Judge. *Higher Orders of Inter-sectoral Consensus: clarification of formal possibilities*. Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1992.
- (47) Edward Aldwell and C Schacter. *Harmony and Voice Leading*. San Diego, Harcourt, Brace, 1989.

Such clues point to forms of dialogue that would not be dependent for their dynamic on any convergence towards consensus (or away from it). As suggested by the computer game of life, stable configurations could emerge for a time, but they might also slowly migrate and develop across a framework of significance. As in many inter-personal relationships, they would be significant for a duration. Some of the above pointers suggest possibilities of "collaborative" games through which richer and more complex patterns get built through the dialogue process. Research on team building, and the variety of skills required (36,37), suggest that these could be fruitfully associated with columns or rows of the table. Much remains to be discovered from the transition from a 2-dimensional table to a 3-dimensional map, as explored elsewhere (38, 39) and as suggested by the recent explosion of interest in fullerenes (40). The implications for management processes crossing cultural divides are especially relevant (41).

Many inter-personal relationships founder on obsession with togetherness, and its claustrophobic consequences for one or other partner. The challenge of relationships between kibbutz children is one example. It may well be that dialogue needs to free itself from the obsession with consensus as the holy grail of dialogue. Conflict is now being creatively explored by major corporations (42). In terms of Zen-style challenging paradoxes (43), it may well be that the art of fruitful dialogue lies in avoiding the stultifying consequences of agreement. The challenge of sustainable dialogue (as opposed to "cash cropping" through consensual dialogue) may require understandings analogous to those for sustainable development as exemplified by permaculture (44). What does it take to sustain dialogue? Like the grail, perhaps sustainable consensus is far more mysterious than is naively assumed. Why does dialogue stop when it does? Are there more profound meanings to "flow" in dialogue (45). Reframing dialogue as suggested above might also counter the tendency for certain dialogues to meander endlessly without constraint, as has been apparent in David Bohm's experiments.

K. Towards higher orders of consensus : freeing the voices

The above framework might be used to examine what was attempted in the Chicago Assembly process in endeavouring to manoeuvre participants into signature of the *Global Ethic*. As a parenthetical note, it is interesting that portions of that declaration were read to the Assembly using alternate male and female voices. The written declaration could however be compared to a plainsong chant from which any form of polyphony was absent. The organizers did however want the participants to furnish a chorus line ("*Peace, Peace— We agree, We agree!*"). As such, the design of the declaration is clearly relatively simple, if not simplistic, in terms of the musical metaphor outlined above. Leaders, and especially spiritual leaders, do not like to sing in chorus lines or to be part of backing vocals. That is not why they are leaders.

A more interesting form of declaration, in terms of the musical metaphor, would not have sought immediate concord between the "voices" represented by the different factions at the Assembly. Rather the declaration would have been designed to allow the different voices to challenge each other, exploring various possibilities of harmony and discord between them — using new discords to force the articulation of more profound harmonies (33, 46). Any group of composers or musicians could articulate a wealth of interesting possibilities (47). The declaration would then have taken the form of a shared journey in which each voice could be allowed a measure of "dominance" for a time. The "ethic" is then given form as a dynamic process rather than as a static end state, as a dynamic pattern of relationships rather than a static set of rules.

The theory of musical harmony suggests many possibilities for resolving the differences between voices through the text as a whole. The strength of this approach is that the identities of the different factional perspectives are not lost in a univocal "consensus" document. The discipline of designing a declaration, that could be "sung" in polyphony or "played" by a variety of instruments, would ensure its far wider dissemination than as a legalistic text or press communiqué. (Al Huang was so frustrated with the poetic inadequacies of the *Global Ethic* text in the Assembly,

that he said he could dance it better!) Adherents of each religion could then follow through the explorations of "their voice" and the challenges to it by the other partners in the ethical ecosystem — adding their own chorus lines if they so wished.

If different styles of music and musical values tend to be favoured by different cultures, is it any surprise that the same might be true of ethical values? If each religion or ideological faction is perceived as a musical instrument, with certain musical strengths and weaknesses, how can the most valued music be created from a group of such instruments? It would be a foolish loss of richness for them all to do the same thing. As an instrument, there are dimensions that "Christianity" can best explore, just as there are others best explored by "Buddhism" or "Islam". Management is coming to this realization (41). Chicago gathered some 40 main religions with a further 200 variants — the resources for a truly magnificent choral symphony, if ways could but be found to evoke the music from them (or through them). The challenge is to bring out the points of resonance and dissonance so as to enrich their interplay, rather than to seek simplistically to eliminate all dissonance. The music provides coherence through which the pattern of differences is "held". As noted by Leonard Swidler, as for Arnold Toynbee, "if the distinct melodies of each religion of the world could be played together, they would make for more harmony than cacophony" (10, p. 86). Why not explore this metaphor more seriously?

It is worth remembering that religions have in the past severely condemned particular styles of music, and even particular chords (*diabolus in musica*), because they did not reflect some simplistic notion of harmony. Is the *Global Ethic*, as currently conceived, not an effort to do just that? Surely what is required is an ethical presentation that honours the differences and justifies them within a larger context. It is the articulation of that context that constitutes the much-sought new paradigm. It can only be effectively articulated by using both what makes religions different and what makes them appeal differently to different cultures, rather than by simply building on commonalities. How dull and alienating music would be if it only used what was common to all cultures!

Recent years have dramatically highlighted

the ineffectual nature of policies and structures based on consensus — especially when confronted with fundamental dilemmas and radically opposed alternatives as in Bosnia. Just as significant dialogue cannot effectively be sustained without significant differences, there is a case for exploring ways of configuring and using differences regarding sustainable policies. The comprehension of more challenging approaches to dialogue, as suggested above, provides a way of evoking the new styles of comprehension required in policy-making and coalition design where differences are intractable and likely to remain so.

L. No doubt? No dialogue!

At an event such as the Parliament, it is useful to be sensitive to four modes, which everyone can get into, although some may be primarily characterized by only one of them:

- (a) Participating to teach: characteristic of presenters, spiritual leaders, and many others who actively wish to convey information from their experience, and to be seen to do so.
- (b) Participating to learn: characteristic of many who wish to hear from presenters and spiritual leaders in order to benefit from their experience.
- (c) Participating to exchange information: characteristic of the networking mode.
- (d) Participating to share doubts: characteristic of those who have discovered the limitations of both the teaching and the learning roles, and the communications they encourage.

"Doubt sharing" is exemplified by a parable offered by a member of the Parliament Board of Trustees: A man is lost deep in the woods. In his futile search for a way out, he comes upon another man and seeks his assistance. The other man replies: "Do not take the way I have for it will surely lead you astray. Now, let us seek to find the right way together."

Unfortunately the Parliament proved to be an exercise in presenting certainties (Mode a) and learning of them (Mode b). Information exchange (Mode c) was suppressed. And no process was developed to work collectively with uncertainty to uncover new routes forward (Mode d). It is from the combination of this Mode (d) with dialogue Type (e), at "higher" levels of dialogue, that the real opportunities for the future will emerge.

(48) John Cobb Jr. *Beyond Dialogue: toward a mutual transformation of Christianity and Buddhism*. Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1982.

(49) World Council of Churches. *Guidelines for dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies*. Geneva, WCC, 1979.

(50) Raimondo Panikkar. *The Intra-religious Dialogue*. New York, Paulist Press, 1978.

(51) John A T Robinson. *Truth is Two-Eyed*. London, SCM Press, 1979.

The Nonprofit Sector in East Central Europe

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for commissioning this study. We owe particular gratitude to Lynn Andersen, Colin Campbell, Hugh Law-son, William Moody, Nancy Muirhead, Russell Phillips, Ben Shute, and Anne Suessbrick, whose support and guidance made this project an enriching endeavour. We extend our tremendous appreciation for the hundreds of individuals whose ideas and insights expressed during extended interviews form the basis of this report. Special thanks go to the many Central Europeans who took valuable time out of their important work to inform this study. We are particularly grateful to Eva Kuti for providing insightful comments and suggestions, and to Eva Bertram for thoughtful copyediting assistance. Finally, we want to thank the following people for their logistical assistance: Judit Acsady, Bebe Anderson, Anita Balaton, Ed and Miriam Becker, Hogan Bell, Adam Blaszcak, Joyce Brody, Katalin Ertsey, Misa Filipová, Noemi Hernandez, Eleanor Hill, Mary Hill, Steve Keihner, Arlene Kline, Zlata, Kate, and Lucy Křiváňová, Kasia Lerch, Nubia Omega, Ann Philbin, Bryant Reed, Jana Ryslinkova, Anna Samborska, Peter Schere, Zuzana Szatmary, Mayra Valenzuela, Karen Waller, Jacek Woyonowski, and Weezie Yancey-Siegel. Reproduced by permission of the editors.

© Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Foreword

SINCE 1989, the grantmaking of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund relating to East Central Europe has had a central focus support for the development of nonprofit sectors in the region. This development process, which had been underway over much of the preceding decade, saw dissidents, dissatisfied students and other citizens' groups organizing themselves, often quite informally and seldom with the benefit of financial resources, to address particular societal needs perceived as calling for urgent attention.

Given the extraordinary political, economic and social change that has taken place in East Central Europe over the last three years, the trustees of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund believe it is important and timely to make a current assessment of the role nonprofit organizations are now playing, and of the challenges they face, in the countries in the region where the Fund has been most active: Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. We invited Jenny Yancey and Daniel Siegel to conduct this study because of their familiarity with the region and, in particular, their earlier work identifying young men and women who are emerging as leaders in this historic time. We were confident that they had the experience, the sensitivity and the credibility to carry out this assignment successfully. We believe they have done so.

In the United States and Western Europe, Ms. Yancey and Mr. Siegel have relied principally on more than 200 interviews with foundation officials, leaders of non-governmental organizations and representatives of government agencies actively involved with issues relating to East Central Europe. In addition, they made a six-week study trip to Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to meet with leaders of non-governmental organizations, government officials, journalists and academics — approximately 250 in all. They also reviewed the relatively limited amount of written material on the subject.

This report contains the authors' sober assessment of the challenges and opportunities

facing the nonprofit sectors in these emerging democracies and suggests areas where Western assistance has been constructive as well as those in which it has been less helpful and perhaps even counter-productive. The authors then make twelve specific, and, in some cases, provocative recommendations for concrete action by foundations and others who want to be usefully involved in what has become a vital component of the democratization effort.

We believe that Jenny Yancey and Dan Siegel have been insightful and highly effective in describing and analyzing the emergence of voluntary sectors in Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic since the revolutions of 1989. These developments have occurred in rapidly changing conditions at first by a determined effort to replace an all-powerful state which had long been the sole arbiter of social, economic and political change, and then by the challenging search for the proper balance between an effective but limited state and autonomous groups in civil society. When considered in this context, the prospects for, and limits to, constructive Western engagement become all the more complex.

It is our hope at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund that this study will provide useful guidance for our grant programs and will inform the work of other Western foundations and non-governmental organizations as they consider their activities in the region. We also hope that it represents a means not only for citizens from the region to express their views but also to reflect on how they might participate with maximum effectiveness in enhancing the role of nonprofit organizations in their countries.

As a final note, to ensure the intellectual freedom of Ms. Yancey and Mr. Siegel, it was agreed at the commencement of this study that its contents and conclusions would be understood as solely those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Colin G. Campbell
President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund
December 1992

Author's Note

For the purposes of this study, the use of the terms "East Central Europe" (ECE) and "Central Europeans" refers to the countries and citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (ČSFR), Hungary, and Poland. At the time of this writing (November 1992), the ČSFR was preparing to divide into two countries at the start of 1993. The nations under review are often referred to as the northern tier states of Eastern and Central Europe, as distinct from the Balkan countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and its former republics. The scope of this study was necessarily limited by time and resources, thus prohibiting a comprehensive analysis of nonprofit, organizational development throughout the seven nations that broadly constitute Eastern and Central Europe.

We recognize that the preponderance of Western aid and attention — aside from the worldwide focus on the tragic conflict in Yugoslavia — is now concentrated on the northern tier. Although the Balkans are outside the purview of this report, we hope that readers bear in mind the critical importance of the development of nonprofit, civic initiatives in the southern tier nations. We also hope that this report — and our recommendations — will shed some light on concerns and dynamics that may be common to the emerging nonprofit sectors in those countries as well as the emerging nation-states of the former Soviet Union.

While using the term East Central Europe, we recognize that the ČSFR, Hungary, and Poland are quite distinct countries, with critically different historical paths and political cultures. Where possible, we attempt to make necessary distinctions. However, given the common history

of the past 45 years under communism, the recent growth of the nonprofit sectors, and the largely similar role played by the West regarding nonprofit development in each country, our study is not organized by country. While in some sections each nation is dealt with individually, much of our analytical writing refers to development trends common to the ČSFR, Hungary, and Poland, with appropriate caveats where necessary.

Although this study uses the term "Western assistance" to ECE, our reference point is largely the United States, with lesser attention to Western Europe. Much of our analysis, however, regarding Western assistance can often be applied to both U.S. and West European initiatives: where necessary, we attempt to be clear about where they differ. We should note that Central Europeans interviewed for this report were asked to comment on assistance provided by both West European and U.S. initiatives. This effort anticipates other studies to provide an in-depth assessment of Western Europe's role vis-a-vis Central Europe's third sector.

The terms nonprofit, charitable, third sector, voluntary sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often used interchangeably by individuals and institutions worldwide. This creates confusion during exchanges between North Americans, Western and Central Europeans. This study most often uses the phrases "nonprofits" or "nonprofit sector" to describe the wide range of non-governmental foundations, associations, and organizations which are independent of the State and which are not principally involved in business or commercial activity. Such organizations are involved in areas ranging from education and social welfare to human rights and the environment.

The Role of the Nonprofit Sector and Civil Society

Within East Central (ECE) (1), the nonprofit sector is often understood as part of an emerging civil society. The term "civil society" was popularized by the democratic opposition movements in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), Hungary, and Poland in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Through a strategy of "social self-organization" emphasizing change from below, these movements sought to emancipate civic values and grassroots activities long suppressed by the pervasive party-state system. The revival of civil society saw the blossoming of independent organizations, initiatives, and movements which repopulated the almost barren political and social landscape, and helped to spark the dramatic citizen revolutions of 1989.

These democratic breakthroughs underscored the importance of creating, in the words of Hungarian philosopher István Bibó, "small circles of freedom" capable of overcoming the region's feudal past and communist systems. The promise of the post-communist era rests largely on the potential for creating a more vibrant and deeply rooted network of organizations and institutions that mediate between the citizen and the State: the connective tissue of a democratic political culture. (2) Such organizations serve several essential functions:

- Providing a means for expressing and actively addressing the varied and complex needs of society.
- Motivating individuals to act as citizens in all aspects of society rather than bowing to or depending on state power and beneficence.
- Promoting pluralism and diversity in society, such as protecting and strengthening cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic (and other) identities.
- Creating an alternative to centralized state agencies for providing services with greater independence and flexibility.
- Establishing the mechanisms by which government and the market can be held accountable by the public.

The events of 1989 provided the public space to build and expand civic structures throughout ECE. Over the past three years, Central Europeans have utilized the insight, courage, and imagination that prompted their liberation to

create new forms of associations and foundations. The advance of nonprofit initiatives, however, has been hindered by several parallel developments.

First, much of the energy, resources, and hopes of these societies — and of Western donors — has been focused on creating market economies and formal systems of democratic governance. The major emphasis of the political transition has been at the national or macro-level: in establishing or revitalizing the rule of law, political parties, and parliamentary practices. Less attention has been devoted to building and supporting grassroots, citizen-based initiatives.

Second, many of the most talented activists and intellectuals of the democratic opposition movements left independent and organizational activity for state politics. The influx of these leaders into the new political parties, governments, and parliaments is helping to build democratic states in the region — a critical basis for free and open civil societies. However, the leadership and direction of many non-governmental organizations and initiatives has been weakened as a result. It should be noted that setbacks and frustrations with national-level politics (for instance, the inability of former Civic Forum activists in the CSFR to gain parliamentary seats through the Civic Movement party during the June 1992 elections) are leading many intellectuals and former activists back to their "roots" in civil society.

Third, the former civil society opposition was united by a common enemy: communism. The fall of oppressive regimes led to the search for new forms of group identity. This fact, combined with post-communist political splintering and economic insecurity, has given rise to virulent forms of nationalism which has tended to divide people and divert energies.

Fourth, after 1989, many citizens found themselves with less time for being engaged in political or social issues. The transition to market-type economies triggered economic austerity and crises, which imposed new challenges on citizens accustomed to stable jobs and subsidized prices. Moreover, many citizens who had grown dependent on central authorities under communism remained passive after its demise, believing that a new benefactor would take care of them — whether it was the "free-market", Western aid, or a new democratic government.

Many in both the East and the West are

(1) The concept of civil society dates back to Aristotle and Cicero, but is most prominently associated with the thought of Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who developed the revolutionary notion that human beings have "natural rights" to form communities of free and equal citizens. The idea of civil society was further developed by other Western thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, George Friedrich Hegel, Alexis de Toqueville and Antonio Gramsci. Current usage of civil society is open to widespread interpretation throughout the world. As Peking University scholar Zhang Zhilian said, "Civil society is a phrase with much resonance but little content; it have to put the meaning

in." See remarks at November 1991 conference, "The Idea of Civil Society," National Humanities Centre (1992 pamphlet). For usage of civil society in the context of East Central Europe, refer to the writings of Václav Havel, György Konrad, and Adam Michnik, amongst others.

(2) As nonprofit leaders from the CSFR declared in a resolution from the Štupava Conference held in November 1991: "The re-establishment of the Czechoslovak independent or so-called third sector is a part of the recreation of a civil society and therefore presents a valuable means of progressing towards European standards of pluralism and democracy. We are convinced that the third sector is one of the necessary cornerstones of a balanced society which is in turn a condition of stable government."

beginning to discover that free markets and free elections are not enough to build and sustain healthy, democratic societies. While a market economy may be effective at producing consumer goods and services, it is inherently limited as a mechanism for addressing a range of social needs. Likewise, citizens cannot depend upon government to insure that vital collective interests — such as a clean environment, civil rights, and social welfare — are fully realized and protected. Thus, the business sector and the governmental sector need to be complemented by a vibrant third sector of nonprofit organizations in order to help realize a triangular vision of balanced societal development.

In the context of East Central Europe, nonprofit organizations are an important alternative to — or partner with — the State in insuring that the common good is not neglected. Current economic hardships throughout the region call for the rapid emergence of new social actors able to help cushion the double effect of government austerity measures and declining state services.

The feudal and communist past created highly centralized state bureaucracies that were inflexible and unresponsive to the needs of communities and citizens. Even today, three years after the collapse of communism, many citizens in ECE are losing hopes — perhaps unrealistic ones — that political parties, the State or parliament can better meet their everyday needs. Many of those we interviewed commented on how the new political leadership and parties tend to be comprised of small, urban-based groupings that lack concrete, broad-based linkages to constituent groups and their interests. They pointed to the enormous gap emerging between the political elite and the public, which is coming to view politics as an incomprehensible game of parliamentary bickering and machinations.

Now that the region is facing dashed hopes and broken promises, the urgent need for autonomous and effective nonprofit initiatives becomes more obvious. As Juraj Zamkovsky, a Slovak environmental activist, told us: "political involvement means more than acting as a party member, but as a citizen."

In this stage of societal transformation, the public has an historic opportunity to create democratic and grassroots institutions and values. Many Central European and Western observers

have commented that it will take anywhere from ten to twenty years for countries in the region to become "stable democracies." However, as events in the former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, and the former East Germany demonstrate, civil societies must take root as soon as possible in order to prevent or cushion the impact of rising nationalism and economic hardship during the transition period.

The next few years represent a critical window of opportunity. Several Central Europeans noted that entrenched laws, processes, and institutions may soon be developed that do not encourage or nurture civic initiatives. The citizenry, in short, needs to build up the sinews of a democratic society by creating and using the tools which can facilitate the development of a new political culture and insure that the rulers serve the ruled.

Historical Background to the Nonprofit Sector in East Central Europe

The emerging nonprofit sectors in East Central Europe are rooted in the communist epoch and the pre-World War II era. In Hungary, for instance, foundations and voluntary associations have a long tradition extending from the nineteenth century, when partnerships between private foundations and public institutions were established to meet various social needs. (3) Over 14,000 voluntary associations existed in Hungary in 1932, comprising approximately 3 million members (out of a total national population of 8.6 million). (4) World War II and the subsequent communist takeover in the late 1940s halted the development of truly independent NGO sectors in the region.

The newly imposed communist regimes tolerated little space for individuals to participate in private and autonomous groups, viewing such self-organization as suspect and beyond permissible ideological boundaries. Thus most foundations, associations, and spontaneous citizen initiatives were banned in the 1950s. Those that remained were nationalized and administered by members of the *nomenklatura*. This officially sanctioned "civil society" was dominated by larger so-called social organizations — such as youth organ-

(3) Éva Kuti, "The Nonprofit Sector and the Restructuring of Economy and Society in Hungary." Paper prepared for presentation at the XV World Congress of the International Political Science Association, July 21-25, 1991, Buenos Aires.
(4) Ibid.

zations, peace councils, and adult education societies — financed by the State and closely tied to party organizations.

Many citizens in East Central Europe resisted these imposed structures. Passive opponents or outright dissidents either worked through officially sanctioned groups — such as nature conservation clubs, boy scouts, and literary organizations — or set up illegal or underground organizations to maintain some form of cultural, intellectual, or political autonomy and integrity. The Solidarity movement in Poland inspired the creation of an entire independent sector of autonomous institutions — “flying schools”, publishing houses, newspapers, study circles — which evolved in the 1980s into what some have called a parallel *polis*, or society. In the CSFR, on the other hand, harsh communist rule persisted until 1989, denying opportunities for widespread dissent or self-organization. As a result, structures of civil society have evolved more slowly in the CSFR.

The success of the revolutionary changes of 1989 sparked a rapid rise in nonprofit foundations and associations throughout the region. (5) Hungary, for instance, had an estimated 800 NGOs in early 1989. Today, that number is over 8,000. (6) Behind such numbers is the liberated and growing sense that people can take matters into their own hands to help themselves, their community, and their nation.

Key segments of the Nonprofit Sector

The nonprofit sector in East Central Europe encompasses a broad array of organizations which address issues ranging from hobbies and sports to scientific research and youth development. This study does not attempt to comprehensively review the entire spectrum of NGOs in the region. The report is focused on particular fields such as the environment and social welfare. We believe, though, the many of the dynamics and recommendations outlined here are directly relevant to other areas of the sector.

Social Welfare

Social welfare is an increasingly vital concern across the region. Policymakers in ECE and

the West generally underestimated the deep social costs of economic reform programs, which have triggered escalating unemployment and poverty and a scaling back of state-provided social services. Problems of poverty were for decades hidden and neglected under the communist regimes, which refused to recognize the existence of poverty for ideological reasons. Yet the former party-state system did insure basic social services — such as cheap food, rents, and utilities — which provided forms of social security that are now largely being phased-out by new governments.

The social dislocation caused by the rapid economic transition poses extremely serious threats to the democratization process. Social frustrations are feeding into deep historical currents of political populism and rising nationalism. “People do not accept the notion of civil society without the minimum conditions for their survival,” said Hungarian sociologist János David, who works on “social crisis management” issues involving local government, state firms, and unemployed workers. “People get very rude or aggressive if they get no support to solve their basic problems.” Pál Forgács, who heads the “Help the Helper” fund at the Soros Foundation-Hungary, concurred:

If I think that social problems are the most urgent need today. Market economies don't solve these problems; there is the danger of a social explosion. The so-called “Wild East capitalism” we have here has no controls, like in the last century. A growing part of the country is impoverished and there is a small group of rising entrepreneurs. This situation opens itself up to social demagoguery, on the left and the right.

Socio-economic dislocation is most obvious in Poland and Slovakia, where unemployment by mid-1992 at 13 percent, and is expected to climb even sharper with the further decline and collapse of state industries.

According to Danuta Zagrodzka, an economics reporter for *Gazeta Wyborcza* who is involved in the Polish nonprofit sector, recent government statistics showed that 40-45 percent of families are living at or below the poverty line.

Social issues such as poverty, homelessness, unemployment, health care, the status of Romanies (or gypsies), refugees, and the elderly are now being addressed by three main sources in ECE: the State (both the central and local governments), non-governmental organizations (includ-

(5) Nonprofit organizations in East Central Europe incorporate themselves as either foundations or associations. It should be noted that foundations in ECE are largely service-providing groups that do not give grants. The legal and tax advantages of the foundation

favorable than registering as an association. This has created confusion in and outside of the region, as the title “foundation” may span a range of organization types. Most of the small-scale, grassroots-oriented nonprofits are registered as associations. Foundations, on the other hand, tend to encompass larger and more stable NGOs and the few actual grantmaking bodies that exist in the region.

(6) By mid-1992, there were about 200 foundations in the CSFR; only about 10 are grant-giving as opposed to grant-seeking organizations. In addition, the CSFR government estimates that there are over 9,000 associations. Because “association” is broadly defined in the region — often to include for-profit enterprises — an undetermined number of these are not fully functioning or may be actual business using the form of an association. It is estimated that there are 5,000 to 6,000 “real” NGOs in Poland.

ing religious institutions), and for-profit service providers. The nonprofit sector's role is rapidly increasing. As Hungarian sociologist Vera Gáthy said, "The State would like to transfer all social tasks to the voluntary sector, the market, and local government."

Human and Civil Rights

The restoration of complete human and civil rights for citizens in East Central Europe was one of the major causes and claims of the revolutions of 1989. While much progress has been made over the past three years in providing the legal basis for such rights, there are several key areas of concern that affect the development of healthy civil societies in the region, including:

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

While this issue dominates discussion about the Balkan states, there are also several active or brewing ethnic conflicts in the northern part of the region. These flashpoints include the current nationalist-inspired break-up of Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian minority population living in Slovakia, and the Hungarians living in Transylvania.

Ethnic conflicts are now being addressed by several NGOs such as the Helsinki Committee in Poland, which wants to create a Central European standard for the rights of minorities; Partners for Democratic Change, which has offices in Bratislava, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw; and the newly created Foundation for Tolerant Societies in Eastern Europe based in Budapest. This Foundation has recently stated:

Historical prejudices and nationalism, hidden under decades of authoritarian rule, have emerged in many forms, ranging from anti-semitism, intolerance of minority culture and language, to the rejection of national sovereignty. Such enmities threaten basic human dignity and rights that political democracy hopes to build, in its most tragic form, ethnic hatred has destroyed thousands of lives in Yugoslavia.

Ethnic violence and hatred throughout the region underscore the urgent need to support activities that lead to the peaceful resolution of conflict, the assurance of minority rights, and the development of community-based dialogue and

cross-cultural understanding: these are essential preconditions for the creation of civil and pluralistic societies.

Racism

The Romany populations face a particularly virulent form of racism in East Central Europe. Romanies constitute 5 percent of Hungary's population, and 3 to 5 percent in the CSFR (accounting for almost 10 percent of the total population in Slovakia). Sociologist Jirina Siklová of Charles University in Prague said that by 2010, Romanies will reflect the largest youth population in Slovakia. "Racism will be the key issue in the future — not the economy or nationalism. We are not prepared for it." (7)

De-Bokhevisation : Dealing with the Past

Perhaps the most hotly contested civil rights issue in ECE involves how governments, the law, media, and the public deal with the past abuses of the communist regimes, efforts to right past wrongs are raising fundamental and difficult questions about the need to protect the rights of the accused, the right to a fair hearing or public trial, and other complex legal and moral issues. The very nature of the democratic transition, warn some observers in the region, is being tested by a process that threatens in some cases to turn the search for justice into a virtual witchhunt.

Environment

The communist regimes not only suffocated civil society, but devastated the region's natural environment. East Central Europe is now stricken by almost every conceivable ecological malady: some areas are among the most damaged in the world. The environmental movements of ECE — some of which were officially tolerated by the previous regimes — preceded and in many ways precipitated the political sea changes of 1989. Many of these NGOs survived the political transition and have been joined in the past few years by new ecological movements and institutions. These efforts have been supported by numerous international organizations and initia-

(7) A poll conducted by the Times Mirror Company found that 91 percent of Czechoslovaks questioned are contemptuous of Romanies. Cited in "Struggling for Ethnic Identity: Czechoslovakia's Endangered Gypsies," Human Rights Watch, August 1992, 2.

tives seeking to help the region achieve greater environmental protection and move toward a process of sustainable development. Several key issues have emerged :

Trade-off Between the Market and the Environment

A region-wide clash has surfaced between environmentalists and orthodox free-market advocates. The conflict is the Czech Republic, where Prime Minister Václav Klaus reportedly believes that the economic reform process must succeed before serious resources toward environmental clean-up and renewal can be committed. Environmentalists challenge this trade-off, arguing that a healthy economy cannot be sustained by a deteriorating environment.

Maturation of the Green Movement

The ecological movements exhibit a particularly strong anti-organizational tendency and anti-hierarchical consciousness. While this has prevented bureaucratization and permitted a high degree of flexibility and dynamism, some feel that resistance to building more structured organizations limits the degree to which environmentalists can expand their constituencies and become effective advocates on matters of public policy.

Eco-colonization from the West

There is growing concern that ECE is becoming a dumping ground for environmentally damaging investments and disposable wastes from the West. Central European ecologists cite Western joint ventures to produce non-recyclable plastics, the influx of consumer advertising which promotes a "throw-away" lifestyle, and the import of public or hazardous waste. For these reasons, environmentalists in ECE are eager for better access to information about incoming investments from abroad.

Access to Research and Monitoring Technology

Information about environmental damage was formerly monopolized and closely guarded

by the State. Central European environmentalists seek access to accurate, independent, and up-to-date scientific information and analysis about the problems plaguing their environment. András Biró of the Foundation for Self-Reliance in Hungary mentioned that his foundation provided mercury monitors to an ecological group in Miskolc, noting, "This is the first time that civil society has the ability to rely on its own facts, which is essential."

Education

The entire field of education throughout ECE, from primary school through institutions of higher learning, is in the midst of slow but radical changes. The former centrally controlled, state-financed system is being transformed simultaneously by the introduction of political pluralism and by cutbacks in government funding. The key issues affecting educational reform in ECE include :

Budgetary Crises

Education in the region — like other social services — is facing the immediate challenge of central budget cutbacks and a shortage of resources. This squeeze was highlighted by Ernő Zalai, a former Vice Rector at the Budapest University of Economics sciences, who said: "The government is slowly destroying the future of the country with higher education cutbacks... the government is not investing in the long run because they cannot meet current expenses."

Opponents to Educational Reform

Efforts since 1989 to overhaul the region's educational system, according to many in the field, have been stymied by entrenched opponents to reform — including teachers, professors, school administrators, and ministry-level bureaucrats. This appears to be particularly true in higher education, universities are saddled with cumbersome administrative procedures and outdated pedagogical methods, and constrained by ineffective professors with life tenure, many of whom were hired by communist party commissions. One social science professor at Charles University in Prague complained that the univer-

sity "faced a united front against reforms, especially in the social sciences." A leading Polish educator noted that the higher education system has "progressive leadership at the top, but gets worse the lower you go in the system."

Teacher Training and Curriculum Reform

Interviewees emphasized that the training of an entire new generation of teachers is needed to overhaul an educational system that has been heavily ideological, based on rote memorization, and filled with alienated students, teachers, and parents. A central challenge is to adapt existing curricula and develop new ones for all levels of education, to reflect a critical approach to history and the social sciences, and meet the needs of a modern economy.

"Brain Drain"

Due to low-paying jobs in education, some of the best academics in ECE are being lured away to teach abroad or to enter into business. A well-respected Rector at one of Poland's major universities noted that a new Polish professor earns \$85 a month before taxes — three to four times less than an unskilled worker. He commented, "All bright and good people with foreign languages and skills do not go to the university — it's a very expensive hobby that only a few people can afford. With such negative selection, we should probably close the university in a few years." In Hungary, some 12 percent of the nation's 25,000 academics leave the country each year, one-fourth of whom remain abroad for more than five years, some permanently. (8)

The Crisis of Vocational Schools

The region's current economic crisis has made vocational education a particularly urgent challenge in educational reform. Vocational schools are attended by many students between 15 and 17 years of age, including, for example, approximately 40-50 percent of Polish students, some are known as "factory schools", because they have been financed by large state firms to train future workers for the needs of a particular factory. Amid the downsizing and collapse of the state economy in the region — and the phasing out of certain industrial and agricultural enter-

prises — vocational school graduates largely find themselves unemployed upon graduation. Many of these schools are located in stagnating regions of heavy industry with increasingly jobless, frustrated, and potentially explosive populations. There is a great need to reform the curriculum of vocational schools, organize retraining courses for the unemployed, and upgrade courses for those currently employed.

Research and Public Policy

The current national budget squeeze across the region is also affecting the state of research related to public policy on social, political, economic, and scientific issues. Such research provides important intellectual resources for citizens, students, scholars, NGOs, and policymakers seeking to construct new ideas and institutions. Traditionally, social science research was funded by the State, and much of it was conducted through central government research institutes or national academies of science which were independent of teaching and university life.

These academies now face severe budget cuts; for instance, the Polish Academy of Sciences has seen its research staff cut by nearly one-half over the past two years. To make ends meet, many intellectuals are leaving teaching or research posts for business or academic opportunities abroad. Young researchers coming out of the universities face a particularly difficult time finding employment.

Public policy-oriented research is adopting new institutional forms. There is an attempt now to reunite research with higher education; for instance, the Polish Academy of Sciences is beginning a post-graduate school of social sciences. University departments are establishing foundations to receive support (largely foreign) to finance research, political parties are also forming "think tanks" or research institutes on a range of political and socio-economic issues.

Regional Issues

There is a range of common issues confronting Central European countries, that offer opportunities for regional cooperation among NGOs. For instance, ECE nations face similar challenges in creating multiparty systems, civil societies, and maker economics, and in resolving

(8) Barbara B. Burn, "Raising the Curtain: A Report with Recommendations on Academic Exchanges with East Central Europe and the USSR," Institute for International Education, 1991, 25.

ethnic conflicts. There is thus an urgent need for Central Europeans to meet one another, share experiences, and where appropriate, to develop collaborative relationships and projects.

For a range of historical and political reasons, however, citizens and NGOs in these states remain largely isolated from one another. Before 1989, Central Europeans often knew more about events in the West (in part through radio broadcasts) than about those in neighbouring countries. Even today, many NGO leaders in ECE say that they stand a better chance of meeting other Central Europeans at conferences in Berlin, London, or Washington than in their own region. One obstacle is airfare within the former Eastern bloc, which has increased to Western prices and is therefore too expensive for most citizens.

Funding for intra-regional initiatives has been extremely limited. The Soros Foundation's "East-East" program, which supports regional conferences, joint research studies, and other projects, is one of the few financial sources funding area-wide initiatives. Creative new efforts at regional cooperation are emerging; for example, the Slovak Association of Towns and Municipalities — with assistance from the Charte 77 Foundation in Bratislava — is supporting cross-border meetings between mayors of towns in southern Poland and northern Slovakia. Similar initiatives are badly needed. Links between southern Slovakia and Hungary, for instance, could help diffuse border tensions surrounding the status of Hungarians living in southern Slovakia. Such programs, if effective, could be used as models to prevent new walls from growing between the northern tier countries, and the poorer and more conflictive southern tier Balkan states and the emerging nation-states of the former Soviet Union.

Major Challenges Facing the Nonprofit Sector

Conversations with Central European nonprofit leaders — and many of those they serve — have clarified several critical challenges facing the nonprofit sector as a whole in the region. These include the following issues, which are discussed in greater detail below: the state of legal and fiscal frameworks; public perception of nonprofit activity; existing sources of funding; the role of state

governments; the importance of local and rural developments; the inclusion of women, ethnic minorities, and youth; the impact of politics on the sector; and the development of nonprofit federations. The urgency of these individual challenges is underscored by three strategic concerns raised with us by Central Europeans:

- Do those within the region's NGOs recognize the important role of the nonprofit sector within their emerging societies? How can such self-identity and self-awareness be nurtured to build self-confidence and a long-term perspective?
- Will the sector be strong enough to serve its critical functions in the transformation process?
- Will enough self-sustaining organizational capacity remain when Western aid is inevitably curtailed?

Legal and Fiscal Framework

A major challenge facing nonprofits across East Central Europe is the need to create legal and fiscal structures to regulate and support the third sector. In the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland, efforts are underway by governmental regulators, tax authorities, legislators, and NGO personnel to draft laws that define a clear legal and fiscal foundation for the development of nonprofit organizations. Many are receiving additional assistance from various international legal experts. A brief review of the region's evolving legal and fiscal frameworks follows.

Hungary

The massive rise in Hungarian nonprofits can be traced in part to the legal and tax framework that has evolved over the past few years. Foundations were forbidden until 1987, when a foundation law was enacted in the Civil Code.

A 1989 government decree declared that neither foundations nor voluntary associations needed any government approval to be established. All nonprofit organizations have to be registered by the county courts in order to be granted legal personality, but registration cannot be refused if they meet the requirements of the Civil Code.⁽⁹⁾

The foundation law was quite liberal in its original form, permitting foundations registered

(9) In the case of foundations, these requirements are: a durable public purpose, a founding statute, and an endowment which is large enough for reaching the foundation's goal. The conditions for the establishment of associations are: at least ten members, a set of written articles, and elected administrative and representative bodies.

in court to automatically receive tax-deductible donations and exempting the business income of foundations from taxes, provided all profits were spent on the charitable purposes of the foundation. As a result, foundations have received greater tax benefits than other nonprofit associations and organizations under Hungarian law.

The explosion of Hungarian foundations included a significant number of for-profit entities, including corporate foundations seeking to evade high Hungarian tax rates. While some of these "quasi-foundations" may serve social purposes, all have sought to shelter the incomes of their employees and managers. (10) Such abuse led the government to tighten up the regulation of foundations through new tax laws introduced in early 1992. (11) The impact of this change is not yet clear; however, the so-called "foundation boom" in Hungary is likely to slow as foundations cease to offer a tax shelter.

The current regulations are contained in tax laws, which must be approved by parliament every December for effect in the following year. Several NGO leaders, legislators, and government ministries — under the facilitation of the Research Project on Hungarian Nonprofit Organizations — are attempting to draft a more consistent and comprehensive nonprofit law which would not be subject to yearly legislative drafting and approval. The Hungarian government, meanwhile, is proposing to introduce new laws and fiscal regulations affecting nonprofit organizations.

Poland

The rise of the Solidarity movement and church-fed initiatives in the 1980s prompted a 1984 foundation law — the first in the region since World War II permitting the legal existence of nonprofit institutions. Poland's initial foundation law was in some ways quite liberal: all that was required to create a foundation were two people able to write a statute. However, foundations were required to seek the supervision of an appropriate government ministry, which gave each ministry considerable discretion as to which foundations would be permitted to register in court.

Despite the approval requirement, many nonprofit institutions elected the foundation form over operating as an association because only

foundations were legally entitled to collect money, hold a bank account, rent an office, and perform other economic activities. In 1991, the Polish law on foundations was amended to remove the requirements of prior ministry approval. The 1990 law on associations permits them to have legal identity, and the 1992 tax law allows them to carry out economic activities through subsidiaries.

As in Hungary, the 1984 law led many for-profit ventures to create foundations in order to avoid paying taxes. The scandals and suspicion created by such activity led to a February 1992 change in the tax laws which now mandate that foundations be taxed at 40 percent of their income if they do not spend that income on their stated statutory purposes in the year of receipt or the succeeding year. This rule applies to all revenues, including gifts and grants.

Under Polish law, a private company or business may make a deductible donation of up to 10 percent of its income to a charitable or social cause. The definition of a charitable or social purpose is very vague, however, making it difficult for individuals, companies, or foundations to make donations. All too often, potential donors are uncertain as to whether a particular organization qualifies as a tax-deductible recipient.

One obstacle to creating a foundation is contained in the 1984 law which requires all foundations to register at a court in Warsaw. Conversely, a group can register as an association in one of the 49 voivodships (districts) in Poland, thus avoiding the additional time and potential bureaucratic confusion of registering in the capital.

The uncertain legal atmosphere is compounded by the fact that it is very difficult and expensive to obtain solid legal advice about nonprofit issues. There are few lawyers equipped to interpret the current laws — largely because these laws grant considerable discretion to administrative agencies to make rules that have not been written or publicized. A group of Polish foundations and association leaders, organized by the Polish Forum of Foundations, is now analyzing the nonprofit legal framework and exploring the need for statutory reforms. A study of the legal and regulatory aspects of the nonprofit sector is also being conducted by researchers at the University of Warsaw and the Catholic University of America under the auspices of the International Centre for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL).

(10) Eva Kuti, 1991 paper, op. cit.

(11) As of 1992, the registration of a foundation in a court no longer guarantees tax deductibility: the foundation must meet a listed criteria of various social purposes. The tax exemption of business income was scaled back; income is tax-exempt only if it does not exceed 10 percent of all foundation income, and in no case more than ten million Forints. The tax treatment of associations also changed. The terms for tax exemption of business income for associations is now the same as foundations; donations remain non-deductible, except in special cases.

CSFR

The CSFR currently suffers from an extremely weak nonprofit legal and fiscal framework. Since the "Velvet Revolution", the government has passed a number of laws regulating aspects of the nonprofit sector. For example, the revised Civil Code contains four broad provisions regulating foundations. However, the law refers to various supporting regulations which do not exist, thus creating confusion and difficulties for new organizations seeking to register with local authorities.

According to CSFR nonprofit expert Gabriela Vendlová and Doug Rutzen, a U.S. lawyer who helped prepare a draft nonprofit law for the CSFR as a member of the American Bar Association's Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI), the current law "does not sufficiently (1) define the scope of 'nonprofit' organizations, (2) grant tax exemptions and deductions, (3) regulate sources of income, particularly participation in commercial enterprises, (4) address the privileges and obligations of foreign organizations, or (5) institute adequate monitoring mechanisms." The limited tax deductions and exemptions available limit tax-effective giving and fundraising possibilities.

Two major efforts are underway to draft new nonprofit regulations to replace the existing law. In March 1992, the Federal Government set up a commission to work on nonprofit issues, headed by Jozef Miklosko, Vice Premier of the Federal Government. The drafting group consisted of lawyers, members of the Federal Government, and representatives of foundations. This group recently produced a draft nonprofit law, but due to the current political situation in the CSFR, it is unclear when or if it will be presented to the Czech or Slovak governments.

Through the CEELI program, the American Bar Association — with the assistance of CSFR governmental and organizational representatives and experts from ECE, the U.S., and Western Europe — has prepared a draft law that seeks to create a comprehensive, nonprofit regulation. The draft provides tax deductions and exemptions for certain types of organizations, imposes an annual reporting requirement, limits the commercial activities of nonprofits, and

attempts to create a registration procedure for both domestic and foreign organizations.

It is unlikely that any law on the nonprofit sector will be passed before the breakup of the CSFR is clearly resolved.

Public Perception

Corrupt practices by some foundations that have exploited the elastic statutory frameworks in the region have spawned negative perceptions of the nonprofit sector among the general public. It is clear that a comprehensive, clear, and enforceable set of legal and fiscal regulations is needed to overcome public suspicious and doubts about the value and practices of nonprofits. "There are no organized rules, so society has no reason to trust foundations," said Dáša Havel of the Civic Forum Foundation in the CSFR. The need to improve the public image of the nonprofit sector was underscored to us during several interviews.

Miklós Marshall, a Vice Mayor of Budapest and former nonprofit sector leader, spoke of difficulties he encountered in convincing city council members to support private foundations because they operate under such unclear laws and are not fully open to public scrutiny and accountability. "If you say the word 'foundation' in Hungary now, it's like a dirty word. There is a feeling that there are many wheeler-dealers and fake foundations [attempting to shield business profits from taxation]."

Public suspicion of foundations was also generated when several former communist organizations changed their names and transferred their assets (which many citizens viewed as 'public' funds) into new private foundations.

Most Central European believe that public perceptions will improve with the introduction of stricter laws and regulations — such as those recently passed in Poland and Hungary denying companies the ability to use foundations as tax shelters. Moreover, as the sector expands and provides concrete and visible services to the wider public, nonprofits will earn a more respected place in society. Nevertheless, there is a need to project the positive missions and initiatives now undertaken in the nonprofit sector throughout the region.

A small but increasing number of media programs in the region now cover the activities of

foundations and associations. One example of such public education was the development of an hour-long documentary shown on Hungarian television called *The Role of Nonprofit Social Service Organizations*. The film was produced by the Black Box, a Hungarian production company, and focused on Dr. Katalin Peto, a psychiatrist who works in a clinic in Budapest's impoverished 8th district. The documentary followed Dr. Peto to the United States where she observed American methods for dealing with homelessness, alcohol and substance abuse, job retraining, and family services. This project received support from the Soros Foundation, the Mott Foundation, and the U.S. Information Agency.

A few nonprofits are attempting to educate and develop relationships with journalists in order to garner more media coverage for voluntary sector initiatives. To ensure greater public accountability — and visibility — foundations in the region are also beginning to publish in major newspapers a listing of grants disbursed.

Sources of Funding

An obvious and urgent challenge for nonprofits throughout ECE is the lack of financial resources. Below is a brief summary of the nature of funding available to the independent sector.

Individuals

Charitable giving traditions were undermined under communism: "compulsory volunteerism" introduced by the party-state forced the deduction of dues from the salaries of workers. Despite antagonism toward such policies, there are many indications that ECE citizens are now willing to support nonprofit causes. One study in Hungary showed that the amount of private donations to NGOs grew over 700 percent between 1988 and 1990. (12)

While individual donations may not constitute a significant proportion of overall funding for the nonprofit sector, some groups have been highly creative in their domestic fundraising efforts. For instance, the United Way of Hungary conducted a campaign that raised some \$343,000 in cash and pledges. The Szeged branch (in southeastern Hungary) of United Way has been particularly effective, organizing sporting events, charity galas, concerts, and door-to-door

appeals to raise funds. In Poland, local chapters of Amnesty International have employed several resourceful means for obtaining funds and in-kind support. Members have written appeal letters to all Polish banks (one bank in lower Silesia responded with a \$3,000 donation); sent appeals to all Polish MPs; held a lottery offering donated books and compact disks as awards; and solicited in-kind donations of labour and paper from a firm in Poznan to produce their newsletter. In the CSFR, the Civic Forum Foundation, drawing on the cultural appeal of Prague, organized an "Evening with [British actor] Peter Ustinov" which raised considerable funds; the foundation has also established an annual membership "Club of Friends," which solicits foreigners living in Prague to join (at a higher fee than CSFR citizens).

Companies

As described above, state-run enterprises formerly collected dues from workers to help cover the cost of social services provided by large firms such as day care centres, cultural facilities, and summer camps. The contribution of state-run enterprises to nonprofit activities has steadily declined since 1989, as their financial positions have weakened. Without clear tax advantages for nonprofit giving by private firms, companies in ECE are not likely to become charitable donors. Moreover, the emerging private sector has not yet developed a philanthropic ethos. As one Polish NGO leader said, "We have a very new upper class with an underdeveloped sense of duty to society."

Foundations

There are very few private foundations in ECE which actually function as grantmaking institutions. For instance, of the approximately 200 foundations in the CSFR, only about ten disburse grants. The largest donor foundations in the region have received their support or endowments from foreign sources. The wealthiest grant-giving private foundations in Hungary and Poland — the Soros Foundation-Hungary and the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw — receive most of their funding from a single foreign source: George Soros, a Hungarian-born and New York-based philanthropist. (13)

(12) Research Project on Hungarian Non-Profit Organizations, Voluntas, 3/1 May 1992, 94.

(13) The Botary Foundation receives 70 percent of its funding from Georges Soros. The Soros Foundation was a key contributor to the birth of NGO development in Hungary in the mid-to-late-1980s. The foundation currently disburses about \$6 million a year in Hungary.

(14) The Hungarian Parliament manages an NGO fund that disbursed 420 million Forints (about \$525,000) in 1992; approximately the same amount was distributed in 1991. The number of applicants to the fund doubled in 1992. The CSFR Federal Parliament is considering a proposal to establish a special fund from privatization proceeds to support the nonprofit sector. The Federal Committee for the Environment in the CSFR distributed roughly \$200,000 in 1991 to NGOs in the Czech and Slovak republics. This support will cease, as the committee was abolished with the break-up of the federal system. The Czech Ministry for the Environment provides about \$150,000 in grants to NGOs; the Slovak Commission for the Environment — which is less amenable to ecological nonprofits — does not provide any such funding.

(15) Eva Kuti, "Social, Political and Economic Roles of the Non-Profit Sector in Hungary in the Period of Transition," prepared for presentation at the Third International Conference of Research on Voluntary and Non-Profit Organizations, Indianapolis, March 11-13, 1992. Municipal and local governments are also heavily dependent on state budgets. Jiri Exner, a Vice Mayor of Prague, told us that 92 percent of the city's budget comes from parliament. He noted that hospitals are directly funded by the State, with no links or connections to municipal decision-making.

Government

The nonprofit sector is heavily dependent on state sources for support. Funding for nonprofits may be provided by central ministries, national parliaments, or local governments. There are a few governmental funds specifically designated to support nonprofit activity. (14) It is very difficult to get up-to-date and accurate statistics about public funding for the NGO sector; most government ministries have not compiled figures tracking government aid to nonprofits as an independent category.

Foreign Funding

The nonprofit sector has received substantial levels of funding from foreign sources — private, governmental, and multilateral — over the past three years. Public and private funding from the United States and Western Europe is either provided directly to ECE nonprofits, or granted indirectly through Western NGOs conducting projects in the region. For a detailed assessment of such support, see the latter section on "External Assistance to the Nonprofit Sector in East Central Europe", and Appendix I on sources of Western aid.

The Role of the State

Governments in East Central Europe are fundamentally shaping the development of the nonprofit sector. Surveys indicate that in 1990, for example, 60 percent of all donations to Hungarian foundations came from central government bodies, and 2 percent came from local government. (15) Voluntary associations are less dependent on government support than foundations.

ECE governments are divided over the importance of supporting the nonprofit sector. The sharpest differences emerge between policymakers within the ministries of finance and economic reform, and those ministries involved in social welfare, health, education, and the environment. The former prefer to restrict nonprofit tax advantages, fearing this could fuel government deficits, while the latter regard the nonprofit sector as an important partner for institution-building. Joanna Starega, a former Vice Minister of Social Welfare in Poland, told us: "The govern-

ment budget doesn't want to give up one penny to nonprofits. It will take time for decision-makers to see that the sector pays off." Dása Havel echoed this opinion, observing that the government "does not understand that the voluntary sector is the cheapest way to keep the society healthy."

Yet current conditions in the region point to at least two principal reasons that ECE governments may begin to embrace the third sector as a vital partner. First, to overcome the centralized, bureaucratic state system inherited from the past, central authorities are looking to the independent sector as a vehicle for decentralizing services and de-nationalizing state property. Second, burdened by massive debt, budget squeezes, and economic crises, ECE governments are open and at times eager either to contract out state-financed public services through NGOs, or to shift wholly the burden of certain social service responsibilities to private agencies. "It's a good thing to minimize state activities in these areas. The government sees the nonprofit sector as a good tool to get rid of a few responsibilities and act in a civil way," said one Hungarian government official.

It is unclear how far ECE governments will go in withdrawing state-supported social services to the public. It remains to be seen whether these states opt for a more traditional West European model, in which government assumes great responsibility for social services and the nonprofit sector is more narrowly defined, or the United States model which relies more heavily on privately funded social service agencies. Many in Central Europe believe that while the State may increasingly rely on NGOs to be service providers, it must continue financing such services due to the lack of alternative sources of funding for nonprofits.

There are encouraging signs, however, of mutually supportive partnerships between ECE governments and nonprofits. In Hungary, the parliament decided that NGOs providing basic social, health, and cultural services have the right to receive exactly the same per capita subsidies given to state-run institutions. Recognizing that some local NGOs can provide basic services cheaper and with more flexibility, the Hungarian government has provided several social service organizations with operating funds, while local governments have provided buildings and other infrastructural support.

One example of public/private cooperation is the creation of foundations to distribute government funds; these foundations "are financially more or less dependent on the state budget, but legally they belong to the private sector." (16) Such foundations raise an important question for the nonprofit sector in each country, and for Western donors and organizations, because they do not fit the traditional model of truly independent, private, and non-governmental institutions.

The Hungarian Foundation for the Development of Local Social Networks is one such institution. The foundation describes itself as "an independent organization of national scope founded by the Ministry of Public Welfare." It receives government and international funding, which it disburses to social service NGOs (mainly serving the handicapped and unemployed). The fund received a three-year, three-million ECU grant from the European Community's PHARE program, and in 1992 received over \$1.2 million from the central government budget. The president of the board is a Vice Minister for Public Welfare, although approximately one-half of the board members are non-governmental representatives. The foundation is seeking funding from other international sources. Gabor Hegyesi, an official of the foundation and a respected social policy academic, believes that this joint public/private initiative differs from U.S. nonprofit models, resembling more closely West European agencies which often include government representatives on their board and receive substantial public funding. "It would not be true to say that we are absolutely independent. We are trying to be as independent as we can be. But the private sector is so weak and has little money. The State is the richest part of the society. If you are really interested in social programs, you can't say we won't deal with the State."

There is concern that state governments are attempting to transfer various social tasks to the voluntary sector and local governments without creating the necessary preconditions, such as nonprofit laws and grassroots funding mechanisms. Several people noted that amid shifting responsibilities, policymakers are operating without the clear frameworks and lines of responsibility necessary to ensure continuity of services and to avoid chaos and confusion. "NGOs presuppose a rationalistic state," confided one Hunga-

rian Welfare Ministry official. "We are missing a reliable partner for NGOs to bargain, negotiate, and work with. They don't know how to access state agencies on a local or national level."

The potential for effective public/private partnerships is limited not only by immature state systems, but also by nonprofit sectors in their infancy. Newly formed NGOs often lack the absorption capacity — such as trained staff, organizational management, and accounting systems — to effectively conduct formerly state-run programs. Local governments, according to Polish NGO expert Kuba Wagnanski, usually contract services to large, established organizations like the Red Cross, because it is difficult for them to develop professional standards for evaluating the quality of services of small and newer nonprofits. Despite such obstacles, it is clear that as NGOs emerge from this early stage of development, they will be better able to conduct and administer various programs.

Local and Rural Development

One of the major themes repeated during our interviews was that far too much of the emerging nonprofit sector is based in and focused on the region's major cities. Many emphasized as a top priority the need to develop, support, and incorporate smaller-scale local, rural, and grassroots initiatives within the nonprofit sector. There are several important reasons for a focused concentration on building civic institutions outside of the capital cities. These include:

- Societies in East Central Europe are heavily over-centralized, and there is great animosity toward development schemes that are imposed from the top within the capital cities. (17) This centralized control is still reflected in much of the development of NGOs since 1989.
- The development of local and participatory community life is one of the greatest needs facing ECE, according to many in the nonprofit sector. Under the previous regimes, they explain, citizens often became atomized individuals who were denied the ability to form natural bonds of community solidarity, interaction, and support. This is particularly true in small, isolated rural villages that lack resources for community development.
- There are promising signs of community activity emerging in the countryside. In some rural

(16) Éva Kuti, 1991 paper, op. cit.
(17) "Most people basically distrust all ideas from above, even if the ideas are well-meaning. That is why reform worked out by experts can only partly be addressed to the leaders. The micro-level communities of citizens should be equally important. Any reform will only have the chance to succeed if these communities accept it."
Lázló Kéri, *Between Two Systems: Seven Studies on the Hungarian Political Change*, Institute for Political Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1992, 107.

areas, there are growing efforts to discover older cultural traditions and daily practices such as the revival of the folk school system of the pre-World War II era. There are also expanding local environmental campaigns, and the creation of informal clubs and community centres. Such efforts are particularly important in areas where large state industries and agricultural economies are stagnating or collapsing. Efforts to rebuild local government administrations — which may in turn cooperate with local NGOs — are also developing. • Most foreign aid and assistance is being funnelled through central government ministries or national-level NGOs. The trickle-down effect is hindered by central bureaucratic channels and a monopolistic mentality among some capital-based recipients. Foreign funds may be more effectively absorbed when granted directly to efforts in smaller cities and villages. "We hear about intentions from the West to help but nothing gets down to us," said one NGO activist in Szeged (a large city in southeastern Hungary), who sent 50 letters to foundations and organizations in the U.S. and Germany appealing for information and funding, but received only a few responses. "If aid goes from Western Europe to Budapest, it disappears." Unfortunately, a large majority of representatives of Western foundations and NGOs limit their visits to the region to the capital cities of ECE, where they can more easily find government officials, national NGO leaders who may be potential program partners, and bilingual speakers.

Women, Ethnic Minorities, and Youth

Under communism, the State created national organizations on behalf of women, ethnic minorities, youth, and other groups. This legacy has created somewhat of a backlash against any "preferential treatment" or "quotas" for select groups in society, despite the fact that institutional life under the previous regimes was primarily dominated by older men. Central European countries remain rather traditional, male-dominated societies which face the challenge of overcoming racism, particularly toward the Romany population.

Some NGO leaders in ECE acknowledge the need to be open and supportive of efforts to insure that a diverse and representative cross sec-

tion of society is involved at the outset in building a healthy and diverse nonprofit sector. Ideally this recognition would be encouraged by Western-based institutions providing funding and guidance. Unfortunately, many Western initiatives in the region have themselves been less than successful in including such groups in their own staffing and programming.

In our interviews and previous work in the region, we have come to recognize the particular importance of emerging youth leadership in ECE. We found many exciting, bright young people who participated in the major civil movements of the 1980s. Many such people told us that they do not see the nonprofit sector as a field in which they can develop their vocational interests and careers. No such sector has existed until now, and where voluntary efforts managed to function 'underground', or develop freely over the past five years, full-time paid jobs have been scarce, and young people are only able to volunteer for various initiatives. Such talented young people thus tend to pursue careers in business, law, journalism, or government.

We believe that many of these individuals would be major assets for the region's emerging NGO community. With adequate support and training, they are capable of confronting many of the urgent tasks facing the nonprofit sector. We often hear the same names of seasoned leaders — usually key dissidents and activists from the pre-1989 social movements — over-stretching themselves to take on new additional tasks. "Burn-out" is a serious problem among the region's activists, and many have indicated that they do not even know quite how to reach out, recruit and train the next generation of activists. Several of these leaders note that the younger generation is often better able to work in a healthier, cooperative, and perhaps more democratic way. New mechanisms should thus be established to recruit and incorporate skilled and energetic young people, and to enable them to sustain a commitment to the growing nonprofit movement.

Politization

Any analysis of the nonprofit sector in ECE must recognize that the nonprofit community throughout the region was born into a highly charged and politicized atmosphere. Organiza-

tional autonomy is a relative term — and an elusive objective — in nations lacking both a secure wealth base and a historical tradition of independent NGO development. As Hungarian writer and NGO activist Robert Braun told us, "There is no space empty for independence — life is politically influenced and determined."

Hungary faces the problems of politicization perhaps most acutely. "It is difficult to say who is independent," said Hungarian political scientist Attila Agh. "The average Hungarian citizen cannot understand a non-partisan organization. Non-partisan is seen as oppositional. It's either you're with me or you're against me." The emerging character of Hungarian politics unfortunately fuels this perspective. Several people interviewed spoke of how the current government is replicating the style of the old regime by attempting to control various private and public institutions in society. They accuse the government of a bias toward pro-government foundations and organizations, resulting in limited resources for groups outspoken against present government policies.

In fact, the government and each of the leading Hungarian parties are creating their own foundations for policy research, training, and other initiatives. Some independent NGO activists are concerned that Hungary will replicate the German system of party-funded and controlled foundations and that, as a consequence, foundations in the overly politicized environment of ECE may be used as a means for campaigning and politicking, as there are currently no laws regulating the political influence of foundations.

Conflicts rising from politicization are even more immediate for NGOs dependent on state and party resources. One adviser to the Hungarian Parliament fund for NGOs spoke of how his expert advice was neglected by legislators, who "distributed this money based on personal and political opinions." According to an official of a major NGO in Hungary, local NGOs seeking support from mayors, district councils, or local ministry offices must make careful political statements and alliances to maintain public funding and support. "There is great pressure coming from parties who want to find a circle of civil groups they can control," said a Hungarian nonprofit researcher.

Foreign foundations and NGOs seeking to

operate in ECE must be sensitive to the issues of politicization, recognizing how certain alliances and aid decisions can have a serious political impact in these nations.

The Development of Nonprofit Federations

The growth of the nonprofit sector in East Central Europe is being accompanied by the emergence of federations of organizations. Some share a focus on a particular field such as health care; other federations have formed to further the work of the nonprofit sector in general. These networks of organizations serve several purposes, including: identifying needs, information-sharing, creating representative bodies to further promote or represent an issue or sector (for example, lobbying the state for better nonprofit laws), and establishing links with international organizations and foundations. Below is a brief country-by-country summary of such activities, with a particular focus on initiatives affecting the entire nonprofit sector.

Hungary

Since 1990, Hungary has seen several efforts to serve and represent the interests of its growing nonprofit sector. Two such examples are the Federation of Hungarian Foundations (FHF) and the Hungarian Foundation Centre (HFC). The former was founded by 31 member foundations in May of 1990, while the latter was established the same year as a for-profit service organization connected to the Hungarian Credit Bank. While each body claims to represent or service hundred foundations, neither has attained the visibility or credibility to represent effectively the over 6,000 foundations in Hungary. (The FHF, in fact, was nearly defunct by mid-1992). Perhaps more promising are the recent grassroots initiatives creating numerous networks for individual sectors such as private schools, health care providers, community development, and cultural foundations.

Poland

Two umbrella structures are now being formed to serve and represent the needs and interests of the Polish nonprofit sector: the Forum of Polish Foundations and the National Council

of Non-Governmental Organizations. The Forum was founded in late 1991, and has about 80 member foundations; the Council claims a similar number of service-providing NGOs as members. Regional umbrellas or service organizations are also emerging around different fields, such as the Service Office for the Movement of Self-Help Initiatives (BORIS), founded in May 1992. BORIS hopes to support the over 900 NGOs working on social welfare issues in the Warsaw district, and serve as a model for similar efforts in the country.

CSFR

Efforts to organize the nonprofit sector nationally in the CSFR have been hindered by the underdeveloped state of the sector in comparison with Hungary and Poland, and by the division between the Czech and Slovak republics. No organization currently exists that broadly represents or serves the nonprofit sector in either republic or throughout the CSFR. Two information centres to assist nonprofits are currently being developed, in Prague and in Nitra, in central Slovakia.

Several Western foundations have been involved in helping to strengthen the overall infrastructure of the nonprofit sector in ECE by assisting the development of national umbrella federations or associations. These attempts have yielded some strong reactions — both positive and negative — which should serve to inform future efforts. These include :

- A deep distrust of centralized agencies seeking to represent or speak for other organizations. Well-intentioned efforts to serve and empower nonprofits often trigger suspicions that such groups will ultimately monopolize or dominate the sector for narrow, self-interested reasons. This attitude accounts, in part, for the slow, difficult, and at times conflictive development of such national umbrella organizations. A related problem arises from the failure of capital city-based, national agencies to reach out more effectively to smaller cities and rural areas; this too has bred distrust of national umbrella efforts.
- Many Central Europeans we spoke to believe that it is important to first organize individual and homogenous parts of the nonprofit sector, gradually forging strong alliances and democratic

leadership from below, that can then lead to the creation of larger national umbrella organizations that serve and represent nonprofits. Others observed that any such national agencies should focus on providing concrete services such as information-networking, lobbying the state for better nonprofit laws, and providing technical assistance in organizational development.

- Most Western foundations and NGOs have focused their attention and cooperative efforts on national umbrella-building efforts among ECE foundations rather than associations. There is a general concern among regional nonprofits that larger grantmaking foundations based in the capital cities will try to control the sector and monopolize contacts and aid from the West.

Major Challenges Facing Individual NGOs

There are a number of critical challenges facing individual nonprofits in ECE as they seek more effective programming and operations. The following nine areas were underscored to us in interviews as the most pressing and significant issues facing groups across the nonprofit sector in the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland : organizational development and management; information-sharing and networking; lack of money; democratic workstyle; blurred lines between nonprofit and for-profit work; unclear status of staff; staff recruitment; appropriate technology; and accountability, disclosure, and self-regulation.

Organizational Development and Management

Non-governmental organizations in East Central Europe are largely at an initial stage of development. Many NGOs — aside from those which existed under the old regimes — have transformed themselves from informal movements or ad hoc groupings into organizations within the past three years. One of the most crippling legacies of the past is a pervasive anti-organizational ethos among individuals and organizations in the region. This sensibility grows out of an earlier opposition to stifling bureaucratic control, yet often translates today into weak management, planning, and accountability.

NGO leaders repeatedly mentioned that while there are many hard-working, dedicated, and intelligent people working in the nonprofit sector, most lack experience and training in basic management skills such as goal-setting, program development, facilitation of meetings, fundraising, board development, budgeting, bookkeeping, long-range planning, outreach, and evaluation. Some nonprofits have been reluctant to invest time and resources into organizational management — viewing it as a road to bureaucratic hierarchy and a diversion from immediate programmatic needs. The notion of improving organizational effectiveness is negatively linked to notions of central planning and top-down control under the communist system. "We've been coordinated for so many years that people don't want to be organized," said Kata Farkasova, a Slovak foundation official.

This visceral reaction is somewhat understandable, particularly when scarce resources limit funds for organizational management. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent to Central European NGO leaders that neglecting basic management and accountability leads to crisis management, ad hoc and undemocratic decision-making, and uncertain program development.

Many recently established NGOs that have received start-up funds for various programs are now seeking assistance in developing organizational management skills.

Information-Sharing and Networking

Many Central Europeans we interviewed stressed the need for greater information-sharing among nonprofits in ECE as well as with the West. NGOs lack national or regional information centres, data banks, and sector-oriented publications; the dearth of information is compounded by weak national infrastructures and communications systems such as telephones, computer networks, and faxes.

As a result, groups are often unaware of like-minded organizations, unable to identify common needs and avoid overlapping efforts, and ill-positioned to take advantage of the potential for joint actions and collaboration. Most ECE nonprofits are also cut off from information in the West regarding opportunities for financial support and inclusion in various exchange and training programs.

Over the past three years, various efforts in the region and the West have been launched to meet these challenges. Please refer to Appendix II for a detailed description of existing information-gathering and dissemination efforts.

Lack of Money

One of the greatest and most immediate problems facing nonprofits in ECE is the lack of money. There are limited sources of private and public funds available in the region, and even fewer sources of independent funds provided with few strings attached. See Appendix I for a detailed discussion about existing sources of funding for ECE nonprofits.

Democratic Workstyle

A repeated refrain among Central European is "Communism is inside of us" — meaning that authoritarian approaches to work and politics are often replicated even by "democratic" opponents to the former regimes. This factor often influences, among other things, how an organization is governed, how staff and volunteers are identified and empowered, how meetings are facilitated, how people network and collaborate with other groups, and how decisions are made and disputes resolved. These processes thus reflect more than the level of organizational development and management skills among NGOs; they are often rooted in the nature of interpersonal relations and workstyles in the region.

Interviewees in the region specifically noted the critical need for more internal democracy within NGOs. "Our objectives must contribute to the democratization of these groups," said Andras Biro of the Hungarian Foundation for Self-Reliance. "Democratic forms and mechanisms are lacking. Hungary has professional knowledge but lacks democratic experience." Others pointed to the lack of a culture of conflict resolution, noting how professional disagreements between individuals often quickly descend into sharp personal attacks and mistrust. "We did not learn to work with people in a group," explained Polish journalist Ryszard Holzer. "There is a tendency to be alone and not know how to manage or collaborate with others."

Blurred Lines Between Nonprofit and For-Profit Work

Given the lack of a private wealth base for philanthropy in East Central Europe, it is not surprising that many NGOs are conducting for-profit activities to support their charitable work. However, we have observed groups conducting commercial or quasi-commercial activities alongside nonprofit efforts — without any clear oversight or financial accounting. Some NGOs, we were told, begin commercial ventures and allow them to become a major or even an overriding organizational activity. Of course, with the nonprofit sector in its infancy — and legal and tax regulations in flux — it is hardly surprising that these issues are clouded by uncertainty.

Unclear Status of Staff

Nonprofit sector staff often wear two, three, or four hats. It can be a real challenge to sit down with an NGO leader to find out exactly what his/her commitments and priorities are, and for whom his/her work is being conducted. Many NGO activists either prefer — or more often are forced by financial circumstances — to hold three or four jobs. This factor further contributes to problems of organizational effectiveness and the grey line between for-profit and nonprofit work. Where it is financially possible, we believe that healthy NGO development is supported by maintaining staff able to commit full-time to a single organization or effort.

Staff Recruitment

We were often told that there is a dearth of qualified people who can be hired as nonprofit staff. While this may be generally true, we found that organizations are often unable to break out of their narrow circle of contacts to locate other highly motivated and skilled recruits. This tendency stems from the lack of trust among individuals — particularly those who were politically engaged — during the communist period, when opposition activists relied on their own networks of confidants. The strategy of aggressively seeking and advertising for staff is usually not considered

or pursued, although some groups are now beginning to advertise staff positions in newspapers.

Appropriate Technology

Many NGOs tend to overemphasize the importance of technology when planning their organizational development. This tendency can be traced to the general deprivation the region has experienced vis-à-vis modern technology. While equipment such as computers and fax machines makes work more efficient, it is important to ensure that the technology obtained is appropriate to specific organizational needs and supplemented with adequate training. State-of-the-art equipment may not be necessary or suitable for a small NGO. We have often found computers and other advanced equipment used in a very rudimentary way, it at all, due to a lack of technical training among staff.

Accountability, Disclosure, and Self-Regulation

A critical issue facing NGOs is the degree to which they are able to conduct their work in an open, transparent, and accountable manner. Hungarian nonprofit expert Eva Kuti offers a context for this problem:

One of the most appreciated merits [under the former regime] was to act openly against the State: to cheat the authorities, to evade the law was considered a bravery. This attitude helped us to survive; to preserve the autonomy of thinking, opinion, and judgement; and to become the front-line soldiers of the political changes. But the same attitude is a source of several problems in the transition process.

One ECE foundation official explained that for forty years there were no real accounting requirements; the only requirement for getting money from the State was to spend it. For those involved in underground opposition activity, the principle of trust and solidarity outweighed the need for formal reporting procedures. That has changed with the introduction of funds granted by public and private, national and international sources — many of which require stricter standards and conditions for public transparency and accountability.

La politique européenne de développement vue par les ONG

par Guido Dumon *

Si la politique européenne de développement est actuellement remise en question dans des forums et à des échelons divers, les doutes quant à l'efficacité des efforts de l'Europe dans ce domaine n'y sont certainement pas étrangers. Le Traité de Maastricht fut pour la Commission européenne l'occasion immédiate de redéfinir sa politique de développement en vue d'un renforcement de la coordination et d'une plus grande cohérence au plan européen. Les intentions de la Commission sont décrites dans le document qu'elle a publié sous le titre «Horizon 2000» et qui a servi de base au Conseil européen des Ministres de novembre 1992 pour l'élaboration d'une résolution marquant un tournant manifeste. Sans oublier le bilan à mi-parcours de Lomé IV qui, à la grande crainte de certains et au soulagement d'autres, pourrait être bien davantage qu'une simple renégociation des protocoles financiers.

Les ONG européennes se doivent d'apporter à ce débat sur les priorités de la politique européenne de développement une contribution dictée par leurs propres expériences et leur savoir-faire spécifique. Le monde des ONG connaît en outre des évolutions qui suscitent certaines questions quant à l'identité même de ce type d'organisation et, bien que ces évolutions soient essentiellement le résultat des circonstances et de la volonté des décideurs, elles méritent une réflexion approfondie.

La politique européenne de développement

Le Comité de Liaison ONG-CE a très largement commenté le document «Horizon 2000» de la Commission. Mais l'Assemblée générale des ONG réunie en avril 1992 a consacré, elle aussi, une attention particulière à la politique européenne de développement. L'action de l'Europe a été analysée dans quatre perspectives : la suppression de la pauvreté, le développement durable, la démocratie et les droits de l'homme, et la migration. L'Assemblée a également examiné si la stratégie européenne dans ce domaine était conforme à d'autres aspects de son action.

Le risque de voir la politique européenne tomber sous la coupe de la politique étrangère ou devenir un instrument de cette politique étrangère n'est nullement le fruit de l'imagination. Or

tel ne peut absolument pas être, dans l'esprit des ONG européennes, la destination de la politique du développement. L'objectif prioritaire doit rester la suppression de la pauvreté. Etant donné que cette pauvreté est le résultat d'un processus, il est important de lui donner une définition plus large et d'analyser de manière plus approfondie les structures économiques, sociales et politiques qui l'engendrent ou qui la perpétuent. La pauvreté ne peut donc être exclusivement définie en termes de statistiques reflétant le revenu *par habitant*. Ce serait ignorer la «composante sociale» de la pauvreté, y compris le droit aux soins de santé, à l'éducation, à l'emploi et au logement. Le document de la Commission ne mentionne pas la lutte contre la pauvreté tandis que son approche met un accent excessif sur la promotion de la croissance économique et le renforcement des mécanismes du marché. Il accorde autant — si pas davantage — d'importance au principe du libre marché que s'il s'agissait d'une réalité déjà en place.

Une plus grande cohérence

S'il est important de présenter la lutte contre la pauvreté comme l'objectif prioritaire de la politique européenne de développement, il est tout aussi important de concevoir les instruments permettant de l'atteindre. C'est la raison pour laquelle les ONG européennes recommandent vivement une plus grande cohérence au plan européen — ce qui signifie, concrètement, que les décisions de politique européenne doivent impérativement être examinées dans la perspective de leur incidence sur les pays en développement. Il arrive trop souvent que la réalisation des objectifs de la politique européenne de développement soit entravée par la politique agricole et commerciale de l'Europe, par exemple. Ainsi, une politique de subvention des exportations de produits agricoles européens peut causer aux marchés locaux des pays en développement plus de tort que les effets de développement de la Communauté pourront jamais en redresser. Les ONG européennes constatent, sur le terrain, les conséquences dramatiques de ce manque de cohérence. La subvention des exportations de viande vers l'Afrique occidentale, contre laquelle les ONG font aujourd'hui campagne au travers d'activités de sensibilisation et d'une action politique, est l'exemple par

* Responsable de l'organisation flamande de coopération au développement «Wetevoldadigheid» et Président du Comité de Liaison du Réseau des ONG européennes à Bruxelles. Reproduit du *Courrier ACD-Communauté européenne*, sept.-oct. 1993.

excellence de cette incohérence. Il est donc urgent d'assurer une meilleure coordination de la politique européenne, un suivi de son incidence sur les pays en développement et une série d'instruments structurels en vue de sauvegarder et justifier les objectifs. C'est dans ce but que les ONG ont proposé la création d'un comité chargé de ces tâches au sein de la DG VIII (1).

Le bilan à mi-parcours de Lomé IV

Comme nous l'avons dit, le bilan à mi-parcours de Lomé IV a également été une occasion de remettre en question les objectifs fondamentaux de la politique de développement de la Communauté européenne. Les ONG européennes ont toujours accordé énormément d'importance à la Convention de Lomé; tout d'abord parce qu'il s'agit du principal instrument communautaire de développement mais aussi en raison de son originalité et de l'importance de ses principes de base pour le développement des pays du Sud.

En ce qui concerne le bilan à mi-parcours de la quatrième Convention de Lomé, le Comité de Liaison ONG-CE reconnaît les points faibles de la Convention et les difficultés de sa mise en œuvre. Mais nous estimons que ces problèmes peuvent être supprimés et résolus dans le cadre actuel. Nous constatons, en réalité, que le Mémoire de Pisani de 1982 définissait des problèmes de mise en œuvre de la Convention très similaires à ceux d'aujourd'hui. C'est pourquoi le Mémoire recommandait davantage de continuité dans le système de coopération entre la Communauté et les pays ACP ainsi qu'un renforcement de la capacité des Etats ACP de gérer et d'appliquer les dispositions de la Convention; il fallait, en d'autres termes, leur permettre de prendre part au dialogue et à l'élaboration de la programmation commune en tant que partenaires à part entière. Les ONG européennes regrettent le peu d'attention accordée jusqu'ici à cette recommandation.

Les priorités de l'Europe

L'aide d'urgence a pris récemment une place prépondérante dans l'assistance globale du développement octroyée par l'Europe. Des ressources de plus en plus importantes sont allouées à l'aide alimentaire et médicale dans les régions

où sévit la famine, d'une part, et celles ravagées par les catastrophes naturelles et la guerre civile, d'autre part. De nombreuses ONG européennes ont d'ores et déjà beaucoup accompli dans ce domaine; elles ont ainsi acquis une expérience unique de terrain ainsi qu'un précieux savoir-faire spécifique.

Les ONG sont néanmoins préoccupées du fait que l'attention se tourne de l'aide structurelle vers l'aide d'urgence. Car si, souvent temporaire et éphémère, cette dernière répond assurément à une nécessité vitale, elle offre peu de perspectives de développement continu pour la population locale concernée si les programmes d'urgence ne sont pas suivis de programmes dits de réhabilitation.

L'attention accrue dont bénéficie l'aide d'urgence au niveau de la Communauté européenne s'est également traduite sur le plan structurel par la création d'ECHO, l'Office européen d'aide humanitaire d'urgence chargé de coordonner l'ensemble des programmes d'aide d'urgence. Les mots clés d'ECHO en ce qui concerne l'aide européenne sont «l'efficacité opérationnelle» et «la visibilité». Les ONG ne sont pas opposées en principe à cette approche mais elles estiment que ces objectifs ne sont pas placés dans l'ordre qui convient. Dans le domaine de l'aide d'urgence comme dans n'importe quel autre, la première place revient aux besoins immédiats des populations concernées. L'identification précise de ces besoins est une condition essentielle pour que l'aide d'urgence soit acheminée à destination de manière «efficace» — et il est évident que les ONG qui exercent leurs activités dans ce domaine peuvent apporter une contribution extrêmement utile. Les ONG elles-mêmes, y compris les plus petites, accordent une importance majeure au professionnalisme et à l'efficacité. Mais cette priorité traduit davantage notre volonté de mieux cerner les besoins des populations des pays en développement, et d'y répondre de manière adéquate.

L'attention excessive qui est accordée à l'aide d'urgence, toujours dans un contexte de famine et de misère gonflé par les médias, a également un impact négatif sur la perception que peut avoir l'opinion publique européenne de la situation des pays en développement. Elle crée, en ce qui concerne certains pays particuliers, l'image d'une situation sans espoir et totalement insoluble mise en place par les régimes locaux.

(1) Direction générale du Développement (Commission européenne).

eux-mêmes. Cette image donne aux Européens l'impression qu'ils ne peuvent pratiquement rien faire pour y remédier. Elle leur donne un sentiment d'impuissance et de découragement. Mais elle est aussi profondément injuste à l'égard des populations en ne reconnaissant pas suffisamment leurs propres efforts de développement. Elle met en outre en péril l'investissement que font de nombreuses ONG européennes dans l'éducation au développement. La «version» donnée par ces ONG ne consiste pas en reportages spectaculaires sur la famine et la guerre : elle est une recherche des causes, une analyse des relations Nord-Sud et le message des solutions structurelles dans une perspective de long terme.

En résumé, c'est à nous — au niveau européen — qu'il appartient de savoir si l'attention accordée par les médias à l'aide d'urgence, et se reflétant dans des principes tels que l'efficacité et la visibilité, ne risque pas de porter préjudice à l'aide au développement structurel, laquelle est de toute façon moins facilement comprise et plus difficilement «acceptable» par l'opinion publique. Cette question préoccupe directement les ONG comme les pays en développement eux-mêmes.

Des programmes de réhabilitation pour faciliter la transition

Nous avons déjà évoqué la continuité que doivent assurer l'aide d'urgence, les programmes de réhabilitation et l'aide structurelle. Les pays frappés par des catastrophes naturelles, la famine ou la guerre civile ne peuvent absolument pas assumer seuls la transition de l'aide d'urgence au développement structurel. Les ONG européennes attirent l'attention des décideurs européens sur ce problème depuis des années. L'objet des programmes de réhabilitation doit donc être d'aider les populations locales à recommencer leurs cultures alimentaires, à réparer l'infrastructure agricole et de transport détruite, à reconstruire l'infrastructure administrative perdue, etc.; en d'autres termes, de rétablir les services et infrastructures de base sur lesquels le développement structurel pourra venir se greffer.

Les ONG ont donc approuvé les dispositions prises par le Ministre danois de la Coopération, Helle Degn, et par Maniel Marin de la Commission. Elles ont promis au Commissaire leur

soutien sans réserve pour tâcher de faire adopter sa proposition d'un programme global de réhabilitation d'un milliard d'euros par le prochain Conseil européen des Ministres. Entre-temps, à l'invitation de M. Marin, un organe de coopération positive réunissant la Commission européenne et les ONG a été mis en place pour préparer et lancer des programmes de réhabilitation dans cinq pays africains. Les discussions sont intervenues dans un climat de respect des contributions et initiatives réciproques.

L'identité des ONG

Les ONG sont de plus en plus souvent approchées au titre d'instruments de la politique européenne de développement. Le phénomène s'amplifie d'ailleurs puisque les agences des Nations Unies ont, elles aussi, tendance à faire appel aux services d'organisations non gouvernementales pour l'exécution de leurs programmes sur le terrain. Nous ne voyons aucune objection à cette démarche à condition que la totale liberté de choix et d'action de l'ONG concernée soit respectée. Mais tout le problème est là.

En réalité, nous avons l'impression que les décideurs européens veulent prendre des orientations rigoureuses et cherchent ensuite des organisations pour réaliser leurs objectifs. Ils sont généralement disposés à apporter les ressources financières requises, et il va sans dire que les ONG sont toutes disposées à agir en qualité de partenaires.

La caractéristique particulière du travail de développement mené par les ONG est la volonté de réagir, en coopération avec les organisations locales, aux besoins par la recherche de réponses les plus adéquates. Ce qui implique que le point de départ de toute action d'une ONG doit être l'identification précise de ces besoins. Le processus doit se dérouler sans interférence extérieure, sans la pression des objectifs ou obligations politiques liés aux directives politiques. Les décideurs européens ont, eux aussi, tout intérêt à défendre ces principes afin de ne pas perdre un facteur majeur (complémentaire) de développement en le réduisant au simple rôle d'agent exécutif.

Bref, le débat porte aujourd'hui sur la liberté d'action des ONG de formuler elles-mêmes les objectifs des projets et programmes, et de les exécuter avec l'appui financier des gouver-

nements. Nous sommes conscients que la manière dont l'autonomie des ONG est garantie dépend du type de relation de coopération qu'elles entretiennent avec la Commission européenne. Si les objectifs du programme de développement, l'approche pragmatique et la méthodologie sont élaborés dans le cadre d'une discussion commune, le droit d'initiative des ONG peut jouer en plein. Mais il en va tout autrement dans le cas d'un programme élaboré en détail par les responsables européens avant d'être offert sur « le marché des ONG » en vue de sa mise en œuvre.

Les expériences de l'aide d'urgence donnent matière à réflexion dans ce domaine. ECHO lui-même a récemment sélectionné une série d'ONG et les a invitées à conclure un accord général dans lequel s'inscrirait leur future collaboration. Cette approche est malheureusement orientée de manière trop exclusive vers les souhaits de la Commission européenne et ne donne pas à l'expérience spécifique de terrain et au savoir-faire de nombreuses ONG la place qui leur revient. Elle ne prend pas suffisamment en considération la contribution particulière que peut apporter toute ONG dans le domaine des programmes d'aide d'urgence comme dans tous les autres.

Nous avons connu des expériences plus positives avec des programmes de réhabilitation menés dans cinq pays africains et auxquels chaque ONG, quelle que soit sa taille, a pu contribuer dans le cadre des objectifs conjointement fixés par la Commission et le Comité de Liaison ONG-CE.

Nous ne souhaitons pas davantage passer sous silence la responsabilité particulière des ONG, qui a également sa place dans ce débat. Que des fonds soient mis à disposition pour certains programmes ne signifie pas que les ONG soient tenues de s'adapter à ces programmes: en agissant ainsi, elles renonceraient à leur propre identité.

Les ONG et les « autorités »

Il convient également d'évoquer dans cette discussion la relation entre les ONG et les « autorités » sur le terrain. Mettre ces deux parties dans des camps opposés ou se replier sur des positions unilatérales) en affirmant que tout ce que fait

l'Etat est mauvais et tout ce que font les ONG est bon, ou l'inverse, n'est pas la bonne approche car elle ne mène nulle part.

La relation entre l'Etat et les ONG est perpétuellement mouvante puisqu'elle tient compte des évolutions politiques et sociales dans plusieurs pays en développement — évolutions qui donnent naissance à une relation nouvelle et différente entre les ONG et l'Etat.

Considérant la nature de la plupart des programmes des ONG, c'est une collaboration entre celles-ci et les pouvoirs locaux qui s'avère la plus indiquée. L'expérience pratique de nombreuses ONG démontre que ce type de collaboration ne pose généralement pas de difficulté dans la mesure où une bonne connaissance des conditions locales permet précisément d'attribuer valablement les tâches dans le respect absolu du principe de l'autonomie. Les problèmes surviennent en général lorsque le gouvernement central cherche à intervenir dans cette collaboration locale en imposant ses propres directives.

Ceci revient à une plaidoirie adressée aux ONG et aux gouvernements des pays en développement pour qu'ils donnent toutes ses chances à une approche du développement qui soit à la fois cohérente et en synergie à l'échelon local. Ce qui implique l'abandon des préjugés existants et des approches unilatérales. La quatrième Convention de Lomé décrit d'ailleurs un modèle de coopération décentralisée avec les possibilités (financières) en la matière. Mais ce type de coopération ne peut aboutir que si les gouvernements centraux des pays en développement sont disposés, sur la base d'une confiance mutuelle, à déléguer les pouvoirs de financement à des niveaux décisionnels inférieurs.

Nous n'avons pu aborder, dans le cadre de cet article, que certains aspects de la politique européenne de développement envisagée dans la perspective des ONG, et sans pouvoir entrer dans le détail. Nous n'avons pas évoqué, par exemple, certaines priorités majeures des ONG telles que le commerce international, l'aménagement de la dette, les programmes d'ajustement structurel, le développement durable, la migration et la sécurité alimentaire. Nous espérons néanmoins avoir mis en évidence les principaux éléments du point de vue des ONG concernant la politique de développement de l'Europe, et les relations que les Etats membres entretiennent avec leurs « partenaires ».

EC-NGO Cooperation (Part I)

Evaluation of EEC-NGO cofinancing in relation to institutional support for grassroots organisations in developing countries *

by Geneviève de Crombrughe, Francis Douxchamps, Nikita Stampa

Summary

I. Origin of the study and methodological approach

In 1988, the EEC's DG VIII set up, on an experimental basis, a new mode of financing the development activities of NGOs. It was called "Financial support for the activities of a grassroots organisation in a developing country" (Chapter 12 of the general conditions of cofinancing). This modality basically consists in the EEC cofinancing (to a maximum of 50%) the overall annual budget of a Southern organisation. The cofinancing can therefore cover any form of expenditure by the organisation (including activities undertaken in favour of the beneficiaries of actions, running costs, investments, etc.). Thus the applications filed with the Commission's departments are no longer assessed on the basis of a single project, with its schedule and detailed budget, but on the basis of an annual overall programme.

Now, after four years experience of Chapter 12, the time seemed right for the Commission to evaluate the existing system, in the context of a review of the general conditions of EEC cofinancing.

The files show that only 25 actions had been financed within the terms of Chapter 12 by the end of 1991. The main users of Chapter 12 were Dutch (8 projects) and Belgian (7 projects) NGOs. The beneficiary organisations were mostly in Latin America (13 organisations) and to a lesser extent in Africa (8 organisations). None of the 25 organisations financed were really grassroots organisations: they were basically support NGOs.

To gain some insight into the reasons why Chapter 12 was under-used, surveys were conducted within 25 NGOs from 8 member states. These surveys revealed a certain distrust on the part of the NGO heads who had experience of Chapter 12; ignorance or mis-understanding of Chapter 12 was common, and in some cases its procedures had been incorrectly interpreted. Other NGOs were simply not interested.

8 Assessments were carried out in the field : 4 in Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, Chili/Uruguay, Peru/Bolivia, Jamaica), 3 in Africa (Senegal, Cameroon, Zimbabwe/Bots-

wana) and 1 in Asia (India). In each of these assessment missions, one project was assessed in depth and two or three others were more rapidly visited. A total of 27 NGOs or grassroots organisations in the South were assessed or visited in this way. Experts from the South as well as the employees of DG VIII/B/2 were involved in several of these missions.

The questions raised during field missions and visits to European NGOs led to an expansion of the frame of reference of the survey, which was agreed by the Commission. It seemed best to consider overall the system/s of financing of aid via NGOs, the constraints arising from the ways in which these organisations work in both North and South, and the relations between partner NGOs from North and South.

II. Evolution of the non-governmental sector of development aid

In this chapter, an attempt is made to place the evolution of the non-governmental development aid sector in historical perspective. We note that:

— the network of associations in South countries has grown considerably in recent years, and is today an important relay for many initiatives on the part of the populations and societies of these countries;

— the fact that Southern actors have to a large extent taken over the implementation and support of actions has led to differing orientations in Northern NGOs. Some of these have continued to implement and support action in the field, others mostly confine themselves to financing actions;

— the activities undertaken by the NGO-sector both North and South are no longer focused exclusively on humanitarian and charitable ends (satisfying needs), but are increasingly concerned with other fields : the organisational and political (support for self-promotion), the economic (support for commercial or productive initiatives) and the social (better coordinated management of activities such as education, health and urban sanitation);

— the increasing numbers of actors and intervention modes, combined with the lack of clear definition of the roles of the different actors, has

* Final version of a synthesis report written by COTA, 18, rue de la Saisonnière, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Phone: 32/2/218.18.96-Fax: 32/2/223.14.95. The authors were assisted by: Marie-Christine Gueneau, Mark Nieuwerkerk, Jean-Louis Schmitz, Jean-Marc Van Nypelseer, and Chris Wardle. The authors accept sole responsibility for this report, drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities, in conformity with all the stipulations of the contract including its annexes. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.

complicated the issue of development aid through NGOs, and conflicts of interest have sometimes arisen between the various actors (see 3.4.1.).

These changes, taken together, make a clarification and redefinition of the respective roles of the different actors necessary. Their needs and the constraints under which they work must be identified. Only when this has been done can cofinancing conditions more appropriate to the new state of affairs be formulated.

III. Strategies for reinforcing and funding the non-governmental sector in the South

The first part of this chapter is devoted to a clarification of the terms currently used to describe the various different actors which compose the non-governmental sector in the South.

— support NGOs normally have no social basis and are akin to charities;

— grassroots organisations have a social basis constituted by their members. They are organised around either an action to be implemented in the field or the provision of services to members undertaking actions in the field. This is the distinction observed in this study: we refer to the former as (first degree) grassroots organisations and to the second as federative organisations.

In their relations to international aid, federative organisations are akin to support NGOs; the goal of both is to support development processes, and their need for financial and institutional reinforcement is often the same.

Analysis of the limitations inherent in the mode of intervention of the support organisations assessed (see 3.1 for their funding sources and modes and ways of operating) suggests that they are essentially looking for a mode of overall funding: that of their Northern partners taking responsibility for a percentage of their overall budget. Overall financing, without allocating sums in advance to particular tasks, is more flexible and better adapted to the conditions in the field. It allows for better organisation of the support work undertaken by both NGOs and federative organisations, and more efficient implementation by the grassroots groups.

Moreover, overall financing allows the organisation itself to improve its own perfor-

mance and thus its own internal functioning. It is clear (see 3.2) that well-organised support organisations can offer better and more efficient services. The adoption of overall financing would thus contribute to the institutional development of the non-governmental sector in the South, and this should be one of the priorities of international aid.

Section 3.3 attempts to identify factors contributing to success and failure in the support of the non-governmental sector in the South. Organisational reinforcement, which should be the aim of Chapter 12-style funding, should be a continuous process tending to improve the performance of the organisation in relation to its goals, its resources and the environment in which it works.

Assessment missions showed that most Chapter 12 funding merely covered running expenses over a given period. Of the seven organisations visited which had enjoyed Chapter 12 cofinancing, five had used it to finance their overall budget (in some cases, a small proportion had been invested); one project had been used for property investment and for buying shares in limited companies related to the NGO; one project allowed the beneficiary NGO to endow itself with capital; and in no case had cofinancing been used for a real organisational development or reinforcement.

This is probably because the results required under the terms of Chapter 12 refer only to the realisation of the scheduled activities and not to the improvement of the organisation itself. It is therefore essential that overall funding should hereafter be considered rather as an *Investment in the organisation* (human or material) than as simply financing its running costs. To this end, it would be best to establish a sort of *contract of aims* in relation to Chapter 12 cofinancing. The contract would bear on the improvement of organisational efficiency, with a view to offering better support to the beneficiaries of the organisation's services. But reaching objectives of this kind requires a whole range of forms of external support, and this will of course have implications for the role of Northern NGOs and for the actions and organisations that they support in the South.

Section 3.4 is a study in greater depth of the sources and modalities of the funding of Southern organisations, with particular emphasis on their autonomy of operation. The full significance of

this aspect is best understood in the context of overall financial support of Chapter 12 kind, insofar as the funding sources finance, for a necessarily limited period, running costs which the Southern organisation will somehow have to assume for itself in the future.

In general terms, Southern organisations are advised to diversify to the greatest possible extent their sources of finance. In respect of Northern funding, this means multiplying (within reasonable limits) the number of funding sources. Several organisations expressed to us during our mission in Africa their desire to obtain more direct access to the public funding sources in the North. The desire seems to originate in a certain disappointment with the way in which the notion of partnership is in practice interpreted by the Northern NGOs. The advantages and limitations of this mode of funding for the different types of Southern organisation are considered (specific recommendations on this subject are made at 6.4).

Southern organisations' potential access to local funds, public and private, is then considered. This is an important part of their long-term financial viability.

The chapter then deals with ways in which organisations obtain funds related to their activities. We distinguish :

- activities not intended to be profitable (of social character), where it is most important to ensure that running deficits are minimised;
- activities intended to be profitable (economic activities essentially undertaken by the support NGOs or by federative organisations in the context of support for beneficiary groups) in which the quest for a profitability threshold must be a priority;
- the granting of credit, which ought to be a profit-making activity, but for which, in the development context, conditions under which not all costs would be covered can be envisaged.

Finally, funds deriving from autofinancing activities not linked to the organisation's activities are also considered. The advantages and disadvantages of various formulas such as consultancy, renting out of premises, capital investment, and recourse to specialist financial institutions are considered.

IV. Strategy for reinforcing and funding the non-governmental sector in the North

This chapter, like the one on Southern organisations, begins with an analysis of the limitations of the way in which Northern NGOs intervene (resources, running costs, scale of projects, number of countries intervening, see 4.1), on the basis of studies conducted in 25 Southern organisations belonging to 8 member states. It then studies how these limitations are compatible with the constraints on project by project cofinancing systems. For the Northern NGOs, project by project cofinancing presents considerable disadvantages:

- assessment of applications is very slow. In some countries, the processing-time can exceed one year;
- the high workload involved in presenting applications, reports and accounts. These are often unrealistic, given the time elapsed before funding becomes available;
- there are often problems with the Southern partners, who find it hard to schedule their activities coherently, given the uncertainty and delays in obtaining funding;
- there are risks for the Northern NGOs which sometimes commit themselves to projects without any assurance that they will obtain co-financing for them.

Section 4.2 concludes that the roles of the non-governmental sector in the North must be redefined in response to the rapid changes in the South in this sector, and to the requests from the Southern NGOs for direct access to the Northern sources of public finance, which has traditionally been the preserve of the Northern NGOs. To remain consistent with their policy of reinforcing organised initiatives emanating from the communities of the South, the Northern NGOs must bring to the institutional development of the sector, and to the organisational reinforcement of the NGOs that compose it, an unequivocal, well thought-out and appropriate form of support. To do so they will have to work out with their partners, and on the basis of their partners' demands, a strategy for supporting the processes now occurring. This implies a reorientation of their support.

The several fields of cooperation in which Northern NGOs must redefine their "raison

d'être" and their strategies so as to foster change in their relationships with the Southern organisations are then presented as different modes of partnership. These are : methodological partnership; technical partnership; partnership for development education; lobbying partnership; thematic partnership; commercial partnership; and financial partnership.

To conclude this chapter, various observations are made about the operation of these kinds of partnership.

— They are important elements for the contractualisation of relations between actors. North and South, as they can serve to specify demands that partners are entitled to make on each other.

— To the extent that the financial component is no longer the sole component of the relationship, they are a way out of the usual donor-beneficiary relationship.

— They often require significant funds for activities (not confined to development education) in Europe. This aspect should be taken into account in the cofinancing conditions for Northern NGOs.

Section 4.3 studies the advantage and disadvantages of the redefined partnership. It concludes that the NGOs must be made more open, that welfarism should be eliminated, that substantial links should be created between the partners, and that the training needs of the Northern NGOs should be appropriately met.

Section 4.4 is an analysis of the cofinancing modes of the Northern NGOs; it is a quick survey of the different European and US systems, with particular reference to their more desirable features.

V. Diversification of aid-financing mechanisms

This short chapter analyses three financing mechanisms intended to create credit funds and which have hitherto been little if at all used in the field of development aid. They are international bank guarantees, venture capital companies, and leasing.

The assessment teams were able to observe six experiments in the use of these mechanisms. Analyses showed that these new mechanisms are promising, but they have certain limits and are

generally difficult to implement. It therefore seems necessary to organise a means by which such experiences can be shared systematically and in depth.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations for EEC cofinancing

6.1. Maintaining the current modalities for overall support for Southern organisations.

Chapter 12 of the conditions of EEC cofinancing answers a need which was very widely expressed during our missions in the field. It thus represents a indubitable advance in relation to the logic that underlies the working of Southern organisations. It would therefore be justifiable to maintain the modality of cofinancing in the perspective of the organisational reinforcement of this sector. But it is also clear that this modality is substantially underused. It therefore seems appropriate to remove the provisional status of Chapter 12 (which relates to its experimental nature), to modify certain of its rules, and to systematically direct projects involving support for Southern organisations toward this funding method. Finally, efforts should be made to promote Chapter 12.

However, it also transpired from our field studies that Chapter 12 does not offer specific and overall answers to the institutional development of the non-governmental sector in the South as such. The Commission should therefore support the identification of measures on the part of the NGOs which would reinforce this sector as a whole. Actions should mainly take the form of concertation and collaboration within the non-governmental sector and with the other local actors (notably governments), of creating a supply of services appropriate to the NGOs, and of the médiatisation of their work.

6.2. Considerations about the conditions of cofinancing of "classic" projects

Cofinancing project by project should

become the preferred mode of financing for grassroots initiatives from Southern countries. For this reason, we have set out a certain number of considerations relative to this mode of cofinancing. They relate to the following themes : the way in which applications are processed; the need for Community procedures to be more open, in relation to both Northern and Southern NGOs; the creation of a fund to help identification of development actions, the attribution of monetary value to local contributions; the funding of follow-up/continuous supervision; the form of financial and accounting justification and the sort of financial report that should be required; the assessments undertaken by NGOs; the percentage of administrative costs relative to the different type of project and NGO; the financing of new roles for the Northern NGOs in the context of redefined partnership; the formulation of conditions of cofinancing; the uniformisation of criteria and methods in the processing of applications; and a study of why projects are refused.

6.3. Reinforcing contractual agreements with the Northern NGOs

The quality of the relationship between certain of the Northern NGOs and the Commission justifies a degree of delegation of power to the NGO in the area of management of funds for cofinancing. This could be done by establishing with them, on an experimental basis and under certain conditions, contractual agreements for several years, which would be more stable and reassuring for the NGOs because of their duration.

The NGOs should only be allowed access to this form of finance on their express demand, which would be examined on an individual basis. They would then have to fulfil a certain number of objective conditions, which could be those now applicable for block-grants. Finally the NGO would have to undergo and in depth study of its methods of working and its intervention practices.

The next step would be for the Northern NGO to present a general programme of action for several years, along with concise details of its intended actions and the budgets these would require. The NGO's programme of activities would be accepted for its total duration, and funds supplied in an annual block-grant. Finan-

cial supervision of the general accounts of the NGO and of the transfers to projects or partners could then be undertaken annually. An NGO financed in this way could no longer present individual projects. Within the block grant, each individual action would have to respect the ceilings applicable to "classic" projects.

6.4. Direct funding of Southern organisations

Direct funding of Southern organisation is already practiced by several bilateral cooperation agencies. It is practised by the EEC itself with Chilean NGOs and, in ACP countries, with Microprojects, and the implementation of EDF projects by local NGOs. Since one of the fundamental point in these experiments is decentralising decision-making, the management by Brussels of this kind of cofinancing is inappropriate and unrealistic. In ACP countries, the experiment could be made using the budgetary possibilities offered by Microrealisations and decentralised cooperation. For non-ACP countries, a new budgetary line would be necessary.

A certain number of "focal countries" in which there have traditionally been significant levels of NGO cofinancing, and in which it would therefore be justifiable to establish a coordination structure, would be chosen for the experiment. Direct funding of Southern NGOs would make no sense in the absence of:

- an expanded role for EEC Delegations;
- the creation or selection of a body which would serve as an interface between the Delegations and NGOs. This body would have to be autonomous in relation to the local administration. Its main functions would be to process applications and follow up projects;
- the establishing of an advisory committee or a joint commission (comprising representatives of the NGOs, the local authorities and the EEC, as well as independent persons involved in the development of the country) which would analyse the applications and advise the decision-making body.

6.5. Structural improvement of the functioning of the Community cofinancing system

A certain number of problems in the man-

agement of community cofinancing have emerged in the course of this investigation. They are problems whose effects are felt right down the chain of development cofinancing through NGOs. The report suggests various lines of thought on this matter. The overall aim of the improvements to the system would be to reduce the quantity of administrative work of the Cofinancing Unit and the NGOs, and to concentrate on quality of work, in order to ensure the continuity and the stability of development funding via the NGOs, in the North and South. Suggested ways of doing this include:

- increasing the budgetary, human, and logistical resources of Community Cofinancing Unit;
- harmonisation of Commission and member states cofinancing conditions;
- a more efficient distribution of roles and a greater complementarity between national and Community systems.

I. Origin of the study and methodological approach

One of the major recommendations of the assessment of EEC cofinancing of European NGOs, which was conducted in 1985 (1) was that the institutions or organisations involved in aiding non-governmental development should be strengthened, at every level; this included the sources of public funding in the North, the Northern and Southern NGOs and the grassroots organisations in the South.

In this perspective, it was clear that the priority of public or private bodies funding Southern actors should be to originate measures and take steps to benefit the latter. For Northern NGOs, this meant reducing their direct involvement in the preparation and carrying out of projects, and entrusting these tasks increasingly to their Southern partners. For the cofinancing body, it meant setting up modes and procedures of funding of support for local organisations on the basis of the overall programme of the latter, and to go beyond the traditional project by project approach (2).

It was with this in mind that, in 1988, DG VIII of the CEC set up on an experimental basis a new modality of funding NGO's development activities, entitled *Financial Support for the Activities*

of a Grassroots Organisation based in a Developing Country" (Chapter 12 or general conditions of cofinancing).

This modality basically consists of the EEC cofinancing to a maximum of 50% the overall annual budget of a Southern organisation. The funding can therefore cover any kind of expenses made by the organisation, including activities on behalf of beneficiaries, running expenses, investments, an so on. The applications presented to the Commission's departments are considered on the basis of an overall annual programme of activities (along with the activities report, accounts and balance sheets of the three previous years) and no longer on the basis of a specific project with its detailed programme and budget. Similarly, as regards supervision, the beneficiary from the South should not account for its use of the funds item by item but provide accounts, balance-sheets and reports for its activities as a whole. This means a significant reduction in the administrative work required of the Southern organisation and encourages the NGO to improve the instruments which are genuinely useful to in the improvement of its management (for more details on Chapter 12, see Appendix 2 of the french version of this report).

As financial support for the working of the Southern NGOs partners raised the question of the long or middle-term functional autonomy of the latter, the support envisaged had also to aim to improve their autonomy.

Moreover, the increasing support going into productive or commercial actions on the part of beneficiaries meant that funding methods should be of a kind that conferred responsibility, imparted dynamism and allowed for continuity. It is in this perspective that NGOs have experimented over the last few years with many different funding modalities, such as flexible funds, bank loans, investment companies, international bank guarantees, capital funds, and so on, several of which have been cofunded.

After four years of Chapter 12, during which time many initiatives have been taken in aid-funding mechanisms by the NGOs, it seemed timely and advisable to assess both the existing system and the projects it had financed. This would allow conclusions to be drawn and recommendations to be made for the future, with particular regard to the fact that a revision of the

(1) Report: "An assessment of small development projects", pp 58-61.

(2) Several forums, documents and development actors recommended this approach: B Lecomte's book *"L'aide par projet: limites et alternatives"* [Aid Through Projects: Limits and Alternatives], the recommendations of the EEC/NGO cofunding assessment of 1985 and of the OECD Development Aid Committee, the requests of the Southern NGOs transmitted via the Northern NGOs and so on.

général conditions of EEC cofinancing was imminent.

The job of assessment was entrusted to COTA in January 1992. It was planned in three phases :

1st Phase

- bibliographical study;
- study of Chapter 12 cofinancing applications;
- selection of the projects to be assessed;
- working out question grids for visits to European NGOs and for assessment schémas for projects to be visited in the field;
- studies of the European NGOs;
- first meeting for sharing information and scheduling the rest of the work;
- drafting a report on the first phase.

2nd Phase

- missions in the field
- drafting mission reports.

3rd Phase

- second meeting for sharing information and synthesis;
- drafting the final report.

For each of the projects studied from application files, the following summary details were noted :

1. Geographical origin of the European NGO which presented the project;
2. Geographical origin of the beneficiary NGO;
3. Beneficiary NGO type (support NGO or grassroots organisation);
4. Duration of the action envisaged (and possible constraints related to this criterion);
5. Type of activities carried out by the beneficiary NGO;
6. Budget of the NGO, divided according to source;
7. Percentage of the beneficiary NGO's own financial resources and origin of these resources;
8. Type of use of Chapter 12 cofinancing envisaged (running expenses, creation of capital reserves, investments,...);
9. Original or innovative aspects in the activities of the NGO and its mode of funding.

Study of the application files revealed certain points :

- 25 actions were financed under Chapter 12 before the end of 1991 (1988: 1, 1989: 9, 1990: 8,

1991: 7). Thus the number of beneficiary organisations is small and decreasing;

— the main users of Chapter 12 are Dutch (8 projects) and Belgian NGOs (7 projects); then come Spanish (4 projects), German (3 projects), British (2 projects) and French (1 project) NGOs; no Irish, Greek, Danish, Luxembourg, Italian or Portuguese NGOs have used Chapter 12;

— beneficiary organisations are mainly in Latin America (13 organisations); then come Africa (8), Asia (3), and Oceania (1);

— of the 25 organisation financed, none was really a grassroots organisation : they were basically support NGOs (for a definition of this concept, see Chapter III, page 7).

Following study of the applications and first contacts with the European NGOs who had promoted Chapter 12 projects, two things became clear. The number of projects available for selection for the 8 field missions was very small (25 projects), and it was still further reduced by the fact that many of these projects (in particular, the majority of the projects of the Dutch NGOs) had recently been evaluated. It was therefore decided, with the permission of the relevant Units of the Commission, to widen the selection to projects using original funding mechanisms and also to projects benefiting grassroots organisations, in order to establish the extent to which the latter might eligible for Chapter 12.

The criteria used for the selection of projects to be assessed in the field were, in order of importance :

- the innovatory characteristics of the action and of the funding mechanism (point 9 of the summary details);
- the type of use made of cofinancing (point 8);
- the geographical spread of the actions in the South, between Africa, Latin America, and Asia (point 2).

As to the European NGOs, 25 were studied : 3 in Germany, 4 in Belgium, 4 in Denmark, 1 in Spain, 3 in France, 4 in Italy, 3 in Holland, and 3 in the UK. The NGOs studied were primarily those which had presented projects for Chapter 12 and/or those whose projects had been or were about to be assessed in the field. However, visits to Italy, France and Denmark were organised in an effort to grasp why the NGOs of these countries had made little or no use of Chapter 12. These studies revealed a degree of distrust

on the part of some NGOs who had experience of Chapter 12, incorrect information about it in many cases and in some cases an incorrect interpretation of its procedures. Other NGOs showed a marked lack of interest in this modality.

The 8 missions were methodologically organised as follows :

— an assessment grid was drawn up and used in all these missions;

— four missions were undertaken in Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, Chili/Uruguay, Peru/Bolivia, Jamaica), three in Africa (Senegal, Cameroon, Zimbabwe/Botswana) and one in Asia (India);

— the geographical spread of these projects is similar to that of the projects cofunded under Chapter 12;

— for each mission, one project was assessed in depth and two or three others received a more rapid visit;

— 27 Southern NGO or grassroots organisations were assessed or visited in this way;

— the in-depth assessments were, for the most part, of Chapter 12 projects (6 missions); one grassroots organisation project (since grassroots organisations were not represented in Chapter 12 projects) and one project of an NGO using an original funding method were also assessed in depth;

— Southern experts as well as DG VIII/B/2 employees were involved in several of the missions;

— NGOs' own assessment reports relating to other Chapter 12 projects were used.

The points assessed during the mission were primarily as follows :

— the activities undertaken by the organisation;

— its institutional functioning;

— the reinforcement of its autonomy and its financial viability;

— its relations with the Northern NGO.

Two considerations led us to widen the study's terms of references. They were i. the issues raised during the field missions to the Southern organisations (see Chapter III) and the visits to European NGOs (see Chapter IV), and ii. the Commission's expressed desire that concrete proposals should emerge from the study on the subject of cofinancing conditions with NGOs. Support for Southern organisations and innovative funding mechanisms could no longer be our sole

concerns. We had to undertake a more general survey of systems of aid funding via NGOs, of the constraints implied by the functioning of these organisations in the North and South, and of the relations between Northern and Southern NGO partners.

II. Evolution of the non-governmental sector of development aid

In previous studies, we have described three types of function necessary for the implementation and successful achievement of development actions (which we distinguish from emergency aid); the implementation of the action itself, the technical support for this action and the financing of these two.

Today, many actors assume responsibility for one or other of these functions. But this has not always been the case.

In the first period of development aid, the period which followed the independence of many colonies, the three functions were generally assumed by a single person or organisation and its network. For example, a missionary structure implemented the action itself, obtained the technical help needed, and was financed by its network of supporters in the town or region it came from. This was a very direct relationship. A variant of this first mode of cooperation saw volunteers implementing the actions.

Later, communities involved in the action emerged as full-scale actors: villages, groups, cooperatives, associations, etc.. At this stage, then, the beneficiaries assume the first function, that of implementing the action, while the Northern NGOs or missions, their volunteers and other agents provided them with the technical support and funding necessary.

During the 70s and particularly the 80s, a third actor appeared. This was the Southern NGO. At first it carried out the support function; then it became an intermediary for the funding of actions. It gradually became the key actor in non-governmental development action.

On the other hand, the acquisition by grassroots actors of structured organisations began to transform the scene. Such structures (unions of groups, federations of associations)

often carry out both implementation and support functions and act as intermediaries for funding too.

Moreover, the appearance of new actors in the South implied new and more structural funding needs (the functioning of the support organisations which were being created had to be ensured), and this caused difficulties for the Northern NGOs, whose public donors were unwilling to invest in "invisible" benefits.

The number of actors in the funding of actions has also increased. Initially, the NGOs obtained funds exclusively from the general public or from a network of supporters. Later, Northern governments set up cofinancing systems for the NGOs.

Currently, European NGOs have access to their national cofinancing system, to Community cofinancing and to the funds of multilateral bodies. And several Northern states and multilateral bodies have already engaged in or are attracted to direct funding of Southern organisations.

Banks are also emerging as actors (many remain potential actors only) in the funding of actions, when these are not confined to the social sphere but venture into economic activities (production, services, sales). In this area, companies too are playing a role.

These facts give rise to the following remarks:

— the network of associations in the South has expanded considerably in recent years, and is now a relay for many initiatives on the part of the communities and societies of countries of the South;

— the fact that Southern actors have largely assumed the functions of implementation and support of actions has led to two different orientations in Northern NGOs. Some of these continue to implement actions directly in the field and to support them. Others confine themselves to funding actions, and to a lesser extent to technical support for them;

— the activities undertaken by the NGO-sector both North and South are no longer focused exclusively on humanitarian and charitable ends (supplying needs), but are increasingly concerned with other fields: the organisational and political (support for self-promotion), the economic (support for commercial or productive initiatives and

the social (better coordinated management of actions such as education, health and urban sanitation);

— the increasing numbers of actors and intervention modes, combined with the lack of clear definition of the roles of the different actors, has complicated the issue of development aid through NGOs, and conflicts of interest have sometimes arisen between these actors (see 3.4.1).

These factors taken together make a clarification and redefinition of the respective roles of the different actors necessary. Their needs and the constraints under which they work must be identified. Only when this has been done can cofinancing conditions appropriate to the new state of affairs be formulated.

Despite the numerous situations which require specific solutions, a certain number of common elements can be detected and some indications of possible solutions to the relevant problems can be sketched out. This will be our purpose in the remainder of our report. Of particular service in this enterprise has been the information we gathered during our missions in the North and South.

III. Strategies for reinforcing and funding the non-governmental sector in the South

As we briefly noted, different categories of actors interact in the South in the implementation of development actions. It therefore seems best to begin by clearly defining the terms which will be used, before studying the advantages, limitations, resources and needs of the different kinds of organisations.

Within the non-governmental sector in the South, *grassroots organisations* are normally distinguished from *support NGOs*. The former have a clearly identified social basis, constituted by members of the organisation, whereas the latter, in theory, do not. Grassroots organisations therefore represent their adherents, whereas support NGOs, of varying juridical status, are similar to associations created by a small number of people.

A document produced by one European NGO offers the following definition: "for a sup-

often carry out both implementation and support functions and act as intermediaries for funding too.

Moreover, the appearance of new actors in the South implied new and more structural funding needs (the functioning of the support organisations which were being created had to be ensured), and this caused difficulties for the Northern NGOs, whose public donors were unwilling to invest in "invisible" benefits.

The number of actors in the funding of actions has also increased. Initially, the NGOs obtained funds exclusively from the general public or from a network of supporters. Later, Northern governments set up cofinancing systems for the NGOs.

Currently, European NGOs have access to their national cofinancing system, to Community cofinancing and to the funds of multilateral bodies. And several Northern states and multilateral bodies have already engaged in or are attracted to direct funding of Southern organisations.

Banks are also emerging as actors (many remain potential actors only) in the funding of actions, when these are not confined to the social sphere but venture into economic activities (production, services, sales). In this area, companies too are playing a role.

These facts give rise to the following remarks:

— the network of associations in the South has expanded considerably in recent years, and is now a relay for many initiatives on the part of the communities and societies of countries of the South;

— the fact that Southern actors have largely assumed the functions of implementation and support of actions has led to two different orientations in Northern NGOs. Some of these continue to implement actions directly in the field and to support them. Others confine themselves to funding actions, and to a lesser extent to technical support for them;

— the activities undertaken by the NGO-sector both North and South are no longer focused exclusively on humanitarian and charitable ends (supplying needs), but are increasingly concerned with other fields: the organisational and political (support for self-promotion), the economic (support for commercial or productive initiatives and

the social (better coordinated management of actions such as education, health and urban sanitation);

— the increasing numbers of actors and intervention modes, combined with the lack of clear definition of the roles of the different actors, has complicated the issue of development aid through NGOs, and conflicts of interest have sometimes arisen between these actors (see 3.4.1).

These factors taken together make a clarification and redefinition of the respective roles of the different actors necessary. Their needs and the constraints under which they work must be identified. Only when this has been done can cofinancing conditions appropriate to the new state of affairs be formulated.

Despite the numerous situations which require specific solutions, a certain number of common elements can be detected and some indications of possible solutions to the relevant problems can be sketched out. This will be our purpose in the remainder of our report. Of particular service in this enterprise has been the information we gathered during our missions in the North and South.

III. Strategies for reinforcing and funding the non-governmental sector in the South

As we briefly noted, different categories of actors interact in the South in the implementation of development actions. It therefore seems best to begin by clearly defining the terms which will be used, before studying the advantages, limitations, resources and needs of the different kinds of organisations.

Within the non-governmental sector in the South, *grassroots organisations* are normally distinguished from *support NGOs*. The former have a clearly identified social basis, constituted by members of the organisation, whereas the latter, in theory, do not. Grassroots organisations therefore represent their adherents, whereas support NGOs, of varying juridical status, are similar to associations created by a small number of people.

A document produced by one European NGO offers the following definition: "for a sup-

port organisation, the institution and its target-group from two separate entities, whereas for the grassroots organisation, the institution and its target-group are one and the same thing" (3).

This is the essential difference between these two types of organisation, which are often required to perform the same functions. The term "grassroots organisation" in fact covers a wide and complex range of entities in the Southern countries; these organisations have different functions at different stages of their development.

— Initially, we find people from a village, a neighbourhood or microregion, who unite and organise themselves around a common project or a social or productive action, in the field. In these cases we speak of groups of producers, village associations, groups of craftspeople, cooperatives, or *comunidades campesinas*, and so on. These organisations act and have their impact at local level.

— Such groups often unite to form federations, associations, unions, trade unions, regional cooperatives, and so on. The function of these organisations is either one of service, support, and follow-up of their member-groups and/or the grassroots actors (technical back-up and organisation), or one of political representation in the field,

or indeed both. They can be intervillage, regional, or even national.

These are not of course fixed categories. There are numerous intermediate stages of development, and other functions for each category (4).

For the purpose of this study, we shall distinguish the different types of grassroots organisation according to the functions they perform. Thus we shall term first degree grassroots organisations those which realise their own development project in the field. We shall call federative organisations those which offer services to their members, whether these are grassroots groups and/or individuals. As we shall see, it is the functions exercised by the organisation that determine its eligibility for Chapter 12-type institutional funding. In relation to international aid, the federative organisations, in the sense given above, are more akin to support NGOs, since both have the same aim, that of supporting processes of development, and they often have the same needs in the areas of funding and institutional strengthening. First degree and federative grassroots organisations nevertheless have common characteristics, which will then be presented in a different way to those of support NGOs.

(3) *Reflexions sur l'auto-financement d'associations d'appui*

au développement (Reflections on the self-financing of development support associations), Lucas Van Wunnik, SOS Faïm, 1990.

(4) For a more detailed analysis of the levels of development and the functions of the different types of grassroots organisations, see the first chapter of *Supporting development action, from identification to evaluation*, French edition L.Harmattan, Spanish IEPALA, English MacMillan Education, 1992.

More or less influence for NGOs at the UN System ?

The UN Economic and Social Council is reviewing the participation of NGOs in UN activities. The review is to be completed by 1995. The Committee on NGOs recommends to the forthcoming ECOSOC session to establish, under the auspices of the Committee, an open-ended working group consisting of representatives of all interested states to "introduce consistency in the rules governing the participation of non-governmental organizations" in international conferences convened by the UN and to update the resolution presently in force.

Addressing the Committee's meeting, Nitin Desai, Under-Secretary General for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, suggested that the review should elicit views of various UN entities who have experience in working with NGOs, as well as from NGOs themselves. The traditional pattern of participation was changed at UNCED due to wide interest expressed by NGOs. Many UN programmes and agencies had already developed their own systems of cooperation with NGOs and following UNCED's example international conferences are introducing alternative ways of participation. Special, interim rules were also agreed at the new Commission for Sustainable Development.

Present arrangements for consultations with NGOs are based on the ECOSOC resolution 1296 adopted in May 1968. The main principles governing the establishment of consultative relations are :

— The organisation shall represent

a substantial proportion and express the views of major sections of the population within the particular field of its competence, covering, where possible, a substantial number of countries in different regions of the world.

— *The organization shall be international in its structure, with members who exercise voting rights in relation to the policies or action of the*

— *National organizations shall present their views through international NGOs to which they belong. The national organizations may be admitted after consultation with the Member State concerned in order to achieve a balanced and effective representation of NGOs reflecting major interests of all regions and areas of the world.*

— *Decisions on arrangements for consultation should be guided by the principle of enabling organizations which represent important figments of public opinion in a large number of countries to express their views.*

The issue of changing the arrangements for consultation is twofold. It would be in the interest of all NGOs to increase their participation. Fears expressed by some organizations that this will undermine their status, remain unfounded. NGOs should not compete with one another but rather should join forces.

However, it would not be acceptable if this were to lead to even more restricted arrangements.

Emphasis has been put on facilitating the active participation of NGOs from the developing world; but classifying NGOs into "northern" and "southern" has acquired some strange features. The criteria used for international NGOs is the location of their

members. Thus ICSW, for instance, is considered a "northern NGO", despite it having two-thirds of its national members in developing countries. Using the same logic, the UN itself could be categorized as "northern".

New rules applied to the Commission for Sustainable Development requests that NGOs produce their own statements for distribution. This may not be a problem for larger NGOs but can become a burden for smaller, local or national NGOs. For them, it is financially unfeasible to send a representative to UN meetings lasting from ten to thirty days, as it is the case of ECOSOC itself—especially when UN meetings are generally held at their main centres in New York, Geneva or Vienna.

Offering wider possibility for participation will bebut empty words if not accompanied by concrete financial measures.

Instead of increasing democracy, it will only give more appearance to those local and national NGOs operating in UN cities or their vicinity, or who have ample funds for travel. These are not "Southern NGOs". Even a world-wide organizations like ICSW can only afford to send representatives to very few meetings. When possible, ICSW has authorized its officers, members of the Executive Committee or representatives of national committees to attend UN meetings and conferences organized in their own city or country; but these happen rarely.

Sirpa Utriainen,
Secretary General ICSW
(News from the International Council on Social Welfare,
June 1993)

Sommet mondial pour le développement social - 11-12 mars 1995, Copenhague

Les Nations Unies convoqueront un sommet sur le développement social au niveau des chefs d'Etat en mars de 1995 à Copenhague. L'ONU a décidé que le sommet portera sur trois questions centrales :

- l'atténuation de la pauvreté;
- le développement des emplois productifs; et
- le renforcement de l'intégration sociale, en particulier des groupes les plus dévotagés et marginalisés.

Un thème majeur du sommet sera de donner force à l'idée que le développement social est essentiel pour le développement économique durable et à la sécurité internationale.

L'ONU a identifié les concepts suivants incorporés dans les objectifs du sommet:

- les besoins humains doivent occuper la place centrale dans le

cadre du développement et de la coopération internationale;

— la coopération internationale doit s'accroître en matière de mise en œuvre de politiques sociales et de stratégies bien conçues et efficaces, qui permettent aux citoyens de participer à ces politiques;

— la définition des stratégies s'impose pour traiter de certaines questions essentielles qui sont au cœur des préoccupations communes à tous dans le domaine du développement social;

— il convient de parvenir à un nécessaire équilibre entre l'efficacité économique et la justice sociale dans le contexte d'un développement équitable et durable, orienté vers le progrès;

— l'interaction entre la fonction sociale de l'Etat, les réactions du marché aux exigences d'ordre social et les impératifs d'un

développement durable doit être bien prise en compte;

— les problèmes communs aux groupes socialement marginalisés et désavantagés sont à identifier;

— des ressources sont à mobiliser en vue du développement social et d'une efficacité accrue des institutions.

L'intention du sommet est d'arriver à un accord sur une déclaration et un plan d'action. On s'attend cependant à ce que l'activité principale et l'impact aient lieu avant et après du sommet. On vise aussi à avoir des activités aux niveaux national, local aussi bien qu'au niveau international. Les résultats doivent inclure les engagements des gouvernements, des institutions internationales, des organisations non gouvernementales, des entreprises commerciales et autres.
(Information du CIAS)

Syndicalisme international

La CISL et la Confédération européenne des syndicats (CES) ont inauguré le 1^{er} décembre 1993 leurs nouveaux locaux dans le centre de Bruxelles.

Le bâtiment de 10 étages, dont six appartiennent à l'« International Trade Union House» (Maison syndicale internationale), abritera diverses institutions associées à la CES, l'Internationale de l'éducation et la représentation à Bruxelles d'organisations syndicales de plusieurs pays.

L'inauguration du bâtiment a eu lieu en présence, entre autres, de Monsieur Michel Hansenne, directeur général du Bureau

Monsieur Jacques Delors, président de la Commission européenne.

Les présidents et secrétaires généraux de la CISL et de la CES ainsi que les dirigeants des principales centrales syndicales du monde entier, qui participaient à Bruxelles aux réunions du Comité exécutif de la CISL, étaient également présents.

L'International Trade Union House, comprend toute une structure de conférence et quatre salles de réunions pouvant accueillir de 24 à 200 personnes, équipées d'installations permettant la traduction simultanée en 12

langues ainsi qu'un centre de presse ultra-moderne.

Le projet de construction d'un nouvel édifice avait été lancé il y a plusieurs années dans le but de rationaliser les ressources nécessaires au fonctionnement des diverses structures syndicales établies à Bruxelles mais aussi en raison de l'exiguïté des locaux, dont disposaient jusqu'ici la CISL et la CES alors que le nombre de leurs organisations affiliées s'est sensiblement accru depuis la fin des années 1980.

(Monde du Travail libre, décembre 1993)

159 pays s'engagent à respecter les conventions sur la protection des victimes de guerre

Les représentants de cent cinquante-neuf pays, parmi lesquels quarante ministres, ont participé, du 30 août au 1^{er} septembre 1993, à une conférence sur la protection des victimes de guerre, convoquée à Genève conjointement par le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) et le gouvernement suisse, dépositaire des conventions de Genève.

Cent quatre-vingt-un Etats ont adhéré aux conventions de Genève destinées à assurer la protection des soldats malades et blessés, des prisonniers de guerre et des populations civiles en temps de guerre. Mais rares sont ceux qui honorent leur signature. Alors que plus de trente conflits armés sévissent actuellement dans le monde et que 90 % des personnes qu'ils mettent en péril sont des civils, un rappel à l'ordre pour le respect des conventions internationales était urgent.

Dans de très nombreux cas par exemple, les civils réputés faire partie du camp adverse sont considérés comme prisonniers de guerre et les militaires comme criminels de guerre, en violation de ces textes. Le CICR est convaincu que si les Etats

exerçaient la pression voulue sur leurs soldats et châtiaient ceux qui violent le droit international, bon nombre d'exactions pourraient être évitées.

Le but de la conférence était de faire en sorte que les Etats s'engagent solennellement à respecter les conventions et à les inscrire dans leurs programmes d'éducation nationale et de service aux armées. Les participants (Belgrade n'était pas représenté) ont fini par adopter par consensus la déclaration finale qui constitue un engagement solennel.

Le texte dit notamment: *«Nous refusons d'accepter que des blessés soient achevés, des enfants massacrés, des*

des victimes privées d'assistance humanitaire élémentaire, que la famine soit utilisée comme méthode de guerre contre Us civils (...) Nous refusons d'accepter que les populations civiles deviennent de plus en plus souvent les principales victimes des hostilités et des actes de violence perpétrés au cours des conflits armés, par exemple lorsqu'elles sont délibérément prises pour cibles ou utilisées comme bouclier humain, en particulier quand elles sont victimes de la pratique odieuse de la purification ethnique (...) Nous réaffirmons notre détermination à appliquer, à clarifier — et lorsque cela est jugé nécessaire, à

envisager de développer davantage — le droit en vigueur relevant des conflits armés non internationaux, afin d'assurer une protection plus efficace de leurs victimes. »

La déclaration stipule également qu'il convient de s'assurer que *«les crimes de guerre sont dûment poursuivis et ne demeurent pas impunis»* et d'*«encourager la mise sur pied en temps utile d'un appareil juridique international approprié»*.

S'abritant, comme l'ont fait pendant des décennies les pays communistes, derrière les principes sacro-saints de la souveraineté nationale, la Chine, l'Indonésie, le Mexique, le Mozambique, le Pakistan, le Sri-Lanka et le Soudan ont tenté de s'opposer à ce qu'il soit question de conflits *«non internationaux»*. Or, la majorité des

conflits armés qui ensanglantent le monde sont des guerres civiles. Convaincus ou réalistes, les contestataires ont fini par se plier à la majorité. La Suisse a, par ailleurs, décidé de réunir un groupe d'experts pour rechercher le moyen pratique de promouvoir le plein respect du droit humanitaire.

Isabelle Vichniac
(*Le Monde*, 3 septembre 1993)

New... Creations... New... Creations... New... Creations... New... Creations... New...

Le Conseil des douze gouverneurs de l'Institut monétaire européen a tenu sa première réunion mardi 11 janvier à Francfort dans le bâtiment historique du Römer prêté pour l'occasion par la ville. M. Lamfalussy, qui préside le Conseil, conservera ses bureaux à Bale dans l'immeuble de la Banque des règlements internationaux, jusqu'à ce qu'un siège soit définitivement trouvé pour l'IME à Francfort, siège qui abritera les 130 collaborateurs de l'Institut.

Quand le processus conduisant au marché unique est apparu irréversible, son prolongement par une Union monétaire a été décidé au Conseil européen de Hanovre en juin 1988. L'idée était de compléter l'abolition des frontières et la fin des entraves commerciales par une monnaie unique.

L'objet de la première réunion de l'IME était double. D'une part, élire le vice-président de l'Institut, d'autre part, la constitution du capital de l'Institut.

Le baron Alexandre Lamfalussy n'aura aucun pouvoir sur la politique monétaire des douze pays de l'Union européenne pendant toute la phase deux, qui durera jusqu'à 1997 ou au plus tard jusqu'en 1999. Sa tâche essentielle — et importante — sera de préparer le passage à la troisième étape.

L'IME est l'embryon de la future Banque centrale européenne. Il remplace le Comité des gouverneurs des banques centrales des Douze, qui se réunissait une fois par mois, généralement à Bale. Son siège est situé à Francfort. Le pendant de l'IME pour les politiques de changes et les politiques budgétaires est le Comité monétaire, qui regroupe les directeurs du Trésor et les sous-gouverneurs des banques centrales. L'IME est dans l'orbite monétaire dans celui des gouvernements.

C'est l'IME qui prépare

techniquement la phase III de l'Union économique et monétaire: en établissant, en 1996, un rapport sur l'état de l'accomplissement par les Etats membres de leurs obligations pour la réalisation de l'UEM. C'est aussi l'IME qui supervise le développement de l'écu et la préparation des futurs billets. Enfin, si l'Institut a pour mission de renforcer la coordination des politiques monétaires en vue d'assurer la stabilité des prix, il n'a aucun pouvoir de décision, les banques centrales de chaque pays gardant ce pouvoir.

L'IME est dirigé par un conseil des gouverneurs, composé d'un président et des gouverneurs des banques centrales nationales, dont l'un est vice-président. Le président est nommé d'un commun accord par les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement, sur recommandation du comité des gouverneurs des banques centrales. Le premier président est M. Lamfalussy.

Managing the Nonprofit Organization.

by Peter F. Drucker, HarperCollins Publishers, 1990.

Can the management practices used by the Girl Scouts of America and the Fuller Theological Seminary apply to the management of information and computation resources in higher education? Yes, and Peter Drucker extracts guiding management principles from the successful responses by those institutions — and a host of other non-profits — to vexing problems and opportunities in their recent histories. Forsaking the jargon of total quality management while honoring its substance, he organizes and articulates the basics of successful management in the nonprofit sector, in which there is no bottom line.

I recommend this book to academic CEOs and CAOs, especially to those who must work with governing boards that confuse "management" with "bottom line". Drucker illuminates each guiding principle with a case study in the form of an interview with a nonprofit CEO, but his advice is scalable from the top down and applies to issues confronting nonprofit managers at all levels. Although not drawn from EDUCOM's specific domain of interest, his examples often suggest leadership parables for nonprofit information technology organizations thrust into the primordial soup of the client-server age. I thus recommend the book to my fellow travelers holding CIO-like responsibilities in higher education. Many of us face the daunting tasks of coordinating central investments in information services and technologies with distributed investments and, thus, of working effectively for the institutional good with advisory committees and working groups of volunteers whose primary responsibilities lie outside our central management span. Surely our customer base included these volunteers, along with a

heterogeneous mix of interested and disinterested members of the faculty, the student body, and the administration. Our management issues thus intersect those of the leaders if nonprofit organizations, who must depend on a mix of volunteers and paid staff members to meet service goals that substitute for a bottom line.

Drucker organizes his advice using five key headings:

1. The Mission Comes First — and your role is a leader.
2. From Mission to Performance — effective strategies of marketing, innovation, and fund development.
3. Managing for Performance — how to define it, how to measure it.

4. People and Relationships — your staff, your board, your volunteers, your community.

5. Developing Yourself — as a person, as an executive, as a leader.

Here are some advice bites found in or inferred from his development of those five themes.

- View change as opportunity, and select opportunities for which you want to be remembered. If success arrives, change things quickly.
- Focus on mission — rather than self — with a balance between vision and detail.
- Don't shy away from controversial goals, but know well your bottom line — the long term goals that can be assessed.
- Make important decisions controversially by and not by acclamation.
- Categorize risky actions as follows: (1) can't afford not to act, (2) can recover if action results in failure, (3) will sink if action results in failure;
- Test innovation, and separate new initiatives from continuing service, but not at the expense of synergy.
- Rely on competencies; don't do what you or your organization

can't do well, and practice abandonment by swiftly trimming the failing or training edge.

• Incorporate marketing into planning, and grow the organization at the place of the market to avoid becoming marginal.

• Segment, target, and position services, and don't use the same message on different segments.

• Don't assume that you are understood, especially on the first try. Invite questions from employees and volunteers, and delegate with clarity.

• Insist on teamwork, and evaluate individual contributions to the team. Always know and clarify who is accountable for implementing a decision.

• Develop standards for performance and strategies for improvement and innovation, and implement them.

• Give latitude to employees and volunteers who perform and innovate, and "feature star performers" as teachers of others.

• Encourage open dissent, but don't tolerate discourtesy and bickering. Bickering indicates a need for organizational change.

• Organize around information and communication, not hierarchy. Information must flow both up and down.

• Strive for excellence, and keep score.

Did I already know or intuit these guidelines? Probably, or so my academic inheritance of diffidence toward management deceived me into believing.

Nevertheless, I thoroughly enjoyed this literate book for the way it organized and clarified issues I face today. I recommend the book for its usually a learning experience to discover familiar issues in unfamiliar circumstances, as unfamiliar as the Girl Scouts of America and the Fuller Theological Seminary.

William Graves
(*Educom Review*, July-August 1993)

Development With A Bang,

by Gautam Vohra; Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi; 1992.

Most voluntary agencies are perceived as small groups of individuals working with tireless zeal in the remote corners of the country, but whose impact is not always visible. This perception is not off the mark. What is not so well known is that there are sizeable NGOs whose budgets may run into a crore rupees and more employing a few hundred people — some no doubt working with tireless zeal — which have had a visible impact in the areas where they operate.

Development With A Bang discusses the contribution of three such NGOs: Bhagavatul Charitable Trust (BCT), Anand Niketan Ashram (ANA) and Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP). The BCT and ANA are relatively old organisations with an enviable track record; the former has done remarkable work with women's groups which have set up

thrift societies that have changed the complexion of the villages; the latter has organised effective people's courts (Lok Adalats), among tribals that have not only enabled them to secure speedy justice but educated them on a range of government programmes. The ANA has of late come in for some flak from the NGO community; in particular the Narmada Bachao Andolan, since it is pro-dam and has been assisting the Gujarat government in the resettlement of the oustees; in the 1970s it came under the shadow of the Kudal Commission.

Like the BCT and ANA, the AKRSP's work too is there for all to see. Its impact has been through the capital-intensive co-operative lift irrigation schemes that it has set up; dramatically raising the incomes of the farmers in the command area.

Vohra provides insights by

examining a range of issues — people's organisations, professional staff, training programmes — with regard to each NGO. This is all the more welcome considering the paucity of empirical material on the voluntary sector. But the weakness of the book is its failure to discuss the processes involved in rural development. For change occurs through a process within rural India and it is not always quick, or dramatic. An answer to how these NGOs have been able to initiate, promote or alter this process, would have been enlightening. This is Vohra's third book on NGOs, as the jacket flap announces. Perhaps he has dealt with this crucial issue in *"Women In Bihar"* and *"Altering Structures: Innovative Experiments at the Grassroots"*.

Rajesh Nanda
(*Development Alternatives*,
May 1993)

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security,

SIPRI Research Report No. 5, by Stephen Iwan Griffiths, Oxford University Press, October 1993, 144 pages.

Since the end of the cold war, a debate has developed among practitioners and analysts of European security on the kind of political, economic and military threats posed by a resurgence of nationalism and ethnic conflict in Central Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkan states and Central Asia. This report provides an analysis of the significance of nationalism and ethnic conflict in these areas. It describes and analyses nationalist developments, particularly in the former Yugoslavia and the former Czechoslovakia, and examines the

response of the principal powers and the European security institutions to problems of ethnic nationalism.

As Stephen I. Griffiths shows, the re-emergence of nationalism and ethnic strife on the European political agenda presents formidable challenges to the states affected and to the available international security mechanisms. What emerges from these pages is a clear signal that unless and until the security implications of nationalism and ethnic strife can be contained in a framework of

integration encompassing the whole of Europe, greater instability can be expected and the two halves of Europe will remain divided. It is hoped that this Research Report will enhance the debate about these issues and stimulate further research into the new sources of instability on the continent.

Stephen Iwan Griffiths is a Research Fellow at the Institute for International Studies, University of Leeds.

Philosophie des réseaux,

par Daniel Parrochia, Presses Universitaires de France, coll. «La Politique Eclatée», 1993, 300 p., 198 FF.

Véritable phénomène contemporain, la diversité et l'expansion des réseaux méritent une solide étude. C'est chose faite avec la parution du livre de Daniel Parrochia.

Livre capital pour les militants réticulaires que nous sommes et qui mesurons à quel point, depuis quelque temps déjà, les réseaux ont pris une importance considérable dans nos sociétés. En particulier, la science et la littérature en parlent depuis

maintes années. L'auteur, professeur de philosophie à l'Université de Toulouse-Lé Mirail, examine ici d'une manière solide et argumentée les différents usages des réseaux, et s'interroge tour à tour sur le cristal et le vivant, autant que sur leurs répliques à grande échelle : formes objectives de la reticulation (réseaux de transports et de télécommunications), formes réfléchies des flux économiques et des échanges culturels,

architecture formelle (mathématiques et informatiques) qui les résument. L'enjeu est aujourd'hui dans un monde qui est un dédale et dont il faut décrire la géométrie sous toutes ses faces de maîtriser, grâce au concept de réseau, fluide et labile, et bien vivant, les «nœuds» et les «carrefours» principaux alors même que la communication est devenue un des moteurs principaux de l'ère dans laquelle nous sommes entrés.

Transnational Associations

Associations transnationales

Some items in récent issues : <i>Parmi les thèmes traités récemment :</i>	Issue number <i>Numéros :</i>
Transnational actors in the international system <i>Les acteurs transnationaux dans le système international</i>	3/1987, 1/1990, 4/1993.
The recognition of the legal personality of INGOs <i>La reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des OING</i>	3/1986, 3/1990, 5/1990, 6/1990.
Latin American Associations <i>Les associations latino-américaines</i>	6/1986, 6/1989, 3/1990.
INGOs' vision of education for Peace <i>L'éducation pour la paix selon les OING</i>	6/1987, 3/1989.
New social movements <i>Les nouveaux mouvements sociaux</i>	1/1988, 6/1989, 1/1990, 3/1990.
Cooperatives in today's world <i>Les coopératives dans le monde contemporain</i>	3/1988, 1/1990, 5/1990.
Voluntary work <i>Le travail volontaire</i>	2/1989, 3/1990, 4/1990, 6/1990.
Cooperation between INGOs and IGOs (Unesco, World Bank, HCR, EEC, OECD) <i>La coopération entre les OING et les OIG (Unesco, Banque mondiale, HCR, CEE, OCDE)</i>	2/1991, 3/1992, 2/1993, 1/1994.
INGOs' view of environmental problems <i>Les OING et les problèmes écologiques</i>	3/1989, 4/1989, 1/1990.
Humanitarian aid and humanitarian law <i>L'aide et le droit humanitaires</i>	2/1988, 6/1989, 4/1990, 2/1992, 4/1992.
Europe 1993	5/1990, 6/1990, 4/1991, 3/1992.
Language in a transnational perspective <i>Langage et transnationalité</i>	1/1991, 6/1991, 1/1992, 2/1992.
Civil Society and the State <i>La société civile et l'Etat</i>	3/1991, 1/1992, 1/1994.
Europe and Latin America 1992 <i>Europe et l'Amérique latine 1992</i>	6/1991, 1/1993.

Transnational Associations *Associations transnationales*

Forthcoming topics :

Dans les prochains numéros :

- NGO Policy Markers and the Social Ecology of Development
La gestion des ONG et l'écologie sociale du développement
- Globalization, Civil Society, Solidarity
Mondialisation, société civile et solidarité

Articles appearing in the journal are indexed in PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) and AGRIS (International Information System for the Agricultural Sciences and Technology), FAO.

	FB	FF	FS	f	US\$	DM
Subscription / Abonnement 1994	1.450	250	58	24.00	46.00	72
+ postage : surface mail or by airmail	300	50	13	5.00	9.50 16.00	13

Commande à envoyer **directement à / Order** to be sent directly to :
UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS INTERNATIONALES
Rue Washington 40 - B-1050 BRUXELLES, Belgique - Telex 65080 INAC B - Fax (32 2) 646 05 25

Order Form :

Name

Address

Payment enclosed

Payment made to your account n°

Invoice required

une facture

Date

Signature

Bon de commande :

Nom

Adresse

Paiement ci-joint

Virement fait à votre compte n°

Veuillez envoyer

Methods of payment /Modes de paiement

Mandat international à notre compte chèque postal n° 000-0034699-70 à Bruxelles ou virement en francs belges auprès de la Générale de Banque compte n° 210-0508283-55 Agence Magistrat, 1050 Bruxelles.
Genève: Compte n° 472.043.30 Q à l'Union de Banques Suisses.
Köln : Konto n° 1.0672712.90, Generale Bank & C°, Christophstrasse 33.
Paris: Compte n° 545150/04200 au Crédit du Nord, bld Haussmann, 6-8.
London : Account n° 04552334, National Westminster Bank Ltd, 1 Princes Street.

Transnational Associations

Associations transnationales

Redaction/Editorial
Jacques RAEYMAECKERS
Geneviève DEVILLE
Anthony J.N. JUDGE
Ghislain de CONINCK
Paul GHILS
Myriam SCHREIBER

Published by/Publié par:
Union of International
Associations (UIAI)
(founded 1910)
Issn-0020-6059

Editorial and

Administration :
Rue Washington 40,
1050 Bruxelles (Belgium)
Tel (02) 640 18 08 - 640 41 09
Tx 65080 INAC B
Fax (322) 646 05 25

Editeur responsable :
Jacques Raeymaeckers
Rue Washington 40,
1050 Bruxelles (Belgique)
TEL (02) 640 18 08 -
640 41 09
Télécopie : (322) 646 05 25

Subscription rate :
BF 1.300, or equivalent per
year (6 issues) + postage BF
270.

Abonnement: FB 1.300 ou
équivalent par an (6
numéros) + Frais de port
FB 270.

Method of payment :
Mode de paiement à
utiliser :

Bruxelles : Compte-chèque
postal n° 000-0034699-70 ou
Compte n° 210-0508283-55 à
la Générale de Banque, 253,
avenue Louise, 1050
Bruxelles.

London: Account n°
04552334, National
Westminster Bank Ltd.,
21 Lombard Street.

Genève : Compte courant
n° 472.043.30 Q à l'Union
des Banques Suisses.
Paris: par virement
compte

n° 545150-04200 au Crédit
du Nord, 6-8, boulevard
Haussmann, Paris 75009.

Copyright © 1994 by
Union of International
Associations. All rights
reserved. No part of this
work may be reproduced or
copied in any form or by
any means - graphic,
electronic, or mechanical,
including photocopying,
recording, taping, or

information and retrieval
systems — without written
permission of the Secretary
General, Union of
International Associations.

UNION DES ASSOCIATIONS INTERNATIONALES
UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
CONSEIL

President:
Marcel MERLE (France)
Professeur émérite
Université de Paris I

Vice-Presidents :
Frits HONDIUS
(Netherlands)
Secrétaire général adjoint,
Commission internationale
de l'état civil.
Raymonde MARTINEAU
(Canada)
Chargée des relations avec
les ONG, Office européen
des Nations Unies
Egon SLOPIANKA
(Allemagne)
Ancien secrétaire général de
l'Alliance européenne des
UCJG-YNCA
Trésorier général /

Treasurer General :
Paul E. HIERNAUX
(Belgique)
Président honoraire de
l'Association des chambres
de commerce et d'industrie
européennes

(EURO-CHAMBRES).

Secrétaire général /
Secretary-General :
Jacques
RAEYMAECKERS
(Belgique)
Ambassadeur honoraire.

Membres / Members :
Jean BOULOUIS (France)
Professeur émérite,
Université Panthéon-Assas
(Paris II),
Paul CARON (Suisse)
Expert financier
Christian DE LAET
(Canada)
Institut Gamma, Montréal

Philip EVERTS
(Netherlands)
Professor, Instituut voor
Internationale Studien
George KIBEDI (Canada)
President, GRIC
Consultants, Toronto.
Georges MALEMPRE
(Belgique)
Directeur adjoint du
Cabinet, UNESCO.
Gregori MOROZOV
(Russie)

Maître émérite des sciences,
Institut de l'économie
mondiale, Académie des
sciences de Russie.
Andrew E. RICE (U.S.A.)
Consultant, Former Deputy,
Society for International
Development
Cyril RITCHIE (Ireland)
President, Federation of
Semi-Official and Private

International Institutions
established in Geneva.
S.A. SAXENA (India)
Former Director
International Cooperative
Alliance.
Myriam SCHREIBER
(Belgique)
Vice-présidente, Fédération
abolitionniste
internationale.
Dusan SIDJANSKI (Suisse)
Professeur, Université de
Genève.
Gianni TIBALDI (Italie)
Professeur, Università di
Padova.
Auguste VANSTENDAEL
(Belgique)
Ministre d'Etat.

REPRESENTATIONS
PERMANENTES DE
L'UIAI
UIAI
REPRESENTATIVES
Organisation des Nations
Unies:
New York: Andrew RICE
Genève: Cyril RITCHIE
Paris: Maryvonne
STEPHAN

