NGOs and Democracy Building in the New Europe

Les ONG et la démocratie dans la nouvelle Europe

1991 - n° 5
This publication, produced by the UAI, appears six times a year.

The purpose of the studies, surveys and information included in this periodical concerning the international and transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations is to promote understanding of the associative phenomenon in a human society which continues to grow and evolve regardless of the consequences.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UAI, is intended to clarify general awareness concerning the associative phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, to inform associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them.

The columns of this review are open to association officers, research workers and specialists of associative questions. The articles do not of course necessarily reflect the point of view of the publisher.
SOMMAIRE

CSCE : a Potential Fertile Ground for NGO Action,
by Alexander S. Kamarotos 250

OIMG, droits d’expression des citoyens: quel accès aux médias?,
par Ignacio Ramonet 253

Le rôle des OIMG dans la promotion de la participation des citoyens à la vie politique,
par Dirk Jarre 255

Foreign Political Aid: the German Political Foundations and their US Counterparts,
by Michael Pinto-Duschinsky 263

NGOs in Development and Participation in Practice,
by Helena Gezelius and David Millwood 278

Le financement des actions d’ONG. Quelles contraintes?,
par E. Beaudoux, G. de Crombrugghe, F. Douxchamps,
M.-C. Queureux, M. Nieuwkerk 292

Changing Roles for Regional Membership Organizations,
by L.S. Harms and Richard J. Barber 296

Los encuentros de Cotonou 300
A Potential Fertile Ground For NGO Action

by Alexander S. Kamarotos *

The CSCE process, far from being recent, has its origins back in 1973, when it was called to fill the gap in East-West relations. At that early time it represented a hope for establishing a basic framework of cooperation. Being the result of long negotiations, the Helsinki process, as it was defined by the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and by the meetings in Belgrade (1978), Madrid (1980/1983), Stockholm (1986), Vienna (1989) reflected certainly the complex evolution of East-West relations.

In fact, at the end of the nineties due to the democratisation process in Eastern Europe and the détente among most of the countries involved, new perspectives seemed, firstly, to consolidate the process and secondly, to widen the range of issue areas in the political, economical, military, humanitarian, cultural and human rights fields (1).

What has been the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the CSCE process? What are the perspectives for the future?

These are the main questions that this article attempts to illuminate.

First of all we should say that the Helsinki Act did not provide for any kind of non-governmental cooperation or consultation. The only reference to NGOs was a recommendation to the governments concerning the part entitled “Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields”: It recommends the “expansion of contacts by way of further developing contacts among governmental institutions and non-governmental organisations and associations, including women’s organisations, the participating States will facilitate the convening of meetings as well as travel by delegations, groups and individuals”. However, this paragraph was the result of a proposal of Eastern countries and has never been implemented (2).

Nevertheless, as the experience of the League of Nations has proven, NGO action does not always depend on formal consultative status; in addition, a great part of non-governmental contribution remains informal even when consultative arrangements exist (e.g. NGO networks at the UN framework). In all the CSCE meetings without exception, NGO representatives were present. Even if they did not even have the right to attend as observers, they managed to influence the process.

The Conference of Madrid (1980) constitutes a turning point for the participation of non-governmental organizations at the CSCE. A substantial number of NGOs, very heterogeneous, imposed their presence in the Spanish capital. Being conscious of their exclusion from the formal meetings, they organized their own meetings as well as a great variety of parallel demonstrations. The most important was the organization of a NGO Conference, which was taking place at the same time as the CSCE Conference. This conference was organized by a NGO, The World Federation of United Nations Associations (Consultative status I at the U.N.), with the support of the Spanish government, including a financial contribution (3). The general title of the conference was: Towards promoting the implementation of the CSCE Final Act. Thirty-two NGOs and fourteen national associations of the United Nations participated in the meetings. It should be noted, however, that the organizations of dissidents (including the different national Helsinki groups) did not participate in this Conference and formed a separated group of consultation (4). The Conference was closed with the adoption of a NGO Final Declaration (5).

After the Conference of Madrid, NGO Conferences became almost a tradition for all the CSCE meetings. Naturally, the process of democratisation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, facilitated even more the access of NGOs and national Helsinki groups to the meetings. In spite of this, there was no evolution in the formal level, and it was becoming obvious that there was a need for a formal framework of NGO participation and consultation. For the first time the final document of the Vienna meeting gives the possibility to ask for the collaboration of NGOs and to

(*) The author of this article is a Ph.D candidate and teaching assistant at the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva.
NGOs in the CSCE process and especially in the Human Rights sessions without having the right to attend the sessions have access to the conference. They could attend to the decisions already taken in Paris NGOs should have access to the plenary meetings and authorises their invite their contribution on particular issues. It gives to NGOs access to the plenary meetings and authorises their presence during the Conference. Following this, several NGOs were invited to contribute in the meetings of Sofia, Bonn and the 1989 Conference in Paris for the human dimension of the CSCE.

In the final document of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990) in its paragraph 30, Part IV, which deals with the rights of minorities, it is stated that the participating States “recognise the important role non-governmental organisations, including political parties, trade unions, human rights organisations and religious groups, in the promotion of tolerance, cultural diversity and the resolution of questions relating to national minorities” (6).

During the same year, the historical document of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, in its “Guidelines for the future”, with a separate paragraph concerning non-governmental organisations, the participating States “recall the major role that non-governmental organisations, religious and other groups and individuals have played in the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE and will further facilitate these activities for the implementation of the CSCE commitments by the participating States. These organisations, groups and individuals must be involved in an appropriate way in the activities and new structures of the CSCE in order to fulfill their important tasks” (7).

These two references to the role and the importance of NGOs in the CSCE process and especially in the human dimension of the CSCE constitute an important step forward for the institutionalized participation of their involvement and their active contribution especially in the meetings of experts on national minorities (July 1991), in Geneva and the meeting in Moscow of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (September 1991).

The meeting of experts in Geneva, of particular interest for several NGOs in the field of Minority Rights, deserves particular attention. Geneva has the advantage of being the site of the CSCE’s main secretariat within walking distance from the building of the conference. This room was not only the centre of technical assistance for NGOs (computers, xerox, etc.) but also an additional place for NGO meetings, informal consultations and coordination. During the session several delegations accepted to address the NGOs and inform them about the different proposals at the Working Groups (10). Other meetings organized by NGOs dealt with minority questions, including a special meeting on Yugoslavia.

During the twenty days, non-governmental organizations took advantage of the possibilities given to them. Instead of having a separate meeting as in Madrid they tried to get involved as much as possible in the process, and this is certainly a positive evolution. However, the limits set by the absence of any consultative arrangement were too restrictive. As it was expressed in a memorandum to the 35 Member-States, it is unthinkable that there could be a three-week meeting on minorities without taking into consideration the experience of the groups concerned. In this memorandum they referred also to the difficulties they had because of lack of time for adequate preparation, lack of information and shortage of contributions to cover the expenses. Several non-governmental participants expressed the problem in obtaining visas and getting through bureaucratic red tape (11).

In conclusion, the recent experience of the CSCE meeting of experts on minorities comes to remind once more the urgent need for a genuine NGO participation (12). Giving full access to NGOs will help them contribute constructively to the CSCE process, especially in areas where NGO action is usually known such as the human rights area. In addition, this will give more transparency to the closed meetings of the CSCE which often reach stalemate (13). In this sense, Moscow is very likely to be a turning point. NGO participation will be put once again to the test.

Received July 1991.

(follows on page 277)
Le Portugal ratifie la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la personnalité juridique des O.N.G.

A Strasbourg, le 28 octobre 1991, le Portugal a ratifié la Convention européenne sur la reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des organisations internationales non gouvernementales.


Avec cette convention, le Conseil de l’Europe a mis au point le premier instrument international qui traite directement de toutes les organisations internationales, à dimension européenne et mondiale. Elle fait obligation aux États contractants de reconnaître de plein droit leurs personnalité et capacité juridiques telles que prévues dans l’État contractant de leur siège statutaire.

Pour bénéficier des dispositions de la convention, une organisation internationale non gouvernementale doit remplir les conditions suivantes :

— avoir un but non lucratif d’utilité internationale;
— avoir été créée par un acte relevant du droit interne d’un État contractant;
— exercer une activité effective dans au moins deux États;
— avoir son siège statutaire sur le territoire d’un État contractant et son siège réel dans cet État ou dans un autre État contractant.


(Photographie Conseil de l’Europe)
ONG, droit d'expression des citoyens: quel accès aux médias audiovisuels?

par Ignacio Ramonet

Dans une société démocratique, l'action des ONG se fonde, en particulier, sur deux libertés fondamentales: la liberté d'expression et la liberté d'association. Elles permettent effectivement la participation du citoyen à des expériences précises visant à améliorer le fonctionnement politique, social, économique ou culturel de la cité. Elles lui offrent la possibilité de défendre concrètement tous les droits de l'homme à travers la planète sans la barrière des frontières ou les réserves légitimes qui légitiment la diplomatie aux États.

Le savoir accumulé par les citoyens présents sur ces innombrables chantiers est immense. Au cœur du concert, au ras de la vie quotidienne, des souffrances et des espoirs des hommes, les ONG acquièrent une vision à la fois plus globale et plus précise des maux qui affectent la planète. Elles mesurent souvent les dégâts que peuvent causer des décisions politiques et économiques adoptées à l'échelon national ou planétaire. Présentes systématiquement là où les dysfonctionnements de tous ordres provoquent des points de douleur, de malaise ou d'insatisfaction, les ONG apparaissent, en cette fin de siècle, comme des témoins privilégiés de la vie vraie des hommes.

Quel profit tirent les médias de tout ce savoir, de toute cette connaissance accumulée? Font-ils partager à leurs audiences de masse certaines des conclusions auxquelles parviennent les ONG? Informent-ils correctement de l'action de ces ONG? A toutes les questions que nous pouvons nous poser la réponse est claire: les médias, en particulier audiovisuels, parlent peu des ONG et souvent mal de leur action. Que faire pour corrigier cette situation, pour vaincre l'apathie, l'inertie des médias?

* Directeur du Monde Diplomatique.


Avant toute chose : comprendre comment fonctionnent aujourd'hui les médias sous la domination, l'emprise du modèle télévisuel. Pour avoir plus facilement accès aux médias, les ONG doivent en premier lieu s'interroger sur les critères actuels du fonctionnement de l'information télévisée et se demander pourquoi les lois du spectacle ont fortement bouleversé le discours de l'information à la télévision et, de proche en proche, dans l'ensemble des médias. Comprendre pourquoi désormais les médias s'adressent plutôt à l'émotion des citoyens plutôt qu'à leur raison ou leur intelligence.

Chacun a pu constater, en fonction de ses propres expériences, combien les médias pouvaient trahir la réalité, proposer une version simplifiée d'un événement complexe. Qui parmi nous, ayant vécu une situation politique - participation à une manifestation, à une grève, à un mouvement social, à un colloque, à un débat... n'a pas été surpris par la version raccourcie, simplifiée, déformée, châtrée qu'en proposent les médias?

Comment contourner cet obstacle?

Il nous faut d'abord poser une question d'ordre politique: les médias censurent-ils l'information en fonction de son contenu? Ce n'est pas aussi simple. Cette suspicion, très forte dans les milieux de gauche durant les années 70, n'est pas toujours légitime. Certes, les médias de masse - et la télévision en particulier - hésitent à rendre compte d'une activité civique si celle-ci contredit frontallement la doxa politique dominante. On a pu voir récemment en France combien l'impact du livre de Gilles Perrault Notre ami le roi bousculait les scrupules de nombreux médias qui hésitaient jusqu'alors à évoquer la vraie nature du régime marocain. Sous l'effet du livre, le regard des médias s'est modifié; et alors que de nombreuses ONG avaient depuis longtemps, sans succès, alerté sur la situation des droits de l'homme au Maroc, soudain les médias confirmaient l'analyse des ONG, les sollicitaient et reprenaient enfin leurs informations. Ainsi donc, s'il y a modification de la doxa, du consensus politique, les médias enregistrent et adoptent instantanément cette modification.

Obéissent-ils au pouvoir politique? Au pouvoir de l'argent? Sans doute, en partie, à l'un et à l'autre. Dans nos...
américains diffusent son propre message. Hussein accepta, à condition qu'à leur tour, les médias l'adresse des citoyens irakiens. On sait que M. Saddam ser sur les chaînes irakiennes un message de M. Bush à prix élevé de la publicité qui, à elle seule, amortit souvent les médias écrits, parlés ou télévisés.

A l'heure des Marchands, les médias veulent des informations rapides, pleines d'émotions fortes, de violence, de sang et de mort. La télévision est particulièrement nécrophile, la mort (en direct si possible) la fascine jusqu'au vertige. Dans ces conditions, les ONG paraissent désarmées pour se soustraire à la vulâtivité qui affaiblit les médias. Car la plu-

d'hui, elle est un nombre de données précises souvent liées à une conception rigoureuse, exagérée, éloignée du citoyen collectif. Leurs rapports sont anonymes, leurs descriptions délétères, leurs propos-

tions raisonnables et reflétées. Rien de tout cela, ou presque, dans les chaînes câblées. Même le récit des affaires, des atteintes aux droits de l'homme laissent les médias saturés, bruts, insensibles à cette somme ininter-

noble de souffrance.

Et ce fonctionnement se vérifie quel que soit le sujet. On se souvient, à propos de la crise du Golfe, du défi que le président américain George Bush lança au président irakien Saddam Hussein. Il le mit au défi de diffu-

sent un message差 d'une heure! Aucune chaîne de masse américaine ne pouvait diffuser le discours du Président irakien à une heure de grande écoute alors que ceux de M. Saddam Hussein les mettraient. M. Bush avait envoyé un message de trois minutes. M. Saddam Hussein en discours de plus d'une heure! Auconchaîne de masse américaine ne pouvait diffuser le discours du Président irakien à une heure de grande écoute alors que chaque minute lui rapporte des centaines de milliers de dollars. L'audience aurait été - à trois estimé dans les cha-

nies de chaînes - trop faible pour amortir le coût de la diffu-

tion.

Est-ce à dire que le message de M. Hussein était sans intérêt? Certes pas mais le coût financier de sa diffusion était inférieur, semble-t-il, à sa valeur politique.

Tel est le système qui règne aujourd'hui les médias. C'est pourquoi certaines ONG - Médecins sans frontières, Amnesty international, etc. - ont elles-mêmes lancé des campagnes publicitaires reprenant des thèmes choqu-

vants touchant les citoyens-téléspectateurs et insistant sur des aspects qui peuvent susciter la peur, l'émotion, l'adhé-

sion sentimentale.

Communicons avec le cœur, plutôt qu'avec la raison, telle semble être la leçon que nous donnent aujourd'hui les médias. Dès que l'on souhaite s'exprimer à propos d'action sérieuses engageant le destin des hommes nous

mons connaissances aux lois de la communication domi-

nantes. Les débats télévisés, entretiens, interventions se font avec une préoccupation centrale chez l'animateur ou le journaliste qui dirige l'émission : faire courir, être bref, clair, sim-

ple... On chacun sait et les ONG mieux que quiconq-

ue - Amnesty international, etc. - ont elles-mêmes lancé des

campagnes publicitaires reprenant des thèmes choquantes qui peuvent susciter la peur, l'émotion, l'adhé-

sion sentimentale.

L'accès aux médias de masse, s'il est indispensable aux ONG, exige donc de leur part d'accepter ces lois qui régissent le spectateur plutôt que la réalité, l'émotion plutôt que la raison, la fiction plutôt que le document.

C'est pourquoi certaines ONG - Médecins sans frontières, Amnesty international, etc. - ont elles-mêmes lancé des campagnes publicitaires reprenant des thèmes choquantes qui peuvent susciter la peur, l'émotion, l'adhé-

sion sentimentale.

L'accès aux médias de masse, s'il est indispensable aux ONG, exige donc de leur part d'accepter ces lois qui régissent le spectateur plutôt que la réalité, l'émotion plutôt que la raison, la fiction plutôt que le document.

C'est pourquoi certaines ONG - Médecins sans frontières, Amnesty international, etc. - ont elles-mêmes lancé des campagnes publicitaires reprenant des thèmes choquantes qui peuvent susciter la peur, l'émotion, l'adhé-

sion sentimentale.
Le rôle des ONG dans la promotion de la participation des citoyens à la politique

par Dirk Jarre *

La vie associative: un élément essentiel de notre démocratie

Des estimations parfaitement conservatrices disent que, parmi les plus de 400 millions de citoyens, jeunes ou adultes vivant dans les 25 démocraties parlementaires qui forment le Conseil de l’Europe, entre la moitié et les deux tiers appartiennent à au moins une association/organisation non gouvernementale (ONG).

Incontestablement, la vie associative, aussi bien sur le plan local que sur le plan national, est devenue élément intégrant, voire indispensable, de la société européenne puisqu’elle reflète deux principes fondamentaux de la démocratie: la liberté d’expression et la liberté de s’associer. Ainsi, les ONG font partie de notre culture politique et doivent être reconnues en tant que telles.

Une définition simple et opérationnelle des ONG pourrait être qu’elles sont des organisations non commerciales, créées par une décision "volontaire", et aptes, à des degrés divers, de choisir ce qu’elles font et comment elles le font, indépendamment des gouvernements.

Un autre aspect important des ONG est leur caractère désintéressé; ce sont des organismes "à but non lucratif". Si elles ont des activités économiques - parfois très importantes - elles les exercent pour servir une finalité qui ne cherche pas le profit mais la seule promotion sociale ou culturelle des populations et l’amélioration des conditions d’existence de certains groupes.

* Président du Conseil international de l’action sociale, Région Europe.

Quatre fonctions principales des ONG

Pour mieux comprendre la nature, la spécificité et les capacités des ONG, il est utile d’analyser d’abord les différentes tâches qu’elles remplissent. Nous pouvons essentiellement distinguer quatre fonctions principales:

a. Fonction de service

Pour beaucoup d’ONG, la fonction de service est prédominante; souvent même leur seule raison d’être. En offrant des services, elles peuvent répondre de deux façons bien distinctes:

- soin couvrir un manque, c’est-à-dire une absence de services;
- soin permettre à l’utilisateur un choix entre plusieurs services.

L’absence de services, de manière générale ou dans des domaines particuliers - par exemple de services publics pour personnes en détresse, pour des besoins éducatifs spécifiques, pour des activités culturelles ou de loisirs - peut constituer un manque ressenti par la population ou par certaines catégories de gens et demande une réponse. Dans le cas où les pouvoirs publics ne répondraient pas à ces besoins, les ONG peuvent créer - et évidemment le font souvent - ces services.

Une société démocratique est basée, entre autres, sur la notion du pluralisme et donc aussi sur le droit de pouvoir choisir. Ceci est particulièrement important dans le domaine des services. Les possibilités de pouvoir exercer un choix influencent, en bonne partie, le maintien de l’identité et l’épanouissement de la personne.

Les ONG offrent cette pluralité et le choix de services, alternatives entre services publics et privés, entre des appartenances ethniques, des orientations religieuses ou idéologiques, etc.

La pluralité et la diversification des services offerts par

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 5/1991

255
les ONG contribuant non seulement à augmenter les possi-
bilités de combinatoire, des territoires, mais peuvent
encore stimuler la compétition et ainsi améliorer les ser-
vices, ainsi bien publics que privés, du côté qualité, prix,
disponibilité, etc.

b. Fonction de réforme

Il n’y a pas de doute que le rôle d’avocat, d’agent de
chantemps ou de reformateur est une autre fonction
majeure des ONG. Le “lobbying”, pour employer le terme
anglais souvent utilisé dans ce contexte, comprend essen-
tiellement les trois aspects suivants:
- défend les intérêts d’un groupe particulier, groupe éco-
nomique, professionnel, en situation de détresse, etc.,
- lutte contre certaines attitudes comme, par exemple, le
racisme,
- œuvre pour que certaines mesures soient prises ou non,
que des changements soient effectués, par exemple dans
le domaine de l’environnement, du cadre de vie,
etc.

Dans ce contexte, on peut distinguer entre le rôle du
“cheval de guerre” quand les ONG veillent à ce que les gens
reçoivent ce à quoi ils ont droit et le rôle du “réformateur”
quand elles œuvrent pour des changements d’attitudes ou
de politiques, des pratiques supplémentaires ou d’autres
améliorations en faveur de leur “clientèle”.

Beaucoup d’ONG agissent principalement comme porte-parole
d’un groupe particulier et protègent ou seule-
tement les intérêts de ce “groupe cible” dans des sec-
tions aussi spécifiques: social, économique, culturel, clin-
cal. Quand, par contre, elles se concentrent sur un seul
problème, souvent non matériel, nous pouvons les appeler
des “groupes cause”. Parfois ces organisations deviennent
si importantes qu’elles obtiennent l’influence qu’un tel
transforme en véritables “mouvements”, comme, par exem-
pie, le mouvement féministe, le mouvement écologiste ou
le mouvement pour la paix.

c. Fonction de pionnier

Le rôle d’agent innovateur ou de pionnier doit être reconnu
comme une des capacités les plus importantes des ONG. En effet, de par leur nature, elles sont beaucoup plus
libres dans leurs décisions et méthodes de travail que les
structures bureaucratiques et, par conséquent, infini-
ment plus souples dans leurs approches des problèmes
nouveaux qui surgissent dans la société, de situations de
détresse et des besoins changeants de groupes spéci-fi-
ques ou de populations entières.
Leur potentiel innovateur se manifeste souvent dans
des réponses tout à fait nouvelles et originales au x pro-
tion d’un esprit d’entreprise, ce qui peut rendre leurs
n’avaient pas encore été utilisés. Souvent, les ONG combi-
ennent l’introduction de méthodes originales avec l’appli-
cation d’un esprit d’entreprise, ce qui peut rendre leurs
actions particulières et efficaces.
En offrant des alternatives aux procédures existantes,
les associations ont souvent changé les attitudes des gens
à l’égard des structures et approches traditionnelles. Par
ailleurs, elles ont été capables d’influencer considérable-
ment la position des parlements et de changer la politique
de gouvernements dans beaucoup de domaines.

Une société vivante a constamment besoin d’innova-
teurs indépendants et audacieux. L’imagination et l’expé-
dimentation de nouvelles réponses aux problèmes nouveaux
ont d’une importance vitale.

d. Fonction de sauvegarde de certaines valeurs

La dernière fonction essentielle des ONG est de sauve-
garder certaines valeurs dans notre société. Par leur nature
propre, leur structure particulière et leurs orientations
aussi bien que par leurs activités spécifiques, elles mettent
en valeur et propagent des valeurs d’auto-protection, de volon-
tariat, de participation et de pluralisme, mais elles défendent
toujours les principes démocratiques de la protection des intérè-
s des minorités et de la nécessité de répondre aux besoins des plus démunis.
Ainsi, elles engendrent de la solidarité dans la société
et multiplient l’énergie des individus en la développant
dans des actions communes, orientées et coordonnées.

En stimulant la personne isolée et parfois passive à
devenir membre actif de la société, à assumer ses respon-
sabilités, pour elle-même aussi bien que pour la commu-
nauté, à participer activement aux processus de décision
dans les domaines politique, culturel, social, économique
et culturel, les ONG ne sont de vraies écoles de démocratie.

Et en assurant la compréhension, l’enseignement et la
pratique des valeurs fondamentales dans notre société, les
ONG ne sont pas seulement importantes pour ce qu’elles
sont mais encore et surtout pour ce qu’elles font et con-
ment elles le font.

Problèmes cruciaux
de la société moderne

La croissance rapide de la complexité et de l’intégral-
peindre de la situation, des processus et des problèmes
de la société occidentale moderne prouve qu’une con-
centration sur les mécanismes de décision et de gestion
politique, économique, administratif. C’est même à une
bureaucratisation croissante, centralisée et trop lourde au
sommet, avec fragmentation excessive des différents niveaux
ayant des visions trop divergentes des mêmes pro-
blèmes.
Par ailleurs, le cloisonnement dans le système adminis-
tratif est une des causes des coupsures fréquentes entre les
différents niveaux qui ont comme résultat, ignorance au
sommet des besoins et des aspirations véritables du
citoyen, mauvaise connaissance des conditions d’exis-
tence au niveau local, manque de “feedback” quand des
décisions prises à un niveau supérieur occasionnent des
problèmes aux niveaux inférieurs, etc.

Souvent, la croissance économique domine et sert de justification à la violation du système
de valeurs plus large dans lequel des objectifs à long terme
des ressources vitales sont sacrifiés en faveur de béné-
fices économiques immédiats ou particuliers.
Par ailleurs, le citoyen conscient et averti accepte de
moins ou moins les “idéologies des partis” qui lui présen-
tent leurs “paniers de la ménagère” contenant des politi-
quêtes plutôt étagées dans différentes matières, à prendre ou à laisser dans leur totalité. Il se sent aussi capable de se
faire une opinion individuelle sur les sujets qui l’intéressent

et d’exprimer des choix selon ses besoins et ses préoccupations.

Les limites du système de la démocratie parlementaire créent, de plus en plus, chez le citoyen, le sentiment que la "démocratie véritable" doit être plus que le droit de voter pour choisir des représentants parlementaires tous les trois, quatre ou cinq ans.

Il résulte de ces facteurs un désintéressement croissant du citoyen pour les affaires politiques, en général, qui se traduit dangereusement par la baisse préoccupante du taux de participation aux élections dans presque tous les pays d’Europe.

**Réponses indispensables du système démocratique**

La réalisation d’un des principes de base de la démocratie: le droit du citoyen, voire sa responsabilité, de participer activement aux processus de prise de décision qui affectent ses conditions d’existence et le rôle du gouvernement d’y répondre, doit continuellement être assurée, développée et concrétisée.

Il y a donc un besoin véritable de faciliter et de promouvoir la participation effective et franche du citoyen aux affaires publiques et dans les processus de décision entre les élections. Le citoyen devrait être consulté - le plus souvent possible - sur les sujets le concernant directement, par des mécanismes appropriés. Sinon, la démocratie perdra son âme et sa vitalité, sa capacité à s’adapter aux circonstances et aux exigences qui changent rapidement et constamment.

Ces consultations fréquentes du citoyen se fait le plus fréquemment au niveau local où prévalent des relations directes entre l’administration, les hommes politiques et le électeur, où les problèmes d’actualité sont, en général, connus et compris par tous. L’intérêt et la compétence du citoyen sur le sujet en question peuvent être, et le sont, le plus souvent, les seuls garants de la validité des décisions prises ou des actions entreprises.

La notion de la participation et la conception de la localisation des responsabilités se retrouvent dans le "principe de la subsidiarité" qui stipule que les organisations plus petites et moins élues devraient s’occuper des problèmes qui peuvent tout à fait être résolus par des instances non étatiques, par exemple les ONG.

L’idée du pluralisme n’est pas moins importante et présente deux aspects. D’une part, elle stipule que le pouvoir et l’influence dans la société soient distribués largement, évitant ainsi qu’une élite ou une fraction de la société prenne la domination ou la régularité. D’autre part, le pluralisme de structures et d’organisations offrant des services permet au citoyen d’exercer un choix selon ses besoins, ses tendances, ses goûts, etc. En même temps, la compétition pourrait avoir des effets positifs sur la qualité des services rendus, leur prix, etc.

Les ONG en tant que soutien de la société démocratique

Les ONG sont, d’une part, l’expression de deux libertés fondamentales et garanties de la démocratie: la liberté de s’associer et la liberté d’expression. D’autre part, il est évident que dans une société démocratique qui se veut garantie des principes de la participation du citoyen, de la décentralisation des pouvoirs, de la subsidiarité et du pluralisme, les ONG jouent, tout naturellement, un rôle très important, sinon essentiel, en permettant, par leurs caractéristiques, au moins en grande partie, la réalisation de ces principes.

Les ONG ont, entre autres, la fonction très importante de "structures médiatrices" entre l’individu dans sa sphère privée et les institutions complexes de la vie publique. Ainsi, elles servent de passerelle de communication entre ces deux sphères et en même temps de moyen de défense contre le danger de l’aliénation et la solitude de l’individu en raison des structures techniques impersonnelles.

Quand les ONG agissent comme innovateurs, quand elles offrent des services, quand elles font du lobbying ou savent d’avance pour améliorer les conditions d’existence, quand elles essaient de garantir les valeurs de base de notre société démocratique, elles devraient et pourraient influencer les décisions prises par les parlements et les gouvernements et les obliger à prendre les mesures appropriées.

Dans leur argumentation, bon nombre d’ONG peuvent utiliser les expériences, informations et compétences accumulées dans les services qu’elles prennent. Ainsi, elles constituent des réservoirs extrêmement précieux de connaissances du vécu du citoyen et d’expertise qui pourraient très valablement être mis au profit de ceux qui assurent des responsabilités politiques et administratives.

Sans les ONG, écoles de démocratie et paradigmes des valeurs de base de notre société, nous serions, en réalité, moins conscients des droits de l’homme et de ses applications, la participation aux affaires de la communauté serait moins répandue et l’individu serait plus dépendant des structures et décisions bureaucratiques, les citoyens seraient moins disposés à prendre des responsabilités pour l’intérêt commun, il y aurait moins de solidarité, moins d’innovation.

Et sans la compétence des ONG dans presque tous les domaines de la vie et de la société - compétence résultant de l’expérience directe de leurs membres - sans leurs efforts permanents en faveur d’un grand nombre et d’une vaste gamme de problèmes, les parlementaires et leurs parties, les gouvernements et leurs administrations auraient moins d’informations sur les problèmes actuels de la société, moins d’options de choix pour prendre des décisions et seraient donc moins capables de jouer leur rôle décisif dans le processus important de la recherche de choix équitables entre les différents intérêts qui se manifestent au sein d’une société démocratique vivante.

Dans une résolution sur "Les principes de la démocratie", datant de 1983, l’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe constate courageusement: "La tendance du citoyen de s’organiser dans des groupes de pression et des groupes d’intérêts particuliers (parties basées militantes) est une mise en garde salutaire (et parfaitement compatible avec le principe démocratique de la liberté) aux partis, afin qu’ils ne manquent pas à..."
leur fonction essentielle d'articuler les préoccupations réelles de leurs électeurs."

Nous avons bien besoin, aujourd'hui, de cette tendance du citoyen à s’organiser lui-même et à créer des ONG afin de défendre ses intérêts légitimes. Ces ONG sont à la fois un défi à la démocratie parlementaire mais, en même temps, un élément tout à fait nécessaire, vital et complémentaire dans nos sociétés démocratiques européennes.

Quelques études de cas prises 
d’un colloque au Conseil de l’Europe 
sur le rôle des ONG

A l’initiative de la Commission de Liaison des ONG dotée du statut consultatif auprès du Conseil de l’Europe et avec le soutien de l’Assemblée parlementaire, le Conseil de l’Europe organise, au mois de novembre 1989 à Strasbourg au Palais de l’Europe, un colloque sur le sujet "Les associations : soutien ou défi pour la démocratie parlementaire ? (études groupes a help ou a hindrance to parliamentary democracy ?) pour prouver que la participation active et engagée du citoyen aux affaires de la cité est bien la condition sine qua non de la santé de la démocratie et que les pouvoirs publics doivent considérer les associations, phénomène organisé de la participation, comme interlocuteurs privilégiés et non comme adversaires.


Dans ce texte, nous présentons ici brièvement trois exemples des ONG, leurs méthodes de travail et leur originalité dans le domaine des affaires des citoyens, de l’écologie et un office public pour l’environnement. La population locale occupe d’abord la presse et plus tard, après avoir été très hostile à l’action, se prononce en faveur du mouvement contre la construction de la centrale. L’intervention spectaculaire et réussie du WWF provoque un changement radical de l’attitude du public et des milieux politiques et administratifs de protection de la nature et de la mise en place d’un office public pour l’environnement. La légalisation de la matière bouche à manière accélérée. La région de la forêt alluviale de Hambourg devient Park national.

Le deuxième exemple, "Sésame, ouvre-toi, mais ferme ta bouche", concerne les problèmes d’environnement dans la région frontalière de la Hollande en Belgique et leur dépôt illégal de produits toxiques provenant de la zone industrielle de la Hollande. Contre le silence dans des cas d’abus.

Le troisième exemple, "La violence, flaire des faibles", montre l’intervention de l’association suédoise BRIS (abréviation pour "Droit de l’enfant dans la société" en suédois), en faveur des enfants maltraités et contre le silence dans des cas d’abus. En engagant des expositions et débats publics sur des cas concrets de mauvais traitements d’enfants, BRIS rend le public et les politiciens conscients de la gravité du problème dans la société suédoise. En même temps, l’association organise des services téléphoniques qui permettent de dénoncer des cas d’abus d’enfants et de porter assistance aux victimes.


Le monde post-moderne et la révolution du pouvoir

Sur la base de ce qui a été dit dans les chapitres précé-
dents, on pourrait être amené à croire que, dans l’état actuel de notre société démocratique, parlementaire et pluraliste, les ONG sont appelées à combler les lacunes du système des pouvoirs publics, c’est-à-dire des structures politiques et administratives, et en sont capables. Le seul problème serait donc de définir les rapports de force entre les différents acteurs et les différents niveaux, qui demain nous qui, qui contrôlerons qui et qui, et comment, bref, il s’agit de préciser les règles du jeu. De la déontologie à respecter par tous.

D’ailleurs, la situation n’est guère aussi simple. Tout d’abord, nous pouvons constater que le monde des ONG ne dispose pas plus des avantages de la “fontaine de jouvence” que les autres composantes de notre société, pas plus que les églises, les partis politiques, les syndicats, etc. Le développement des associations suit un peu le même rythme de vie que ces autres organisations: elles deviennent adultes et plus calmes, elles perdent leur spontanéité d’origine, leur imagination prélassante et leur “esprit de trouvailles”, elles s’organisent sagement et se surestiment souvent, mais elles perdent progressivement le contact avec leur base, leurs membres et leur clientèle, et poursuivent leurs propres ambitions dans le jeu du pouvoir. Finalement, elles deviennent poussiéreuses, conservatrices et s’isolent souvent, pour un jour sentir le renfermé, moisi et devenu obsolète.

Pourquoi, le phénomène associatif porte en lui-même, en raison de la vocaction d’organisations érigées spontanément par les citoyens afin de satisfaire leurs besoins, une énorme vitalité et une grande capacité de régénération: au fur et à mesure que les circonstances et les besoins ou aspirations du citoyen changent, celui-ci peut, librement, cette ouverture de nouvelles structures associatives qui y répondent. Cette extraordinair flexible et le phénomène associatif de devenir définit l’extréme vitalité et une grande capacité de régénération: au fur et à mesure que se modifie l’activité de chaque, toutes les structures associatives qui y répondent. Même si l’activité de chaque, toutes les structures associatives qui y répondent.

Mais un autre développement affectant progressivement les bases de nos sociétés d’aujourd’hui, devenant avantagé n’est pas l’action, à savoir le changement en cours de la nature du pouvoir que bouleverse tous les rapports entre les nations, les organisations, les groupes et les individus, auxquels nous nous référerons.

Nous vivons à l’heure actuelle l’effondrement de l’ordre établi des rapports de pouvoir et de domination, basés soit sur la force, soit sur la richesse ou les deux, soit sur le pouvoir et le money, soit sur le pouvoir et l’armée. Il est devenu nécessaire d’attendre notre attention, à savoir le changement en cours de la nature du pouvoir qui bouleverse tous les rapports entre les nations, les organisations, les groupes et les individus, auxquels nous nous référerons.

Nous vivons à l’heure actuelle l’effondrement de l’ordre établi des rapports de pouvoir et de domination, basés soit sur la force, soit sur la richesse ou les deux, soit sur le pouvoir et le money, soit sur le pouvoir et l’armée. Il est devenu nécessaire d’attendre notre attention, à savoir le changement en cours de la nature du pouvoir qui bouleverse tous les rapports entre les nations, les organisations, les groupes et les individus, auxquels nous nous référerons.

Avec tout cela, le pouvoir de chacun ne se définit plus par la notion de la quantité: en armes, en monnaie ou en nombre d’individus, mais plutôt par la qualité du savoir et des informations dont il dispose et qui sait stratégiquement faire voix. Dans tous les domaines d’activités, le savoir révèle comme source la plus démocratique du pouvoir.

Scénario du futur:
le citoyen au centre de la politique

Etant donné que le savoir n’est pas, ou plutôt n’est plus, le privilège des forts ou des riches, d’une part, et que loin de s’interdire de s’approprier, à ses services, s’approprier, à ses services, s’approprier, à ses services, d’autre part, un nouvel accès au pouvoir s’ouvre aux faibles et aux pauvres, des nations ou des individus. Le pouvoir se révèle comme la source la plus démocratique du pouvoir.

Les nouvelles possibilités d’information et les nouvelles dimensions du savoir ouvriront des nouveaux horizons pour l’existence humaine qui dépasseront de loin les règles traditionnelles de la domination d’autrui, de leadership, de maîtrise, de la nature et de la gestion de la société. Elles définissent, de façon révolutionnaire, le pouvoir entre les hommes eux-mêmes, entre les hommes et l’environnement, et entre les hommes et l’information, c’est-à-dire que le pouvoir qui se définit le plus convaincant.

A partir de cette situation, les organismes de masse (les partis, les syndicats et même les armées) perdent leur poids et les idéologies établies deviennent caduques. Après avoir développé la force de la solidarité et après avoir obtenu la liberté, les citoyens découvrent maintenant leur pouvoir de choisir et de décision individuel au moyen de l’information, c’est-à-dire au pouvoir.

Il réalise, avec ce nouveau pouvoir, qu’il sortit d’une multitude de dépendances politiques, économiques, sociales et culturelles et qu’il est devenu beaucoup moins manipulable qu’autrefois. Mais en même temps, il se rend compte qu’il est aussi beaucoup plus responsable de ses conditions d’existence ainsi que de l’état de santé de la société entière. Il ne suffit plus de faire confiance, en tout, à ceux qui “donsent savoir”, les leaders des mondes politiques, administratifs, techniques et toutes les “autorités”, ainsi que les savants.
Le rôle des ONG dans la promotion de la participation des citoyens à la politique

 Avec l'érosion de la domination par d'autres, l'individu s'inscrit progressivement de son acte d'objet de toute sorte de politiques en véritable sujet. Il apprend à mieux savoir ce qu'il lui faut et pourquoi et comment ses besoins pourraient être satisfaits.

Sans aucun doute, ces changements qualitatifs revêtiront tout l'avenir. Ces aventures donneront aux citoyens, jusqu'ici victimes de leurs adversaires (specialistes) trop souvent achetés à la dimension "homo oeconomicus", et développeront de nouveau le respect pour les aspects mortels des activités humaines: l'esprit de solidarité, la sens de la justice, le concept du partage des responsabilités ainsi qu'une attention accrue aux conséquences sociales et écologiques de l'économie du marché.

Le citoyen lui-même refera de plus en plus de suivre avantageusement tous les développements techniques et scientifiques. Il les mettra sérieusement en question et souhaitera exercer son influence sur la définition de leur contenu et de leur direction. Il s'acceptera plus que des décideurs ou des théories sont imposées à l'homme et dominent son existence.

Graaf à l'information, les systèmes de production, la prise de décisions, de gestion et d'administration deviennent plus et plus transparents et donc influencées par des particuliers, groupes ou individus, qui peuvent dès lors agir en unis autant que ceux "au pouvoir" jusqu'ici.

Quand les citoyens s'engagent en associations ou sous d'autres formes d'ONG, pour influencer les politiques en combinant leurs différentes capacités et leur expérience, les informations du pouvoir deviennent disponibles, ils disposent de sérieux avantages sur les structures politiques et administratives : une énorme flexibilité et une connaissance intime des réalités de l'existence. Grâce à ces atouts conjugués avec leur volonté d'exercer leur influence, leur disponibilité gratuite et leur possibilité de boycotter les pouvoirs publics par le refus de compter donner aux citoyens, et donc aux associations, un pouvoir qui commence réellement... dans un sens aussi bien positif que négatif.

Les responsables politiques et les responsables des associations feront bien de repenser leurs rôles respectifs et d'imaginer rapidement de nouveaux principes pour leurs relations et de nouvelles formes de coopération afin d'assurer au citoyen une participation aux affaires de la cité, basée sur de nouvelles possibilités, que ne se fasse pas malgré eux mais avec eux et qui le mette véritablement au centre de toutes les prises de décisions, décisions et actions. il sera ainsi objet et sujet de la politique en même temps.

ANNEXE

Cas n°1

BELGIQUE

Domaine : Environnement
Titre : "SEASAME, OUVRE-TOI, MAIS FERMES TA BOUCHE"
Un dépôt illégal de déchets toxiques près de la ville de Benagora
Présenté par BENAGORA

1. ASSOCIATION

Benagora (Belgisch-Nederlands Grensoverleg Regio Antwerpen) est une association de volontaires, venant de la Belgique et de la Hollande, qui agissent depuis plus de 10 ans contre tout attentat de l'environnement dans la Belgique et de la Hollande, qui agissent depuis plus de... (concerné dans ce cas de façon directe en plus!).

2. OBJECTIFS

Arrêter les transports des déchets toxiques venant de la Hollande en Belgique, arrêter les déchets toxiques de transport à partir de la ville, un laboratoire) afin de leur donner l'occasion de se défendre et de renforcer notre confiance.


Offre de collaboration avec les services du ministère, sinon attaque frontale promise de ses services (il a choisi la collaboration)

Actions juridiques : corruption entre fonctionnaires de la ville et les firmes privées (achat de doubles clés des portes).

Relation avec d'autres cas (comme par exemple Lekkerkerk, Hollande). Mentionner des noms au moment où il n'y avait aucun doute.

Nous n'avons jamais agi sans dossier, ni travaillé pour un seul parti politique, nous n'avons jamais organisé de grandes manifestations publiques.

4. FINANCEMENT

Budget indicatif 20.000 FB: subsides du ministère (concernant dans ce cas de façon directe ou plus!).

Vente de dossiers.

Aide financière des membres et de quelques communes hollandaises de façon officielle.

5. OBLIGATIONS ET SOUTIEN

Obstacles : les fonctionnaires qui sont forcés de se taire, des politiciens qui n'ont souvent rien et ne sont pas

260 TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, 5/1991
intéressés, ou qui défendent les intérêts des firmes pri-

vées; le coût élevé des analyses des échantillons toxiques;

le manque total de volonté d’agir des autorités locales; le
caractère continu des actions (volontaires et temps libre);

garde attention dans la presse (notre qualité de nos dossiers); le travail
concréte sur le terrain: pas de théories, mais des faits.

6. RESULTATS

Problème résolu sur place (on a forcé la ville à réagir

enfin, après avoir trouvé des firmes en flagrant délit sur le
terrain).

Législation pour des déchets toxiques dans toute la

Flandre (matières régionalisées en Belgique) - mais tou-

jours manque absolus de contrôle et de punition.

L’attention publique a été attirée sur plusieurs au-

tres cas similaires dans tout le pays.

7. DUREE

A peu près 10 ans (…) .

L'action se continue dans d'autres endroits: les ori-

gines du problème n'ont pas changé (industrie chimique et

pétrochimique forte dans la région, les systèmes de pro-

duction n'ont pas changé).

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 5/1991 261
6. RESULTATS
La constitution d'une commission écologique chargée de réexaminer ce type de problème a représenté un changement d'attitude. Par la suite, de nombreux citoyens ont lancé des campagnes analogues. Les municipalités et les élus progressistes (par exemple la municipalité de Vienne) ont essayé depuis de tourner le public mieux informé.

Les divers aspects du conflit de la forêt de Hambourg ont accéléré l'élaboration de mesures démocratiques favorables à l'environnement, notamment:
- création d'une agence nationale de protection de l'environnement;
- introduction de l'essence sans plomb et des pots catalytiques;
- amendements à la loi relative aux projets de centrales électriques visant à la protection de la nature;
- projet de loi sur la participation des citoyens;
- vote en face du public à l'égard des entreprises d'électricité marquée par le soutien de presque l'ensemble de l'opinion publique.

7. DURÉE
Première phase: Campagne contre la construction de la centrale électrique, 1979 à fin 1985
Deuxième phase: Commission écologique 1985
Troisième phase: Début 1985, discussion du projet de parc national.

Cas n° 3
SUEDE
Titre: "LA VIOLENCE ENVERS LES FAIBLES"
Présenté par: BRIS (Les droits de l'enfant dans la société suédoise)

1. ASSOCIATION
L'organisation BRIS (abréviation suédoise des "droits de l'enfant dans la société") est située à Stockholm.

2. OBJECTIFS
Considérant que le jeu des groupes d'intérêts et des hommes politiques a conduit le Parlement à envisager des idées nouvelles et à prendre de nouvelles mesures pour l'essence même de la démocratie, nous avons lancé des campagnes qui ont réussi à modifier la situation et la législation en Suède.

3. MÉTHODES (exemples)
En 1971, après la mort d'une petite fille de quatre ans provoquée par de mauvais traitements, une émission de télévision promettait de revenir à cette date pour rendre compte jusqu'à ce que l'enfant ait reçu une aide. Chaque émission se terminait par la question: "A quelle date comptez-vous régler ce problème?". Si cette personne n'ose aviser le même ministre des Affaires sociales et d'autres personnalités. Un des projets de loi proposés par BRIS concernant les châtiments corporels.

Le ministère de la Justice a chargé une commission de passer en revue tout ce qui concerne les enfants dans la législation suédoise. Cette commission existe toujours. Sa première démarche a consisté à proposer une loi interdisant les châtiments corporels, adoptée par le Parlement en 1979. Elle a également étudié la loi sur la paternité et l'intéresse maintenant à la défense des enfants parties à une affaire qui touche leur vie de famille.

Le BRIS a proposé à l'entreprise qui fabrique les emballages de bâton d'indiquer sur ces emballages l'existence de la loi interdisant les châtiments corporels, ce qui a été fait, si bien que toutes les familles du pays en ont pris connaissance.

4. FINANCEMENT
Le BRIS bénéficie d'un soutien économique des services sociaux.

5. OBSTACLES ET SOUTIEN
Au début, les autorités étaient parfois méfiantes et irritées à l'égard des actions du BRIS, parfois aussi reconnaissantes de l'intérêt éveillé dans les médias, qui leur a permis d'agir sur l'opinion publique et de préparer les changements nécessaires.

6. RESULTATS
Maintenant, le BRIS et l'association "Save the children" sont considérées comme des collaborateurs utiles par les autorités qui veulent changer la société pour le bien des enfants.
Foreign political aid:  
the German political foundations and 
their US counterparts

by Michael Pinto-Duschinsky *

I. The German foundations

As the West German political parties rebuilt themselves after the Second World War, they set up organizations for internal political education, a task considered necessary after twelve years of Nazi rule. In 1947, Social Democratic politicians re-established the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Stiftung), originally founded in 1925 but banned by the Nazis in 1933. In 1956 the Christian Democrats formed a "political academy", which in 1964 became the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. In 1958 the Free Democrats created the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and in 1967 the Bavarian Christian Social Union established the Hanns Seidel Foundation. (*)

With the benefit of the generous public subsidies that are a feature of the German party system, these foundations (Stiftungen) not only developed their political education and research functions within the Federal Republic, but soon became active in international political projects. Once again, the Social Democrats were the pioneers. By 1957 the Ebert Foundation was using money from the West German foreign ministry for its work with the organization of anti-Communist trade unions in Latin America, ORIT.

In 1961, a ministry for overseas development was created, the Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ). From 1962, the ministry allocated funds to the political foundations on a regular basis for projects in developing countries officially characterized as "socio-political education" and support for "social structures". The foundations have also received smaller grants from the foreign ministry (Auswärtiges Amt), especially since 1978 for "international activities" in industrialized countries.

The reasons why West Germany developed the system of party foundations as channels for overseas political funding are too complex for this article to explore. But it may be stated that Germany has a long tradition of foreign political payments dating back to Bismarck's "reptile fund", to the German foreign ministry's subsidies to the Bolshevik Revolution during the First World War, and to payments to foreign parties during the Nazi era. Moreover, it is a broader German practice to pay non-governmental organizations—churches as well as parties and cultural bodies—to carry out governmental functions in the domestic and foreign fields.

There were specific reasons why it was especially attractive for the West German authorities in the early 1960s to conduct some of their most sensitive overseas aid operations through party foundations. In accordance with the Hallstein Doctrine (which linked West German diplomatic relations with foreign countries' refusal to recognize East Germany), West Germany felt compelled to counteract Communist influence in the Third World. (1) At a time when memories of the Nazi era were still fresh (2), payments were thought to be more acceptable abroad if they came in the name of political parties rather than from the German government. The system of West German payments to foreign political organizations had the general

* This article first appeared in Vol. 67, no. 1, 1991, of International Affairs, London, and is reproduced by permission.

© International Affairs
Foreign political aid: the German political foundations and their US counterparts

Political aid aims to exercise a direct influence on the working of politics within a foreign country. Frequently the objective is to encourage a change from military or one-party government to an elective democracy. This may involve long-term or medium-term projects to promote trade unions or other elements of a "civil society"; it may also involve shorter-term activities such as finance for electoral registration or for election observer missions (both US specialists). Sometimes the intention is to assuage a foreign political party or ideological tendency, or simply to promote contacts and influence among important elites.

The party foundations are legally distinct from the German political parties, and they may not pass money to a party. In reality, however, each foundation is firmly connected with a party and is governed by boards which include some of the most senior party leaders. The working chairman of each foundation is a top party figure. Similarly, many foreign organizations receiving grants from the foundations are formally independent from but actually connected with parties and trade unions. Indeed foreign parties have sometimes set up "institutes" and "foundations" specifically to receive the German money. This legal structure is also useful as a way of evading the restrictions existing in some countries relating to foreign contributions to political parties and to election campaigns. Assistance is also given to other bodies selected on the basis of existing or potential political influence, such as independent media, employers' associations, civic and human rights groups, and politically active research institutes.

The German party foundations' overseas work is partly open, partly concealed. The foundations certainly operate for foreign extension agencies, traditionally the bodies responsible for clandestine foreign political payments. Foundations representatives do not hide their identities or phone addresses, many of their activities and projects are publicized, and each foundation issues a fairly detailed annual report in which a number of projects are identified and described. In 1986 the German government issued statistics giving the global amounts granted to each foundation under each budget title. However, full project lists and accounts were obtained for the purposes of my research study on which this article is based from the Adenauer, Ebert and Naumann Foundations. Much of this information has not been made available in the past.

Funding

In 1988, federal government funding of the foundations' overseas work totalled about DM 290 million ($ 170 million at 1988 rate). About 90 per cent came from the development ministry (nearly $ 2 billion at Dec. 1990 rate) from the development ministry. The development ministry's payments to the political foundations are part of a wider set of contributions to non-governmental organizations in Germany. In 1988, the ministry's funding of non-governmental organizations amounted to 629.7 million DM ($ 370 million at 1988 rate) or 9.3 per cent of total spending on development aid, of which the four party foundations received 264.6 million DM ($ 157 million, 4.2 per cent of the overseas development budget), the main Catholic and Protestant Church relief agencies 256 million DM ($ 150 million), and other German non-governmental bodies 56.2 million DM ($ 33 million).

There were also special grants for food aid and for development education. Between 1962 and 1988 the political foundations received a total of 2,895.16 million DM (nearly 5.2 billion at Dec. 1990 rate) from the development ministry.

Government funds for overseas projects are allocated in the following ratio: Konrad Adenauer Foundation 2; Friedrich Ebert Foundation 1; Friedrich Naumann Foundation 1; Hanns Seidel Foundation 1. The Greens have recently won the right to public funding for a party foundation of their own, named the Rainbow (Regenbogen) Foundation, and this started to receive small grants in 1989. The Greens' entitlement to receive subsidies for a party foundation was established by the Constitutional Court in 1986.

Activities

The foundations are active in most underdeveloped states. Some 1987 they have been setting up offices in underdeveloped countries as well, and they have recently expanded into Eastern Europe (where they have been active on a smaller scale for a number of years). In 1980 the Ebert Foundation, for example, had projects in at least 100 countries.

A feature of the foundations' overseas operations is their heavy use of German field representatives. At the end of 1988 there were 312 foundation representatives funded by development ministry grants, and about 20 representa-

---

Table 1: Foreign expenditures of the German party foundations (million DM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Christian Democrats)</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>102.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Free Democrats)</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanns Seidel Foundation (Christian Social Union)</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>191.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>221.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funding sources: grants include scholarships for overseas students selected by the foundations, totalling 137 million DM and 11.7 million DM for "non-governmental activities".
The Ebert Foundation, which launched its foreign programme as late as 1976, has focused on Africa, and specializes in the training of public administrators. The largest expenditures of the foundations in individual countries in the six years 1983-8 are given in Table 3.

The party foundations normally organize their overseas operations into projects with specific "partner" organizations. Projects usually run for several years. In a few cases they date from the 1960s. The Ebert Foundation has traditionally focused on a smaller number of major projects, constructing multi-purpose buildings in such countries as Madagascar, Zambia, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Costa Rica and Venezuela. Some of the projects had a regional purpose. Ebert has employed larger teams of field representatives than the other foundations and, in particular, has organized teams of trade-union advisers. The foundations’ work in industrialized countries (financed by the foreign ministry) is for specific conferences or activities rather than for longer-term “projects”.

How political is political aid?

As seen in Table 4, some projects appear similar to the social development projects of conventional aid agencies. However, the foundations' objectives are considerably more political than is suggested by the categories given in the Table, which is based on their annual reports. The largest category, "political education" (about 80 million DM), includes grants to party-related organizations. Grants to trade unions are another major category. In 1988 the Ebert and Adenauer Foundations devoted nearly 30 million DM to foreign trade union projects. And to mass media in developing countries devoted about 20 million DM.

The foreign ministry regulations impose various restrictions on the foundations - a protection against possible accusations of interference in foreign countries. These forbid payments for electoral propaganda or in support of strikes. According to a ministry interpretation which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Adenauer</th>
<th>Ebert</th>
<th>Friedrich</th>
<th>Konrad</th>
<th>Hanns Seidel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Foreign Information.
has recently been incorporated into the formal rules, all-purpose payments to foreign parties and unions are also prohibited. This has little practical meaning, however, since subsidies for specific party projects or to party-linked foundations are permitted.

One-third of the money given by the development ministries to the party foundations is for relatively non-political projects to develop "social structures" (3). - For example, youth centers in India, fishing cooperatives in Peru or a carp 'weavers' cooperative run under government auspices in Morocco. In practice, seemingly non-political or self-help schemes often have political intent. In some countries, especially in Africa and Asia, analogy projects have a function of allowing a foundation representative to establish a presence, or "a foot in the door" as one foundation official put it. The representative will then establish political contacts (4). Some projects listed as "research" are useful for purposes of campaign organizations. For instance, according to information from the Adenauer Foundation, grants to the economic research institute INESERP in Nicaragua included finance in 1989 for a staff of ten and for eight cars, which not only served the cause of research but could reasonably be seen as providing aid for the Nicaraguan opposition in the run-up to the presidential election of February 1990. (5)

Some non-political rural development and cooperative projects are intended to allow trade unions and parties linked with the projects to recruit supporters. For instance, the agrarian activities of one organization receiving German money in the Philippines have the function of building an anti-Communist political base. The political coordination of apparently non-political projects is evident from internal reports about the Adenauer operation in Chile in 1984-6. In 1985, it was a monthly meeting of a committee of the Chilean Democratic Christian Party which coordinated eight projects ranging from an agrarian institute (Instituto de Pro-mocion Agraria) and a self-help project for shantytowners (Acción Vecinal y Comunitaria) to three academic institutes (Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanisticos, Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, and Fundación Eduardo Frei). Bodies designated as "research institutes" or cooperatives are frequently permitted to work in situations where open party activity is restricted.

In fact, however, German foundations frequently have a strategy of combining projects relating to parties, unions, mass media, business organizations and cooperatives as part of a coordinated political campaign. Moreover, projects by different foundations complement each other. As an illustration of the cooperation among the various political projects, Ger- man and US political payments to Chile in the five years preceding the crucial plebiscite of October 1988 are sum- marized in Table 3: (6)

Table 3: Chile's transition to democracy: political funding by the German and US governments, 1984-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funding</th>
<th>Total German Payments</th>
<th>Total US Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Foundation</td>
<td>9,502</td>
<td>12.65 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich Naumann Foundation</td>
<td>2,186</td>
<td>6.77 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konrad Adenauer Foundation</td>
<td>24,599</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36,378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While primarily limited US dollars, it also excludes the significant financing provided by a number of other governments which is described in social and formation work. (7)


(4) Support for the Nicaraguan opposition in the run-up to the presidential election of February 1990... Transnational Associations 5/1991, p. 268.


(7) Support for the Nicaraguan opposition in the run-up to the presidential election of February 1990... Transnational Associations 5/1991, p. 268.
ferences of party leaders, and grant or withhold recognition from parties and party representatives (as act of impor-
tance for parties in exile). They enjoy considerable prestige and political access, yet their budgets are small and their headquarters, in most cases, remote. In exchange for a relatively small financial investment, the foundations thus have the opportunity to play a major role.

Each of the four foundations backs a separate party international. In addition the German Greens have already established a considerable international base and began to receive government money for their international activities in 1989.

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation has been a major force in the Socialist International. According to Eusebio Mujal León, it was Ebert that provided the bulk of the manpower and other resources for the meetings of the Socialist International in Caracas in 1976 and in Lisbon in 1978 that led to the creation of the Socialist International's Latin American Committee in 1977 and to backing for the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, who then received training "to assume rev-
coutes of government" (6) at Ebert's educational institute in Costa Rica (CEDAL, Latin American Centre for Democratic Studies). The support for emerging Socialist parties in Por-
tugal and Spain in the 1970s involved close cooperation between the Ebert Foundation and the Socialist Interna-
tional.

The Ebert Foundation has ties with the anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). It does not subscribe to ICFTU, but in Latin America and Asia it normally works with union federations belonging to it. In Africa, where few unions are ICFTU members, this rule is relaxed (9). In the last few years the foundation has intensified its cooperation with the international trade sec-
terunats (international organizations of workers in particu-
lar trades or professions - teachers, metalworkers, etc.), an independent part of the ICFTU network. Ebert currently subsidizes the foreign work of twelve of them. Ebert sub-
to unions in Latin America have served to reduce the influence of US union interests in ORIT, the Latin American branch of ICFTU.

Ebert's prestige in the international labour field is largely based on the fact that, together with the labour institures of the American AFL-CIO, it is the only Western organization with a dense network of worldwide offices and union advisors. Its regional offices in Nairobi, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Tokyo, Quito and Buenos Aires have specific union responsibilities, and there are additional Ebert offices in some 60 other countries.

The Hanns Seidel Foundation is the mainstay of the Christian Democrat International. It provides core funding for the International's Latin American organization, OSWA, and for its educational institute, IFEDEC, both based in Venezuela. In 1989 it subsidised member parties of the Christian Democrat International in twelve Latin American countries.

In 1986 the Foundation's expenditure on the Christian Democrat International's Latin American organization and on its Latin American member parties totalled 7.1 million DM. The foundation also met the travel costs of senior Latin American officials of both party and union internation-
als attending strategy meetings held at its head-
quarters near Bonn.

In Asia and Africa, the Christian Democrat network is weaker. (10) The Christian Democrat connection provides contacts in a few African countries where the Catholic Church has some influence. However, in countries where there is a weak Christian Democrat party, the Adenauer Foundation faces a dilemma for if it support a Christian Democrat, it will be backing a sure loser, if it backs a Con-
Servative party candidate who has a better hope of win-
ning, it will risk undermining the Christian Democrat Inter-
national and offending Christian Democrat allies in neighbouring countries. (11) Currently the foundation's pol-
icy is one of compromise: its main contacts are still with Christian Democrats but, in a few cases, it supports other

The German Christian Democrats are also members of the International Democrats Union, the Conservative inter-
national (though it is in the Hanns Seidel Foundation, to be discussed below, that is most active here). This allows the CDU and the Adenauer Foundation to keep open lines of communication with foreign Conservative parties.

As for unions, Adenauer maintains the Latin American branch, CLAT, of the international organization of Christian trade unions, WCL, and currently supports the CLAT's Venezuela-based educational institute, which has responsi-

bility for all Latin America and the Caribbean. It also sup-
ports four union educational institutes responsible for groups of countries in Central America, the Caribbean, the Andean region and the Southern Cone, as well as Christian trade union federations in nine individual Latin American countries. (13)

The Naumann Foundation is the most important backer of the Liberal International. The total contributed by the Foundation for projects involving Liberal parties and groups is about 20 times greater than the Liberal International's entire budget. Through Naumann's support, a Central American branch of the International, FELICA, was formed in 1986. From its offices in Colombia, Naumann finances FELICA's journal, Perfiles Liberates, and most of the indi-
vidual member parties. In several countries where there is no established Liberal party, the Foundation works to build Liberal groups into parties which may then apply for mem-

bership of the International. Its offices in each country often provide the main contact between the Liberal Interna-
tional's headquarters in London and its local member par-
ties. In 1989 the foundation budgeted over 9 million DM for its projects throughout the world with Liberal and allied par-
ties and with Liberal groups. (14)

The Hanns Seidel Foundation has become active in the International Democrat Union, the Conservative interna-
tional founded in 1983. Other financial support for the Interna-
tional Democrat Union comes from the National Republi-
can Institute (which channels money from the US government provided through the National Endowment for Democracy, to be described below).

Serving the German national interest

A common claim for the German party foundation sys-
tem is that it serves not only party interests but German national interests. The German involvement in the interna-
tionals can be seen as an example of this. There are at least four ways in which the foundations can be seen as valuable instruments of German foreign policy.

First, the foundation and their overseas representatives are in a position to make friends and establish contacts

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 5/1991 267
with opposition leaders and members of liberation move-
ments in foreign countries where diplomats cannot reach
without risking the displeasure of existing governments,
and they have the organization to aid politicians in exile
who may become future prime ministers. The aid given to
Philippe González in the 1970s was not only to the credit
of the Ebert Foundation and the German Social Democrats,
but arguably added to German prestige when he became
the Spanish premier.

The Ebert Foundation forged close links in the 1980s
with leaders of newly independent African states, for
example Philibert Tsiranana in Madagascar, Dr Busia in
Ghana (where Ebert later claimed to have assisted a Com-
munist take-over by its activities), Milton Obote in Uganda,
and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia. In the 1970s the Foundation
was closely involved with Daniel Ortega's Sandinistas in
Nicaragua. It has also aided several African liberation
movements (e.g. SWAPO and the ANC) and has financed
some of their offices in Bonn. Adenauer protégés include
the late Eduardo Frei and Patrice Aime in Chile, Vinces
Centro in Guatemala, the late José Napoleon Duarte in El
Salvador and Paul Ssemgerere in Uganda. It has actively
supported COPEI in Venezuela and, especially, such politi-
cians as Rafael Caldera and Aristides Calvata. The Seidel
Foundation supported the personal links established
between the CSU leader, Franz Josef Strauss, and such
African politicians as President Moïse of Zaire and Presi-
dent Ekuem of Togo.

The foundations of opposing parties usually cooperate
with one another both in Bonn and abroad. The chief
executive of the Adenauer Foundation told me that he and
his opposite numbers in the other foundations were mem-
bors of the same club, a view echoed by the other foun-
dations. In the field, the different foundations' representatives
usually complement each other's activities, frequently con-
centrating on different countries or within the same
country, on different political groups. Indeed, there is a
regulation that prevents different foundations from funding
the same partner organization. Spain and Portugal have
been predominantly Socialist, i.e. Ebert territory (though all
due to the foundation's involvement in these countries)
Chile and Guatemala are Adenauer ground, Tanina is a
Nassau territory, while Seidel has close links with such
African countries as Togo and Zaire and is especially active
in China, Egypt and the Pacific. In countries where the
foundations back parties, as in Nicaragua, Venezuela and Namibia, Germany can hope to gain a friend
as head of government no matter who wins.

Third, as already mentioned, the foundations serve the
purposes of the political parties of origin (purely) and there are
some defined national diplomatic objectives. For example,
the Ebert Foundation combined its cultivation in the 1980s of
hosts of governments (mainly but not exclusively in the Social-
ist Internation with projects in several countries designed to investi-
gate, and presumably to neutralize, the propaganda ac-
tivities of the Communist bloc.

Fourth, both in theory and in practice, the work of the
foundations is subject to considerable governmental con-
trol. Unlike the Church agencies, the foundations are not
required to raise matching funds as a condition of receiving
state aid. But they do not receive block grants for their foreign
projects; each development project must be approved by the BMZ as well as by the foreign ministry.
Both these ministries have sometimes delayed approval,
negotiated changes in proposed programmes, or refused
to accept them altogether. Examples of disputes between
foundations and ministries, recounted in interviews with
officials from both, range from refusal to sanction Aden-
auer aid to the Namibian SWALU project after 1985, to
objections to Seidel projects in South Africa, Namibia and
Singapore.

There are limits to bureaucratic control, however. This
is partly because officials are aware that the political foundations
receive support “from the top.” For example, when the
German embassy in Pretoria questioned the Adenauer
Foundation’s proposed aid to Chief Buthelezi’s Inkatha
movement, Chancellor Kohl was recruiomed to overcome
the objections. The development committee of the Bundestag
could, in theory, demand information and exercise a
measure of oversight. In practice, the fact that all Bundes-
ing parts are beneficaries means that there has been
little criticism or questioning of the political foundations’
work, except (for a period) from the Greens.

Considering the scope of the foundations’ foreign oper-
ations over the past 20 years, the number of scandals and
embarrassments has been low. There have been occa-
sional expulsions of field representatives, particularly after
coups in African countries where a foundation has been
identified with a deposed leader, and occasional allegations
of currency infringements and illegal funding of German
parties. (13) The most serious charges emerged during the
campaign funds to the West German SPD. Again, this was,
it is alleged, an illegal method of tax evasion. In 1990 enqui-
ries concerning the Flick affair of the mid-1980s, one of West Ger-
mans’s most serious scandals. It was commonly sus-
pected that some of the money had been used to supply
campaign funds to the West German SPD. Again, this was,
it is alleged, an illegal method of tax evasion. In 1990 enqui-
ries were still in progress.

But the Flick affair does not seem to have destroyed
political or public support for the foundation system, des-

2. US political aid

The United States system of political aid is more com-
plicated and fragmented than the German one. The main

264 TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, 5/1991
(i) The National Endowment for Democracy is a private, non-profit corporation governed by a board consisting of leading figures in the Republican and Democratic parties, the trade unions, and the US Chamber of Commerce. It gives grants for democracy-building from a budget approved annually by Congress ($15.8 million in 1989). Some grants are given directly to American and foreign organizations which administer particular foreign projects; most of the money is channelled through four “core grantees”, which are, in miniature, replicas of the German foundations. The National Republican Institute for International Affairs, a legally distinct institute affiliated to the Republican Party, was awarded S1.8 million in 1989. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (affiliated to the Democratic Party) was awarded the same amount. The Free Trade Union Institute (affiliated to the AFL-CIO) was awarded $1.8 million in 1989. The National Endowment for Democracy (affiliated to the US Chamber of Commerce) was awarded $1.2 million.

Congress voted to create the National Endowment in 1983 after strong backing for the idea by President Reagan, the chairman of the Republican and Democratic National Committees and members of the AFL-CIO’s labor institutes. Despite its powerful support, however, the new body has faced continued congressional scrutiny and criticism. In 1984 Congress refused to allocate any money to the two party institutes, which led to a temporary windfall for the Free Trade Union Institute. The funding of the party institutes was restored the following year.

The National Endowment has strong friends in both parties on Capitol Hill and has gradually established itself, but it retains a number of enemies. Critics on the Right characterize some foreign activities funded by the Endowment as “boondoggles”, and fear that grants to party institutes may set a precedent for the public funding of domestic party activity. From the Left there have been allegations of involvement by the CIA and with the White House Iran-Centre team. (18) It is possible that the spotlight of publicity on the Endowment has made it harder to expand its budget. Certainly the grants given under the Agency for International Development’s various trade union and democracy programmes have been, on the one hand, less publicized and, on the other, considerably larger.

The Endowment takes pride in the openness of its work. Organizations receiving grants have to agree that they will be made public. This applies even to grants to illegal organizations such as Solidarity, which received money through the National Endowment during the period in which it was banned. The Endowment’s annual reports list all grants and the amount allocated to each recipient.

The Endowment is subject to administrative scrutiny by the US Information Agency, and to diplomatic oversight by the State Department. A Foreign Service officer of ambassadorial rank has a desk responsibility for the Endowment. All proposed projects must be passed through him for comment by the relevant US embassy. However, unlike the West German foreign ministry in its dealings with the foundations, the State Department has no power of veto. In practice, the main influence on the National Endowment is Congress rather than the administration.

The combination of a relatively small budget and a system requiring a staff at the National Endowment and offices and staffs for each core grantee inevitably leads to relatively high administrative costs, despite the small size of each office (the five offices have about 100 employees in all). With administrative costs at about one-third of the total, little more than $10 million a year has been available for grants. This has precluded any possibility of building a network of field representatives on the German model. However, Congress and the Agency for International Development have occasionally allocated special additional funds to be administered by the National Endowment in particular countries: for example, for Solidarity in Poland and for special programmes in Chile, Nicaragua and Paraguay. In September 1989 Congress voted a sum of $9 million to be spent, mainly by the National Endowment, on the 1990 Nicaraguan elections, and the Endowment received further sums in 1990 for special programmes for Eastern Europe and for South Africa.

**Table 6: National Endowment for Democracy: funds allocated to “core grantees”, 1984-9 ($ million)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Endowment</th>
<th>National Republican Institute</th>
<th>Free Trade Union Institute</th>
<th>National Democratic Institute</th>
<th>National Endowment for Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Endowment for Democracy documents
As shown in Table 7, almost half the Endowment's spending in 1988 was for Latin America (though a surprisingly small proportion was devoted to Central America). The "core grantees" each concentrated on different world areas. Given its limited resources and budget uncertainties, the Endowment has tended to provide a large number of small grants, mostly under $100,000. Nevertheless, it and the core grantees have succeeded in developing a distinctive and potentially valuable role in several fields. The Endowment gave early support for the activities of independent groups in Eastern Europe, and more recently to national organizations within the Soviet Union. Some of the aid was passed through groups of émigrés living in Britain, Western Europe and the United States. The main beneficiary was the Solidarity union in Poland. Between 1984 and 1989, this received over $5 million, transmitted partly through the Brussels-based Coordinating Office of Solidarity Abroad. Other grants included support for independent publishers within Poland, as well as support for publications in the West intended for distribution within Poland, and assistance to independent film producers to prepare video versions of films for unofficial showings.

Although their budgets have only been about $2 million a year, the National Republican and National Democratic Institutes have been able to establish important roles within two of the party internationals. The Republicans work-closely with the International Democrat Union, the Conservative International. Some of the National Republican Institute's most important grants have been to international Democrat Union member parties, especially in Latin America. The Institute acted as the major sponsor of the Caribbean branch of the International Democrat Union (covering the main salary and office expenses). The National Democratic Institute has a policy of non-partisan activity - it aims to foster the democratic system and not a particular party - and therefore attends meetings of a number of different party internationals. It main connection is with the Liberal International, with which it has worked closely in the task of making contacts with like-minded opposition groups in Eastern Europe. For example, the National Democratic Institute financed the Liberal International's mission to Hungary in May 1989.

Work with the party internationals has brought the American party institutes into contact with the German foundations. In particular, the National Democratic Institute and the Naumann Foundation share the Liberal International connection, while the IDU has brought the National Republican Institute into occasional partnership with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, especially in Central America and Bolivia. The National Republican Institute has also given significant support to organizations connected to the IDU member parties in Nicaragua and Colombia (where the Social Conservative Party is supported by the Adenauer Foundation).

The National Democratic Institute, and to a lesser extent the other Endowment grantees, have concentrated on key elections, including those in the Philippines, Pakistan, Chile, Haiti, Panama and Paraguay—all countries holding elections after years of dictatorial rule. The National Democratic Institute organizes brief training seminars on election registration, poll watching and other aspects of campaign organization. It recruits large and influential international teams of election observers. Before the 1988 elections in Pakistan and the Chilean plebiscite in the same year, National Democratic Institute teams toured for months training local party activists and, in particular, advising on ways to limit electoral fraud. In a number of cases the presence of international observers has been of major diplomatic importance. Predictably, the presence of the observers has sometimes been attacked by incumbent regimes, for instance in the Philippines in 1986 and in Chile in 1988.

The four "labor institutes" of the International Affairs Department of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations. These cover aid to unions in Latin America (the American Institute for Free Labor Development, founded in 1962); Africa (the African-American Labor Center, founded in 1964); Asia (the Asian-American Free Labor Institute, founded in 1968); and, mainly with European responsibilities, the Free Trade Union Institute, founded in 1973 and later given the status of a "core granteer" of the National Endowment. The institutes are almost completely reliant on government funds. In 1987, only $0.7 million of a total budget of $28.5 million was raised by the AFL-CIO from non-governmental sources (see Table 8).

Table 7: National Endowment for Democracy expenditure, 1988, by continent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-regional</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: AFL-CIO international labor institutes expenditure 1982-89 ($ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Institute for Free Labor Development</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Labor Center</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American Free Labor Institute</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Free Trade Union Institute receives its public money from the National Endowment. The other three institutes, which are responsible for underdeveloped areas, also receive some funds (via the Free Trade Union Institute) from the Endowment but their main finance comes from the Agency for International Development, which provided them with $22.8 million in 1987.

American trade unions have a long history of international activity. They became involved in the 1940s in the struggle against Communism within the international trade union movement and received financial aid from the CIA. In 1962 the American Institute for Free Labor Development was formed as part of President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" to combat Cuban influence. Since then the Institute has been responsible for the AFL-CIO's Latin American union programmes. Similar institutes for Asia and Africa were created in the 1960s. The Agency for International Development supplies most of their funds, and they are publicly declared (though buried, in practice, in the Agency's complex accounts). The Free Trade Union Institute was formed in 1978 to support the anti-Communist Portuguese union federation, União Geral de Trabalhadores.

The four labour institutes are the only American political aid organizations with their own networks of field representatives. In 1985 there were 40 field offices: 17 in Latin America, 15 in Africa, and 8 in Asia and the Pacific. In international unionism, this network rivals that of the West German party foundations.

The AFL-CIO institutes' strong brand of anti-Communism has sometimes brought them into conflict with many affiliates of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which have also been anti-Communist but have favoured a more pragmatic approach. However, the AFL-CIO rejoined the IcFTU in 1982. The main political role of the institutes has been to combat the influence of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. An important union struggle has continued in the Philippines against the Communist Party's "labor front," the Kilusang Mayo Uno.

The institutes help foreign unions in a number of ways - by paying for their offices and equipment, by arranging training courses providing a variety of membership services ranging from small loan schemes to medical help, and by organizing training workshops for members. (20)

(iii) The Agency for International Development's "Human Rights and Democratic Initiatives Program" (21) makes grants for regional human rights programmes (especially in South Africa), for election assistance (mainly in Central America), and for the "promotion of democratic institutions". When this programme began, under the Carter administration, the emphasis was on the promotion of individual human rights, for example by schemes for legal counselling, particularly for women. These projects continue in Nepal, Thailand and elsewhere. Funding is given to human rights commissions (such as that in Togo) and to the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights. There are grants for legal training and for legal texts in various countries. Increased attention recently has been given to "democracy-building" and, in particular, to schemes for technical support for electoral administration. Under Section 116(e) of the 1976 Foreign Assistance Act, the programme provides core funding for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, a Washington-based organization which gives specialist advice on electoral registration and other aspects of electoral administration.

(iv) The special "Democracy Program" for Latin America, administered by the Agency for International Development's Latin American and Caribbean Bureau, stems from the 1984 report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (the Kissinger Commission). Its budget is devoted mainly to "administration of justice" projects. It also funds "democratic initiatives" including technical assistance for elections and support for technical facilities such as computers for legislatures in Latin America. Some of these projects are funded under Section 116(e). In 1985, central expenditure on the Latin American democracy programme and on 116(e) human rights and democracy projects in other continents amounted to $23.3 million.

Though most of its grants are channelled through outside organizations, the Agency's worldwide human rights and democracy programmes are basically a form of government-to-government aid, albeit devoted to institution-building. As the official governmental agency, it is not well placed to give aid to opposition parties or to media in foreign countries. On the other hand, it is able to give assistance to foreign governments in drawing up voter rolls and in other aspects of electoral administration. (22)

3. Political aid assessed

Political aid can be assessed in four ways: first, in terms of its success in fostering democratic forms of government and protecting individual rights; second, in terms of forwarding the donor government's national interests; third, in terms of its impact on political life in the donor country; and fourth, in terms of its cost-effectiveness.

It has often been implied in discussions of political aid that the aim of "democracy-building" will be consistent with that of promoting national interests. This has usually been the case for West Germany and the United States. It has been strongly argued that unpopular, potentially unstable authoritarian regimes make unreliable allies. But there is no automatic coincidence between the two objectives and there have been times when national interests as seen by policy-makers in both West Germany and the United States have compelled support for authoritarian regimes. That is why it is necessary to distinguish between the usefulness of political aid as an instrument of democracy-building and political aid in the donor nation's interest.

Building democracy

The West German and US programmes of political aid have had some notable successes in advancing the cause of democracy. However, it is not possible to give an unequivocal evaluation. The events leading to a transition to democracy are inevitably complex. Even when fully detailed information is available it is not possible to disentangle the results of foreign aid, or to show what would have happened had such aid not been given. Success in helping to create a democratic regime has all too often proved short-lived. These uncertainties apply also to the long-term effects of other forms of development aid and diplomatic activity.
The most frequently cited successes of political aid are the defeat of the Communist threat and the establishment of democracies in Portugal and Spain in the 1970s. Here the Ebert Foundation was a key operator, in a support effort involving West German trade unions and the Socialist International as well as other European governments.

(i) Southern Europe in the 1970s: The emergence of the Socialist leaders - Mario Soares in Portugal and Felipe Gonzalez in Spain - was certainly aided in large measure by this help. The senior CIA official, Cord Meyer, the Agency's station chief in London at the time, expressed a commonly held view when he wrote in his memoirs that the foundations played a crucial role in providing support for the indigenous democratic forces in Portugal in their rivalry with the COMMUNISTS after the repressive dictatorship was overturned. Comprehensive details about international aid to both COMMUNISTS and anti-COMMUNISTS in the Iberian peninsula in the 1970s have yet to emerge. The story is complicated by the probability that in addition to the foundations' activities, secret political aid was channelled through the CIA (in particular to Portugal), through the West German Chancellery and possibly through the West German foreign ministry. Funds for election campaigns seem to have been transmitted through these channels. West German trade unions were active, particularly IG Metall, and special funds were raised from businessmen, as later emerged during revelations about the Flick affair.

The Ebert Foundation provided financial and other support for Socialist politicians during dictatorships in Spain and Portugal. The Portuguese Socialist Party, under Mario Soares, was established at a meeting in 1973 at one of the Ebert Foundation's training centers at Bad Munstereifel. Following the revolution in 1974, Ebert officials travelled regularly to Portugal for extended stays. Ebert opened a permanent office in Madrid in early 1975, before the Socialist Party PSOE was legalized, and its chief, Dider Konnics, was later decorated by King Juan Carlos for his contribution to the new democracy.

The Ebert Foundation, and to a lesser extent the other German foundations, specialized in training party recruits and in providing advice to party leaders on policy and campaign techniques. In Portugal, Ebert also provided training at the local government level, and in Spain, at a crucial time in 1973, it arranged conferences on constitutional reform. In Portugal the foundations aided the organization of anti-Communist trade union federations.

The distinctive contribution of the foundations consisted in the fact that they had the staff and facilities, both in Germany and soon afterwards in Spain and Portugal, to provide practical help, advice and training at a time when the new political parties and unions were beginning to emerge from the grass roots. They were involved in arranging international contacts and meetings for their Spanish and Portuguese partners, and in nourishing economic aid at key points of the transition to democracy. Non-German Social- ist leaders, including Olaf Palme and James Callaghan, lent their prestige to the cause of the Portuguese and Spanish Socialist parties, but the organizational assistance - travel expenses and arranging meetings for activists and potential activists of the emerging parties and of anti-Communist unions - came largely from the foundations, as well as from individual West German unions. The international departments of the British Labour and Conservative parties were involved in Spain and Portugal, and were committed to helping democratic partners, but they lacked even basic resources. By the late 1970s, all the German foundations had representatives in the peninsula. In 1977 the Ebert Foundation alone spent 4 million DM ($ 1.7 million at 1977 rates) from BMZ funds in the two countries.

(ii) Chile in 1988-9: In Chile, the Adenauer Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Agency for International Development gave major assistance before the 1988 plebiscite, as detailed in Table 5 on p. 40: Other help was reported to have come from funds supplied by the Italian and Dutch governments. The Adenauer Foundation's projects were coordinated with the Christian Democratic International and with its Latin American branch, ODICA.

The re-emergence of the Christian Democrats in the November 1989 Chilean presidential election followed 16 years of work with the Adenauer Foundation. During years of military rule in Chile, when open political activity was banned, foreign contributions sustained a series of research institutes which provided a base for party and union activists. Adenauer alone was spending some 5 million DM (nearly $ 3.5 million at Dec. 1990 rate) a year in the mid-1980s on its field representatives and activities in Chile. Alan Angel's study of this activity concludes that the research institutes played a vital role in the (1988) plebiscite campaign of the opposition.

Before the 1988 plebiscite, technical support for electoral registration and for the training of poll watchers came from abroad. As shown in Table 5, the National Democratic Institute and the Agency for International Development's 116(e) Democratic Initiatives Program made significant contributions in terms of personal assistance and money to this effort. Election observer missions also played a role in reassuring potential electors and acting as a safeguard against electoral fraud. Foreign advisers encouraged the emergence of a united civic opposition to the military junta, though the main role was played by internal actors, in particular the Catholic Church.

In Poland, the National Endowment for Democracy's payments to Solidarity from 1984 of over $ 5 million (largely through the Free Trade Union Institute) and its grants to independent publishers were later perceived by the recipients as highly important, first in sustaining the structures of Solidarity during the time it was banned, and second in allowing the OKNO groups to obtain essential supplies for their publications. Microcomputer technology has made it possible to publish materials cheaply and effectively, and wordprocessing and desktop publishing equipment and laser printers were supplied through the National Endowment grants to the networks of small independent publishers. Solidarity was attacked by the Communist government for accepting US money. In May 1989 there was a consensus attempt to make this into a campaign issue. Solidarity successfully defended the legitimacy of the Network. In the Philippines, in 1986, it was the presence of National Democratic Institute and National Republican Institute observer teams that led President Ramos to accept the conclusion that there had been large-scale electoral fraud, which led in turn to the fall of President Marcos. Two further areas where large-scale and potentially important political aid exercises were mounted in the late 1980s were Central America and South Africa. The Ade-
rance, Elliott and Naumann Foundations were all heavily engaged in Nicaragua before the 1990 presidential election, as was the National Endowment for Democracy. In South Africa and the neighbouring states the German and American foundations were joined by the European Community and by a number of European - especially Scandinavian - countries in giving aid to sustain and encourage anti-apartheid organizations and to encourage non-violent change.

In the Chilean and other cases, political aid did not operate in a vacuum. Two days before the plebiscite the US State Department made an influential declaration warning the Chilean junta to respect the poll. In the case of Eastern Europe, overseas broadcasting was important in spreading information about dissident movements, and voluntary groups mobilized support and raised funds. However, the political aid institutions that are the subject of this article were distinctive in that they could give support directly to opposition groups and mount election observation exercises that could not have been carried out by embassies - German political aid and the recent forms of US assistance generally have been acceptable in the recipient countries, though governing regimes have sometimes passed laws intended to restrict the inflow of foreign funding for election campaigns, or have attempted to raise foreign political payments as a campaign issue. The relative openness of the foundations has usually avoided the suspicions and the scandals surrounding campaign money from foreign intelligence agencies. When recipients, have been attached by their own governments for receiving foreign - especially American - money, as in Chile in 1988 and in Poland in 1989, their overt nature has acted as a protection. When controversy has continued, it has resulted from evidence, as in Central America, that open political assistance has been accompanied by a secret programme.

In general, the impact of foreign political aid are affected by assumptions about how subject societies are to outside influences. According to one view, a country's internal structures have a dynamic of its own. Historical traditions, political culture, deep-rooted ethnic, religious or linguistic divisions and the interplay of personalities and factions are likely to be far more important than any extrinsic influence. Linked with this interpretation is the argument that 'democracy-building' is likely to fail because it usually involves an attempt to reproduce the democratic system in a unique foreign setting. An opposite view is that many countries are highly "programmable," as Moisé León has put it. Elites look outside the country for moral and material support, public opinion is directly affected by news and ideas from abroad. There are circumstances in which outside influences are unlikely to have any impact: a brief seminar organized by a foreign association on the techniques of election planning is unlikely to have an effect on deep-rooted attitudes to violence in a Central American state dominated by death squads. Experience in many countries has proved that no amount of foreign backing will enhance an organization which lacks genuine support. But political aid from abroad can be valuable and even decisive for internal groups, often in such simple forms as supplies of paper for newspaper money to buy paper, or in sustaining families of activists. Where there is a conflict between opposing political forces within a country, the outcome may depend on foreign help. The judgement that Western models of democracy cannot be exported is a half-truth. While some aspects of Western political campaigning, electoral administration and electoral systems may be inapplicable, many have been conveyed to new democracies. The help given to combat electoral fraud is one example of the successful application of foreign experience. Information about opinion polls aspects of party and union organization and the use of television (which proved an asset in the Chilean plebiscite) may be essential in countries with no local experience of elections and little access to foreign literature on the subject. Also, many, political aid projects do not seek to transmit Western institutions, but rather to expose one country to the experience of a neighbouring country. For example, the main centre for advice on election administration in Latin America (funded by the USAID, Naumann and the Canadian International Development Agency) is based in Costa Rica; a country with a developed democratic system, and run by Latin American experts.

In Asian, African aid and to a lesser extent Latin American countries, a combination of government restriction and underdevelopment has hampered the growth of independent unions and parties. In some countries the government imposes a one-party system; in others, 'parties' and 'trade unions' are frequently paper organizations; unions memberships are small, members frequently do not pay subscriptions, and figures tend to be exaggerated to boost their leader's prestige. It is an uphill struggle to build unions in countries where the vast majority of adults have no formal employment.

It is all too easy for foreign party foundations or international trade union organizations to find themselves funding governing parties and official unions which consolidate a one-party regime. Alternatively, they may arrange conferences and training for union and party 'leaders' who lack followers. Despite such problems, political aid may occasionally have an impact in these unpromising areas of the world. First, even in one-party regimes in Africa, trade unions may exercise a degree of independence which can be nurtured by international trade union organizations and foundations. Second, aid to Third World unions combats the activities of the Communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions (it remains to be seen whether this will need to be a future priority). Third, the fact that some Asian and African countries have taken steps towards free elections indicates that projects in these continents are not doomed. Fourth, as already mentioned, projects which promote cooperatives, civic organizations, business associations and local media may serve as a basis for eventual development of free democratic institutions. Both the German and US political aid programmes in Africa have been based on the assumption that in countries where political activity is banned, it is still worthwhile to create elements of a 'civil society'. By encouraging the emergence of leaders in social and voluntary settings, they hope to lay the foundation for organizations that can assume political roles in the future. It is reasonable to suggest that following dramatic moves towards democratic systems in Latin America and Eastern Europe - developments which are still far from complete - the focus for 'democracy-building' will turn increasingly to Africa an Asia.

There is a distinction between political aid given through political, union and civic organizations, and 'institutional development' formulated on a government-to-government basis. In limited areas, such as the administration of elections, government-to-government aid may be a useful part of a democracy-building programme. In

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES. 5/1991 273
general, aid projects that aim to increase the efficiency of the machinery of government or of police forces, though they may be justified in their own terms, are not sufficient to ensure the building of democracy. The essence of a pluralist system is the existence of coherent groups independent of government and able to challenge government. For example, the provision of library and computerized information systems for a legislature in an underdeveloped country is unlikely to promote democracy if there is no political opposition. It may make one-party rule more efficient.

**Forwarding the donor government's national interests**

The German party foundations have proved successful instruments in generating networks of contacts between domestic and foreign legislators, party leaders and activities, trade unions, journalists and politically active academics, and in particular in providing easier contact with political oppositions. Officials of the West German foreign ministry have observed in interviews that this has given their country major influence abroad at the subgovernmental level.

The democracy-building successes of the German and US political foundations in southern Europe and in Chile have been of benefit to German and US strategic interests. Whether there was a real prospect of a Commendt takeover with the replacement of the authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, and in other Mediterranean countries, is open to judgement. At the time, the risk of Communism in Europe's southern flank appeared one of the greatest dangers confronting the Western alliance.

An important example of the way in which party foundations may promote their country's interests is seen in the work in Washington and New York of the German foundations. The four main German party foundations all have offices in Washington, and arrange conferences and meetings with influential elites. Though funded by the German foreign ministry, they are free from normal diplomatic restraints and are able to build contacts on a party-to-party basis.

**Impact on the donor country's political life**

The main impact of the German foundations' foreign work on the structure of internal West German politics has been to give all the parties a role in influencing some executive role in foreign affairs. According to a common view, this may have had the effect of encouraging a consensus on foreign policy, but this is hard to demonstrate. The considerable government grants for the foundations' foreign activities have an integral part of the German system whereby political parties and party-related foundations receive state funding for a variety of campaign and other purposes and serve to consolidate the system.

In the United States, one fear about granting funds for foreign democracy-building activities to party-affiliated institutes was that this might create a precedent for similar subsidies for parties' domestic purposes. This has not happened at the present time.

The system of grants to the US parties' international institutes has had one side-effect. For the "opposition" party, the Democrats, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, with a staff of over 30, has assumed some of the functions both of a shadow foreign ministry and of an enlarged international department of the Democratic Party. Some of its projects (in Northern Ireland, Israel and Poland) are designed partly to appeal to domestic Democratic constituencies. This is one reason why the National Democratic Institute has given financial support to the SDLP in Northern Ireland (Interestingly, the SDLP also received some support from the Bert Foundation).

**Cost-effectiveness**

It is a fraction of projects have succeeded in their aims, political aid has been a highly cost-effective instrument. The amounts raised and spent in most countries on party and union organization and on election campaigns are an insignificant proportion of national income, and certainly inexpensive compared with economic or military assistance. Therefore it is possible for a foreign government to have a major impact by means of a small expenditure on political aid. The $7 million spent by the National Endowment for Democracy, the American Institute for Free Labor Development and the Agency for International Development in Chile in the five years before the 1988 plebiscite was substantial in terms of Chilean politics, but minor in comparison with spending on conventional economic aid. Even the German programme of political aid, probably the largest in the Western world, consumes only 4 per cent of the government's spending on development aid.

**Broader issues**

Though the amounts of money likely to be spent by most countries on overseas political payments are relatively small, political aid raises broader questions about the aims of development aid, about the changing forms of international relations, and about the use of non-governmental organizations by development and foreign ministries.

In the 1950s and 1960s the most influential school of thought in the United States asserted that underdevelopment was an economic phenomenon. There was little hope for democratic government in nations plagued by poverty, disease and ignorance. The act of voting meant little to illiterate people who did not know where their next meal was coming from. In a celebrated chapter on "Economic development and democracy", S.M. Lipset presented evidence that "the more well-fed a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy." (25) Economic advance comes to be seen as central, but academics and administrators are now paying more attention to other factors.

First, it has been argued that the absence of popular government is itself a barrier to economic development. In countries where there is no check on the government, corruption, instability and inefficiency are likely to result. Violent changes of government and periodic of military rule are not a recipe for steady economic growth. The approach of "economic development first, democracy and human rights later" is therefore rejected. A 1987 report for the Canadian
Second, and connected with this, though there is a correlation between advanced economic development and the existence of stable democracy, the question of causation is unclear. Moreover, there are poor democracies and rich tyrannies. It may be possible to encourage democratic institutions and a democratic culture even in low-income countries. On the other hand, there is no assurance that growing wealth will automatically lead to democracy. According to the 1986 report of the Canadian parliament’s Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations:

"The assumption underlying development assistance policy has been that economic growth would enhance other forms of social and political development - including enhanced respect for human rights - more or less automatically. Experience has shown that although creating and distributing wealth is of fundamental importance to developing countries, economic development by itself does not resolve social and political tensions. It often increases them."

Third, it is argued that personal rights are not a luxury but as much a basic need as food, water, shelter and medical care. The risk of arbitrary arrest may be as great a problem for slum-dwellers or poor peasants as hunger. Consequently, personal and democratic rights ought to be promoted whether they are likely to lead to material improvements or not.

It follows from these arguments that economic growth is a necessary but not a sufficient aim of development aid. There should be parallel measures designed to promote individual and democratic structures. Interestingly, the Argentine-Italian treaty of 1987 and the Argentine-Spanish treaty of 1988 explicitly connect trade and economic matters with support by the Argentine government for the consolidation of democracy. This connection has also been given a high priority by aid to Eastern Europe. The linkage of aid and standards of political conduct by recipient governments was examined by the 1986 Canadian parliamentary report on Canada’s International Relations. More recently the British Foreign Secretary has stated that British decisions on development aid will also take these considerations into account. (27)

Next, the entry of an increasing number of governments into the field of political aid may be seen as a response to changes in the nature of international relations. According to Andrew Scott, an American scholar and former intelligence officer, there has been a "revolution in statecraft" (the title of his book on the subject). (28) International relations, he suggests, have never been restricted to negotiations and dealings between foreign services. Attempts by governments to influence opinion and politics in foreign countries by direct means are not new. Nevertheless, the growing importance and extent of these efforts constitute a "revolutionary" change. The number of independent states has escalated. Mass communications have developed. Political parties, unions, pressure groups have become increasingly influential. It is therefore vital for governments to enter the political arena in foreign countries.

The increasing practice of governments of employing professional political lobbyists in foreign countries, and the development of "public diplomacy", may be seen as responses to these conditions. However, another way to reach party politicians and interest groups in a foreign country without seeming to interfere in its political process may be to encourage contact with counterparts and groups in one’s own country. The party internationals - three of which have their headquarters in London - may be becoming increasingly important in this regard.

The use of party foundations and similar bodies is part of a broader trend towards the use of non-governmental organizations by development ministries. There has been a steady growth in the money allocated by governments for the foreign work of relief agencies. Churches and other non-governmental organizations. As mentioned earlier, West Germany allocates well over $ 370 million - 9 per cent of its development budget - to German non-governmental organizations. These have, in the words of a 1989 German government report, "become increasingly more interesting partners for international organizations such as the UNDP, World Bank and FAO". (29) The European Community has established a co-financing programme under which 217 million ECU ($ 375 million) was given to non-governmental organizations between 1976 and 1987. Further grants were given to non-governmental organizations under other EC programmes, especially to assist "the victims of apartheid" in South Africa. (30) In 1988 the Canadian parliament voted to establish an International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Though its structure is distinctive, the new centre is another variation on the National Endowment for Democracy model. Japan has extended its mechanisms for aiding foreign trade unions. Sweden is planning to become active in the field of foreign electoral assistance and observations, and there have been major international exercises in 1990 to observe and assist electoral processes in Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Eastern Europe.

The justification and even the legality of interference in the internal politics of other countries will continue to be a matter of controversy. But it is safe to predict that payments for foreign politics will be an increasingly significant instrument of modern diplomacy and development aid.
and backed Violeta Chamorro.

The Adenauer Foundation rejected the official Christian Democrat candidate between the Adenauer Foundation and the Latin American presidential elections of February 1990 led to conflict (11) Divisions among Christian Democrats in Nicaragua before the elections of 1990 and 1996, see Tilman Evers' chronology and bibliography in: Accidentalism in Latin America (Bettina, Borchers- and Documentationszentrum Chile-Latina-

(8) It is more difficult to give a definitive list of Ebert than of Ade-

(7) For example, a stream of senior politicians from Chile and Nicaragua visited the Foundation headquarters in the run-up to the elections of 1989 and 1990.

(6) The German statistics slightly underestimate the total given since they exclude expenditure in Chile by the Ebert Foundation, which is included in its regional and supranational pro-

(5) According to a senior Adenauer official, the foundation par-

(4) For example, an Adenauer field representative in India in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Tilman Evers' chronology and bibliography in: Accidentalism in Latin America (Bettina, Borchers- and Documentationszentrum Chile-Latina-

(3) The point was made by a senior foundation official of the

(2) This point was made by a senior foundation official of the

(1) See Rudolf Schier, Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik: eine Reise (Munich: Göttinger Verlag, 1979), p.18.

Notes

(14) In 1989, the Serame Foundation funded the Federación de Trabajadores Liberales y Centristas de Comunicación y del Carácter (FELICA), and backed institutes linked with parties belonging to the Liberal International in Tallin or other member

(13) In 1989 and 1990, the National Republican Institute funded institutes belonging to the IDU as members or associates in the following countries: Honduras (National Party), Guate-

(12) In 1988, AIFLD supported Latin American union activities in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Caribbean, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. In Asia and the Near East, AAFLI concentrated on aiding trade unions in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and the South Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati and Vanuatu). It also had pro-

(11) For example, in 1987 Stern magazine revealed that unre-

(10) It is more difficult to give a definitive list of Ebert than of Ade-

(9) For example, a stream of senior politicians from Chile and Nicaragua visited the Foundation headquarters in the run-up to the elections of 1989 and 1990.

(8) Eusebio Mujal León,

(7) For example, a stream of senior politicians from Chile and Nicaragua visited the Foundation headquarters in the run-up to the elections of 1989 and 1990.

(6) The German statistics slightly underestimate the total given since they exclude expenditure in Chile by the Ebert Foundation, which is included in its regional and supranational pro-

(5) According to a senior Adenauer official, the foundation par-

(4) For example, an Adenauer field representative in India in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Tilman Evers' chronology and bibliography in: Accidentalism in Latin America (Bettina, Borchers- and Documentationszentrum Chile-Latina-

(3) The point was made by a senior foundation official of the

(2) This point was made by a senior foundation official of the

(1) See Rudolf Schier, Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik: eine Reise (Munich: Göttinger Verlag, 1979), p.18.

Notes

(14) In 1989, the Serame Foundation funded the Federación de Trabajadores Liberales y Centristas de Comunicación y del Carácter (FELICA), and backed institutes linked with parties belonging to the Liberal International in Tallin or other member

(13) In 1989 and 1990, the National Republican Institute funded institutes belonging to the IDU as members or associates in the following countries: Honduras (National Party), Guate-

(12) In 1988, AIFLD supported Latin American union activities in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Caribbean, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. In Asia and the Near East, AAFLI concentrated on aiding trade unions in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and the South Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati and Vanuatu). It also had pro-

(11) For example, in 1987 Stern magazine revealed that unre-

(10) It is more difficult to give a definitive list of Ebert than of Ade-

(9) For example, a stream of senior politicians from Chile and Nicaragua visited the Foundation headquarters in the run-up to the elections of 1989 and 1990.

(8) Eusebio Mujal León,

(7) For example, a stream of senior politicians from Chile and Nicaragua visited the Foundation headquarters in the run-up to the elections of 1989 and 1990.

(6) The German statistics slightly underestimate the total given since they exclude expenditure in Chile by the Ebert Foundation, which is included in its regional and supranational pro-

(5) According to a senior Adenauer official, the foundation par-

(4) For example, an Adenauer field representative in India in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Tilman Evers' chronology and bibliography in: Accidentalism in Latin America (Bettina, Borchers- and Documentationszentrum Chile-Latina-

(3) The point was made by a senior foundation official of the

(2) This point was made by a senior foundation official of the

(1) See Rudolf Schier, Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik: eine Reise (Munich: Göttinger Verlag, 1979), p.18.
Foreign political aid: the German political foundations and their US counterparts

In the 1980s, there were frequent reports of renewed payments to foreign politicians and for overseas elections, especially in Salvador and Panama. It is not possible to estimate the size of these payments.


Alan Angell, "International support for political democracy in contemporary Latin America: the case of Chile", unpublished paper.


Douglas Hurd, speech to the Overseas Development Institute, London, 6 June 1990.


European Community, Budget Line 9530. Between 1986 and 1988, 55.9 million ECU of the Community’s funds were spent for this purpose.

Notes


Page 117 of the Helsinki Final Act. It is obvious that because of the origin of this proposal, the Western countries were very reluctant. It should be mentioned that in the old communist regimes non-governmental organizations had very close ties with the communist governments. As an example we could state a recent case at the United Nations. In 1990, the representative of a NGO with consultative status was invited to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. He was the same time member of the mission of the Soviet Union in the same session.

This NGO Conference had however the precedent of similar, though less organized conferences in Helsinki and Belgrade.

The meetings ended with a hunger strike to protest against the Soviet Regime. At the same time, Soviet Jews in different cities of USSR also started a hunger strike.

For an analytical report of the parallel meetings as well as for the list of NGOs participating and the final declarations see José Antonio GARCIA VILAR, Las Organizaciones no Gubernamentales ante la Reunión en Madrid de la C.S.C.E., Salamanca, Universidad Pontificia, 1983; pp. 84-99.

Page 40; paragraph 11.

The host country, in this case Switzerland, is responsible for the organization of the meeting.

The situation was even more crucial because of the tragic events in Yugoslavia.

Among others, the Dutch delegation (on behalf of the EEC), the Bulgarian delegation, the American delegation and the Soviet delegation addressed the NGOs.

And if this truly happened, despite the undeniable good will and experience of the Swiss hosts, one can be really reluctant about the meeting in Moscow, where hundreds of NGOs are expected to participate.

Several delegations, in their opening statements addressed the question of NGO participation and expressed the need for adoption of concrete consultative arrangements.

During the meeting in Geneva they had difficulty in reaching agreement on basic items concerning the final document. It would be interesting and constructive for the NGOs to follow these discussions. As the UN experience suggests, networking and lobbying depends directly on access to information.

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 5/1991 277
NGOs in Development and Participation in Practice
An Initial Inquiry (Part I)
by Helena Gezelius and David Millwood

In recent years, development assistance agencies have become increasingly aware of the necessity of active popular interest and participation in development projects and activities. Such participation is considered a prerequisite for successful long-term and self-generating development processes in the rural areas of less-developed countries.

Popular participation constitutes a key component of SIDA’s Strategy for Rural Development. According to the Strategy, popular participation should be promoted and practised in the planning and implementation of development projects. Such efforts should be preceded by a thorough analysis of the situation and needs of the people involved, and of the preconditions for their active participation in identification of needs and problems as well as in planning, implementation and evaluation of projects.

The Popular Participation Programme is a SIDA-financed research and development programme at the Development Studies Unit of the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm. It was established in 1987 with the objective of identifying, studying and analyzing practical, methodological and theoretical experiences in the field of popular participation in development assistance. Particular emphasis is given to rural development.

The main objectives of the Programme are to identify preconditions, problems and possibilities for the practice of popular participation, and to develop methods and procedures that can be used in the promotion and positive reinforcement of popular participation in Swedish development assistance. The activities of the Programme include desk studies which synthesize, analyze and discuss the literature on popular participation, as well as field studies and trial operations within ongoing development projects.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often considered by development researchers and agencies as particularly well-suited for carrying out participatory development projects. NGOs are considered to have good contacts or channels for organization at the grass-roots level, and they are thought to escape many of the problems associated with governmental administration and bureaucracy.

In addition, NGOs are frequently regarded as innovative in their approach to organization and to implementation of development projects, particularly with reference to popular participation. The designation NGO, however, is a very general and heterogeneous category. It includes different kinds of organizations with differing objectives, activities and membership composition, as well as different scopes of action.

The objectives of the present study by Gezelius and Millwood are, on the one hand, to conceptually discuss and distinguish different types of NGOs on the basis of their most important characteristics and, on the other hand, to present those NGOs with experience in participatory development work that seem to have developed advanced participatory methods. The report provides a broad overview, or outline map, of the roles of NGOs in development, with special attention to the way they work in terms of being vehicles for popular participation.

Anders Rudqvist
Popular Participation Programme

* Popular Participation Programme. Working Paper No. 3. Development Studies Unit, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm.

Although this document was originally written in 1989, it seemed to the editor that its intrinsic value still makes it worth publishing in this issue.
Introduction

This report presents the results of a short study for the Popular Participation Programme of Stockholm University, which is situated in the Development Studies Unit of the Department of Social Anthropology. The study aims to:

(i) provide a broad overview, or outline map, of the world of NGOs in development, except for those whose activity is only in the North; and

(ii) by casting a wide net, capture examples of popular participation described in operational terms as well as documented cases of methods and techniques that have been tried out.

We gathered information by studying the literature and making a series of short interviews with people who have broad or specialized knowledge of development NGOs and participation.

Despite our attempts at a global outlook, the study has a clear European bias: not only are both authors European but all the interviews were made in Western Europe. Also, our net necessarily had a wide mesh; as the study was to take only one and a half months, we could not hope to catch and examine every species but rather present a few interesting specimens.

In Part One we draw on and discuss various attempts to classify non-governmental organizations in development.

PART ONE

1. NGOs IN DEVELOPMENT

A number of authors writing about non-governmental organizations express dissatisfaction with the term (which, according to the International Coalition of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), first appeared in the United Nations Charter) (ICVA, 1983).

First, its meaning is defined by a negative feature — not being governmental — rather than expressing a meaning of its own. Second, the term is so broad that it covers everything from a transnational corporation to a village sewing circle and therefore becomes an imitatively blunt descriptive tool.

Perhaps a hint of this irritation can be found in Koenn-Der Oud's question:

Should we not ban the word NGOs from our vocabulary and start indicating the various institutions which the non-governmental sector comprises by more positive and precise terms?

(Cebemo, 1987, p. 27)

And yet, at the same time, the term — especially its abbreviation, NGO — has a very positive ring to it in development circles. For NGOs have the reputation, deserved or not, of altering the world in more efficient and participatory ways than government agencies, albeit on a relatively small scale up to now.

Martin de Graaf offers a useful warning for those trying to get NGOs within their sights:

... in the current development debate and even more in the prevailing practices of international and local agencies, NGOs are often perceived and treated as systems on their own. The special world of international development appears to become even more special and reclusive under the current NGO focus. An international circuit seems to evolve around the development activities undertaken and supported by NGOs which could easily encapsulate the various actors and their institutions. And this social and professional myopia can easily reflect on the strategic orientations and self-conceptions of NGOs and their staff. In other words, the environment outside the NGO and beyond its field of operation can easily be ignored or inadequately perceived.

(de Graaf, 1987, p. 278)

It is often taken for granted that the world of NGOs in development divides naturally into two: Northern and Southern — that is, those in industrialized countries corresponding roughly to the membership of OECD and those classified by the United Nations as 'developing' in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

One exception to this way of seeing is David Korten's.

Noting that non-governmental organizations “defy attempts at precise classification”, he states that:

Even so, among those NGOs that work in development, it is possible to identify three distinctive orientations in programming strategy: (a) relief and welfare; (b) local self-reliance; and (c) sustainable systems development. All three strategic orientations appropriately co-exist within the larger NGO community — and sometimes even within a single NGO. At the same time there is an underlying direction of movement that makes it appropriate to label those orientations as first, second and third generation.

(Korten, 1987, p. 147)

A footnote points out that generational terminology is derived from the human family, in which new generations take their place alongside older ones rather than, as in the world of computers, render the previous generation obsolete.

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 5/1991 279
The first generation, in Korten’s schema (Table 1), includes such organizations as Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) that began as charitable relief organizations delivering goods and services, first as disaster relief and then, using the same model, as development aid. The second generation focuses on community development “with the intent that benefits would be sustained beyond the period of NGO assistance” (Key words are small-scale and self-reliant.)

The third generation of NGOs assumes a catalytic rather than an operational role, “directing its attention to facilitating development by other organizations, both public and private.” The focus now is on the regional or national level, and the aim is to develop “sustainable systems” (ibid, pp. 147-149).

Table 1. Three generations of NGO development program strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST</th>
<th>SECOND</th>
<th>THIRD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defining features</td>
<td>Small-scale self-reliant</td>
<td>Sustainable systems development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem identification</td>
<td>Local inertia</td>
<td>Institutional &amp; policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time frame</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Indefinite long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial scope</td>
<td>Individual or family</td>
<td>Neighborhood or village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief actors</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>NGO + beneficiary organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development education</td>
<td>Starving children</td>
<td>Community self-help initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management orientation</td>
<td>Logistics management</td>
<td>Project management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.1 Northern NGOs

Some writers, even as recently as 1985, are able to discuss NGOs without mentioning their existence in the South. Gary Arnold is one of them. His broad classification (Arnold 1985, p.96) divides NGOs into five categories relating to their purposes and functions:
- first, churches and missions concerned mainly with proselytization but also with providing education and health services;
- second, large national organizations (such as the Ford Foundation), only part of whose activity is directed towards Third World development;
- third, national agencies created specifically to deal with Third World problems (e.g. Oxfam and Novib);
- fourth, international organizations not originally designed for Third World operations but which are becoming increasingly involved in them (e.g. International Red Cross, World Council of Churches, World University Service);
- fifth, volunteer-sending agencies such as Britain’s Voluntary Service Organization (VSO) that may also be partly or wholly government run.

A simple, nine-category classification of NGOs was formerly used by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), in particular to show the distribution of grants to Swedish NGOs. These broad categories (which included trade unions, humanitarian, women’s, missionary and cooperative organizations) have recently been replaced by a 22-category classification of NGO projects that receive SIDA funding (e.g. health, education and different types of disaster relief).

The new focus on NGO activities rather than the organizations themselves seems to follow the most common Northern approach - but it bypasses the question of classification.

On the whole, Northern scholars (and NGOs) have shown themselves to be more interested in examining, describing (and, as certain Southerners point out, criticizing) organizations in the South than in the North.

Sithembiso Nyoni, of the Zimbabwean ORAP (Organization of Rural Associations for Progress) says:

Most development agencies are centers of power which try to help others change. But they do not themselves change. They aim at creating awareness among people yet they are not themselves aware of their negative impact on those they claim to serve. They claim to help people change their situation through participation, democracy, and self-help and yet they themselves are non-participatory, non-democratic and dependent on outside help for their survival.

(Nyoni, 1987 p 53)

1.1.1 Lists and Directories

The 1987 listing by the United Nations of NGOs in various degrees of consultative status with the Economic & Social Council (ECOSOC) includes 824 organizations with headquarters in different parts of the world and all, presumably, with some kind of interest in Third World development. (UN, 1987) But this listing obviously includes only a fraction of the NGOs concerned with development. These
were some 250 foreign NGOs operating in Burkina Faso alone in the middle of the 1970s. (EGA, 1988, p. 11)

A more comprehensive listing, published and periodically updated by the OECD Development Centre in Paris, includes some 1,700 organizations based in OECD member countries. (OECD, 1981)

Even when the NGOs being discussed are only those in development, the field is so relatively recent and scholarly scrutiny that there are as yet no agreed definitions and terminology. (See 1.3 below on terminology.) For example, according to some understandings of 'NGOs in development', but not others, a Northern commercial (for profit) corporation engaged in development work in the South qualifies for inclusion.

Giulio Fossi, Head of External Cooperation at the OECD Development Centre, emphasizes that the borderline between what is and is not an NGO is hard to draw and that the national NGO scene varies enormously, even within western Europe.

The OECD Directory does not divide NGOs into categories but simply lists them by country or as international NGOs. Each organizational profile is attributed a number of key words, which are listed in an index. This allows for the identification, say, of all youth organizations in the OECD area. For more detailed inquiries the Centre has a computer service that allows information based on several key words to be retrieved.

The computer makes it much easier to divide NGOs and their interests into small, specific groupings. At the same time as this offers obvious advantages, there are drawbacks: the wealth and fine diversity of information may result in 'not seeing the wood for the trees', and the whole system, naturally, stands or falls with the quality of information fed into the computer. (For example, the 1981 OECD Directory has only four entries under the key word 'Participation', including the Swiss organization devoted to the treatment of leprosy and Medicus Mundi in Brussels.)

There are many Northern national listings of NGOs, or at least the most important among them concerned with development. The Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), for example, publishes a directory of Canadian NGOs (CCIC, 1986) that lists organizations and attributes to most of them one or more of a variety of labels: e.g. voluntary organization in international development, umbrella organization, professional association; university/collage; cooperative; church group; research group; learner center; service club.

NGOs in the North dislike being classified by others. As Constant Bartholomeussen of the NGO-EEC Liaison Committee in Brussels has put it: 'NGOs don't want to be put in boxes. This is a general feeling.'

And when it comes to publishing lists of their Southern partner organizations, Northern NGOs are even less enthusiastic. The explanation they usually give is that their partners should be as close as possible to the people they oppose the oppressive government.

As one of the most significant features of Northern NGOs in development is the increased government funding they receive, we deal with this aspect separately (see 1.4 State Funding of NGOs).

1.1.2 A Southern Perspective

The perspective from which Northern NGOs are considered in the literature is usually a Northern one though, most recently, Southern specialists in NGO research such as Mário Padrin, Hash Seth, Rupesh Tandon, and G. Shukla have contributed new ways of looking at NGOs, including Northern ones. Alcier P. Fernandez of Myriad, an Indian NGO, provides a categorization of Northern donor organizations involved with rural development “depending on their pattern of operation”:

1. Those who do not have representatives in the country but operate through regular (three, four, six) monthly reports, statements of expenditure and forecasts. They send out evaluators, usually hired from their countries, and visit the programs annually for a few days. Such donors tend to have a small staff and call on outside expertise for technical expertise when required.

2. Those who have representatives in the country. Here there are two major models: (a) those donors who are operational throughout the world and directly implement their programs in the field through their own staff; (b) those who have local or regional representatives but who function only as channels for funds or as advisors and monitors. These work through local NGOs (voluntary agencies) and are not directly operational. Here the practice of hiring an expert or local as their representative tends to give a different image of the donor.

3. There are some donors who do not have permanent representatives but who keep staff on and off in the country for longer periods (1-2 years): this practice is growing.

4. There are also others who have a group of in-country consultants on call to assess or evaluate their projects. Cutting across these categories are two types of relations that donors establish: (a) a long-term relationship with the partner - here donors are concerned not only with the program but with the growth and health of the institution; (b) a relationship which relates only to a particular program or project.

(Fernandez, 1987, pp. 46-47)

1.2 International NGOs

So far, international NGOs are a feature almost exclusively of the Northern scene. Their origin may often be a grouping of Northern national organizations, in which Southern counterparts are added at a later stage (though their authenticity as Southern organizations is sometimes in question: what takes place can be described as a Northern organization spawning Southern affiliates or subsidiaries.)

In a recent study of Canadian NGOs, the authors show that 25 percent of the NGOs in their national survey were those with an international head office. The main task of the Canadian affiliate was fundraising. (Broadhead & Herbert-Cupley, 1988)

A more recent phenomenon is the international network, which functions mainly for exchanges of information between autonomous national and regional member organizations. Though the work of many of these members is of a kind that fits with the aims of Northern funding agencies, their network activities and the task of servicing the network do not fit the project mould and, therefore, often fail to attract funds.

Groupings of quite different types have adopted the
network model. One is the single-issue movement or campaign, pioneered by the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN); another is the grouping of Southern development NGOs called BRED (in English Development Innovations & Networks), which has its secretariat in Geneva; whereas IBFAN also has one of its three central offices.

### 3.3 Southern NGOs

The picture of NGOs in the South is at least as complex as that in the North, although the number of larger, officially-recognized NGOs is much smaller. OECD estimates put the number of indigenous NGOs in the South between 6,000 and 8,000.

There is more diversity in Asia than on the other two continents, according to the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). The Asian situation is profoundly different, particularly with regard to the influence of traditional ideologies on problems of social relations. (Stiefel & Pearse, 1982, p. 159)

Asian and Latin American NGOs are widely considered to be more experienced and "sophisticated" than their African counterparts, most of which have a much shorter history. The results of a major study, by Milton Esman and Norman Uphoff, support this view. They look at the performance of local organizations (LOs) in Asia, Africa and Latin America and assign to them a score on a 1-5 scale for a variety of tasks. In general, LOs in Asia performing tasks better than those in Latin America and Africa. Latin American LOs come out ahead of their African and Asian counterparts in the areas of service tasks. The performance of African LOs is relatively poor in both internal and external tasks. (Esman/Uphoff, 1984, pp. 97-98)

Another, somewhat oversimplified, generalization about NGOs on different continents in the South is that those in Latin America tend to oppose government in one way or another, those in Africa mostly work with government, and are less independent; and those in Asia make claims on government bodies to gain access to services and facilities.

### 3.3.1 NGOs at the local level

The term "local NGO" is widely and confusingly used in the North to designate any non-governmental organization at any level, with one implied and ethnocentric proviso, that it is in the Third World! (In the same way, to most of those who work with Northern NGOs "local people" means those in the Third World.)

A minimum three levels need to be distinguished:

1. Central government agencies
2. Local government units
3. Local organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central government agencies</th>
<th>Local government units</th>
<th>Local organizations</th>
<th>Political organizations</th>
<th>Private enterprises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Esman/Uphoff, 1984, p. 58)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third category, local organizations, consists of three different types of organizations:

1. Local development associations (LDAs). These are multifunctional membership organizations in that they...
can undertake a wide variety of tasks and are extensions of the community more than of the government, though they may be government initiated and assisted.\(^\text{[i]}\)

(ii) cooperatives. The defining characteristic is the pooling of resources, and the common task is the production of public goods. Membership is usually more inclusive than that of local development associations. The most crucial difference between cages and LDAs is that the latter contribute mostly to public goods, accessible to all, while the benefits from cages are usually of a more private nature, most accruing directly to members.\(^\text{[ii]}\)

(iii) interest associations (IA). Members of this, the most diverse of the three categories, are defined not by geographic boundaries (LDAs) or by pooling of economic resources (coops) but by certain common features of their membership. Examples are water user associations (functional IA) and church groups and landless labourers' associations (categorial IA).

Of the 150 documented cases of local organizations studied by Esman and Uphoff, the largest category (46 percent) is the third type: interest associations. This category, however, invites description as a miscellaneous grouping consisting of LDAs that are neither local development associations nor cooperatives. The authors indicate that the IA is a simpler form that may evolve into a LDA or cooperative.

Nineteen percent of these 150 LDAs are classed in local development associations (LDAs). LDAs are "as heterogeneous as the communities involved, since the only common characteristic that members share is their place of residence".\(^\text{[iii]}\)

Their multifunctional nature includes a wide variety of tasks from road-building and church construction to regulating social conduct. (Examples given include: Sarvodaya Shramadana in Sri Lanka, village development committees in Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, the Ayni Ruway in Bolivia.)

Cooperatives are a "voluntary" sector consisting of membership organizations and cooperatives, and - a "public" sector that includes local government and local administration; - a "voluntary" sector consisting of membership organizations and cooperatives; and - a "private" sector with service organizations, as well as businesses/enterprises.

Uphoff considers that, for the most part, secular voluntary organizations reacting into the masses of the population are a recent phenomenon, if present at all, and the capacity for such organizations remains very unevenly distributed... it is not surprising if.

for the great majority of the rural population and urban marginalized population, formal voluntary organizations are either non-existent or are controlled and manipulated by forces other than their members. (Wolfe, 1981, p. 144)

Though Wolfe's remarks were published seven years ago, and the situation has evolved rapidly in many countries since then, they are still worth bearing in mind.

1.3.2 Classifying According to Political Regime

In contrast to the very general reasons usually given for wanting to classify NGOs and their activities, Ralph Tandon of the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (SPRA) offers a very specific one. (Tandon, 1987) He considers that classifying different types of economies and countries of the South helps to conceptualise and understand the roles the NGOs play in them:

- Under (a) military and other dictatorial regimes where there is "no possibility of any direct or indirect cooperation or collaboration with the State or its agents", the NGO role is to strengthen and augment a political opposition. (He cites China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and, until recently, the Philippines.)
- In (b) single-party political systems, where NGOs risk to "get neglected, pushed aside, humiliated or absorbed by the Party and its organs", their role is "to create political space in order to play the role of highlighting and adding newer elements in the party's programmes and the State's understanding of problems of development". (The examples: Ghana, Tanzania and "some of the socialist countries").
- In (c) liberal democracies where, "unlike in the countries of the North, governments do not accept criticism, critique, questioning, dissent and articulation of an alternative point of view", the NGO role is more complex.

What happens, for example, in India, where a group of women demand participation in government development programmes "as a consequence of the educational and organizational efforts of a local NGO, the local and district level officials may feel harassed, threatened, perturbed and begin to point their fingers at such voluntary organizations as the cause of their troubles". (Other countries in this category, in addition to India, are given as Brazil, Peru, Senegal and Sri Lanka.)

The Esman/Uphoff perspective is as far from that of Tandon as it is from that of Wolfe. Unlike a number of other NGO researchers, Esman and Uphoff seek ways of looking at and assessing local organizations irrespective of the nature of the regime where they are found. They recognize that "governments can be incompetent, or brutal and exploitative" but "for better or for worse, government influence is here to stay, whether leftist, rightist, reformist, or technocratic, government activities in rural areas are likely to increase, not diminish, most successful local associations enjoy the support or at least the acquiescence of government and are linked to services or resources that originate in the state." (Esman/Uphoff, 1984, p. 267)

However, Fernand Vincent, Secretary General of IBED, has no doubt that a regime's politics affects the scope and nature of local initiatives in the Southern continent he knows best: Africa. A country like Senegal, he considers, "where there is space and possibility for local action and organization", provides the best ground for participatory rural development initiatives to flourish. Also, those coun-

**ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES. 5/1991** 283
tories like Rwanda, with elected local authorities, which they inherited from their former colonial powers, may allow popular movements to grow.

In those African countries where capitalism is strongly entrenched, one of the characteristics of the NGO scene, according to Vincent, is that the government maintains a wary eye on the intermediate-level support organizations, and is concerned to limit their growth and influence. There are many local organizations but they do not have the possibility of becoming larger people's movements, "which are considered dangerous."

Padrón centres most of his attention on NGDOs and their relationship with his other two organizational categories; that is, on the NGO as recipient, intermediary and one of three equal partners in the development process.

An even stronger watch on unofficial activities is noticeable in socialist countries. "When the party is too strong it destroys local initiative. In Tanzania, which was considered the model country for rural development efforts 15-20 years ago, it is now very difficult to do anything - it's the African country that is the least cooperative with NGOs."

The situation is different again in countries like Zaire, where the majority of the population in rural areas are left completely on their own and are obliged to take initiatives in order to survive.

1.3.3 Southern Perspectives

A FAO Freedom from Hunger Campaign/Action for Development (FFHC/AD) report resulting from several meetings between Latin American NGO activists and scholars reveals some of the special characteristics associated with NGOs in Latin America:

The originality of the NGOs lay precisely in the fact that, by definition, they dedicate themselves to movements at the intermediate or lower levels of the political and social body... They are not businesses, churches, parties or government bodies, and could not replace them. They simply constitute an instrument for bringing together focal initiatives.

This FFHC/AD report describes what is typical for these Latin American NGOs: they were created, usually by intellectual representatives of the middle class, to help - or, in their own terminology, to serve - the poor. They are non-profit organizations whose services are free, and most are almost totally dependent on funds from foreign donors.

Although it is clear that the three broad categories suggested by Mario Padrón, of the Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo (DESCO) in Peru, emerged from the Latin American context, they apply to NGOs generally:

(a) non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs), applied to indigenous organizations catering to the multiple needs of communities with informal traditional structures, most often constituted by far the largest category. It consists of communities with informal traditional structures, most often undertaking activities that benefit all their members.

(b) grassroots organizations (GROs), with the help of international development cooperation institutions (IDCs).

(c) confessional NGOs organized by churches and influenced by them to a greater or lesser degree. (Though this African report includes churches as NGOs, the previous Latin American report excludes them.)

(d) National and local NGOs set up either by the rural populations themselves or by national volunteers, and which have obtained official recognition.

(ii) Traditional village organizations or rural communities. Though not officially recognized as NGOs, these constitute by far the largest category. It consists of communities with informal traditional structures, most often undertaking activities that benefit all their members.

The two main categories of "official" and "traditional" organizations above roughly correspond with the two major categories of Asian NGOs suggested by G. Shahbīr Cheema His "standard organizations" and "community organizations and peasant groupings" are, for example, a modification of an FAO classification (Cheema, 1983)

The secular category is broken down into 11 sub-groupings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of Voluntary Organizations</th>
<th>Community Organizations and Peasant Groupings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard Organizations</td>
<td>Community Organizations and Peasant Groupings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cooperatives</td>
<td>1. Special organizations or rural disadvantaged groups such as tenants associations and organizations of agricultural labourers and landlord women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Village development committees</td>
<td>2. Village-based ad hoc organizations formed to agitate for a specific and immediate local need</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NGOs in Development and Participation: In Practice

3. Government-sponsored farmer’s organizations

3. Village welfare associations

4. Trade unions

4. Village funeral societies

5. Urban organizations

5. Caste associations

6. Political party branches

6. Ethnic associations

7. Development committees in new settlements

7. Irrigation associations

8. Other voluntary organizations sponsored by the government

8. Mutual and work groups

9. Religious associations

1.3.4 Networks and Directories

Directories of NGOs exist in many countries of the South. Sometimes an indigenous umbrella NGO is the publisher, and sometimes aid agencies like UNICEF, in which case they are usually limited to particular themes, such as NGOs that work with water and sanitation. All directories of Southern NGOs are ephemeral, however, as the constantly changing NGO scene renders them quickly out of date; also, they usually include only those NGOs that are officially registered.

Some NGOs have built up quite extensive webs of contacts within their field of interest, e.g. the Environment Liaison Centre in Nairobi, which has a very broad definition of environment and is in contact with a large number of African NGOs.

IREDD (see 1.2) has a network with 500 partners. In Latin America the regional office is in DESCO, Lima; in Africa there are two offices: one in Niger and one in Zimbabwe, as well as organizations such as ENDA, which are networks in themselves; and in Asia there are two centres, one in Sri Lanka and the other in India.

1.4 State Funding of NGOs

No-one today questions the significant role played by Northern NGOs in Southern development, though of course the nature and quality of what they promote and whether or not it is “real development” are certainly questioned. The growth of their role measured in money terms has been spectacular in recent years.

According to OECD data, total Third World aid disbursement of NGOs of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries in 1985 was US$ 5,419 million (more than one-third of which consists of governmental contributions).

This means that it multiplied more than 6 times in 16 years, the relevant figure for 1970 being US$ 89.7 million.

The following table (Table 2) shows the growth of relief and development aid by NGOs in the main DAC countries and the proportion provided by the respective governments of 1986 NGO aid.

### Table 2. Relief & Development Aid by NGOs of Selected DAC Countries (1970, 1975, 1985 & 1986, in US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>% of which gov’t funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>108.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (Fed Rep)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>398.0</td>
<td>804.0</td>
<td>2,316</td>
<td>2,413</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**


** The 1975 Review of the OECD Development Assistance Committee.


(1) Applies in 1986 figures.

(2) Not fully comparable with figures for other countries. For example, data for both Switzerland and the US exclude subcontracts to NGOs (1985 & 1986), and data for the US excludes $243 million for emergency programmes in 1985, while the source included the figures for 1980.
While studying the figures - in particular, the proportion of state funding - the difficulties of knowing what is included are worth bearing in mind. Government agencies as a rule only have data concerning projects they support, not data for all national NGO aid; nor is this data always directly comparable with that of another country. (In the case of Sweden, for example, the proportion - 34 percent of government funding seems unrealistically low, considering that most major NGOs are 80 percent, 90 percent or even 95 percent funded by SIDA.)

Another indication of the importance of government funding to NGO aid can be seen in the various national rules for government contributions to NGO development projects. The following table (Table 3) gives the general rule for several major donor countries; for certain types of project, however, there are exceptions that allow an even higher proportion of government funds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportion of Government Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia, France, New Zealand, Switzerland</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom, United States, CEE</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, Germany (FRG), Ireland</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway, Sweden</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark, Netherlands</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada, Italy, Japan</td>
<td>No fixed percentage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Government funding of Northern NGOs for their Third World development projects (and also, in many cases, for their administrative costs as well) is now firmly established. One-third of DAC-country governments have instituted a system of block grants to their major NGOs instead of contributing on a project-by-project basis, thereby saving administrative costs and allowing these NGOs more power of discretion over state-funded projects. Official grants are also often available for NGO feasibility studies and evaluations, and some governments, including the Swedish, have been making direct contributions to Southern NGOs that, already in 1984, accounted for 15 percent of their official allocations to voluntary agencies (OECD, 1988).

The NGO hesitations are of various kinds. In addition to concerns among heavily-government-funded Northern NGOs about being bypassed, there are aggravations of familiar worries about loss of autonomy and independence. In a study for the World Council of Churches, Kees van der Poort calls the trend toward direct funding "one of the most alarming phenomena" and concludes:

"The trends of privatization and direct funding are a serious threat to the NGO project market as it exists today. Donors may see their position weakened (especially donors who are dependent on government funds) and the whole NGO development phenomena (sic) may well become more and more an instrument of government development and foreign policy..." (van der Poort, 1987, p. 88)

Figure 1 shows the various routes that development aid money from Northern governments take. By far the largest flow consists of government-to-government (bilaterial) aid but a rising proportion is being channelled via NGOs, including international NGOs such as the League of Red Cross Societies, the World Council of Churches and international trade union bodies.

1.4.1. Direct Funding

A more recent development is direct funding by Northern governments of Southern NGOs engaged in development. Several of the large donor governments and international donors (e.g. IBRD, UNDP) have introduced various ways of funding Southern NGOs directly - a trend that is growing space.

One of the countries with the longest experience of direct funding is Canada. For a decade it has been making small grants to Third World projects via overseas embassies and CIDA offices abroad. The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden also have experience in this field. The Dutch and the Swedes began with direct funding of women's projects, while the Norwegians have been making direct contributions to Southern NGOs that, already in 1984, account for 15 percent of their official allocations to voluntary agencies (OECD, 1988).

There are still a number of official doubts and many NGO hesitations about this kind of funding; however, for one thing, its compatibility with international law is unquestionable only as long as it has the approval of the government in the receiving country, which is not always the case at present.

The NGO hesitations are of various kinds. In addition to concerns among heavily-government-funded Northern NGOs about being bypassed, there are aggravations of familiar worries about loss of autonomy and independence.

In a study for the World Council of Churches, Kees van der Poort calls the trend toward direct funding "one of the most alarming phenomena" and concludes:

"The trends of privatization and direct funding are a serious threat to the NGO project market as it exists today. Donors may see their position weakened (especially donors who are dependent on government funds) and the whole NGO development phenomena (sic) may well become more and more an instrument of government development and foreign policy..."

(van der Poort, 1987, p. 88)
organizations are gradually becoming available to Southern NGOs, there is "a certain priority on SIDA for Swedish money to handled by Swedish hands." (ibid, p. 48).

Figure 2 shows Swedish aid disbursements. The lion's share of government NGO funding goes to Swedish NGOs in three different forms: for disaster relief, development projects and humanitarian aid. There is nothing to prevent an NGO engaged in all three activities from receiving all three types of funding. In addition, NGOs may employ volunteers paid for by SIDA (some 700 were supported in this way in the fiscal year 1986-87) and limited amounts are also available for information and education in Sweden.

The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) is in contact with more than 500 NGOs that have applied for support of projects in the Third World. Eleven Swedish NGOs and two international NGOs (World Council of Churches and International Cooperative Alliance), have special "(frame)" agreements with SIDA that allow them to receive block grants; some of these are umbrella organizations (e.g. Swedish Missionary Council) that distribute their grants among members. In addition, SIDA gives sectoral aid (for health, education and so on) to such organizations as the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature.

The types of Swedish NGOs receiving SIDA development aid can be distinguished (in rough order of magnitude) in churches, trade unions, cooperatives, voluntary organizations and solidarity groups. For the churches, unions, cooperatives and many smaller organizations, their World development projects are not their main activity or raison d'etre.

The churches, however, represent a different institutional reality in that they have a longer history in the Third World than any other type of NGO. To see them as a homogenous grouping, though, is mistaken: the spectrum of Swedish church aid runs from the old-fashioned type where decisions are made by a congregation in Sweden for "their" project in the Third World, to church groups who support organizations of poor people, including non-Christians, on their own terms. (The same is true of church aid from other countries and of international church aid via bodies such as the World Council of Churches and the Lutheran World Federation.)

In SIDA's 1981/2 budget, total disbursements to NGOs represented 8.6 percent of all aid via SIDA. In 1986/7 this figure increased to 19.7 percent (or, if measured in terms of total government aid, about 10 percent). Figure 2 does not include government support to research institutes like the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC) or SIDA's administrative and information costs, as well as some other costs, amounting to almost one-tenth of the total.

No-strings-attached is also one of the features of the aid to liberation movements (some of which are now in power), which goes via Swedish solidarity groups.

Swedish direct funding is no longer limited to women's projects in the South, which since 1979 could receive funds from SIDA's development cooperation offices in the Third World. For 1987/88, 17 million kronor (roughly US$ 2.8 million) were allocated for this purpose in 15 of the 17 so-called SIDA programme countries. On a trial basis, Indian and Bangladeshi development NGOs began receiving direct SIDA grants in 1983; and two years later Sri Lankan NGOs also; together they receive up to 15 million kronor.

Although the experiment is considered generally successful, and will continue in these countries, plans for extending it to other countries have been shelved, mainly due to lack of SIDA administrative staff (Norway's NORAD employs 8 people for this purpose alone, whereas SIDA employs none.)

A further type of support to Southern NGOs exists, though it doesn't show up under a "NGO" heading in the SIDA budget. In Kenya, for example, the Ministry of Water Development and SIDA have a total water supply programme in which one budget item is "Support to NGOs." The larger part of this support (including the provision of 5 sociologists) has gone to KWAHO, a Kenyan-based NGO involved in improved water and sanitation on a self-help basis. A smaller sum is allocated to other NGOs, including informal organizations such as registered self-help groups in areas where water systems are installed (Requests for such help are made to the Deputy District Commissioner, i.e. to the Kenyan authorities.)

In SIDA programme countries, NGOs may receive support within the framework of government-run rural development and health programmes and Swedish NGOs may cooperate under contract with a state body in carrying out part of a bilateral aid programme. A well-known example is the Swedish Cooperative Centre's collaboration with SIDA's agricultural division, helping to build up the cooperative movement in Zambia.

3.5 Terminology

The purpose in introducing problems of terminology is not to start mapping the forest of terms and definitions but rather to point it out in an area in need of maps. There's a need not only to try and find the most appropriate term for

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 5/1991  287
each species, but also to clarify what is really meant by cer-
tain terms in frequent use (such as local organization); to
differentiate between things for which the same term is
used; and to identify those terms used to designate the
same thing.

At present the same kind of organization is described
differently in different parts of the world. For example, the
European's "NGO", which most of the Third World has
adopted, is often considered synonymous with "PVO" (pri-
vate, voluntary organization), a term used mainly in the
Americas.

However, Michael M. Cernea, Sociology Advisor to the
World Bank, states:

Voluntary agencies are a specific category, a subset of
NGOs, with specialized objectives, whose activities are of a
humanitarian character, not profit-pursuing. The NGO con-
cept is broader and avoids the limiting connotation tradi-
tionally associated with PVOs as charitable or philanthropic
organizations.

Koenraad Verhagen, a Dutch specialist in NGOs, has
contributed to a clarification of terms. In a report of a 1987
experts' consultation in the Netherlands, he compiles a list
of terms used by contributors to the meeting, which is
quoted below, with his comments. (His reference to ES-31 is
to a study by the German Federal Ministry of Economic
Cooperation described in Part Two.)

The more progressive "private service organiza-
tions" (Uphoff) in the Third World, commonly referred to as
"local NGOs", base as their major goal the "organization of
the target population" into groups, etc.; in other words,
they intend to promote the "associative sector" among the
rural and urban poor.

For our discussions, I think we should make a distin-
tion between membership organizations and non-member-
ship service organizations, since the two types of institu-
tions are different in their objectives, structure and
functions.

What is in a name?

Third World based, non-membership service organiza-
tions which perform a combination of facilitating, promo-
tive, and public functions as a service to the people are
designated by the authors of the position papers by a vari-
ety of names:

NGOs - Non-Governmental Organizations (used in most
papers)

NGDOs - Non-Governmental Development Organiza-
tions (used by Neggers and Wils as a synonym for NGO)

Voluntary Organization - used by Tandon

Intermediary Organization or Intermediary NGO - used
by Neggers and Wils as a synonym for NGO; also used by
Tandon, but in a different meaning, namely as a distinct
category of NGOs which provides backup service like
research, training, documentation, networking, etc. to other
NGOs or MOs; sometimes also referred to as "inter-
mediates".

Social Action Groups (India) - they are small NGOs, 4 to
5 persons, mostly informal.

Indigenous NGOs - used by Ward to indicate NGOs
located in the Third World, not formally linked to donor
NGOs.

Local NGOs - used to indicate Third World based
NGOs, as a synonym for SHPI.

SHPI - Self-Help Promotion Institutions. A term which
the Cebemo study has adopted from ES-31 to indicate:
"local NGOs" geared toward self-help promotion.

(Verhagen, 1987, pp. 24-27)

Verhagen goes on to propose a clear distinction
between membership (people's) organizations (MOs or
PVOs), and private service organizations (PsOs). Those he
lists as examples of MOs include:

- people's organizations/beneficiary organizations ("in the
context of development assistance")/local organizations;

- grass-root (based) organizations/bureaucratic

- village organizations/social groups/self-help

- groups/social groups/self-help organizations.

Others that might be added include (local) community
organizations - local (or village) institutions - local asso-
ciations - village mutual aid groups and other traditional
groupings. In addition, of course, membership organiza-
tions can also be cooperatives or trade unions.

The role of Verhagen's second main category, service
organizations, is more that of intermediaries. They, too,
comprise a wide range. On the one extreme those who
see themselves as facilitators, responding to what grass-
roots populations want from them; on the other, those who
act as delivery mechanisms for conventional development
services.

(2nd Part to appear in next issue)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

d'ABREO, Desmond A. and ROY, Rathindra Nath
- Report of NGO Consultation on Participation in Fisheries
  Development. (December 1986). Small-Scale Fisheries
  Communities in the Bay of Bengal, Madras, India, 1987.
  (FAO project)

ARNOLD, Gay
- Aid and the Third World: The North/South Divide. Robert

ARRUDA, Marcos
- The Role of Latin American Non-Governmental Organiza-

208  TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, 5/1991
tions on the Perspective of Participatory Democracy.
- Report on Third International FFHCAD Consultation
- Touloukian, Karto, mime.

  South Asia Training for Women Development Workers.
  FAO, New Delhi, 1985(a).
- Formulating Projects With People. FAO, New Delhi,
  1985(b).
- Are We on the Right Track? Report of a Workshop on
  Participatory Evaluation. FAO, New Delhi, 1986.

- BMZ (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenar-
 бот - Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation)

- Fighting Rural Poverty through Self-Help. (Report on first
- Fighting Poverty through Self-Help. (Report on second
- Final Report of the Special Unit. Fighting poverty through
  Self-Help (ES-31) on the Second Working phase, part
- Approaches to Overcoming Poverty through Self-Help
  and Target Group-Oriented Financing Instruments. Final
  report (S4) Special Development Tasks Bonn, 1984.

- BROODHARE, Tim and HERBERT-COLEY, Brent
  - Bridges of Hope? Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the

- CCIC (Canadian Council for International Cooperation)

- 10 Profile: A Who’s Who & What’s What of Internatio-
  nal Non-Governmental Organizations and Local Develop-
  ment Cooperation. SAREC, Stockholm, 1981.

- CEREMO
  - Promotion of Autonomous Development. (Report on pro-
    ceedings of experts’ consultation, October 1987, Neuro-
    dorf, the Netherlands.)

- CERNEA, Michael M.
  - Non-Governmental Organizations and Local Develop-

- CHEEMA, G. Shabbir
  - The Role of Voluntary Organizations. In Developmental
    and Development (eds. Cheema & Rondinelli), Sage

- GIEBEN, Vera, Genevieve et al
  - Une évaluation des petits projets de développement (An
    Evaluation of Small Development Projects). COTA,

- DADDSON, J. A.
  - People’s Participation Project in Ghana: An Operational

- DILLON, Bridget & STEIFFEL, Mathias
  - Making the Concept Concrete: The UNRISD Participation
    Programme. In Report 21 of Agricultural Extension &
    Rural Development Centre, University of Reading (UK),
    1987.

- EGA (UN Economic Commission for Africa)
  - From Aid to Solidarity. Report by Robert Sharp for ICVA, to
    International Conference on the Human Dimension of
    Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (Khar-

- ELZINGA, Aant
  - Evaluating the Evaluation Game: On the Methodology of
    Project Evaluation, with Special Reference to Develop-
    ment Cooperation. SAREC, Stockholm, 1981.

- ESMAN, Milton J. & UPHOFF, Norman T.
  - Local Organizations: Intermediate to Rural Develop-

- ESTEVA, Gonzales
  - Mexico: Self-Help network, in IFAD Newsletter. No. 51
    1986.
  - Boose of Participation in Development: Seeds of Change,
    1985: 3. Society for International Develop-
    ment, Rome, 1983.

- FAO-FFHCAD (Food and Agriculture Organization-Free
  and Target Group-Oriented Financing Instruments).
  - Report on FFHCAD Regional Planning Meeting on Train-
    ing in Project Formulation (Nairobi, January 1982).

- FERNANDEZ, Alexeius P.
  - NGOs in South Asia: People’s Participation and Partner-
    ship, in World Development Vol. 15 Supplement. Perga-

- FEURSTEIN, Marie-Thérèse
  - Partners in Evaluation: Evaluating Development and Com-
    munity Programmes with Participants. Macmillan, Lon-
    don, 1986.

- FIGUEA, Aurélia & CHANDLER, Dale (eds)
  - Methods and Media in Community Participation. Dag

- GHAI, Sharran
  - Participatory Development: Some Perspectives from
    Grass-Roots Experiences. In Journal of Development
    Planning.

- GIANOTTI, Vera
  - Methodological Notes for Evaluation. FAO-FFHCAD,

- GORDON DRAKE, Anne (ed)
  - Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs.
    World Development Vol. 15 Supplement. Pergamon

- GORMAN, Robert F. (ed)
  - Context, Constraint or Control? Zimbabwean NGOs and
    Their Environment, in Development Policy Review,

- GRAN, Guy

- GUENEAU, Marie-Christine
  - Les petits projets de développement: sont-ils efficaces ?
    (The Small Development Projects: Are They Effective?)

- HUIZER, Gerrit
  - Guiding Principles for People’s Participation Projects.

- IREDD
  - No Shortcut to Progress: African Development Manage-
    ment in Perspective. Heinemann, Nairobi, 1983.

- ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Agencies)
  - Definitions of “non-governmental organization”, “volun-
    tary agency” and related terms. ICVA, Geneva, 1983.

- IFDA (International Foundation for Development Alterna-
  tives).

- IFDA-FAO-FFHCAD Regional Consultation for Africa

- IRRED, Geneva.
  - NGOs in Development and Participation In Practice

- IRED Forum (quarterly), in English and in French.
  IRRED, Geneva.

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES, 5/1991  289
Self-Evaluation Among Local Organizations and NGOs in Millwood, David and Gezelius, Helena

Participation: A Precondition for Authentic Development, oakley, Peter

The Monitoring and Evaluation of Participation in Rural Development, Facia, entfer

Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People-Centred Development, in World Development, Millwood, David

Non-Governmental Organizations in Latin America, in World Development, Oakley, Peter and Marsden, David

Strengthening People's Participation in Rural Development, Approaches to Participation in Rural Development, Korten, David


The Role of NGOs in International Development Cooperation, Office for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 1981.


On Proshika organisationarupchari bland landbebyggda jordbruksföretag i Bangladesh (On Proshika Organization Work Among the Rural Landless in Bangladesh), Skolverket (Swallows), Lund, Sweden 1985.


Non-Governmental Organizations in Latin America, in World Development, Millwood, David


The Rote of Non-Governmental Organizations in Development Cooperation, in World Development, Millwood, David


The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Development Cooperation, OECD, Paris, 1986.

Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations in OECD Member Countries Active in Development Cooperation OECD, Paris, 1981.


Anisur Rahman, Anisur and FAZI-BORDA, Orlando


Non-Governmental Development Organizations: From Development Aid to Development Cooperation, in World Development, Millwood, David


Anisur Rahman, Anisur and FAZI-BORDA, Orlando


SHARP, Robin (see EGA)

SIDA (Swedish International Development Authority)

SITTERL, Matthias and PEARSE, Andrew

TANDON, Rajesh

TENDEL, Judith

TILAKARATNA, S.

TURTON, Andrew

UNITED NATIONS

UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development)
- Dialogue About Participation. (Four issues of irregular publication, 1981-83).

UPKOFF, Norman

VERRAGEN, Koenraad


WENCENT, Fernand

vON der WEID, Damia and POITEVIN, Guy

WOLFE, Warshall

WOLFSON, Margaret

WORLD BANK (International Bank for Reconstruction & Development-IBRD)
Le financement des actions des ONG
Quelles contraintes? *

par E. Beaudoux, G. de Crombrugghe, F. Douxchamps,
M.-C. Queneau, M. Nieuwkerk

L’observation des pratiques des ONG du Nord et du Sud a servi de base à la rédaction d’un guide méthodologique présenté ailleurs (1). Les recommandations qui y sont données partent des besoins du terrain et constituent une réflexion sur les manières de satisfaire ces besoins. Les moyens financiers nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre les méthodes préconisées sont définis dans le guide, mais l’intérêt de ces moyens dans les ONG du Nord et auprès de leurs cofinanceurs, ainsi que les modalités d’octroi, ne sont pas envisagés. C’est précisément l’objet de cet article.

Les recommandations présentées ici s’adressent donc aux organismes de financement, tant publics que privés, qui mettent à la disposition des ONG du Nord et du Sud les moyens financiers nécessaires à la réalisation de leurs objectifs. Dans la filière de l’aide au développement, nous avons, tout au long de notre travail, distingué trois niveaux, celui de l’action de terrain, celui de l’appui à cette action. C’est donc à ce troisième niveau que ces recommandations sont adressées. Elles partent des conseils émis dans le guide méthodologique et exploitent des modalités de financement qui permettront aux ONG du Nord et du Sud de mettre en pratique ces conseils.

Les acteurs directs des actions et les ONG d’appui comptent généralement sur deux sources de fonds extérieures différentes (au-delà de leurs fonds propres et des fonds locaux qu’ils mobilisent): les fonds propres des ONG du Nord, qui sont généralement récoltés auprès des donateurs sympathisants, et les fonds publics utilisés pour le cofinancement des actions de développement de ces ONG, et provenant donc de recettes fiscales. Ces deux types de fonds sont, dans la plupart des cas, utilisés ensemble lors du financement d’une même action de développement dans le tiers monde. Il semble dès lors utile que les modalités d’octroi de ces deux types de fonds soient similaires, ou du moins harmonisées car ils sont au service d’une même cause.

L’aide aux ONG d’appui du Sud est une pratique relativement récente des ONG de financement, elle appelle des conditions de financement nouvelles. L’ONG du Nord et celle du Sud y sont partenaires à part entière, engagées ensemble dans une même action en faveur de processus de développement de régions du Sud. En général, les institutions publiques de cofinancement, tant au niveau des institutions multilatérales, que des institutions nationales ou multilatérales de cofinancement des ONG ont une possibilité de financer directement une aide à des ONG du Sud (la division de cofinancement des ONG internationales de l’Agence européenne de développement international - ACDI, par exemple, ou encore la CEDEpour des lignes budgétaires spécifiques).

Par le biais des fonds de micro-projets de certaines ambassades ou délégations du Fonds européen de développement, des ONG d’appui du Sud sont également en contact direct avec des sources de financement publiques des pays du Nord.

Les ONG d’appui du Sud qui offrent des services aux acteurs de base d’actions de développement doivent pouvoir assurer ces services à moyen et même à long terme. Il est clair que le financement de ces services devra venir de l’extérieur - dans ce cas-ci des ONG du Nord et des organismes de financement publics - aussi longtemps que les pouvoirs locaux ou les utilisateurs ne seront pas à même d’assurer ce financement.

Il est important que l’ONG du Nord qui s’engage aux côtés d’une ONG du Sud, avec laquelle elle établit de véritables liens de partenariat (sur une base contractuelle), soit capable d’assumer ses promesses. Or, actuellement, la plupart des ONG du Nord doivent faire dépendre leurs engagements de l’accord du cofinanceur, qui leur fournit entre 50 et 100 % des fonds nécessaires à l’accomplissement de ces engagements. C’est un obstacle pour

(*) Reproduction, Echos du COTA, 2/1991, cet article est fondé sur un support réalisé pour la Communauté économique européenne. La coordination de l’équipe avait été assurée par le Collectif d’échanges pour la technologie appropriée (COTA), rue de la Palmyre 18, 1000 Bruxelles.

292 TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, 5/1991
Le financement des actions des ONG

...
Le financement des actions des ONG

Le financement des actions des ONG
cofinancé par les ONG et le bailleur de fonds public selon une répartition à définir. Il serait réalisé chaque année en fonction des dépenses réalisées. On pourrait s’inspirer de l’expérience française des Fonds d’études préalables (FEP), qui fonctionne depuis deux ans selon un schéma de ce type pour les projets produits uniquement, ou encore d’une expérience similaire au Danemark. Il semble que la limite à l’utilisation du FEP soit le faible nombre d’études proposées pour des projets produits et correspondant aux critères d’accès définis.

 Créer un fonds spécial pour des études thématiques préalables à des actions
Ce fonds devrait permettre à des ONG d’étudier à fond un secteur d’activité, avant de lancer des actions spécifiques dans ce secteur (par exemple, avant de financer plusieurs actions de maraîchage autour d’une ville, il serait bon d’étudier d’abord les problèmes de marché pour l’horticulture dans la région). Cette recommandation est assortie de celle de coordination en effet, l’usage du “fonds d’études thématiques” devrait être fait, de préférence, par plusieurs ONG concernées par le même problème, de plus, il devrait être conditionné à la présentation d’un projet d’étude qui fasse clairement le pont sur toute autre étude éventuelle, en cours ou déjà réalisée, sur le même thème dans la même région, et qu’il serait opportun de compléter. Il serait de toute manière nécessaire de confier ces études à des structures complètes : ONG de service, coordination locale d’ONG, bureaux d’études du Nord ou du Sud.

Rechercher des voies et moyens pour des financements directs de certaines institutions du Sud
L’intermédiaire des ONG de financement du Nord présentera des avantages (dans certains cas, elles protègent les partenaires du Sud de l’ingérence de leurs gouvernements, une parfaite connaissance des mécanismes administratifs de leurs cofinanceurs leur permet de mieux structurer leurs partenaires du Sud et de les aider à faire face correctement à leurs obligations de rendre compte) et des inconvénients (parties le lenteur d’un long processus de prises de décisions en cascade ; la dépendance également, et son corollaire, le partage des coûts). Sans vouloir proposer le cofinancement direct systématique d’ONG du Sud, il est recommandé d’élargir la pratique de “donations globales directes” à certains partenaires du Sud avec lesquels une longue expérience de collaboration fructueuse existe déjà sous couvert d’ONG du Nord. Il convient bien sûr d’envisager cette proposition avec beaucoup de prudence, et de veiller à mettre en place les garde-fous nécessaires pour limiter au maximum ses possibles effets pervers sur les ONG du Sud (limitation de la liberté d’action des ONG, ingérences politiques, obligation pour les ONG de se conformer au cadre des relations intergouvernementales, etc.).

Elargir la possibilité d’octroi de fonds souples pour le soutien aux activités des ONG du Sud
Ces fonds souples ne pourraient être demandés qu’à l’issue d’une phase d’identification qui aura mis en évidence les capacités de l’ONG du Sud à pouvoir gérer correctement les fonds, et à obtenir des services útils aux groupes de base. Le suivi est particulièrement important ici et les cofinanceurs devront s’assurer que celui-ci est bien fait. En effet, les cofinanceurs ne sont pas enclins pour assurer eux-mêmes ce suivi et ces évaluations des ONG du Sud. Étant donné le nombre d’ONG du Sud qui finance via les ONG partenaires du Nord, ce type de suivi exigerait des moyens humains et matériels extrêmement lourds. C’est, par contre, le rôle des ONG du Nord d’amener ce suivi et ces évaluations avec leurs partenaires du Sud. Le contrôle des cofinanceurs s’exercera sur les méthodes de travail des ONG du Nord qu’ils cofinance. Il se fera en exigeant que soient présentées régulièrement des documents de suivi et d’évaluation et en les analyzant. On peut également envisager de mettre en place un système d’audit, choisi conjointement, pour les ONG bénéficiant d’un volume important de financement par fonds souples, sans qu’en cas de litiges. Tout comme pour les donations globales, il est en effet important que la souplesse des fonds soit assortie d’une rigueur bien comprise et une responsabilité accrue de la part des ONG.

Accepter le financement à moyen terme du fonctionnement des partenaires du Sud
Cette modalité est possible si on peut s’assurer qu’une procédure de suivi répétée (par l’ONG du Nord intermédiaire et son partenaire du Sud) est effective. Le financement peut se faire par phase annuelle et devrait être poursuivi aussi longtemps que les résultats de l’ONG du Sud sont probants et que des sources locales de financement publiques ou privées ne peuvent être trouvées.

Accélérer les procédures d’octroi de fonds, et veiller à raccourcir les délais de paiements
Le cofinanceur devrait toujours avoir le souci de permettre à l’ONG de disposer d’une certaine flexibilité dans ses relations avec les groupes du tiers-monde avec lesquels elle travaille. Les ruptures dans cette collaboration, que provoquent les longues attentes de cofinancement, peuvent être une cause d’échec. Il est donc particulièrement important que le cofinanceur adopte des procédures de prise de décision rapides et facilement applicables, et qu’il se préoccupe de leur respect. De leur côté, les ONG du Sud et du Nord doivent veiller à envoyer, avec leurs propositions d’actions à financer, tout type de documentation importante et nécessaire à la prise de décision, et qu’elles cessent d’anticiper les différentes questions que les institutions de cofinancement soulèvent susceptibles de leur jouer. Le compte-rendu de l’identification devrait être un document important permettant de décider de l’octroi de fonds. Les évaluations d’autres actions de l’ONG sont également des sources de renseignements, permettant de juger rapidement des méthodes de travail de KONG et des résultats qui s’ensuivent. Dans un même ordre d’idées, il convient d’être particulièrement attentif à réduire au minimum les délais de paiement des différentes tranches des cofinancements. Ceci demande un suivi des procédures internes de la part du cofinanceur, mais également beaucoup de rigueur de la
Le financement des actions des ONG

Encourager la concertation et la coordination des ONG du Nord qui appuient un même partenaire (entre elles, et avec ces partenaires).
Cette forme de coordination se fait de plus en plus, lorsque sont concernées de grandes ONG du Sud qui travaillent avec plusieurs partenaires financiers du Nord. Il est recommandé de participer au financement de rencontres organisées dans un but de coordination, et de considérer un pourcentage supplémentaire de frais administratifs pour une ONG qui aurait à charge le secrétariat de ce travail de coordination.

Encourager la coordination entre les ONG du Sud d’un même pays ou région
Certains pays du Sud se sont dotés de banques de données sur les actions ONG réalisées dans leur pays. C’est très utile pour ceux qui veulent prendre des nouvelles initiatives en s’insérant dans un ensemble d’actions existantes. Par ailleurs, les “fédérations” d’ONG du Sud jouent souvent un rôle important de représentation et de négociation avec les autorités locales pour le compte de leurs membres. Il est recommandé de consolider des financements pour des actions spécifiques de coordination proposées par ces fédérations.

Aider au financement des bureaux décentralisés des ONG dans les pays du Sud où elles interviennent
Beaucoup d’ONG du Nord estiment qu’il est très utile de disposer d’un relais dans les pays où elles interviennent. Il est recommandé, dans les budgets de financement d’actions, d’augmenter le pourcentage destiné à des bureaux régionaux (et les financer) lorsque ces actions ont lieu dans des pays où de telles représentations existent. Les cofinanceurs pourraient aussi encourager la coordination entre les ONG du Nord dans ce domaine (utilisation de bureaux communs à plusieurs ONG qui partagent un même secrétariat, téléphone, photocopieuse, télécopieur, etc.) en augmentant encore ce pourcentage de frais administratifs pour les ONG qui partagent leur bureau de représentation dans un pays du Sud avec d’autres ONG.

Demander aux ONG au Norad une présentation plus globale des informations sur les partenaires du Sud et les actions proposées

Généraliser l’inclusion des rubriques “Évaluation” dans les budgets de cofinancement
Il est recommandé de pratiquer un suivi de ces rubriques budgétaires et d’exiger que ces évaluations internes ou externes soient effectuées. D’autre part, si l’évaluation est bien perçue comme un moment de réflexion critique et prospective, au cours de laquelle on cherche à apprendre du passé pour améliorer l’avenir, il paraît souhaitable que les documents produits au cours de ces évaluations soient utilisés systématiquement comme instrument de communication interne pour les différents partenaires de la filière du projet concerné.

Introduire des évaluations des méthodes de travail des ONG du Nord par des experts indépendants
Ces évaluations pourraient être faites à la demande des ONG du Nord qui souhaiteraient améliorer leurs méthodes de travail et leurs performances. Ces évaluations permettraient aussi aux fonctionnaires des services de cofinancement de mieux connaître les ONG du Nord avec lesquelles ils travaillent.

Encourager l’amélioration des compétences professionnelles du personnel des ONG du Nord et du Sud
Ceci pourrait être réalisé en acceptant de couvrir les frais de tout type de formation nécessaire pour améliorer significativement le professionnalisme et la capacité de gestion (au sens large) de l’ensemble du personnel des ONG, au Nord comme au Sud.
La démarche recommandée par le guide méthodologique pourrait notamment servir de base à des formations centrées sur l’étude des projets. Une demande pour ce type de formation existe très clairement dans les ONG du Sud, et peut se percevoir également dans certaines ONG du Nord.

ASSOCIATIONS TRANSNATIONALES. 5/1991 295
Changing roles for regional membership organizations

by L.S. Harms *
and Richard J. Barber **

Regional membership organizations play a vital role in promoting and assisting various parts of the telecommunications environment as it undergoes rapid change. Parallel- ing the growth of telecommunications has been the establishment, restructuring and growth of both existing and new general and special telecommunications-focused non-profit membership organizations. What functions these organizations now plan, what changes they are undergoing to adapt to the new environment and what the future may hold is examined in this paper. In particular, the configuration of a new regional inter-organization will be discussed; it is tentatively named: FORA Pacific.

Telecommunications in the Pacific

During the past decade, many countries in the Pacific have adopted policies which favor rapid development of telecommunications facilities. For example, recall the introduction of competition in Japan, privatization in Malaysia, revised government policies in Australia, and radical structural changes in New Zealand. These shifts have been accompanied by debates about whether telecommunications should be viewed primarily as a national good or as a profit center.

Taken together, these rapid shifts in government telecommunications policy, the high rate of growth in telecommunications infrastructure and advancement in technology along with new applications of information systems and services all serve to create a great deal of uncertainty. The old realities of only a few years ago have given way to new corporate strategic alliances along with frequent ownership and personnel changes.

New technology and its region-wide application pushes for the rapid creation of new standards and places pressure on the allocation of the telecommunications spectrum. New capacities in region-wide long haul and in local loop systems raise connected questions of access and appropriate tariffs. The rising awareness in the Pacific of the economic importance of having an adequate telecommunications infrastructure brings to the fore questions of funding and of national and regional priorities. Of growing importance is the associated need for human resources development. Where are the skilled information industry workers going to come from?

In face of these many uncertainties, a number of organizations have been established to provide for the sharing of information, for consensus building, and for the creation of reference points - focal points - for the systematic checking of this emerging reality.

Illustrative of the increased attention being accorded international organizations has been the recent spate of reassessments on the part of such entities as the ITU through the “High Level Committee,” the recent ESCAP internal review; an outside consultants review of the Telecom Programme of the South Pacific Forum as well as a reassessment of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity.

Roles for regional organizations

The way individual nations approach telecommunications development often transcend national boundaries and become regional issues. Current discussions, for example, focus on the need for multinational investment, for regional training, for common standards and for easy connectivity. The potentially conflicting roles of new regional satellite systems with those of established global systems con-
Changing roles for regional membership organizations continues to be a topic of debate. Planning for additional undersea fiber links continues to make news in the region. This is compounded by the lack of a cohesive planning venue combining both undersea cable and international satellite systems.

Access to the network as well as to the information content it carries are of growing concern to all entities of the Pacific Region.

How are all these issues managed? Is there a single system in place which allows for orderly debate, information sharing, and conflict resolution? Are there mechanisms in place which allow an easy transfer of resources, once a consensus is reached? The obvious answer is: no. At least, not yet.

However, there has developed a loose grouping of regional membership organizations which have been created and continue to address various aspects of these broad concerns. The fact that they exist is a tribute to the many professionals who work with acknowledged success in this environment and to the thousands who volunteer time and provide monetary and other resources to these groups.

One of the little appreciated functions of the regional organizations is that they provide a vital connection to the international organizations active in the telecommunication field, notably the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ITU provides a mechanism for developing international agreements on vital matters such as radio frequency assignments, satellite orbit allocations and communication standards. Geneva-based, this one-and-a-quarter century old United Nations organization facilitates planning and negotiations among all member governments on matters pertaining to standards for telecommunication transmission.

Other bodies that play a role in international standard setting, and thereby impact on the Pacific, include the International Standards Organization (ISO), Electronics Industry Association (EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and various national standards bodies. Currently, the most notable standards setting efforts are in the areas of integrated services digital networks (ISDN) and high definition television (HDTV).

The ITU has also become engaged through its Center for Telecommunications Development (CTD) in persuading governments and industry of the necessity for more investment in the telecommunications infrastructure in developing countries. This effort runs parallel with a long-standing ITU program in technical assistance. Several of the regional organizations in the Pacific are closely associated with the ITU.

By one recent count, there are now some 80 organizations with a dual interest in telecommunication and the Pacific region. These membership organizations are non-profit and either non-governmental or inter-governmental. For the most part, they are professional associations primarily providing needed services to their own members. Four of these organizations with headquarters in the Pacific-Asia will be discussed below and several other organizations will be noted. Further details can be found in these and other organizations in the 1990 publication of the Pacific Telecommunications Council: "Non-profit organizations with Communication Interests in the Pacific Hemisphere."

The Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) was established in 1964 with current headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. Its primary objectives are to support the interests of member broadcasting organizations and to establish relations with other broadcasting unions, and to study problems of broadcasting and ensure timely exchange of information. The ABU organizes exchange of radio and TV news by satellite among members along with joint productions. Seventy-five broadcasting organizations in the region are members. The ABU holds annual general meetings along with meetings of standing committees on programming and engineering matters and of specialized working parties and study groups. The Union publishes the ABU News and the ABU Technical Review.

The Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre (AMIC) was established in 1971 with present headquarters in Singapore. Its central objective is to assist the development of the media and other means of communication in the region within the broad framework of continuing education, economic, social, and cultural changes. AMIC is developing a major data bank related to media development in the Pacific and West Asia. Members are individuals, educational institutions, government agencies and non-profit organizations. AMIC holds an annual general meeting along with frequent seminars, training meetings and refresher courses. It publishes the quarterly Media Asia, monographs, occasional papers, and a bibliography series.

ASSOCIATIONS TITRES NATIONALES, 5/1991 297
The Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT) was established in 1979 with headquarters in Bangkok. The APT's objectives are to correlate the planning and development of intra-regional telecommunication networks to meet immediate and future requirements; and, to promote the implementation of agreed networks and to assist within the region with national level development. Ongoing concerns are with technology transfer and training of telecommunications personnel. Membership is open to any state within the region which is a member of the UN or a member of ESCAP. APT holds an annual meeting along with seminars, training programs and other means for exchange of information among specialized personnel. It publishes the bi-annual Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, seminar proceedings and a variety of reports.

The Pacific Telecommunications Council (PTC) was established in 1980 with headquarters in Honolulu. The objectives of the PTC are to provide a forum for the discussion and the interchange of information, ideas, and points of view regarding telecommunications in Pacific area, by bringing together a multi-facted, diverse body, including users, planners, and providers of equipment and services; and, to promote the general awareness of the varied telecommunication requirements to meet the needs of the people of the Pacific hemisphere. PTC membership is open to all for-profit (116 members) and non-profit (40) entities which have a direct interest in telecommunication in the Pacific Hemisphere. Individual membership is open to qualified professionals (116 from 24 countries). PTC holds an annual conference in January in Honolulu, mid-year seminars in Pacific area countries and ad-hoc meetings in conjunction with other organizations. PTC publishes the proceedings of its annual conference, a monthly newsletter, a quarterly magazine Pacific Telecommunications, reports and books.

In addition to the general-purpose organizations cited above, ABU, AMIC, APT and PTC, there are a growing number of specific-focus organizations and telecommunications projects as well as several ad-hoc or study groups formed by more broadly based regional organizations.

In the first category are entities such as the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcast Development (AIBD) Co-located with the ABU in Kuala Lumpur, AIBD seeks to foster the development of professionals in the broadcast field and organizes extensive training activities. A single forum, ISDN, prompted the Japanese to establish the Asian ISDN Council (AIC) in 1987. Through working groups and discussion, this council seeks to provide for the development of digital communication in the Asian region.

An example of telecommunication-related projects of more generally-oriented organizations is the ‘Triple T’ project of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). Triple T refers to transport, tourism and telecommunications. A major report on this project was made at the PECC meeting this past November in New Zealand.

A quick overview of a few of the more visible governmental and non-governmental groups illustrate the diversity of such organizations. Government-based telecommunications membership organizations active in the Pacific area include the POSTEL committee of the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Commonwealth Telecommunication Organization which has many members in this region; and the telecom program of the South Pacific Forum, which covers all of the independent Pacific Island nations.

On the non-governmental side we have the International Computer Communications Conference (ICCC) with a somewhat unusual structure, existing more as a 'network organization' and conducting international conferences in various locations in the world, most recently in India. INTUG, the International Telecommunication Users Group is headquartered in Europe but has several national branches and members in the Pacific Region; for example, the active Australian Telecommunication Users Group (ATUG). Finally, while based in London, the International Institute of Communication (ICC) holds some of its annual meetings in the Pacific region, has national chapters in Australia and Japan, and has many individual members in the region.

An observer of the organizations noted above will find a number of similarities in terms of structure and governance, and discover a common set of activities that include conferences and publications. There are, however, wide differences in the topics addressed; and in the level of annual activity. One of the important differences is found in terms of the membership base - non-governmental or inter-governmental. The chart below gives a rough breakdown on this dimension of a few of the entities studied.
Another classification by type of activity shows:

- Resource Allocation: policy, standards, finance, facilities, ABU, ITU, POSTEL.
- Technical Assistance: planning, training, expert consultation: AIBD, APT, ITU, SPF.
- Information Source: publications, database, seminars: ABU, AK, AMIC, APT, PTC, TTT.
- Communication Network: member contacts: AIC, AMIC, ICC, PTC.

While these classifications on the basis of membership and activity are precise, they do serve to show that non-governmental organizations focus on information sharing activities while the intergovernmental organizations having official standing are more involved in resource allocation.

Through meetings and information exchange, the regional membership organizations appear to perform a needed function in the development of telecommunications in the region. Over time, they help to prepare for new alliances and for a new consensus surrounding telecommunications development and utilization.

**Configuring FORA Pacific**

In 1983, the Pacific Telecommunications Council developed and published a first listing of non-profit membership organizations focused on the Pacific with an interest in communications. This publication was updated and reissued in 1986. Recently, the 1989 edition was published; it contains about 80 entries.

As a natural outgrowth of this interest in what other organizations are doing, PTC called an ad hoc meeting of the heads of such organizations who were thought likely to be represented this past May, 1990, at the CommunicAsia conference in Singapore. Fourteen individuals representing twelve organizations participated. Temporarily, PTC serves as the informal facilitator of information exchange among these entities. Traditionally called FORA (Federation of Regional Associations Pacific), this paper is one part of an ongoing attempt to configure FORA Pacific to meet the emerging needs in this region.

Four general goals were distilled from the Singapore meeting and subsequent discussions:
- Maintain a master list of scheduled meetings;
- Maintain a comprehensive list of publications;
- Enhance services to current members; and
- Develop new exchange mechanisms as needed.

These goals only suggest that the regional organizations should do a bit more, a little more systematically, than they now do. As such, the goals hardly merit a new organization with a new acronym.

However, the Singapore scenario for FORA Pacific was to configure not only a new but also a new type of network resident inter-organization. As currently envisioned, FORA will make extensive use of phone, FAX, email, file transfers and teleconferencing in meeting its goals. Perhaps, each participating organization will in time become a logical address and a gateway through which its own members can directly access FORA, but FORA itself will not have a physical headquarters as the member regional associations each do. Thus, FORA represents an attempt to use imaginative and productive ways the technologies of central interest to the affiliate organizations.

A first master list of scheduled meetings was developed after the Singapore meeting. Such a list has a number of uses, most obvious, some not. For example, if AMIC in Singapore were to invite a resource person from the EC in Brussels to address one of its meetings, APT in Bangkok might wish to invite that same person to stop in Bangkok to make a presentation on the way home. In a few years, a master list would reduce the chance of having two meetings being scheduled by different organizations in nearby cities on similar topics on the same days, as sometimes now happens. Further, a member from Sydney attending the annual PTC conference in Honolulu might be able stop in Tokyo on the way home to sit in on a meeting of one of the Asian ISDN working group meetings. And, so on.

All of the regional organizations who have expressed an interest in FORA annually publish a wide range of materials. These materials include but are not limited to conference working papers, quarterly periodicals, research reports and books. This paper-based information can be regularly cataloged and a comprehensive list of these publications can, with a continuing effort, be maintained. But the need for more rapid access than traditional paper publication and postal service provide has led several FORA organizations to develop online information bases for use by their members, notably AMIC and APT. Possibly, through the offices of FORA, those important resources could be made more widely available, and online.

Both the master list of scheduled meetings and the comprehensive list of publications could be used to enhance the services that the FORA organizations routinely provide their own members. Specifically, a schedule of meetings should often enable a member of any FORA affiliated organization to attend two important meetings for little more than the price of one. A comprehensive list of publications would help assure that current members of the FORA affiliated organizations do not overlook critically important information.

FORA Pacific, as it is now taking shape, can facilitate exchange among the affiliate organizations, as well as the ordinary members of each of those organizations. Further, the increasing capacity of telecom networks in the Pacific, the emerging standards for message handling and directory services, can help move FORA a giant step into the future. It is not the purpose of this brief paper to detail the alternate futures of FORA; rather it is the purpose here to report the line of thinking that has followed from the Singapore meeting, and to invite additional contributions to it. Just maybe, FORA Pacific is an idea whose time has come!
Les Rencontres de Cotonou

Cotonou, une histoire

Pendant cinq jours, 150 animateurs de la coopération internationale non gouvernementale ont pu faire le point. Soixante pays et tous les continents étaient représentés. Mais les Rencontres de Cotonou ne se sont pas seulement jouées quelques jours de janvier au Bénin. Elles ont aussi vu lieux avant et après. Elles ont été un moment dans une dynamique collective de début entre Ong (1).

Les Rencontres de Cotonou s'inscrivent dans une histoire. Il aura fallu près d'un demi-siècle aux associations du Nord pour passer du paternalisme au partenariat. Et la mutation est loin d'être achevée.

Si le mot partenariat fait l'unanimité, sa signification concrète reste encore en partie à construire. Relations passées et conflituelles, difficiles mais fortes : Ong du Nord et du Sud n'ont fait qu'entamer le dialogue.

La conférence d'Arusha en 1990 et différentes réunions sur les PMA constituent autant de jalons dans la recherche de relations plus équilibrées entre le Nord et le Sud.

Le groupe de travail mis en place en octobre 1989 autour de la Fondation de France pour piloter la préparation des Rencontres, s'est ancré dans cette histoire et s'est tout de suite donné un avenir : ne pas être une structure mais un catalyseur et se dissoudre après Cotonou au profit de nouveaux types de collaboration entre Ong.

De par sa position institutionnelle, son rôle et ses fonctions, la Fondation de France est au cœur de ces relations parfois difficiles entre Ong du Nord et du Sud : parce qu'elle travaille aussi bien avec les associations du Nord que du Sud et parce qu'elle cherche, elle aussi, à mettre en place des relations de partenariat différentes, plus équilibrées entre le Nord et le Sud.

A la fois partie prenante et suffisamment extérieure pour disposer du recul nécessaire, la Fondation de France a pu mobiliser une cinquantaine d'Ong du monde entier, sans déclencher de réaction partisane, mais en allant jusqu'au bout de la mise à plat des problèmes des Ong du Nord et du Sud, les unes vis-à-vis des autres. Comment préparer une rencontre sur le partenariat associatif Nord/Sud sinon avec les partenaires de ce dialogue?

Seule une forte décentralisation de la préparation des Rencontres pouvait rendre possible une implication locale du tissu associatif, sur tous les continents.

Décentraliser et mobiliser

D'octobre 1989 à janvier 1991, un groupe constitué de douze personnes, issues du monde des Ong et représentant les cinq continents, s'est mis au travail.

Le groupe de pilotage des Rencontres a décidé de laisser à quatre coordinations continentales (Avec, Afrique, Amérique latine, Europe/Amérique du Nord) l'entière liberté de préparer les Rencontres en fonction des enjeux et des thèmes prioritaires sur chaque continent. Liberté de sujet, d'angles d'attaque, de ton, de méthode.

Continent par continent, chaque équipe, à son rythme et à sa manière, a trouvé les moyens d'associer les personnes, organisations ou regroupements d'organisations intéressées.

Le groupe Afrique a notamment travaillé sur la question de la participation populaire à l'organisation des sociétés civiles, dont les travaux de la conférence d'Arusha de février 1990 ont été un exemple. Sa participation a été partagée par le Fovad (2).

Les coordinations Afrique et Amérique latine ont choisi d'approfondir les questions du développement à la base et de la coopération Nord-Sud, notamment les réflexions de l'Iggri (3) et du groupe de Fazenda (4).

La coordination Nord a suivi les travaux de l'Icva (5) et du Comité de liaison des Ong auprès de la CEE. Elle a mobilisé de nombreux réseaux et s'est inspirée des propositions novatrices des Ong canadiennes et de l'expérience du bureau d'information des Nations-Unies à Genève en matière de communication.

En Asie, la coordination s'est attachée à formuler les nouvelles orientations de nombreuses Ong qui souhaitaient redéployer leurs efforts vers les populations les plus démunies et renforcer leurs réflexions et initiatives sur les grands problèmes de société (paix, armement, environnement...).

Conflits et consensus

Organiser des Rencontres sur le principe de l'échange réciproque, de la liberté de parole et de la reconnaissance de la diversité des points de vue constitue un pari complexe. Le ton des débats a parfois été vif et les escalades nombreuses. Dans les choses, c'est aussi surmonter une unanimité de façade.

Dénoncer les effets pervers de l'aide internationale et faire évoluer les pratiques et méthodes de coopération : ce principe recueille toujours l'unanimité. Mais dès lors qu'on aborde la question de "comment faire ?" et du type de stratégie commune à mettre en place, le débat devient plus aigu.

La multiplication et la croissance des Ong du Sud ont été souhaitées et recherchées par leurs partenaires du Nord. Cette évolution obligé à redéfinir le partage des tâches et à rééquilibrer le rôle des Ong au sein de leur propre société.

300 TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, 5/1991
Ce débat dépasse largement la seule question de la répartition des financements disponibles, même si cet enjeu ne doit pas être sous-estimé. Il faut analyser la possibilité de proposer de nouveaux programmes d'action, de sortir du champ des “projets”, d’assouplir l’utilisation des financements.

Plus encore, le professionnalisme nécessaire de l’intervention en développement ou en coopération, ne doit pas faire oublier que les Ong représentent aussi et surtout une partie de la société civile. En tant que telles, elles sont impliquées dans un double débat social : un débat national sur le type de société et de démocratie à construire, et un débat “international” sur les relations entre les nations et entre les peuples, sur les minorités et des démocraties mondiales.

D’une certaine façon, chaque Ong affirme que nous sommes à la fois citoyen d’un pays et citoyen du monde, et que nous ne pouvons être l’un sans l’autre. Le Sud est loin d’avoir le monopole des problèmes de développement, de chômage et d’exclusion. Même qu’ils n’y sont pas de façons plus encoule.

De la création de puits à l’organisation de ce débat public et politique (et non politicien), le fossé semble énorme. Pouvant, c’est bien l’ensemble de cette chaîne que les Ong doivent tenir. Une chaîne qui va d’un travail de base avec les populations sur les initiatives locales de développement jusqu’à la mobilisation de l’opinion publique et des réseaux sociaux pour porter et mettre en oeuvre un projet de société, à l’échelle nationale et internationale, plus juste, plus solidaire, plus démocratique.

Plus que leur réticence à laisser les Ong du Sud accéder directement aux guichets de l’aide internationale, ces dernières ont surtout reproché à leurs partenaires du Nord leur timidité à porter sur la place publique, au niveau des populations comme des pouvoirs politiques et économiques, le débat sur les rapports Nord/Sud et sur les diverses approches des relations internationales.

De nouvelles perspectives

Qu’il s’agisse de l’image du Sud dans les médias du Nord, ou du lobbying social et politique pour changer les règles du jeu, les Ong du Sud attendent davantage de celles du Nord. A l’inverse, les Ong du Nord s’interrogent parfois de la réelle représentativité de certaines Ong du Sud et de la nature de leur ancrage dans les réseaux populaires.

Comment aider à construire un mouvement associatif un peu plus cohérent dans ses objectifs et stratégies tout en respectant l’indispensable diversité des Ong? Entre celles qui travaillent comme des professionnels de développement et celles qui ont opté pour l’animation, la mobilisation et l’organisation de mouvement populaires, le pont n’est pas toujours simple à établir. Pourtant, comment dis- socier les pratiques concrètes de développement des dynamiques sociales et donc politiques?

Bien sûr, les Rencontres de Cotonou n’ont pas eu la prétention de répondre à l’ensemble de ces questions. Mais elles ont eu le mérite de permettre qu’elles soient posées. Les liens sont établis. Le dialogue est enclenché. Une commission Sud/Sud s’est mise en place, pour faciliter la poursuite des relations entre Ong africaines, asiatiques et latino-américaines.

Comme convenu, le groupe de préparation des Rencontres de Cotonou s’est dissous. Il reste néanmoins à la disposition et à l’écoute de toutes demandes d’appui à un travail de renforcement de la concertation Nord/Sud.

Bernard Latarjet
Directeur général de la Fondation de France.

(1) L’ensemble des dossiers de préparation et de synthèse des Rencontres de Cotonou est disponible, sur demande, à la Fondation de France - 40 Avenue Hoche, 75008 Paris.

(2) Fovad: Forum des Ong volontaires africaines du développement.

(3) Iggri: International Group for Grassroots Initiatives.

(4) Le groupe de Fazenda est une structure de concertation et de réflexion entre Ong latino-américaines.


Recommandations des rencontres de Cotonou 9, 10 et 11 janvier 1991

Introduction

1. L’émergence dans plusieurs pays du Sud de différents mouvements sociaux (groupe “modernes”, associations traditionnelles, secteur coopératif, etc.) qui, ces dernières années, ont uni leurs efforts et leurs expériences pour survivre et défendre leurs droits, a consolidé les sociétés civiles encore hésitantes. Les ONG du Sud ont pris sur la scène internationale la parole des pauvres, rejoignant ainsi ceux qui dans le Nord défendaient les exclus et les marginaux. Ce faisant, les ONG ont, au cours de cette décennie marquée, souvent avec bonheur, ce dialogue perdus depuis longtemps, principalement depuis Cancún, et la coopération entre le Nord et le Sud.
2. Elles ont rempli certaines carac... nation, avec des moyens contre limités, mais avec détermination. C'est pour participer à, et conduire la réalisation des relations entre ONG du Sud et ONG du Nord, compte tenu de leur évolution spécifiques, de leurs exigences mutuelles et de l'évolution du contexte international, que les Rencontres de Cotonou ont été conçues et organisées. Elles sont une nouvelle étape d'une longue entreprise jalonnée par les rendez-vous précédents de Londres, de Santo Domingo et d'Amchit.

3. Cotonou a réaffirmé le principe d'un développement centré sur l'homme comme nécessité vitale pour l'ensemble de la communauté internationale car le Nord et le Sud forment un seul monde. Il en résulte l'urgence nécessaire pour les ONG de s'organiser collectivement pour pouvoir avec davantage d'efficacité les tâches de sensibilisation et de mobilisation de contre-pouvoir et de développement qu'elles se sont données.

4. En s'appuyant à l'ordre économique international actuel les ONG affirment que le développement se fera pour tous ou ne se fera pas. La préférence pour les exclus, les opprimés, les marginalisés, les pauvres, étant un objectif essentiel à ne pas perdre de vue.

5. Tâche d'autant plus délicate que la détermination de l'image du Sud dans les opinions publiques du Nord oblige à un effort considérable de communication, de promotion, de valorisation, effort qui pourrait être une clé pour déboucher sur des actions communes.

Le moment semble venu d'envisager et de conduire des changements dans les types de relations qui sous-tendent ONG du Nord et du Sud (récurrents dans les conditionnalités et pour certaines interventions).

6. Dans le même temps, l'horizon des ONG s'allonge:
   a. L'évolution vers plus de démocratie implique un développement de la société civile et confère aux ONG de nouvelles responsabilités, leur ouvrant de nouvelles perspectives dans le développement d'organisations de type associatif.
   b. Le "modèle de développement" évolue, non seulement sous l'influence des organisations internationales, mais sous l'effet d'une profonde mise en cause des valeurs humaines par l'apparition des mouvements féministes, écologistes, pacifistes.
   c. La dépendance qui a dominé les terrains dernières années se modifie, par ce que le Sud a de plus en plus accès à de multiples sources de financement et par ce que le rôle des ONG du Nord se transforme sous la pression de nouveaux besoins économiques et sociaux dans leurs pays comme des nouvelles demandes du Sud.
   d. Les relations binaires et hiérarchiques entre donateurs et bénéficiaires demeurent largement majoritaires. On observe toutefois une multiplication d'expériences, de relations négociées et multipolaires.
   e. De même, si les relations strictement financières et momentanées dominent, on constate cependant des exemples de collaboration à long terme dont les projets ne sont que les moyens, non les fins.
   f. La règle supposée d'autopartage des ONG est contestée et un début de reconnaissances des caractères politiques du développement se fait jour.
   g. Aux termes de résultats strictement comptables et quantitatifs commencent à se substituer des évaluations plus qualitatives (organisation des populations, niveau des formations, indice de développement humain, etc.)

5. C'est dans ce contexte que les recommandations qui suivent ont été émises:

**Recommandations**

I. A l'objectif général de démocratisation, démocratisation qui ne saurait se limiter à des mécanismes de représentation formelle, mais impliquer indépendance politique, équité, justice, solidarité, les ONG doivent repartir par des actions spécifiques et bien déterminées. Elles doivent:

1. Mettre l'accent sur l'information et la formation comme facteurs essentiels de la démocratisation.

2. Favoriser l'accès des groupes de base aux circuits de l'information et encourager la participation de la population, notamment les plus défavorisées, aux processus de prise de décision.

3. Appuyer leur sortie aux organisations et groupes sociaux représentatifs capables d'élabore des politiques alternatives et de conduire des actions de changement par rapport à celles traditionnellement définies par les groupes dominants.

II. Dans cette perspective, le type de relation que les ONG nouent avec l'Etat a fait l'objet de larges échanges de vues. Comment concilier le souci d'un solide enracinement populaire, l'indispensable maintien de l'autonomie des ONG, le renforcement du tissu démocratique qui se structure ici et là, le rôle de contre-pouvoir que nos organisations doivent continuer à exercer avec une incertitude coopération avec l'Etat?

Les Rencontres de Cotonou ont insisté sur:

4. La nécessité d'identifier les fonctions propres aux ONG en vue d'éviter le piège de la tentation volontariste de se substituer à l'Etat.

5. Le souci de continuer à développer les réseaux propres des ONG en fonction de leurs besoins et non sous l'influence des agents de financement internationaux ou des services de l'Etat.

6. Le souci d'éviter l'institutionnalisation par l'Etat et par les institutions multinationales tout en se réservant la possibilité d'analyser, voire de généraliser les expériences de contractualisation qui ont pu surgir ici et là.

III. Il est clair cependant que les rapports avec l'Etat ne sauraient être dommage de ceux que les ONG pourraient entretenir avec la société civile. Les Rencontres de Cotonou ont souligné l'action que les ONG doivent entreprendre pour promouvoir les sociétés civiles qui commencent à émerger et à se structurer dans de nombreux pays du Sud. La société civile incarne le peuple dans sa diversité, lorsque ce peuple a pris conscience de son pouvoir pour le pouvoir, mais le pouvoir en tant qu'instrument d'intervention humain, etc.)

rencontre de Cotonou
vers l'éducation, la culture et, pourquoi pas, d'envisager l'élaboration d'une nouvelle pédagogie unie d'une nouvelle culture.


10. De travailler à une démocratie participative qui dépasse les frontières tout en respectant les cultures existantes.

11. D'œuvrer à l'émergence de projets culturels et sociaux mobilisateurs à l'échelle du Sud.

IV. Respect des cultures, renforcement de la solidarité, affirmation des identités renvoient inévitablement au mécanisme qui entoure le Sud, Sud qui est composé de peuples dynamiques.

12. D'acquérir l'effort de promotion des femmes et de leurs rôles dans les décisions et actions de développement.

13. L'action culturelle se révèle une fois de plus très importante, l'éducation au développement est essentielle et implique une critique des modèles actuels du développement.

14. Les ONG doivent s'assurer en ayant à l'esprit que la convergence d'intérêts entre groupes du Nord et du Sud est encore le meilleur support pour favoriser et susciter les actions de mobilisation.

15. A cet égard, l'image de l'immigrant joue un rôle capital. Le bon étranger étant celui qui est le plus loin possible, c'est également sur l'image de cet étranger, de cet immigrant qu'il convient de travailler. Cela est indispensable si l'on entend changer l'ensemble de la perception de l'autre.

16. Sans ces législations visant à rendre les images plus exactes, travailler sur des messages, lutter contre les préjugés véhiculés de part et d'autre, autant d'objectifs à l'égard des femmes, l'environnement, le désarmement.

VI. Dans ce monde réduit à un village planétaire, la coopération s'impose comme une incontournable réalité.

17. Les réseaux d'information et de contacts doivent être renforcés entre Nord/Sud et Sud/Sud. Les ONG doivent donc identifier ensemble les thèmes et préoccupations communs à l'échelle planétaire.

18. L'utilisation par les ONG du Nord de leur capacité à peser sur les processus d'élaboration et de prise des décisions aux différents échelons de la vie nationale et internationale ONG du Nord et ONG du Sud doivent donc identifier ensemble les thèmes et préoccupations communs à l'échelle planétaire, se donner ainsi la possibilité de proposer des alternatives aux stratégies actuelles. Au plan local, elles sont appelées à renforcer leurs relations avec les mouvements de base, les organisations sociales et paysannes, les syndicats, etc.

VII. L'un des aspects essentiels de l'action des ONG est le renforcement de leur capacité à peser sur les processus d'éducation et de mobilisation.

19. Les médias sont porteurs de paradigmes dominants, ils reflètent l'ordre mondial qui prévaut et les concepts de développement qui s'imposent.
Ils sont contrôlés par les pouvoirs du Nord et par les gouvernements au Sud où leurs activités ne concernent que indirectement les masses rurales et éliminent. Trouver des solutions alternatives dans ce domaine est devenu impératif.

Les ONG n'ont pas toujours "accès" aux médias de manière appropriée. Les messages n'ont pas toujours été traités de façon convenable. Il faut donc réagir et agir. Des possibilités existent, il faut les exploiter. Pour ce faire, il est nécessaire:
30. De convaincre ONG du Nord comme du Sud de la nécessité de faire appel aux journalistes professionnels intéressés au développement.
31. D'adapter les messages des ONG de manière à intéresser le public à leurs activités.
32. D'utiliser toutes les capacités des ONG du Nord pour véhiculer des informations politiques importantes en provenance des pays du Sud où la presse est sous le contrôle de l'État.
33. D'autre part, il est nécessaire de promouvoir tant au Sud qu'au Nord les réseaux de communication populaires alternatifs (journal, vidéo, radio populaire) qui permettent de passer les messages qui sont passés sous silence.

IX. Il se dégage des considérations précédentes qu'un partenariat renouvelé s'impose aujourd'hui. Les raisons et les motivations du partenariat doivent être claires. Quels sont les objectifs de développement poursuivis et dans quelle mesure les valeurs culturelles de chacun des partenaires sont comprises et respectées? Le partenariat implique aujourd'hui davantage que l'échange des informations politiques importantes en provenance des pays du Sud où la presse est sous le contrôle de l'État.

45. L'évaluation est un élément essentiel de telles rencontres. Elle doit être prévue dès leur organisation et être chargée de son préparation.
46. Le suivi et les prochaines étapes du dialogue doivent approfondir en particulier:
- l'analyse des stratégies de développement et la critique des modes économiques de croissance préconisés par les ONG du Nord.
- les nouvelles "règles du jeu" entre ONG du Nord et du Sud.
- la mise en œuvre des recommandations adoptées à Cotonou.
Commonwealth NGOs

The Commonwealth NGO Forum of August 1991 at Harare was the first gathering of Commonwealth NGOs and also the first Commonwealth meeting with South African NGOs, represented by four leaders. The main theme of the Forum was the environmentally sustainable development; the two other themes were: collaboration in the Commonwealth, and NGOs in South Africa.

Coming events, such as the Earth Summit in Brazil, spurred participants to raise the profile of NGO operations and provided the context for the wide spectrum of issues discussed. These ranged from civil liberties to patterns of consumption, poverty, education, population, women's role, technology choices and environmental legislation. The Forum called for greater community participation in development and a more real partnership of governments with NGOs, as a basis for safeguarding the interests of both nature and society.

(Commonwealth Currents, Oct-Nov 1991)

Accord de siège

Le gouvernement du Québec a signé un accord de siège avec l'AUPELF UREF le 28 mai dernier à Montréal. M. Guy Rivard, ministre délégué à la francophonie, qui a paraphé cet accord au nom de son gouvernement, était accompagné d'un délégué gouvernemental québécois composé notamment de M. Bernard Auger, sous-ministre du Revenu, et de M. Pierre Lucier, sous-ministre de l'Enseignement supérieur du gouvernement du Québec.

C'est M. Abdellatif Benabdellah, président de l'AUPELF UREF qui a signé l'accord pour l'Association en présence des vice-présidents du Conseil d'administration, MM. Arthur Bodson (Université de Liège), Moïse Oliveira (Université Omar Bongo), Régis Ritz (Université de Bordeaux III) et de M. Michel Guillou, directeur général de l'AUPELF et recteur de l'UREF.

En concluant cet accord, le ministre Rivard, le premier de son genre avec une ONG œuvrant dans le domaine de la francophonie, le Québec souhaite contribuer, «concrètement au maintien et à l'essor d'une de ces organisations internationales non gouvernementales qui est pour lui « un partenaire très actif de la francophonie ». A cet égard, le Québec consent certains avantages à l'AUPELF UREF pour faciliter l'accomplissement de son mandat et favoriser la consolidation de ses activités au Québec, comme il le fait déjà notamment pour l'Association du transport aérien international (IATA) ou la Société internationale de télécommunications aéronautiques (SITA) qui ont leur siège à Montréal.

La cérémonie de signature de l'accord s'est déroulée à l'occasion de la session du Conseil d'administration de l'AUPELF, Conseil de l'Université des réseaux d'expression française, tenue à Montréal et à Ottawa les 28 et 29 mai derniers.

A ce jour l'AUPELF UREF bénéficie d'un accord de siège avec les gouvernements du Québec (Direction générale de l'AUPELF, Rectorat de l'UREF et Bureau Amérique du Nord à Montréal), de Madagascar (Bureau Océan indien à Antananarivo), d'Haïti (Bureau Caraïbes à Port-au-Prince) et du Sénégal (Bureau Afrique à Dakar).

OIG-ONG

En vertu de l'article 77 du règlement de la CNUCED, trois ONG qui sollicitent leur admission dans la liste des ONG accrédités, ont été présentées à une telle admission, lors de la 38e session du Conseil de la CNUCED en septembre 1991. Il s'agit de l'International Express Carriers Conference (IECC), Liaison Commissi...
Des groupements artistiques d'une douzaine de pays ont décidé de créer un réseau informel de libre échange culturel et artistique et ont approuvé la création, à Leningrad, du Centre international pour le dialogue des cultures.

Les membres de la communauté artistique internationale et plus de 70 hautes dirigeantes soviétiques se sont réunis à Leningrad (17-20 juin 1991), sous l'égide de l'UNESCO, pour discuter notamment de l'intérêt d'un Centre de dialogue culturel afin de tisser des liens avec les groupes artistiques étrangers et comprendre le retrait progressif du soutien de l'État soviétique dans le domaine des arts. Les participants ont publié un communiqué final, le Serment de l'Ermitage, par lequel « ils s'engagent à tisser entre eux un solide réseau de solidarité et d'information concernant leurs échanges de vues, leur renforcement et leur solidarité et d'information concernant leurs échanges de vues, leur renforcement et leur solidarité. »

Le nouveau réseau devra pouvoir mettre sur pied un forum inédit de libre échange culturel et artistique et organiser une évaluation des synergies et des co-produc-ateurs projets réciproques afin de susciter une conciliation et l'éduction de positions communes.

Les associations européennes membres un forum faciliteront leurs échanges de vues, le conciliation et l'élaboration de positions communes.

Onze associations européennes parmi les plus actives dans le domaine de l'éducation/formation se sont regroupées au sein d'un groupe artificiel équivalent de la communauté artistique internationale. Les objectifs poursuivis par PLEASE sont de créer une instance de concertation dans un esprit de complémentarité; d'être reconnus par les institutions européennes comme organes consultatifs; s'engager en collaboration avec les autres partenaires européens des activités visant à renforcer la dimension européenne dans l'éducation et la formation; et de stimuler l'information.

PLEASE offre aux associations européennes membres un forum facilitant leurs échanges de vues, leur concertation et l'élaboration de positions communes.

PLEASE relâche donc les positions des partenaires associatifs de l'édu- cation et se présente comme l'interlocuteur des institutions euro- péennes. Commission, Conseil, Parlement.

Les activités de PLEASE concer- neront également la participation aux initiatives communes qui contribuent à la mise en œuvre de la dimension européenne dans l'éducation et la formation.

PLEASE s'est constitué, avec le support de la Task Force Resources Humanitas, Éducation, Formation de la Commission lors d'une réunion organisée à Luxembourg (Belgique) en novembre 1990.

Les associations membres de PLEASE sont: AEDE - Association européenne des enseignants; EPA - Association européenne des chefs d'établissement d'enseignement secondaire; ATEE - Association européenne des enseignants; EFEA - Forum européen pour l'administration de l'éduca- tion; EURO ORIENTATION - Asso- ciation européenne des servides de conseils en éducation.

Adresse: PLEASE c/o HEURAS: Rue de la Concorde 51, 1050 Bruxelles.

(UNESCO presse)
Le siège est établi B-1210 Bruxelles, rue Verte 69.

Le même jour, les deux bureaux se sont réunis pour la première fois à Bruxelles. L’objectif a porté sur l’échange d’expériences entre les deux uniques institutions communautaires où les gouvernements, les employeurs, les travailleurs et la Commission travaillent sur un pilier d’égalité. M. Parkison, directeur de la Fondation de Dublín, a participé à la dernière réunion du Conseil d’administration du Centre de Berlin et M. Pohl, directeur du Cedefop de Berlin, assisté à la prochaine réunion de la Fondation de Dublín.

Les deux institutions ont engagé la préparation d’élaboration des lignes directrices de leurs activités pour la nouvelle période quadriennale 1993-1996.

(Communiqué)

Des personnes issues principalement du milieu éducatif (enseignants et administrateurs) ont créé une association internationale selon la loi belge du 25 octobre 1919 intitulée Volontariat international femmes éducation développement (VIDES) qui a pour but la promotion et les études concernant le droit de la femme dans les pays en voie de développement. L’association s’intéresse également aux programmes en faveur des jeunes marginaux. Le conseil d’administration comprend 14 personnes de 8 pays différents, tous européens. Le siège est établi B-1000 Bruxelles, chaussée de Wemmel 9B.

(Annexes au Moniteur Belge du 24 octobre 1991)


(Communiqué)
Some items in recent issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Issue number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INGOs tomorrow</td>
<td>X/1987, 1/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs' vision of education for Peace</td>
<td>5/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives in today's world</td>
<td>5/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language in a transnational perspective</td>
<td>1/1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa</td>
<td>3/1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs and the Replication Trap</td>
<td>1/1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Forthcoming topics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Issue number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous Translation in International Congresses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Associations in Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social change in Eastern and Central Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Articles appearing in the journal are indexed in PAIS - Public Affairs Information Service.