


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NGOs and the Replication Trap

**Transnational Regulation
of Timber Trade**

1991 - n° 4

The review of international
associations and meetings

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This publication, produced by the UAI, appears six times a year.

Cette publication, éditée par l'UAI, se présente à ses lecteurs sous la forme d'une revue de période bimestrielle.

The purpose of the studies, surveys and information included in this periodical concerning the international and transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations is to promote understanding of the associative phenomenon in a human society which continues to grow and evolve regardless of the consequences.

Son objet associatif d'études, d'enquêtes, d'informations, au service des réseaux internationaux et transnationaux d'organisations non gouvernementales, s'attache aux idées et aux faits d'un phénomène de société humaine en expansion continue et en évolution hâtée.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UAI, is intended to clarify general awareness concerning the associative phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, to inform associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them.

Son programme, conforme aux principes et aux méthodes de l'UAI, vise, en général, à éclairer les connaissances du grand public sur la vie associative dans la perspective des relations internationales et, en particulier, à informer les associations des divers aspects de leurs problèmes propres et d'intérêt commun.

The columns of this review are open to association officers, research workers and specialists of associative questions. The articles do not of course necessarily reflect the point of view of the publisher.

Les colonnes de la revue sont ouvertes à la fois aux responsables d'associations, chercheurs, spécialistes des matières associatives, dont les articles n'expriment pas nécessairement le point de vue de l'éditeur.

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NGOs and the replication trap *

by Thomas W. Dichter

The NGO community seems to have accepted "Replicability" as a legitimate development objective. This paper questions that legitimacy. First, it discusses the background of replication, and it suggests that NGOs are attracted to replicate because it putatively solves an NGO deficiency-limited impact. The paper also offers a typology of replication, and argues that replication does not need to be built into projects. Rather, it suggests that if the organization's overall approach to development is strategic, focused, and systemic, wider impact will result. Finally, the paper lists the hidden traps of replication (such as cost-consciousness) that NGOs should approach with caution.

Introduction

Practitioners of "grassroots" development among poor people in the Third World face a new frustration. In a field requiring a high tolerance for failure, and where few projects are unequivocally successful, it is no longer good enough to manage a good project or program. We are regularly asked a new and painful question about our work; "Yes, it's good", say our donors, "but is it replicable?"

For thousands of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that are thus challenged, and for the many bilateral development agencies, private funding organizations, and multilateral development agencies who pose it, this question is largely accepted as appropriate. But is it?

An odd-sounding, slightly pretentious term, "replication" generally means the spread of a particular project or program's positive results. The goals of replication are often complex - and include long-term impact, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness - so that the large amounts of money spent developing a successful approach will be reduced when it is replicated.

One of the antecedents of replication is manufacturing; the repetition of a process to reduce costs and increase impact (or "profit" in the manufacturing world). When international development practitioners talk about models or transferring a methodology, and they suggest repeating a successful intervention or translating an approach to

create a "cookbook" for others, they reflect this mechanistic view.

For NGOs, this adaptation of industrial and labor economics has both a positive and a negative side.

On the positive side, thinking "industrially" gets us used to relating impact to the extension of project benefits and acquaints us with cost-effectiveness (the efficiency of mechanized production).

On the negative side, "replicationists" tend to accept that while difficult, one can ultimately reach high levels of efficiency and achieve significant multiplier effects in fundamental social goals and social processes. There are good reasons to question this.

The replication urge leads to a paradox. The presumed advantages of NGOs (their flexibility, small size, and emphasis on the grassroots) mitigate strongly against NGOs achieving significant impact. Simply, NGOs cannot easily move mountains using tools meant to move molehills.

Political economist and thoughtful NGO critic Judith Tendler says there are structural limitations to NGO efficiency

and impact, and that they may be insurmountable.

In "Livelihood, Employment and Income Generating Activities", a report Tendler prepared for the Ford Foundation in 1987, she states:

"The non-governmental sector, where much of the Foundation's LEIG [Livelihood, Employment and Income

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Generation/ program is concentrated, has a certain structural inability to expand or to have its experiments implicated. This is why the impact of NGO projects is usually quite limited, a disturbing finding for donors interested in having an impact on poverty.

The constraints on NGO expansion and replication by others have to do with the fact that: 1) NGO strength and effectiveness often derive from smallness and social homogeneity, which get lost when NGOs try to expand; 2) NGOs see each other and the public sector as competitors for scarce donor funding, rather than as cooperators, in the quest to alleviate poverty, which makes it inherently difficult for them to cooperate with each other or imitate each other's successes; 3) foreign funding accounts for a large share of NGO funding in some countries, which places the NGO sector somewhat at odds with the state, thereby blocking the path to replication of NGO experiments by the public sector; 4) though NGO projects may have small budgets in comparison to the public sector, their costs per beneficiary are often high, which means that even their successful projects are not necessarily feasible as models for serving larger populations; and 5) NGOs themselves often do not strive to serve large numbers of clients, nor are they under pressure to do so, which means they are often content to accomplish programs that work well in a handful of communities." (1)

There are managerial limitations resulting from NGOs origins as voluntary organizations. Many NGOs still have cultural predispositions to non-hierarchical structures, and are often anti-management. Even managerially strong NGOs sometimes have a major flaw related to their success - they do not manage their own growth well.

In the debate about NGO impact, replicability enters as the great peace maker; it is here that the great hope lies. If NGOs can maintain their small size and at the same time have greater impact, they will have achieved the best of both worlds. They will satisfy their inner culture of smallness and custom-made projects, and satisfy the demand of the larger development actors who want to see greater impact.

But there is both a sensible and a fantastical element in such a hope. The sensible element is familiar - the search for ways to improve performance and impact. The fantasy is the expectation that we can achieve a geometric extension of benefits so that 1 becomes 100 and 100 becomes 10,000. More and more, NGOs want to graduate to the big time.

Several programs study ways to accomplish these goals. In the U.S., one NGO, Technoserve, began a department in 1984 whose sole mandate is Replication (Replication and Dissemination). We have been humbled by the task and wish to share with others the insights and lessons we have gained so far. The long and short of our experience is: replication is not what it's cracked up to be. There is both more and less to replication than meets the eye.

Why the ground swell of interest in replication and the sudden widespread use of the term?

We are responding to pressures in the marketplace of the development industry. Development is under increasing scrutiny - and for good reason. More actors are involved in development, and many jobs and organizations have a stake in it.

NGOs are at a critical juncture. The NGO sector (including "Northern" NGOs - those of the OECD nations, and "Southern" NGOs - those of the Third World) is the fastest growing sector in development. The number of Northern NGOs listed by the OECD has almost doubled since 1980 (from 2500 to over 4000). Expectations about NGOs have grown too. Funding is more difficult to find, and a shake-out has begun, part of the maturation process that occurs in the evolution of any industry, NGOs are aware, some dimly, others acutely, that they must prove more to their donors about their value. They also want to enter into more equal relationship with the major players and this means having an impact worthy of consideration. These changes are part of the muscle-flexing of this newest part of a young industry, and goes along with the professionalization of what was once a "calling".

The dilemma facing NGOs stems from a common bias against organizational traits that could result in larger impact. NGOs like their smallness, flexibility, and focus on the grassroots and the community level. To have greater impact in an old-fashioned mechanistic way means expanding - thus threatening the internal culture. But by finding a means to extend without expanding - to grow in impact without growing in bureaucracy - fulfills the NGO fantasy of having significant impact while retaining a culture grounded in smallness. Again, replication holds that promise.

Because the pressure is on, NGOs want to learn the art of replication quickly. But we tend to ignore a lesson from history - few changes occur instantly - especially when they concern changes among entire classes of people. European peasants did not become mechanized agriculturalists overnight, and when they did, it was part of a larger set of changes. Part of what is driving the replication movement now is our own impatient desire for concrete change.

This impatience is morally justified. Poverty and its accompanying evils are unacceptable. But in many other respects, impatience is not justified. The world does not solve all its problems at once. Poverty and injustice cannot be reduced to simple theories ("free market", Marxian, or otherwise) and there is little good historical evidence (except perhaps in case of plague or major war) suggesting that fundamental changes occur quickly in the human realm.

The impulse to replicate, to the extent that it is based on impatience, may be counter-productive. It can distract our attention from consolidating what we have learned, and causes us to undertake shortcuts where none may be possible.

Learning the limits of project replication

Technoserve is an NGO with 20 years of experience in enterprise development in rural agriculture. The technical assistance we offer to groups of low-income people enables farmers and agriculturally related workers to transform their farms into viable small and medium enterprises. These farmers, who may come together as shareholders in a limited liability company, a cooperative, an informal association, or other legal entity with shared ownership, receive training in agronomy, marketing, accounting, business planning, analysis of future markets, and administration and management. We work with farmers

at the low end of the income scale. In Zaire, Kenya, Rwanda, and Ghana, these farmers are classic small-holders. In places such as western Panama, El Salvador, and coastal Peru, these farmers tend to be cooperative members, often former peasant workers on large farms which were turned over to them in agrarian reform programs.

Some examples of replication attempts

Because Technoserve limits its activity to one sector of development - rural agricultural enterprise development - we would seem to be in a good position to have many possibilities for replication. The chronology is interesting:

In Central America in the early 1970s, Technoserve worked with a number of cooperatively owned feedlots. Our approach was based on the belief that the best way to help low-income farmers was to help them run their operations as viable, profit-making businesses. We concentrated so hard on the end product - seeing these farms become viable - that we saw little else but the enterprise itself. We thought business acumen was the sole missing ingredient, and opted to use retired businessmen as volunteers to go to Central America to help put these businesses in the black.

We then began to catch on to one aspect of replication - the repetition of projects. Since we had acquired experience in feedlots, we naturally went on to work with other feedlots. This is replication in its primitive, mechanistic, one-dimensional form: do it once well, then do it again. Replication, however, can and should occur in other ways too.

The typology of replication we suggest has two categories, "Traditional" and "Non-traditional".

Traditional replication

Traditional replication is what we did in Central America in the 1970s and what many NGOs have practiced for many years.

Traditional replication comes in two forms. The first could

be called HOPEFUL or ACCIDENTAL, that is, one hopesim-pact will spread to be copied elsewhere. HOPEFUL repa-tion has limits (See Figure 1).



The second type within the Category of Traditional Repli-cation, we could call STRICT CONSTRUCTION - where the elemental (mechanistic) sense of replication is used (See Figure 2).

Replicating our feedlot experience was at this level embodying all three examples of the STRICT CONSTRUC-TION type.

But the enterprise development process is, as well learned, multidimensional. Later we realized several key aspects of programs were missing, which in the end limited the impact of replication. We neglected the fact that the agricultural enterprise is made up of its owners. To the extent that we understood the enterprise to consist of land, equipment, and livestock, we successfully replicated the business aspects. But we had neglected the people who were to keep it going. Not only did we not pay enough attention to training for the long-term, we did not pay attention to community participation in the work - we were too impatient. As a result of our attempt to replicate projects in this way, not much lasted very long.

We also learned that by using volunteers for one and two years assignments, supposedly to make projects more replicable by reducing costs, we undermined our efforts to learn from experience and make future projects more successful. The rate of staff turnover began to contribute to a lack of organizational memory, reducing the opportunities to learn. Ultimately, the possibilities of a quantum leap - from mere repetition of projects in the same commodity sector to cumulative learning leading to a true multiplier effect - were drastically eliminated before they could be realized. A simple principle was discovered: an accumula-tion of experience residing in the heads and hearts of long-term committed staff (preferably local) can lead to replica-tion of a more indirect, and more sophisticated sort.

By 1979, we believed we had incorporated the lessons learned above and had developed a methodology of enter-prise development including another principle - the reliance on careful, comprehensive, and systematic feasibility studies. Before beginning a given project, our staff would examine the availability of inputs, capital, labor, and mar-kets and potential markets for the commodity involved. Many projects started to yield significant success after this kind of careful homework. But we began to think that the methodology was so important that we forgot that



it has no life of its own beyond the persons implementing it. This led to new mistakes and we again had to relearn the basic principle of the "right" people.

For example, having had success in Kenya with the kind of comprehensive analytic approach above, we transferred it to a commercial rabbitry project in Ghana. Technoserve conducted a feasibility study, got the involvement of the small farmers, looked at the market and the availability of inputs, put together a business plan based on our analysis, and decided to launch the project. The result was a disaster. The project showed initial promise, but at no time did it show any significant positive results. The original assessment of the market, as well as the availability of inputs and technical skills needed, was wrong. In brief, the form of the analytic framework was adhered to properly, but the content was erroneous because our staff did not fully understand it.

The methodology proved to be a hollow core. Because we had been so convinced that our methodology worked, we felt we could transfer the form from Kenya to Ghana and see it work too. Obviously we realized the importance of people in this process, but we were so impressed by the success of the method that we tended not to look critically at the skill level of the people managing the project in Ghana.


By the early 1980s, in three countries where Technoserve had about eight to ten years of experience, we had built substantial local staff, had kept records of our projects in key commodity areas, and knew what we had learned. For the first time, we found we were in a position to influence policy at the macro level. In effect, we had already done what David Korten calls "Micro policy reform" at the grassroots: we successfully trained communities to run their own agricultural enterprises. We now found a link between the micro and the macro. We used accumulated knowledge from grassroots projects in selected commodity sectors to influence policy at government ministerial levels. We were in a position to influence government policies in Savings & Credit legislation, milk and cattle pricing, synthetic fiber importation, and agricultural lending.

We discovered that with patience, continuity, and focus, replication could be achieved by sticking to what we knew how to do best, thus creating comparative advantage over time to ensure that learning was systematically monitored and recorded. This helped us to influence macro policy. Evaluation of why a project worked, and analyzing lessons learned, was the key to being able to replicate success in a different environment.

Non-traditional replication

This last example leads us to the second, non-traditional category of replication. It is more exponential than linear in nature. This broad category is far less direct and is less a matter of transferring project models than of transferring underlying principles, such as the value of concentrating or focusing on a region or sector (See figure 3).

Ironically, as Technoserve moved from the traditional to the non-traditional means of replication, a key lesson we learned was that since fostering viable sustainable small enterprises involves many factors, replication is a *gratuitous term*. That is to say, it has always been possible to increase impact (traditional replication) in limited ways with limited multiplier effects. But when an organization wants to



significantly increase impact in complex projects, it needs to engage in Non-Traditional replication. And since those forms of replication (as illustrated above) are really applications of basic principles of effective organizations in general, attention may be diverted from this fact by using a term such as "replication".

In other words, the ambitious goals of replication are achievable, but *not as a function of designing something called "replicability" into the project*. Rather, those goals function as elemental principles embodied in the organization undertaking the development task. An organization must consider what makes a good project work: this means having a solid system of monitoring and evaluation. An organization needs to look rigorously at project costs, which will always be a key factor if others are to imitate (replicate) the project. An organization also needs to consider the use of rare assets in a program (assets which others might not have access to) to see whether others might be able to imitate it. These concerns enhance organizational effectiveness in any field.

In Technoserve's case, accumulated commodity sector knowledge can influence policy for the wider good of small farmers or small entrepreneurs. This makes the role of internal information dissemination critical. We have had many instances of failure to transfer knowledge learned in one country program to another simply because no one knew about it. Even with knowledge that has generic qualities (such as an understanding of the technical and business aspects of storing certain tropical produce), when we did achieve a better organized system of internal dissemination, we found that this was only the first step. Once sent, nobody can guarantee it will be used. People on staff elsewhere often suffer from the "not-invented-here" syndrome. They cannot be forced to use information well. Exchanging staff may be one way to overcome this problem. In short, to make advances in replication, an

tion needs to first make advances in its internal functions in

When Technoserve started his Replication department in 1984, an important first assumption was that we could extend impact if we transferred our method and our organizational traits to other organizations - especially indigenous organizations in the Third World.

We searched for partners already philosophically predisposed to our organizational traits and our participatory development methodology. Even with such partners, we found the process time consuming and uncomfortable because it involved compromises, adjustments, and issues of "ownership" residing in the organizational ego. Finally, these lessons learned are not easily taught to others who haven't had the same experiences.

The first successful experiment of organizational transfer began in 1984 when we helped The Katalysis Foundation of California launch the Belize Enterprise for Sustained Technology (B.E.S.T.) an indigenous Belizean NGO specializing in agricultural enterprise development.

Naturally, B.E.S.T. has its own ideas about goals and methods, and it wants to learn things in its own way, not ours. Still, they have adapted what we have learned, and the repetition of our mistakes is being avoided. The important thing, of course, is whether there is local impact to improve people's lives in significant ways. If that can be shown to be the case, then we have achieved our goal.

According to a report from the OECD Development Assistance Committee, this "partnership" approach to replication is fairly new:

"It is only recently, and mainly through evaluations, that inquiry into the potential for replicability has shifted to factors such as the adequacy of local leadership training or a deliberate search for contact with governmental services and other potential partners, in order to tap and replicate a particular model"... (2)

We can sum up with a simple typology of replication:

- Programmatic/Operational (repeating project successes in various ways, along various spectra).
- Communication/Informational (informing others about project successes and failures).
- Training/Educational (teaching others to do it).
- Collaboration (working with other, partnership organizations so that more groups take similar approaches).

Preconditions for replication

We have so far talked about ways and means of replicating. There must also be something worth replicating, and knowing what to replicate is not always clear. For replication to have potential, a project must:

- Have something that works well enough to warrant replication.
- Have recognizable and unambiguous reasons for project success.
- Have sufficient resources, including the necessary management skills to reproduce the conditions for success.
- Be applied by an organization which is effective, i.e., can learn, apply its learning internally, remember its learning, focus, establish a niche, use comparative advantage, be efficient, say no, etc.

Obstacles to replication

Besides the internal "cultural" obstacles mentioned earlier which block the NGO community's path in its effort to improve the record on replication, there are additional obstacles to be aware of:

1. Organizational obstacles - We generally have not spent enough time rigorously analyzing what we do and whether it works for the reasons we say. Thus we are not yet ready to meet some of the preconditions for successful replication.
2. Also, we may not have the organizational maturity or sophistication (including the appropriate internal management skills) to undertake the more exponential types of replication.
3. There may be thresholds in the community, or in individual organizations, where the difficulty of jumping towards exponential replication is considerably greater than mechanically repeating a "model" several times in different regions. These thresholds need to be better understood. Attempting to jump over and beyond them before realizing that one is at such a threshold, could result in high costs, project failure, organizational over-extension, and internally destructive tensions.

Questionable pressures to replicate projects

Today there are some interesting currents in the development community pushing us towards replication that are worth questioning. We refer here to five of them:

The "star" tendency

The "star" tendency arises out of our need to find project "models" for success. There is a sense of urgency in development circles which is reflected in unreasonably short project time frames of two to five years - the "star" tendency often prematurely pushes us to declare isolated successes as models.

Behind this is the idea that something good, a project such as the Grameen Bank credit program in Bangladesh, is too good not to try elsewhere. Thus we raise it to the level of a model - something which can be transferred by taking its basic elements and setting them up again somewhere else (just as in a model house the floor-plan and structure are displayed so that people can choose the model they like and build it in a different place).

As in the model house, elements of the floor-plan can be fairly easily adapted to new sites and to the tastes of the new owners. We recognize that elements of the Grameen Bank may have to be adapted to other environments with different politics, cultures, and economies.

The problem lies in our not being perfectly sure why the Grameen case works the way it does. While the construction techniques in a model house are perfectly understood and tested, those of a project like Grameen are not. By raising the model to "star" status, we may prematurely encourage its replication, in a wholesale cookbook manner rather than in a limited experimental way which would further our learning about the subtleties of what it work in the first place.

The pilot project embarrassment

The concept of the pilot project has become a trap in our thinking about replication. Because of growing impatience with our limitations, and because of outside pressure for more impact, NGOs seem to feel increasingly uncomfortable with pilot projects. We implicitly compare ourselves to industry, where we know there is little tolerance for continuing to indulge in pilot projects or experiments. At some point, the demands of the marketplace put pressure on producers to move from drawing board to product, to go from prototype to mass-production.

Thus, we are embarrassed by pilot projects after awhile. In our fast-placed culture, saying that we development practitioners are still (after all these years) building pilot projects and experimenting, seems legitimate cause for self-consciousness. The pressure to replicate ties into this self-consciousness. We often endure pilot project embarrassments. But, given the still new nature of development, it is not at all unreasonable to continue to experiment and perfect a pilot program in sectors where our experience is only a few years old. We need to learn to be less defensive of our pilot projects with donors.

The "science" tendency

The element of social "engineering" which permeates our development professionalism often gets in the way of a full recognition that we are dealing with human beings, not mechanical systems. The push to replicate reinforces the development practitioner's tendency to think we can tinker with models and furthers our forgetfulness about the human factor. Since thinkers have been analyzing human systems, there has as yet been no satisfactory comprehensive explanatory framework accounting for all the complexity and unpredictability of human behavior and social systems. If thousands of social scientists, economists, anthropologists, and psychologists have failed to reduce humankind to succinct axioms, how can we?

In the Grameen Bank's case, we must ask questions about key variables in the "model". What is unique about the Bank? Is it the personnel doing the work? Is it the Bank's founder? Is it the extent to which the founder was connected to the Bangladeshi power structure? Is it that the activities funded are ones already engaged in by the borrowers?

Our tendency to apply scientific method to complex human system is understandable given the pressure to replicate. But again, we need to remember that despite the advances in economic and psychological theory, human behavior cannot be reduced purely to scientific formulae. Greater learning about the development process would seem to take place in a condition of some humility about the process. That stance would allow a very open-ended view of what makes the difference in a "success." By becoming increasingly enamored of development as "science" rather than as art, we risk losing vital links in the development process.

The cost-effectiveness tendency

A fourth pressure in our thinking about replication is cost. We are under increasing pressure to reduce costs. But we do not use the connections between replication and costs

as well as we might in addressing those pressures. Calculators that cost \$ 100.00 in the early 70s now cost under \$10.00. Similarly, certain apparently high costs of some kinds of development projects, are justifiable given either the expected stream of benefits later on, or lower project costs once replicated.

Donors and practitioners alike have become obsessed with costs: cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit analysis, cost recovery, recurrent costs, and so on. Donors such as USAID can criticize even the best of projects with, "it's good, but it costs too much." Of course, we are products of our time and culture - cost and efficiency obsess us. Nonetheless we should not forget other strains in our culture (as reflected in old wisdoms such as "you get what you pay for," or "penny-wise and pound-foolish"), suggesting that costs may have a more intricate and ambiguous relationship to quality than that expressed in standard cost-benefit analysis. Development is still in an experimental stage, and we should not unconditionally fear high costs. If NGOs can avoid constant short-run price considerations, we can resist questionable pressures to replicate.

The lessons learned tendency

There is also a flip side to the replication tendency: we may incorporate too much orthodoxy from lessons learned. When a project is deemed not to have worked, we should not automatically conclude that something like it should not be tried again. Just as there are accidental successes, there may be accidental failures. A re-appraisal of the project may reveal a foundation for a successful application of the goals and techniques elsewhere.

Conclusions

Replication is a laudable goal for NGOs, but it needs to be kept in the perspective of where we are in development praxis. If NGOs concentrate on doing good development work, and if we foster high quality sustainable projects, then worrying about replication may be gratuitous. Development programs need sophisticated analysis and dissemination of lessons learned. Too many projects are replicated, not because they are uncommonly good, but because they are commonly cited by academic researchers who often choose the same countries to work in.

If we can adjust our beliefs to see that an experimental mode is not an inappropriate one for us to remain in for some time, and if we recognize the nature of our tasks, it is difficult to say that pilot projects are *ipso facto* too expensive. It "pays" to make quality work an objective.

Most grassroots development work undertaken by NGOs is a craft and an art. It is not something which can be easily mass-produced.

We contradict ourselves when we call for replication in advance of project success. This is where we carry replication past what we understand to be true about projects. We tend to think that because replication is a good thing, we can ask that it be built-in to the plans for a project, as if by adding some special ingredients to the plans, we can make it replicable. In fact, what makes our efforts replicable are the underlying principles of good development work applicable to any project.

By giving the term replication special status as a major goal, we have given it a life of its own. This is inappropriate.

and contrary to the sophisticated understanding of the development process that NGOs have established in recent years.

What is replicable in development is not a project "model", but the principles that define development models. We are not likely to succeed in isolating the key variables of particular projects because too many of them are embedded in different social, cultural, linguistic, political, and economic structures. Such differences will always compel grassroots development projects to be custom-built.

The underlying principles of good development work are the keys to replicability:

- Invest in finding and training competent, professional personnel with appropriate skills including the capacity to transfer skills to others, particularly in such basic areas as management, accounting, and planning, which are part of the sustain ability of all organizations.
- Acknowledge the realities of the development process, which means planning for longer time frames for projects and programs.
- Remain flexible. The dynamics of development need acknowledgement - projects ebb and flow, there are false starts, some aspects of a project lead others, and adjustment often necessitates change.
- Pay attention to participation and ways to insure that participants have a significant stake in their project (for example, by having to pay something for it) to insure that they are motivated.

* Be "systems" minded - recognize linkages between parts in a system. This leads to making impact a strategy rather than size or money. This implies systems vertically and horizontally, and a concentration capacity to build bridges across sector barriers, linking micro development activities with macro policy).

- Guard integrity in the assisting organization. The values of the people who form these organizations are critical. We have tried to suggest that replication, like many development buzzwords, needs a closer look. There are hidden traps in the concept, implications we may want to resist and costs (especially in learning) we may not want to pay. Nor can we assume that the impulse behind replication, unlike another current term - sustainability - is clearly a good one. The push for project efficiency, one of the elements in the complex political economy of the development industry, is a good one. But let's remember that NGOs risk adopting not just the word replication, but many of the impulses behind it. This paper simply raises the familiar warning: *Caveat Emptor*.

Notes

- (1) Judith Tendler, *Livelihood, Employment and Income Generating Activities*, The Ford Foundation, 1987, p.v.
- (2) Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Voluntary Aid for Development: The Role of Non Governmental Organizations*, Paris, 1987, p. 49.

Cooperation Between The World Bank and NGOS

The text that follows is the 1990 Progress Report, established by the World Bank International Economic Relations Division, External Affairs Department, January 31, 1991.

Executive Summary

1. This eighth annual progress report examines Bank-NGO cooperation in two broad areas: operational collaboration and policy dialogue.

OPERATIONAL COLLABORATION

2. Fifty of the 222 projects approved by the Bank's executive directors in FY90 had NGO involvement. Over the years, most NGO-associated projects have been in Africa, but the shares in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean increased significantly in FY90. International NGOs used to predominate, but since FY88, nearly 80 percent of the types of NGOs involved have been either grassroots organizations or indigenous intermediary NGOs.

3. Implementation remained the most common functional category in FY90. NGO involvement in design has risen somewhat as a result of encouragement from Bank senior management; however, its incidence continues to be relatively low compared to implementation. There are several explanations, including: the lack of a financial mechanism whereby the Bank can directly fund upstream work by NGOs; the limited resources available for the staff-intensive work needed to engage NGOs; and continued resistance by many governments and NGOs to closer cooperation. Some preliminary lessons of experience have emerged regarding: (a) the channeling of financial resources to NGOs through Bank-financed projects, and (b) the impact which the Bank has had on government-NGO relations in a country.

4. NGOs seldom receive funding directly from the Bank; however, they can be indirect recipients of proceeds from Bank loans. Two situations are most common: (i) an NGO receives financing for an activity which it has developed and proposed to a government for funding, or (ii) an NGO is engaged by a government as a contractor or executing agency of a project designed mainly

by that government. Bank-financed socio-economic development funds (SEDFs) are an increasingly common context for government funding of NGOs. Experience with SEDFs has revealed the importance of taking beneficiary participation into account in appraising NGO sub-project, and the need to target promotional activities directly to NGOs.

5. Obstacles encountered in the realm of government-NGO relations that have affected Bank-financed operations have included: rivalry between public agencies and NGOs for financial resources; difficulties in dealing with diverse and disparate NGO communities; and inappropriate public policies towards NGOs. Regarding the latter, the Bank has in some countries participated in discussions on public policy options that would contribute to an effective nonprofit, voluntary sector.

6. Relations among NGOs have also been shown to affect project effectiveness. National associations of NGOs have been involved in a number of Bank-financed operations. While results have been mixed, NGO associations have tended to be most effective when their role in a project is consistent with their overall mandate and areas of expertise and when they have had ample opportunity to prepare for participation.

7. The Bank has in the past few years initiated several mechanisms aimed at systematizing and institutionalizing its work with NGOs. In 1990, the Bank published a booklet called *How the World Bank Works with Nongovernmental Organizations*. A series of staff training seminars on working with NGOs continued, with a new sector specific emphasis. The Economic Development Institute began developing a three-year seminar program on the role of NGOs in development. A reciprocal exchange of staff between the Bank and an NGO was tried for the first time. EXTIE commissioned studies of some NGO-associated projects under implementation. The Bank's resident missions continued to play an important role in maintaining Bank-NGO relations at the country level.

POLICY DIALOGUE

8. The expansion of NGO involvement in Bank-financed operations has occurred against a backdrop of intensified policy discussion between NGOs and the Bank on three topics: poverty, environment, and popular participation.

9. The strategy for poverty reduction set out in the *World Development Report (WDR) 1990* provided a focal point for Bank-NGO discussion on poverty-related issues. The *WDR* affirms the role that NGOs play in poverty reduction. It recommends that official development assistance be focused on the recipient country's broad-based poverty reduction performance, a view which some NGOs have been advocating.

10. Many NGOs continue to be critical of the impact of Bank-supported adjustment programs on the poor. The Bank has for several years been concerned about mitigating the potential adverse effects of adjustment on the poor, while not agreeing with many of the assumptions underlying the NGOs' criticisms. Although many NGOs initially resisted the whole idea of adjustment, most have come to recognize that economic reforms are needed in hard-pressed developing countries.

11. Policy dialogue between the Bank and NGOs has been the most wide-ranging on environmental issues. The Bank has rapidly increased the attention which it gives to the environmental impact of the policies and projects it supports. It is taking steps to encourage the involvement of affected groups and local NGOs in the environmental assessment of projects. It is also currently revising its forest policy and has invited NGOs to contribute to this process. The Bank has sought NGOs' views on the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Some NGOs consider steps to date insufficient, however, and remain skeptical about the GEF.

12. Popular participation in development planning and decision-making straddles the concerns of both poverty and environmental NGOs and is becoming a prominent issue on the agendas of governments and donors as well. The NGO-World Bank Committee discussions in Bangkok in November 1989 revealed a surprising degree of agreement between Bank and NGO members on the importance of giving low-income people more of a say in development decisions. Committee members later agreed on a joint statement on popular participation.

1. Introduction

1. World Bank relations with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued to deepen in 1990. Events both within and outside the Bank have helped set the stage for increased cooperation. Possibilities have expanded for NGOs to be involved in Bank-financed projects, as the Bank's borrowers are becoming more aware of what NGOs can contribute to national development. The emergence of democracies in some countries had also led to more favorable government attitudes towards

The Committee discussion helped set the stage for the launching of a modest Bank-wide program of action and learning on the issue of participation. The program will entail the establishment of a learning group on participation and in-depth study of some 20 exceptionally paracipatory Bank-financed projects.

13. The Bank's dialogue with NGOs is conducted in many fora, the most important of which is the NGO-World Bank Committee. The Committee held its tenth annual session in Washington on October 31-November 1, 1990. The agenda included updates on progress in Bank-NGO operational collaboration, the participation issue, and areas of agreement and disagreement regarding the broad outline of policies that promote development which is good for poor people and the environment.

14. The International Forum on World Bank and IMF Lending is another significant venue for Bank-NGO interaction. The Forum emerged from NGO protests at the Joint World Bank/International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings in Berlin in 1988. During the 1990 Annual Meetings, the Bank organized a series of seminars for Forum NGOs on such issues as the Bank's forest policy, environmental assessment, the *WDR 1990*, and the GED.

15. The number of events in which substantive Bank-NGO interaction takes place grows each year. Perhaps the largest such meeting in 1990 was the World Conference on Education for All. A Bank-NGO meeting which was organized by the Bank's European Office in April 1990 in Bruges, Belgium, discussed Bank-NGO cooperation; environment and sustainable development; debt, aid and trade; structural adjustment; and the Bank's longterm perspectives study on sub-Saharan Africa.

16. The Bank undertakes some development education activities in industrialized countries, sometimes in cooperation with NGOs. It supports an «interdependence project» to show the importance of economic progress in developing countries to people in industrialized countries. It also produces instructional materials about development that are designed specifically for secondary and tertiary classroom use. The Bank's External Grants Program provides some financial assistance to NGOs for development education purposes.

citizens' groups. The challenge of meeting the needs of the world's poor, together with heightened urgency about global environmental degradation, have prompted the coming together of institutions of different types — NGOs, governments, and intergovernmental organizations — to find ways to protect, conserve, and develop the world's human and natural resources.

2. Operational collaboration remained the centerpiece of the Bank's work with NGOs in fiscal 1990 (FY90) (1). An additional 50 projects involving NGOs were

TABLE I PATTERNS IN WORLD BANK-NGO OPERATIONAL COLLABORATION: FISCAL 1973 TO FISCAL 1990										
	FY73-FY87		FY88		FY89		FY90		Total FY73-FY90	
	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)
REGIONS (No. of Projects)										
Africa	100	(50)	11	(55)	27	(59)	22	(44)	160	(51)
Asia	46	(23)	5	(25)	8	(17)	14	(28)	73	(23)
Europe, Mid. East & N. Africa	15	(8)	1	(5)	4	(9)	3	(6)	23	(7)
Latin America & Caribbean	37	(19)	3	(15)	7	(15)	11	(22)	58	(19)
TOTALS	198	(100)	20	(100)	46	(100)	50	(100)	314	(100)
SECTORS (No. of Projects)										
Adjustment-related	0	(0)	2	(10)	4	(9)	8	(16)	14	(5)
Agriculture/Rural Dev.	94	(48)	8	(40)	15	(33)	18	(36)	135	(43)
Education/Training	19	(10)	1	(5)	4	(9)	5	(10)	29	(9)
Environment	0	(0)	2	(10)	2	(4)	4	(8)	8	(3)
Industry/Energy	21	(10)	1	(5)	4	(9)	1	(2)	27	(9)
Infrastructure/Urban Dev.	41	(21)	0	(0)	8	(17)	5	(10)	54	(17)
Population/Health/Nutrition	21	(10)	5	(25)	7	(15)	9	(18)	42	(13)
Re&f	2	(1)	1	(5)	2	(4)	0	(0)	5	(1)
TOTALS	198	(100)	20	(100)	46	(100)	50	(100)	314	(100)
TYPES OF NGOS (No. of NGOs)										
Grassroots	59	(26)	16	(62)	29	(41)	30	(42)	134	(34)
Indigenous Intermediary	70	(31)	5	(19)	28	(40)	26	(36)	129	(32)
International	99	(43)	5	(19)	13	(19)	16	(22)	133	(34)
TOTALS	228	(100)	26	(100)	70	(100)	72	(100)	396	(100)
FUNCTIONS (No. of Functions)										
Advice	71	(28)	4	(15)	7	(10)	7	(8)	89	(20)
Cofinancing	9	(4)	1	(4)	5	(7)	8	(10)	23	(5)
Design	31	(12)	2	(7)	11	(16)	19	(22)	63	(15)
Implementation	142	(56)	20	(74)	42	(59)	46	(54)	250	(57)
Monitoring & Evaluation	1	(0)	0	(0)	6	(8)	5	(6)	12	(3)
TOTALS	254	(100)	27	(100)	71	(100)	85	(100)	437	(100)

approved, and some significant lessons have begun to emerge from the Bank's experience in the 314 NGO-associated projects identified between FY73 and FY90. Policy dialogue between the Bank and NGOs during the year was richer — in terms of frequency, depth, and significance — on issues related to poverty reduction, environmental assessment, and popular participation. Attention was given to improving systems which were put into place in previous years to bolster the Bank's work with NGOs, and increasing emphasis was placed on monitoring the quality of Bank-NGO interaction. Although much has been achieved in Bank-NGO co-operation to date, some constraints to further progress are noted in this report which may need to be addressed in the years to come.

3. This is the eighth annual progress report on Bank-NGO cooperation prepared by the Bank's central NGO office, now located in the International Economic Relations Division of the External Affairs Department (EXTIE) within the Policy, Research, and External Affairs (PRE) complex. (The previous report was issued on March 8, 1990). This report is intended primarily to keep Bank executive directors abreast of progress and new developments in Bank-NGO cooperation in the last year. It also serves to keep Bank management and staff, NGO representatives, and other government officials informed. The report is divided into the two main areas of Bank-NGO cooperation: Operational Collaboration and Policy Dialogue.

// Operational Collaboration

4. This section provides an update on patterns of Bank-NGO operational collaboration between FY73 and FY90 - by region, sector, type of NGO, and function. It points to some emerging lessons from this experience, particularly with respect to funding for NGOs in Bank-supported operations and improving government-NGO relations, and to some apparent constraints to promoting closer Bank-NGO operational collaboration. Finally, it describes mechanisms established by the Bank to help institutionalize and improve the quality of Bank-NGO interaction.

Patterns of Bank-NGO Operational Collaboration

5. The number of cases of NGO involvement in Bank-supported projects identified in FY90 continued the rapid expansion begun the year before. Fifty of the 222 projects approved by the Bank's executive directors in FY90 had NGO involvement, four more than in FY89 and 30 more than in FY88. Annex 1 provides summary descriptions of a sample of 12 of the NGO-associated projects approved in FY90.

6. Table 1 provides data on Bank-NGO collaboration from FY73 to FY90, emphasizing particularly the last three years of this period. In FY88, the Bank began a systematic effort to increase NGO involvement in its operations, and this involvement is now roughly three times what it was before. An average of 13 NGO-associated projects a year were approved between FY73 and FY87, while an average of 39 projects a year have been approved between FY88 and FY90.

fi) Regional Pattern

1. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the regional distribution and trends in Bank-NGO operational collaboration since

FY73. As in previous years, sub-Saharan Africa the largest share of projects involving NGO percent), but the shares in Asia and Latin America (LAC) increased significantly (17 percent to 28 percent and 15 percent to 22 percent, respectively, from FY89 to FY90). The share of projects in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa (EMENA) remained low in FY90 (six percent), despite evidence of some growth in numbers of NGOs in Eastern and Central Europe recently.

8. There are several reasons for the continuing predominance of projects involving NGOs in Africa. Governments and economies are generally weak in Africa and there is great reliance on a partnership with the non-profit, nongovernmental «third sector» to fill gaps in services and financing. In addition, the Bank's portfolio in Africa coincides more than in other regions with areas in which NGOs tend to be active — for example, social sectors, small business development, and agriculture. The largest share of concessional financing from IDA (2) goes to Africa, and funding of NGOs by governments is apparently facilitated by the availability of financing on IDA rather than on IBRD terms.

(ii) Sectoral Pattern

9. Figure 3 shows the sectoral distribution of NGO-associated projects identified since FY73. The distribution in FY90 was similar to past patterns, albeit with some minor variations. Agriculture, with a 36 percent share in FY90, continued to account for, by far, the largest number of projects (double the next most common sector). Infrastructure/urban development, however, which accounts for 17 percent of all NGO projects since FY73, dropped to 10 percent in FY90. By contrast, the incidence of NGO involvement in population, health and nutrition (PHN) has steadily increased to 18 percent in

BANK-NGO OPERATIONAL COLLABORATION BY REGION, FY73-FY90






Figure 1

Cooperation Between The World Bank and NGOS





FY90. Among the PHN projects approved in FY90 is the Gambia Women-in-Development Project, which is the Bank's first free-standing women-in-development project (see Annex 1). There was only one industry/energy project in FY90 that involved NGOs. NGO involvement in education/training has remained almost constant through the years at about 10 percent.

10. Another noteworthy change is that the numbers of both adjustment-related (mainly multisectoral, social-dimensions-of-adjustment projects) and environment projects involving NGOs doubled from FY89 to FY90. It is possible that NGO involvement in these two sectors will continue to grow in much the same way that it has in

PHN. Bank staff working in PHN since FY85 have become convinced that NGO involvement will enhance the development effectiveness of Bank-supported projects in that sector, and about one-fifth of the Bank's PHN projects presently involve NGOs. Staff working on environment and the social dimensions of adjustment are beginning to make similar efforts to engage NGOs in their projects.

(iii) Type-of-NGO Pattern

11. Regarding the types of NGOs, NGO-associated projects in FY90 continued the pattern of a year earlier of



involving more grassroots groups (42 percent) and indigenous intermediary NGOs (36 percent) than international NGOs (22 percent). Each of the three different types of NGOs presently accounts for about a third of all NGO projects identified since FY73 (see Table 1).

12. International NGOs used to predominate, accounting for 43 percent of the projects from FY73 to

FY87 (see Figure 4). However, beginning in FY88, that trend started to shift so that by FY90, nearly 80 percent of the NGOs involved were either grassroots groups (for example, water users' associations, farmers clubs, women's groups, or cooperatives) or indigenous intermediary NGOs (national religious or voluntary organizations or locally registered international NGOs).

The Bank has made a deliberate effort to seek out the involvement of local NGOs in its operations - for the grassroots knowledge and expertise that they can bring to the design and implementation of projects — and that may account for the shift in trend (para 15). International NGOs have strongly supported this initiative by the Bank.

(iv) *Functional Pattern*

13. Figure 5 shows trends in functional categories of projects involving NGOs since FY73. Implementation has through the years remained the most common category, accounting for 57 percent of the projects since FY73. Advice, cofinancing, and monitoring and evaluation have together occurred in about a quarter of the projects, and there was little change in this trend in FY90.

14. NGO involvement in design is rising somewhat (up to 22 percent in FY90 from 16 percent in FY89). And, of the FY90 projects in which NGOs were involved in design, it is noteworthy that mainly grassroots groups were included. Women's working groups, for example, are planning local project activities in the Indian Tamil Nadu Second Nutrition Project, and water users' associations are planning deep tubewell systems in the Nepal Third Bhairawa Lumbini Groundwater Irrigation Project (see Annex 1).

15. The Bank's senior management has encouraged staff to seek increased involvement of beneficiary groups and local NGOs in the design and planning of Bank-financed projects. This strategy recognizes that NGOs' insights can be as important to the Bank as their implementation capacity. The importance of involving groups of the poor in project planning is noted in the *World Development Report 1990* which points out that, «successful [poverty-focused] programs have usually involved the poor both at the design stage and during implementation.» (3) To further NGO involvement in project design, the Bank has for the last two years regularly updated a «List of World Bank-Financed Projects with Potential for NGO Involvement» to inform NGOs about upcoming possibilities for collaboration. The Bank has also been mailing worldwide its «Monthly Operational Summary» to NGOs that request it (para 48).

16. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the support of Bank senior management in this area, the data show that there continues to be a relatively low incidence of NGO involvement in design (in comparison to implementation, for example). There may be several explanations for this phenomenon. One obvious constraint is the lack of a financial mechanism through which the Bank can directly fund this kind of upstream activity by NGOs (para. 20). NGOs are used to financial assistance from grant-making institutions. They often find it difficult to bear the substantial prefinancing costs that are usually associated with the lengthy project preparation activities of large-scale projects. Another problem for the Bank is the

limited time which it can devote to the relatively staff-intensive work involved in engaging NGOs. NGOs have not generally been strong on either coordination among themselves or self-evaluation. In addition, various communication channels among NGOs, government line agencies, and the Bank are sometimes weak or, worse, non-existent. These and other weaknesses make it difficult, time-consuming, and hence costly for Bank task managers to get a clear understanding of the diversity of NGOs and of what they are capable of offering operationally in a given situation. Finally, Bank staff continue to report that, for various reasons (para. 33), many member governments, and sometimes NGOs in those countries, remain resistant to promoting closer government-NGO cooperation and, hence, to the idea of involving NGOs in Bank-financed official projects. This attitude represents a clear disincentive to attempts to increase NGO involvement in Bank operations in those countries, particularly at the design stage.

Emerging Lessons of Experience

17. To promote closer Bank-NGO cooperation, part of the Bank's strategy over the last few years has been to work to increase the number of Bank-financed projects involving NGOs. With good results to report in this area, the Bank has, during the period covered by this report, begun to focus more on evaluating the effectiveness of increased NGO involvement in its operations. The Africa and Asia Regional Offices, for example, both conducted in-depth reviews of lessons of experience from Bank-NGO operational collaboration in their regions. The Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Division (now located in the Africa Technical Department) reviewed its experience with socio-economic development funds, with particular emphasis on involvement of NGOs. EXTIE is developing a more rigorous system of monitoring of a group of some 25 illustrative cases of collaboration (para. 53).

18. From these and other reviews, some preliminary lessons of experience can be drawn regarding effective NGO involvement in Bank operations. This report focuses on two topics which have emerged as particularly challenging issues for further progress in promoting closer Bank-NGO cooperation, namely: (i) mechanisms for channeling financial resources to NGOs through Bank-financed projects, and (ii) the impact which the Bank's presence has had on government-NGO relations and relations among NGOs in a country.

(i) *Channeling Financial Resources to NGOs Through Bank Projects*

19. The Bank is building a body of experience in channeling financial resources to NGOs in the context of the projects it finances, despite the lack of a direct funding mechanism for NGOs. The Bank's business is to make loans or credits to its developing-country member governments for project investments and for policy

changes that contribute to economic growth, poverty induction, and environmental protection. The Bank does not implement projects; this is the borrower's responsibility.

20. In this context, the Bank very seldom makes funding available *directly* to NGOs (4). But NGOs can be the indirect recipients of proceeds from Bank loans and credits. The Bank lends to a government which, in turn, may provide financing to NGOs. While there are a variety of situations in which involving, and hence funding, NGOs in Bank-financed projects make sense, two seem to be most common. In the first instance, an NGO receives financing for a project which it has itself developed and proposed to a government for funding (paras. 21-23). In the second, an NGO is engaged by a government; under a fee-for-services contract, as a contractor or executing agency of a component of a project that has been designed mainly by that government (para. 24). Both types of activity entail a contractual agreement between the government and NGO. In almost all cases, funding to an NGO is in grant form and is not meant to be repaid to the government (5). In such cases, the government may determine that the expected outcome of the NGO intervention (for example, more effective implementation or greater outreach to remote areas of the country, relative to government agencies' capacities) makes funding of the NGO activity worthwhile.

(a) Financing of NGO Subprojects

21. In the context of Bank-financed operations, governments have used several different mechanisms to channel Bank financing to NGO-designed subprojects. One is via the Bank's Project Preparation Facility (PPF). The normal PPF provides advance loan funding to help governments cover the costs of project preparation before a project is appraised. The Bank also maintains a Special Project Preparation Facility (SPPF) to fund the preparation of innovative projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Once a project materializes, these advances are added to the IDA credit or IBRD loan to be repaid by the government. Sometimes, governments have passed on proceeds from PPF, or SPPF, funding to NGOs that are engaged in project preparation activities. A PPF helped finance, for example, the pilot phase of the Cameroon Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Project, approved in FY90, during which NGOs were identified to participate in the promotion of income-generating subprojects (see Annex 1). In the Togo Grassroots Development Initiatives Project (GDIP), approved in FY89, a US\$500,000 SPPF contribution finances seven pilot NGO subprojects before the regular IDA-financed project was begun. Under the IDA project, the Government of Togo is providing US\$3 million in grants to fund community-based development projects designed and carried out by NGOs and project beneficiaries. In both the Cameroon and Togo cases, PPF funding proved to be a convenient mechanism of initial funding for NGOs before project monies began disbursing.

22. Another mechanism through which goos have channeled Bank financing to NGO sub via «socio-economic development funds SEDF is a demand-driven, multisectoral fund that ces small, grassroots development subprojects aimed improving poor people's access to social services, employment opportunities, and income-generating assets. The funds established under the above-mentioned Cameroon SDA and Togo GDIP projects, for example, are types of SEDFs. The success of the Bolivia Emergency Social Fund (ESF), which in FY90 entered into its third incarnation as a «social investment fund» (see Annex 1), has made a number of other governments interested in developing SEDFs (6). Governments now often establish such funds in conjunction with economic recovery programs to help mitigate the effects of adjustment on poor, vulnerable populations. In almost all SEDFs supported by the Bank, NGO-designed and -implemented subprojects have been among those eligible to receive financing, along with government-sponsored subprojects. In some instances, such as the Togo GDIP, NGOs have also been involved in designing the SEDFs themselves and in the subproject selection process (para. 27).

23. SEDFs are multisectoral with respect to the subprojects they finance. Similar, *single-sector* financial mechanisms have also been incorporated into some Bank-financed projects. Perhaps the most noteworthy case in terms of fund size is the Brazil North East Rural Development Program, begun in the mid-1980s. Under a Support to Small Rural Communities component (SSRC) of the Program, the Government of Brazil is providing a total of US\$200 million in grant funds to NGOs and local communities, mainly via state government planning offices. Financed by ten Bank-financed projects, one for each of the ten northeast states of Brazil, the SSRC is financing small social infrastructure activities in predominantly rural areas in community development, water and sanitation, microindustry, and agricultural development. By contrast, one of the smallest grant programs provided for in a Bank-financed operation is in the Benin Health Services Development Project, approved in FY89. Under this project, the Government of Benin is providing grants of US\$10,000 to culturally relevant, traditional community organizations that promote developmental activities in hygiene education, safe motherhood, family planning, nutrition, self-help, and mutual credit.

(b) Engaging NGOs as Contractors or Executing Agencies

24. In the second most common situation in which NGOs receive funding in Bank-financed projects (para. 20), NGOs are engaged by borrowing governments as contractors or executing agencies of official project components. In such cases, the NGOs are paid for services rendered as set forth in a contractual agreement between the NGO and the government line agency responsible (7). This mechanism is often used in cases where an NGO will implement a government-designed program. It is also sometimes used when a government would like

to introduce or expand an NGO-sponsored program in an area where government implementation capacity is weak. Under The Gambia WID project, for example, the Government has contracted with Gambia Women's Finance Trust, a Gambian affiliate of Women's World Banking, to organize and train traditional and village-level women's groups in improved saving practices and to facilitate the groups' access to regular banking channels. Under the Uganda Forestry Rehabilitation Project, approved in FY87, CARE (a US.-based NGO) is the executing agency for a farm forestry component which entails expanding its existing tree farming activities in the country. In this case, a combination of funding arrangements was used, including bilateral and NGO cofinancing. Besides the regular contractual agreement between the Government of Uganda and CARE for execution of the farm forestry component, the Government also advanced funds from the SPPF to CARE to enable it to carry on operations until the IDA credit became effective; DANIDA provided cofinancing through the Ugandan Ministry of Environment to CARE for vehicles and equipment; and CARE itself financed some administrative costs.

(c) Preliminary Lessons in Funding NGOs in Bank Operations

25. From experience to date, preliminary lessons are emerging regarding the conditions under which funding of NGOs in Bank-supported operations has been most effective. Most of the analysis pertains to SEDFs. The Bank's SDA Division, for example, prepared in FY90 an operational guideline on SEDFs based on experience in such countries as Bolivia, Cameroon, Guatemala, Guinea, and Sao Tome & Principe (8). The guideline notes that NGO involvement is critical for the success of a SEDF. The grassroots, demand-driven character of a SEDF makes it imperative that it has the trust and participation of beneficiary groups, and NGOs often have stronger links to poor communities than governments. The following conclusions are drawn from this analysis by SDA as well as from other research by EXTIE, the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), and some Bank operational departments on Bank-NGO collaboration.

26. One obvious conclusion is that it is generally best to work with NGOs with proven track records. NGOs are uneven in their strength, coverage, and ability to mobilize effectively large numbers of people. NGO performance in many Bank-supported projects had not met initial expectations or targets set for those projects. Past performance is thus an important factor in selecting an NGO subproject for financing or an NGO as contractor of a project component. On the other hand, a project can sometimes widen its impact and help build NGO capacity by careful attempts to engage inexperienced NGOs (perhaps by associating them with more experienced ones). The Bolivia ESF, for example, focused primarily on well-established NGOs, but it also discovered previously underestimated absorptive capacity among grassroots groups (para. 30).

27. Another lesson is that NGOs may usefully contribute to subproject appraisal and selection. For example, in the Togo GDP, NGOs are serving along with government representatives on a steering committee which is responsible for approving subproject proposals and overseeing the overall program. NGO involvement at this level is warranted not just to channel their insights and expertise into subproject selection but also to ensure their continued participation in the funding program (para 45).

28. Along these lines, yet another lesson related to the need to take beneficiary participation into account in appraising NGO subprojects. Several reviews of completed projects by OED have found that strong beneficiary groups are important for the success and sustainability of many development projects. Experience has shown that this holds true particularly when a project has been designed to meet the needs of a specific group and when that group must actively cooperate (operate and maintain irrigation channels, for example, or pay user fees) to make the project work. Projects will more likely be sustainable if they have been generated by local grassroots groups and communities, so a SEDF should allow NGOs the time and personnel intensity that are often required in fostering community participation. Special training and other outreach activities to assist NGOs and beneficiary groups in generating good proposals are often essential for the success of a SEDF. Subproject selection should look for indicators of strong beneficiary support for proposed interventions. In the Uganda Program for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA) project, for example, one criterion for subproject selection under a fund to finance small-scale infrastructure interventions is that beneficiary communities must contribute up to 30 percent of the project costs, either in-kind (labor or basic materials) or in cash (see Annex 1).

29. A final lesson relates to the need for targeting more promotional activities to NGOs, to stimulate NGO interest in a SEDF and to obtain reliable estimates of potential NGO demand and absorptive capacity for additional financing. Many SEDFs have experienced a problem of low NGO demand in their initial stages. In the early stages of the Bolivia ESF, for example, NGO activity was lower than expected. One reason for this was the lack of publicity about the ESF targeted to the NGO community. Another reason was that some NGOs were skeptical of government intentions in inviting NGO participation in the ESF (para. 33). It was also discovered, however, that ESF developers had made overly optimistic estimations of NGO demand, expecting that there were many unfunded projects waiting and ready to be appraised. In reality, many of the first NGO subprojects submitted for funding were a long way from appraisal and had to be rejected on grounds that they were poorly conceived, inefficient, or technically unviable.

30. To increase NGO demand and build capacity, a «promotion unit» was set up to inform NGOs about the

ESF and to help them develop viable subproject proposals. In the end, under ESFs I and II, over 900 NGO projects were financed totaling about US\$ 43 million (as of May 1990), representing roughly 30 percent of the total number of projects approved and 25 percent of total ESF resources available. Of that amount, grassroots organizations have demonstrated unexpected absorptive capacity, executing over \$10 million in ESF projects. The Guinea Socio-economic Development Project, approved in FY89, has also experienced a similar case of low NGO demand, and a promotional and NGO strengthening effort is currently underway there.

31. The Brazil North East Rural Development Program suffered promotional problems of a different kind. In this case, rural workers' unions and cooperatives were subcontracted to do the outreach work, mainly because of their large memberships among the rural poor. But these organizations focused narrowly on their own constituents and generally proved to be inadequate in experience, staffing, and mandate to assist community groups in formulating subprojects. When other intermediary NGOs in Brazil were asked to assist, most declined because they had not been invited to participate in the upstream planning stages of the Program, and they disagreed with some of its aspects.

32. The main lesson regarding outreach to NGOs thus seems to be that effective promotional activities directed at NGOs must be incorporated in the design of SEDFs. «Promoters» should have credibility in the NGO community as well as the expertise to assist in subproject proposal preparation. Finally, as pointed out earlier in this report, one of the best ways to ensure effective NGO participation at a level consistent with the NGOs' capacities and interest is to invite involvement in the earliest possible stages of a project's conception.

(ii) Impact of Government and NGO Interrelationships on Project Success

33. Along with lessons regarding funding of NGOs in Bank-financed operations, the Bank's experience in SEDFs and other kinds of NGO-associated projects has also demonstrated the importance to project success of taking into account the relationship between a government and NGOs in a country. This context can range from distrust to close collaboration. In many countries, a strong spirit of cooperation exists. In others, governments are suspicious of NGOs and their self-appointed roles as agents of change. Conflicts sometimes occur because governments and NGOs find themselves in political and economic competition. Many NGOs are reluctant to enter into contractual agreements which might mean increased government control over their internal affairs or limit their flexibility in executing projects effectively. Some NGOs are also suspicious about the Bank co-opting them for its own policy agenda.

Similarly, relations among NGOs have been shown to have a significant impact on the effectiveness of a project. In several countries, plans for a Bank-financed gov-

ernment-sponsored Funding mechanism have, revealed tensions, and added to competition, among NGOs. The Bank has begun to build a body of experience in working with associations of NGOs in some of the projects it supports.

35. The Bank works primarily with and for its 155 member governments. However, Bank staff are encouraged to seek the views and expertise of NGOs in project planning, preparation, and implementation, where this makes sense and the borrowing government concurs (para. 15). In some cases, borrowers have sought advice from the Bank on the most effective ways to promote government-NGO cooperation in their countries. Ultimately, it is the relationship between the government and NGOs (not the Bank and NGOs) that will determine the success and sustainability of NGO-associated projects. While there is still much to be learned in this area, some lessons are already emerging from the Bank's work in (a) helping promote better government-NGO relations, (b) developing public policies that favor an effective non-profit, voluntary sector, and (c) working with NGO associations.

(a) Improving Government-NGO Relations

36. The NGO-associated projects approved in FY90 provide a few examples of ways in which some borrowing governments are seeking to improve relations with NGOs in their countries. Some projects, for example, institutionalize ongoing policy dialogue and collaboration between the government and NGOs concerned. In the Tanzania Health and Nutrition Project, the Tanzanian Council for Population and Development, which is charged with determining population policy, provides for representation by religious groups. In the Madagascar Environment project (see Annex 1), the National Association for Environmental Action, charged with financing the preparation, appraisal, and implementation of sub-projects, plans to have a majority of NGOs on its board of directors (11 of 14 seats).

37. In addition, some of the FY90 projects recommend the legalization of NGOs to help ensure their effectiveness and enhance their status with governments. Legalization is a particularly significant institution-building step for hitherto informally structured grassroots groups. The *World Development Report 1990* on poverty notes that «local organisations are more likely to succeed if they are legally recognized by the central government and if the government provides support in the form of guidelines, training, and information systems.» (9) The India Integrated Watershed Development (Plains) Project and the Nepal Third Bhairawa Lumbini Groundwater Irrigation Project, both approved in FY90 (see Annex 1), provide for the legalization of grassroots groups. The India case encourages formalizing the legal status of users' groups to ensure their full participation in managing nonarable lands. In the Nepal case, water users' associations (WUAs) are being given legal status for operation and maintenance of deep tubewells.

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38. Although the training of NGOs by NGOs has been a regular feature of Bank-NGO operational collaboration, the training of government personnel by NGOs occurs less frequently. The Mexico Water, Women and Development

approved in FY89, provided for training of state government officials during project preparation by OEF International (a U.S.-based NGO). In the Chad Social Action Development Project, approved in FY90, the Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès (a French NGO) has been contracted to train instructors in the Ministry of Labor and Employment in microenterprise development (see Annex 1).

39. The above examples of efforts to bring government and NGOs closer together are difficult to arrange in countries where government-NGO relations are strained. Experience in the Bolivia ESF, however, illustrates ways in which, even in a negative environment, some of the difficulties between a government and NGOs can be overcome. When the ESF began, there was no established mechanism for bringing NGOs into a collaborative relationship with the government, and little trust existed between the two parties. To help build trust, the ESF adopted a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of NGOs. The ESF operated in an efficient and transparent manner, which reassured NGOs that the fund would deal with them in a straightforward and professional manner. To minimize rivalry for funding between NGOs and line agencies, the ESF astutely adopted a neutral eligibility policy; all types-of organizations would be eligible for financing, and projects would be appraised on a technical basis. This policy helped create a relatively healthy atmosphere of competition among public and private agencies to present technically sound projects. In the end, according to one review of NGO involvement in the Bolivia ESFs, one of the most important outcomes for NGOs has been «the maturing of a cooperative relationship with the government.» (10).

(b) Public Policy Framework for NGOs

40. In some countries, the Bank has participated in discussions on public policy options that would contribute to an effective nonprofit, voluntary sector. In Bangladesh, for example, efforts to launch a foundation aimed at expanding the NGO contribution to poverty reduction in the country entailed discussion on prevailing government policies towards NGOs related to, among other things, registration procedures and approval processes for receiving external donor assistance. The Bank recognizes that governments have legitimate reasons for regulating the «NGO sector» — for example, to guard against pseudo-NGOs set up as tax shelters or to ensure the proper application of public funds. Upon review, however, many of the policies and practices in the Bangladesh situation were more complicated and onerous than necessary and amounted to over-regulation of NGOs. Although the Government chose not to pursue the Bank's offer to support the foundation, it has since simplified some of the regulations pertaining to NGOs.

41. The Bank is increasingly studying NGOs in the course of its analysis of country and sector issues and, hence, deepening its knowledge of the «NGO sector». For example, a Bank study completed in 1990 for the Government of Indonesia, which documents the remarkable progress Indonesia has made against poverty, urges more support for community initiative and NGOs (11). (It is difficult to assess the effects of the Bank's dialogue with government officials, but government policy has become markedly more favorable towards NGOs in Indonesia). Several sector reports undertaken by the Bank in 1990 also discuss the role of NGOs. An agricultural sector review for Nepal for example, recommends strengthening the legal status of water users' associations (WUAs) (para. 37) and shifting emphasis away from new large irrigation schemes to existing, small- and medium-sized WUA-managed schemes (12). A similar report on agriculture in Nigeria discusses increasing the role of farmers' service organizations (i.e., cooperatives and farmer associations) in input deliver' systems in the country. The report notes that developing such organisations would entail well-diverted financial and technical support away from some moribund, state-owned input delivery systems, but also increased government regulation of the NGOs. The report cautions, however, that «excessive government intervention in the management of these institutions carries the risks of stifling the independence and dynamism of cooperatives.» (13)

42. EXTIE is presently seeking funding for a comparative study on the interrelationships between public policies and NGOs. The results of this research should inform Bank staff about guidance to borrowers with regard to tax and other policies that directly shape the role of the NGO community in their countries' development. The study methodology has been tested in a preliminary way in India (14).

(c) Experience with Associations of NGOs

43. Relations among NGOs have also had an impact on the effectiveness of some Bank-financed projects, particularly those in which the Bank and its borrowers have sought to involve national NGO associations as efficient means of reaching a diversity of NGOs in a country. The results of working with NGO associations have been mixed, as the following three summaries of experience in Bank-supported operations in Bolivia, Togo, and Guatemala demonstrate.

44. As noted earlier (para 29), the Bolivia ESF originally experienced some difficulties' in outreach to the NGO community. The ESF tried contracting with FENASONGS, an association of NGOs operating in the health sector, to promote a greater NGO response in social assistance projects. Unfortunately, FENASONGS was unable to deliver the 80 social sector subprojects as promised, partly due to a miscalculation of potential demand, but also because the timeframe of the contract did not take into account the time needed to foster community participation. In addition, FENASONGS had

not had much experience in project preparation. FENASONGS eventually lost credibility as an interlocutor — among both the NGOs and in the ESF — when some of the subprojects proposed by its members were rejected by the ESF on technical grounds, and when some of its members submitted proposals directly to the ESF (not through FENASONGS) and received funding.

45. The Bank's experience with an NGO association in the pilot phase of the Togo GDIP was likewise difficult and illustrates the fragility of some NGO consortia. Some NGOs feel that the Bank moved too quickly to commit funds in this case, thereby leading to the demise of the, then, national Togolese association, CONGAT. Another contributing problem, however, was that CONGAT was not representative of the NGO population in Togo. In addition, CONGAT created conflicts within the NGO community when it sought to compete for funding for its own operational arm, CONGAT-Service, against other NGOs. When the government asked CONGAT to elect NGO representatives to serve on the subproject selection committee for the GDIP (para. 27), tensions mounted among the NGOs and the association was eventually dissolved. A new association, FONGTO, has since been established and took part in designing the regular GDIP.

46. Bank Experience with an NGO association in Guatemala has been more positive. When the Government of Guatemala asked the Bank to help prepare a social investment fund (SIF), the Bank sought to ensure that NGOs were involved in the first steps. Previous attempts by the Government of Guatemala to work systematically with the NGO community had not been very successful. This time, ASINDES, the largest consortium of service and development NGOs in the country, was brought into the planning and negotiation process early as the primary NGO interlocutor. ASINDES sent a delegation of NGO staff and community-based leaders to Bolivia to review the ESF experience before the Bank sent its first mission to Guatemala to consider a SIF. Some tensions developed in the process of planning the SIF, stemming largely from personality conflicts and long-standing mistrust between NGOs and the government in this previously war-torn country. But overall, ASINDES has played a helpful, catalytic role in negotiating workable plans and gaining NGO interest in a SIR. The SIF negotiation process had provided NGOs their first major opportunity to have a direct input into national development policy.

47. Experience to date with NGO associations in Bank-supported projects thus seems to show that these organizations are most effective when their role in a project is consistent with their overall mandate and areas of expertise, and when they have had ample opportunity to prepare in advance for participation in an officially sponsored project. Strong NGO associations can help to formulate coherent policies among NGOs, promote exchange of information, and create a unified platform in negotiations with government and donors. Associations that are still in their formative stages, have confused mis-

sions, or do not have adequate resources may not be able to define a common voice representing all members. The Bolivia ESF experience did not go well primarily because FENASONGS tried to claim authority over its members and enter into previously untried operational areas. The Togo situation is an example of how a confused mission can cause trouble, particularly when outside forces provoke rapid change. The Guatemala case seems to have been more successful (although the SIF is not yet functioning), in large part because of ASINDES's organizational strengths. A U.S.-based NGO, PACT (Private Agencies Collaborating Together) provided helpful technical assistance to ASINDES in this process.

Institutionalizing the Bank's Work with NGOs

48. The Bank has in the past few years initiated several mechanisms aimed at systematizing and institutionalizing its work with NGOs. Some of these mechanisms have already been mentioned, such as the «List of World Bank-Financed Projects with Potential for NGO Involvement», which is now distributed to over 3,000 NGOs worldwide, and the «Monthly Operational Summary», which summarizes all future operations in the Bank's pipeline and now also categorizes those projects which may have an adverse environmental and/or social impact (para. 15).

49. A number of the initiatives undertaken in 1990 sought not only to increase the quantity but also to improve the *quality* of Bank-NGO interaction. EXTIE published a booklet entitled *How the World Bank Works with Nongovernmental Organizations* aimed at better informing NGOs about Bank-NGO cooperation and providing detailed information about how to arrange collaboration. A «Sourcebook on Environmental Assessment», which will provide Bank staff with a «how-to» guide to environmental assessment, including consultation with affected communities and local NGOs, was prepared (still in draft).

50. A program of internal, staff training seminars on involving NGOs in Bank-supported projects was successfully launched in 1989 by EXTIE and the Bank's Training Division. Two more seminars in this series were offered in 1990. One in April provided an overview on Bank-NGO operational collaboration; the other in October had a new sector-specific emphasis, focusing on the role of NGOs in the environmental assessment process. Both had high attendance and excellent evaluations. Other staff training programs have also featured sessions about working with NGOs. For example, a sector seminar held in January 1990 for Bank staff working in population and human resources included a session on the «Growing Role of NGOs and Community Groups in the Social Sectors.»

51. The Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI) is getting more involved in training that relates to NGOs. For example, the Steering Committee of the NGO-World Bank Committee was invited to a workshop

in June 1990 to help EDI conceptualize a three-year seminar program on the role of NGOs in development (financed by the Government of Japan). The workshop decided that the main objective of the program would be to promote, on a regional basis, a regular exchange of dialogue and experiences among planners and managers of various kinds of institutions (government, donor, and NGO) on the effective involvement of NGOs in development programs. In another EDI-sponsored program, a Cameroon-based, pan-African NGO - the Pan African Institute for Development — hosted in May-June 1990 the initial needs-assessment workshop of a «training-of-trainers» program aimed at building management capacity of African local organizations, particularly groups of women entrepreneurs.

52. The Bank has, in the past, sponsored special appointee assignments for NGO staff to advise it in areas in which NGOs have particular expertise, such as cooperative development and agricultural extension. For example, the Africa Regional Office (APR), along with the NGO-Bank Committee, has been searching for an African NGO leader to be assigned to the SDA Division to liaise between the Bank and NGOs on issues related to the social costs of adjustment. A reciprocal exchange of staff, however — where the Bank also sends a staff member to an NGO — was tried for the first time in 1990. AFR and Save The Children Fund (SCF-UK) exchanged one staff member each for a three-month period. The Bank staff member involved helped revise SCF-UK's health policy towards developing countries. The SCF-UK staff member seconded to the Bank prepared country briefs for journalists and other papers for AFR on such topics as environmental issues in Africa and the work of British NGOs in Africa. At the end of her assignment, the SCF-UK staff member applauded the exchange as a unique vehicle for allowing the NGO voice to be heard in the Bank and Bank developments to be disseminated back to NGO fora. She recommended institutionalizing the program by creating a limited number of positions in Bank operational departments that would be permanently filled, but on a rotating basis, by staff of NGOs. AFR is continuing this experiment with SCF-UK and plans to exchange staff with other NGOs as well.

53. The Bank's knowledge about NGO involvement in its projects had depended mainly on reports by the Bank staff involved and on appraisal reports which are based on project plans. The Bank is getting more feedback on some projects from NGOs, and EXTIE has begun commissioning independent monitoring studies and concentrating more on projects already under implementation. For example, EXTIE contracted with PACT in 1990 to review and assess, together with ASINDES, the history of Bank-government - NGO interactions to date in preparing the Guatemala Social Investment Fund (para.47). OEF-International is doing a similar review of its often frustrating experience with the Mexico women and water project (para 38). Inside the Bank, in addition to promoting new initiatives, EXTIE is placing more emphasis on assessing

the quality of ongoing cases of NGO involvement in Bank-financed operations. It is developing a more systematic methodology for monitoring and evaluating some 25 especially important cases of Bank-NGO collaboration and has also begun computerizing its data on NGO-associated projects to make this growing body of information more easily accessible.

54. The Bank's resident missions continue to play an important role in maintaining Bank-NGO relations at the country level. The majority of the resident missions in Africa, for example, report regular interactions with individual and umbrella NGOs; NGO inventories have been conducted in most of these countries; and some missions are beginning to organize seminars and workshops for NGOs.

55. The NGO Resource Center in EXTIE was greatly expanded and information retrieval enhanced in 1990. The NGO Profile Database now includes information on over 7,000 NGOs worldwide, and the NGO Directory Database includes over 400 NGO inventories and reports that are retrievable by country and sector. The Resource Center also contains a computerized roster of over 100 consultants specializing in NGO-related activities; a collection of 2,500 technical documents regarding NGO work in low-cost appropriate technologies; and organizational files for over 700 NGOs from 300 countries.

///. Policy Dialogue

56. The rapid expansion of NGO involvement in Bank-financed operations has occurred against a backdrop of intensified policy discussion between NGOs and the Bank. The Bank has come to appreciate exchanges of information, experience, and viewpoints with NGOs on development policy issues related to, in particular, the social and environmental aspects of development. Likewise, many NGOs in both developed and developing countries want to contribute their perspectives to influence the Bank's thinking. NGOs are becoming better organized into coalitions and networks, and their collective voice is consequently gaining greater notice in the Bank and among the Bank's borrowers.

57. This section summarizes areas of agreement and disagreement in the Bank-NGO dialogue on three main themes: (i) poverty, (ii) environment, and (iii) popular participation. It described discussions in the NGO-World Bank Committee and highlights other significant fora in which the Bank and NGOs exchange views on development policy issues. It concludes with a look at Bank-NGO cooperation in development education.

Main Themes in the Bank-NGO Dialogue

(i) Poverty

58. The *World Development Report 1990* has provided a focal point for Bank-NGO discussion on poverty-related issues. It is about policies and practices which have proved effective in reducing poverty. It argues for coun-

tries to adopt poverty reduction strategies that both (a) promote the productive use of the poor's most abundant asset - labor - through policies that harness market incentives, social and political institutions, infrastructure, and technology; and (b) provide for basic social services to the poor, particularly in primary health, primary education, and family planning (15). In addition, the *WDR* affirms the important role which NGOs play in poverty reduction. It points, in particular, to NGO involvement in rural infrastructure and technology programs where local institutions can help mobilize labor as well as savings. It notes that successful poverty reduction programs have not relied exclusively on government agencies but employed a mix of institutions including NGOs, private operators, and local groups. It concludes that «flexible programs that involve the intended bénéficiaires, build institutions, employ NGOs and local groups, and respond to local needs are the best ways of molding infrastructure, services, and technology to the needs of the poor.» (16).

59. The *WDR* also recommends that official development assistance be focused on the recipient country's broad-based poverty reduction performance and overall commitment to social needs. Some NGOs, such as the Development Banks Assessment Network (DBAN) and RESULTS in the U.S. and the World Development Movement in the U.K., have also been encouraging greater emphasis on «poverty effort» in the allocation of IDA resources. This was a feature of the donor's agreement on the ninth replenishment of IDA (IDA-9), negotiated in 1990. In testimony before the U.S. Congress in March 1990, DBAN urged that within two years, 50 percent of IDA-eligible countries adopt national poverty eradication strategies and that those policies be developed through open consultation with popular and grassroots organizations. The Bank has argued that more official development assistance generally (not just IDA) should be focused on the poverty effort of recipient governments. At the Development Committee meeting in September 1990, finance ministers from the industrial countries also agreed to a review of bilateral aid programs from this point of view.

60. Some poverty-oriented NGOs, notably RESULTS, have urged increased Bank lending in such areas as primary education and primary health. In fact, the Bank is already committed to substantial expansion in both these subsectors. This commitment was reiterated in a response by President Conable to a letter from some 90 U.S. Congressmen, who had been spurred on by NGOs. Current projections are that Bank lending for primary health could reach five percent of total lending in three to four years, and lending for primary education is expected to be the largest single element in the Bank's growing education program. It is not the Bank's intention, however, to earmark a fixed percentage minimum for the share of Bank lending in these sectors. Addressing these basic poverty needs must ultimately be based on individual countries' needs and take into account the countries' own

efforts as well as assistance provided by aid donors to these subsectors.

61. Many poverty-oriented NGOs continue to voice sharp criticisms of the impact of adjustment on the poor. NGOs on the NGO-Bank Committee, in their «NGO Working Group Position Paper» (presented at the 1989 Committee meeting in Bangkok, Thailand), argue that Bank-supported adjustment programs are too «trade- and market-oriented, with too little attention to poverty environment, and popular participation. Based on similar concerns about the social and environmental impacts of adjustment, DBAN has called for the Bank to reduce the share of adjustment lending to 10 percent of its lending. (At the time of this report, the share is 20-25 percent.)

62. The Bank has for several years been concerned about mitigating the potential adverse effects of adjustment on the poor, while not agreeing with many of the assumptions underlying the NGOs' criticisms of adjustment. The Bank's operational guideline for preparing adjustment loans and credits, in effect since 1987 requires paying particular attention to «the short-term impact of the adjustment program on the urban and rural poor and measures proposed to alleviate negative effects.» (.17) Since July 1986, nearly every adjustment program supported by the Bank has contained components to address the long- or short-run social impact on the poor. For example, measures such as severance payments, resettlement to rural areas, public works, retraining, and credit schemes have been targeted to the newly unemployed. For the chronically poor, measures such as social expenditure reallocations, subsidized distribution of food, public works, retraining, nutrition, and credit schemes have been included. Such measures targeted to the poor complement the Bank's total program of country assistance, which includes sectoral investments in health, education, food security, agriculture, industry, energy, and infrastructure. While many NGOs initially resisted the whole idea of adjustment, most NGOs have come to recognize that economic reforms are needed in hard-pressed developing countries, and the Bank-NGO debate has shifted primarily to determining the appropriate design of adjustment programs and, beyond adjustment, how best to reduce poverty.

63. The Bank undertook in 1990 an evaluation of adjustment operations approved by the Bank's executive directors during the period FY79 to FY88 (18). The report concluded that adjustment lending has been moderately successful in improving aggregate economic performance and that, on the average, countries receiving adjustment loans performed better than those that did not. The report contained a number of recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of adjustment lending to promote and sustain the recovery of growth, while taking into account the social dimensions of adjustment. One such recommendation was that adjustment-lending operations be designed with the poverty consequences of policies firmly in mind. Another Bank review completed in 1990 concluded that the treatment of social

impact issues in Bank-supported adjustment programs has been improving (19). It noted, however, that efforts to address social impact have mainly depended on targeted projects rather than on design changes in the adjustment programs themselves and that little analysis was available regarding the impact of a particular policy-mix on major subgroups of the poor.

(ii) Environment

64. Dialogue between the Bank and NGOs has been the most wide-ranging on environmental issues. Some of the discussions have been highly constructive; others have been less so. During the period covered by this report, environmental groups in the «Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) Campaign» continued their criticism of some projects financed by the Bank, such as the Brazil Polonoroeste and the India social forestry and Sardar Sarovar dam projects, that have had environmentally adverse impacts. Friends of the Earth-Japan and other NGOs apparently had a role in persuading the Government of Japan not to provide bilateral funding in 1990 for the Sardar Sarovar project. A number of single-issue environmental groups have, however, continued to criticize the Bank in ways which often are not constructive. For example, full-page advertisements from the U.S.-based Rainforest Action Network that were highly critical of the Bank (and the International Monetary Fund) appeared in the *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal*. The Bank continues to try to clarify its position and to correct the misinformation contained in criticisms of this kind.

65. The Bank has rapidly increased the attention which it gives to the environmental impact of the policies and projects it supports. The Bank's first environmental annual report, issued in September 1990, provides a full accounting of the myriad ways in which the Bank is making a major contribution to the integration of environmental issues into all phases of development work. The report notes, for example, that about fifty percent of the 222 loans approved by the Bank in FY90 — or 107 loans — contained environmental components. The Bank is doing pioneering work on the impact of economic policies on environmental problems, a level of analysis which few NGOs had previously considered. It has been announced that the 1992 *WDR* will focus on environment and development and will be issued prior to the major United Nations conference on this topic in June 1992.

66. The IDA-9 agreement further strengthens the Bank's resolve in the environment. It promotes several environmental initiatives for IDA lending, including, among other things, increased public access to information on specific IDA projects and programs; improvement and implementation of the Bank's Operational Directive on environmental assessment; debt-for-nature transactions; and increased lending for end-use energy efficiency, renewable energy programs, and least-cost energy planning in borrowing countries.

67. The Bank has tried to move quickly to institutionalize changes consistent with its new environmental policies, notably regarding the involvement of affected groups and local NGOs in the environmental assessment of projects. The Bank's new Operational Directive on environmental assessment (EA), adopted in October 1989, calls for consultation with affected groups and local NGOs early in the planning of all environmentally sensitive projects (20). The Bank began in 1990 to disseminate a quarterly supplement to its «Monthly Operational Summary» to give NGOs and others advance information about those projects that will require EA. The Bank invited comments from NGOs on the EA directive and on a provisional draft of more detailed guidance to Bank staff on how to implement the public consultation aspect of the policy. It has distributed both documents widely to NGOs around the world that are active on Bank-related environmental issues. In addition, the Environment Division of the Africa Technical Department organized in June 1990 a brainstorming session with 12 representatives of African NGOs on how to make the new EA policy effective in Africa.

68. Most NGOs now recognize that the Bank has taken steps over the last few years to strengthen its work on environmental aspects of development. Some NGOs consider steps to date insufficient, however. They continue to press the Bank to adopt more open guidelines for public access to information and to promote much greater involvement of NGOs and local communities in the identification, preparation, and implementation of Bank-financed projects. And many environmental groups are calling for further reform, particularly in the Bank's forest and energy lending policies.

69. The Bank is committed to expanded lending for forests. Given the complex issues in this area, the Bank is preparing a new forest policy and is seeking NGO advice in its formulation. In this connection, many NGOs are particularly critical of the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP). The TFAP is a Five-year, US\$8 billion program supported by the FAO, World Bank, UNDP, and the World Resources Institute that was intended to stop the depletion of the world's tropical forests by boosting investment in five areas: forestry in land use, forest-based development, fuelwood and energy, conservation and tropical forest ecosystems, and forestry institutions. Several recent studies of the TFAP, however - by NGOs and by an independent panel appointed by FAO which is administering the Plan — have identified severe shortcomings in the Plan's implementation. The Bank agrees with many of their criticisms, has some important criticisms of its own, and is committed to working towards a major revamping of the TFAP.

70. In another new environmental initiative, the Bank has been working with UNDP and UNEP to initiate the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The GEF will provide concessional funding for investment projects and related activities in developing countries that address global environmental concerns in four priority

arcas: depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, loss of ecological diversity, and pollution of international waters (21). Initial commitments to the GEF, which is expected to be operational by mid-1991, are estimated at US\$ 1 billion-1.5 billion. The Bank invited NGOs' comments on the proposed Fund in various fora, including a special session at the annual forum of InterAction (a consortium of over 100 U.S. private voluntary organizations) in April 1990 in Baltimore; a meeting in June 1990 at the Center for our Common Future in Geneva; and a seminar organized by the Bank for the International NGO Forum on World Bank and IMF Lending during the September 1990 annual meetings of the Bank and Fund. Procedures for working with NGOs and communities are being incorporated into plans for the GEF. Many environmental groups, particularly those affiliated with the International NGO Forum, remain skeptical, however, about the GEF, partly because they are critical of the Bank's past record in environment, but also because they are convinced that the Bank and other aid agencies could achieve many of the GEF's same objectives under the framework of existing programs.

71. Washington-based environmental groups and the Bank's Environment Department discussed the possibility of setting up an NGO advisor group on environmental issues to provide a routine mechanism for consultation between the Bank and an international group of NGOs interested in environment. This group might be established, for example, as an expanded subcommittee of the NGO-Bank Committee. The International NGO Forum on World Bank and IMF Lending (see para. 82) concluded, however, that the establishment of such a group would be premature. It suggested other mechanisms for consulting with NGOs instead, including possibly setting up a subcommittee on communication and consultation between the Bank and NGOs.

(Hi) Popular Participation

72. Popular participation in development planning and decision-making has been a key topic of discussion in the NGO-World Bank Committee and other fora for a year or more. The issue straddles the concerns of both poverty and environmental NGOs and is becoming more prominent on donors' agendas as well. It is also closely linked to the need to get relevant information about proposed interventions to people who have a «need to know» — that is, the affected communities — so that these people can contribute to and make informed decisions about factors affecting their lives.

73. Access-to-information and popular participation were discussion items at the November 1988 meeting of the NGO-Bank Committee in Washington, and the Bank followed up this meeting with revisions in its own information disclosure policies. Popular participation was again prominent on the Committee's agenda at its meeting in November 1989 in Bangkok. Meanwhile, the Economic Commission for Africa organized in February 1990 in Arusha, Tanzania a major NGO-oriented con-

ference on participation. The OECD Development Assistance Committee has also made participation a priority theme of its activities in late 1990 and beyond. The Bank has come to recognize that popular participation is needed to reduce the environmental and social costs which large infrastructure projects may entail. Participation is a significant feature of the Bank's new policy on environmental assessment (para. 67) and was also one of the initiatives promoted for IDA lending in the donors' agreement on IDA-9.

74. The NGO-Bank Committee discussions in Bangkok revealed a considerable degree of agreement between Bank and NGO members on the importance, and complexity of giving low-income people more of a say in development decisions. Committee members later agreed on a joint statement on popular participation. The statement summarizes motives for promoting participation, the types of institutions involved, situations in which participation is most important, and lessons from NGO and World Bank experience. It then suggests proposals for possible follow-up action which the Bank might pursue by itself and together with NGOs and governments. Among the actions mentioned for possible follow-up by the Bank are: research and discussion on experience with popular participation; continued promotion of effective government-NGO relations, including NGO involvement in the planning of projects and public policies that encourage NGOs; effective implementation of the Bank's new environmental assessment policy; appropriate modifications in the Bank's operational directives; and development of some projects which are models for popular participation in large-scale official programs. Proposed follow-up by NGOs might include: (a) regional and country-level initiatives to encourage and guide NGO engagement with the Bank and governments on policy issues, project design and implementation, environmental assessment, and the development of model participatory projects; and (b) further discussion of participation in the Committee, now including environmental assessment and the possibility of a parallel process of social audit.

75. The dialogue in the NGO-Bank Committee over the past couple years helped set the stage for the launching of a modest program of action and learning in the Bank on the issue of popular participation in development decisions. The Bank's External Affairs Département, in close collaboration with the Central Operations Department, will be leading the program. The program will entail (a) continued attention to the participatory aspects of environmental assessment and the Bank's work with NGOs, (b) selective review of how relevant Bank guidelines are being implemented and attention to the treatment of participation in new operational directives, and (c) a Bank-wide learning process on participation. A learning group of PRE and Operations staff is being set up, and the Bank's Regional Offices are identifying about 20 exceptionally participatory projects for in-depth study by the learning group. The group will

draw on analytical work on participation being done in various parts of the Bank and in other agencies. The group will report to Bank management after 18 months, and again after three years, focusing on ways in which the Bank may need to modify its operational practices to encourage popular participation more widely in appropriate Bank-financed activities.

NGO-World Bank Committee

76. The Bank's dialogue with NGOs is conducted in many fora. The most important forum — in terms of longevity as well as breadth and depth of the consultation — has been the NGO-World Bank Committee. Formed in 1982, the Committee provides a formal, international forum for policy discussions between senior Bank managers and 26 NGO leaders from around the world. Annex 2 lists present Bank and NGO Committee members. NGO membership rotates via annual elections organized by the NGOs themselves.

77. The Committee held its tenth annual meeting at Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. on October 31-November 1, 1990. (A discussion draft of this progress report was presented to the Committee for comment.) The meeting attracted more observers than ever before, from official agencies (UNDP, ILO, IDB, IMF, ECE, and the Dutch government) and NGOs (mostly U.S. private voluntary organizations, but also two European groups and one from Central America). Sessions with Bank executive directors are fast becoming a Committee tradition for meetings held in Washington. At the 1988 meeting, the Committee met with two executive directors from developing countries. At the 1990 meeting, a special session was held with the U.S. executive director.

78. Discussions during the two-day 1990 meeting centered on both old and new agenda items for the Committee. Update reports were given on progress in several ongoing areas of discussion, including the Japanese-financed EDI program to strengthen the capacity of NGOs (para. 51); the issue of direct Bank funding for NGOs; and the question of popular participation. Regarding the latter item, the Committee was informed on the various ways in which the Bank is pursuing the participation issue, especially regarding senior management's decision to launch a Bank-wide learning program (para. 75). The Committee also returned to the question of differences that exist between the Bank and Committee NGOs on broad issues of development policy, a debate that began in earnest at the previous year's Committee meeting in Bangkok with the presentation of the «NGO Working Group Position Paper» (para. 61) and the Bank's subsequent response. John Clark of OXFAM-UK presented a paper to the Committee which urged the Bank, among other things, to be more supportive of popular empowerment and agrarian reform and more outspoken about the need for adjustment in industrial countries. The paper noted, however, that the Bank and NGOs agree on many

points. The Committee plans to develop a joint statement that summarizes more precisely where the Bank and Committee NGOs tend to agree and disagree on the broad outlines of development policy.

79. Regarding new agenda items, the Committee for the first time discussed the Bank's *World Development Reports*. It focused, in particular, on the *WDR 1990* on poverty but also explored ways to get more NGO input into upcoming *WDRs* (particularly the *WDR 1992* which will focus on the environment). Committee NGOs also introduced the idea of pursuing the theme of «social audit» in future Committee meetings. Social audit is a concept similar to environmental assessment and means more attention to the social aspects of development in the appraisal, supervision, and evaluation of projects. The Bank and the Centre de Recherche et d'Information pour le Développement (GRID), a Committee NGO that is a consortium of French research-oriented NGOs, cosponsored a seminar on social audit in Paris in October 1990.

80. Committee NGOs work between meetings to communicate the Committee's experience to their own constituencies and to consult with other NGOs on Bank-related issues. For example, Caritas Internationalis (the largest network of Roman Catholic social welfare and development agencies) has developed a program to brief its member agencies at the national level about the Bank and issues discussed in the NGO-Bank Committee. OXFAM-UK has prepared a guide for its field offices on how to work with the Bank. NOVIB, a Dutch NGO which funds some 800 NGOs in developing countries, has offered to help some of those NGOs to engage critically in the planning of selected Bank-financed projects (for example, environmental assessment Category A projects). In addition, the NGOs have widely disseminated the «Position Paper» they adopted in Bangkok, along with the Bank's response. The two papers, which have now been translated into French, Spanish, and Japanese, have been distributed at NGO meetings, advertised in NGO newsletters, and published in magazines such as *Lok Niti*, the journal of the Asian NGO Coalition in the Philippines; *Transnational Associations*, the journal of the Union of International Associations in Belgium; and *Trocaire Development Review*, an Irish development journal.

81. The Bank encourages channeling information about the Committee to the broader NGO community and has, in some instances, provided financial assistance to help this effort. The Conseil des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales d'Appui au Développement, a Senegalese NGO member, was provided modest financing by EXTIE to undertake a special effort to inform non-Committee African NGOs about the Committee's work. The national NGO-Bank liaison committee set up in India has also been assisted financially by the Bank. GRID organized a seminar for French NGOs on «Servicing Debt or Financing Development?», held in Paris in September 1990, for which it received a grant from the Bank's External Grants Program.

Other Bank-NGO Fora

82. The International Forum on World Bank and IMF Lending is another significant venue for Bank-NGO interaction on selected issues. The Forum is a new NGO network emerging from protests around the Annual Bank/Fund Meetings in Berlin in 1988. Next to the NGO-Bank Committee, it provides the next most visible opportunity for international Bank-NGO dialogue. The Forum is trying to build a coalition between environmental and social justice activists that are critical of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Several members of the NGO-Bank Committee participate in the Forum. The Forum's organizers brought more developing-country NGOs to the 1990 Bank/Fund Annual Meetings and limited participation by industrial-country NGOs. They published two booklets and several issues of a newsletter, all sharply critical of the Bank. In order to promote a more informed basis for dialogue with Forum NGOs, the Bank organized, during the Meetings, a parallel series of seminars on the Bank's forest policy, environmental assessment, the *WDR 1990*, the GEF, and the suggestion of a Bank-NGO advisory group on environmental issues (para. 71).

83. There is often a lack of understanding among NGOs of the Bank's policies and practices, and Bank staff also often fail to understand NGO views and the reasons for them. The Bank believes that it is important to engage NGOs in productive exchanges of views, as that would ultimately benefit poor people in developing countries. Seminars and conferences provide valuable opportunities for the exchange of ideas and views, and the number of such events in which substantive Bank-NGO interaction takes place grows each year. Bank staff attend NGO-organized meetings; NGO representatives participate in Bank-sponsored events; and both are often represented at meetings convened by bilateral and multilateral agencies. A description of three such meetings which the Bank itself organized in 1990 is provided below to give a flavor of this form of Bank-NGO policy interaction.

84. Perhaps the largest meeting in 1990 in terms of the number of NGOs participating was the World Conference on Education for All, which was convened in Jomtien, Thailand in March 1990 by the Bank, UNDP, UNESCO, and UNICEF. The Conference launched a global undertaking to affirm the right to education and to commit all parties to act in partnership to meet the basic learning needs of all children, youth, and adults. In his address to the Conference, the Bank's president renewed the Bank's commitment to education as an instrument of human development and pledged to expand the Bank's educational lending significantly over the following three years. NGOs were heavily involved in preparations for the meeting, and some 125 NGOs from around the world attended as full delegates. Since the Conference, NGOs met with representatives of the four sponsoring agencies in July 1990 in Paris to explore establishing a global Education For All NGO network which would aim at

exchanging information, facilitating maximum cumulation, and sustaining commitment to partnerships in EEA within the NGO community.

85. The Bank's European Office in Paris has long organized seminars for European NGOs to keep them informed about the Bank's work and get their feedback on new initiatives. One such meeting was held in April 1990 in Bruges, Belgium for NGOs based in Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Among the topics discussed were: Bank-NGO cooperation; environment and sustainable development; debt, aid and trade; structural adjustment; and the Bank's long-term perspectives study on sub-Saharan Africa. Nineteen NGO representatives and eight Bank staff participated.

86. The Bank's Working Group on Women and Credit (WGWC), which is co-organized by the Bank's WID Department and Industry Development Division, is an informal group of Bank staff interested in examining women and credit issues. The WGWC held a seminar at Bank headquarters in April 1990 on expanding income-generating opportunities for women in developing countries, based on the July 1989 issue of the journal, *World Development*, devoted to the same subject. Among the invited speakers were representatives of several NGOs, including Accion International, The Center for Community Self-Help, and the Ford Foundation. Some 100 people attended the seminar from other NGOs, the Bank, USAID, ILO, universities, and other institutions.

Development Education

87. Many NGOs seek to increase the understanding and support of the general public on international development issues. Just as NGOs can be effective in reaching the grassroots in developing countries, many also have far-reaching channels of communication among the citizenry of industrialized countries. The Bank has a much more limited development education outreach, but sometimes works with NGOs. Its contribution to development education stems mainly from its nearly unrivaled collection of data on most dimensions of socio-economic development.

88. The Information and Public Affairs Division of the Bank's External Affairs Department supports an "interdependence project" which aims at showing the importance of economic progress in developing countries to people in industrialized countries. In collaboration with the Panos Institute, a seminar guide was prepared in 1990 which has helped several US-based NGOs such as the Global Tomorrow Coalition, the National Council of Returned Peace Corps Volunteers, and the National Governors' Association to tailor interdependence education programs to their own audiences. The Bank's Publications Department produces instructional materials about development designed specifically for secondary and tertiary classroom use. For example, the Bank issued in 1990 its third poster kit on gross national product per capita as part of its series of posters on "Measures of Progress."

89. The External Grants Program (see footnote 4) provides modest support for development education activities. While various activities assisted by the Program have public information elements, grants for purely development education purposes went in FY90 to the Asian Forum of Environmental Journalists (Nepal).
Notes

- (1) This report covers calendar year 1990. However, for comparison's sake, operational data were collected on the basis of the Bank's fiscal year (July 1989 through June 1990).
- (2) The International Development Association (IDA) is the Bank's concessional lending affiliate.
- (3) *World Development Report 1990* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 1990), page 4.
- (4) There are a few exceptions wherein the Bank can fund NGOs directly. Consultant trust funds set up by the Bank's member governments have sometimes been tapped for NGOs. An NGO may also receive grant funding from one of the Bank's Special Grants Program, such as the program of support (US\$500,000 in FY90) to the International Planned Parenthood Federation and other NGOs to strengthen population NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa. The Bank's External Grants Program provided in FY90 about US\$400,000 to organizations (mainly NGOs) for activities that promote discussion and dissemination on timely development issues.
- (5) One exception wherein an NGO received proceeds of a Bank loan in loan form is the El Salvador Second Urban Development Project, approved in FY77. Under this project, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) lent funding from the Bank (of up to US\$6 million) to the Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarrollo y Vivien da Minima (FSDVM), a Salvadoran NGO that was the executing agency for a sites and services component. FSDVM is repaying the loan to the GOES over 30 years.
- (6) An ESF is designed as a temporary operation, generally with a central goal of employment generation during a period of economic crisis. An SIF is longer term, with goals including institutional support and meeting the most urgent social and economic needs of poor communities.
- (7) In the case of the El Salvador Second Urban Development Project, however, a project agreement was also signed between the NGO (FSDVM) and the Bank, since FSDVM was a beneficiary of the Bank loan.

Environmental Problems Foundation of Turkey, Japanese NGO Center for International Cooperation, and One World Broadcasting Trust (U.K.). The two grants to developing-country NGOs supported programs on environmental education.

- (8) "Socio-Economic Development Funds: An Operational Guideline." World Bank (AFT), September 1990.
- (9) *World Development Report 1990*, page 70.
- (10) «NGOs and the ESF» (draft), Julie VanDomelen (consultant), June 1990.
- (11) «Indonesia: Poverty Assessment and Strategy Report» (gray cover), (Washington, D.C.: World Bank (ASS), May 1990).
- (12) «Nepal Agricultural Sector Review» (gray cover), (Washington, D.C.: World Bank (AS1), March 1990).
- (13) «Nigeria Strategy for Agricultural Growth» (gray cover), (Washington, D.C.: World Bank (AF4), December 1989), page 72.
- (14) «Policy Impacts on the Nongovernmental Sector» (a research proposal from The Institute for Development Research to the World Bank), January 1990).
- (15) *World Development Report 1990*, page 3.
- (16) *World Development Report 1990*, page 73.
- (17) World Bank Operational Manual Statement 2.01, Annex D1, November 1987, Page 1.
- (18) «Report on Adjustment Lending II: Policies for the Recovery of Growth» (Washington, D.C.: World Bank (CEC), March 1990).
- (19) «The Treatment of Social Impact in Adjustment Programs Supported by the World Bank» (Washington, D.C.: World Bank (PRD), July 1990).
- (20) «The Bank expects the borrower to take the views of affected groups and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) fully into account in project design and implementation, and in particular in the preparation of EAs.» See World Bank Operational Directive 4.00, Annex A, October 1989, page 3.
- (21) Also known as the «Green Fund», the GEF was first proposed by donor countries at the Bank/Fund Annual Meetings in September 1989. The Bank will be the administrator of the Facility, and UNDP and UNEP will provide technical and strategic planning assistance, respectively.

**Summary Descriptions of FY90
World Bank-Financed Projects Involving NGOs**

I. ADJUSTMENT-RELATED

BOLIVIA: Social Investment Fund Project (1991-94)

1. The project, which follows on the Emergency Social Fund (ESF) I and II projects, will support the initial phase (1990-93) of the Social Investment Fund (SIF) Program with a view to assisting the Government in its effort to improve the coverage and quality of basic services in the health and education sectors. One of the lessons of ESF is the large role played by NGOs in the health and education sectors which underscores the value of building and establishing links with nongovernmental agencies. It was ESF's reliance on NGOs that made possible the rapid identification of hundreds of small projects. SIF will also contribute to the Government's ongoing effort to strengthen the project-executing capacity of public institutions. One of the principal mechanisms to achieve this objective is to develop increased responsibility to local governments and NGOs.

2. Under the project, the Government will establish a US\$40 million annual grant financing facility for SIF subprojects. The project also provides for an SIF institutional development component and an ESF training program. Health sector subproject include, for example, construction, repair, and expansion of facilities for day care and nutrition centers, school meal programs, installation of basic water supply and sanitation infrastructure, and so on. Education subprojects could include construction of primary school buildings and expansion of library facilities. NGOs will be one kind of institution eligible to receive financing and participate in subproject implementation.

3. The SIF will collaborate with existing networks of NGOs, such as the ASONGS (Asociación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales — a regional NGO network), to avoid the duplication of activities and effort that has occurred among NGOs operating in the same geographical area. To expand coverage in regions where there are no institutions to serve as requesting agencies, SIF will provide funds for institutional support (linked to a subproject proposal) to existing organizations operating nearest to the area, such as NGOs.

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON: Social Dimensions of Adjustment Project (1991-96)

4. The project is a part of Cameroon's structural adjustment program and aims at supporting the Government in the implementation of its poverty

reduction strategy by a variety of interventions in human resources, employment, micro-enterprises and institutional development. NGOs will be involved in components for population, employment, women-in-development (WID) and community development.

5. The population component includes an action - program to strengthen and expand family planning services provided through Government and NGO programs. It includes assistance for direct service delivery, supplies, information and education, and training workshops and seminars for promoting safe motherhood and regulating fertility. Under this component, USAID, which is cofinancing the project, will provide US\$500,000 in direct grants to CARE and Save the Children Federation, both U.S.-based NGOs.

6. Under the employment component, the Cameroon Opportunities Industrialization Center (COIC), an independent training center established with the support of U.S.-based OIC, will be provided support to develop its training programs. Specifically, COIC will, in the first two years, concentrate on consolidating its existing training facility and adding training courses in simple business practices. In the third year, COIC will open a new training center. COIC will receive US\$4 million total under the project, of which US\$3 million will be financed through a grant from USAID and the balance through a World Bank loan. Other NGOs capable of providing relevant training, such as APICA and the Pan-African Development Institute, may also be given institutional support. Also under the employment component, a microenterprise support program will extend financial support on a grant basis to NGOs and other organizations that provide training and/or advisory services to start or expand microenterprises.

7. In the WID component, NGOs will participate in an already existing interdisciplinary task force to formulate an operational strategy for the execution and monitoring of the multisectoral WID strategy and action plan. The project will provide assistance to rural women's groups in formulating and managing small project. In the community development component, financial assistance to NGOs and community groups will be provided for (i) small-scale social infrastructure subprojects benefitting the community (ii) social services for the community in the areas of hygiene, health, education, training, and nutrition; (iii) training and management support in simple business skills; and (iv) small-scale income-generating activities.

THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD: Social Development Action Project (1990-95)

8. The Social Development Action (SDA) Project is part of a larger social action program by the Government aimed at meeting certain basic needs of the population as part of the adjustment process in Chad. The project's main aims are to (i) stimulate employment generation by increasing access to training facilities and productive assets for poor and/or unemployed people; (ii) improve health and living conditions of disadvantaged groups; and (iii) reinforce the Government's institutional capacity to design and monitor programs to improve social conditions.

9. NGOs will be mainly involved in the employment generation component, providing credit assistance and management support as well as technical assistance for microenterprises. Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), a U.S.-based NGO, is already working in a USAID-funded scheme to train staff on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in the management of a credit assistance program for microenterprises. Under the SDA project's credit assistance and management support subcomponent, VITA will be under contract with the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation to manage a line of credit funded by IDA under this project (gross credit commitments would amount to US\$1.6 million) and to provide long- and short-term technical assistance to promote a microcredit program and general marketing for microenterprises. Under the technical assistance for microenterprises subcomponent, the Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès, a French NGO, will train three instructors to be part of the unit in the Ministry of Labor and Employment charged with implementation and supervision of this subcomponent.

10. Also, in an urban infrastructure component of the SDA project, the Association Française pour la Lutte Contre La Faim, a French NGO, will work to sensitize communities in urban hygiene and provide training in waste collection and disposal. In addition, NGOs will be involved in training small artisans in producing construction materials such as bricks and mortar.

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA: Alleviation of Poverty and the Social Costs of Adjustment Project (7990-95)

11. The Program for the Alleviation of Poverty and the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA) is designed to address some of Uganda's most pressing short-term social concerns so that the benefits of the Economic Recovery Program are widely spread. In order to address the urgent multi-sectoral needs of the most vulnerable groups, the US\$106 million program, which consists of 19 components, will rely heavily on local communities and NGOs for its implementation. NGOs were involved in the formulation of the program while serving on a task force consisting also of representatives of the World Bank, UNICEF, USAID, Makerere University, and

government ministries; they will also provide some co-financing.

12. In the small-scale infrastructure component, Action Aid, a U.K.-based NGO, will assist Resistance Committees (RCs), which are the most active organizational unit in the rural areas from the village to the district level, with preparing proposals for funding of sub-projects such as construction of wells, rehabilitation of primary schools and health centers, and rehabilitation and maintenance of minor community access roads. Through the District Development Committee (ODC), responsible for coordinating and monitoring the project, Action Aid will participate in the coordination and monitoring of the component. Specifically, Action Aid would help improve the monitoring capacity of the DDC, assist the RCs with the preparation, design, and presentation of their proposals; and arrange for the administration of funds, procurement of inputs, technical advice where required, and the monitoring and evaluation of subprojects.

13. The health component will be implemented by NGOs in close collaboration with the Ministries of Health and Local Government and the local RCs. The Ugandan War Widows Association, an indigenous intermediary NGO, will implement a subcomponent to establish a pilot, community-based health care program to enable the provision of basic health care for widows and their households who have been victims of civil war or AIDS. The health development of orphans will be the responsibility of World Vision Uganda, a locally registered NGO. World Vision will receive financing for school fees for needy orphans, community education savings schemes, vocational/rural training centers, and community-based health care programs in four districts.

14. NGOs will also serve on the PAPSCA steering committee which was set up to determine the general orientation of work under the social dimensions of adjustment component (including reviewing semi-annual work program, results of surveys, studies and analyses), the ultimate objective of which is to improve institutional capacity for social policy planning in Uganda.

II. AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

BOLIVIA: Eastern Lowlands: Natural Resource Management and Agricultural Production Project (1990-97)

15. The project aims at assisting the long-term development of the Eastern Lowlands by strengthening the supply-side response capacity of the agricultural sector (research, extension, credit, infrastructure), and by increasing agricultural productivity in a way that will protect the natural resource base and be environmentally sound. The project will include (i) support to the «Ayoreos» indigenous groups (11 communities totalling about 2,000 people spread along the railroad line over the Santa Cruz-San Jose de Chiquitos) in their efforts to

delineate their tribal lands and improve their living conditions, and (ii) assistance to the «Chiquitanos» (tribal groups) in demarcation of their lands.

16. NGOs will be involved in agricultural extension and support to the Ayoreos community. In agricultural extension, various producers' organizations will be responsible for providing extension services to their respective producer clientele. CIDOB (the Organization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian Orient), an indigenous grassroots NGO, will implement activities intended to improve the welfare of the Ayoreos. Under this component, the project will finance community organization, support for the demarcation of tribal lands, training and secondary education, social and productive infrastructure, and technical assistance and administrative support to CIDOB.

17. ABCOP, another Bolivian NGO, along with CIDOB, helped to design the project. They were consulted during preparation and appraisal, and were involved specifically in working out the feasibility of the project and its various components as well as in developing the implementation program for the extension component.

INDIA: Watershed Development (Plains) Project (1991-98)

18. The project aims at slowing down and possibly reversing ecological degradation in a variety of agro-ecological zones by promoting sustainable and replicable production systems. The project will seek to introduce improved land management practices in selected watersheds (the states of Gujarat, Orissa and Rajasthan) through the development of cost-effective, replicable and sustainable technologies, with particular emphasis on vegetative soil and moisture conservation measures, improving ground cover, and encouraging land use that responds to people's needs and land capability.

19. A major objective of the project is to introduce effective institutional arrangements for interagency coordination in watershed planning and implementation and to ensure the full participation and agreement of watershed land users in all stages of land development. In pursuit of this objective, the project will generate models for joint land management with appropriate written, legal agreements and, with the help of local NGOs, support the necessary institution-building, including formalizing the legal status of users' groups where needed.

20. A group of experts will be recruited for, among other purposes, coordinating the work of NGOs with technical field staff on community mobilization and institution-building. Umbrella NGOs in each state will provide expertise to local-level NGOs and assist in their coordination, NGOs will receive training in several areas including conservation measures, consultative planning and local institutional development, WID issues, legal issues, designing water treatment plants and so on. NGOs will train community leaders, members of

watershed management committees, and members of user groups/societies who are mobilized under the project for management and protection of non-arable lands, in group interaction and group dynamics, land resource management, common property resource management, and so on.

NEPAL: Bhairawa Lumbini Groundwater Irrigation III Project (1991-99)

21. The project aims at raising agricultural production and farm incomes through an expansion of the ongoing deep tubewell (DTW) irrigation program. The main ingredients for this objective are privatization, farmer management of operation and maintenance (O&M) of irrigation schemes, farmer organization and participation in increasing demand for services and ensuring sustainability, and strengthening Nepal's irrigation subsector institutions. This Stage III project follows on Stage I and II projects but marks a departure from the earlier projects in its emphasis on farmer participation and organization. To the extent possible, farmer participation mechanisms will be incorporated in the ongoing Stage II project also.

22. Based on Nepal's new irrigation sector program policy and strategy, which IDA helped to design and establish, the proposed project envisages a major role for farmers' groups and water users' associations (WUAs). Farmers groups will request DTW facilities and commit to (i) forming a water users' association for their DTW; (ii) contributing to construction costs; and (iii) taking over responsibility for DTW O&M upon completion. In contrast to earlier stages, the proposed project will include specific provisions for a comprehensive farmer organization program and the establishment of WUAs under a new Irrigation Regulation.

23. The project will also finance institutional training on organization and procedures for WUAs. It includes an «Irrigation Line of Credits» pilot component to finance subprojects whose primary objectives are to expand farmer-managed irrigation, promote farmer participation and local initiative, and help develop the Department of Irrigation's capacity to implement a sector program based on farmer participation in preparation for future sector lending, including IDA's proposed Irrigation Sector Project. The subprojects will be managed by farmer groups which will form Farmer Irrigation Associations (FIAs) and contribute to capital costs and will be formed at private, farmer-managed irrigated schemes. These FIAs will be established as legal bodies under the Registration of Associations Act.

III. POPULATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES

BANGLADESH: General Education Project (1991-96)

24. The project will support a number of important Government policy objectives for the sector, especially those in primary education. The components are (i)

expanding equitable access to primary and secondary schooling; (ii) improving the quality of general education; and (iii) institutional development. NGOs will be involved in the first component which will (a) finance experiments by them and community groups to assess the potential of a variety of school-based programs to make public primary schools more attractive to the very poor and girls; and (b) increase access by expansion of nonformal primary education programs. The experimental programs will include, but not be limited to, school feeding schemes, provision of school uniforms, teaching aids, and community outreach.

25. Financing for nonformal primary education programs implemented by NGOs is divided into two subprograms. One subprogram is for experienced NGOs to deliver nonformal primary education along lines pioneered by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, including recruiting more women teachers, offering a simplified curriculum, more active teaching methods, flexible scheduling, and so on. The other subprogram is for less experienced NGOs to develop their expertise in delivering nonformal primary education; these NGOs will have experienced NGO trainers to assist them and local communities to develop their programs. Up to three percent of the funds under this component could be used for evaluation of the NGO/community programs.

REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA: Women in Development Project (1991-96)

26. The project aims at improving women's productivity, income-earning potential, welfare and status; strengthening government capability to better deal with women's issues; and bringing about a change in society's perception of the role of women. This project is the Bank's first free-standing women-in-development project. The Gambia is particularly suited for such a project because of the government's commitment to address women's issues, and because the encouraging results of small-scale innovative approaches, particularly by NGOs, merit replication. NGOs will be involved in the agriculture, skills development, safe motherhood, and family planning components, and will receive financing from a special fund set up by the project for small projects and programs designed specifically to help women and children.

27. In the agriculture component, cooperative women's groups, government services, and private initiatives will be involved according to their comparative advantages in extension services, access to improved production technologies, post-harvest storage, preservation and food processing, coarse grain mills, and savings mobilization. The Gambia Women's Finance Company (a local NGO) will, under a two-year renewable technical assistance contract, help organize and educate existing women's groups to promote and improve savings practices, familiarize them with savings options, and facilitate their access to regular banking channels.

28. In the skills development component, kafos (village-

level women's groups) will help to identify and select women tutors or others from the villages to promote basic numeracy and literacy. In the safe motherhood and family planning component, approaches currently used by NGOs — for example, the use of simple pictorial cards for screening risk cases and the involvement of (traditional women's groups based on family ties) to identify and refer high-risk pregnancies — will be pilot-tested in the provision of public health services to help the Government decide whether to integrate them into the national public health care system. NGOs such as Save the Children Federation (U.S.), Catholic Relief Services (U.S.), and The Gambia Family Planning Association will be actively involved in the implementation of this component.

29. The project will establish a Fund of US\$500,000 to be used by NGOs on a matching fund basis for a variety of village-level activities, small projects and programs. Possible areas of intervention include digging wells, providing credit or inputs to women in rural areas, and enabling NGOs to expand ongoing successful activities beyond the areas in which they normally operate.

KENYA: Fourth Population Project (1991-97)

30. This project is the second free-standing population project financed by IDA for Kenya. In the Third Population Project, which began in 1989, population issues were for the first time appraised separately from health. NGOs played an active role in that project in generating demand and delivering family planning services.

31. NGOs' participation is quite significant in the Fourth Population Project as well. The objectives of the project are (i) to increase further the availability, accessibility, and quality of family planning services provided by the Government and NGOs; (ii) to strengthen the demand for family planning services through expansion of information, education and communication (EC) programs in additional government ministries and NGOs; and (iii) to strengthen the capacity of the National Council for Population and Development (NCPD) to plan and monitor the expanding National Population Program. These objectives will be achieved by mobilizing and coordinating the resources of both government and NGOs and through close collaboration with donor-assisted ongoing population projects.

32. An innovative aspect of increasing the demand for family planning services featured in this project is the provision of income-generating activities to women's groups by NGOs. The project will support the introduction of income-generating activities, family planning, and contraceptive distribution to women's and men's groups through the provision of technical assistance, training, and support for small-scale projects which contain a significant population component.

33. Several Kenyan NGOs, including the Family Planning Association of Kenya, Kenya Catholic Secretariat, Seventh Day Adventists, and Crescent Medical Aid Society of Kenya, will be extensively involved in IEC acti-

vities, using tools such as workshops, seminars, study tours, and client counselling.

34. NGOs are playing a major role in designing population strategies in Kenya generally. As a result, the NCPD is continuing to increase the number of NGOs involved in the programs it supports. Increasingly, district-level NGOs are being supported, and there are preliminary indications that they are very effective.

IV. ENVIRONMENT

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR: Environment Program (1991-96)

35. The program, which is the first five-year slice of Madagascar's 15-year Environmental Action Plan (EAP), will continue and expand the implementation of six priority programs identified by the EAP. These priority programs include protecting and managing the national heritage of biodiversity; improving the living conditions of the population by improving the protection and management of natural resources; promoting environmental education, training, and communication; developing mapping and remote sensing tools; environmental research; and mechanisms to manage and monitor the environment. The program consists of seven components. They are soil conservation, agroforestry, reforestation, and other rural development activities; environmental training, education and awareness; protection and management of biodiversity; mapping and progressive establishment of a geographic information system; establishing clear boundaries for protected areas and improving land security; environmental research on land, coastal, and marine ecosystems; and support activities.

36. NGOs will be involved in the first three components. The National Association for Environmental Actions (ANAE) will manage the soil conservation, agroforestry, and rural development component and will finance the preparation, appraisal, and implementation of mini-projects. Mini-projects will relate to watershed management, productive infrastructure and support, including storage facilities and rehabilitation of feeder roads and social programs. Eligible beneficiaries will be exclusively collective bodies rural associations and village communities) of at least five families, organized with authorized representatives (president, secretary, and treasurer). These groups will collectively design and prepare the mini-projects, participate in the financing of the initial investment, and bear the full cost of operation and maintenance. ANAE will finance field operators, including NGOs, to help communities identify, prepare, submit and implement mini-projects. (The ANAE founding members include national and international NGOs and religious groups. ANAE's Board of Directors has been established with a very large majority of representatives (11 out of a total of 14) from the private sector, mostly

NGOs).

37. In the environmental training, education, and communication component, NGOs, along with specialized public and private agencies, will be contracted for media production. Also, NGOs active in education in rural areas will be assisted in delivering, in their curricula, messages and documentation related to the protection of the environment while ensuring sustainable development.

38. Regarding the component for biodiversity protection and management, international NGOs are already doing this work in Madagascar, particularly in parks and reserves. Some local NGOs are interested in getting involved and will be assisted by international NGOs that will also help establish new local NGOs. The National Association for the Management of Protected Areas (NAMPA), for example, was recently established to coordinate development and protection in the Protected Areas that include parks and reserves as well as their buffer zones. The founding members of NAMPA include national and international NGOs. NAMPA's board of directors will be named soon and will include NGOs and representatives of involved ministries (forest, agriculture, research, education and so on).

ZIMBABWE: Forest Resources Management and Development Project (1997-97)

39. The project aims at promoting the conservation of forests and the environment and the improvement of forest grazing and wildlife management and productivity and quality of the wood-processing industry. The project components are rural forestry, wildlife and forest grazing management, and commercial forestry development.

40. NGOs will participate in the components of rural forestry and wildlife and forest grazing management. In the rural forestry component, NGOs will be involved in extension and will also receive training and technical support. Village Development Committees will be involved in woodlot management under this component. In the wildlife and forest grazing management component, village-based groups will be set up to enter into profit-sharing arrangements.

41. An important role for women's groups and other grassroots NGOs is envisaged in the implementation of this project. A monitorable action program stipulates guidelines on mobilizing and training women's groups on nursery development and woodlot management. The processes of mobilization will include identifying women's groups already existing in the project area, ways of forming groups in areas where none exist, and a methodology for orienting and supporting these groups in tree-planting activities. Among other grassroots groups, informal community groups are seen as the cornerstone of the rural afforestation program, as they will be the main target audiences for extension services.

ANNEX 2

List of NGO-World Bank Committee Members

WORLD BANK MEMBERS

Alexander Shakow, Committee Co-Chair
External Affairs (EXTDR)

Michael Cernea
Agriculture and Rural Development Department
(AGRPS)

Amnon Golan
Economic Development Institute (EDIDR)

David Goldberg
Legal Department (LEGOP)

Ann Hamilton
Population and Health Resources Department
(PHRDR)

Parvez Hasan
Office of the Regional Vice President for Europe, Middle
East and North Africa (EMNVP)

Kenneth Piddington
Environment Department (ENVDR)

Nimrod Raphaeli
Central Operations Department (CODOP)

Daniel Ritchie
Asia Technical Department (ASTDR)

Ismail Seragelding
Africa Technical Department (AFTDR)

Rainer Steckhan
Country Department II for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (LA2DR)

Michael Wiehen
Europe, Middle East and North Africa Country Depart-
ment I(EM1 DR)

Hans Wyss
Central Operations Department (CODDR)

NGO MEMBERS 1990/91**AFRICA**

Thierno Kane
Federation des associations du Fouta pour le développe-
ment (FAFS)
Senegal

Abdul Mohammed
Inter-Africa Group (IAG)
Kenya

Abdalla Suliman Elawad

Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA)
Sudan

Mazide N'Diaye
Réseau africain pour le développement intégré (RADI)
Senegal

Joyce Fungayi Chikara
Zimbabwe Freedom From Hunger Campaign (ZFFHC)
Zimbabwe

ASIA

Amaresh Sen
Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Develop-
ment (AVARD)
India

Fazle Abed
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAG)
Bangladesh

Juan Flavio
International Institute for Rural Reconstruction (IIRR)
Philippines

L.M. Samarasinghe
National NGO Council of Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka

Martin Khor Kok Peng
Third World Network/ Consumers' Association of Pen-
ang (TWN/CAP)
Malaysia

LATIN AMERICA

Magda Renner
Amigos da Terra - Brasil/Acao Democratica Feminina
Gaucha
Brazil

Allan Kirton
Caribbean Conference of Churches (CCC)
Barbados

Eduardo Latorre
Fundación Dominicana de Desarrollo (FDD)
Dominican Republic

Jaime Ruiz Tagle
Programa de Economia del Trabajo (PET)/Academia de
Humanismo Cristiano
Chile

Enrique Fernandez, Committee Co-Chair
SOLIDARIOS
Dominican Republic

NORTH AMERICA/PACIFIC

Peter Davies
American Council for Voluntary International Action
(InterAction)
United States

Tim Brodhead
Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)
Canada

Douglas Hellingier
Development Group for Alternative Policies (D-GAP)
United States

Shunsuke Iwazaki
Japanese NGO Center for International Cooperation
(JANIC)
Japan

EUROPE

Irene Noerlund
Danish Coalition for North/South Cooperation
Denmark

Reinhard Hermle
MISEREOR
Germany

Glossary

AFR Africa Regional Office

ASINDES Asociación de Entidades de Desarrollo y de Servicio No Gubernamentales de Guatemala

CONGAT Conseil des Organismes Non-Gouvernementaux en Activité au Togo

GRID Centre de Recherche et d'Information au Développement

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency

DBAN Development Banks Assessment Network

EA Environmental Assessment

ECE Economic Commission for Europe

EDI Economic Development Institute

EMENA Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

ESF Emergency Social Fund

EXTIE International Economic Relations Division, External Affairs Department

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FENASONGS Federation National de Asociaciones de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales en Salud

FSDVM Fundación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo y Vivienda Mínima

GDIP Grassroots Development Initiative Project

GEF Global Environmental Facility

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA International Development Association

Max Van den Berg
NOVIB
The Netherlands

Pierre Galand
OXFAM -Belgique
Belgium

Frank Judd
OXFAM-UK
United Kingdom

INTER-REGIONAL

Gerhard Meier
Caritas Internationalis
Italy

Midge Beguin-Austin
World Council of Churches
Switzerland

NGO Secretariat

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
Geneva, Switzerland

Cyril Ritchie, Interim Executive Director
Esperanza Duran, NGO Liaison Officer

IDB Inter-American Development Bank

ILO International Labor Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

LAC Latin America and the Caribbean

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OED Operations Evaluation Department

PACT Private Agencies Collaborating Together

PAPSCA Program for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment

PHN Population, Health, and Nutrition

PPF Project Preparation Facility

PRE Policy, Research, and External Affairs

SCF-UK Save The Children Fund - United Kingdom

SDA Social Dimensions of Adjustment

SEDF Socio-Economic Development Fund

SIF Social Investment Fund

SPPF Special Project Preparation Facility

TFAP Tropical Forestry Action Plan

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WDR World Development Report

WID Women-In-Development

WUA Water users' Association

Decentralisation for rural development Government approaches and people's initiatives in Asia and The Pacific

by Heinrich Siedentopf

Once more, research has confirmed the necessity of grass roots participation in development policymaking and implementation. The author served as coordinator of the extensive research summarised here below, and editor of the findings. He is Professor of Comparative Public Administration and Public Law at the Post-Graduate School of Administrative Sciences in Speyer, Germany.

Objectives of the research project

The following observations and conclusions are based on the findings of a two-year research project (1985-1987) undertaken by the Asian and Pacific Development Centre; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, under the auspices of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, St. Augustin near Bonn, Germany. The purpose of the research project was to assess the outcome of recent decentralisation trends in the Asian and Pacific region. (2)

The research was intended to provide a regional and country overview of decentralisation, not within a broad framework, but in the context of a single sector, i.e. rural development. Since the ultimate objective of decentralisation was development of the people who mostly lived in the rural areas - the villages - the study, to be significant, had to focus on the dynamics of participation at the grass roots. This is based on the premise that if local development is to have a meaningful impact on national development, the local people themselves must be allowed to be heard and listened to, to determine their needs, and to be in control of their own lives and development.

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The objectives of the project were:

1. to analyse the current problems of concentration and centralisation of competence and power at the national level;
2. to provide a better understanding of the rationale for increased decentralisation as well as to its limits in the Asian and Pacific region;
3. to examine in depth existing processes of increased decentralisation;
4. to assess the current measures or projects for decentralisation undertaken and determine their outcome;
5. to provide for an exchange of experience in development-oriented decentralisation in rural areas with a view to further strengthening the process of decentralisation. Ultimately, the project outcome would have relevance for future government policies, aiming at greater mobilisation of human resources at local level and increased participation and initiatives by the people in managing their own affairs.

Perspectives of decentralisation in Asian and Pacific countries

Centralism is still a common feature of public administration systems of many countries in the Asian and Pacific region. Centralism was even pursued after the colonial period and formed the foundation for development policies and programmes of newly independent governments. We should not forget that in the 1950s and 1960s a centralist theory of development was recommended by the interna-

tional agencies and that development strategies required strong interventions in investment and production processes by national governments and called for centrally conceived, comprehensive plans. Local programmes were often in conflict with national plans. Planning without implementation at the central level and implementation without planning at the local level - this polemic contrast presents the shortcomings of that period quite well.

In the 1970s, programmes of decentralisation became fashionable - programmes of déconcentration or administrative decentralisation in order to improve service delivery systems and the administration of public programmes. In the face of these programmes different forms of decentralisation can be distinguished, primarily by the extent to which authority to plan, decide and manage is transferred from the central government to other organisations. Therefore, with regard to governmental decentralisation efforts, the varying forms of decentralisation were analytically differentiated in the context of the research project as follows:

1. *déconcentration*, which means delegation of authority to a lower level;
2. *delegation* to semi-autonomous or parastatal agencies;
3. *devolution* to local governments; and
4. *transfer* of functions from public to non-governmental institutions.

Although there was, in general, a trend towards decentralisation, in order to promote effective, efficient and equitable rural development, most governments were virtually unwilling or unable to decentralise. Moreover, political systems in most Asian countries have moved towards the direction of authoritarianism or centralism. They have been primarily concerned with political integration and consolidation of power. They have tried to centralise and monopolise the flow of resources to promote national programmes, much to the detriment of local initiatives, interests and organisations.

If new decentralisation approaches have been tried, Asian countries have been selective about them. Most decentralisation measures fell within the category of decentralisation and delegation, rather than devolution. As such, many new field offices of the central government ministries were created and workloads were merely shifted to them, while the ultimate governmental authority remained in the hands of central agencies. To some extent delegation of rural development functions, especially those relating to construction, operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, did take place. Public sector corporations undertook productive functions at local level; statutory authorities were set up for area development. But devolution or the granting of substantial autonomy to local government units and empowering them to administer their own affairs, has seldom been pursued.

The very high administrative costs inherent in the practice of déconcentration and delegation of authority, coupled with the scarcity of resources, stagnation of rural areas and the inefficiency of bureaucraties to respond to popular needs, called for government attention to rationalise expenditures and devise better service delivery systems. At the same time, there was a growing concern among NGOs and local communities to initiate, mobilise and become themselves empowered, so as to undertake local level development which would be of direct benefit to local communities. There was a substantial increase in the number of NGOs, movements for people-oriented rural development and self-

help organisations especially in rural areas, where the central government cannot penetrate or extend its service delivery system. Thus, NGOs or community organisations began a new trend, voluntarily assuming tasks of rural development, agricultural development, education, infrastructure and other socio-economic services.

As this new form of decentralisation becomes more widespread, governments in the regional countries will be faced with three major challenges: Firstly, how to create an environment where this form of decentralisation (local initiative and voluntarism) can grow; secondly, how to establish linkages which would produce a new partnership between government and non-government organisations for progressive rural development; and finally, how to ensure that rural poor, and not the local elite, would benefit from the new decentralisation approaches and organisations established under them.

As to the first issue, there are indeed factors which could create an environment more conducive to the mobilisation and growth of local initiative, voluntarism or participatory decentralisation. As noted in the case studies as well as by other researchers, these considerations include, among others, the following:

1. Governments should be willing to decentralise powers to grass roots institutions, and on the other hand, grass roots organisations should be willing to accept and exercise these powers, thereby giving rural dwellers responsibilities and control over project inputs and outputs, making them eager to participate in rural development and, consequently, facilitating decentralisation.
2. Each community has its own values, structures and processes for decision-making and implementation. Therefore approaching communities through a uniform administrative arrangement is not feasible nor desirable.
3. Local people are capable of effectively taking decisions on projects that meet their felt needs and that benefit them. Thus, the people themselves should be able to decide the level and kind of participation with which they can expedite their own development.
4. As decentralised powers, resources and benefits can be centralised or manipulated or monopolised by the powerful few even at the lowest level, decentralisation policies should consider not only the types and levels of participation, but also which section of the society should participate in the development process.
5. Village managerial capabilities should not be ignored or substituted; a lot of management skills are available at village level and it is more a question of utilising and enhancing them.
6. Local culture has to be appreciated before considering it as a hindrance or a facilitating factor in rural development; social feasibility analysis of rural development projects vis-à-vis their technical or commercial feasibility only has to be emphasized.
7. Especially for grass roots decentralisation within government programmes, there is a need for administrative simplification and debureaucratisation - it means aiming at small units, less hierarchical levels; specific clientele, etc.

The second challenge is the establishment of new relationships or linkages for progressive rural development. It is generally the view that effective participatory decentrali-

sation should be undertaken as a team effort amongst government local people and non-governmental organisations. Inter-organisational linkages have to be encouraged. This relationship can be expressed in terms of assistance linkages (finance, service and technical and personnel assistance). Usually, such linkages operate through a referral system - indigenous community workers, where they exist, are backed up with management by professionals at the level of an intermediate organisation, which has certain advantages (like technical know-how) in implementing a programme but is lacking in others. Requirements beyond the capability of the grassroots organisations are referred to this intermediate level organisation for technical support. Aside from assistance linkages, this relationship can also provide control: each organisation checks if it is performing according to an acceptable standard. But the extent of control should be based on the needs of local organisations. Experience shows that excessive control lessens the effectiveness and efficiency of organisations. What is perceived, therefore, to be an ideal relationship is that undertaken without undermining anyone, whether it be the local institutions, central government or non-governmental organisations.

And the third issue is how to ensure that the rural poor and not the local elite benefits from participatory decentralisation. Ultimately, these questions have to be raised. To what extent are rural development programmes in reality committed to their targeted clientele and the concept of participatory development? Are the programmes capable of reaching the rural poor, and how far are the interests of the poor represented in decentralised rural development?

Concluding notes

It seems to be evident that the public sector, in particular at the local level, will not be able to grow and to provide for extensive services in the future. But there is some evidence that people at local levels have taken significant initiatives, either on their own or when motivated by a catalytic agent from outside:

- in organising themselves under local leadership,
- in identifying their specific development needs and effectively articulating them,
- in formulating development plans to meet those needs and mobilising available resources,
- in drawing up action plans and taking collective decisions to implement them.

- in bargaining and liaising with relevant government agencies to demand resources and to utilise them effectively for development purposes.

This empowerment of the people model is based on people-centred values and development is defined as a process requiring as its primary resource *human commitment* and *creativity*. Organisations are built gradually from the bottom up rather than the top down. Their primary resources are creative, committed and knowledgeable people.

With these objectives in mind, NGOs seem to be capable of and willing to fill gaps which exist due to scarce financial and personnel public resources at the local government level. This observation was also shared by the participants of the final policy meeting of the research project which was convened in the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1987. (3)

The participants of the seminar agreed that in order to ensure easier access to central governments, NGOs should be organised in sectoral federations or councils at the national level, as in the case in Thailand. With regard to international cooperation and activities of international NGOs, it was emphasised that although this cooperation was welcome, preserving national and local identity was necessary to guarantee that rural programmes remain indigenous, relevant and responsive to people's aspirations and needs.

Notes

(2) The country and case studies cover the following countries: Bangladesh, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and South Pacific countries.

(3) The seminar was organised by KAF, APDC and the Post-Graduate School of Administrative Sciences, Speyer. The five-day conference provided a forum for a policy dialogue on decentralisation and people's development. It brought together twenty-five participants involved and concerned with rural development, namely senior officials and policymakers from the Asian region (Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand); representatives of two leading non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Thailand and Pakistan, as well as researchers and academics who have undertaken extensive studies on the subject matter (China, India, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Federal Republic of Germany).

The International Tropical Timber Organization

Kill or Cure for the Rainforests?

by Marcus Colchester *

When it came into existence five years ago the International Tropical Organization was welcomed by many environmentalists as offering a real opportunity to curb the excess of the timber industry and to promote 'sustainable logging'. Today, sustainable logging is seen to be a myth — with even the World Bank criticizing the concept — and the ITTO has proved itself hopelessly dominated by the interests of the timber trade. Hobbled by political compromise, the ITTO is incapable of addressing the wider problems plaguing forestry. Governments should no longer rely on the ITTO to halt the destruction caused by logging.

"I do not like experts," he said. "They are our jailers, I despise experts more than anyone on earth."

"You're one yourself, aren't you?"

"Therefore I know! Experts are addicts. They solve nothing! They are servants of whatever system hires them. They perpetuate it. When we are hanged, experts will hang us... When the world is destroyed, it will be destroyed not by its madmen but by the sanity of its experts and the superior ignorance of its bureaucrats..."
John Le Carré, *The Russia House* (1)

The world's tropical forests are disappearing faster than ever (2,3,4). Logging, it is now thought, is responsible for a significant part of this devastation. Indeed, some studies put logging as the single greatest cause of tropical forest loss (5). The main reason is that logging opens up previously isolated and inaccessible forests to a flood of landless settlers (6). Tropical forest logging is also associated with the continuing denial of forest peoples' rights: it not only brings them few benefits but also undermines their livelihoods. At the same time, the timber industry has contributed to the emergence of highly corrupt and self-serving élites, whose control of the political process in developing countries is undermining democratic principles and disenfranchising the rural poor (7,8,9,10).

Many foresters continue to hide behind their technical jargon to avoid confronting these wider issues. As one forester notes, "No silvicultural system can be given the

blame for inadequate [forest] protection" (11). Yet, these wider issues cannot be wished away so easily. On the contrary, the longer foresters continue to take a narrow view of their professional responsibilities, the more vulnerable the forests entrusted to their care will be.

Within the ITTO — the body which many governments and environmental groups see as playing a major role in solving the tropical forest crisis — the narrow focus on forestry is all too evident. When combined with the dominant position enjoyed by timber producers within ITTO, it has served to ensure that the organization is little more than a lobbying group for timber interests.

The Origins of ITTO

When the Japanese originally tabled a resolution at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for the creation of International Tropical Organization in 1977, they had in mind a commodity agreement, of the kind adopted for jute and rubber, which would be strictly confined to trade considerations. However, in discussions, it soon became clear that tropical timber could not be treated in such a closely defined manner. Tropical timber, coming as it does from a wide variety of tree species growing over a vast area of the world's forest, cannot be dealt with as a single commodity (12).

The protracted negotiations as UNCTAD soon took on a more complex character. The usual group of civil servants who deal with trade negotiations were joined by foresters brought in to elucidate the technical complexities of the industry. A crucial shift in the debate came about with the intervention of the UK-based policy research organization, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), which forcefully argued that the agreement could not limit itself to the technical and commercial con-

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[1] This article is reprinted by permission of *The geologist*, 5, 1990.

cerns of timber extraction and trade but must also provide for the other crucial ecological and genetic services provided by forests. This was an argument that the western countries, under increasing pressure from environmental organizations back home, could not afford to ignore.

A Conflit of Interests

The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), signed in November 1983 after six years of wrangling, thus emerged as a unique trade agreement. Its most significant articles not only set the ITTO the task of promoting the trade in tropical timber, but also gave the ITTO the apparently contradictory duty of encouraging the *sustainable* use and *conservation* of tropical forests and their genetic resources, and of maintaining ecological balance (13).

As far the national governments playing a part in the ITTO were concerned, establishing who would control the organization was important as establishing its terms of reference. Much of the internal struggle during the six years between 1977 and 1983 focused on agreeing a voting system, the present structure of which reveals very clearly where the acting parties think the priorities lie.

According to the system established in the ITTA, votes are divided equally between 'producers' in the tropics and 'consumers' in the industrialized world. Consumer countries' votes are apportioned according to the degree to which they largest vote of any single nation. Producers similarly get votes according to the amount of timber they export, with only a secondary weighting given to a country's actual area of forest. *The net result is that the more a country destroys tropical forests, the more votes it gets.* The voting structure ensures that the ITTO's primary role of promoting the timber trade heavily outweighs its secondary conversation role.

As soon as the ITTA had been signed, and before it entered into force on 1 April 1985, a further two-and-a-half-year political battle immediately ensued. This time the objectives were to define who should gain the influential role of Executive Director of the ITTO and where the secretariat was to be seated. As the horse-trading and jockeying for power developed, it was tacitly agreed that, to ensure balance, the producer and consumer blocks should share the roles: if one provided the seat for the secretariat, the other should provide the first Executive Director.

The front-runners soon emerged, with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Brazil, Indonesia and Japan leading in the race to provide the seat, and with the Malaysians and Dutch having the most likely candidates as Executive Director. The Dutch, in particular, took strong exception to the proposal to have Japan host the secretariat, apparently fearing that the ITTO's conservation goals would be subverted by the powerful vested interests of the Japanese timber trade. As the negotiations continued, regional groupings emerged, the two blocks of North and South themselves splitting, to a substantial extent, between East and West. Divided in this way, no groups were able to secure the required two-thirds majority of votes to allow a definitive solution. As the ITTO limped from one meeting to another, the prospect of it actually getting down to work became frustratingly remote.

The uncertainty ended when the Japanese Government offered several million dollars to fund the ITTO, as well as free office premises and secretarial functions, and, in addi-

tion, undertook to underwrite the costs of bi-annual Council meetings both in Yokohama and overseas. At the same time, Japan effectively secured the support of a number of producer countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa. The close and existing trade ties between Japan and the Southeast Asian nations provided them with more natural allies in that region. In exchange, the Japanese agreed to promote the appointment of the Malaysian forester, Dr Freezailag, to the post of Executive Director.

As Charles Secrett, then Tropical Rainforest Campaigner of Friends of the Earth (FoE) UK recalls: *"The gossip was that they (the Japanese) were setting up preferential trading deals to secure Third World votes to support Japan's position"* (14). The effective, if well-disguised, domination of the ITTO process by the Japan-SE Asia axis needs to be constantly borne in mind when the ITTO is being evaluated.

Unreal Expectations?

In 1986, after years of negotiations, the ITTO could finally get down to work. In his opening address to the International Tropical Timber Council (ITTC), Dr Freezailag likened his task to a canoeist swirling down a foaming river with a two-handed paddle, one end of which represented conservation and the other utilization. Only by reconciling the two objectives, he argued, could the long-term future of the timber industry be assured (15).

"The voting structure ensures that the ITTO's primary role of promoting the timber trade heavily outweighs its secondary conversation role."

For their part, many non-governmental organizations (NCOS) welcome the ITTO, perceiving that it offered a real opportunity to curb the excesses of the logging industry. Some even hoped that a strict enactment of the ITTA would mean ITTO assistance in establishing national parks as a means of realizing its conservation objectives.

But the main reason that NGOs have supported the ITTO was their belief in the concept of *sustainable logging*. Many organizations — such as FOE, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and IIED — saw the achievement of this objective as a key means to saving the forests and believed that the ITTO provided a means of enforcing it (16). According to Jeffery Sayer of the IUCN, for example, *"One of the best uses of forest that can in theory retain most species of animals and plants is natural forest management for timber production"* (17). The IIED has gone even further, arguing that *"it is a fact that sustainable management is technically feasible"* and that *"the sustainable management of natural forest for timber production is one of the keys to forest conservation and to the timber trade"* (18,19).

Other organizations have been more cautious and have thus found themselves promoting what are potentially internally inconsistent arguments. Thus the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), on the one hand, admits that *"an important question which has yet to be answered is whether tropical forests can be managed sustainably (i.e. without significant ecological impoverishment), while yielding adequate revenue to producer countries"*. Yet, at the same time, the WWF argues that the ITTO *"provides a*

forum for establishing trade mechanisms which discriminate in favour of sustainably produced timber" (20).

The Myth of Sustainable Logging

The fact that practically everyone who addresses this thorny topic has their own notion of what 'sustainable' actually means, provides one of the main sources of confusion in this debate.

As made popular by the Brundtland Commission, the phrase 'sustainable development' refers to the means by which development is made to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (21). Since the needs of future generation of species and ecosystems are equally unknowable, the term apparently implies that total biological assets are not reduced, in the long term, through use.

In terms of tropical forests, such sustainable use would include not just maintaining timber resources and conserving biological diversity, but also maintaining the ecological functions of forest such as soil quality, hydrological cycles, climate and weather, and downstream fisheries. It should also imply maintaining supplies of other forest products — game, fruits, nuts, resins, dyes, construction materials, fuelwood etc. — essential to the livelihoods of local people.

Logging, which inevitably simplifies forest ecosystems, can never be sustainable in such terms. Indeed, as Lee Talbot, an ex-director of the IUCN and now environment officer for the World Bank's Africa Environment Unit (AFTEN), points out:

"In practical terms, no commercial logging of tropical forests has proven to be sustainable from the standpoint of the forest ecosystem, and any such logging must be recognized as mining, not sustaining the basic forest resource" (22).

It is all the more surprising, therefore, that the IUCN continues to refer to such logging of forests as 'sustainable', without defining how much biodiversity can be lost or must be maintained to qualify for this epithet.

Sustained Yield Management

Even if one accepts the more limited concept of 'sustainability' popular amongst foresters, that of 'sustained yield management', it is doubtful whether sustainable logging is possible. 'Sustained yield management' refers to logging practices which do not result in more timber being removed than a forest is capable of regenerating on a continuing basis.

In 1988, an IIED-led survey of the timber industry carried out for the ITTO concluded:

"The extent of tropical moist forest which is being deliberately managed at an operational scale for the sustainable production of timber is, on a world-scale, negligible."

Indeed the study found that less than one eighth of one per cent of tropical forests, where timber extraction is occurring on a commercial basis, were being logged sustainably (23).

Even this assessment has now been seriously challenged. Dr Aria Keto of the Rainforest Conservation Society of Australia carried out a detailed field study of logging in the rainforests of Queensland — extolled by the IIED as a

shining example of sustained yield management. She found that the Queensland case should be excluded on two grounds. The first was that, far from being commercially viable, forestry in Queensland was heavily subsidized with public money. Moreover, she found that the actual sample plots on which the estimated rates of timber regrowth were based, were hopelessly unreliable. In sum, the evidence that commercial logging in Queensland was practised on a sustainable basis does not exist (24). The data, on which the IIED study had based its findings, is, she claims, "at best bad science or, at worst, scientific fraud" (25).

Many other professional foresters are also very unsure that sustainable logging in natural forests is achievable. As Hans Lamprecht has noted:

"The pressing question of to what extent a natural tropical forest ecosystem may be modified for economic reasons without seriously impairing its ability to function and survive cannot answered on the basis of the present state of knowledge" (26).

The major funding agencies are also getting cold feet about the notion. Lee Talbot of the World Bank notes: "It appears that true sustainability from natural tropical forests has yet to be proven." Noting that most logging in Africa has led to serious deforestation and that the funding of logging in intact forests contradicts the World Bank's policy commitment to 'sustainable development', he observes that "obviously, the Bank... should not support further exploitation of [intact forest areas] for timber production" (27).

The main obstacles to sustained yield timber extraction are not so much technical as political, social and economic — as amply demonstrated by the example of Papua New Guinea see George Marshall, this issue), and by the social pressure on forests from landless settlers. Unfortunately, foresters and the ITTO seem reluctant to tackle these issues (28).

From Logging to Plantations

Robert Goodland and others at the World Bank believe that truly sustainable logging in natural forest can only be achieved at an extremely low level of cutting, to the point where plantation forestry, even of slow-growing hardwoods, is likely to become financially competitive (29). These conclusions are indirectly reinforced by the findings of Roger Sedjo and Kenneth Lyon of Resources for the Future, who concluded in a recent study that industrial wood prices are unlikely to rise for the foreseeable future (30). This tendency may be reinforced by the recent cut in tariffs on tropical timber products negotiated in the current Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Goodland and his colleagues argue that the World Bank should halt its financing of logging in natural forests and switch to promoting plantation forestry as the only truly sustainable alternative (31).

Even this faith in plantation forestry may be misplaced. As Lamprecht warns us, "On no account should it be lost from sight that a high degree of diversity is indispensable if the ecosystems of moist tropical forests are to retain their ability to function" (32).

The World Bank's conclusions should also signal a clear warning to those conservationists who have too readily clutched at the notion of 'sustainable logging' as a way of salvaging some biodiversity. They may find that in the end their support has been used as justification for tree mono-

cultures, a prospect as remote from their hopes of preserving biodiversity as clear-cut logging. The IUCN, it seems, has just woken up to this realization. As Jeffery Sayer noted in testimony to a House of Lords inquiry: "We now fear that what is going to happen in the tropics is that governments will find that natural forest management is too difficult and will gradually move a way from it ... / think it is significant that, in Indonesia, the Reafforestation Guarantee Fund which contains an enormous amount of money — it runs into millions of dollars — and which was intended to be used to compensate concession-holders who did apply the selective management regulations... will be used instead to fund plantations" (33).

Sustained Dissimulation

Despite the findings of its own studies, which show that sustained yield logging is practically nowhere being achieved, and despite the fact that the ITTO has yet even to agree on a definition of sustainability, sustainable logging remains the ITTO's immediate goal. During its 1990 annual meeting in Bali, the Council moved further into the realms of fantasy by announcing Target 2000' whereby all trade in tropical timber was to be supplied from sustainable logging within ten years (34).

The resolution, which was proposed by a united caucus of producer nations, was at first received with incredulity by delegates from the consumer countries, who, striving to remain true to a reasonable definition, felt that restricting the trade to sustainably produced tropical timber was practically equivalent to the trade's extinction. Despite these hesitations, the resolution was passed, leaving the NGO representatives scratching their heads in bemusement. In fact, Target 2000' will present the timber industry with few difficulties, for, according to the rhetoric of the producers and traders, logging as practised *already is sustainable*. Target 2000' thus becomes nothing more than a formula for business as usual.

For example, Arthur Morell of the UK Timber Trade, who is also an official delegate of the UK mission to the ITTO, claims that logging in Indonesia and Malaysia is sustainable on the grounds that both countries issue their own 'sustainability certificates' (35). Indonesia and Malaysia have entered into an official agreement to jointly campaign against call for a boycott of unsustainably produced timbers (36). As part of this campaign, all 400 ITTO delegates in Bali were flown at the Government's expense to the Presidential Palace in Jakarta, where the meeting was told by the ITTO's chairman that Indonesia's commitment to sustainable forest management was an example to the world.

Indonesian timber tycoons have funded adverts in the *New York Times*, extolling the virtues of Indonesian logging (37,38), while official publications insist that sound management ensures timber supplies 'in perpetuity' (39,40). Indonesia's Minister for Forestry, Hasrul Harahap, asserts that the forests of Indonesia are managed under a sustainable system (41).

These are just some examples which painfully illustrate how far the rhetoric of sustainability has drifted away from reality. For example, the conclusion of a recent IUCN study of logging in Indonesia "was that concessions were generally managed very poorly. The Indonesian Selection System

which legally should be applied... (the rules) were almost totally either ignored or simply flouted, and in many cases the concessionaires were not really aware of what they should be doing. The knowledge of the (forests') ecology and species was not there, either in the forest departments or amongst the concessionaires" (42).

The IUCN's findings only echo what the ITTO's own investigations have themselves revealed (43). As Simon Counsell of FoE (UK) notes, "The ITTO is being used as a stalling mechanism to prevent effective change. Member countries are quick to point to their membership to demonstrate their concern for the environment. Yet they are persistently failing to act the ITTO's findings when these prove inconvenient" (44).

Regulating the Trade

As might be predicted, given the way the organization is controlled, the ITTO has moved extremely slowly to institute any effective mechanisms for achieving the promised transition to sustainability. Any moves to suggest regulations on the trade in unsustainably produced timber have been hotly resisted and even moves to monitor the trade are viewed with hostility.

A crucial pre-condition to achieve the transition, whether by incentives or trade restrictions, is for wood in the market to be labelled as to its origin, thereby allowing buyers and customs officials to be more discriminating. In 1989, when the British Government and FOE (UK) proposed an experimental project to test the feasibility of such a labelling scheme, the producer nations led by Indonesia and Malaysia blocked the project from getting approval until it was substantially modified. "What we were hoping for was a project specifically to test the feasibility of a certification and labelling scheme to trace forest products right from source to the consumer but, we fear, the project will now be so theoretical as to be largely irrelevant to the trade and consumers," explains Simon Counsell (45).

"Target 2000' will present the timber industry with few difficulties, for, according to the rhetoric of the producers and traders, logging as practised already is sustainable. Target 2000' thus becomes nothing more than a formula for business as usual".

Calls by NGOs in SE Asia for an end to logging in natural forests have been backed by vigorous campaigns in Europe, Australia and the USA for a ban on the import of unsustainably produced tropical timber products. The ITTO has vigorously rejected any such restrictions on free trade. Proposed legislation in the European Parliament and the US Senate, which would impose such trade regulations, has been bitterly condemned by timber producing nations like Malaysia and Indonesia. The supposedly neutral Executive Director of the ITTO has been quick to take up the cudgels on the producers' behalf.

In his opening statement to the ITTO in Bali in 1990, Dr Frezailah accused those NGOs that were pressing for a halt to the trade in unsustainably produced timber, of carry-

ing out a "simplistic", "short-sighted" and "misleading" campaign to restrict the export of tropical timber. He charged the northern NGOs with being oblivious or uncaring of the complexities of tropical deforestation and for promoting a strategy that will seriously harm Third World countries, particularly the poor. Poverty, Dr Freezailah claimed, is the real cause of deforestation. The NGO campaign of "threat" and "vilification" is built on "colossal misconceptions, confusion and obsessions... threats of fire and brimstone, alarmism and vindictiveness" (46).

The official ITTO position is that "import regulation may result in negative effects in producing countries in terms of their commitment to sustainable management of tropical forests. The regulation will at the same time promote substitution with temperate timbers and synthetic products. Such a development combined with the anti-tropical timber campaign now being mounted by certain conservation groups, will kill the trade in tropical timber. Once the trade is reduced or killed, it will eliminate the leverage of the international community to influence policies and developments regarding tropical forests." The ITTO argues that once tropical forests lose their value "as earners of revenue and foreign exchange", governments will be tempted to clear them to earn revenue by other means (47).

Some organizations, such as the IUCN and the MED, support this position, the IIED being opposed to any regulation on the grounds that "any appearance of coercion will be deeply resented" (48). But regulation of the trade is strongly favoured by the WWF, which has supported moves to introduce selective trade bans in the European Parliament. Entirely contrary to the ITTO's view, Francis Sullivan of WWF (UK) believes that "without regulation the trade has no future, because either there will be no forests left or no one will buy the timber anyway." According to this view, it is the lack of immediate and effective regulation which poses the greatest risk to the timber trade. WWF (International) is thus calling for a total switch to sustainably produced timber by 1995, to be imposed by trade restrictions if the ITTO cannot transform the trade by other means. The WWF is already looking to use the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) to halt trade in already vulnerable hardwood species (49).

Giving the Forests Value

Sullivan also rejects the argument that forests will be cleared faster by governments if they cannot harvest revenue from them — and with good reason. Indeed, history shows that the contrary is the truth. For example, in Brazil, the Government has promoted the conversion of forests for agriculture for political reasons, with no attempt to realize the forests' economic value, whereas, in other areas, logging and hence forest can be saved only by making them lucrative is entirely spurious.

Hans Gregerson and Alien Lundgren of the University of Minnesota and Gary Lindell of the United States Department of Agriculture, note:

"In fact, higher prices (for timber) have not led to sustained yield management, if anything, they led in the recent past to more rapid timber mining. This is partly because, while sustainable yield management may have become more profitable, it is even more profitable for the industry to take all merchantable timber, which often results in damage to residual stands to a point where

stained yield management becomes impossible" (50).

Moreover it has become clear that not all producer countries are as opposed to regulation of the trade as Indonesia and Malaysia. In April 1990, Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, noted "it would be a major benefit if these (consumer) countries could support our own policy requirement for sustainable yield production by imposing their own restrictions upon tropical timber not supplied from genuine sustainable yield projects" (51).

Consumer countries, too, are likely to move ahead unilaterally in imposing selective bans if the ITTO continues to lag behind. The Dutch Parliament is already in the process of considering a ministerial proposal to halt the import of all unsustainably produced timber after 1995, having reassured itself already that such a measure would not contravene GATT. Many local councils in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK have also taken the decision not to use tropical hardwoods in their construction programmes, while some Australian trades unions have refused to handle tropical timber.

A Consumer Boycott

In the absence of selective bans, or at least accurate labels defining a product's provenance, a complete consumer boycott of tropical timber products seems inevitable.

What the ITTO favours instead of such disincentives is a voluntary code of improved forest management which national governments would be urged to adopt in their own interests. Initially, attempts were made at the ITTO jointly to agree binding guidelines for 'best practice' but producer governments have reacted against this too as a violation of national sovereignty. In May 1990, the ITTO agreed on non-binding guidelines, characterized by the NGOs as 'guidelines for guidelines'.

Many NGOs are very sceptical of the value of such prescriptions by themselves, noting that in many countries, like Malaysia and Indonesia, 'sustainable management' regimes are already theoretically in place, but the situation on the ground is one of rapid deforestation. What is needed, the NGOs argue, is combination of incentives and disincentives to force the trade to improve its practice. Increasingly they are looking outside the moribund ITTO to achieve these objectives.

What About People?

Conspicuously absent from the whole debate about the timber trade has been any mention of people. The ITTO is so dominated by the thinking of conventional forestry that it has been unable to find ways of dealing with such a 'politically sensitive' question. Issues such as community-based forest management, community participation in planning, the land rights of forest dwellers, even the human dimensions of sustain ability, have barely received consideration. Nor, until recently, have the NGOs done much to redress this critical short-sightedness.

The question was only raised for the first time in the ITTO's 1988 meeting in Rio de Janeiro, when FOE adopted language drafted by the human rights group Survival International urging that the rights of forest dwellers to their

Logging in Sarawak: The Facts

Some 70 per cent of Sarawak's forests have been leased out to loggers. The forests are being cut at some 300,000 hectares per year, at which rate the primary forest will be practically logged out in 7 to 12 years. Logging concessions are handed out by the Chief Minister who is also the Minister for Forestry. Nearly all State Assemblymen have logging interests. One of the largest concessions is held by the Minister for Environment and Tourism.

Logging roads have been pushed across areas cultivated by native people and their burial sites have been disturbed. The intensive logging of primary forests has caused a serious decline in game. Mean intakes in protein have declined from 54 kg/person/year to only 12 kg/person/year according to a WWF study, while a Sarawak Government study shows that, in recently logged areas, there is a threefold increase in serious malnutrition in native communities, affecting some 31 per cent of the population.

The accelerating forest loss is also leading to increased soil erosion and rapid surface run-off, causing the visible pollution of streams and rivers, muddying drinking and bathing waters, blocking piped water supplies and causing stocks of fish to crash, so further

impoverishing the local diet. Government figures reveal that some 60 per cent of Sarawak's rivers suffer such pollution.

The destruction of the native peoples' environment is denying them access to forest produce, for making baskets, for construction canoes and longhouses, for their medicines, arrow poisons and blowpipes, for resins, fruits and dyes. Logging is also directly affecting native people working in the lumber camps, where mortalities are some 21 times the rate found in Canada.

About 220,000 native people in Sarawak depend on the forest. Their ways of life are being undermined by the logging, which is destroying the forests that they depend on. Since March 1987, native people have repeatedly blockaded logging company roads to prevent the destruction on their lands. The Government has done nothing to address the native peoples' grievances or curb the logging. Instead, the army, the police and forest guards have sought to intimidate the local people. There have been many arrests, most under a new law passed in November 1987 which makes the obstruction of logging roads a criminal offence. The latest blockades went up in late July 1990. To date, there have been over 300 individual arrests.

lands should be respected in the handing out of logging concessions. At the November 1989 meeting of the ITTO, Survival International argued that the ITTO must also include the concept of sustaining forest peoples' livelihoods in its working definition of sustainability (52). The organization has repeatedly called on the ITTO to respect the rights of forest peoples to the use and ownership of their traditional lands, a call which has now been taken up by most of the other NGOs attending ITTO functions (53). This concern was echoed by Prince Charles who counts himself "among those people who find it disturbing that [the ITTO's] Articles of Agreement make no mention of the rights and needs of indigenous forest dwellers" (54).

The Sarawak Mission

The issue of forest peoples' rights finally forced its way into the ITTO's agenda in 1989, as international indignation about the escalating conflict between loggers and native people in Sarawak became too heated to ignore. At the May 1989 meeting, in Côte d'Ivoire, the ITTO adopted a resolution to send an official investigative mission to Sarawak with the aim of assessing "the sustainable utilization and conservation of tropical forests and their genetic resources, as well as the maintenance of the ecological balance in Sarawak... with a view to ensuring their optimum utilization" (55).

As publically presented, the idea of the mission originally came from the ITTO, promoted by the Malaysian Executive Director, Dr Freezailah. It transpires that, in fact, it was the Malaysian Government itself that requested the visit. Sarawak's Chief Minister travelled personally to the Côte d'Ivoire meeting. Evidently the Malaysian authorities hoped that such a mission would demonstrate to the outside

world their willingness to deal openly with the controversy. Many NGOs, however, feared that the mission was a smokescreen which would obscure the lack of real progress being made within Sarawak to resolve the conflict of interests between loggers and forest dwellers.

Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM), the environmental organization which has most closely supported the native resistance to logging, was quick to voice concern about the mission. "Our fundamental objection to the mission is that it is unable to function objectively because of its vested interest", noted SAM's President, Mohammed Idris. "A truly independent study of forest management in Sarawak would require terms of reference which do not presume that timber is the primary value of the tropical forest" (56).

"In practical terms, no commercial logging of tropical forests has proven to be sustainable from the standpoint of the forest ecosystem, and any such logging must be recognized as mining, not sustaining the basic forest resource."

Lee Talbot, Environmental officer for the World Bank's Africa Environment Unit, 1990.

Subsequently events proved these misgivings well founded. In the first place, the 'terms of reference' of the mission did not explicitly direct it to investigate the social impact of logging, much less the legitimacy of the native peoples' grievances. Moreover, the ten member team, composed as it was of foresters and economists, was ill-prepared to look into such matters. Yet, had it chosen to do so, the mission could have interpreted the concept of 'opti-

mum utilization', as laid down in its terms of reference, as referring to all forms of forest use, not just the extraction of timber. The concept of 'sustainability' could also have been taken to include a concern for sustaining local livelihoods, particularly as the official Forest Policy of Sarawak itself sets the 'prior claims of local demands' above the export trade in forest produce' (57).

In the event, the mission chose a narrow interpretation of its task, which it defined as being "to assess the sustainability of forestry", thereby marginalizing not only human considerations but also alternative forms of forest use (58). The mission made no serious attempt to evaluate the importance of non-timber products in the local economy, although many of these products are vital to the lives of local people.

Even as the mission progressed, NGO concerns were sharpened. Mission members made clear that a priority in their minds was that the mission itself should be replicable. In other words, the mission could not probe too deeply into issues that might reflect badly on Sarawak government, because, if it did, other producer nations would be very unlikely to allow similar ITTO missions into their own countries in the future. This 'lowest common denominator' approach clearly implied that social considerations would get short shrift.

Moreover, the first of the mission's three visits to Sarawak was entirely chaperoned by the Sarawak Government. Careful guidance by government officials continued during the course of the investigation. The ITTO's Executive Director also accompanied the mission on each of its visits to Sarawak. Thus, although the mission did meet with native people, these meetings nearly all took place in formal settings, usually in government buildings with officials looking on.

Despite receiving many written invitations, the mission visited none of the settlements which had complained most about the impact of logging. Of the two communities that the mission did visit, one was a model village seen during the first government-guided tour, while the second attracted the mission because it was in the vicinity of a proposed national park. Lamently the mission report concluded that it had been unable to investigate any of the grievances noted by the native people (59).

Despite the limitations, and before the investigation had even concluded, one mission member felt authorized to write to the US Government alleging that the suggestion that there was rural opposition to logging "is contrary to the findings of the ITTO mission. Throughout the country, one group after another including rural community leaders, told us they favored logging" (60).

"The argument that forests can only be saved by making them lucrative is entirely spurious."

Meanwhile, from the Sarawak Government's point of view, the mission was proving a publicity success. Long before the mission actually reported to the ITTO, banner headlines in the local newspapers shrieked 'Top marks for our forest management', citing the mission leader as stating that Sarawak's forest management system is "one of the best in terms of policy" (61).

Ignoring Native Rights

NGOs were quick to criticize the mission report when it appeared. In its opening chapter, the report revealingly refers to the "native peoples question" as an "awkward difficulty" and it was clearly not one to which the mission members gave much priority. Of some 260 publications to which the mission referred, there was not a single anthropological text. The report made no attempt to assess how many people live in the forests or are dependent on them for their welfare (62).

Despite the fact that what the native people had been demanding was a mechanism to secure their land rights, the report made no such recommendations. While noting that extensive areas under 'native customary rights' exist in Sarawak — and that these rights present a problem to the management of Permanent Forest Estate (PFE) — the report simultaneously advocates a considerable expansion of PFE without providing a means of resolving conflicting land claims. "This is a formula for further increasing land disputes in Sarawak," stated Harrison Ngau, a native Kayan who runs the SAM office in Sarawak (63).

Lawyers working with the native people in Sarawak were also very disappointed by the mission's cavalier attitude to legal issues. Lacking a lawyer, even though this had been strongly urged before the final team membership had been announced, the mission team was obliged to note that it "was not competent to address land rights matters". Notwithstanding, the report went on to make categorical statements on native peoples' land rights. Chee Yoke Ling, a lawyer at the Penang-based Asia-Pacific Peoples Environment Network, is concerned that these statements could prejudice future attempts to resolve the legal problems in Sarawak:

"An examination of the document reveals fundamental misunderstandings of the law on the part of the mission. In their meetings with native leaders the mission members adopted a lecturing tone and made misinformed statements about the nature and extent of the natives' legal rights." (64)

Many observers believe that one of the main problems in Sarawak is the way that the handing out of logging concessions is tightly controlled by politicians, who share them out amongst themselves to maintain their wealth and power. With logging so directly benefiting the political elite, the forestry service is ill-placed to insist on careful management or a concern for local communities (65). Yet, this was not an issue that the mission chose to investigate. Indeed, according to one mission member, the possibility that timber concessions "are concentrated in the hands of friends or family members of political elites [does not] serve any purpose relevant to the study... if true it might even favour rather than discourage good forest management, since it would then be necessary only to convince the political elite, who then presumably could force their cronies into line" (66).

Professional Compromise

NGOs have also criticized the report's professional competence. The mission only recommended a 30 per cent reduction in the annual cut, simultaneous to the introduction of cross-the-board improvements in the forestry service. According to WWF (International), instituting such

improvements could take up to half a century to take effect - by which time there would be no primary forests left. "Using the mission's own figures for forest timber yields, a 60 per cent reduction seems to be what the mission should have called for", notes Christopher Elliott of the WWF (67).

Despite all these serious shortcomings, what the mission did reveal about Sarawak's forests has shown that environmentalists' concerns were amply justified. At present rates, the primary forests of Sarawak available for timber production will be all logged out within eleven years. The mission found ample evidence of poor logging management and practice, and consequent forest degradation and ecological problems (68).

Many NGOs considered the Sarawak study to be a test case of the ITTO's competence. What it reveals very clearly is how the ITTO subordinates human and environmental considerations to the interests of the timber industry. The mission is a clear example of what Vandana Shiva calls the 'violence of science', the narrow view of experts riding rough shod over the needs and views of local people (69).

The Future of the ITTO

Under the terms of the ITTA, the ITTO is an independent organization controlled by a council made up of member countries, that has a set term of authority of five years. The Council (ITTC) is empowered to extend its term by up to two terms of two years each if it so decides. The ITTC has already invoked this power once and, if it does so again, its authority will lapse in 1994 when the ITTA is either renegotiated and extended or the ITTO is dissolved. Renegotiation of the ITTA would, under normal circumstances, take place under the auspices of UNCTAD, in Geneva. However, timber interests in Japan and SE Asia are keen to control the process as much as possible and are pushing to have the ITTA renegotiated at a special meeting of the ITTC itself in Yokohama. In this case, a second UN Conference would be necessary to ratify the second ITTA.

Either way we can be pretty sure that the ITTO meetings in 1993 and 1994 will be completely taken up by the

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renegotiations, leaving precious little scope for the ITTO to make any substantive progress. Governments would do well to look elsewhere if they are hoping to achieve any rapid transformation in the tropical timber trade. At the 1989 meeting, in a joint statement to the Council, the NGO's expressed their disappointment that "despite 15 years of negotiations, the ITTO is still not able to decide what to do to manage tropical forests, or even how to define sustainable management. During these years of vacillation, 160 million hectares of tropical forest have been destroyed" (70).

This article has attempted to demonstrate how this lack of progress is structurally inherent in the ITTO. Hobbled by political compromise and dominated by the interests of the timber trade, the ITTO's narrow scope is reinforced by scientific expertise which hesitates to address the wider problems plaguing forestry and the tropical forests. In the words of Jack Westoby:

"Here we come to grips with what I consider is the worst crime that can be laid at the door of foresters; they have conducted themselves as conscientious, loyal and obedient public servants... and in so doing they have failed in their civic responsibilities... the forester, like any professional scientist or technician, has a responsibility to the hand that feeds him. But this is not the end of his responsibilities. He also has a responsibility to the community-at-large, to society, to the public.

"Take for example, the professional foresters of the developing countries of SE Asia. In many of these countries, the forest resource is being recklessly pillaged in response to overwhelming local political pressures. The local forester, isolated, lacking political allies, is powerless to check this process — indeed is often an accessory. His situation is not helped when he sees the [expatriate] forester... condoning practices that he would never dream of allowing on his home ground. If the expatriate forester were more conscious of his social responsibility, were truly alive to his basic ethic, he would feel an obligation to counter and expose unacceptable practices." (71)

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ITTO and Forest Conservation Priorities

In WWF's view the conservation objective of ITTO should be:

The rapid phasing out of conventional logging practices in favour of sustainable natural forest management by

- The adoption of appropriate national policies by Producer and Consumer countries coordinated by ITTO and the adoption of a Code of Conduct;
- Definition of ecologically sustainable management (as in Article 1(h));
- Identification of successful examples of sustainable managed concessions;
- Identification of tree species endangered by further trade, and cessation of that trade;
- Establishment of tariff and quota regulations - including reform of grading rules - to phase out log trade in favour of timber processed in producer countries, and to phase in sustainably produced supplies for consumers;
- Creation of a fund to demarcate and protect threatened forest areas of high biological importance (eg those being identified by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature) in cooperation with aid agencies;
- Inclusion in the Annual Report of key forest data, including rates of loss, conversion to plantation and other uses, rate of establishment of alternative sources of supply, rate of protected area establishment, and volume of trade in species identified as endangered by trade;
- Negotiation to establish a "real price" for timber allowing for the costs of reforestation and conservation. And.
- In the short term, ITTO should ensure that the Reforestation and Management Committee and ITTO's Project programme have adequate expert advice (ie forest conservation-capable staff)
- All consumer and producer members should pay their full dues;
- EEC states and US should contribute to the Project Fund on a comparable basis to Switzerland (which gave US\$1 m) and the Netherlands which gave US\$600,000.

Le monde associatif européen et la révision du Traité d'union politique de la Communauté

Dans le n° 5 du *Citoyen Européen*, a été présentée une proposition en dix points qui reflète les souhaits des associations de citoyens par rapport à la question de la révision des traités communautaires. Trois objectifs se dégagent clairement de ce qu'affirment ECAS et beaucoup d'autres organisations européennes ou nationales:

- Il faut que le nouveau Traité reconnaisse le rôle du monde associatif. Il est certainement tout à fait anachronique de voir les associations non lucratives exclues en vertu de l'article 58/2 au moment où la Communauté envisage une citoyenneté européenne et l'extension de sa compétence dans des domaines qui sont au cœur des activités du monde associatif.
- La Communauté doit être compétente non seulement en matière de libre circulation des ressortissants communautaires mais aussi en matière d'immigration, non seulement pour la politique sociale sur le lieu de travail mais aussi pour la moitié de la population qui ne travaille pas. Il faut une base légale permettant de s'attaquer à toutes les formes de discrimination. De nouveaux articles du Traité doivent permettre de prendre les décisions à la majorité (le vote à l'unanimité serait un pas en arrière) pour les conditions de vie comme pour les conditions de travail, la santé, l'éducation, la culture et la protection des consommateurs, surtout pour les catégories de la population les plus vulnérables.
- Le Parlement européen représente les intérêts des citoyens individuels. Il a traditionnellement soutenu le rôle des associations et fait pression pour étendre les ressources et les compétences communautaires. Il faut qu'il puisse partager le droit d'initiative avec la Commission au moins dans le domaine de l'Europe des citoyens. Un système de co-décision devra permettre d'étendre ses pouvoirs de manière à ce que le Conseil des ministres n'ait plus le dernier mot dans le processus législatif. Dans ce dossier, qui sert également de document de travail pour un séminaire organisé par ECAS le 6 juin au Parlement européen, nous commenterons le texte de la présidence luxembourgeoise du 17 avril («Projet d'articles de

Texte présenté au séminaire sur «Le monde associatif et la révision du Traité» organisé par ECAS (Euro-Citizen-Action-Service) le 6 juin 1991 au siège du Parlement européen à Bruxelles.
Le titre est de la rédaction.

Traité en vue de la mise en place d'une union politique») et le document de travail de la Commission. Largement diffusé, le texte de la présidence du Conseil se présente comme un «non-paper», un titre plutôt modeste pour ces 90 pages d'amendements; quant au texte de la Commission, qui est encore plus long, il contient d'utiles réflexions de fond sur les propositions d'amendements.

Le texte de la présidence est un «non-paper» parce qu'il ne vise pas à refléter les positions des Etats membres mais plutôt des tendances générales en laissant largement ouvertes des questions fondamentales telles que les procédures de vote. Il y a toutefois un certain parallélisme entre les deux documents (sauf sur la question des pouvoirs respectifs des institutions) et les propositions visant à étendre la compétence communautaire à de nouveaux domaines reflètent sans doute le point de vue de certains Etats membres. La question est de savoir ce que les autres Etats membres en pensent et quelle proportion des amendements proposés sera effectivement adoptée. Il est trop tôt pour y répondre étant donné que les négociations à la conférence intergouvernementale se poursuivront très probablement jusqu'à la fin de l'année, sous la présidence néerlandaise. Il faut d'ailleurs que les amendements au Traité, qui doivent être ratifiés par les parlements nationaux, soient adoptés à l'unanimité. Au point où en sont les choses, les organisations du secteur bénévole ne peuvent pratiquement plus avancer de nouvelles suggestions: il leur faut s'en tenir de près aux textes préparés par la Commission et la présidence du Conseil.

Voici quelques pistes pour d'éventuels amendements.

1. Le «déficit démocratique» et les pouvoirs du Parlement européen

La Commission rappelle que dans son avis du 21 octobre elle s'était prononcée pour un renforcement de la légitimité démocratique du Parlement en augmentant son pouvoir législatif, son contrôle sur les accords internationaux et sur son budget. Ce qui intéressera particulièrement le monde associatif, c'est que le renforcement des pouvoirs du Parlement proposé par la Commission intervient en seconde lecture d'un texte législatif, de sorte que le Conseil n'a plus le dernier mot: le Parlement et le Conseil adoptent tous les deux le texte après qu'un accord a été

trouvé dans un comité de conciliation. Le texte de la présidence prévoit lui aussi un comité de conciliation, mais le dernier mot dans le processus législatif reste au Conseil, même si le Parlement dispose d'un droit de veto. Il semble également que cette co-décision entre le Conseil et le Parlement ne s'étendrait pas à des domaines tels que l'agriculture.

La Commission va donc davantage dans le sens du rapport de David Martin, Vice-Président du Parlement européen. Il y a cependant certains pièges pour le Parlement. Ce projet de révision du Traité prévoit en effet de créer, au-dessus des directives et des règlements, un nouvel instrument législatif, appelé «loi», qui réunirait certaines caractéristiques des deux textes traditionnels. Certes, le Parlement exercerait un plus grand contrôle sur ces lois, mais en contrepartie la Commission propose une extension de son pouvoir exécutif pour émettre des règlements et des décisions. Or, si les autres institutions peuvent examiner ces arrêtés d'exécution, normalement elles ne les contrôlent pas. Pour le Parlement, le risque est donc de voir un texte vidé de sa substance par les modalités d'application. Pour sa part, la présidence du Conseil propose également de créer des lois, sans avoir visiblement à l'esprit que ceci pourrait conduire à un renforcement du pouvoir exécutif de la Commission.

Au contraire de la Commission, la présidence du Conseil fait un geste pour conférer un droit d'initiative au Parlement européen. Mais cela aboutit seulement à donner une base légale à la pratique par laquelle le Parlement adopte une résolution demandant à la Commission de faire des propositions, sans la moindre obligation pour celle-ci de le faire. Si les questions de politique étrangère et de sécurité pourrnt entrer davantage dans le cadre communautaire, le droit d'initiative de la Commission et la capacité du Parlement européen à exercer un contrôle démocratique ne semblent pas pour autant sortir renforcés du processus. Les négociations tourneront-elles en un conflit de pouvoir entre les institutions? Il est en tout cas certain que les gouvernements ne sont pas convaincus de la nécessité d'accroître le rôle législatif du Parlement européen bien au-delà de ce qui est prévu dans l'Acte unique.

2. La forme générale d'un nouveau Traité

Notre analyse se cantonne aux propositions d'amendement du Traité susceptible d'intéresser les membres d'ECAS, ce qui risque d'en donner une image quelque peu faussée. Nous ne comptons pas (encore) de membres actifs dans le domaine de la sécurité et du contrôle des armements mais les associations spécialisées dans ces questions sont conscientes que les discussions de Bruxelles et de Strasbourg revêtiront une importance de plus en plus grande. En effet, l'essentiel de la discussion au Conseil des ministres et de l'interminable liste d'amendements introduits par la Commission et la présidence du Conseil vise non pas à faire de la politique étrangère et des questions de sécurité des matières relevant clairement de la compétence communautaire, mais à les rapprocher des institutions pour éviter que les ministres des affaires étrangères, et demain peut-être les ministres de la défense, ne doivent se rencontrer dans des lieux différents. Pour les problèmes de sécurité par exemple, les ministres de la CE se réuniraient sur la base d'un travail préparatoire effectué par l'Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO). Même si la plu-

part des gouvernements veulent introduire des règles contraignantes et des procédures plus claires pour éviter la confusion apparue au moment de la crise du Golfe, il y a une nette opposition à l'idée que les problèmes de sécurité puissent relever de la compétence communautaire. Il n'empêche qu'à cet égard le nouveau Traité pourrait constituer une dimension nouvelle pour les groupes de citoyens et il serait intéressant d'organiser un séminaire spécialement destiné aux associations qui s'occupent de désarmement ou de coopération au développement, qui fait aussi l'objet d'un nouveau chapitre dans le Traité.

3. La citoyenneté européenne

Sur la base de l'initiative espagnole, la Commission propose que le Traité contienne les éléments de base de la citoyenneté européenne en complément de la nationalité, afin de permettre à cette notion de se développer. La présidence luxembourgeoise rejoint tout à fait la Commission sur ce point tout en laissant plus de latitude au Conseil pour décider à un stade ultérieur comment appliquer pratiquement les dispositions, par exemple sur le droit de vote. L'idée de David Martin de créer une charte des droits fondamentaux n'est reprise par aucune des deux institutions, qui s'en tiennent à une clause très large: «L'Union respecte les droits et libertés fondamentaux reconnus dans les constitutions et lois des Etats membres et dans la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales». La notion de citoyenneté européenne ne repose pas sur le lieu de résidence mais sur l'appartenance à un Etat membre. Le texte de la présidence luxembourgeoise prévoit que «tout citoyen de l'Union a le droit de circuler et de séjourner librement et sans limitation de durée sur le territoire des Etats membres de l'Union». Il en résulte donc que la liberté de mouvement s'applique tant aux travailleurs qu'aux non-actifs. Cependant, le principe de la liberté de séjourner dans d'autres pays est précisé par la nécessité de «dispositions destinées à assurer une répartition équitable des charges qui en découlent pour les Etats membres, notamment dans le domaine de la protection sociale». Le texte poursuit en stipulant que «tout citoyen de l'Union a le droit de vote aux élections municipales et aux élections au Parlement européen dans l'Etat membre où il réside», une question soumise elle aussi à des conditions qui doivent être adoptées avant le 31 décembre 1993. La Commission va plus loin, d'une part en prévoyant un droit d'éligibilité dans d'autres pays, d'autre part et d'une manière générale en plaçant la citoyenneté européenne dans un contexte plus large. Son texte instituerait un droit à un environnement sain, à l'égalité des chances et de traitement, à la solidarité sociale et au respect mutuel.

Afin de rendre la CEE plus accessible à ses citoyens, le Traité pourrait inclure le droit (existant) d'adresser une pétition au Parlement européen, sans toutefois prévoir de dispositions pour faciliter l'accès à la Cour européenne. La Commission propose de créer dans chaque Etat membre un médiateur (ombudsman) chargé de régler les questions des citoyens ayant trait à l'Europe une fonction que la présidence du Conseil suggère d'attribuer au Parlement européen. Ne convient-il pas de combiner une approche centralisée et décentralisée? Le Parlement aura le droit - qu'il exerce déjà en pratique - de mener des enquêtes publiques. Quant à l'idée de lui permettre d'élire le président de

la Commission, elle n'a pas emporté l'adhésion de la plupart des Etats membres.

Cette notion de citoyenneté européenne en pleine émergence devrait intégrer le rôle des associations de citoyens, notamment dans la collecte des pétitions auprès des particuliers.

Et qu'en est-il de la liberté de mouvement à l'intérieur de la Communauté en matière d'immigration? ECAS et les organisations de défense des libertés fondamentales ont défendu le droit des immigrants et des réfugiés à bénéficier du même traitement que les citoyens communautaires, avec la même procédure de décision et le même contrôle démocratique. La présidence du Conseil suggère de faire un petit pas dans cette direction:

Article A

1. Aux fins de la réalisation des objectifs de l'Union, du fait de la libre circulation des personnes et de l'institution d'une citoyenneté de l'Union, et sans préjudice des compétences des Communautés européennes, les Etats membres considèrent les domaines suivants comme des questions d'intérêt commun:

- (a) contrôle lors du franchissement des frontières extérieures des Etats membres;
- (b) entrée, circulation et séjour réguliers sur le territoire des Etats membres de ressortissants de pays tiers (notamment conditions d'accès, politique des visas, politique d'asile);
- (c) lutte contre l'immigration et le séjour irréguliers sur le territoire des Etats membres de ressortissants de pays tiers;
- (d) lutte contre les trafics illicites, notamment le trafic illicite de la drogue;
- (e) coopération douanière dans les domaines ne ressortissant pas des compétences des Communautés européennes;
- (f) coopération judiciaire en matière civile et pénale, notamment en ce qui concerne la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions judiciaires;
- (g) prévention et poursuite de toutes les formes de délinquance (1).

4. L'extension des compétences communautaires

La place nous manque pour évoquer ici tous les aspects du projet qui intéressent le monde associatif. Certains articles existants subissent des changements profonds (comme la recherche et le développement, où l'accent est mis davantage sur les objectifs qualitatifs et plus seulement sur celui d'assurer la compétitivité de l'industrie européenne), mais ce qui frappe le plus, c'est l'élargissement de la politique commune à de nouveaux domaines, dont les plus importants pour notre secteur sont:

- l'énergie;
- l'établissement et le développement de réseaux trans-européens;
- la recherche d'un niveau élevé de protection de la santé;
- la recherche d'un enseignement et d'une formation de haute qualité et de l'épanouissement de la culture européenne sous toutes ses formes;
- la politique de coopération au développement;
- le renforcement de la protection des consommateurs;

(1) Voir aussi article 209 du Traité C.E.

- les mesures de protection civile;

- les mesures liées au secteur du tourisme,

Nous limiterons notre analyse aux changements essentiels intervenus dans les domaines intéressant les membres d'ECAS.

4.1 La politique sociale

La Commission souligne le décalage entre les compétences communautaires résultant des dispositions actuelles du Traité et les ambitions de la Charte sociale. L'accent est mis sur le principe de subsidiarité, la Communauté laissant une grande marge de manoeuvre aux négociations collectives et au dialogue entre les partenaires sociaux (dont devrait également faire partie le secteur bénévole, selon l'idée défendue par ECAS, dans la mesure où la politique sociale dépasse le cadre du lieu de travail). Dans sa note explicative, la Commission fait référence à des accords sociaux qui vont au-delà des relations de travail. Elle propose également d'étendre le vote à la majorité qualifiée, d'inclure dans la politique sociale, outre les conditions de travail, les conditions de vie et de compléter l'article relatif à l'égalité de rémunération pour un même travail afin de couvrir de façon plus générale les discriminations dont les femmes sont victimes.

Les passages qui suivent, extraits du texte de la présidence luxembourgeoise, reprennent l'essentiel des propositions de la Commission, et notamment une définition un peu plus large de la politique sociale:

La Communauté a pour objectif de contribuer à améliorer les conditions de vie et de travail, d'encourager le dialogue social, de développer les ressources humaines et de lutter contre les exclusions (article 117). Le dialogue social, la coopération entre Etats membres, les études et les avis etc. doivent permettre d'atteindre ces objectifs. A cet égard, il vaut la peine de citer intégralement certaines des dispositions prévues aux articles 118 A, 119 et 128 (voyez l'encadré).

4.2 Extension des compétences communautaires

L'encadré reprend les propositions visant à inclure dans le Traité de nouvelles bases juridiques permettant d'agir dans les domaines suivants:

-La santé: la priorité ne va pas au lancement d'un vaste programme mais à la «*lutte contre les grands fléaux*». L'objectif premier est donc de donner une base juridique à l'action européenne contre le cancer, le sida, les maladies cardiovasculaires et l'usage de drogue, ce qui devrait déboucher sur des mesures légales de prévention ou des initiatives communes très ciblées pour réduire le nombre des victimes de ces fléaux. Le texte ne précise cependant pas si les décisions seront prises à la majorité ou à l'unanimité (cette dernière hypothèse constituerait un pas en arrière en comparaison avec l'article 100 A de l'Acte unique qui prévoit que les textes législatifs en matière d'alimentation, de médicaments, de sécurité des produits et de recherche sont adoptés à la majorité qualifiée). A l'inverse du document de la Commission, le texte de la présidence du Conseil précise utilement que «*tes exigences en matière de santé sont une composante des autres politiques de la Communauté*».

Article 118 A

1. En vue de réaliser les objectifs de l'article 117, la Communauté soutient l'action des Etats membres dans les domaines suivants:

- le milieu de travail et notamment la protection de la santé et de la sécurité;
- la conformité des conditions de vie et de travail aux droits fondamentaux des travailleurs;
- l'information et la consultation des travailleurs.

2. A cette fin le Conseil, statuant à la majorité qualifiée sur proposition de la Commission, en coopération avec le Parlement européen et après consultation du Comité économique et social, arrête par voie de directive les prescriptions minimales applicables progressivement, compte tenu des conditions et des réglementations techniques existant dans chacun des Etats membres.

Ces directives évitent d'imposer des contraintes administratives, financières et juridiques telles qu'elles contrarieraient la création et le développement de petites et moyennes entreprises.

3. Les dispositions arrêtées en vertu du présent article ne font pas obstacle au maintien et à l'établissement, par chaque Etat membre, de mesures de protection renforcée des conditions de travail compatibles avec le présent traité.

4. Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas aux domaines de la sécurité sociale et de la protection sociale, des rémunérations, du droit syndical, des conditions d'exercice du droit de grève ni aux dispositions relatives à l'accès à l'emploi des ressortissants des pays tiers.

Article 119

1. Chaque Etat membre assure l'égalité de traitement entre hommes et femmes dans le travail. En particulier, il assure l'application du principe de l'égalité de rémunération pour un même travail et celui de l'égalité des chances sur le marché de l'emploi.

2. Par rémunération, il faut entendre, au sens du présent article, le salaire ou traitement ordinaire de base ou minimum, et tous autres avantages payés directement ou indirectement, en espèces ou en nature, par l'employeur au travailleur en raison de l'emploi de ce dernier. L'égalité de rémunération, sans discrimination fondée sur le sexe, implique:

- (a) que la rémunération accordée pour un même travail payé à la tâche soit établie sur la base d'une même unité de mesure;
- (b) que la rémunération accordée pour un travail payé au temps soit la même pour un même poste de travail.

Article 128

Le Conseil statuant à la majorité qualifiée sur proposition de la Commission, en coopération avec le Parlement européen et après consultation du Comité économique et social, arrête les principes généraux et les actions nécessaires pour la mise en œuvre d'une politique commune de formation professionnelle qui puisse contribuer au développement harmonieux tant des économies nationales que du marché commun.

- L'éducation, la culture et la protection des consommateurs: comme dans le domaine de la santé, on privilégie ici aussi une approche prudente «*qui appuie et complète celle des Etats membres*» et reconnaît les principes de subsidiarité et de diversité, notamment sur le plan culturel. L'article relatif à la protection des consommateurs prévoit cette fois le vote à la majorité qualifiée. Il contient aussi une clause qui devrait figurer dans le chapitre relatif à la santé et selon laquelle les mesures communes «ne font pas obstacle au maintien et à l'établissement, par chaque Etat membre, de mesures de protection renforcées compatibles avec le présent traité». On peut aussi défendre l'idée que, comme pour la santé, il y a tout lieu d'inclure la protection du consommateur, l'éducation et la culture dans les autres politiques de la Communauté (telles que l'harmonisation fiscale, la politique sociale ou l'action des fonds structurels). Plutôt que de se contenter de donner une large base juridique dans le Traité, les textes relatifs à la culture et à l'éducation ne devraient-ils pas aller plus loin et s'intéresser aussi à l'action et aux programmes de financement des institutions communautaires?

En guise de conclusion

Il est encore trop tôt pour juger les propositions de la Commission et celles de la présidence du Conseil ou pour deviner la proportion de celles qui seront adoptées et notamment pour savoir si le vote à la majorité qualifiée sera étendu. Le succès de l'Acte unique est en effet largement dû à ce dernier, qui a permis de compenser la formulation très générale de nombreuses clauses. Mais on peut déjà se demander, surtout à la lecture du texte de la présidence, si l'extension des politiques communes ne risque pas de se faire aux dépens du contrôle démocratique sur celles-ci. Et si, dans cette évolution prudente, il n'y aura pas un décalage entre les volets de certaines politiques qui reposeront sur une base juridique et les autres. Il est certain que le «non-paper» a suscité les critiques tant du Parlement que de la Commission dans le sens où l'Union qu'il propose prend la forme d'une structure intergouvernementale imposée aux institutions communautaires, qui ne fait l'objet d'aucun contrôle démocratique et réduit la Commission à jouer un rôle de secrétariat.

Il n'est pas encore trop tard pour que les associations de citoyens fassent part de leurs points de vue à leurs gouvernements, aux parlementaires nationaux et européens et à la Commission.

Nouveaux domaines de compétence communautaire

Titre XIV
La santé publique

Article unique

1. La Communauté contribue à assurer un niveau élevé de protection de la santé humaine en encourageant la coopération entre les Etats membres et, si nécessaire, en appuyant et en complétant leur action.
L'action de la Communauté porte sur la prévention et la promotion de modes de vie sains en accordant une attention particulière à la lutte contre les grands fléaux.
Les exigences en matière de santé sont une composante des autres politiques de la Communauté.
2. Les Etats membres coordonnent entre eux, en liaison avec la Commission, leurs politiques et programmes dans les domaines visés au paragraphe 1. La Commission peut prendre, en contact étroit avec les Etats membres, toute initiative pour promouvoir cette coordination.
3. La Communauté et les Etats membres favorisent la coopération avec les pays tiers et les organisations internationales compétentes en matière de santé publique.
4. Le Conseil, statuant (à ...) sur proposition de la Commission (rôle du Parlement européen ...) et après avoir consulté le Comité économique et social, arrête les mesures nécessaires à la réalisation des objectifs visés au présent article.
5. Les actions entreprises dans le domaine de la recherche sont décidées et mises en œuvre conformément aux dispositions du titre X.

Titre XV
L'éducation

Article unique

1. La Communauté contribue au développement d'une éducation et d'une formation de qualité en encourageant la coopération entre Etats membres et, si nécessaire, en appuyant et en complétant leur action dans le respect de l'autonomie des systèmes éducatifs et de la diversité culturelle.
2. L'action de la Communauté vise en particulier:
 - à promouvoir la coopération entre les établissements d'enseignement;
 - à favoriser la mobilité des étudiants et des enseignants, y compris par la reconnaissance académique des diplômes et des périodes d'études;
 - à développer la dimension européenne de l'enseignement, notamment par l'apprentissage et la diffusion des langues;
 - à organiser les échanges d'expérience et préconiser des orientations permettant de répondre aux problèmes communs aux systèmes d'éducation des Etats membres.
3. La Communauté et les Etats membres favorisent la coopération avec les pays tiers et les organisations internationales compétentes en matière d'éducation et de formation.
4. Le Conseil statuant à ... sur proposition de la Commission (rôle du Parlement européen) adopte des mesures pour contribuer à la réalisation des objectifs visés au présent article.

Titre XVI
La culture et la conservation du patrimoine


Article unique

1. La Communauté contribue à l'épanouissement des cultures des Etats membres tout en mettant en évidence l'identité et la dimension culturelle européennes.
2. L'action de la Communauté, qui respecte la diversité culturelle en Europe, encourage la coopération entre Etats membres et, si nécessaire, appuie et complète leur action dans les domaines suivants:
 - l'amélioration de la connaissance et de la diffusion de la culture et l'histoire des peuples européens,
 - la conservation et la sauvegarde du patrimoine culturel,
 - les échanges culturels,
 - la création artistique et littéraire,
 - la formation dans le domaine culturel,
 - le développement du secteur européen de l'audiovisuel.
3. La Communauté et les Etats membres favorisent la coopération avec les pays tiers et les organisations internationales compétentes dans le domaine de la culture.
4. Le Conseil, statuant à ... sur proposition de la Commission (rôle du Parlement européen), adopte des mesures pour contribuer à la réalisation des objectifs visés au présent article.

Titre XVII
La protection des consommateurs

Article unique

1. La Communauté contribue à la réalisation d'un niveau élevé de protection des consommateurs. Son action, qui appuie complète celle des Etats membres, porte sur la protection de la santé, de la sécurité et des intérêts économiques légitimes des consommateurs ainsi que sur leur information.
2. Le Conseil/statuant à la majorité qualifiée sur proposition de la Commission (rôle du Parlement) (Comité économique et social) adopte les mesures nécessaires à la réalisation des objectifs visés au présent article.
3. Les mesures arrêtées en vertu du présent article ne font pas obstacle au maintien et à l'établissement, par chaque Etat membre, de mesures de protection renforcées compatibles avec le présent traité.



Le Conseil de l'Europe et la vie associative dans les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale

L'action du Conseil de l'Europe en faveur des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale se situe sur un triple plan:

- *La sensibilisation, l'information et le dialogue sur les grands principes de la démocratie, des droits de l'homme et de l'architecture politique future de l'Europe.*

- *L'assistance et la coopération pour renforcer les évolutions démocratiques en cours et former les nouveaux responsables.* C'est dans ce contexte qu'ont été lancés le programme "Démosthène" d'assistance pour tous les aspects du fonctionnement de la Cité démocratique, et le programme "FOR E.A.S.T." destiné à la formation des chercheurs dans quelques domaines des sciences et techniques.

- *L'insertion*, qui permet d'intégrer progressivement les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale aux programmes et activités du Conseil de l'Europe, afin de les faire participer au processus de coopération européenne, dans l'attente de leur possible adhésion de plein droit à l'Organisation.

Pendant près d'un demi-siècle, ces pays ont été coupés des sources d'information occidentales, et l'on constate une véritable soif de connaissance que, dans le cadre de son action, le Conseil de l'Europe est en train de pallier.

Dans ce contexte, les organisations non gouvernementales et, plus généralement, le mouvement associatif, ont un rôle essentiel à jouer en tant que vecteur d'expression des attentes de la population, relais d'information et surtout, en tant que gardien vigilant des engagements démocratiques.

En effet, la coopération établie, de longue date avec le monde associatif, a enrichi les travaux du Conseil de l'Europe et a permis à ce dernier d'acquiescer une source d'expérience qu'il est disposé, avec le concours actif des ONG dotées du statut consultatif auprès de l'Organisation, à partager avec les représentants des organisations non gouvernementales en voie de création dans les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale.

Dans ce contexte, le Conseil de l'Eu-

rope a déjà pris une série d'initiatives, parmi lesquelles on peut notamment citer les suivantes:

A l'occasion des sessions de septembre-octobre 1990 et de janvier 1991 de l'Assemblée parlementaire, il a été organisé une visite d'étude, d'information et de contacts destinée aux représentants d'ONG établis dans des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale. Au cours de ces deux visites de 3 journées, les participants, représentant une trentaine d'ONG de 7 pays ont reçu une information détaillée sur le Conseil de l'Europe, ses réalisations et ses travaux en cours; ils ont également pu suivre les débats de l'Assemblée parlementaire. Les participants ont, finalement, rencontré des représentants des ONG dotées du statut consultatif auprès du Conseil de l'Europe, et participé à plusieurs de leurs réunions.

Le Conseil de l'Europe a l'intention d'organiser à l'avenir, dans le cadre du même programme des visites similaires, à l'occasion de certaines des sessions de l'Assemblée parlementaire.

Avec le concours actif du Conseil de l'Europe, une conférence sur "Le rôle des ONG dans un Etat démocratique" a eu lieu à Varsovie, les 16-18 décembre 1990. Il s'agissait d'un projet commun du ministre polonais du Travail et de la politique sociale, du Sénat polonais et de la Commission de liaison des ONG dotées du statut consultatif auprès du Conseil de l'Europe. La nécessité d'organisation d'une vie associative - surtout dans le secteur social - dans le cadre du développement des institutions démocratiques en Pologne a été fortement ressentie par les autorités polonaises, qui ont fait appel à l'expérience des ONG "occidentales". La Commission de liaison des ONG a répondu favorablement à cette demande de coopération et, avec l'aide du programme "Démosthène" du Conseil de l'Europe, une douzaine d'experts ont informé du rôle des ONG dans une société démocratique, de leur organisation interne, de leur statut juridique, etc. Après l'expérience positive de Varsovie, des conférences similaires pourraient être organisées dans d'autres pays.

Dans le cadre de la politique de coopération du Conseil de l'Europe avec les organisations non gouvernementales, une conférence sur le thème: "La politique au service des citoyens et la participation des citoyens à la politique" a été organisée, du 15 au 17 mai 1991 à Budapest, conjointement par la Commission des relations parlementaires et publiques de l'Assemblée parlementaire et par les ONG dotées du statut consultatif auprès du Conseil de l'Europe.

La Conférence a traité les deux sous-thèmes suivants:

- "Rôle des ONG dans la promotion de la participation des citoyens à la politique"

* "ONG, droit d'expression des citoyens: quel accès aux médias?"
Au cours des débats, l'accent particulier a été mis sur la lutte menée, par les ONG, pour la préservation de l'environnement.

La Conférence comptait parmi ses participants: des parlementaires

membres de l'Assemblée parlementaire et de pays jouissant d'un statut d'invité spécial auprès de l'Assemblée, des représentants des médias et des représentants d'ONG - un nombre considérable, en l'occurrence, représente la société civile, de par des ONG déjà établies dans des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale.

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L'expérience positive de ces premières initiatives confirme le rôle concret et constructif à jouer, par les ONG, dans les réformes en cours et dans le développement des structures démocratiques des pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale. L'action menée ensemble avec les ONG dotées du statut consultatif s'intègre parfaitement dans le cadre des programmes de coopération du Conseil de l'Europe avec ces pays, destinés à renforcer les évolutions démocratiques en cours et à former les nouveaux responsables aux différents niveaux de la société.

- Attribution au CICR du statut d'observateur auprès des Nations Unies

L'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies a décidé, le mardi 16 octobre 1990, d'inviter le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge à participer en qualité d'observateur à ses sessions et à ses travaux. Elle a en effet adopté sans vote un projet de résolution attribuant au CICR ce statut d'observateur, projet parrainé par 138 des 159 Etats membres de l'ONU.

Le texte de la résolution est le suivant:

Attribution du statut d'observateur au Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, eu égard au rôle et aux mandats particuliers qui lui ont été assignés par les Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949

L'Assemblée générale,

Rappelant les mandats que les Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 ont assignés au Comité international de la Croix-Rouge,

Considérant le rôle tout particulier que le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge remplit en conséquence dans les relations humanitaires internationales,

Désireuse de promouvoir la coopé-

ration entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge,

1. *Décide* d'inviter le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge à participer en qualité d'observateur aux sessions et aux travaux de l'Assemblée générale,

2. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de faire le nécessaire pour assurer l'application de la présente résolution. L'inscription à l'ordre du jour de la question de l'attribution du statut d'observateur au CICR avait été demandée par les représentants permanents de 21 pays, par lettre datée du 16 août 1990 adressée au secrétaire général des Nations Unies. Cette lettre était accompagnée d'un mémoire explicatif dont nous reproduisons le texte ci-après (Doc. A/45/191) et d'un projet de résolution dont le texte figure ci-dessus.

Le projet de résolution a été présenté à l'Assemblée générale réunie

en séance plénière par S.E.M. Vieri Traxler, Représentant permanent de l'Italie auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, lequel a expliqué sa démarche en raison d'un précédent historique: la présence à Solferino d'Henry Dunant, fondateur de la Croix-Rouge. Au nom de ses coauteurs, l'ambassadeur Traxler a rendu hommage à l'institution pour son importante contribution à la codification, au développement et à l'application du droit international humanitaire et pour son rôle d'intermédiaire neutre et impartial, voué à la promotion des idéaux humanitaires. Puis il a proposé que l'Assemblée consacre l'oeuvre impressionnante du CICR à la cause de l'humanité en lui accordant le statut d'observateur.

Il convient de rappeler ici que les Etats et autres organisations, notamment des organisations internationales régionales ou spécialisées, bénéficient du statut d'observateur auprès des Nations Unies, mais c'est la première fois que celui-ci est attribué à une institution qui n'est pas une organisation gouvernementale.

A ce propos, l'ambassadeur Traxler a déclaré que selon les coauteurs de la proposition, cette attribution ne devait pas être considérée comme un précédent, mais qu'elle soulignait le rôle spécial que la communauté internationale a conféré au CICR et aux mandats qui lui ont été assignés par les Conventions de Genève, lesquels font du Comité international une institution unique en son genre, de par sa nature et son statut.

Plusieurs orateurs, notamment les représentants de l'Inde, du Pakistan et des Etats-Unis se sont exprimés dans ce sens.

Comme l'a dit le président du CICR, M. Cornelio Sommaruga, "l'admission du CICR comme observateur auprès des Nations Unies représente une remarquable reconnaissance du rôle de l'institution au plan international". Par cette décision, l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies a réaffirmé les mandats du CICR; les principes humanitaires qui animent son action, notamment les principes de neutralité, d'impartialité et d'universalité. Elle contribuera également à renforcer encore la coopération du CICR avec l'ONU. Et sur un plan pratique, en ayant la possibilité

de s'exprimer sur des sujets de sa compétence, en ayant accès non seulement à la documentation mais aussi aux séances de l'Assemblée générale et des commissions, les représentants du CICR, dans les réunions des Nations Unies à New York, Genève et ailleurs pourront agir avec plus de rapidité et de manière plus directe auprès des acteurs de la scène internationale.

Annexe

ATTRIBUTION DU STATUT D'OBSERVATEUR AU COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE, EN EGARD AU ROLE ET AUX MANDATS PARTICULIERS QUI LUI ONT ETE ASSIGNES PAR LES CONVENTIONS DE GENEVE DU 12 AOUT 1949

Mémoire explicatif

1. Institution humanitaire indépendante créée en 1863 à Genève (Suisse), le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) a reçu mandat de la communauté internationale des Etats, par des traités internationaux universellement ratifiés, d'agir en qualité d'intermédiaire neutre pour assurer protection et assistance aux victimes des conflits armés internationaux et non internationaux.

2. Les quatre Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 sur la protection des victimes de la guerre - auxquelles 166 Etats sont parties - et leurs deux Protocoles additionnels de 1977 attribuent en effet expressément au CICR le rôle d'intermédiaire humanitaire neutre et impartial. Ainsi, les traités de droit international humanitaire investissent le CICR de fonctions similaires à celles d'une puissance protectrice chargée de sauvegarder les intérêts d'un Etat en proie à un conflit armé, puisque le CICR peut agir en tant que substitut de la puissance protectrice au sens des Conventions de Genève de 1949 et du Protocole additionnel I de 1977. D'autre part, le CICR dispose, parallèlement à la puissance protectrice, d'un droit d'accès aux prisonniers de guerre (troisième Convention) et aux personnes civiles protégées par la Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre (quatrième Conven-

tion). Outre ces compétences expresses, le CICR jouit, en tant qu'organisme neutre, d'un droit d'initiative, en vertu d'une disposition commune aux quatre Conventions, lui donnant la possibilité de faire toute proposition qu'il juge utile à l'intérêt d'un conflit.

3. Les statuts du Mouvement international de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, adoptés par la Conférence internationale de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, à laquelle les Etats parties aux Conventions de Genève participent, demandent au CICR de travailler à la compréhension et à la diffusion du droit international humanitaire, ainsi que d'en préparer les développements éventuels. Ces statuts le chargent également de maintenir et de diffuser les Principes fondamentaux du Mouvement, à savoir: humanité, impartialité, neutralité, indépendance, volontariat, unité et universalité.

4. C'est à l'initiative du CICR que les gouvernements ont adopté la première Convention de Genève de 1864 pour l'amélioration du sort des militaires blessés dans les armées en campagne. Depuis, le CICR s'est attaché à développer le droit international humanitaire, parallèlement à l'évolution des conflits.

5. Pour être mieux en mesure de remplir les tâches qui lui incombent, en vertu du droit international humani-

taire, des résolutions de la Conférence internationale de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et des statuts du Mouvement, le CICR a conclu avec de nombreux Etats des accords de siège réglant le statut de ses délégations et de leurs membres. L'exécution de ses mandats l'a amené à conclure encore d'autres accords avec des Etats et des organisations intergouvernementales.

6. Avec une moyenne de 590 délégués répartis dans 48 délégations, le CICR a déployé ses activités en 1989 dans près de 90 pays d'Afrique, d'Amérique latine, d'Asie, d'Europe et du Moyen-Orient - compte tenu des pays couverts à partir de ses différentes délégations régionales - pour apporter protection et assistance aux victimes des conflits armés, conformément aux Conventions de Genève et, avec l'accord des gouvernements concernés, aux victimes de troubles intérieurs et de tensions internes.

7. En cas de conflit armé international, le CICR a pour mandat de visiter les prisonniers de guerre ainsi que les personnes civiles conformément à la Convention de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre (troisième Convention) et à la Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre (quatrième Convention) ainsi qu'au Protocole additionnel

aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (Protocole I). Lors d'une situation de conflit armé non international, le CICR s'appuie, pour avoir accès aux personnes privées de liberté en raison du conflit, sur l'article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève, et sur le Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés non internationaux (Protocole II).

8. En dehors des situations couvertes par les Conventions de Genève et leurs Protocoles additionnels, le CICR peut proposer aux gouvernements son accès aux personnes privées de liberté en relation avec des troubles et des tensions internes, conformément à son droit d'initiative statutaire.

9. Les visites du CICR à des personnes privées de liberté ont un but exclusivement humanitaire; il s'agit de s'informer du traitement accordé aux prisonniers, d'examiner leurs conditions matérielles et psychologiques de détention et d'intervenir auprès des autorités chaque fois que des mesures permettant d'améliorer le traitement et les conditions matérielles de vie des détenus s'avèrent nécessaires. Le CICR ne se prononce jamais sur les motifs de la détention. Ces visites font l'objet de rapports

confidentiels qui ne sont pas destinés à la publication.

10. Dans le cadre de conflits armés et de troubles intérieurs, le CICR entreprend avec l'accord des gouvernements concernés, des actions d'assistance, tant sur le plan matériel que médical, pour autant qu'il ait la possibilité de vérifier sur le terrain l'urgence des besoins des victimes, de procéder à des missions d'évaluation sur place lui permettant d'identifier les catégories et le nombre de bénéficiaires de l'assistance, et d'organiser et de contrôler les distributions de secours.

11. Pour sa part, l'Agence centrale de recherches du CICR (ACR) remplit des tâches découlant, d'une part, de ses obligations conventionnelles vis-à-vis des victimes civiles et militaires de conflits armés internationaux et, d'autre part, du droit d'initiative humanitaire du CICR dans les autres situations. L'ACR et ses délégués sur le terrain se consacrent notamment aux tâches suivantes: obtenir, enregistrer, centraliser et, le cas échéant, transmettre des renseignements concernant les personnes bénéficiant des activités du CICR, telles que prisonniers de guerre, internés civils, détenus, personnes déplacées et réfugiés; rétablir un lien entre familles séparées, notamment au moyen de messages familiaux lorsque les moyens de communications normaux

sont inexistantes ou interrompus en raison d'un conflit; rechercher les personnes portées disparues ou dont les proches sont sans nouvelles; organiser des réunions de familles, des transferts en lieu sûr et des rapatriements.

12. Les liens de complémentarité et de coopération entre le CICR et l'ONU sont toujours plus étroits, tant dans les actions sur le terrain que dans les efforts pour assurer un meilleur respect du droit international humanitaire. Ces dernières années, cette complémentarité et cette coopération dans l'action d'assistance et de protection en faveur des victimes ont pu être constatées sur tous les continents.

13. Cette complémentarité et cette coopération entre le CICR et l'ONU existent aussi sur le plan juridique, ainsi qu'en témoigne la contribution du CICR aux travaux de l'ONU dans ce domaine. Elles se reflètent en outre dans nombre de résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, de l'Assemblée générale et de ses organes subsidiaires ainsi que dans des rapports présentés par le Secrétaire général.

14. La participation du CICR aux travaux de l'Assemblée générale en qualité d'observateur favoriserait la coopération entre l'ONU et le CICR et aiderait le CICR à remplir ses tâches.

(Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge, nov.-déc. 1990)

MOTION

Lors de la réunion de la Consultation interfédérations des associations internationales, le 6 juin 1991 à Paris, a été évoqué le problème de la Convention européenne sur la reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des organisations internationales non gouvernementales qui, au 6 juin 1991, n'a été ratifiée que par quatre Etats du Conseil de l'Europe.

La Consultation interfédérations souhaite que cette Convention européenne soit ratifiée dans les meilleurs délais par tous les Etats du Conseil de l'Europe.

Elle demande à chaque fédération ou union d'associations internationales, et aux associations membres, de faire les démarches appropriées auprès de leurs parlements et de leurs gouvernements respectifs.

Paris, le 6 juin 1991

-La Fédération des associations internationales établies en Belgique (FAIB)

-La Fédération des institutions internationales établies en Suisse (FIG)

-L'Union des organisations internationales non gouvernementales établies en France (UOIF)

-L'Union des associations internationales (UAI)

Business Can Learn a Lot From Nonprofit Groups

Claudia H. Deutsch
New York Times Service

Nonprofit organizations can still learn a lot from the private sector about managing projects and money. In fact, last October the well-known management guru Peter Drucker founded the Peter F. Drucker Foundation for Nonprofit Management to provide advice and money to nonprofit groups willing to try new management techniques.

But Mr. Drucker and other experts say that when it comes to managing people, nonprofit executives have passed their corporate colleagues. Frances Hesselbein, head of the New York-based Drucker Foundation, discussed some of the reasons behind the discrepancy.

Q: Nonprofits seem to do better managing volunteers than corporations do in managing well-paid workers. Why?

A: They've had to, and for longer. Nonprofits went through the kinds of seismic changes in the 1970s that corporations are going through now. The continued movement of women into the work force dried up the pool of volunteers, and government budget problems shrank subsidies.

Meanwhile, the number of nonprofits keeps proliferating. They have to compete with each other for people and funding, and they must do so with incredibly stringent budgets.

Q: That mirrors the demographic, financial and competitive problems facing today's downsized multinational corporation. Are there parallel solutions?

A: Absolutely. Nonprofits make enormous demands on volunteers, just as downsized corporations do on their staffs. Today's volunteers have full-time jobs and specialized skills, and look at volunteer work as parallel careers from which they want personal growth as well as the satisfaction of doing good.

To recruit and retain them, nonprofits provide job descriptions, training, even promotion paths and performance appraisals. And they make sure that the volunteers are doing important, skilled work. Machines can stuff envelopes and subcontractors can take care of routine administration.

In other words, nonprofits treat their volunteers the way companies, should manage their highly skilled work force.

Q: Aren't volunteers motivated by altruism, while paid workers are motivated by money?

A: Few people are motivated only by money. The most motivated workers are those whose personal goals are congruent with the company's goals.

Nonprofit boards seem better at making sure the group's mission - whether it be to cure a disease or to help battered women - is clear to paid staff and volunteers alike.

Q: But corporate and nonprofit boards are made up primarily of outsiders who are not immersed in the organization's work on a full-time

basis. How can they understand the missions so thoroughly?

A: Nonprofit boards are more likely to include community leaders and other grass-roots people who are taking a hands-on approach to their membership. This involvement means that nonprofit directors not only understand their group's mission, but are adept at appraising how well it is accomplishing that mission.

Q: Isn't that what corporate governance is all about?

A: You can make money by doing worthwhile work. If you define what your mission is, who your customer is and what you can do to somehow enhance that customer's life, chances are, money will follow.

Nonprofits have learned to go to every volunteer and say, "Because you contributed your expertise and X number of weeks of your time, these many lives were affected and here's how."

Corporations could do the same - go to each employee and say, "The work that you did on this project changed a customer's quality of life in the following way." That's more effective than just saying, "Hey, nice job." (*Herald Tribune*, July 18, 1991).

Employer's organizations: New impetus for EC/LA relations

Organized by the Geneva-based International Organization of Employers (IOE) and held in Madrid at the headquarters of the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (CEOE), the fourth meeting of the Chairmen of Latin American and Spanish Employers' Organizations has as a main item on its agenda the adoption of statutes and setting of 1991/92 priorities and programmes for the newly created Association for the Co-operation of Employers (ACE).

Launched in April 1990 in the light of the rapid advance of European economic and monetary union, ACE aims to promote ties between Latin America and European Community employers' organizations by providing a suitable framework for private sector initiatives between the two regions and support for their needs in developing mutually beneficial business and investment opportunities in an improved free trade climate.

Not just a Hispanic framework.

Membership of the Association is also open to organizations from the non-Spanish speaking countries in both Latin America and Europe. Indeed central organizations from France, Italy and Portugal have already expressed interest in participating.

A permanent centre for co-operation: To respond effectively to the important challenges which lie ahead, said the Chairman of the Madrid meeting, CEOE President José María

Cuevas, the Association will serve as a permanent centre for co-operation between employers on the two continents. When fully operational it will provide ACE members and associates with a well co-ordinated programme Of research, training, support services and promotional activities. The main features of this programme will include:

- studies and publications on vital aspects of trade, commerce, industrial relations and labour market conditions in the relevant sectors, countries and regions, including information on investment laws and regulations and related fiscal policy;
- the organization of ACE information and training seminars and workshops focusing on concrete and practical themes and issues;

- and so as better to acquaint participants with the economic and social realities of the countries concerned, to place special emphasis on the organization of bilateral LA/EC meetings and study tours.

Trans-Atlantic assistance: The Association will also provide specialized assistance by, for example, helping EC enterprises interested in forming joint ventures with the private sector in Latin America through the somewhat bewildering maze of regulations and procedures. Similarly, ACE is also well placed to assist Latin America entrepreneurs who are ready to expand into the European market deal with a similarly complex range of EC and individual member State investment rules and business regulations.

It will also play an active role in informing and assisting members in their commitment to better the protection of the environment and will keep them up to date on relevant EC

policy and directives in this field.

Research priorities: In setting priorities for ACE's long-range programme of research and studies, participants at the Madrid meeting stressed the need for the Association to begin by concentrating on the current business climate in Latin America - particularly as concerns both the problems and potential for the private sector to develop exports to the European Community, as well as for this sector to attract trade and joint-venture partnerships from it.

An inventory of business prospects: Accordingly, it was recommended that the first phase of research and study should focus on developing a Latin American country-by-country inventory of those products, sectors, industries and services with good potential for export to the EC. This would include new and promising industries such as the processing for export of shrimp and other shellfish which abound in Latin American waters.

For European firms interested in business prospects in South and Central America the inventory will also pinpoint those specific investment areas and business ventures which offer attractive partnerships and management opportunities, such as in the hotel and tourism fields.

A focus on export-oriented problems: Last but not least in paving the way for more dynamic trans-Atlantic economic and commercial ties, the Association will also devote part of its immediate research and study efforts to analyzing the critical problems faced by private entrepreneurs in developing export-oriented activities in Latin America. Accordingly, it will target those key national (as well as regional and sub-regional) regulations

and requirements which hamper such initiatives and will propose ways in which they may be gradually eliminated.

Priority training role: Top priority was also accorded by the Madrid meeting to the Association's role in providing appropriate information and training at all levels, particularly where they might facilitate joint trans-Atlantic ventures.

Featured on its agenda for 1991 are two sub-regional information and training seminars: one for South America and the other for Central America. They will concentrate on three inter-related subjects: First, the European Economic Community's structure, functions and machinery for promoting trade and investment with other regions; second, on incentives and disincentives to free trade and investment posed by Latin American codes, regulations and practices at national, regional and sub-regional levels; and third, problems and prospects relating to LA/EC subcontracting arrangements.

Finally, with a view to reaching the largest possible number of interested managers and employers the Madrid meeting announced that the 1991/92 work programme will also focus on developing courses for the training of instructor-trainers.

Sources:

"Reunión de organizaciones empresariales de Iberoamérica y España: Impulso para las relaciones económicas y comerciales CEE-América Latina", in *Boletín CEOC* (Madrid), No. 131, Oct. 1990.

ILO: Information provided by the International Employers' Organization (IOE), Geneva.

(*Social and Labour Bulletin 1/91*)

New... Plans... Creations... New... Plans... Creations... New... Plans...

Dozens of management training and consultancy institutions have mushroomed throughout the USSR in the past two years as the change to a market economy highlights the need for new management skills and expertise both in the state enterprises and in the newly created private sector.

One of the latest newcomers to the field is the International Center for Social and Labour Problems. Although providing training, facilities and services offered by similar institutions, the Center breaks new ground by focusing on the establishment and development of tripartite co-operation between the social partners. This represents a radical breakthrough in a country where such labour relations were previously dominated by the dialectic of the class struggle. Participants will be drawn from the administrations of different Soviet republics, state enterprises, private businesses, and trade unions as well as from non-Soviet countries.

The Centre itself, financed on a tripartite basis within the Soviet Union, has also received support from the Geneva-based International Organization of Employers, the French and Finnish ministries of labour, various national employers' organizations and the International Labour Office, all of whom hope that the Centre will play an active international role in promoting tripartite co-operation between the social partners.

Social and Labour Bulletin 1/91

Sous l'égide de I.P. Chaveau (ORSTROM, Montpellier) et de J.P. Olivier de Sardan (EHESS-CNRS, Marseille), une bonne centaine d'anthropologues et d'africanistes se sont réunis à la Fondation pour le Progrès de l'Homme à Paris, du 5 au 6 mars 1991 pour mettre sur pied une association euro-africaine pour une anthropologie du changement social et du développement. Après une journée de débats et d'échanges sur la recherche-action anthropologique dans le domaine du développement (saisi heuristiquement: "là où il y a des développeurs, il y a du développement") et ses tenants et aboutissants institu-

tionnels, les participants se divisèrent en groupes de travail afin d'explorer les moyens concrets d'avancer leur cause: circulation de l'information à l'intérieur du réseau, démarches auprès d'autres acteurs et agents du changement social.

A la fin de la seconde journée des statuts portant création de l'association furent adoptés. Bien qu'axé autour de l'anthropologie, et centré sur l'Afrique, le réseau se veut pluridisciplinaire et ouvert à d'autres horizons. Le français est la langue véhiculaire du réseau, mais sans exclusivité; son bureau provisoire comprend des délégué(e)s de l'Allemagne, de la Belgique, de la France et de la Hollande ainsi que de plusieurs pays africains.

Une douzaine de personnalités représentant les douze pays de la Communauté européenne - dont plusieurs membres du Parlement européen, ont fondé à Bruxelles l'Association internationale pour la coopération et le développement en Afrique australe (ACODA). Celle-ci a pour objet de favoriser la coopération entre la Communauté européenne d'une part et la Communauté des Etats d'Afrique australe d'autre part, mais aussi de favoriser la détente et la coopération entre les Etats d'Afrique australe eux-mêmes. Le siège est établi: Avenue des Nerviens 51, 1040 Bruxelles.

*(Annexe au *Moniteur Belge* 6 déc. 1990).*

La création d'une Fédération européenne des Clubs Unesco et une plus grande solidarité avec les pays du Sud figurent parmi les recommandations d'une réunion des Clubs Unesco européens à Strasbourg (France) du 17 au 21 décembre 1990. (Sources Unesco, février 1991).

Le 23 août 1990 a été créée à Gand (Belgique) une association sans but lucratif dénommée European Largest Textile and Apparel Companies (EL-TAC). Elle a pour but de contribuer efficacement au processus de pleine réalisation d'un marché unique européen dans le cadre d'un marché textile mondial, conçu en vue d'une inté-

gration des intérêts de ses membres, leurs clients, leurs employés et leurs actionnaires. Les membres sont les sociétés les plus représentatives des secteurs du textile et de l'habillement des divers pays de la CEE et qui comptent au moins un membre de chaque pays constituant la Communauté où l'industrie textile est d'une certaine importance. La cotisation est fixée à 0,2% du chiffre mondial consolidé de la société. Les membres fondateurs au nombre de 14 proviennent de: Belgique (2), France (2), Grèce (1), Pays-Bas (1), Italie (5), Grande-Bretagne (1), Allemagne (2). Le siège est situé: Square de Meeds 19-20, B-1040 Bruxelles.

*(Annexe au *Moniteur Belge* 29 nov. 1990)*

At a meeting in Treviso (Italy) the seventeen organizations representing the architectural profession in the twelve member states of the European Economic Community decided to restructure themselves on a European level.

A new organization was created: the Architects' Council of Europe, composed as follows:

- the Assembly, which is made up of delegations from the seventeen participating organizations, meets once a year.

- the Executive Council, a representative from each member state.

President of the Council for this year is Romano Viviani (Italy). The BNA (Netherlands) will be in charge of the Council's administration until 1991.

The new Council will examine the following main points:

- directive on public service contracts
- architectural training (in relation to the 1985 Directive)
- liability and professional insurance
- copyright.

The Council also publishes a monthly Newsletter.

Information : CAE-ACE c/o BNA Royal Institute of Dutch Architects - 321 Keizersgracht - Postbus 19606 - NL 1000 GP AMSTERDAM (Netherlands) - Tel: 31 20 228111 - Fax: 31 20 232679.

(IUA Newsletter, Oct. 1990).

