


TRANSNATIONAL

# ASSOCIATIONS

TRANSNATIONALES



**Nouveaux partenariats  
pour la coopération au développement**

**NGOs Involved in  
Humanitarian Assistance**

**1990 - n° 4**

The review of international  
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This publication, produced by the UAI, appears six times a year.

The purpose of the studies, surveys and information included in this periodical concerning the international and transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations is to promote understanding of the associative phenomenon in a human society which continues to grow and evolve regardless of the consequences.

The programme of the review, in accordance with the principles of the UAI, is intended to clarify general awareness concerning the associative phenomenon within the framework of international relations and, in particular, to inform associations about aspects of the problems which they tend to share or which are of common interest to them.

The columns of this review are open to association officers, research workers and specialists of associative questions. The articles do not of course necessarily reflect the point of view of the publisher.

Cette publication, éditée par l'UAI, se présente à ses lecteurs sous la forme d'une revue de période bimestrielle.

Son objet associatif d'études, d'enquêtes, d'informations, au service des réseaux internationaux et transnationaux d'organisations non gouvernementales, s'attache aux idées et aux faits d'un phénomène de société humaine en expansion continue et en évolution hâtée.

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# Nouveaux partenariats pour la coopération au développement

Les organisations non gouvernementales des pays membres de l'OCDE actives dans la coopération pour le développement: orientations des années 1980 et défis des années 1990

par Henny Helmich \*

*Le texte qui suit reprend l'essentiel du chapitre introductif de la nouvelle édition du répertoire des ONG de développement publié cet été par l'OCDE (1). Au seuil d'une nouvelle décennie, l'auteur passe en revue les principales orientations des années 1980, pour examiner ensuite les défis des années 1990.*

## Avant-propos

Depuis une dizaine d'années, les ONG se voient accorder une place grandissante dans les politiques de développement des gouvernements des pays membres de l'OCDE. Dès la fin des années 1970, chacun de ces gouvernements avait établi dans ce contexte des procédures de collaboration avec les ONG de son pays. Parallèlement, les Nations-Unies et ses organismes spécialisés, la Banque mondiale, et diverses autres organisations internationales ont créé des services de liaison avec les ONG.

En 1988, la contribution publique aux activités des ONG représentait 4,7 pour cent de l'aide publique au développement (APD) et s'élevait à près de 2,3 milliards de dollars des Etats-Unis. En complément, les ONG ont réussi à rassembler plus de 4,2 milliards de dollars pour leurs activités, par la collecte de fonds privés. Les membres du Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) de l'OCDE, réunis en décembre 1989, ont exprimé leur satisfaction de voir les ONG mobiliser ainsi 3 à 4 milliards de dollars de contributions volontaires par an depuis 1985 (2).

Les données présentées dans les tableaux 1 et 2 donnent un aperçu des ressources consacrées par les ONG aux activités de développement et de secours de 1974 à 1988.

Les ONG de développement, leurs rôles, leurs atouts et leurs faiblesses ont déjà fait l'objet d'un certain nombre d'analyses poussées (3). Il reste à déterminer si, dans l'avenir, le rôle que remplissent actuellement ces ONG dans les politiques de développement s'estompera comme une mode passagère, ou s'il s'accroîtra comme un phénomène de grande envergure. La plupart de leurs activités sont centrées sur des micro-projets, dont les succès peuvent être balayés sous l'effet d'une hausse des taux d'intérêt de seulement 0,1 pour cent, de l'effondrement du commerce international, ou d'événements politiques à résonance régionale ou mondiale.

Au cours de ce rapide survol, les contributions des ONG à la coopération pour le développement seront examinées sur le plan qualitatif.

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## *Historique des activités des ONG dans le domaine du développement*

### **Origines de l'intervention des ONG dans le domaine du développement**

L'idéal démocratique du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle reconnaissait à chacun le droit de s'enrichir (ce droit s'étendait aux habitants des colonies) et de prendre part à la vie politique. On vit alors des citoyens se regrouper pour défendre des intérêts divers. Au nombre de ces groupes ainsi constitués, les premières ONG de «développement» lancèrent un plaidoyer en faveur d'une action législative des gouvernements pour abolir l'esclavage.

L'action de développement des ONG trouve également sa source dans la tradition de charité chrétienne et d'assistance à son prochain. En même temps que les Eglises chrétiennes faisaient du prosélytisme outre-mer, les missionnaires prenent en compte le bien-être matériel des individus et des petites communautés. Ils furent parmi les premiers à construire des écoles et des dispensaires, et à travailler avec la population locale dans les domaines de la production alimentaire et de la gestion des ressources naturelles.

Les citoyens du Nord percevaient les habitants des colonies à travers l'expérience de ceux qui vivaient au contact direct de ces populations: administrateurs, ecclésiastiques, soldats et commerçants. Beaucoup s'inquièrent des conditions matérielles impropres au développement de ces régions et lancèrent des appels pour que les sociétés du Nord renforcent les activités de «secours».

Les actions des citoyens aux Etats-Unis et au Canada étaient influencées par leur situation de pionniers. Dans des secteurs où le gouvernement et les structures juridiques étaient encore peu présents, des groupes de citoyens formèrent des associations locales pour faire face aux besoins immédiats de leur société. Cette tradition pluraliste d'auto-assistance a constitué une base importante pour les futures actions de solidarité internationale.

### **Après 1945**

Ce qui frappe chez les ONG de l'après-guerre actives dans le développement international, c'est qu'elles n'avaient pas pour principal objectif la coopération au développement. Des problèmes économiques, politiques, d'environnement, d'éducation ou culturels étaient à la base d'un certain nombre de leurs activités. La première génération (4) d'ONG de développement contemporaines est née après la seconde guerre mondiale. Des organisations privées furent créées pour venir en aide aux pays européens dévastés par la guerre. De nombreuses situations d'urgence amenèrent les citoyens à organiser des secours, à commencer par l'installation en Israël des Juifs ayant survécu à l'Holocauste, la fuite hors de Palestine des populations arabes, la partition de l'Inde et d'autres événements majeurs de l'Histoire de l'après-guerre.

Dans les années 1950, la reconstruction de l'Europe était déjà bien avancée, beaucoup d'organisations de secours, dans un même élan optimiste de reconstruction, se mirent à prêter attention aux efforts des nations devenues depuis peu indépendantes.

### **Les années 1960 et 1970**

Dans les années 1960 et 1970, les campagnes des ONG étaient axées sur la faim, l'aide alimentaire et l'auto-suffisance en matière de production alimentaire. Les programmes des ONG, de même qu'une partie des stratégies des donateurs publics (5), avaient pour objectif de fournir un matériel moderne ainsi que des ressources financières et humaines pour le développement.

L'idée était que, puisque ces ressources manquaient dans les «économies traditionnelles», il fallait les apporter de l'extérieur pour permettre le «décollage» économique des pays en développement. Cette approche renforçait l'image déjà faussée des peuples du Tiers monde: ils apparaissaient comme de pauvres et naïves victimes d'influences provisoirement défavorables, vivant dans des régions arriérées.

Les ONG chrétiennes ont joué un rôle déterminant, dans les années 1960 et le début des années 1970, pour la reconnaissance en tant que «partenaires» des groupes du Sud qui géraient leurs propres projets.

Au Japon, l'action philanthropique organisée, issue des anciennes philosophies religieuses et culturelles du Bouddhisme et du Shintoïsme, était traditionnellement orientée vers la famille et la communauté locale. Jusque dans les années 1960, époque où la nouvelle position du Japon comme acteur sur la scène économique a amené l'internationalisation de sa société civile, les groupes privés de citoyens n'entreprenaient pas d'activités de développement international, surtout quand celles-ci impliquaient des relations d'affaires ou diplomatiques. Beaucoup d'ONG japonaises se sont alors créées, en intervenant d'abord dans les pays d'Asie et du Pacifique, puis en Afrique et dans d'autres régions du monde, pour des opérations de secours d'urgence.

Au début des années 1970, de nombreuses ONG de développement du Nord ont prôné la théorie d'un micro-développement communautaire fondé sur l'auto-suffisance, et commencé à s'intéresser aux technologies appropriées. Elles en étaient venues à penser que la fourniture d'outils, de connaissances et d'argent ne suffisait pas à soulager une pauvreté avant tout structurelle. Elles portaient aussi plus d'intérêt à la compréhension des relations économiques internationales et à l'identification des causes de la pauvreté et de la dépendance économique. On commençait également à reconnaître la valeur des connaissances et des traditions culturelles des populations du tiers monde pour la recherche de solutions appropriées à des problèmes locaux.

Certaines ONG avaient adopté une attitude critique à l'égard de l'aide publique et des efforts de développement gouvernementaux, et cherchaient à identifier les causes du malfonctionnement des structures économiques internationales. Ces structures leur semblaient être des entraves aux efforts produits par les peuples du tiers monde afin de parvenir à un niveau plus élevé de bien-être économique et social, et même représenter un danger pour leur survie.

D'autres ONG ont également passé en revue le rôle des

donneurs publics. Ceux-ci étaient confrontés à des perspectives pessimistes sur le processus du développement, en partie parce qu'ils n'avaient pas réussi à atteindre les objectifs des premières décennies. Comme certaines ONG

partageaient, avec les donateurs publics, une même vision de l'aide et du développement, les critiques formulées à l'égard des limites et des faiblesses de cette politique publique ont influencé leurs propres activités.

## Principales orientations des années 1980

### Relations entre gouvernements, organisations internationales et ONG

#### Gouvernements

La coopération entre gouvernements et ONG s'explique notamment par une plus grande sensibilité des ONG aux aspects non économiques des stratégies de développement. Les ONG ont également montré leur supériorité pour la mise en oeuvre de programmes qui s'adressent aux besoins essentiels de l'homme dans les communautés de base.

Les années 1980 ont vu le resserrement des budgets publics. Pendant cette décennie, le soutien aux ONG a semblé être un choix pragmatique, un moyen pour les gouvernements de réduire les investissements gouvernementaux en personnel et, dans le secteur privé, les dépenses des sociétés de consultants. Cela permettait aussi d'éviter les critiques au sujet des dépenses gouvernementales considérées comme inefficaces et génératrices de gaspillage, ces ressources ayant été fournies sans faire jouer la concurrence du secteur privé (6).

La politique des années 1980, dans les pays membres de l'OCDE, a été axée sur le rôle du secteur privé et sur la reconnaissance de sa supériorité dans des domaines qui, au cours du 20<sup>e</sup> siècle, avaient été généralement considérés comme étant du ressort des gouvernements : ceci a eu une influence profonde sur le rôle des ONG dans la coopération pour le développement. Ce changement de politique a été justifié par des preuves récentes de la plus grande efficacité du secteur privé dans certains domaines de services. En même temps, quelques échecs ont abouti à la conviction que les gouvernements actuels devront continuer à gérer les économies et les sociétés, dans l'intérêt de tous.

Les ONG des pays membres de l'OCDE qui travaillent en collaboration avec des organismes gouvernementaux sont, pour la plupart, bien établies et solidement enracinées dans la société. L'évolution des relations entre gouvernements et ONG a eu pour résultat un plus grand professionnalisme de la part de celles-ci. Elles ont acquis de l'expérience et accru leur capacité à réaliser des projets de développement de façon indépendante, et à effectuer des campagnes d'éducation au développement, ce qui confère une dimension supplémentaire à l'information diffusée par les médias (7).

Dans les années 1970, un groupe d'ONG a poursuivi le débat autour des effets négatifs de l'ordre économique international, et de la théorie du développement fondée sur la modernisation et la croissance économique. Au cours des années 1980 également, l'opinion publique a continué à s'intéresser aux situations d'urgence dans les pays en développement, notamment en Afrique subsaharienne. Ce soutien de la part du public a obligé les ONG à rechercher des approches pragmatiques conduisant à des résultats

visibles et, parfois, à faire pression sur les gouvernements pour qu'ils prennent des mesures efficaces.

Beaucoup de gouvernements du Sud étaient, et sont encore, méfiants à l'égard des ONG qui jouent un rôle trop important. De leur côté, les ONG sont parmi les seules organisations constituées à bénéficier d'un certain degré d'autonomie de la part des gouvernements, et à avoir une présence directe au niveau des communautés de base. Les gouvernements et les ONG se retrouvent donc juxtaposés, situation nouvelle et motivante qui demande que, des deux côtés, les responsables évaluent le potentiel de conflit ou de coopération entre leurs organismes. Les organismes d'aide gouvernementaux ont également choisi de coopérer avec les ONG à la suite de déceptions, dues à la mauvaise application de programmes gouvernementaux bilatéraux (8).

#### Les Nations Unies

Les ONG s'efforcent depuis longtemps de promouvoir les objectifs des organisations internationales. Les ONG qui bénéficient d'un statut consultatif auprès des Nations Unies peuvent ainsi faire part, de façon formelle, de leurs points de vue sur des questions économiques et sociales. Au cours des années, elles ont joué un rôle de plus en plus important en leur sein en soulevant des problèmes politiques concernant les droits de l'homme, les droits de la femme, la paix et le désarmement. L'Organisation des Nations Unies et ses agences spécialisées ont développé des relations formelles avec les ONG, qui vont du soutien direct à la sous-traitance de projets.

Le Service de liaison non gouvernemental des Nations Unies joue le rôle d'un lieu de concertation entre ONG nationales et internationales. Ce service s'intéresse particulièrement à l'éducation au développement.

Les ONG ont toujours considéré que les Nations Unies étaient vouées aux mêmes objectifs qu'elles. Dans de nombreux pays, des organisations ont été formées pour soutenir leur travail par la sensibilisation de l'opinion publique ou la collecte de fonds destinés à des programmes spécifiques, tels que les comités nationaux pour l'UNICEF (9).

#### La Banque mondiale

La Banque mondiale est devenue sensible aux critiques portant sur sa façon de concevoir les programmes de développement, sans prêter suffisamment attention au soulagement de la pauvreté et aux conséquences sur l'environnement.

Ayant reconnu la compétence des ONG dans ces domaines, la Banque a mis en oeuvre une politique de collaboration opérationnelle. En 1989, les ONG ont participé à 202 projets de la Banque mondiale (5 pour cent du total). Une étude de la Banque mondiale est parvenue à la conclusion que les ONG sont trop utilisées comme des instru-

ments, c'est-à-dire comme des organismes fournisseurs de services, et non comme des institutions partenaires ayant leurs propres objectifs de développement. « Dans le passé, les ONG étaient surtout utilisées (dans 57 pour cent des cas) comme des agences d'exécution. Seulement 11 pour cent des ONG participaient à la conception et à la planification des projets ». Cette étude recommandait donc à la Banque d'impliquer les ONG dès la conception des projets, et de faire appel à leur compétence pour des « questions politiques décisives telles que l'évaluation des effets sur l'environnement, le développement communautaire, la dette du tiers monde, les micro-entreprises et l'ajustement structurel » (10).

#### *La Communauté économique européenne*

Depuis 1976, la coopération entre la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) et les ONG a eu pour objectif d'ajouter, au seul versement de fonds de la CEE pour des programmes de développement, les potentialités des actions des ONG (11). En dehors d'une coopération fondée sur le cofinancement de projets et l'éducation au développement, la Communauté fournit une aide alimentaire et une aide d'urgence en collaboration avec les ONG européennes.

Pour collaborer avec les ONG, la Communauté économique européenne a en effet commencé par mettre en place des procédures de cofinancement des programmes de développement. La CEE reconnaît les qualités propres aux ONG: leur aptitude à travailler avec les communautés de base dans les pays en développement, et leur capacité à mobiliser des personnes engagées et très motivées pour participer à des actions de développement. Estimant important d'avoir des relations étroites avec les ONG de ses pays membres, la Communauté a encouragé la création d'un Comité de liaison avec les ONG qui permet à celles-ci d'exposer leurs points de vue auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes et du Parlement européen, notamment par le biais de la Commission pour le développement et la coopération (12).

#### *Les Banques régionales de développement*

Deux des trois principales Banques régionales de développement — la Banque asiatique de développement (BASD) et la Banque interaméricaine de développement (BID) — ont elles aussi reconnu les ONG comme partenaires dans la mise en œuvre de projets. La BID a mis en place des politiques axées sur le secteur informel dans les pays latino-américains, où les ONG peuvent jouer un rôle décisif. La BID estime que celles-ci, spécialement dans le domaine de l'éducation au développement, peuvent être des partenaires pour accroître le degré de sensibilisation aux problèmes du développement en Amérique latine. Elle a une politique opérationnelle avec les ONG, qui consiste en un programme de financement de petits projets. En 1989, la Banque africaine de développement (BAfD) envisageait elle aussi d'établir des relations avec les ONG.

#### **L'émergence de nouveaux partenaires:**

les ONG du Sud

A partir du milieu des années 1970, la reconnaissance des ONG du Sud comme partenaires des efforts de développement a marqué un changement important. Dans les années 1980, des estimations modérées situaient leur nombre entre 6.000 et 8.000. Comme l'affirment les délégués des ONG, certaines associations ont été créées par

des professionnels déçus par l'exécution des programmes d'aide extérieure, ou par l'inefficacité de leurs propres gouvernements dans certains domaines (13). D'autres groupes, tels que les organisations de paysans ou de femmes, étaient issus d'actions de l'Eglise ou de mouvements populaires dans les pays en développement. Certaines interventions réussies des ONG du Nord et des organismes publics, fondées sur le concept de la participation, eurent aussi pour conséquence la création d'ONG dans le Sud.

Baucoup de pays en développement, notamment en Asie du Sud, ont de solides traditions d'auto-assistance. Les populations de ces pays, pour survivre, ont dû prendre en main leur existence, sans attendre que leurs propres gouvernements — ou des gouvernements étrangers — réagissent. Dans d'autres régions, surtout en Afrique et en Amérique latine, le secteur informel s'est développé face à l'incapacité des gouvernements centraux et locaux de fournir certains services, à cause de la dégradation de la situation économique au cours de la dernière décennie. Dans ces pays, même quand une action est entreprise de façon structurée, elle peut suivre des modèles d'organisation très différents de ceux, plus conventionnels, des ONG du Nord.

Les ONG du Sud possèdent la plupart des caractéristiques des ONG du Nord (14). On peut les répartir en plusieurs groupes, qui correspondent chacun à des situations et à des besoins différents. Le groupe des « bénéficiaires de services » existe en tant que récipiendaire des fournisseurs de services que sont les donneurs publics d'aide et les ONG du Nord. Un autre groupe a pour objectif le renforcement des structures, pour parvenir à l'auto-assistance dans le combat quotidien de la population locale. Une troisième catégorie est constituée de fédérations d'ONG qui veulent exprimer les aspirations de la population à l'échelle nationale.

Les stratégies de développement, mises en œuvre par les ONG du Nord dans les années 1970 et 1980, ont pris en compte la volonté d'améliorer les conditions de vie avec la participation des « groupes-cibles ». Les ONG du Nord ont voulu aller plus loin et ne plus considérer les populations comme de simples objets de développement dans des projets de participation. Les ONG les considèrent maintenant comme des sujets capables d'identifier leurs besoins immédiats et de trouver des solutions adéquates, à condition qu'une politique d'auto-suffisance ait été initiée, qui préserve leur sens des objectifs communs, leurs connaissances actuelles et leur accès à des ressources économiques (15).

#### **Des relations qui changent:**

collaboration entre partenaires

Les ONG du Sud — pour qui le développement est un processus permanent et qui ne voulaient plus rester dans un contexte de fourniture de services —, ont estimé que les types de projets d'aide du Nord n'étaient pas toujours les mieux adaptés aux besoins particuliers de leurs traditions, de leurs cultures et de leurs sociétés. Les projets d'aide menés par les ONG du Nord ont non seulement une forte composante d'assistance technique, mais les règles pour la gestion des fonds et les délais pour qu'ils soient disponibles entraînent souvent des schémas directeurs et des planifications imprévisibles. Les ONG sont parties du principe que la société rurale est, à la base, une société harmonieuse, dans laquelle des interventions extérieures pour-

Tableau 1. Ressources consacrées aux activités de développement et de secours des organisations non gouvernementales, 1988

Dons d'origine privée accordés par les ONG	Concours publics aux ONG *			
	Equivalent en millions de dollars EU	En dollars par habitant	Equivalent en millions de dollars EU *	En pourcentage de l'APD totale
Australie	44.7	2.7	8.6	0.8
Autriche	(24.3)	(3.2)	(0.1)	-
Belgique	6.2	0.6	48.8	8.2
Canada	218.0	8.4	178.9	7.6
Danemark	19.4	3.8	(12.9)	(1.5)
Finlande	15.1	3.1	15.7	2.6
France	105.6	1.9	17.3	0.3
Allemagne	695.4	11.3	(343.0)	(7.3)
Irlande	23.0	6.5	0.8	1.4
Italie	19.2	0.3	88.3	2.8
Japon	107.4	0.9	64.3	0.7
Pays-Bas	179.5	12.2	146.2	6.6
Nouvelle-Zélande	7.9	2.4	1.2	1.1
Norvège	55.5	13.2	71.2	7.2
Suède	(120.0)	14.2	82.9	5.4
Suisse	88.7	13.3	106.2	17.2
Royaume-Uni	238.7	4.2	10.2	0.4
Etats-Unis	2 255.0	9.2	(1 090.0)	(10.7)
Total des pays du CAD	4 223.6	5.9	(2 286.6) *	4.6

## Notes:

(\*) Estimations du Secrétariat du CAD ou chiffres datant de 1987.

a) A l'exclusion des contributions aux organisations bénévoles internationales.

b) Les contributions aux ONG pour l'envoi de volontaires et pour les contrats de mise en oeuvre de projets officiels sont incluses dans la plupart des cas.

c) La Commission des Communautés européennes a accordé \$94.7 millions pour le cofinancement de projets d'ONG (et, en plus, \$29.6 pour l'aide alimentaire. \$35.4 millions pour l'aide d'urgence et \$72.2 pour différentes autres causes).

Tableau 2. Ressources consacrées aux activités de développement et de secours des organisations non gouvernementales, 1974-1988

	Dons d'origine privée accordés par les ONG		Concours publics aux ONG *	
	Equivalent en millions de dollars EU	Equivalent en millions de dollars EU 1987 *	Equivalent en millions de dollars EU *	Equivalent en millions de dollars EU 1987 *
1974-1976				
Moyenne	1.320	2.866	239	519
1977-1979				
Moyenne	1.720	2.777	(808)	(1 .305)
1980	2.386	3.150	.045	1.380
1981	2.005	2.754	.253	1.719
1982	2.317	3.257	.159	1.630
1983	2.318	3.268	.183	1.668
1984	2.598	3.744	.324	1.908
1985	2.884	4.109	.473	2,099
1986	3.338	3.840	.951	2,244
1987	3.525	3.525	(1.899)	(1,899)
1988	4.224	3.943	(2.287)	(2.134)

## Notes:

(\*) Estimations du Secrétariat du CAD.

a) A l'exclusion des contributions aux organisations bénévoles internationales

b) En dollars des Etats-Unis ayant subi la déflation de 1987 au niveau des prix ainsi que les fluctuations es taux de change

c) Les contributions aux ONG pour l'envoi de volontaires et pour les contrats de mise en oeuvre de projets officiels sont incluses dans la plupart des cas.



raient favoriser en premier lieu les groupes forts, et ensuite seulement avoir des retombées bénéfiques sur les vrais pauvres. Cette approche n'était pas forcément la plus adéquate pour identifier ceux qui jouent un rôle crucial dans la vie quotidienne. Elle était parfois utilisée lors de programmes très centralisés de développement rural intégré, centrés sur le paysan : on ne prêtait alors pas suffisamment d'attention au contexte socio-culturel dans lequel celui-ci évoluait, et on n'envisageait pas que la paysanne pût jouer un rôle central. La pression bureaucratique exercée sur les ONG du Nord pour qu'elles dépendent, dans un certain délai, les fonds qu'elles ont reçus des gouvernements ou de leurs propres donateurs, a parfois conduit à un « activisme » tout à fait hors de propos (16).

Dans certains cas, la relation donneurs-bénéficiaires, qui existe entre ONG du Nord et ONG du Sud, évolue graduellement vers un partenariat fondé sur des objectifs communs. Ce processus d'émancipation mutuelle a parfois été mal ressenti, en partie à cause de cette longue période où les ONG du Nord avaient investi dans la création d'institutions chez leurs partenaires du Sud. Il a généralement fallu dix années ou plus avant que ces institutions ne deviennent autonomes.

Certaines ONG du Sud ont, dès le début, accordé une grande importance à formuler elles-mêmes leurs stratégies de développement, et à organiser des centres de réflexion. C'est surtout vers la fin des années 1980 qu'on a assisté au développement de structures telles que les réseaux, destinées à favoriser la collaboration entre des ONG indépendantes agissant dans les mêmes domaines: l'environnement, les droits de l'Homme. L'établissement de liens institutionnels entre les ONG du Sud a été facilité par la diffusion, au sein de leurs unités de recherche et de documentation, des nouvelles technologies de la communication. La force des réseaux dépend de la matière et des ressources que les ONG membres lui apportent. Dans certains cas, les réseaux ont de petits centres administratifs qui servent pour la centralisation des fonds et la gestion de programmes communs (17).

Le renforcement des réseaux et des relations de partenariat a apporté, aux activités de développement des ONG du Nord, la possibilité d'avoir un impact plus fort.

L'augmentation du financement direct des ONG du Sud par les organismes publics d'aide de certains membres du Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) est l'une des caractéristiques importantes des années 1980. La preuve a été faite cependant, que les donateurs publics rencontrent beaucoup de difficultés lorsqu'ils veulent impliquer les ONG du Sud autrement que comme fournisseurs de services. Ils préfèrent donc souvent laisser aux ONG de leurs pays le soin d'établir ce type de collaboration.

Certaines ONG du Sud, créées sous des régimes plus ou moins autoritaires, ont adopté une attitude prudente dans ce domaine, compte tenu de tout ce que peut impliquer la collaboration avec des ONG du Nord qui maintiennent des relations avec leurs gouvernements.

#### Efficacité opérationnelle et auto-évaluation des ONG

Certaines ONG montrent un intérêt pour l'évaluation de leurs activités. Il est cependant peu probable que les méthodes traditionnelles d'évaluation des projets d'aide puissent mettre en lumière l'efficacité de leur rôle de catalyseurs du processus de développement: en effet, les résultats ne seraient pas facilement quantifiables, surtout dans un laps de temps limité.

La part de l'APD mise à la disposition des projets des ONG est en constante augmentation. Ces fonds sont très importants pour 50 pour cent des 200 plus grosses ONG des pays membres de l'OCDE (18). Ces ONG impliquent dans leurs programmes un très grand nombre d'individus comme bénévoles, consultants, participants ou donateurs. L'évaluation de l'efficacité opérationnelle des ONG requiert une approche qui tient compte de la taille de leurs projets, et des moyens limités qu'elles ont accordé, jusqu'à présent, à l'évaluation.

Certains organismes publics ont aidé les ONG du Nord comme les ONG du Sud à mettre en place des cadres administratifs pour l'évaluation des projets, et elles ont inclus des représentants d'ONG dans certaines missions d'évaluation des programmes publics dans le tiers monde.

Cette demande accrue d'évaluations, de la part des donateurs publics, va sans doute malheureusement augmenter les pressions sur les ONG pour qu'elles s'adaptent aux objectifs des programmes d'aide, perdant ainsi la spécificité pour laquelle elles avaient été choisies comme partenaires.

Certaines ONG du Nord font participer à leurs efforts d'auto-évaluation leurs partenaires du Sud, ce qui constitue une nouvelle donnée. Les auto-évaluations les plus complexes sont celles qui font appel aux « groupes-cibles » pour l'élaboration du projet. Cette dernière orientation rend nécessaire un changement de mentalité chez les ONG (19).

#### Orientations dans le domaine de

##### l'éducation au développement

Le terme « *éducation au développement* » regroupe toutes les activités qui visent à faire mieux comprendre le concept et la réalité du développement, de l'interdépendance et de la coopération. Cette expression recouvre aussi la sensibilisation aux cultures et aux modes de vie d'autres peuples, ainsi qu'aux questions liées aux relations économiques internationales.

L'hétérogénéité des ONG actives dans le domaine de l'éducation au développement rend difficile toute classification analytique. Un groupe important est constitué par les ONG, souvent non structurées et informelles, ayant des actions de solidarité et qui entreprennent des campagnes de soutien à certains pays en développement, ou qui défendent des causes spécifiques. Un autre groupe, issu du monde religieux et syndical, s'intéresse à l'étude des causes profondes du sous-développement. D'autres groupes encore participent à des programmes d'échanges (par exemple entre agriculteurs) pour mieux faire comprendre la réalité des autres à travers des contacts personnels directs.

Les programmes d'éducation au développement des ONG comportent souvent une information sur leurs propres activités et sur leurs projets dans le tiers monde. Ainsi, la diffusion de l'information sert d'instrument pour collecter des fonds et s'assurer d'un soutien continu de la part du public.

Les collectes de fonds faites à court terme dans le Nord en réponse à des situations d'urgence, ainsi que l'attention ponctuelle apportée à ces situations par les médias, renforcent l'image déjà existante des peuples des pays en développement vu comme victimes impuissantes.

D'un autre côté, les médias et les ONG ont réussi à communiquer au grand public des informations sur les plus démunis, et ont ainsi suscité une forte réaction: ce fut le cas, par exemple, lors de la sécheresse et des famines en

Afrique, dans les années 1980. De larges mouvements émergent de la base et, en dépit de la «lassitude du développement», encouragèrent les gouvernements à apporter des secours d'urgence sur une plus grande échelle. Dans les années 1980, certaines ONG du Nord parmi les plus importantes ont examiné plus attentivement le processus du développement en entreprenant maintenant des recherches et des analyses plus systématiques dans ce domaine. Les unités de recherche des ONG, au Sud comme au Nord, doivent être renforcées et fournir des informations plus analytiques afin de contrebalancer celles, souvent très ponctuelles, diffusées par les médias.

Pour un économiste spécialiste du développement ou un administrateur d'aide, les ONG ont souvent des opinions peu fondées, basées sur une analyse inadéquate et souvent «naïve» de la situation. Elles insistent sur les problèmes de la famine et de la pénurie de nourriture, alors que le professionnel se concentrera sur le commerce alimentaire, la fixation des prix et le développement rural intégré. Pourtant, ce sont souvent les informations fournies par les ONG qui mettent en évidence les vrais problèmes. La diffusion de leur savoir-faire provenant de leur expérience professionnelle en matière de projets, prévient contre les dangers de l'abstraction excessive et de la sim-

plification idéologique. Certaines ONG sont parvenues à surmonter les orientations trop sectorielles des programmes publics. Elles ont mis en lumière les liens horizontaux qui existent entre, d'une part, les problèmes du développement et, d'autre part, les questions relatives à la paix internationale, au désarmement, aux droits de l'homme, à la démocratisation, aux droits de la femme et à l'environnement.

Des experts et des volontaires, revenus des pays du tiers monde, ont participé activement à la sensibilisation de leurs compatriotes. Ils ont l'expérience directe du travail sur le terrain: et ceux qui parmi eux ont pris part, de près ou de loin, à des programmes publics d'aide ont émis des jugements fondés et structurés. Beaucoup de ces personnes sont devenues les pivots des centres communautaires locaux d'éducation au développement.

Certaines ONG du Sud ont émis l'idée que les ONG du Nord devraient se concentrer davantage sur les activités d'éducation au développement, créant ainsi les conditions d'une meilleure compréhension des efforts fournis par les populations des pays en développement, et être moins impliquées dans l'élaboration et la mise en oeuvre de projets dans le Sud.

## Défis des années 1990 pour les ONG

Certains des domaines dans lesquels les ONG devront faire des efforts particuliers pour conserver leur efficacité et leur supériorité en tant qu'acteurs et innovateurs dans le domaine du développement, sont examinés ci-après.

### Evolution des relations

entre donneurs publics et ONG

Les relations financières entre gouvernements et ONG ont une influence sur l'autonomie et la responsabilité des ONG dans ce domaine.

Si la tendance des années 1980 se poursuit au cours des années 1990, les gouvernements exigeront davantage du secteur privé à but lucratif. Ceci aura de plus en plus de conséquences sur le rôle des ONG qui proposent souvent des services de consultants, sans qu'il soit question de profit.

L'utilisation de subventions gouvernementales doit être justifiée auprès des comptables et des contribuables. Les ONG répondent de plus en plus à la demande des gouvernements qui est de faire correspondre, aux fonds alloués, des résultats quantifiables. Une des conséquences de cette attitude est que les ONG se comportent de plus en plus comme des organismes fournisseurs de services.

Néanmoins, «*par souci de préserver l'autonomie, l'intégrité et la spécificité des ONG, certains donateurs ont adapté leurs procédures de cofinancement, lesquelles se ramenaient en substance au début à des subventions de contrepartie, en adoptant des dispositions plus souples et à long terme telles que les subventions forfaitaires, les financements pluriannuels, les fonds d'avances renouvelables et les garanties de crédit. On s'accorde généralement à penser que, à l'avenir, les donateurs devraient poursuivre cette voie et favoriser le financement de programmes pluriannuels qui facilitent la coordination et la planification à*

*long terme, au lieu de s'en remettre à la forme plus classique d'un soutien fragmenté par projet*» (20).

A l'heure actuelle, les donateurs publics et les ONG déclarent, de diverses façons, qu'il est important que leurs interactions soient plus conformes aux orientations politiques.

### Interdépendance et globalisation

La fin des années 1970 et le début des années 1980 ont été caractérisés par de mauvaises conditions économiques dans les pays membres de l'OCDE. L'opinion publique était surtout préoccupée par des problèmes internes tels que l'augmentation du chômage, la réduction du service public, l'examen des différents systèmes de sécurité sociale et par une moindre implication des gouvernements dans la société. Le débat sur le Nouvel ordre économique international s'est trouvé vite remplacé par une approche plus pragmatique en raison d'une réduction de la demande des pays de l'OCDE en faveur des produits des pays en développement, et d'une perte de confiance des gouvernements des dits pays quant à leurs possibilités de développement économique et social. La fin des années 1980 a été marquée par une remarquable reprise économique dans les pays de l'OCDE, ainsi que dans certains pays d'Asie de l'Est. Cette reprise n'a pas eu le même impact dans toutes les régions en développement. «*Le Tiers monde est un kaléidoscope culturel et économique d'une complexité et d'une diversité déroutantes, même au sein de régions très peu étendues, voire au sein des pays*» (21). Certaines régions de l'Asie du Sud ont vu un accroissement de leur pauvreté et l'Afrique ne s'est pas encore remise d'une des plus graves crises de l'histoire d'après-guerre. Dans le domaine du développement, cette dernière décennie a été surnommée la décennie perdue.

L'économie internationale des années 1990 sera caractérisée par des facteurs d'influence mondiale. Le rôle des entreprises multinationales, en tant que propriétaires de capitaux et d'atouts technologiques, augmentera probablement. Les marchés financiers sont en effet dominés par d'importants acteurs privés. Face à ces réalités, les gouvernements nationaux pourront donc de moins en moins contrôler l'orientation des politiques économiques. Certains pays en développement feront un gros effort pour rejoindre les pays qui dominent réellement la scène économique internationale, tandis que d'autres courent le risque d'être écartés des grands courants des relations économiques internationales (22).

Adapter leurs stratégies de lutte contre la pauvreté à ces écarts qui se creusent entre différents pays en développement pourrait bien constituer un défi important pour les ONG.

#### Démocratisation et participation

Selon le Rapport du CAD 1989, « *il ne sera sans doute pas possible d'arriver à des politiques et à une affectation des ressources davantage orientées sur la justice sociale et sur la participation de toute la population sans un minimum de mécanismes démocratiques allant de pair avec un partage plus large des responsabilités économiques et politiques* » (23).

La plupart des gouvernements des pays en développement doivent mettre en place des politiques d'ajustement difficiles et complexes pour rétablir la croissance économique. Il leur faut non seulement prendre en compte leurs forces et leurs faiblesses face à l'économie mondiale, mais aussi trouver des « *accommodements* » avec leurs propres populations. Les années 1980 ont montré que les régimes autoritaires ne constituent peut-être pas les meilleurs fondements pour des politiques d'ajustement économique. C'est ainsi que de nombreux pays ont marqué un retour à des formes démocratiques de gouvernement qui, à long terme, peuvent offrir plus de souplesse.

À l'aube des années 1990, les changements historiques qui se sont produits en Europe de l'Est et dans d'autres régions du monde, et qui conduisent au pluralisme économique et politique, renforcent l'idée qu'une large participation des individus aux stratégies de développement est importante.

En décembre 1989, les membres du CAD déclaraient que « *vouloir privilégier le développement participatif n'est pas chercher à court-circuiter les gouvernements. De fait, pour que le développement soit efficace, il faut des gouvernements et des services publics forts et compétents. Dans le même temps, les actions visant à promouvoir plus résolument l'initiative individuelle et le secteur privé exigeront que les donateurs s'orientent vers des filières moins "étatisées", en faisant appel aux institutions nationales et aux ONG locales dans le cadre de la coopération d'Etat à Etat* » (24).

La dimension politique du développement est peut-être le problème le plus complexe que les ONG devront affronter dans leurs relations avec les gouvernements des pays en développement. L'administration publique du Nord admet parfois difficilement l'aspect politique des activités des ONG, et risque par là même d'être incapable de faire évoluer une relation tendue entre gouvernement du Sud et ONG vers une relation qui produira des résultats durables.

Dans leur soutien au processus de développement du tiers monde, les ONG sont confrontées aux structures poli-

tiques existantes. Si développer signifie amener des groupes d'individus à transformer leurs mentalités, leurs activités et leurs institutions de manière à augmenter leurs possibilités d'obtenir des bénéfices durables et équitables, alors les politiques de développement équivalent à des stratégies politiques (25).

Les implications d'une approche plus participative et démocratique au niveau des groupes de base ont été ainsi décrites : « *Passer de la participation aux projets d'aide à la responsabilité de ses propres programmes est une étape nécessaire pour qu'un groupe de population libère sa capacité d'inventer et d'agir. Cette étape franchie, le groupe peut alors discuter avec l'Etat et avec les agences d'aide pour faire cofinancer des actions choisies par lui et eux, et négocier. Passer des projets d'aide à des processus d'appui, c'est d'abord changer d'instruments: abandonner celui qui est connu, commode et simplificateur pour un autre, plus complexe et qui sera à remettre au point en permanence. C'est aussi changer de partenaires: ne plus considérer les acteurs essentiels comme des exécutants et des bénéficiaires, et admettre que la négociation sera élargie et continue* » (26).

#### Le rôle des femmes dans le développement

Le débat des années 1970 et 1980 sur le rôle des femmes dans le développement a suscité un effort de réflexion chez les décideurs.

Le rôle des femmes dans la gestion du cycle de vie quotidien des sociétés en développement et le fait qu'elles assurent plus de la moitié de la production vivrière ont été reconnus dans les années 1980, et les politiques de « *secteur privilégié* » ont été soumises à des pressions diverses. Au cours des années 1990, plaider pour l'octroi de ressources supplémentaires à un groupe particulièrement défavorisé de la population ne sera plus suffisant, car l'on a démontré qu'il était nécessaire de modifier les structures et des lignes d'action pour permettre aux femmes de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans le processus de développement. Les ONG prêtent désormais une attention toute particulière au rôle des femmes en tant que gestionnaires de leur environnement naturel (27).

Comme cela se produit souvent avec les donateurs publics, les projets de développement rural et de génération de capitaux menés par les ONG continuent à être axés sur le rôle domestique des femmes et cherchent rarement à leur faciliter l'accès à des ressources importantes, ou à améliorer leur savoir-faire en matière de gestion ou de leadership. Mais les ONG soutiennent de plus en plus les femmes qui exercent leurs droits politiques dans un contexte où l'héritage institutionnel, des handicaps culturels et la compétition pour des ressources peu abondantes, sont encore des obstacles importants.

Selon certaines opinions exprimées hors des cercles gouvernementaux, les ONG du Nord pourraient accorder une plus grande place aux femmes dans leurs projets de développement, en renforçant leurs liens avec les organisations féminines du Sud. Pour cela, il serait peut-être bon d'augmenter le nombre de femmes qualifiées dans leurs propres organisations. Au cours de la prochaine décennie, les ONG pourraient soutenir davantage les groupes de femmes appartenant aux couches sociales les plus défavorisées, au moment où des organisations féminines se sont créées pour représenter les femmes économiquement et politiquement les plus puissantes dans ces sociétés. Tra-

duire en actions concrètes cette prise de conscience du rôle essentiel des femmes constitue un défi important (28).

#### Communication et recherche Sud-Nord

Au cours des années 1990, les activités d'«éducation» au développement des ONG pourront peut-être se transformer de plus en plus en une communication à double sens, dans laquelle les populations du Sud fourniraient au Nord des informations plus pointues sur les problèmes auxquels elles sont confrontées dans leur vie quotidienne. Elles devront aussi continuer à les informer sur les obstacles fondamentaux au développement et, pour cela, renforcer les capacités de leurs unités de recherche dans le Sud (29).

La reconnaissance, par les communautés de chercheurs du Nord, de la valeur des recherches sur le développement menées dans le Sud, pourrait apporter une dimension pratique et servir de complément à leurs hypothèses de recherche théoriques et abstraites. En outre, l'accroissement des contacts entre réseaux d'ONG ouvre la possibilité d'un plus vaste échange d'informations entre chercheurs dans les sens Sud-Sud et Sud-Nord.

Ce point de vue n'a pas cours seulement dans le monde des ONG. On peut entendre des opinions similaires, en faveur d'une «coopération mondiale», dans les services de liaison avec les ONG des organismes publics d'aide. L'accroissement des capacités de réflexion des ONG du Sud et une meilleure collaboration Sud-Sud pourraient fournir aux ONG et aux donateurs du Nord des relations de coopération à partir desquelles ils pourraient parvenir à «une meilleure compréhension des complexités et des avantages procurés par des partenariats qui poursuivent des objectifs communs et partagent des visions de développement à long terme» (30).

#### Environnement et développement durable

À la fin des années 1980, on a assisté à une forte prise de conscience, de la part des gouvernements, des ONG et du secteur privé, de la gravité des menaces pesant sur l'environnement. Les ONG avaient déjà, au cours des années précédentes, soulevé de nombreux problèmes concernant l'environnement. Des réseaux et des collectifs d'ONG se sont constitués dans ce domaine et doivent être maintenus et consolidés (31). Ces réseaux ont alerté les décideurs sur les impacts négatifs pour l'environnement et les populations locales, de certains projets de développement, ce qui a parfois abouti à des changements d'attitude.

Au cours des années 1990, les ONG de développement devront maintenir leur pression sur les gouvernements pour que ceux-ci prennent en compte la question de l'environnement dans leurs stratégies de développement.

À la fin des années 1980, les ONG ont commencé à comprendre que les questions d'environnement s'inscrivaient dans un contexte plus large englobant la culture, les modes de vie, les problèmes macro-économiques, la paix, la sécurité et les droits de l'homme. Les ONG du Sud actives dans ce domaine ont demandé aux grandes ONG internationales de faciliter leur dialogue avec les donateurs et les gouvernements du Sud et de travailler avec elles dans le domaine de l'éducation sur l'environnement pour parvenir à un développement durable (32).

#### Migrations, relations ethniques et droits de l'homme

La réalité d'une société mondiale interdépendante, dans laquelle les sociétés du Nord tendent de plus en plus à se séculariser, conduit à une certaine reconnaissance de la valeur d'autres discours culturels et des bases philosophiques de leur prétention à la vérité universelle. Cette reconnaissance a été difficile dans certaines régions du monde moderne, en particulier dans celles où les mécanismes économiques et politiques sont devenus moins efficaces, ou sont entrés dans une importante phase de transition.

Les années 1980 ont vu un flot continu de migrants des pays en développement vers les pays de l'OCDE, mais aussi à l'intérieur des régions du tiers monde. Parmi les nombreuses conséquences des migrations, figure en bonne place l'accroissement possible des tensions entre groupes ethniques (33).

Leurs sociétés traversant une période de modernisation et de transition, les pays membres de l'OCDE, l'Union soviétique, les pays d'Europe de l'Est et de nombreux pays en développement doivent de plus en plus souvent faire face à des conflits d'origine ethnique ou nationaliste.

Les économies en expansion des pays membres de l'OCDE génèrent une demande de plus en plus importante de main-d'œuvre, ce qui tend à augmenter l'immigration. Dans un contexte de taux de chômage relativement élevé et de pressions grandissantes de la part des services publics restructurés, l'immigration a donné naissance à des tensions ethniques entre des groupes qui se considéraient comme des concurrents.

Les ONG actives dans les domaines des droits de l'homme et de l'éducation au développement doivent donc fournir à leurs membres des informations sur le milieu culturel et socio-économique des migrants, des réfugiés et des autres groupes ethniques, ainsi que sur les raisons de leur présence dans les sociétés industrialisées.

#### La dimension culturelle du développement

Selon la Banque mondiale, «une bonne ONG de développement peut, mieux que la plupart des autres organismes, comprendre et exprimer les besoins des populations, et mettre en place, des actions pour subvenir efficacement à ces besoins. Les ONG agissent comme un relais entre les bénéficiaires et le monde extérieur; elles importent un nouveau savoir-faire et motivent les populations d'une manière compatible avec leurs croyances et leurs traditions culturelles» (34).

Dans le milieu des ONG, le débat qui porte sur la dimension culturelle du développement s'est axé sur les effets attendus des projets, tels que l'augmentation de la consommation, des investissements et de la production de biens par des populations du tiers monde qui sont profondément influencées par les traditions et la culture. Ces populations évaluent les options qui s'offrent à elles en fonction des possibilités politiques et économiques auxquelles elles peuvent accéder.

La collaboration accrue entre ONG du Nord et partenaires du Sud pourrait augmenter la reconnaissance, par les planificateurs du développement, des dimensions traditionnelles et culturelles du développement, celui-ci étant vu comme un processus dans lequel les gens peuvent choisir eux-mêmes, à condition que la société leur fournisse suffisamment d'options (35).

## Conclusions

Au cours des précédentes décennies, «*la coopération pour le développement a considérablement contribué au progrès dans une partie du tiers monde. Mesuré en termes de taux de croissance, le développement de ces régions a été un grand succès. Par contre, il n'a représenté qu'un succès partiel en termes d'éradication de la pauvreté, de création d'emplois et de satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux de l'homme*» (36).

Les ONG ont manifesté une remarquable aptitude à mobiliser l'opinion publique des pays membres de l'OCDE sur les problèmes de développement. Dans leur diversité — depuis les petites initiatives locales avec des buts limités jusqu'aux ONG nationales et internationales bien établies menant des programmes de grande envergure — elles sont l'expression d'un large soutien de l'opinion aux objectifs de la coopération pour le développement et de la solidarité internationale. Les ONG existent parce que des groupes de personnes sont convaincus que des actions individuelles peuvent, face à une réalité atterrante, apporter une contribution significative.

Les années 1980 ont été caractérisées par une prise de conscience critique de la coopération et de son impact sur le bien-être économique et social des populations. Les effets négatifs des programmes d'austérité et d'ajustement sur les pauvres du tiers monde ont incité certaines ONG à remettre en question le contenu et les réalisations de leurs propres actions de développement.

Au début de ce survol sur le rôle des ONG dans la coopération pour le développement, il s'agissait de déterminer si l'attention que leur portent les donateurs publics

est l'effet d'une mode passagère, ou si elle représente un phénomène durable dans le monde du développement.

Quel que soit le soutien que les gouvernements apporteront aux ONG, celles-ci continueront d'exprimer les opinions du grand public sur les effets des politiques de développement, comme elles l'ont fait au cours des dernières décennies. En outre, maintenant que les ONG sont de plus en plus engagées dans la création de relations de personne à personne entre le Nord et le Sud, elles seront à même d'exprimer les pensées d'un plus grand nombre sur les questions Nord-Sud.

Les ONG du Nord, qui ont inclus des ONG partenaires du Sud et des mouvements populaires engagés dans l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de leurs projets pourraient recevoir un plus grand soutien, par exemple sous la forme de l'amélioration des procédures de financement qui comportent une certaine souplesse, pour mieux respecter l'autonomie des ONG et des réseaux du Sud.

Les gouvernements des pays membres de l'OCDE ont reconnu la valeur du travail d'éducation au développement mené par les ONG. La relation entre gouvernements et ONG aura des conséquences importantes pour chacun. Aménager un dialogue et admettre les potentialités et les contraintes de l'autre représenteront un défi pour les uns comme pour les autres.

Bien que la collaboration entre gouvernements, organisations internationales et ONG ne soit pas toujours fondée sur des objectifs communs, c'est l'intérêt de tous d'agir pour mettre en place, dans l'avenir, de vraies relations de partenariat.

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- (28) OCDE, *Rapport du CAD 1989*, p. 61.
- (29) Un important réseau pour la recherche Sud-Sud a été créé au sein du Comité inter-régional de coordination des associations de développement (ICCCA). Avec le soutien du Centre de Recherches pour le Développement International (CRDI) et du Centre de Développement de l'OCDE, cinq associations régionales de recherche et de formation en matière de développement ont formé le Réseau international d'information sur le développement (IDIN), et publient à intervalles réguliers des répertoires sur les projets de recherche en cours, et des inventaires contenant une description des instituts de recherche et de formation. Les bases de données sont mises à jour en permanence par les centres de documentation des cinq associations. Elles contiennent aussi des informations sur différentes institutions régionales qui ne sont pas membres des associations. Ces répertoires et ces inventaires sont publiés conjointement par les associations et par le Centre de Développement de l'OCDE.
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## La ratification par la Belgique entraîne l'entrée en vigueur de la Convention du Conseil de l'Europe sur les OING

La Belgique a ratifié le 4 septembre 1990 à Strasbourg la Convention européenne sur la reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique des organisations internationales non gouvernementales.

Trois ratifications étant nécessaires pour permettre l'entrée en vigueur de cette Convention, la ratification de la Belgique, qui suit celle du Royaume-Uni (février 1989) et de la Grèce (juin 1989), entraînera l'entrée en vigueur de cet instrument juridique dès le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1991.

C'est Colette TAQUET, chargée d'affaires a.i. de la Belgique auprès du Conseil de l'Europe, qui a remis entre les mains du secrétaire général adjoint, Gaetano ADINOLFI, l'instrument de ratification de la Belgique.

Jusqu'ici les organisations internationales non gouvernementales, malgré le caractère international de leurs objectifs et de leurs activités, étaient régies par la législation nationale relative aux associations et fondations dans chaque Etat. Avec cette Convention, le Conseil de l'Europe a établi le premier instrument international qui traite directement des organisations internationales et fait obligation aux Etats contractants de reconnaître de plein droit leur personnalité et la capacité juridique, si elles remplissent les conditions énoncées dans la Convention.

Les Etats contractants décident de reconnaître «de plein droit» la personnalité et la capacité juridiques d'une organisation non gouvernementale telles qu'elles sont acquises dans l'Etat contractant de son siège statutaire.

Pour bénéficier des dispositions de la Convention, une organisation internationale non gouvernementale doit remplir les conditions suivantes:

- avoir un but non lucratif d'utilité internationale;
- avoir été créée par un acte relevant du droit interne d'un Etat contractant;
- exercer une activité effective dans au moins deux Etats;
- avoir son siège statutaire sur le territoire d'un Etat contractant et son siège réel dans cet Etat ou dans un autre Etat contractant.

La Convention établit les règles régissant les preuves à apporter aux autorités de l'Etat contractant où la reconnaissance est demandée et énonce les cas exceptionnels où un Etat contractant peut refuser la reconnaissance (par exemple, lorsque les activités de l'organisation considérée contreviennent à la sécurité nationale, à la sûreté publique, à la défense de l'ordre et à la prévention du crime, etc.).

La Convention présente un intérêt particulier pour des pays qui sont le siège de nombreuses OING, tels l'Autriche, la Belgique, la Suisse ou le Royaume-Uni, mais aussi pour d'autres pays où des OING déploient une activité intense.

# Student Movements in Advanced Western Societies

## Transnational movements and their national political contexts

by C.A. Rootes \*

To many contemporary observers, the wave of student radicalism which swept the advanced societies in the late 1960s and the early 1970s appeared to be a thoroughly transnational phenomenon and some were moved to write of the emergence of a global student movement as a powerful new agent of political and social change. Others saw in its apparent transnationalism symptoms of the fundamentally psychopathological character of the movement, a kind of generational hysteria which knew no boundaries and which was ultimately destructive both of political order and of the activist students themselves (Feuer, 1969).

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, whilst there were indeed powerful transnational forces behind the

eruption of student activism, the courses of development and the outcomes of student movements were profoundly shaped by their national, social and, especially, political contexts. Indeed, the history of student movements is an example of the ways which the transnational imperatives of social change in an increasingly integrated world system are refracted by the prisms of national and even local institutions and political situations: it was the interplay between (nearly) universal impulses and national and local contexts that gave student movements their character and which best explains the considerable variation in their incidence, development and consequences.

### *Student radicalism: a «new social movement» ?*

The student movements which swept the advanced societies of North America, Western Europe and even such outposts of European civilization as Australia during the 1960s and early 1970s were not entirely without precedent: students had, after all, been active in radical politics before, most conspicuously in the years between the World Wars

What was novel about the student movements which arose in the 1960s was that they developed as autonomous and usually amorphous movements of students, movements which generally scorned the whole range of adult political parties, pressure groups and other more or

less institutionalized forms of political representation. It was not only this which puzzled even academic even academic observers and tempted them into tendering explanations of the rise of such movements as a kind of suicidal hysteria of generational revolt which might better be explained in terms of deep irrational compulsions than in the normally sober language of ordinary political analysis.

The new student movements defied the conventions as well by denying distinctions between politics and private life, by employing tactics of direct action and civil disobedience, and, most importantly, by acting on behalf of causes which defied interpretation in terms of the vocabulary of material interests which was supposed to characterize the politics of mature liberal democratic states. They seemed all the more irrational because it was not the disadvantaged who took to the streets but the relatively privileged minority who had the advantage of higher education, the children of the relatively privileged who themselves had every reason to expect privileged places in the occupational structure upon the completion of their studies.

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The student movements may not have been the first of the «new» social movements -that honour probably goes to the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament - but they did constitute the first nearly universal manifestation of the phenomenon, and in many respects they were to establish the forms and diffuse the ideas that have served as the inspiration of have served as the inspiration of more durable «new» social movements such as the women's movements and the ecology movements.

Melucci (1985: 796-797) suggests that the new social movements of the 1980s  
*arise in those areas of the system which are connected to the most intensive informational and symbolic investments and exposed to the greatest pressures for conformity. The actors in these conflicts...do not fight merely for material goals, onto increase their participation in the system. They fight for symbolic and cultural stakes, for a different meaning and orientation of social action.*

However, apposite that is as a characterization of the movements of the 1980s, it is entirely applicable to the student movements of the 1960s.

### *The Social Context*

Student movements became prominent in the advanced societies towards the end of a period in which enrolments in higher education had everywhere doubled or even trebled. As a result, students were everywhere more numerous, absolutely and relatively, than they had ever been: in the United States, the proportion of 18-19 year olds in post-secondary education passed fifty per cent for the first time.

The expansion of higher education had a number of sources, the relative importance of which varied from one country to another. One factor was demographic pressure: an increase in the numbers and proportion of people in the age groups from which students were typically drawn. Another was the entrepreneurial action of universities and colleges themselves. Everywhere, however, the main pressures for expansion were political: on the one hand, pressures from governments imbued with the fervour of human capital theorists and anxious to upgrade the educational qualifications of the work-force lest the country in question should be left behind in the race for economic growth and, on the other, political pressures from parents of young people of student age; people who, though not usually themselves graduates of higher education, were beneficiaries of the post-war rise in living standards and, often, of the expanded opportunities for professional, managerial, administrative, scientific and technical employment; people concerned to guarantee their offspring, by means of higher education, future tenure of the social position they had themselves acquired largely because of structural changes in the economy. At the same time, affluence made it possible for unprecedentedly large numbers of young people to enjoy a moratorium on adult obligation. Youth as a distinct stage of life was born and the university appeared to be its ideal locus.

The combination of these factors meant that the numbers of students expanded just at the time that demographic, economic and social changes conspired to enhance the status and visibility of youth. The entry of this new generation into universities inevitably produced strains within institutions whose ethos was one of elitism in terms

both of the numbers and past and future status of their students and of an academic ritual that made the university, after the Church, the nearest thing extant to a living relic of medievalism.

The fact that in some countries, especially in France and Italy, the rapid expansion of student numbers had outstripped the provision of facilities such as libraries and classrooms, generated a measure of discontent about the material conditions of students life. More important, and more general, however, was the collision between the demands and expectations of students who imagined they were adults and university authorities who insisted on regarding themselves as being *in loco parentis*.

Whether disputes began over dormitory regulations (as in France) or over the rights of students to be politically active on campus (as at Berkeley), the first tremors of student revolt were conflicts with university authorities. But these «*encounters with unjust authority*» (or, more strictly, encounters with authority that appeared to be unjust but which was, more often, merely inept) initiated a process of political learning that quickly spilled over beyond the campus.

Another source of strain often mentioned by commentators is the collision between students' expectations of elite employment and the recalcitrant reality of labour markets which generated new elite employment less rapidly than universities produced new graduates. Statera (1975) writes of the contradiction between the increasing objective centrality of students as a social category in an increasingly knowledge-based society and simultaneous marginalization of the individual student whose advantage was reduced in proportion to the increase in the numbers of his/her colleagues. Worse, the mismatch between the kinds of education students received and the qualifications demanded by employers, together with the relative overproduction of graduates in general, was claimed to produce graduate unemployment of which students had direct knowledge or which they realistically feared.

Some countries were reckoned in this to fare better than others: Britain, with its relatively selective and numerically restricted intake into higher education, low student-staff ratios and its generous provision of grant assistance to students, was seen to have preserved most of the characteristics of the elite university and its relationship with society, whereas Italy, with its massive enrolments in understaffed and chronically overcrowded facilities, had travelled furthest in the direction of the mass university. Yet, accurate though these characterizations are, it is implausible to attribute the rise of student movements to actual or anticipated graduate unemployment. In Italy, where Statera speaks of «*thousands of unemployed graduates*», the Years 1964 to 1969 were marked by an historically very low level of graduate unemployment (2 to 3 %) and it was not until 1970, after the student movement had passed its peak, that graduate unemployment began to rise, albeit modestly (Baarbagli, 1982: 240).

Tensions and dislocations attending the rapid expansion of higher education during the 1960s did not of themselves constitute a sufficient basis for the eruption of student movements on such an unprecedented scale but they did produce a considerable accumulation of combustible material. Little local difficulties may have raised civil libertarian issues that provided the first sparks, but the real fuel for ignition of the conflagration was provided by events in

the wider political arena. Important as social, demographic and educational changes were in providing the actors for the social movements that were to develop, it was events in and features of political systems which accounted for the generalization of protest and which are sufficient to account for much of the cross-national and intra-national variation in the incidence of student protest.

## **Beginnings**

Civil libertarian reactions to actions of local university or civic authorities were usually important to the initial mobilization of student protest and can often be located as the specific determinants of the variation from campus to campus of the intensity of protest and the proportion of the student population mobilized: the Free Speech episode at Berkeley in the fall of 1964 helps to account for the preeminence in protest of Berkeley among the California campuses, just as the state governments' ban on street demonstrations accounts for peculiarity, among the Australian movements, of protests among students at the University of Queensland. But such local incidents do not exist outside a larger political context, a context which is necessary both to explain students' inclination to take political action in the first place and to account for the detonator effect such local conflicts often had.

The Berkeley case is, of course, a classic. Students returning from a summer of activism in behalf of civil rights in the American South were prohibited from using for the distribution of political literature an area at the main gate to the campus which had traditionally (if, by a strict interpretation of university by-laws, illegally) been used for such purposes. The civil libertarian movement which followed was soon caught up in the earliest campaigns of opposition to the United States' prosecution of the war in Vietnam.

Similarly, in the Queensland case, it was their attempts to demonstrate their opposition to Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War that brought Queensland students into conflict with the state police. The two-year long civil liberties campaign which ensued proved a fertile ground for the subsequent mobilization of a much larger number of students than hitherto in opposition to the War itself and a basis for the development of what many observers reckoned to be the first and most original of Australia's New Left groups (Rootes, 1988).

In France, local disputes at Nanterre had their background in more general problems of the French higher education system, problems which in turn were symptomatic of the intensely rigid, remote, bureaucratized and centralized character of the French state. That these problems were felt most acutely at Nanterre probably had less to do with the location or physical environment of the campus than with the contradiction between its modernity, in curricula, subject mix and staffing as much as in his architecture, and the archaism of rigid, centralized state administration which meant that only the National Ministry of Education itself had the power to vary even dormitory regulations. Again, it is inconceivable that a local lockout at Nanterre should have issued in a national political crisis had not the political situation in the country at large been so tense. The left, never entirely reconciled to the legitimacy of the Fifth Republic or the manner of De Gaulle's imposition of it, was smarting at the fact that it had been rewarded for its near victory in the 1967 legislative elec-

tions by cuts in welfare benefits, the prorogation of parliament and the Prime Minister's arrogation to himself of powers of rule by decree.

If, however, there is a general political condition which conduces to the development of student movements it was the existence of an effective vacuum of opposition, within the political mainstream, to the policies of governments.

The most literal case of such an absence of opposition is the German one. The entry of the SPD into Grand Coalition with the ruling Christian Democrats reduces opposition in the Bundestag to the handful of liberal Free Democrats. For German left-wing students, however, this was only the final, practical demonstration of the extinction of meaningful opposition in the Federal Republic, a process which had begun with the SPD's rejection of marxism at its Bad Godesberg conference in 1959 and its subsequent disaffiliation of SDS, its erstwhile student wing.

The most nearly parallel case is probably that of the United States where, before 1968, only one or two lonely voices were raised in the legislature in opposition to the Administration's conduct of the Vietnam War. Much has been made of the catch-all, non-ideological character of American political parties (and its consequences for social movements (see, e.g., Jenkins, 1983: 548), but it is probably more pertinent in this case that it was the Democrats, whose party on domestic issues at least was generally more hospitable to the left, who were in power and who were ultimately responsible for the prosecution of the war. In the absence of articulate opposition *within* the political system about an issue — Vietnam — which the draft compelled students to take seriously, student opposition simply expanded to fill the space available.

The Australian experience was not dissimilar. Although the Vietnam War had been an issue of partisan political controversy in the 1966 general elections, the Labor Party, which had advocated the withdrawal of Australian troops, was badly defeated and its new leader, Whitlam, himself associated with the right wing of the party, chose for tactical reasons to downplay the Vietnam issue in Labor's subsequent campaigning. It was only after Labor's defeat at the polls and Whitlam's accession to the leadership that student opposition to the Vietnam War began to assume the proportions of a mass movement and that, with the sole exception of Students for Democratic Action in Queensland, New Left groups began to be formed on the campuses.

Nor is the French case an exception. There was, very clearly, a semi-institutionalized Left opposition in France, but the parliamentary tactics of the Gaullists and their allies and, more generally, the presidential domination inscribed in the constitution of the Fifth Republic, meant that the Socialist and Communist parliamentary opposition was scarcely audible let alone effective. The very structure of French government in the Fifth Republic obstructed, as it was designed to do, any effective institutionalized opposition just as the centralized and bureaucratic character of the state precluded access to the system at other levels.

A further complication to the French case, and one that it shared with the Italian case, consisted in the fact that the largest opposition party was a Communist Party which not only seemed to have little prospect of forging a left majority but which, because of its associations with Stalinism, was anathema to students of even modestly libertarian disposition. French students had, nearly a decade earlier, pion-

ered the cause of Algerian independence in the face of the active hostility of the whole spectrum of political opinion in France. That experience scarcely encouraged students to view the Communist Party with affection, but it did establish a precedent for students' assumption of the role of unofficial opposition.

Britain was, by the account of one of its leading New Left intellectuals, the only major industrialized country which did not produce «a coherent and militant student movement» (Anderson, 1969: 214). It may be tempting to seek an explanation, as Anderson does, in the peculiarly unimaginative, pragmatic and utilitarian British political culture, a culture which is simply not fertile ground for Utopian chthiasm, or to emphasize the effective social integration of British students as a consequence of their cosetting by a providential state and a well-staffed, well-organized and benignly paternalistic university system. More important, however, is the fact that British student unions were well-institutionalized and were in this period dominated by members of the student and youth organizations of the governing Labour Party itself.

That, however, might have counted for little had disillusionment with the Labour government been sufficiently intense. Labour was, after all, in office throughout the period during which student movements flourished elsewhere in Europe. But the Labour Party, after thirteen years in opposition and nearly two of government with the barest majority in the House of Commons, had scarcely been in power long enough to have betrayed all the hopes held of it. Moreover, although it disappointed many of its left-wing critics, particularly by its failure forthrightly to denounce the United States' part in the Vietnam War, it did at least resist American entreaties itself to send British troops. Labour in power may not have been inspiring, but it could, for many on the left, certainly have been worse and it seemed a deal better than the only practicable alternative. In Britain, then, institutionalized opposition survived and was credible just because there had recently been an alternation of power and Labour was in government. Moreover, although the Left was no longer so powerful in the Labour Party as it had recently been, the Party was by no means closed to the Left and it remained, for most of the British Left, an objective whose capture was both desired and considered feasible, the British New Left of the late 1950s having been inspired principally by disillusionment with the Communist Party rather than the Labour Party. Student protest in Britain accordingly lacked the coherence and mission that different political circumstances gave its counterparts in other countries.

This theme of an oppositional vacuum is repeated at the local level. It was not at universities and campuses where the institutionalized Left was strongest or where the various marxist sects were well-entrenched that the student movement of the 1960s began, but at those campuses where the institutionalized and marxist Left was weak or absent.

The French student movement did not begin at the Sorbonne where UNEF, the National Union of French Students, was strong and where all manner of marxist and trotskyst groups competed for attention, but at Nanterre where UNEF was practically non-existent and the marxist sects were individually so weak that they could gain a hearing only by collaborating as they did, even with such self-proclaimed anarchists as Cohn-Bendit, under the umbrella of the March 22 Movement.

Germany the student movement did not begin in Heidelberg, Cologne or Munich where the marxist SDS was strong, but in Berlin and Frankfurt where a more libertarian and Utopian strain of student politics predominated. In Italy, it was at Trento and in Turin, where the national students union had already been dissolved, that the student movement began (Statera, 1975: 76, 83).

Similarly, in Australia, although New Left student groups did develop at those universities and in those cities (Sydney and Melbourne) where the old Left was best established, it was campuses with no such radical tradition in cities where the old Left was conspicuously weak (Brisbane and Adelaide) which nurtured the most impressive New Left student movements (Rootes, 198). In both cases there was, moreover, an absence of effective political opposition at state level, in Queensland because a discredited, trade union-dominated Labor Party was kept in opposition by an electoral gerrymander which gave government to a rural-dominated conservative coalition, and in South Australia because an even more outrageous gerrymander had ensured the electoral defeat of Labor government which had actually obtained a clear majority of the popular vote.

The general picture is, then, clear. It was an absence of effective, institutionalized opposition which was the general condition most propitious for the development of student movements and, at the local level, the absence of established sectarian marxist groups which best conduced to the libertarian protests which mobilized the largest numbers of students. Statera suggests (1975: 119) that it was the political and social isolation of the German student movement and the hostility of the authorities that was responsible for its maturation of a genuine Utopian movement which served as inspiration for the Italians and the French. Again, the Australian experience reinforces the point: it was in Queensland, the most liberal and repressive of the Australian states, that the most innovatively Utopian of Australian student movements flourished.

## *Development and Decline*

The subsequent development of student movements was a matter of complex interaction between the movements and their environments and their internal social and political dynamics.

That the two are not easy to disentangle is clear from a consideration of the impact upon the American student movement of just one of the elements in its environment — the mass media. Todd Gitlin (1980) has ably shown how treatment of the movement by the mass media stimulated not only a powerfully consequential popular reaction of attraction and repulsion to the movement but also a dynamic of development *within* the movement that was divisive and ultimately destructive.

There are a number of instances of direct political manipulation of the mass media's treatment of student protest including, most famously, the Gaullist administration's imposition of a television blackout during May 1968 and its subsequent dismissal of journalists employed by ORTF, the State broadcasting organisation, for having had the temerity to attempt to report what they saw.

The Nixon administration, too, successfully brought pressure on the media networks to downplay the size and significance of mass anti-war demonstrations in the United

States. But, as Gitlin stresses, such-interventions were, in the United States at least, the exception rather than the rule; the coverage the media gave to student movements was more usually determined simply by the professional routines and conventions by which journalists and editors operate and which determine what is news. The consequences for the movement were, however, dramatic: media attention created a bandwagon effect from which the movement gained new recruits, but once the novelty had passed and the momentum began to falter, media amplification created a reverse bandwagon effect which contributed to its demobilization and exacerbated internal tendencies to doctrinal dispute and political adventurism. Even early in its life, the media's coverage was not entirely benign for the movement : it created « leaders » by focussing upon personalities and it deflected the movement into narrowing the range of its concerns in accordance with the media's span of attention. Media coverage thus exacerbated tendencies towards spectacle which are, by reason of the resource balance of the student condition, an occupational hazard of student movements (Rootes, 1978a).

The internal dynamics of the movement are, however, beyond the scope of this paper, except insofar as the political system had an impact upon them. It will be useful at this point to distinguish the several levels of the political system which are relevant here:

1. the policy actions and outputs of government
  - (a) at the international level
  - (b) at the national level
  - (c) at the local level
2. the actions and responses of political parties
3. the actions and responses of other movements and/or non-institutionalized political groupings.

In the policy area of international relations, the relationship between student movements and the state rarely attained the status of an interaction. Rather it was that the state disposed and the student movement opposed. The state's international involvements were frequently stimuli to student mobilization, but the movements' response was almost invariably limited to reaction simply because national governments were not prepared to admit students to the policy-making process. This is not to say that student opposition to the Vietnam War was not a factor in the Nixon administration's decision to wind down American involvement — both Nixon and Kissinger attest that it was — but rather than students being admitted to the policy-making process, their mobilization was seen as one of the obstacles which had to be surmounted or neutralized in order that the administration's ends might be realised.

Similarly with national policy, even where it concerned higher education, students were rarely admitted even to consultative procedures before policy was proposed. The successive projects for the reform of French higher education are simply the most glaring examples of a process of proclamation of legislative projects without prior consultation with those immediately affected that, although it is perhaps most acute in the French system, is really quite general in the advanced societies and particularly in such matters as directly concern students. Representation in decision-making within universities may have been one achievement of student movements, but representation is even now token and ineffective; before 1968 it was virtually non-existent. The situation was marginally better in those countries (e.g. Britain) where there existed an effective and

institutionalized national student organization capable of representing student interests at national level, but such, as we have seen, was by the mid 1960s the exception rather than the rule. For the most part, students, having no opportunity for interaction, could only react.

It was at the local level that interaction between student movements and the state was most common, but even at that level interaction was largely limited to questions of administrative procedure rather than the substance of policy. Thus students might negotiate the route and timing of a demonstration with police or local authorities, but the issue of the protest was more likely to be firmly within the province of a higher and more remote level of state authority. Nevertheless, the actions of local representatives of the state were extremely important to the generation and maintenance of student mobilizations. The issues of « police-brutality » and « repression » were at least as important as the apparently arbitrary acts of university administrations in stimulating eruptions of the civil libertarian outrage that were everywhere the most powerful vehicles for the introduction to protest of previously unmobilized students. The largest and most spectacular mobilizations were almost always those where confrontation was unplanned and unanticipated, but the tacticians of the student movement quickly recognized their mobilizing potential and confrontations with the authorities were often engineered with the aim of producing just such results.

It is difficult to discern much pattern in these interactions since even the most benign and liberal police forces were easily caught off-guard, but whereas some responded intelligently to provocation, others could be relied upon to overreact every time. One general point that can be made, however, is that it was crucial to the survival of the student movement that official repression should remain moderate and unsystematic. Nowhere in the West did the level of repression of student protest rival that usual in Eastern Europe and student movements were able to develop in the free space of liberal democratic societies aided by the intermittent stimuli of erratic police action. On those few occasions where repression did become extreme — as for example with the shooting of four students at Kent State University in 1970 - the immediate reaction may have been a fuelling of indignant protest but the longer term effect was demoralizing and demobilizing.

But Kent State was very much the exception. In general, attempts to repress the student movements were mild by comparison with the treatment meted out to strikers and left-wing working class demonstrators. Even in France, where the student revolt had so nearly toppled the regime, the Gaullist response was not generally vindictive. Rather, it distinguished between the troublesome minority and the mass of students whose grievances were accorded legitimacy. Thus, the trotskyst groups were proscribed and their leaders arrested as they left clandestine meetings, while at the same time the government embarked on a major programme of reform of higher education which extended the right of participation in decision-making to students themselves.

Interactions with political parties were almost always confined to parties of the left. Here there is no simple pattern. Where student organizations had direct access to left parties, as was the case with the Labour Party and the Liberal Party in Britain, no autonomous student movement developed, but it must be wondered whether in the British case the quality of ties with mainstream political parties

was as important as the relative absence of issues which divided British students from the rest of British society.

Elsewhere the links between student political organizations and the established parties, where they existed at all, tended to be weak and usually troublesome. The formal organizations about which the student movement coalesced in Germany and in the United States were the estranged former student affiliates of the SPD and the social democratic wing of the Democratic Party respectively.

In France, however, divisions among formal student organizations reflected some of the political divisions on the French left. Communist students, quite apart from their attempting to influence UNEF, had their own union, the UEC. Yet even before 1968, doctrinal disputes had enervated the UEC, with the Communist Party insisting on the expulsion of militants whom it denounced as « trotskysts » for their assertion of policy independent of the Communist Party itself. These expulsions, at the end of 1965, led to the formation early in 1966 of the Trotskyist and Maoist groups which were so to dominate the rhetoric of French student politics after May 1968 (de Maupeou-Abboud, 1974: 176-7).

Although the French student revolt of May 1968 was often portrayed as a « revolution betrayed », (betrayed, that is, by the Communist Party) student leaders had in fact been accusing Communist Parties of a more general betrayal (of socialist idealism) in both France and Italy long before the events of May (Statera, 1975: 193). The Communist Party, for its part, was understandably wary of close identification with a student movement and both during May 1968 and afterwards it was concerned to use its influence to steer student politics away from Utopian contestations with the authorities and into a more narrowly corporatist conception of student unionism. If there was a positive link between the French student movement and a political party, it was not with the mass party of the working class but with an unorthodox socialist party, the PSU, much of whose support came from salaried professional workers.

In Australia, relations between the student movement and political parties varied considerably from place to place. Their activity in the anti-war movement brought student leaders into contact with local peace committees on which the Communist Party (CPA) and the left of the Labor Party (ALP) were well-represented, and in many cases cordial relations were established. The Labor left was, however, only a minority within the party and although individual members and MPs were supportive of and helpful to the student movement in a number of ways, they could not be said to have been greatly influential.

Relations with the Communist Party were more complicated. The CPA at first endorsed the French Communist Party's line against the «left adventurism» of the May revolt in Paris but, after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia later in 1968, it began to revise its appreciation of the student left and took a number of measures to forge links with it. One of these was its organization in 1969 of a «Left Action» Conference designed to bring together in discussion all the diverse threads of the revolutionary Left. The CPA was accused of manipulation in its conduct of the Conference and it was boycotted or attended only clandestinely by both libertarian and Maoist strands within the student movement, some of whom had already been involved in more or less bitter clashes with Party officials. It seems

more likely that, rather than seeking to manipulate the student movement, the dominant revisionist faction of the CPA, in the course of its battle with the Moscow-liners, sought to use the Conference to revitalize the Party by exposing it to radical thinking which was critical of the Party and its legacy of Stalinism.

As the student movement developed, it was not mainstream parties which were its point of reference but other movements — which almost invariably meant other student movements — and increasingly, the variety of sectarian Marxist groups. Nevertheless the pattern of the mainstream party system was influential insofar as it strongly influenced the available stock of political ideas.

In the United States, the absence of a socialist party and the intellectual hegemony of Lockean liberalism meant that there the rhetoric of the student movement initially took the form of a reaffirmation of the «democratic and egalitarian values of the American creed» (Huntington, 1975: 112). American protests were at first liberal, only gradually tapped a submerged Utopian tradition, and did not so much degenerate into Marxism-Leninism as witness the capture, by new converts to that faith, of the formal organizational structures of SDS. Since national SDS had, in any case, reflected the decentralization of the United States by being little more than an annual forum and an inefficient focus for national coordination and communication, the victory was a rather empty one. In most places the student movement simply went on as it had always done, obeying the dictates of local circumstances and reflecting the idiosyncratic balance of views among local activists.

In countries such as France and Italy, where Marxism was entrenched in the party system and where the political stances of people even outside the left were defined in relation to it, the intrusion of Marxism into the student movement occurred much earlier. Just because orthodox Marxism was entrenched in France and Italy, unorthodox and dissident Marxist tendencies were better developed and were relatively accessible as a source of interpretation of political developments (cf. Martinelli and Cavalli, 1972: 308).

Each instance of a student movement had, in some measure, a demonstration effect for those that followed it. The most obvious case is that of the United States where the mass media performed the function of communicating the slogans and forms of action of one protest group across the country more effectively than any effort of the groups themselves. Slavish imitation was not, however, normal; rather, each local group or national movement learned rather haphazardly from the experience of others and acted as it thought best in peculiarly local circumstances. Ideas were communicated: Statera, for example, suggests that Rudi Dutschke's ideas found more fertile ground in Italy and in France than in their native Germany. But there was seldom anything organized in this traffic in ideas; what sometimes appeared as imitation was often merely a quite autonomously similar response to similar conditions.

If the influence of other movements was generally benign, that of the sectarian Marxist groups appears everywhere to have been almost wholly pernicious. Nowhere were they themselves principally responsible for the mobilization of the student movement. Rather they grew out of it as student activists cast about for more sophisticated theoretical analysis or organizational links which would maintain (sometimes failing) momentum and/or extend the movement beyond its merely student base, or else they

opportunistically fastened upon the student movement as a convenient vehicle for recruitment and proselytizing.

The product of this encounter was not the more effective political action which some student leaders had hoped for but the accelerated demobilization of a student movement whose original impulse and whose continuing appeal to students lay in a libertarian utopianism, i.e., in the very antithesis of sectarian theorizing and Leninist organization. The process of demobilization may already have been well advanced as a result of the exhaustion of tactics that quickly beset the student movement and the secular tendency to demobilization, but it was everywhere hastened by the turn to Leninist organization.

In most cases, the movement simply declined but in France and the United States it dramatically collapsed. In the United States, the principal factor was the way the U.S. invasion of Cambodia had demonstrated the importance of the protest movement and the way the shootings at Kent State had raised the stakes of protest. The movement spent itself in a spring of impotent rage, and by the fall of 1970 it was gone.

In France, the movement was simply overwhelmed by the political crisis it had unleashed. Its moment passed when de Gaulle dissolved the National Assembly and announced a legislative election, for then the focus of attention shifted back to the conventional political actors and into a field from which students were alien. This disconcerted, the libertarian strand in the movement was no match for the marxist sects which, emboldened by the crisis, moved in with the ambition of engineering its repetition by means of a coalition of students and (ideologically correct) sections of the proletariat.

The student movement's rediscovery of the proletariat occurred almost everywhere and was a systematic guarantee of the extinction of the movement since students were encouraged to believe that, as students, they could have no serious political impact, and that the path to socialist revolution lay in spreading the good word among the working class. The political mobilizing efforts of students were henceforth directed off-campus and lost in the marxist-leninist rhetoric to which the working class itself has a well-practised aversion.

In this Germany appears to have been the exception and there for reasons both of social structure and of politics. The German ideology of social harmony, the SPD's abandonment of the language of class, and the very low proportion of German students from working class backgrounds, together combined to isolate the student movement from the German working class more effectively than in Italy or France (Statera, 1975: 114-119). Nor can it have helped that the SPD was in government from 1966, albeit in coalition until 1969. One result was that when the student movement did seek to broaden its appeal beyond the campus, in the formation of the APO, the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition, it looked to a broader stratum of German society than simply the working class. Thus, even after the German student movement had finally dissolved itself in «theoretical sublimation», there were wider legacies which were eventually to find an echo in the Green movement.

## *Reprise*

By 1971, student movements had almost everywhere burned themselves out. Their chief legacy was the infusion

of a new enthusiasm for marxism into the curricula of universities and the activist counterpart of that enthusiasm, the plethora of marxist-leninist groups and parties. Such groups saw the universities principally as recruiting grounds but in some places, especially France, they were actively engaged in the struggle for control of student unions with the result that student representative organizations were often split and the rhetoric of student politics was entirely dominated by the internecine warfare among the various marxist groups.

One consequence of this was that in the rare case where an issue that had sustained a massive student mobilization did recur a decade later, it did not produce a student movement. In 1977, almost exactly a decade after the first massive student civil liberties demonstration, the government of the Australian state of Queensland announced a complete ban on street demonstrations. A university-based committee was immediately formed to protest the ban but although its leading activists were mostly students, they did not seek directly to mobilize their fellow students. Mostly «non-aligned» socialists, they immediately sought to organize protests among the working class, employing contacts in the Labor Party and the trade union movement. The first protest demonstrations did indeed attract a high proportion of students but no specific attempt was made to mobilize them with the result that, in succeeding demonstrations, the proportion of students fell even though 75% of university students more or less strongly disapproved of the ban (Bootes, 1982, 1983, 1983a). It seems clear that an opportunity to resuscitate the student movement went begging because the marxist-influenced organizers were looking the other way.

France provides more signs of life in the idea of a student movement than any of the other advanced western societies. Extensive and protracted student mobilizations occurred in France in 1976, 1983 and 1986.

The 1976 student strike wave was the longest and most extensive in French history, yet it quite failed to have the wider political ramifications of its predecessor in 1968. That it did so fail in part reflects the impact upon student organizations of the sectarian marxist groups which had flourished in the aftermath of May 1968. It has been suggested that, for this reason, 1976 marks the end of the process of development of the student movement begun in 1968 (Wieviorka, 1984). The May movement had, however inarticulately, addressed the key issues of the «programmed society», issues of which the contestation of culture was central. The 1976 protests were, by contrast, so dominated by leftist determination to represent them as anti-capitalist that they displayed little sensitivity to the themes of cultural critique.

But that is to overstate the case. Certainly, the self-appointed leftist «leaders» of the protest - the militants of the Trotskyist and Communist versions of the National Union of French Students (UNEF) represented the protest in this way. However, if theirs were the most articulate voices, they did not necessarily speak for the much larger mass of students who took part in the strikes and demonstrations. Indeed, the 1976 protests were remarkable for the extent to which students rejected any attempt by the marxist groups, and especially the Communists, to lead, speak for, or organize them (Routes, 1982: 26-41). The protests, far from being initiated by the teachers' and students' unions, as Wieviorka claims, actually began in the traditionally conservative law faculty at the University of

Nantes, a university in which the student unions and leftist groups were almost non-existent, located in a city which has the lowest Communist vote in France but a local tradition of libertarianism. The strike movement proceeded as a largely spontaneous and leaderless movement; indeed, its leaderlessness led many observers to doubt its capacity for survival. The grandstanding of student unions and left-wing groups served only to mask what was really a much more deep-rooted and independent movement.

If the cultural element was weaker than in May 1968, it was certainly not absent. What was different was that in 1976 those who *claimed* to speak for the movement were relatively insensitive to the cultural dimension whose existence independent observers had remarked upon. The rank and file student activists were, as they had been in 1968, relatively inarticulate, but whereas the personalities of the 1968 movement spoke of cultural revolution and were rewarded with the applause of those for whom they presumed to speak, the activists of 1976, schooled in the disciplines of marxist theory and leninist practice, spoke the language of class struggle and were catcalled off the stages by students who, however little they could articulate what they *did* want, knew that they did *not* want what the marxists offered.

So, while Wiewiorka is right to suggest that the presence of the sectarian left was an obstacle to the development of an autonomous student-based social movement capable of addressing the central, cultural issues of the programmed society, the situation in 1976 was rather that the inchoate and inarticulate gropings toward such a movement which were detectable among the determinedly unorganized mass of student demonstrators and strikers, were continually frustrated by the intellectual hegemony the marxist left had managed, since 1968, to achieve over virtually every organized form of student organization. The strong presence of the sectarian left was, once again, not an aid in the more effective prosecution of student protest, but an obstacle to the coherent mobilization of a student movement.

Yet, however much the baleful influence of the sectarian left impeded the development of a French student movement in 1976, it was not the most important factor in determining its fate. The single most important factor differentiating the movement of 1976 from that of 1968 was the political context within which it took place (Rootes, 1982: 39-41).

In 1968, the Left had only recently failed to unseat the

## *The impact of student movements on the political system*

The direct impact of student movements upon formal political structures was extremely limited. It is, in fact, a considerable irony that the one nearly universal political structural legacy of the student movements — the extension of the franchise to persons aged eighteen to twenty-one — appears nowhere to have had detectable political effects of any consequence.

Nowhere in the advanced societies did student movements succeed in overthrowing an established government. Even in France, with the benefit of hindsight it seems highly improbable that the student revolt could have succeeded in bringing down the Fifth Republic, let alone that it could have produced a regime that would have satisfied even a fraction of students' aspirations. It is sometimes

Gaullist majority in the National Assembly, whereas in 1976 its win in the local elections encouraged many to believe that the left was at last on the road to power in the 1978 legislative elections. Thus the parties of the left were encouraged to tread warily and had every interest in defusing a potentially explosive student movement, particularly as the legislative elections of June 1968 had amply demonstrated the electoral liabilities of the kind of political crisis a student revolt might ignite. The Republic itself was by 1976 more widely accepted as legitimate than in 1968: it had survived the passing of its architect, de Gaulle, and it had, in Giscard d'Estaing, a President who was not a Gaullist and whose carefully cultivated image was relatively liberal. A revived student movement was thus simultaneously robbed of the opportunity to perform the role of an oppositional intelligentsia and confronted with a more formidable opponent. By comparison with 1968, although the political structures remained essentially the same, the political conjuncture had changed out of all recognition and a largely reactive student movement could find no point of entry on to the political stage.

The French student protests of 1983 and 1986, like those of 1976, were mobilized around opposition to government projects for the reform of higher education and, in particular, against the principle of selection in access to particular courses. The 1983 protests produced some spectacular confrontations between the small number of right wing demonstrators and the police, but in the end the protests merely added one more minor burden to the travails of a Socialist government besieged by an increasingly frenetic right-wing opposition. The student protests of 1986, by contrast, created a major crisis for the Chirac government and issued in the withdrawal of the reform project, the resignation of the responsible minister, and the assurance of the Prime Minister that future proposals for reform would go ahead only after due consultation with all those affected.

The reasons for these differences in outcome are surely complex, but one factor which clearly differentiates them is the position of the government. In 1983, besieged though it was from the right, the Socialists controlled both the National Assembly and the Presidency. In 1986, however, the Chirac government had only a bare majority in the National Assembly and it had to suffer a Socialist President who contributed to its troubles by letting it be known that he disagreed with the government and sympathised with the student protestors.

suggested that de Gaulle's referendum defeat and subsequent resignation in 1969 were at least indirectly attributable to the student movement, but it seems more likely that, in staking his Presidency upon a complex of referendum proposals which were in themselves contentious, de Gaulle simply overreached himself.

Nor do student movements seem positively to have affected the outcomes of elections. The June 1968 elections in France provide the most spectacular example of the negative impact of student protests upon the fortunes of parties of the left. The greatest direct effect of the American student movement was its part in persuading Lyndon Johnson not to seek re-election in 1968, but it is probable that its negative effect, the spectacle of public

disorder, was a factor in securing the election of Richard Nixon.

The impact of student movements on government policy is impossible accurately to measure but was probably more positive. Certainly, student protests gave issues such as the Vietnam War a centrality on political agenda that they would not otherwise have had. The student movement in the United States, by raising the domestic stakes of foreign military adventures, probably hastened the end of the American involvement in Indo-China, as well as making it less likely that similar actions would be undertaken in future. Student demonstrations against the Vietnam War in other countries at least served to remind the US administration that its policy did not enjoy universal popularity abroad.

The greatest policy impact of student movements, however, was in higher education itself. The turmoil in universities decisively changed the climate within higher education and persuaded policy-makers of the need to modernize systems that in many cases had simply evolved from long-standing practice. The French case is again the clearest: the Faure reforms of higher education were a direct and deliberate response to the student revolt of 1968 and if their reformist intention was subverted by legislative amendment and inconsistent implementation, they nevertheless marked a decisive break with the previous assumptions of the administration of French higher education, not least because, for the first time, they admitted student representatives to the management of university facilities.

Yet even here, the response missed the point of the protests. Participation of a limited kind was conceded, but the Gaullists' basic response to the student movement was the mirror of their response to striking workers: if the students were protesting then they must be placated with material concessions — more classrooms, better libraries, more teachers. The fundamental questions of the cultural critique raised by the student movement were no more responded to in France than they were elsewhere, simply because they raised demands of a kind which were incomprehensible to the technocratic establishment and were incapable of being handled by existing political structures.

The changes within universities themselves were more far-reaching. Changes in curriculum content (notably, the expansion of the social sciences and, within the social sciences, the (re)introduction of marxist perspectives), in methods of teaching and assessment (more emphasis on course work assessment and less on examinations), and in staffing (the recruitment of large numbers of new Junior faculty, usually young and often themselves educated in an environment heavily influenced by the student movement), all combined to effect the «modernization» of the universities.

It may reasonably be doubted whether, in the longer term, the changes in higher education have been either very durable or particularly radical in their consequences. What is less open to doubt is that they strongly coloured the experience of higher education for perhaps a decade during and immediately following the peak of the student movement. Whatever the longer-term stratum effects, there are clearly measurable generation effects among graduates. The «generation of '68» stands out in surveys of the graduate population as one that is still relatively radical. In Britain, for example, it was, amongst graduates, those in their thirties who were most likely to have voted for the Labour Party in 1983 (Rootes, 1986). Yet Britain is,

because it did not experience a fully developed student movement, probably the country where one would *least* expect to find such effects.

These developments in turn have had effects upon the political system which, though indirect, are profound. Just because university graduates overwhelmingly find elite or sub-elite employment and are, in aggregate, the best informed and most articulate section of the population, they are disproportionately likely to serve as opinion-leaders, and are disproportionately likely too to be politically active in both formal and informal ways. Moreover, they constitute an especially critical public for governments: if there is a «legitimation crisis» in the advanced societies, it is the highly educated who are most likely to be sensitive to it (Rootes, 1980, 1986a).

The «generation of '68» is now forty and many of its members are beginning to occupy positions of seniority and power. One does not have to assume that the fires of radicalism are undimmed by the passage of time to believe that this is likely to have at least some detectable consequences.

One area in which it has already had consequences has been in socialist, social-democratic and communist parties. The influx of the highly educated into these parties in the aftermath of student movements has been a common phenomenon in Western Europe. The Communist Party of Australia may be the only party actually to have been taken over by veterans of the student movement, but elsewhere parties as diverse as the Italian Communist Party and the British Labour Party experienced an influx of young, highly educated members in the 1970s. The outstanding exception, for obvious reasons, was the French Communist Party.

That an influx of highly educated, ideologically committed socialists is not necessarily a happy experience for a social democratic party is evident in the difficulties of the British Labour Party. The new militants have taken control of many constituency parties and a number of Labour-governed municipalities, often with consequences that have embarrassed the Party's national leadership and hastened the collapse of Labour's standing in the polls.

In Italy, by contrast, the influx of graduates into the Communist Party seems actually to have abetted the secularization of the party and contributed to the development of a pragmatic policy-making culture for the first time in Italy's modern history (Levy, 1985).

Student movements also had important effects in stimulating the development of other new social movements. One direct effect, and one that is manifold in its repercussions, was the emergence of the women's movement. In part, the women's movement developed as a direct response to the contradictions of a male-dominated student movement ostensibly committed to ideals of human liberation (Evans, 1979), but partly as well because the student movement had produced a generation of «movement entrepreneurs» equipped with the ideas and the skills to undertake the work of proselytizing and organizing. In the United States, in particular, those «movement entrepreneurs» were active in mobilizing farm workers (Jenkins, 1985: 143 ff) and other poor people (Delgado, 1986: ch. 2) as well as moving on to a variety of more fashionable and distinctively middle-class concerns with the environment and all things nuclear.

Although their impact on other movements seems to have been less by means of «demonstration effects» than



by the diffusion of the «movement entrepreneurs» they schooled, student movements do seem to have played an important role in the legitimation and diffusion of protest politics. In the early 1960s, protest politics had been rare, was mostly associated with social outgroups and was generally stigmatized. By the late 1970s, there was evidence that protest was accepted as part of the normal political repertoire of a majority of the citizens of most Western polities (Bames, Kaase, et al, 1979).

In part, student movements achieved the legitimation of protest by calling into question the legitimacy of representative liberal democratic government. Whilst this created an opening for other social movements, it also, in Italy, West Germany and Northern Ireland, created space for the development of terrorist organizations and propelled the state into counter-terrorist measures which for a time seriously contracted the political liberties of its citizens. Paradoxically, these terrorist episodes may actually have served in the end to enhance the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state : in the Italian case by discrediting political violence and terminating the power of the Resistance myth, and in the West German case by demonstrating that the state was sufficiently flexible to enact emergency measures in its own defence and to withdraw them when the crisis was passed.

On balance, it does appear that the more durable achievement of the student movement has been the expansion of the political realm and a blurring of the boundaries between the political and other areas of social life. To put it rather grandly, this amounts to a significant change in the «political culture» of the advanced societies. There have, of course, been other, quite independent factors in the production of these changes — the development of mass media and the transformation of work and occupational structures being but two — but whether they are considered as more or less autonomous actors or merely as agents of larger social forces, the student movements have played a significant part.

## **Conclusion**

In retrospect, what is extraordinary about western student movements is not that they so quickly disappeared but that anybody should have expected that they would long endure. The conditions of student life, especially the rapid turnover of student generations, hardly conduce to a politics of the long-haul (Rootes, 1978a).

The student movements of the 1960s arose out of an extraordinary conjunction of demographic and social change, a prolonged period of rising standards of living, an expansion of higher education which owed much to technological change and its reflection in the transformation of the occupational structure, and an effective vacuum of political opposition. It is entirely possible that some or all of these conditions will recur; it is improbable that they will again recur in such conjunction.

That is not to say that we shall not again see students active in radical politics. But a number of conditions have so changed since the 1960s that a general resurrection of Western student movements is unlikely. The 1960s now appear as a transitional stage in the development of the advanced societies in two important respects. Firstly, they marked the point at which youth emerged as a distinct stage of life and was accorded the liberties and the rights of adults: the lowering of the age of legal majority and extension of the franchise to eighteen year-olds was the

symbolic recognition of this. Secondly, the 1960s were the crucial decade in the transformation of the university from an elite institution at one remove from society into a site of mass higher education increasingly closely integrated with the demands of the market for highly skilled labour.

The transformation of higher education amounts in many countries to its dilution : not only are studies increasingly narrowly vocational but students themselves are less and less likely to be eighteen year olds, straight from school and studying full-time. Even in Britain, which remains something of an exception to this latter trend, the value of student grants has failed to keep pace with inflation with the result that increasingly students are obliged to take part-time and vacation employment. The Italian pattern of the «*worker-student*» (Ciucci, 1984; de Francesco, 1984) has become increasingly common in Australia, in France, in Sweden (Abrahamsson, 1984) and now in Germany (Huber, 1984; Liebau, 1984: 275-278). At the same time, government policies favouring «continuing» and «recurrent» education have encouraged universities to enrol more older students. The status of «student» is, in consequence, becoming less determinate as students themselves are increasingly integrated into the social mainstream, including mainstream economic activity.

Already there are signs that student politics has accommodated itself to these changes. As we have seen, one of the obstacles to the regeneration of student movements in Australia and in France has been the fact that the possible leaders of such movements were themselves oriented towards and active in predominantly non-student political organizations. This is not merely an effect of the influence of marxism (although initially that was certainly an important part of it); it also reflects the greater integration of students into adult political life.

Cultural and moral concerns have not disappeared from student politics, but as they have, with the proliferation of «new» social movements, become more general in non-student politics, so the distinctiveness of student politics has declined. Distinctively student politics have, as a result, come more closely to resemble the politics of other sectional pressure groups. Western student movements look increasingly like an unrepeatable product of a quite extraordinary period of social and political transition.

It would nevertheless be unwise to conclude that no large-scale revival of student movements is possible in the West. Even though students are now better integrated, socially, economically and politically, than they were in the 1960s, a large proportion of students is likely to remain at least relatively insulated from the full force of the integrative pressures of career and family which constrain older generations of the highly educated, and many of them will continue to study subjects that unsettle their worlds-taken-for-granted and encourage the adoption of an attitude critical of established authority. To that extent, students can never be *completely* integrated. Nor, moreover, is it likely that states will so perfectly accomplish the tasks of political integration that they will no longer generate the kinds of unresolved grievances to which students may be especially sensitive and unusually wellplaced to react. If student movements do develop in response to such situations they are likely to be transnational only to the extent that power itself has shifted from the local and national to the supranational level and that it is, accordingly, transnational or supranational authority whose action or inaction has generated the grievance.

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# Le classement des organisations internationales dans le *Yearbook of International Organizations* 1990-91 \*

\* Sortie de presse: août 1990.

	Intergouvernementales			Non gouvernementales (internationales)			Total	
	Nbre	% Section	% OIG	Nbre	% Section	% OING	Nbre	% Total
<b>Organisations internationales conventionnelles :</b>								
Section A. Fédération d'organisations internationales	1	2,4	0,4	40	97,6	1,0	41	1,0
Section B. Organisations à membra-riat universel	34	7,3	11,6	430	92,7	9,2	464	9,3
Section C. Organisations à membra-riat intercontinental	41	5,0	14,0	770	95,0	16,5	811	16,4
Section D. Organisations à membra-riat délimité par région	217	6,0	74,0	3406	94,0	73,3	3623	73,3
<b>Total organis. int. conventionnelles</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>6,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>4646</b>	<b>94,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>4939</b>	<b>100,0</b>
<b>Autres organisations internationales:</b>								
Section E. Organisations fondées à partir de lieux ou de personnes physiques ou morales	796	27,2	51,0	2129	72,3	18,4	2925	22,2
Section F. Organisations aux formes spéciales, y compris fondations et fonds	680	26,2	43,5	1 1915	73,8	16,6	2525	19,8
Section G. Organisations nationales à orientation internationale	87	1,1	5,5	7518	98,9	65,0	7605	58,0
<b>Total autres organisations internatio-nales</b>	<b>1563</b>	<b>12,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>11562</b>	<b>88,8</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>13125</b>	<b>100,0</b>
<b>Total Sections A à G</b>	<b>1856</b>			<b>16208</b>			<b>18064</b>	
<b>Sections spéciales:</b>								
Section H. Organisations dissoutes ou apparemment inactives	251	10,2	10,2	2204	89,8	36,0	2455	28,6
Section J. Organisations recensées récemment, pas encore confirmées	141	12,1	5,7	1023	89,7	16,7	1164	13,6
Section R. Ordres religieux et insti-tuts séculiers	0	0	0	683	100,0	11,1	683	7,9
Section S. Séries autonomes de conférences	71	14,0	2,9	437	86,0	7,1	508	5,9
Section T. Traités multilatéraux et accords intergouvernementaux	1674	100,0	67,9	0	0	0	1674	19,5
Section U. Organisations non conventionnelles actuellement sans activité	329	15,6	13,3	1779	84,4	29,1	2108	24,5
<b>Total sections spéciales</b>	<b>2466</b>	<b>28,7</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>6126</b>	<b>71,3</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>8592</b>	<b>100,0</b>
<b>Total de toutes les sections</b>	<b>4322</b>			<b>22334</b>			<b>26656</b>	

## Combien y a-t-il d'organisations internationales aujourd'hui?

Question fréquemment posée à l'UIAI. Et ceux qui la posent sont toujours étonnés de s'entendre dire: la réponse n'est pas simple.

Il y a cinq manières au moins de comptabiliser les organisations internationales. Voyons le tableau ci-dessus.


1. Les juristes qui considèrent comme non-existantes — en termes de droit international — les organisations internationales non gouvernementales retiendront seulement les organisations inter-gouvernementales (OIG) conventionnelles, soit 293. On y ajoutera peut-être la section T (les traités et accords multilatéraux) ceux-ci étant des "instruments" très proches des OIG: 1674 + 293 — 1967.
2. Ceux qui considèrent les OIG et les OING autonomes comme fait social incontournable prendront les totaux cumulés des sections A + B + C + D soit 4939.
3. Ceux qui admettent que des formes non convention-

nelles d'organisation ou des substituts structurés puissent prendre rang aujourd'hui à côté des formes traditionnelles d'organisation internationale adopteront le total des sections A + B + C + D + F soit 7534, en y ajoutant peut-être les sections S et T, soit 9716.

4. Ceux qui considèrent la section R comme acteurs indépendants dans la réalité sociale internationale ajouteront 683 au chiffre précédent, soit 10399.
  5. Ceux qui reconnaissent un impact international aux organisations contenues dans les sections non encore citées se rapprocheront du total général donné dans le tableau.
- Il semble cependant que seuls les chercheurs et les documentalistes prendront en compte les sections H, J et U.

N'est ce pas que la réponse n'est pas simple?

G.D.



Le « Yearbook » de l'UIAI était, à Quito, entre les mains de Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Prix Nobel de la Paix, au cours de la première conférence régionale des ONG d'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes, en mars 1990. (Voir article paru à ce sujet dans notre numéro 3, 1990). A droite de la photo, M. Georges Malempré, Chef de la Division des organisations internationales non gouvernementales et des fondations, à l'Unesco.

# MEASURING OUR IMPACT

## Determining Cost-Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Organization Development Projects \*

by Margaret Bowman  
Jorge Baanante  
Thomas Dichter  
Steven Londner  
Peter Reiling

### INTRODUCTION

Many people in the development field are accustomed to measuring the number of dollars spent, vaccines shipped, loans made, or training hours invested as a sufficient way of estimating the effectiveness of a development project. These factors are signs of progress, and can be readily measured. But they do not in themselves reflect development "output." By focusing on efforts, we may lose sight of the true objectives of development work: sustainable results.

But therein lies the question. How can an organization tell if its efforts are creating sustainable beneficial results? How can a "business" with social goals measure the effects of its projects?

Technoserve keeps its focus on economic and social goals, and monitors its impact in the field, with cost-effectiveness tools. Our cost-effectiveness methods allow us to measure the social or economic impact of our work on beneficiaries' lives, and provide a framework for analyzing these changes. The value of our model lies both in its application to interprise development projects, and more generally, as an approach to analyzing effective results *vis à vis* invested resources.

### WHAT IS COST EFFECTIVENESS?

We define cost-effectiveness as the ability to achieve project objectives at a reasonable cost. A cost-effective project should yield a return of benefits (to the target group) that is greater than the assisting organization's total investment. In the case of development assistance, these benefits can often be difficult to measure and monitor. They typically involve cultural, social, political, and economic

effects. For Technoserve, this means comparing the costs of running our programs and projects to the positive sustainable impact we have on participant-owned enterprises and their surrounding communities and regions.

Developing a cost-effective project is not the same as developing a project at minimum cost. Containing project costs does not necessarily lead to high project cost-effectiveness, especially if the time-frame for analysis is short. For example, a well-designed training program may lead to long-run gains in program objectives. If cost-containment is our only concern then valuable effectiveness-enhancing investments in training or other investments with long gestation periods may be foregone because they do not seem to pay off in the short-run.

### WHY HASN'T COST-EFFECTIVENESS BEEN USED MORE?

Why should development organizations, with their ambitious tasks, bother with cost-effectiveness measures at all? Indeed, to many who feel that the work of development organizations is worthwhile regardless of cost, the idea of evaluating cost-effectiveness is distasteful. In this case, the effort and resources expended are accepted as sufficient proof of a project's value; quantification reduces their worth.

Some do not object to quantifying project evaluation, but they feel most common tools of measuring cost-effectiveness are inappropriate. Current methods seem more applicable to the for-profit sector, where the primary objective is to maximize return on investment. Making decisions based purely on financial figures does not seem appropriate for non-profit organizations. With limited knowledge of the methods, and the limitations of quantifying complex development objectives, non-profit organizations have not adopted cost-effectiveness analysis.

Until recently, the worthy and complex goals of development organizations have allowed non-profit organiza-

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tions to escape real pressures to prove their effectiveness. We no longer have that luxury. We have new pressures from increasingly better-informed donors and shrinking funding pools. To diffuse these pressures, and to advance our profession, we must directly tackle the issue of project cost-effectiveness.

In our experience, well-designed cost-effectiveness analysis is appropriate for most types of development organizations, including non-profit ones. It is only natural that non-profit organizations concern themselves with the principles of cost-effectiveness — comparing costs of assistance to end results. We generally have limited funds, rely on donors to support our efforts, and tend to tackle large projects that could use all the resources we can divert to them. By being cost-effective, we can expand our ability to better help more people or add new depth or diversity to our programs.

### *HOW TECHNO SERVE BECAME INTERESTED IN COST-EFFECTIVENESS*

Technoserve's efforts to assess its impact date back to 1975. Our motivation was an internal one, driven by a desire to help as many people as possible with our limited resources, and to be disciplined stewards of our donors' money. As a small organization focusing exclusively on enterprise development, we thought we could easily quantify the benefits of our work and arrive at an appropriate analog to a corporation's "bottom line" concept of profits as a measure of success.

Over the next ten years, as we moved from the abstract notion of cost-effectiveness to trying to apply a model, we ran into complex issues of definition. Should indirect costs and benefits be included in the analysis? How should dif-

ferent levels of infrastructure development and political risk be taken into consideration when comparing impact between projects, or between countries or regions? We also ran into predictable questions of local currency benefits versus dollar costs, inflation, and changing rates of interest, as well as headier issues of unintended consequences, such as how to count the value of work by other organizations which may have preceded us in a project. We realized that this exercise involved much more planning and participation by staff than we had anticipated. In addition, we realized that if we tackled some of these issues, we would learn more about the nature and impact of our development work. In an effort to control some of these elements, we established some guidelines for the development of the analytical method.

Two principles guided our development of a methodology:

1. First, we needed a model that was useful enough for our field staff. Many interesting methodological and theoretical issues arose, revealing layers of complexity which could have easily made an already complicated analysis unmanageable. The model needed to be accessible to all of our varied field staff, whatever their professional expertise and academic training. Given these constraints, we consciously kept our method simple for our work in the field.
2. The model needed to be efficient. To apply the analysis to our projects, it could not require staff members to deviate significantly from their existing work. Highly detailed and technical methods, such as those employed by the World Bank on its projects (and about which abundant literature exists), require more information and technical skills than we had easy access to without greatly increasing our expenditures. We had to strike a balance between analytic rigor and expense.

### TECHNO SERVE

Technoserve aims to improve the long-term economic and social well-being of low-income people in developing countries by fostering the development of small and medium scale enterprises. Most of its work is in the rural agricultural sector of Africa and Latin America, where it provides technical and managerial training to the worker-owners of enterprises so that they can manage their own businesses. In addition, Technoserve tries to influence local policymakers to make it easier for low-income people to run enterprises with a minimum of interference and constraints. Technoserve believes that successful community-based enterprises

increase jobs, productivity, and income. These enterprises directly benefit the local community, promote self-reliance, and ultimately, contribute to the establishment of economic justice. In turn, the regional and national economies become stronger.

Technoserve is a private, non-sectarian, non-profit organization founded in 1968. Its funding comes from foundations, corporations, religious organizations, individuals, host-country institutions, international private voluntary organizations, various multilateral organizations, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.



## COST-EFFECTIVENESS VS. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Our cost-effectiveness model differs from the conventional cost-benefit analysis in three ways: 1. Cost-effectiveness relates to overall financial and *non-financial* effectiveness as specified by an organization, whereas cost-benefit methods typically focus only on financial or economic aspects of a project; 2. Our cost-effectiveness model analyzes benefits to *project beneficiaries* compared with *our* costs as an assistance organization, whereas cost-benefit methods typically include all costs associated with the project and analyze a project from one perspective, such as that of the government; and 3. Cost-benefit analyses usually result in a single number — the larger the better. The results of our method are neither so easy to interpret, nor perhaps so precise. However, the two methods serve different purposes. We geared our analysis to an NGO's need for a relatively simple, reduced cost management tool which

could be applied to the local economies surrounding development projects.

Fully recognizing the importance of state-of-the-art cost-benefit analysis techniques, several staff members researched cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness processes used by other organizations. We considered the different viewpoints from which the analysis was conducted (country, enterprise/investor, a combination)\*, the level of accuracy and rigor of the methods, and the useful information which could be learned from the results. After this careful research, we felt that the method we developed would hold external validity. Additional time was spent at the World Bank and at university economics departments discussing debatable issues such as the use of social discount rates (which measure a society's preference for uses of money now vs. later), and simplifying assumptions of financial analysis we proposed to use.

\* In economic cost-benefit analysis, the relative value of a project is assessed from a national economic viewpoint, and necessarily entails a host of explicit and implicit assumptions about the country's policies preferences. In financial analysis, the relative values are viewed from the perspective of the prospective investor or participant. In Technoserve's cost-effectiveness analysis, we draw on the techniques commonly used in the above methods, and we further attempt to use measurable indicators consistent with our agency goals and objectives for operating a development program.

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## OUR MODEL IN A NUTSHELL

The focus of Technoserve's work is to transfer managerial, technical, and administrative skills to enterprise owners and members, and to help local institutions positioned to assist them. Because our focus is enterprise development, the core of our model includes a measure of enterprise profits (the accepted indicator of business success) and financial returns to project participants. But, because our goals are social as well as economic, we have also developed a means of encompassing other non-quantifiable goals into our project evaluation process.

The resulting system is a combination of two complementary, but distinct, methods of analysis. The first part of the analysis, the *Financial Component*, calculates a basic Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (using relatively standard practices of cost/benefit and net present value analysis). This is derived through an annotated spreadsheet constructed to compare the expected financial gains to the participants of the project to the program cost of providing services. The second part, the *Non-Quantifiable Benefits Rating*, is a system of weighted values reflecting other development benefits that cannot be easily translated into dollar amounts.

Each of these components can stand independently to determine project effectiveness. When interpreted together, they present a multi-dimensional view of our impact and ability to deliver services to the communities in which we work.

## THE TECHNO SERVE COST-EFFECTIVENESS MODEL

In our first attempt to apply cost-effectiveness to our work, we focused too heavily on enterprises as an end in themselves rather than a means to an end. As we evaluated the nature of our work, it seemed logical to measure the economic performance of the enterprises we assisted. We had built-in standard criteria: jobs created, wages paid, profits, etc. In an attempt to identify a relatively objective process using objective criteria, we used methods commonly applied to corporations and ended up with a rather dry financial analysis of our enterprise assistance.

We found that this was a mistake for a development organization. We assumed that a financially healthy enterprise was a sufficient proxy for the benefits we hoped would result. (We assumed that through the enterprise, participants would increase their incomes allowing them to "buy" better health, better housing, and better education). While not an unreasonable assumption, it remains a matter of speculation unless we track the real long-term effects of our work. After all, an enterprise could be profitable even while the low-income people who participated in it did not make more money. On the other hand, it was possible for an "unprofitable" enterprise to still enable low-income farmers to increase their incomes (1).

Thus, our early approach focusing on enterprise financial information skipped over the very elements that make

our work so important. What we strive to do is improve people's lives, teach them how to work together, transfer technical skills, empower the poor to make their own decisions, and improve national policy towards the poor. The

complexity of these elements was hardly captured in the financial records of an enterprise.

The Cost-Effectiveness Ratio is calculated from the Financial Component spreadsheet. It is estimated as follows:




Figure 1.

As our organization evolved, we did not abandon enterprises as our focus. On the contrary, we strengthened our capability in this regard. What we did do was to explicitly recognize enterprises as the *vehicles through which* we hoped to improve the lives of our beneficiaries, not ends in themselves. Therefore, to measure our impact and effectiveness we decided to broaden our analysis to include project participants and the immediate community.

Over time, we also became aware of the need to monitor the sustain-ability of assisted enterprises. We had to find a way to see whether the enterprise was instrumental in producing a *stream of benefits over time* to the people we intended to reach. A community derives significantly greater benefits from a successful enterprise over 15 years than from one that fails after two years. If a non-governmental organization is in primary health care, how does it evaluate the effectiveness of a clinic built at low cost that is unused and abandoned or broken down after one year of operation? We needed to address long-term sustainability and its relation to real impact.

Finally, as we learned more about cost-effectiveness, we understood that we would need to keep abreast of traditional literature on cost-benefit analysis, but we also realized that we would have to customize traditional cost-effectiveness methods to our own needs.

### MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE ANALYSIS

The first step towards developing our method was to evaluate our definition of cost-effectiveness. The criteria we developed grew out of Technoserve's stated objectives, long-term strategic plans, and the experienced opinions of staff members. The result was a set of working criteria that took into account factors such as:

- Providing ready markets for locally produced goods
- Increasing enterprise profits

- Producing additional jobs or sources of wages for local workers
- Ensuring equitable ownership of enterprise assets
- Ensuring enterprise sustainability
- Increasing participants' sense of control over their lives
- Increasing and sustaining agricultural productivity
- Improving linkages with other areas of the economy
- Affecting national policy
- Being consistent with Technoserve's skills and resources.

Our definitions entailed a broader view of cost-effectiveness than is applied by academics and business-persons, but we felt that the omission of social, economic, and policy considerations in more traditional methods would not capture our definition of effectiveness. Recognizing that many notable economists have invested significant effort to refine cost-benefit analysis techniques, we made an effort to understand and integrate the most widely agreed upon principles of cost-benefit analysis into our method.

*Financial (Quantifiable) Component* — Conceptually, our model captures all easily identifiable direct financial benefits derived from the enterprise under study, and compares them to the amount of money and time it takes Technoserve to deliver services to assist it. This information is compiled over time because, while we incur costs at the beginning of the intervention, the enterprise usually derives increasing benefits as participants learn to become more self-sufficient.

The financial component of the model focuses on three aspects of the participants' projected income constituting our definition of financial return to beneficiaries: 1. increased community-level (farmers, suppliers, owners) incomes; 2. increased enterprise profits (before dividend payments, mandated reserves, reinvestment, or taxes); and 3. increased aggregate salaries, wages, and benefits to enterprise employees or directly contracted services. Each must be calculated as a net incremental return, i.e. the difference between that attributable to the project and

that which would have occurred in the absence of the project. Projections are made for two scenarios: with Technoserve assistance and without it. These figures are projected out ten years beyond the termination of intensive Technoserve assistance to the project(2).

We feed data for each project into a cost-effectiveness financial spread-sheet appropriate to that project type. To keep the financial measurement consistent and "in-check", only direct benefits to project participants are included. By restricting our financial analysis to direct and measurable returns, we produce lower, more conservative benefit estimates.

In our model, financial benefits are more difficult to calculate than costs. Standard methods for estimating financial returns are rigid and complex, and they include concepts such as shadow pricing, foreign exchange components, and taxes which will probably not affect the management decisions of small enterprises. We chose to trade-off precision for simplicity while trying to maintain assumptions about financial returns relevant to the enterprise owners.

For example, the salary and wage component of financial returns in our model pertains to funds injected into the local economy from new project employment. In rural areas, we assume that any new local jobs created by the project are drawing new people into the wage-earning labor force, and thus represent new production. We make judgments of whether it is worth our effort to estimate the opportunity cost of a farmer's time (and include it in the analysis) when he may not have had previous steady employment or was not remunerated for his work. When the value of the farmer's time is easily measured, we do estimate and include it in calculations. Such simplifications could be disputed, but we feel the development of a vibrant rural economy is often more valuable (in terms of stimulating the local economy, avoiding urban immigration, etc.) than the contribution of salaries and wages that we include in the calculation. Thus, we feel satisfied that we have considered the trade-offs of making this simplifying assumption.

The second financial returns component looks at the "bottom line" of the enterprise itself. Net enterprise profits are an obvious gain to beneficiaries since they are the owners. Also, any increases in enterprise net assets/net worth are clearly a benefit to owners. Taxes paid are a cost to the enterprise, but from Technoserve's perspective, taxes paid are a benefit to the local and national economy (they add to the legitimacy of the enterprise), and thus are included in our calculation.

These total net financial benefits are brought to a present value in the year of analysis using standard techniques for handling inflation and other discounting/compounding factors. We then compare project benefits to an analogous present value representing Technoserve's costs. The Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (C-E Ratio) equals the present value of net benefits divided by the present value of costs of the project.

Notice in the equations below that our model views financial benefits from the project participants' viewpoint, whereas costs are viewed as Technoserve's. This is an important element of the model because it reflects our view of development assistance. We do not want to measure how Technoserve benefits from our development assistance, but how our *bénéficiaires* benefit. By mixing the perspectives of the financial analysis, we depart from traditional cost-benefit analysis to focus our development objectives on the low-income people we assist when measuring the effectiveness of our organization.

Also, Technoserve's costs may constitute only a modest portion of total development assistance injected into a community or region. Therefore, we look at the total net financial returns we feel are most directly attributable to Technoserve's participation in the activity and compare it to our costs. If we effectively use Technoserve's development "investment" to leverage other significant investments in a project, such as new roads, electrical service, debt financing, and the like ... so much the better. Our resources are being put to good use. Again, it is a matter of perspective : we are looking for the best use of our limited resources, and the best return to beneficiaries on our own investment.

The *Cost-Effectiveness Ratio Summary Sheet* is an abbreviated version of a set of spreadsheets completed by Technoserve field staff. Each summary item, such as "owner income", is calculated from a supporting spreadsheet using actual figures and projections (3). For example, when working with agricultural enterprises, we derive farmer income from crop yields, input prices, crop prices, labor costs, and other costs of production. The enterprise income calculation, much like a business plan, includes production variables, prices of inputs, administrative expenses, packaging costs, depreciation, and interest.

This analysis therefore requires that estimates, and preferably actual financial details of the enterprise, be collected regularly. The more accurate the data, the more useful the calculations will be. The analysis also requires accurate, up-to-date records of how much is spent on each project and associated administrative costs. However,

The *Cost-Effectiveness Ratio* (C-E Ratio) is calculated as follows:

Figure 2,

	With Technoserve Assistance		Without Technoserve Assistance
NET = BENEFITS	A. Owner's income + B. Enterprise Income + C. Salaries and Wages paid by enterprise.	less	A. Owner's previous income + B. Previous enterprise income + C. Previous salaries and wages paid by enterprise.
COSTS =	A. Technoserve project and direct administrative costs. ess B. Fees paid by enterprise for Technoserve services.		

even with tentative pre-project estimates of costs and benefits, this tool is useful for identifying unrealistic expectations of development project.

The analysis proceeds as follows:

- Past financial returns, calculated in local currency, are converted to current values using annual Consumer Price Indices for each country, then added. (This accounts for local inflation).
- Future returns are discounted by a country's "social discount factor" to account for the opportunity cost of money invested for social purposes, to obtain a current discounted value (See figure 4 for details on *Present Value of Benefits in Local Currency*).
- Once in current local currency values, all benefits are converted to dollars using the exchange rate for the year of analysis.

Assistance costs are usually in dollars because they are dollar expenses Technoserve's accounting department tracks from our home office:

- Past/future costs are compounded/discouted by the appropriate Treasury Bill interest rate to approximate the opportunity cost of money in the U.S., where most of our funds are generated.

The Cost-Effectiveness Ratio is calculated by dividing the present value of benefits by the present value of associated costs. For example, a ratio of 1:1 tells us that the financial benefit expected to be derived by project participants is equal to the financial costs incurred by Technoserve, and a ratio of 5:1 suggests that the financial benefit is five times as great as our expenditures. This ratio, and its supporting spreadsheets, provides us with information about our financial "bottom line", the analog to business profits that we were searching for.

*Non-Quantifiable Component* — The financial component tells only part of the story. We realize that failing to look at the non-quantifiable benefits can distort the reality of a project, both positively and negatively. To address the remaining criteria in our definition of a cost-effective project, we developed a second component of our methodology, the *Non-Quantifiable Benefits Rating Sheet (NQBR)*. We developed a list of non-quantifiable benefits which we divided into three categories: social, economic, and policy benefits. Because Technoserve has overarching goals affecting each country program, we established standard sub-categories within the three headings for the entire organization. Examples of social benefits include

### DEFINITION OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS TERMS

**Net Income to Farmers:** Is the actual and/or expected income to farmers net of their enterprise-related farm-level production costs (this varies by project type). Income to farmers within the target population is calculated net of what they earned previous to Technoserve assistance.

**Net Enterprise Income:** Increased enterprise income is the most direct financial benefit of enterprise assistance. Net enterprise income is calculated before taxes, dividends distributed, etc. It is drawn from projections or actual data from the enterprise income statement, depending on when the analysis occurs.

**Salaries and Wages Paid:** These consist of salaries and wages paid by the enterprise to its staff. Other workers' wages may be appropriate to include, such as those who interact regularly with the enterprise, and local people whose incomes have risen due to increased volume of activity.

**Benefits Without Technoserve Assistance:** Any financial returns in the form of farm-level income, enterprise profits, and salary and wages that exist prior to Technoserve assistance are calculated in baseline studies. We assume these benefits would continue if Technoserve had not become involved.

**Total Financial Benefits:** Sum of the first three items above, minus the fourth, calculated in local currency (so information is useful at field level).

**Total Financial Benefits in 1988 Currency:** Total financial benefits, above, are converted to current units for the year of analysis (e.g. 1988) using the Consumer Price Indices for each country. This allows us to account for the effects of past inflation.

**Present Value of Financial Benefits in Local Currency:** Stream of financial benefits is revalued in the year of analysis (1988) to account for the opportunity cost of money in each country. Benefits in the past are worth more, benefits in the future are discounted according to

the social discount rate assumed for the country. (The Social Discount Rate estimates the opportunity cost of money to society when invested for the good of society, which may differ considerably from a discount rate derived purely financially. Generally, the social discount rate varies from 8,5% to 12,5% according to the strength of the economy. Technoserve assumed this rate to be 10% for this exercise). **Present Value of Financial Benefits in US Dollars:** To keep currency conversion errors to a minimum, we convert local currency into dollars only once. We use the prevailing average exchange rate for the year of analysis (1988).

**Technoserve's Costs:** We include all costs directly associated with the project, including administrative costs in the field and attributable support costs of the main office. These costs are largely incurred in dollars and require no conversion.

**Fee Income:** This is subtracted from Technoserve's costs, because it represents payment from the participant groups for services. From Technoserve's participants pay fees because such payments reinforce commitment and encourage businesslike behavior. Fees are generally minimal relative to the total technical assistance costs and are determined by the beneficiaries' ability to pay. While fee income is not intended for our cost recovery, it must still be accounted for in the spreadsheet because it directly offsets Technoserve costs to the project.

**Net Present Value of Financial Costs:** Technoserve's net financial costs are discounted according to the U.S. Treasury Bill rates for each year. We projected current (constant) T-Bill rates into the future. **Cost-Effectiveness Ratio:** Present value of benefits divided by present value of costs. This ratio should be interpreted within the context of the project environment.

"increased access to public services" and "greater participation for marginalized groups". Economic benefits include "increased employment" and "improved backward/forward linkages". Finally, policy benefits include "improved national policy environment for rural enterprises" and "institutional policy impact"

Evaluations equally divide rated "weights" between social, economic, and policy benefits. This reflects our organizational aims of extending benefits through targeting the beneficiaries we originally intended to assist, keeping national/regional economic goals in mind, and having a policy impact. However, we determine the relative importance of each sub-category through discussions with staff to bring the categories in line with the strategic goals of each country and program. These subheadings remain stable until any major shifts in program focus necessitate changes.

Once the NQBR Sheet weights are complete for each country, the individual projects are rated independently by three persons. To keep a balanced perspective of non-quantifiable benefits, designated field staff, including the project advisor, the project manager, and the country program director, evaluate the project (4). These staff members are responsible for the project, and have the knowledge and experience to assign a value representing the degree to which Technoserve's intervention had an impact (positive or negative) on the given category.

The three ratings are averaged, and comments or discrepancies among them noted in the final rating sheet. Later these sheets are used to instigate important discussions among project advisors. The averaged rating sheet, at a glance, identifies the non-financial benefits of pursuing the project. Furthermore, the comments accompanying each rating provide information about which aspect of the Technoserve intervention had an impact on the given category.


**EXAMPLES OF ITS APPLICATION**

Technoserve's Cost-Effectiveness (C-E)<sup>2</sup> methodology was designed for use at three points in a project's development (See Figure 1). At the project design stage, the analysis provides an assessment of the project merit and the viability of Technoserve involvement. Baseline data provide some actual figures for the analysis, but most measurable elements are projections.

As the project develops, we apply the analysis for a mid-point review of project progress and impact. Initial projections may be updated to reflect actual figures, and revised projections of the future can be made. At this stage, the C-E Ratio and the NQBR Sheet will be much more useful for feeding back information to project managers. There is still time to reflect on progress and address any issues that the analysis points to. Depending on the project and the enthusiasm of local staff to use the cost-effectiveness tool, such analysis during implementation may be conducted annually.

Ex-post analyses of projects that have "graduated" from Technoserve assistance serve as complements to our evaluation processes. As Technoserve usually maintains monitoring contracts and friendly relations with groups beyond our original period of assistance (and because our field staff are nationals, they are still in the area), we have the opportunity to collect data about projects after assistance has ended. By looking at the analyses conducted over the life of the project, and by comparing it with similar projects we can learn a lot about how to make our approach more cost-effective. Furthermore, analysis a project completion helps to determine parameters for future evaluations.

- 1. Assessment of:
  - Project Merit



- Viability of Technoserve Involvement
- 2. Mid-Point Review of Project Progress and Impact
- 3. Evaluation of Project Impact; Determination of Parameters for Future Evaluations

Figure 3.

## HOW TO INTERPRET AND USE SUMMARY SHEETS

The cost-effectiveness analysis was intended to yield results which could inform a manager of a project's progress and effectiveness in a summary form. Each analysis requires that spreadsheets and various NQBR sheets are carefully constructed by the field advisors. However, the final presentation of the analysis to other Technoserve staff and managers is in the form of summary sheets. A completed analysis includes: 1. a short description of the project and an explanation of major cost-effectiveness findings; 2. a financial component summary spreadsheet; and 3. an averaged non-quantifiable benefits rating sheet.

Summary sheets tell a great deal about a project's effectiveness. First, the project description sets a context in which the results should be analyzed. It might include information about currency devaluations, inflation, the extent to which civil unrest impacts the project area, the nature of the assistance Technoserve is providing, and consideration of the beneficiary group, among others.

Second, the C-E Ratio Summary Sheet clearly specifies the benefits and other key indicators that are useful for project monitoring and evaluation. The breakdown of actual and projected benefits to farmer income, enterprise income, and salaries and wages allow the interpreter to determine from where the real returns of the project were derived. Exchange rate fluctuations and other external financial variables affecting the finances of the enterprise can be observed and considered when interpreting the final C-E Ratio. Major variations in trends can be quickly identified. This sheet can then serve as a tool for identifying problem areas of the enterprise's finances that can be further explained by project managers.

Comparing C-E Ratio Sheets completed at different points in a project's development is illuminating because actual figures do not always match expectations.

Through readjustment of projections, staff improve their ability to gauge their expectations of the financial returns from an enterprise. The summary ratio at the bottom of the spreadsheet indicates the cost-effectiveness of the project, but alone, without a breakdown of the variables, it does not convey the nature of the benefits provided.

Third, the NQBR Sheet details the benefits which accrue to the project participants. Field staff who perform the ratings fill in accompanying comments to the values they assign to communicate the nature of changes in benefits. We established ranges for rating values so that a rating of 1 indicates neither a positive nor negative effect on the benefit category. Therefore, values significantly lower or higher than one (.5 or 2 are the extremes) indicate notable effects on non-quantifiable benefits. Low NQB Ratings (under one) tarnish high C-E Ratios when the two components are interpreted together to determine project cost-effectiveness. Such a case might imply that economic gains for the enterprise were achieved at the expense or exclusion of social or policy benefits. Consistently low NQB Ratings could then alert Technoserve staff to re-direct their efforts to social and policy benefits.

Interpreted together with the C-E Ratio summary sheets, the NQBR Sheet adds another dimension to our effectiveness in reaching project beneficiaries. Results of the NQBR do not vary as much from project to project as C-E Ratios. This consistency is probably a result of careful project and beneficiary selection at the outset of our assistance. Meaningful comparisons can be made between Non-Quantifiable Benefits Ratings in earlier years compared to later years for the same project. Initially, the Rating indicates what non-quantifiable benefits are expected, and as the project proceeds, later Ratings reflect progress made.

The two components of cost-effectiveness analysis are also useful at the country program level. Consistently low benefit ratings for an entire country may indicate a lack of attention to important Technoserve objectives, help us to understand what the national of regional barriers are to cost-effective enterprise development, or may reflect the different values of the country's currency against the dollar. Also, if the analysis is conducted for all projects in a region, we can compare projects sectorially to determine barriers to growth at the policy level. Such barriers could include government restrictions, our own management capabilities, lack of human resources, lack of infrastructure, etc. Analysis of the cost-effectiveness results will lead us to consider these possibilities so that we can improve our programs by confronting these problems. At the very least, this analysis allows us to recognize the economic and social challenges before us so that we may introduce a healthy mix of projects into our overall portfolio.

The summary results shown in figure 4 are characteristic of the cost-effectiveness analysis as applied to a samp-

### SAMPLE SUMMARY RESULTS FROM COST-EFFECTIVENESS FIELD TESTS

The following is as representative sample of the cost-effectiveness results from some of Technoserve's community-owned, agriculturally-related enterprises.

COUNTRY & PROJECT	PROJECT TYPE	C-E RATIO	NQBR
SALVADOR 1	Livestock management and rice production project	3.46:1	1.74
SALVADOR 1	Tomato processing plant.	1.06:1	1.60
COSTA RICA 1	Fruit marketing co-op.	9.28:1	1.41
COSTA RICA 2	Food and farm supplies co-op.	6.00:1	1.40
PERU 1	Vegetable, fruit & cattle co-op.	1.68:1	1.45
PERU 2	Regional water management project	29.50:1	1.65
PANAMA 1	Multi-service consumers co-op.	8.20:1	1.27
PANAMA 2	Agricultural products marketing and consumer retail store.	9.59:1	1.34
ZAIRE 1	Production and marketing of cassava, maize, ginger, & charcoal production business.	0.62:1	1.47
ZAIRE 2	Agriculture production & marketing enterprise.	0.91:1	1.42
KENYA 1	Cultured milk processing business.	1.86:1	1.49
KENYA 2	Community-owned water utility.	4.94:1	1.47
SUDAN 1	Small farmer credit program.	13.61:1	1.45
GHANA 1	Oil palm milling business.	.71:1	1.50

Figure 4.

ling of current and past Technoserve projects. The C-E Ratios can vary from 0 to any positive number. We hope that our projects will result in at least as many positive financial benefits as the cost we invest as a development organization, and so are pleased with ratios of 1 to 1 (1:1) or greater. Our project analyses have yielded results varying from 0.5:1 up to 50:1. The wide range of results reflects the diversity of project conditions in which Technoserve works.

### **COST-EFFECTIVENESS APPLIED TO TECHNOSERVE PROJECT**

In the sample of our results (see figure 4), the majority of the C-E ratios are positive, and the non-quantifiable rating results were all positive. This level of summarizing the cost-effectiveness results, however, cannot indicate why the results turned out as they did (certainly, unstable currency conditions play a large role in results from Zaire and Ghana). Summary numbers, such as those presented here, only give a general indication of whether a project returns more overall benefits to beneficiaries than costs invested by Technoserve.

Although we designed the C-ERatio to be the financial "bottom line" of the enterprise, this must be interpreted along with the NQBR to determine whether the project is cost effective. Take the example of a project that turns out to have a C-E Ratio of 7:1, less than breaking even. The project involves a very poor group of women who have no other source of employment. Furthermore, the women have learned valuable skills in group organizing which have carried over into other aspects of their lives, and two women have learned bookkeeping (resulting in a NQBR of 1.7). The cost-effectiveness result of such a project therefore, is strongly influenced by our interpretation of the value of non-quantifiable benefits. In this case, we feel the benefits outweigh the costs, but we must then consider whether enterprise development is the most efficient way to achieve these objectives.

We constantly think about the relationship between the trade-offs that we must often make in development projects. The cost-effectiveness method makes the trade-offs more clear, and helps us to consciously decide how far we are willing to go to promote monetary benefits to beneficiaries at the "expense" of other benefits, or vice versa. These are not easy decisions, but we have to make them every day. In the end, our evaluation of project effectiveness comes from further interpretation of the cost-effectiveness analysis, and from discussions with the project participants and managers.

### **ANALYSIS OF THE METHOD**

Technoserve has spent considerable effort designing and refining its cost-effectiveness method. We feel that it meets our expectations of a management tool that can relate benefits and costs to objectives. It is easy enough for our program staff to understand and use, feeds back necessary project information to program staff, and has imposed more discipline on our staff to consider both the quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits of our work.

In the course of our efforts, we came to appreciate the value of the cost-effectiveness measurement process itself. Some Technoserve employees concluded that the

process was ultimately more important than its eventual product. Through structuring the analysis, debating the elements, and assessing the impact variables have on the end result, our staff learned more about the implications and impact of their projects than the C-E results reflect.

For the first time, we have an effective and comprehensible tool that accurately represents the project process. The method forces us to be explicit about our assumptions and expectations for project performance and impact. Done properly, the quantitative element starts with the enterprise business plan, and building upon it, matures into a more sophisticated model of expected impact appropriate for sensitivity analysis. Discussions of the non-quantifiable aspects of the model help focus staff attention and interest on the underlying developmental objectives of our work, and more clearly illuminate our overall objectives in day-to-day project decision making. As we improve our understanding of cost-effectiveness results, they will play an increasing role in strategic planning, monitoring, and evaluation.

The implementation of the cost effectiveness process has strengthened Technoserve's already considerable commitment to the responsible stewardship of limited donated resources and the maintenance of a broad development perspective on our work.

The C-E model also provided the impetus for a substantial revamping of our internal project-related management information system. We found that while we had collected the information we need to complete cost-effectiveness calculations, we had not done so consistently or in a form that was easy to manipulate. We examined the efficiency of our current reporting systems, debated the usefulness of aggregated data at different levels of our organization, and developed parameters to collect, store, and compare financial and socio-economic data for an organization-wide database.

Another important aspect of the cost-effectiveness model is its use in fundraising. C-E analysis allows us to respond more authoritatively to donor/funding agency concerns that might arise regarding the impact and use of donated resources. In addition, because we feel the analysis reflects the complex nature of enterprise development, this tool educates as well as informs donors. For example, in the current debate about credit versus non-financial assistance to enterprise projects, a common assumption is that non-financial assistance costs too much. A cost-effectiveness analysis of these approaches (focusing on impact) applied to similar projects over a reasonable time frame may dispel some of these assumptions and move the debate to questions of "under what conditions is one approach more cost-effective?" or, "what mix of services is most effective for what circumstances?" If we can build sustainable projects with a demonstrated positive impact, and we can communicate the notion that a strong enterprise can continue to deliver a stream of benefits over time, then donors may commit to more long-term project funding.

Despite the positive aspects of developing a cost-effectiveness methodology, we realize its limitations. It would be nice to produce results that can easily be interpreted as good or bad. However, our method does not produce such clear-cut results, and we therefore rely on educated users of the information to correctly interpret how cost effective the project is/was. Several project variables can influence high or low ratings. These include the timing of the analy-

sis, the strength of the local currency against the US dollar, legislated restrictions on wage rates, and other development activities which complement or restrict the enterprise, such as civil unrest, changes in local government, or natural disasters, among others.

Still, Technoserve feels ready to address our effectiveness even though we cannot predict what the outcome and implications of this analysis might be. C-E allows for relative comparisons. It is not an ordinal determination of an individual project or program's success or failure. We recognize the danger that others might misuse our methods to make uninformed cut-and-dry analyses of complex events. We do not intend to judge projects solely on the basis of cost-effectiveness results. Other monitoring and evaluation tools, particularly the sound and experienced judgement of our field staff, will never be replaced by a cost-effectiveness formula.

### WHY IS COST EFFECTIVENESS APPROPRIATE FOR NGOS?

Development oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should regularly evaluate and assess the effects of different project approaches. NGOs need to examine some of the methods of achieving different development goals to identify those that are cost-effective. With this information in hand, we can move ahead as a profession to "scale-up" our impact and effectiveness. In this way, cost-effectiveness analysis is an important step towards improving overall NGO development impact.

Project sustainability and impact are now key determinants of development effectiveness. NGOs need to show that the results of our projects are achieving stated goals, and that the results are sustainable over a reasonable period of time. As development organizations, we need to focus on meaningful outputs.

NGOs are also stewards of donors' money. As such, we have a responsibility to spend funds wisely. Cost-effectiveness methods can make clear what our programmatic objectives are, how we have achieved them, and at what cost. The analysis imposes a discipline on organizations so that they can compare the ultimate impact of their work to their costs. Some large donors are already establishing norms and encouraging others to impose more rigorous and measurable standards for their work.

### LESSONS LEARNED

In the course of developing our cost-effectiveness methodology, we learned several lessons:

- To pursue organizational cost-effectiveness *requires strong commitment by top management*. Initially, the process is time-consuming and requires substantial internal coordination and might not have developed without the backing of our president and Management Committee.
- The *process* of assessing cost-effectiveness can be as important as evaluating the results. Creating a C-E process forces us to be explicit about assumptions and expectations for project performance and impact. Moreover, it provides an ideal opportunity for staff training in long-term developmental objectives, and motivates staff members to thin more broadly and concretely about the

social, economic, and policy consequences of their efforts.

- *Reliable cost-effectiveness calculations are impossible without sound historical data* (including baseline financial and socio-economic measurements), *and an ability to make reasonable projections into the future*. The former comes with a comprehensive evaluation and reporting system. The latter requires sound financial skills as well as an in-depth understanding of the operating environment, including likely policy developments, economic trends, etc.
- Since not all project are alike, special effort must be taken to design a *flexible yet consistent* C-E model.
- *The results of cost-effectiveness analyses should not be taken out of context*. All results must be understood within the environment in which they were generated — the national political climate, macro-economic conditions, the program's stage-of-growth, etc. We have a responsibility to present figures clearly and in context. Users of the our cost-effectiveness methodology must be careful not to make false comparisons between results drawn from widely different industries, sectors, countries, or regions.
- *Each country appears to have its own range of acceptable C-E numbers*. A considerable number of projects must be evaluated to determine those ranges before the end result has any inherent meaning.
- *A straight conversion of local currency to US dollars does not accurately capture the full extent of benefits in local currency, nor does it allow for comparisons between countries*. We continue to seek ways to factor currency imbalances into our model. One method we are exploring is a purchasing power parity index such as that used by the UN International Comparison Project (ICP) (5).
- Cost-effectiveness results must be handled with care and should be used by management as *one input among many* for making strategic decisions.
- While highly useful in the assessment of our direct enterprise development activities, the Technoserve cost-effectiveness methodology, is *not appropriate for the analysis of institution-building efforts*. To capture the cost-effectiveness of this work, we need to modify our current model.
- Use of a C-E formula could pressure us towards easier projects. Assistance is cheaper, for example, if participants are better educated, or if provided in a city. For example, in a city, transportation costs will be lower and the chances of a project's success will be generally higher due to better infrastructure. Measures should be taken to remind field staff that *higher numbers in the quantitative component of the formula are not necessarily better* and they will be tempered by lower marks in "reaching marginalized groups, increased community solidarity, etc." if projects do not reach Technoserve target clients in target areas.

### IS COST-EFFECTIVENESS FOR EVERYONE?

There is great diversity within the NGO community. Different development sectors are addressed by different NGOs. Within the same sector, each NGO may use a different approach, use different kinds of staff, or have different levels of resources. And within a single organization, there may be significant differences in types of projects. No indi-



vidual measure can ever tell the entire story of a program or an organization's effectiveness.

Given this diversity, and because there are few industry norms in development, it is especially important that NGOs wishing to measure cost-effectiveness take the general literature on the issue with a grain of salt. No single cost-effectiveness "system" or formula is likely to be applicable or adaptable to every type of organization.

However, programs with enterprise and credit components should be expected to undergo quantification and are primary candidates for cost-effectiveness analysis. After all, our reasons for pursuing enterprise and credit projects are that they increase incomes and jobs, enliven economies, and increase economic participation of the poor — all of which are measurable goals.

The purpose of conducting cost-effectiveness exercises is not to reduce development efforts to a number.

#### NOTES

- (1) Some enterprises, by law, cannot earn a profit. However, through rebates to members, access to services, reduced input prices, or higher prices negotiated for goods sold, members/owners of the enterprise can increase incomes.
- (2) We adopted the convention of projecting accrued project benefits for a period of ten years following Technoserve assistance - an average period of existence we expect for the enterprises we work with. We considered the average expected life of healthy continuing to exist after our assistance had ended. In particular cases, a different duration for the benefit stream may be appropriate (e.g. forestry projects) however, after 10 years, these benefits (when discounted) are negligible. Similarly, we adopted the convention of ignoring a project's residual (liquidation) value of assets. But again, in certain cases, such as for a capital intensive irrigation system scheduled for a major rehabilitation in its eighth year, this convention may be contravened.
- (3) Since not all projects are alike, special effort must be made to design spreadsheet templates which address the elements of the C-E Ratio summary sheet that are suitable for each project type and the assistance Technoserve is providing (e.g. production, agro-processing, service cooperatives, marketing).

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The real aim is to be more explicit about goals, planning, and monitoring, and to learn to interpret the information to improve project management. These are appropriate exercises for many types of projects.

We acknowledge that the model we present may not be appropriate for other development activities in the exact form presented, but the principles underlying cost-effectiveness seem to be useful for most programs and projects. There is little question that such an analysis triggers important questions within an organization that would otherwise probably not be raised. It seems that the discipline fed back to the organization by the cost-effectiveness process has positive reverberations in all aspects of our work, especially strategic planning. We hope that the lessons extracted from Technoserve's experience with cost-effectiveness analysis can be adapted to other organizations' needs.

- (4) While it is important that direct project participants evaluate the project, we realize that their view of the effectiveness of a project might be limited to their project and how it relates to them. We intend the NQBR to also include impacts on the wider community and incorporate policy and social issues which may not seem immediately relevant to the group. We therefore decided to limit the NQBR raters to Technoserve staff who not only have the direct beneficiaries' needs in mind, but also understand the importance of wider social, economic, and policy benefits to development goals. However, beneficiary evaluations and opinions are not overlooked by Technoserve. In depth participatory evaluations by beneficiaries are an integrated part of the Technoserve process.
- (5) The real value of benefits in the financial component of the model does not accurately represent the value of purchasing power in each country. This tends to undervalue the stream of benefits that we attribute to each project and prevents us from making realistic comparisons of benefits between countries. To capture this notion, we have experimented with the ICP indices as conversion factors. If the ICP were factored into the conventional exchange rate, the stream of benefits (in local currency) might increase by as much as 10 (El Salvador) or 20 (Kenya) times.

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# NGOs Involved in Humanitarian Assistance

## Some Preliminary Considerations

by Raymond J. Smyke \*

*Contrary to development projects, humanitarian aid provided by local and international associations (or voluntary agencies) is not accustomed to being evaluated as regards its impact on beneficiaries' lives. The following study is an attempt at defining the methodological framework which would make such an evaluation effective, as a first step toward improving the results of humanitarian action. This entails new rights and responsibilities illustrated by the increasing pressure, particularly on Nordic aid agencies, to evaluate all aspects of work for which they provide funding. From this stems, more specifically, the "right of a donor to evaluate", and the corresponding responsibility for NGOs that received the funding to be evaluated.*

### *Background and Introduction*

This paper plows a very narrow field, aiming to explore and identify some basic considerations in constructing methodologies for evaluating the operational activities of NGOs involved in humanitarian, especially refugee related work, to learn how well they provide services to refugees. Laudatory statements testifying to the importance of NGOs in humanitarian activities abound, but they must be contrasted to literature surveys disclosing few publicly available studies/reports and no agreed upon methodology for the evaluation of their performance (1).

While there are many NGOs (2), those involved in humanitarian work total less than 25%. Terminology can be confusing. NGOs, PVOs and Volags are abbreviations used interchangeably to denote non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations and voluntary agencies respectively. NGO usually refers to a national non-governmental organization, while INGO has come to mean an organization made up of different national groups and served by an international secretariat. A general impression exists that NGOs give value for money and are efficient, small-to-medium-scale providers. They share some common characteristics such as: a) generally founded by private individuals, b) funded through member dues or public subscription to carry out specific objectives, c) democratic governance and administration, d) generally free of government control, e) where laws permit, contributions to them may be tax — deductible for the contributor, f) activities are recognized by government and tax authorities to be charitable, not for profit and oriented toward the public good. An

NGO's power stems from the above characteristics reinforced by a community of interest or a constituency prepared to donate money or pay membership fees to support its activities and to allow a considerable degree of operating flexibility. Recognition by the United Nations or by one or more specialized agencies confers certain privileges. Humanitarian NGOs, as a specific group are not accustomed to being evaluated.

### *Institutional Memory*

Some NGOs have been doing their work for a long time, even before the United Nations and donor agencies existed. Staffs are more often than not dedicated to what they are doing and, as a result, extremely hard working. The absence of 'community' or institutional memory is an NGO weakness, as is the propensity to always talk of cooperation but rarely ever practice it. This single minded focus is a help in doing one's task but a hindrance in learning new ways to do it.

Professor Ron Baker, then with the British Refugee Council, compiled and edited an August 1981 seminar report on *The Psychosocial Problems of Refugees*. Co-sponsored by the BRC and ECRE, this seminal work has yet to be replicated. Writing about the absolute dearth of literature, either written by refugees themselves or by refugee workers, Baker notes: *"It is often said that refugee workers are very busy people who are responding to intensive and immediate needs. That is where their commitment lies, and any time engaged in doing anything else (such as writing, administration, or research) is time wasted. I respectfully must disagree. Because of the above norms the refugee field is plagued by a lack of property recorded and evaluated work. We have much to learn from practitioners, which when it is recorded and analyzed will*

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be of tremendous help to other refugee workers and those involved in developing appropriate programmes for refugees both in the UK and elsewhere. Because there has been little development of a 'community memory', or a flexible range of guiding principles that has grown out of assisting refugees in the past, each time a new 'wave' or 'trickle' arrives much time and energy is used in beginning from scratch. One wonders how many times the wheel needs to be reinvented before we learn this basic lesson". The highlighting is supplied. Baker's 1981 observations remain true today.

## NGO's Involved in Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance had initially meant disaster relief, including refugee flows and people affected by leaving the disaster area. As the world population steadily grew — 1.5 billion people in 1900, 2.8 billion in 1950 and 5.4 billion today — refugee flows also grew and took on increasing importance due to changing geo-cultural composition. The Finnish scholar Harto Hakovirta estimated that between 1945 and 1980 the cumulative number of people who left their home country as refugees was roughly between 70 and 80 million (3). The 20th Century refugee experience shows the vital and honorable role of voluntary work in dealing with the mass flows of people. One of the principal results of this movement has been the establishment of legal norms and of agencies specifically concerned with refugees, their care, protection and resettlement or repatriation. Many of these agencies were national and religious. "Before the establishment of the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees in 1921, private agencies not only shouldered the principal burden of refugee aid but coordinated international effort as well ... organized from headquarters in Washington, D.C., New York, London, Paris, Brussels or Geneva ... The Red Cross, the Quakers, the Save the Children Fund... were all busy at work..." (4). NGOs were involved in settling 30 million European refugees following World War II. Today they work with the 12 to 14 million refugees, the majority in the Third World, who currently fall under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). NGOs are also poised to deal with refugee flows resulting from events in Eastern Europe in the decade of the 1990's.

The task is normally divided into two broad areas. Refugees who are settling into a country of *permanent asylum*, usually in Europe, North American, Australia or New Zealand; and those confined to camps or in a country of *temporary asylum*. Outside of the UNHCR mandata are the NGOs working with the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or those working with the 250,000 Khmer displaced persons on the Thailand - Kampuchean border under the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO). Large scale NGO activities are deployed in Operation Salam, the name given to the work of the Coordinator for United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan. An NGO structure or consortium operates around each U.N. agency. In the case of UNBRO and UNHCR in Thailand there exists the Committee for Co-ordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) made up of 39 NGOs. An active program of monthly meetings with Thai government and inter-

governmental representatives insures a broad exchange of information — the most that can be hoped for among NGOs operating in the field.

"Operation Salam" is a little more complex. There are over 100 NGOs working with Afghan refugees, returnees and displaced persons in health, education, shelter, demining and other fields. They are divided into two major groups. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) is an independent association of more than 50 NGO service providers based in Peshawar and operating from Pakistan inside Afghanistan. It was formed in 1988. Founded the same year and based in Guetta, is the 15 member Southern and Western Afghanistan and Baluchistan Association for Co-ordination (SWABAC). It provides services to a special geographic area with unique problems in Baluchistan and inside Afghanistan. The Operation Salam "First Consolidated Report", September 1988, lists by country the 104 NGOs and PVOs concerned with Afghanistan, with a brief profile on some.

Central American NGOs are not as structured. NGO and church activities on behalf of refugees have gone hand in hand, but competition will probably intensify in light of the United Nations Plan for Central America which targets Over US\$ 4.3 million for the region. In Costa Rica alone there are over 1,000 NGOs, while in Guatemala there are over 800. Many are created by Central American governments who can fund and control them. There is also a tendency in the region for United Nations agencies to become operational rather than to work through NGOs. The adversarial climate and strained relations between NGOs, national governments and United Nations agencies is evident in the Region. This will be touched on later but it contrasts sharply with NGO-government cooperation in Asia and Africa. Thus, one sees in Central America a less programmatic and more political stance, with NGOs very much linked to defending human rights of the poor and displaced, a theme governments do not like to be reminded of (5). To all of the above Third World activities may be added the important work being carried out by the members of the European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (6).

There are at least three basic considerations in attempting to construct an evaluation methodology in the field under discussion. The first concerns levels of humanitarian aid; the second, humanitarian NGO's and the political process; the third, operating structures and constraints on delivering humanitarian aid.

## Assessment of the Levels of Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian work whether in a developed or developing country concerns the delivery of goods and services, such as health care, to the elderly, handicapped, the maladjusted or disadvantaged, in short to anyone permanently or temporarily in need. These *people* are called the service recipients. The evaluation of the service providers is often a delicate matter requiring a methodology or evaluation criteria suitable to the society. A 'standards manual' may be used, but judgments are involved in dealing with people and these have a wide range of interpretation.

A more difficult and complicated level for assessment and thus for constructing methodologies involves service delivery to people from other cultures. To problems of subjectivity, language, stress, cultural misperceptions and

hardship conditions must be added the absence of any generally accepted 'standards manual'.

The most difficult service providers to evaluate are those working with people from different cultures who have been forcibly displaced from their homes and are living in camps. Recipient identity is by official label such as: refugee, displaced person, vulnerable group, victim of war, torture or violence. To the absence of a 'standards manual' must be added the near total dependence of camp refugees on the service provider, usually represented by an expatriate NGO worker from a developed country, often very young and in the field for the first time. Expatriate camp staff with prolonged and close working contact among disadvantaged groups often become proprietary, identifying recipients as "my people". NGO inter-personal and agency conflict is common in camp situations. It arises when a number of service providers with distinctly different religious, philosophical or political mandates are involved in the same location among the same people.

### *Humanitarian NGO's and the Political Process*

Up to this point one may wonder why an evaluation strategy different from that applied to any NGO is required. The reasons are these. In four out of five current Third World refugee situations, NGO staffs work in the proximity of armed conflict, in some cases actually subject to artillery shelling, (as in the camps on the Thai - Kampuchean border). In other cases, NGOs deliver services to internecine war and torture victims, (Operation Salam Afghanistan - Pakistan), or to mutilated refugees (Mozambique). Refugee victims result from the wide spread use of anti-personnel mines and the more restricted but documented use of chemical weapons, booby traps and poison. "Ninety per cent of today's 12 million refugees were generated from situations of non-international armed conflict." There were 93 internal conflicts in 1988 identified as those resulting in 1,000 or more deaths (7). While only a few NGO personnel may actually be subject to shelling, the majority work in an atmosphere of apprehension and fear which permeates areas touched by conflict. The impact of these conditions on NGO staffs has no basis of comparison to NGOs in normal development work. Thus, new evaluation methodologies must be devised, sensitive to these conditions and their impact on the interface between humanitarian service providers and recipients.

In addition to daily contact with victims, another more subtle and corrosive factor affects this type of activity. Expatriate personnel in the combat zones cited above are well aware that some large national donors of relief supplies are supplying armaments to one faction or the other engaged in the non-international combat. Providing humanitarian aid in a situation gripped in power politics is immensely frustrating. The NGO advocacy role is often muted in fear of expulsion by the host government or operating agency. Médecins sans frontières (MSF) was expelled from Ethiopia in 1987. UNBRO funds all NGOs working on the border, effectively limiting criticism of itself.

Weak governments in the Third World aim for control. The work of local churches and cultural associations is understood or at least tolerated, but foreign non-governmental organizations which sponsor or assist local branches are often suspect. This is the situation in Central

America. Objective observers may marvel at NGO maturity amassed through hard work, dedication, concern, efficiency, ability to do tasks that neither donor governments nor multi-lateral agencies could or would do. This clear and fundamental belief in themselves was developed at a high price. The murder and disappearance of indigenous NGO workers in this region is well documented by human rights groups. Refugee camps ostensibly under UNHCR protection are violated at will, often by covert government insurgents. Official complaints are muted because weak governments are extremely sensitive to criticism. "Armed attacks had been carried out on camps, attacks which had been condemned by the Executive Committee of UNHCR. In a number of situations refugees had been recruited into belligerent forces. Clearly this was contrary to the accepted notion that they were civilians" (8).

Being powerless to do anything substantive to solve the political equation, yet working with its pawns, fundamentally affects the climate for evaluation. Physical, mental and spiritual attrition is inevitable among NGO staffs in such situations. They are not at all interested in being evaluated nor in having their work evaluated. They want to get on with the job they know best, i.e., responding to the urgent, immediate, human needs they see all around them. Yet, these non-governmental organizations, collectively, form the largest pool of humanitarian service providers and, as stated in endnote on "the scope of their programmes and the strength of their financial resources may exceed those of UNHCR." Establishing a methodology to evaluate this complex mixture of persons and activities that is satisfactory to the service providers, the service recipients, host governments and the donors requires new modes of thought and reflection.

### *Constraints on Delivering Humanitarian Aid*

The third basic consideration in preparing an evaluation methodology must recognize that currently some donor agencies believe that NGOs may have reached their carrying capacity or saturation point in undertaking humanitarian work. *Therefore an evaluation methodology should be designed not merely to provide information, but to give clues that will permit NGO's to improve performance and increase their carrying capacity.* This also implies a 'shakeout' or a means of identifying the very best NGOs whose carrying capacity may be increased. Some recent trends to substantiate the need for a 'shakeout' :

- a) The proliferation of NGO involvement in humanitarian work giving rise to competition and duplication of efforts.
- b) The strongly religious, self-financed organizations that have entered the field of humanitarian aid with a clear objective of recruiting refugees to their belief system or serving mainly their own co-religionists.
- c) The rapid growth of Third World (often government related) NGOs to counter-act the influence of Northern sponsors.
- d) The recognition that some totally self-financed NGO humanitarian service providers work as cooperating equals with UNHCR.
- e) As the UNHCR budget shrinks and its deficit increases, the agency must rely more on the groups in d), implying loss of coordinating control.

Concerning the last two points, d) and e), the emergence of "super NGOs" (9) in humanitarian work is significant. Quite adept at raising money and functioning independently of United Nations or aid agency funding, some of these groups are devoted exclusively to humanitarian work, while others take it on as an extension of their institutional mandate. INGOs like the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LRCRCS), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), OXFAM, Médecins sans frontières (MSF), Fédération internationale terre des hommes, CARE, Save the Children Alliance, Rädda Barnen and national agencies like the American Catholic Relief Service (CRS), and the episcopal Organization for Development Co-Operation, Germany (MISEREOR), are all powerful actors in their respective fields. They have income paid to them from several sources: the dues of affiliated members or organizations; a steady and well-articulated public subscription base; or generous private and institutional backers. *As long as they continue to carry out their institutional mandate and satisfy contributor expectations they can remain financially independent.* In some cases government grants and contracts are accepted which permit an expansion of their basic mandate. The truth is that humanitarian inter-governmental agencies increasingly *need and depend* on the "super NGOs" to help carry out their work. This inverse power relationship means that control over them is surrendered since the agencies are reluctant to interfere, critique or evaluate a group they need and depend on.

NGOs and INGOs which *depend exclusively* or in large measure on external government funding for their existence, sooner or later begin to feel programmatic tensions that are not always creative. To what extent can such a contractor criticize the aid policies and practices of its benefactor? If it cannot, then the NGO's mandate comes into conflict with the work it is being paid to do. Of course there are other considerations vital to preparing a methodology: a willing acceptance to be evaluated; an NGO's own evaluation strategies and practices; its research capabilities and how findings are used to alter objectives or methods; the Third World governmental environment in which donor and NGO work; the type of NGO being evaluated and an understanding of its institutional mandate; the political and cultural systems in which the NGO headquarters operates. For example, many INGOs have their own unique structure of governance. This includes the annual or biannual delegate assembly made up of members from national affiliates, an elected executive committee meeting between assemblies to define and clarify policy and a full time paid staff headed by a secretary general responsible for the day-to-day operations and tasked to implement the agreed upon mandate. Just as the business community speaks of the "corporate culture", one must consider the "INGO culture". Since governance is usually international, a cross cultural, multi-disciplinary approach is vital.

### *Participatory Methodologies*

A methodology may be looked at in several ways. One may designate with a large M the systematic body of procedures and rules for achieving a given objective. But, the individual steps, techniques, strategies and tactics to implement M need a different designation such as m. Given the conditions under which humanitarian NGOs work

and which are described above, and the fact that entirely new ground is being plowed, the main thrust of the following is in M, although when techniques need to be introduced they will be clearly labeled as m.

While donor evaluation practice tends to contract the task to teams drawn from academic institutions, humanitarian evaluations call for a new departure which is *fully participatory*. This different path is initially costly, requiring the donor's most precious commodity — TIME! The construction of a prototype methodology where none has existed, in the extremely sensitive humanitarian field, requires hands-on experience. The donor takes this unusual step in helping to design and conduct a prototype methodology to learn how to do it. After that, evaluations can be contracted out with the knowledge that the process has been designed and field tested by the donor and an NGO working in close collaboration. NGO sensitivity is respected and donor credibility enhanced.

Team selection, for example, would include persons with Third World non-governmental and/or inter-governmental humanitarian aid experience in operations, administration and management, the donor represented by a senior staff person. Everything from the pre-design stage to the final report must reflect this participatory approach: the selection of the country or project, the definition of timelines, special donor needs, team tasks, the salient characteristics of reporting and so on. Some negotiation will be required on the type of evaluation, i.e., whether an overall assessment of the effectiveness of NGO performance against an agreed contract, or a detailed examination of certain aspects of the projects(s). Is the objective: 1) to critique performance, 2) to identify factors which have contributed to inadequate or exemplary performance, 3) to help formulate policy recommendations, 4) to recommend ways of increasing an NGO's carrying capacity? All of the above must be arrived at in participatory consultation.

Often lack of trust exists between field staff and headquarters personnel in any organization. Thus, if the donor works only with an NGO headquarters staff in this prototype, it is courting failure. The field conditions of humanitarian workers are what makes them different from their colleagues in ordinary development work. That difference must be respected.

At the level of m, team selection criteria would require all evaluators to demonstrate an in-depth grasp of the NGO to be evaluated, its *raison d'être*, institutional mandate, governance, history and working culture. In addition, of course, more specific information is needed: how long have they been engaged in the task being evaluated or similar work; what percentage of their total resources is made up of donor-project funding; have there been prior evaluations, reports or observations on the NGO's overall or specific performance as an operating/executing agency, and are they available? The above, in this context is not done by a "literature survey" so familiar a part of evaluation strategies. Instead, in keeping with the participatory approach, answers to the above are obtained by the evaluators *listening* to NGO's headquarters staff and governance to learn how the project to be evaluated fits into the institutional mandate. An NGO should be able to test or pass on the evaluator's grasp of its total structure and work. When the basic ground work is laid in the above participatory manner and a degree of confidence, trust and mutual respect is established, consideration may pass to site strategies at the level of m. Since there are different

types of NGOs involved in humanitarian work, several *site strategies* may be described.

The first is perhaps the most thorough and costly to implement; however, the results are often far reaching. It assumes that a donor agency wishes to have an evaluation of the quality of service delivery programs carried out by an contracted NGO. This strategy is adapted from standard education seminar evaluations carried out in rural conditions and is sometimes called "the happiness test". When all parties to a contracted arrangement are more or less happy with the way things are going, this is a strong indication of an effective, well led, compassionate, humanitarian field operation. The methodology is uncomplicated. The techniques require, as described above, that the evaluator interrogate the president, members of the executive committee, the secretary general and the financial controller in the NGO's headquarters operation to fully assess what each believes to be the organisation's responsibility under the existing contract. This task having been completed, the evaluator constructs, in a fully participatory way with the NGO field staff, a basic and standard interview schedule or questionnaire. It is obvious that this is a lengthy undertaking. The aim of the interview schedule is to guide the evaluator, so that the same questions are put to everyone interviewed. Camp visits would rely upon an independent and trustworthy language interpreter. The skillful interviewer actually sits down with each of the persons or categories of persons agreed upon in the preparation stage. The operative element in this methodology is to "sit down with", to use a local rather than a western sense of time in order to glean the fullest response. The questionnaire is short because it aims to establish one measure for all — is the person more or less happy with the operation. Oblique or non-replies may be probed to carefully guide the respondent into sharing observations and concerns. The private face to face meeting is extremely important; having others present would alter a respondent's answers. The evaluator would be able to assess a range of problems from minor to serious that may be addressed by the sponsoring organizations. The absolute value of this methodology is that it builds confidence among field staff and among headquarters personnel. The fact that someone came that far to "sit down" and listen to what they have to say carries valuable organizational rewards. It is important to stress that in the field or camp environment the same basic questions are used for all NGO field staff, both expatriate and indigenous, national and local government officials, the military and police in the camp area, the camp administrator and his expatriate and indigenous staff, United Nations organization personnel from the agency responsible for the camp and its inhabitants, indigenous families from the locally impacted or affected villages, village elders and so on (See below, third prototype, for a discussion of the possibility of including the service recipients—the refugees themselves—in the "happiness test").

A second prototype is a monitoring device for "super NGOs" who raise all funds privately and are not subject to outside donor evaluation. It is designed as a quick "in house" assessment of a field operation. As noted earlier, many self-financed INGOs are involved in humanitarian work independent of existing international structures. The are run much like a business even though they are more often than not church related groups. Normal financial, audit, business and personnel controls are in place, with accountability to a private or church board and to a limited

public. Headquarters and field operations are in the hands of trained and concerned leadership, sharing the same religious faith, convictions, outlook, objectives and language. The tightness of the whole structure assures vertical communication and horizontal monitoring. Built in evaluation systems permeate the operation. A visible sense of organizational and personnel well being must be evident, indeed felt, by the leadership, the workers and the donors alike for the whole system to operate. The process described above is as old as religious charity itself. It stands to reason that external, in-depth evaluation is unlikely to happen, although internal evaluation strategies go on all the time generally at the level of m.

This calls for a senior and respected person, perhaps a retired father figure, to visit personnel from time to time to speak with them individually or in small groups to learn "how they are doing". These are not normally reporting sessions in the strict sense of the word, but more closely linked to monitoring or listening with the aim of fine tuning the field operation. Although the organizations being described are called NGOs or INGOs, it is important to stress that this methodology is not for the ordinary NGO with its centrifugal tendencies. It is for those wealthy, homogeneous, self-satisfied humanitarian aid groups so active in the field today. While some may argue that they need external in-depth evaluation more than donor supported NGOs, the reality suggests it will not happen. As noted, the UNHCR and other United Nations agencies have come to depend on these "super NGOs" with scant possibility of influencing their working habits.

A third methodology centers on the recipient as the object of humanitarian aid. There are few documented, publicly available evaluations which have asked service recipients if they were satisfied with what was being provided to them (10). On the face of it no one should have any difficulty with this methodology. In their temporary place of asylum refugees would surely have something to say about the provision of services which the United Nations and/or its implementing partners provide. One may, by slight extension, anchor this to the "right to development", which the former Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights, Theodore van Boven, promoted so diligently during his tenure. For example, if a refugee has a right to receive care under an existing and legal United Nations agency mandate, then he has the corresponding right/obligation to comment on the quality of that care.

This methodology may not be popular with field staff working in camps. However, if a donor wishes to know about the service delivery it is paying for, there is perhaps no better way to find out. It would require some preliminary orientation for the field staff at the site to be evaluated. They would have to be assured that there is no basic problem with their work, but that since a donor has the right to evaluate where and how its funds are spent, the donor has chosen to meet with and to learn from 'the client' or service recipients.

The strategy calls for a completely independent body to carry out the task. This invariably would be a university in the region or a specific department of the university, with persons either from the same ethnic group as the refugees themselves or with linguistic compatibility to the refugees. The mode of inquiry and the questionnaire would have to be designed with the NGO and headquarters staff. A thorough study of the contract and its requirements must be made well beforehand to learn exactly what the NGO was

tasked to do among the refugees. This basic understanding, transformed into a questionnaire to be used by the evaluator, must have the agreement of all parties — the donor, the NGO, its local and indigenous staff, plus the United Nations agency overseeing the camp. At implementation, the site visitation must be seen to be correct, professional, friendly and confidential, with no camp staff, police or monitors present. The inquiry can be carried out among small groups.

It is desirable that the assessment team include refugees themselves. There are in every cohort persons who because of age, traditional leadership roles or unquestioned integrity could be involved in the process. In this formula they would be trained by those charged with the evaluation to carry out the desired inquiry among their own people. The assessment of findings into several broad categories designated by the donor, should also involve some of the key refugees mentioned above who were linked to the inquiry. In most instances totally dependent camp refugees would not vocally condemn the agency responsible for their very livelihood. The cultural nuances in the replies, therefore would be extremely important and only persons from the culture could transliterate these so that they are meaningful in the final assessment. It would seem that at the psychosocial level as well as the operational level a net gain would result from a process that takes into consideration the views of the totally service recipients.

## Humanitarian Assistance and Development

The relationship between humanitarian assistance and development needs mention. Humanitarian NGOs may resist being evaluated on criteria based on the long-term

### Endnotes

(1) A statement from the January 1989 "Information Paper" published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) states: "Over the decades, perhaps the most sustained and devoted service to the cause of refugees has been provided by voluntary agencies. The scope of their programmes and the strength of their financial resources may exceed those of UNHCR. Voluntary agencies or non - governmental organizations frequently act as UNHCR operational partners in the implementation of specific projects. They also play an important part in the migration and resettlement of refugees. Other voluntary agencies are of great importance by virtue of the funds they make available for refugee assistance. UNHCR has direct contact with some 200 NGO's, the majority of which are helping in operational or other ways to assist refugees. UNHCR also maintains close contact with the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Geneva." In connection with earlier drafts of this paper a number of Canadian, American and Nordic studies were reviewed. Particularly valuable was the USAID's "Program Design and Evaluation Series", issued by the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) which has published over 200 titles in 21 major categories. The above survey revealed no evaluations or evaluation methodologies for humanitarian assistance. A meeting with the UNHCR Chief of the Evaluation Unit on 22 March 1989 drew the astonishing response that they do not evaluate NGO's!

developmental impact of their work. Many would even consider 'development' outside their mandate. Their first priority is saving lives — responding to the urgent needs of an emergency situation. Yet, the systems and procedures set up in the emergency phase invariably last much longer than intended. Though deemed 'efficient' or 'necessary' in the emergency, they may in the long run make the refugees more dependent, as well as having an adverse effect on the process of development in that area of the host country.

Some NGOs recognize the relationship between humanitarian assistance and development and there has been much debate on the subject. The United Nations ICARA I and II Conferences linked "permanent solutions to development", but it turned out to be a catch phrase rather than a sustained effort. But it remains an area where research is needed to demonstrate cause and effect relationships especially in refugee assistance. In the meantime once can expect some continued resistance among humanitarian organizations to being evaluated on the developmental impact of their work when, after all, they were designed and tasked to help people in urgent need.

## Conclusion

The work of NGOs in the humanitarian field is extensive at both the national and international levels. Yet, donor agencies have been hesitant to evaluate that work. NGOs and United Nations agencies may be doing their own evaluations but the results are not publicly available. Humanitarian aid recipients deserve quality services until they are able to shift for themselves. Most NGOs probably do credible work, but there is no current means to learn about the excellent programs or the correct those which fall short of expectations. Innovative evaluation methodologies would be the first step towards systemic improvement.

- (2) There are no reliable estimates of the exact number of NGO's in the world. The UNHCR statement at the beginning of this paper noted 200 implementing partners with whom they work. Those registered with both the New York and Geneva offices of the United Nations number almost 2000 including some duplication. Approximately 400 INGO's are exclusively in humanitarian work. Small indigenous NGO's operating in local situations are not counted in the above estimates.
- (3) Harto Hakovitra, *Third World Conflicts and Refugeeism*, Helsinki, Finnish Society of Science and Letters, 1986, 160 pp. No 32 in the Series Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium. One of his conclusions in this excellent study is that Third World refugee flows are not going to stop or even slow down and that they are now reaching threshold levels of developed country tolerance for accepting refugees. The October/November 1989 events in Eastern Europe suggest that European refugee flows will effectively reduce Third World intake into Europe.
- (4) Louis J. Gallagher, S.J., *Admund A. Walsh, S.J. - A Biography*, New York, Benziger Brothers, 1962, 250 pp; p. 14.
- (5) The May 1989 issue of *Refugees*, a modest but reliable publication prepared by the Refugee Service of the World Council of Churches, is devoted to Central America. It aims to inform readers about issues at the inter-governmental meeting: "Conferencia Internacional Sobre Refugiados Centroamericanos (CIREFCA)" held the same month in Guatemala City.

- (6) Founded in the mid-70's, it now has 50 participating organizations including the Swedish and German FRG Red Cross societies. The London-based British Refugee Council (BRC) provides secretariat services, focusing on bringing together national NGOs and international organizations working for the protection and support of asylum seekers and refugees in Europe. In addition to meetings on issues, representations are made to governments and to the UNHCR, the European Commission and the European Parliament. The challenge of one Europe in 1992 has given urgency to ECRE activities.
- (7) "Report of the 14th Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law", intervention by Dennis Gallagher, Refugee Policy Group, at the Red Cross and Red Crescent Symposium, held at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo, Italy, 12-16 December 1989. The themes of this Round Table were : *The Protection of Refugees in Non-International Armed Conflicts and The Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts*. From report by Professor Vera Gowlland, Refugee Studies Program, Webster University in Geneva, 20 November 1989.
- (8) *ibid* Report of the 14th Round Table.
- (9) My own definition of "Super NGOs" is non-governmental organizations — national or international — that are capable of raising a minimum of US\$50 million in cash (not in kind) a year from private sources. The term occurred to me while reading a report by the "World Child Strategy Working Group" of the Non-Governmental Organizations Committee on UNICEF, Chaired by Cyril Ritchie (Interim Report April 1988). To obtain information on NGO resources devoted to children, 261 detailed questionnaires were sent to well known NGOs and INGOs. Fifty one replies were received. It was found, *inter alia*, that four large NGOs based in the United States and carrying out programs abroad had raised a total of \$313 million in cash from private sources in one fiscal year. There is no reason to believe that NGOs in the United Kingdom, Nordic countries and other European countries are not similarly financed. Research in this direction is going on. Some of these organisations freely choose to cooperate with the UNHCR but without accepting UNHCR funds. As UNHCR come to depend on these "super NGOs" it has less control over the carrying out of its own mandate and indeed is accepting a charitable contribution.
- (10) One such evaluation has been carried out by the Refugee Service Alliance in Houston, Texas, which combines the work of 12 different ethnic service groups, both publicly and privately supported agencies. The Alliance, formed and headed by a refugee, has a working staff of fifteen representing most refugee communities. This deep and concerned refugee involvement in administration and fundraising aims to provide the most effective and sensitive services to refugees in the state of Texas. The full refugee involvement in all aspects of the Alliance is probably the reason for the innovative evaluation approach.



## **GUIDELINES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMME COMMITTEE**

The planning and co-ordination of the scientific programme is of vital importance to the smooth running of an international conference. Most members of IAPCO have wide experience of working with scientific committees and will provide administrative support to such a committee as part of their basic duties. However, whenever a professional congress organizer (PCO) is engaged, the scientific chairman should ascertain what tasks they would normally undertake and what extra services can be provided at additional costs. Many PCOs are able to provide a full computerized abstract-handling service which can be of immense value to the scientific chairman and his committee.

These guidelines refer only to the scientific or technical aspects of a conference and are intended for the use of the scientific committee. It is assumed that all other aspects of the organization are being handled by a PCO or other body, with whom liaison especially on budgetary items is essential.

### **1. BASIC QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE WHEN COMMENCING THEIR TASK**

#### **1.1 COMMITTEE STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

Is the committee to be appointed nationally or is there traditionally an international committee who will work together to compile the scientific programme?

How will the work be allocated?

How long do you expect the work to take?

How many members do you think are needed?

How much time can each person set aside for this work?

#### **1.2 TIMETABLE AND PROGRAMME FORMAT**

What will the timetable be?

Are speakers to be invited only/chosen from submitted papers - or both?

How much time will be allocated to each spoken presentation?

What will the programme format be:

- |                             |                       |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| — Keynote/Plenary Sessions? | — Round Tables?       |
| — Lectures?                 | — Symposia?           |
| — Workshops?                | — Poster Sessions?    |
| — Seminars?                 | — Satellite Meetings? |

(Pharmaceutical companies or other relevant organizations are often invited to organize peripheral meetings alongside conference activities.)

How many parallel sessions will there be? Can these be accommodated, bearing in mind the venue and expected number of delegates?

How many presentations can be made orally and how many as posters (see section 6)?

#### **1.3 ABSTRACTS**

If there are to be preferred papers, how many abstracts are expected? Is this knowledge based on historical records of the conference?

In which languages will abstracts be accepted?

Will all abstracts be accepted and, if not, why will some be rejected?

How will you deal with more than the expected number of abstracts? Will you:

- specify in the Call for Papers that there is a restriction on the number of admitted abstracts?
- allow for more poster presentations?
- publish abstracts by title only?
- be more selective in adjudication and reject some abstracts?

How will abstracts received after the deadline be dealt with?

#### 1.4 INVITED SPEAKERS

Remember that keynote speakers and chairmen need to be invited early (a) to ensure the best people are available and (b) so that confirmed names and topics can be published in early publicity material and the advance programme/call for papers.

Which people are to be invited?

Who will invite them ?

What expenses/benefits will they receive?

What other information will they require:

- length and topic of presentation?
- date and time of presentation?
- names of contacts on scientific committee?
- type of written material required and deadlines for receipt (e.g. abstract/full paper for proceedings)?
- acceptable languages for presentation (oral and written)?
- details of other speakers/topics in session?

#### 1.5 CALL FOR PAPERS

When will the Call for Papers be mailed, with the registration mailing or in advance?

How much information about the programme will be given in the Call for Papers :

- names of confirmed invited keynote speakers and chairmen?
- list of topics or keywords to choose from?
- format of sessions (posters, symposia, workshops, etc.)?

#### 1.6 POSTER PRESENTATIONS

What time will be set aside for posters?

What format will poster sessions take:

- viewing only?
- discussions in workshop sessions according to topic?
- review of all posters in plenary session?

Will the posters be changed daily/every two days/remain throughout?

#### 1.7 PUBLICATION OF ABSTRACTS

In what format will the abstracts be published (it is assumed that abstracts are to be submitted on specially designed forms as camera-ready copy):

- horizontal or vertical format?
- how many on each page - one, two, three or four or more?

Will all abstracts be published, including those from poster presenters?

Will abstracts for any satellite meetings be published?

Will the abstracts be published in a separate book or included in the final programme?

Will a publisher be appointed or will the organizer print abstracts?

Will the abstracts be distributed to all delegates at registration?

What indices will be included:

- author and co-authors (how will presenting authors be indicated?)?
- keyword or topic?
- chairmen?

#### 1.8 PRE-PRINTS

Will pre-prints (extended abstracts) be published for distribution before or at the conference?

#### 1.9 PROCEEDINGS

Will full proceedings be published, including those from poster presenters, or only invited papers?

Will proceedings be distributed to all delegates at the conference or afterwards?

Payment for proceedings:

- will the cost be included in the registration fee?
- will the cost be an optional purchase and offered on the registration form (at an advantageous price)?

Will a publisher be appointed or will the congress organizer arrange for the printing of proceedings?

## 2. TIMETABLES AND DEADLINES

At least 18 months before the congress, an outline programme should be drawn up showing keynote/plenary sessions, lectures, workshops, seminars, round tables, symposia and poster sessions. At about the same time, invitations should be sent to keynote/invited speakers and chairmen, not forgetting to give details of expenses payable.

A timetable listing actions and deadlines prior to the congress is essential. Ideally, this would be month by month and include a precise schedule for the handling of abstracts, from mailing the Call for Papers to printing the programme and/or abstract book. A PCO would be able to advise fully on planning a detailed schedule of activities.

## 3. BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS

The following items will affect the whole conference budget.

### 3.1 COMMITTEES

Complimentary registrations and other expenses to be allowed to committee members:

- committee members to be specified
- type of expenses/benefits to be specified
- are spouses included?
- remember pre-conference expenses (travel to meetings, catering, hotel accommodation)
- secretarial and administrative costs (what and for whom?)
- abstract handling and computerization costs

### 3.2 SPEAKERS

Complimentary registrations and other expenses to be allowed to speakers and chairmen :

- who is eligible?
- what is payable? — travel (where from and what class?)
  - subsistence
  - expenses for spouses
  - accommodation
  - fees

Note: it is recommended that any expenses payable are handed to speakers on arrival at the conference rather than mailed in advance.

Speakers' dinner or other entertainment.

Gifts for keynote speakers.

### 3.3 CALL FOR PAPERS

How many to be printed and mailed?

To be incorporated in the registration mailing or despatched separately?

Format and weight?

### 3.4 PROGRAMME

Number of days for scientific programme?

Number of parallel sessions?

Sizes of rooms required?

Audiovisual aids required?

Are conference sessions to be interpreted into other languages? if yes, how many and what languages?

Are print items to be translated into other languages?

### 3.5 ABSTRACTS

Format and size of abstract book?

Number required?

Included in registration fee or not?

Mailed in advance or not?

### 3.6 POSTERS

Size of area for poster presentations.

Number and type of poster boards (lighting requirements and method of fixing should also be taken into account).

### 3.7 OTHER

Special identification required for authors/presenters (e.g. special badges, ribbons).

Mailings:

- separate mailing of Call for Papers
- interim details of scientific programme
- abstracts mailed out in advance

### 3.8 PROCEEDINGS

Are these included in the registration fee? If yes:

- typeset or camera-ready?
- hard or soft cover?
- all papers to be included or invited only?
- size, format and number?
- editorial costs

If circulated after congress, remember to include mailing costs.

### 3.9 ALL PRINT ITEMS

## 4. ABSTRACT HANDLING PROCEDURES

On receipt of the abstracts, a number of tasks will have to be undertaken, either by the PCO or another body. It is assumed that the information will be computerized to enable the tasks to be carried out more easily and efficiently. Most PCOs will have an abstract-handling programme on their computer system, which may or may not be linked to the registration programme.

All information input must be proof-read against the original abstract. Tasks include:

- receipt, recording and acknowledgement
- sorting, distribution and filing
- compiling computer lists and programme charts
- input of programme information
- printing of abstracts and indexes

## 5. ADJUDICATION AND ALLOCATION TO SESSIONS

This is the one area where the PCO is unable to be of assistance except by producing charts to aid the scientific chairman and his committee and offering advice as necessary.

Depending on the size of the conference and the number of abstracts received, it is sometimes helpful for two or three days to be set aside for the scientific committee to 'go into retreat' to consider all abstracts and compile the scientific programme.

If a residential weekend is planned, remember to include the costs in the budget.

## 6. POSTER PRESENTATIONS

This is a method of presenting scientific or technical data graphically instead of orally and enables the scientific committee to accept many more abstracts than if all papers were presented orally.

Poster boards should be situated in a central and easily accessible area of the conference centre. They can also be combined with a trade exhibition to attract delegates to both activities.

The committee should decide on the maximum number of abstracts they wish to accept as poster presentations and whether the posters should ideally remain in place for the entire conference, two days, one day or half a day. The conference organizer will advise on whether the ideal plan is possible, taking into consideration any venue limitations. If necessary, the posters may have to be changed more often to accommodate a higher number.

Authors selected to present posters are allocated a board for the appropriate length of time. The board can be between 1 metre and 2 metres wide and posters should be grouped by topic. Each board should bear an identifying consecutive number so that posters can be easily located and also the abstract number of the poster should be displayed.


The organizer should provide appropriate fixings to enable the author to mount his poster neatly and easily.

Consideration should be given to any extra lighting required.

Advice should be given to the author on the best size and format of the material to be displayed. This can be in the form of text, photographs, graphs, drawings, etc. The abstract title and names of authors and co-authors must be included.

The presenter should be instructed to stand by his board at pre-selected times and care should be taken to set aside sufficient time for delegates to view posters. It is advisable for time also to be allocated for posters, to be discussed either in workshop sessions by topic, or reviewed in plenary sessions.

The International Association of Professional Congress Organizers (IAPCO) was founded in 1968 by and for professionals engaged in the organization and management of international and national congresses and conferences. At a time when more international meetings are taking place, our professional association, which is truly international in its membership, is uniquely placed to raise the standard of professionalism of its members through education and interaction with others in the field of congress administration. For the preparation of this document, IAPCO is indebted to Pat Davies of Conference Associates & Services Ltd., U.K., and Eva Thorslund Benson of Stockholm Convention Bureau, Sweden.



### **International union movement rallies to Eastern Europe**

In a letter of 23 March 1990 addressed to Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, the General Secretaries of two major international trade unions (ICFTU and WCL) and of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), expressed both optimism and reservations about Western efforts to help Central and Eastern Europe resolve their enormous economic and social problems.

*Joint assistance from trade unions.* Describing the decisive role played by the international trade union movement in Eastern European developments, the union leaders outlined the work being done by their secretariats to support and strengthen the democratic and independent unions.

Under their combined leadership, workers education programmes are being set up based on the model programme now being organised in Poland in co-operation with Solidarnosc. A series of seminars and workshops are being organised on key issues such as union organisation, wage bargaining, fiscal policy, social security, occupational safety and health, and the environment. It is expected that initial pilot projects will be followed by comprehensive programmes.

*The social dimension of assistance.* However, the main thrust of the letter is to express the Confederations' fears that economic adjustment programmes in the region ignore the social and employment problems of restructuring.

An appeal is made to the member States of the Community and to Western countries in general (Group of 24) to ensure that economic aid programmes do not neglect social issues.

*ILO involvement.* At a time of difficult decisions that are bound to affect millions of workers and their families, social dialogue between freely chosen representatives is critical to the success of adjustment policies.

ILO assistance is therefore essential in designing and implementing foreign assistance projects to help national authorities cope with these unprecedented economic and social changes. The Confederations propose that the ILO be invited, along with the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD to the ministerial meetings of the Group of 24.

Finally, the point is made that aid granted to Eastern Europe should not be to the detriment of co-operation programmes in other parts of the world.

Source : Letter from the General Secretaries of the ICFTU, WCL and TUC to Mr. J. Delors (Brussels), 23 mar. 1990, 3pp.

### **Registration Authority**

The International Federation of Producers of Phonograms and Videograms (IFPI) has signed an agreement with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) which recognises IFPI as the Registration Authority for the International Standard Recording Code (ISRC). The ISRC was originally conceived in the 70s as a means of identifying the contents of sound and audio-visual recordings. However, due to the enormity of the task of cataloguing existing recordings, the system has only as yet been used to an minor extent for sound recordings.

Music video, however, being a new format, presents an opportunity to take full advantage of the potential benefits of the system. The number of releases is smaller and the back catalogue is of manageable administrative proportions. With the proliferation of new television stations, pan-European satellite and cable networks all providing increased access to music videos, there is an urgent need to establish an efficient identification system which ensures that right owners are correctly remunerated for their product.

In essence ISRC is a numbering system which effectively identifies the individual track of a recording by the same number all over the world. In practical terms this system will enable the income generated from

television, satellite and cable companies to be distributed accurately and quickly and with the minimum of

expense. It is expected that within the next few years all existing music videos worldwide will have ISRC

numbers

(54 Regent Street, London W1R5PJ)

## Afrique de l'Ouest: Appui du PNUD aux "ONG"

Le Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD) a mis sur pied un Projet régional de renforcement de la collaboration entre les gouvernements, les ONG et le PNUD en Afrique. La question des ONG en Afrique est fondamentalement une, question d'organisation avant d'être une question de financement.

**Objectif** — Renforcer les liens de coopération entre les gouvernements, les ONG et le PNUD en Afrique. Pour ce faire, il offre une assistance à la demande de l'une ou l'autre des parties pour aider à l'établissement d'une politique de coopération mutuelle pour le renforcement de l'autopromotion des communautés de base.

### Services qui peuvent être rendus

- Elaboration d'une stratégie de développement communautaire dans le pays considéré.
- Définition d'un schéma directeur d'assistance aux ONG locales.
- Définition d'une méthode de recherche et de mobilisation de financements pour soutenir les projets d'initiatives de base.

- Aider à la mise en place d'un système de communication et d'information entre gouvernement et ONG.
- Utilisation de conseils locaux.
- Management de structures gouvernementales de coopération avec les ONG.
- Elaboration de textes organiques définissant les relations entre ONG et gouvernements.
- Définition de stratégie de coopération entre structures d'Etat et ONG.
- Organisation de tables rondes.
- Financement d'ateliers de travail gouvernements-ONG pour des montants ne dépassant pas \$2.000.

**Important:** Le projet collecte des données sur les activités des ONG à travers l'Afrique pour équiper un centre de documentation dans les locaux de son siège. Toute documentation sera la bienvenue. En outre, huit associations d'ONG à travers l'Afrique reçoivent une assistance en gestion afin qu'elles puissent mieux remplir leurs fonctions au profit de leurs ONG membres.

### Qui peut adresser une requête au projet?

- Les gouvernements.
- Les représentants résidents du PNUD.
- Les associations d'ONG (conseil, fédération, consortium, etc.) par le biais du bureau du PNUD dans chaque pays.

Le projet a déjà financé et participé à un atelier de travail ONG-gouvernement au Cameroun, au Congo, au Ghana et au Bénin. Le PNUD s'est engagé à financer une étude pour la collecte de données sur les ONG au Bénin et au Swaziland, et mené une étude au Togo auprès des membres de la Fédération des ONG sur les services que celle-ci devrait leur rendre. L'aide du projet a également été sollicitée par le Bénin et la Guinée-Bissau pour une consultation en matière de renforcement d'associations d'ONG.

(BP 911, Lomé, Togo)

(IFDA Dossier 77, May/June 1990)

## RENCONTRE EST-OUEST

### Vers une Europe de la médecine humanitaire

Venus de la plupart des pays d'Europe, des deux côtés de l'ex-rideau de fer, quelque 400 médecins et professionnels de la santé se sont rencontrés à Cracovie, à la fin mars, pour jeter les bases d'une "Europe de la médecine humanitaire".

La rencontre était organisée par "Médecins du monde", qui a déjà créé plusieurs sections en Europe de l'Est, et par la Commission santé et droits de l'homme de Solidarnosc. Son objectif était de faire se rencontrer des médecins actifs dans le domaine de l'aide humanitaire, des professionnels de la santé, des animateurs d'associations humanitaires ou d'aide sociale.

A l'issue de ce congrès, les participants ont adopté une "Charte européenne de l'action humanitaire" ou

*proclame que celle-ci est désormais "part intégrante de la vie politique en démocratie". "L'action humanitaire doit s'exercer au bénéfice de son prochain et de son lointain, chez soi et chez les autres", affirme cette "Charte de Cracovie".*

Ceux qui y souscrivent refusent toutes les formes de discrimination ainsi que "les exclusions nées de la pauvreté, de la précarité et des pathologies". "Je m'engage à apporter une assistance à toutes les victimes de catastrophes naturelles, écologiques ou politiques, dans mon pays et au-delà des frontières", déclare encore la "Charte de Cracovie". "Je m'engage à tout mettre en oeuvre pour que soit appliqué le droit des organisations gouvernementales de secours, agissant de manière

*impartiale, à porter cette assistance humanitaire aux victimes, sans discrimination et en toute circonstance".*

### La "société civile"

L'ambition des organisateurs de cette rencontre Est-Ouest était de contribuer au développement d'une "société civile" indépendante aussi bien à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest. De ce point de vue, les débats animés qui si sont déroulés dans les onze groupes de travail du colloque ont permis de prendre la mesure du bouillonnement de la vie associative à l'Est.

Même si celle-ci avait déjà commencé à reprendre vigueur dans certains pays de l'Est, sous des formes plus ou moins clandestines, en Pologne en particulier, il est mani-

festes que l'effondrement des régimes communistes et le retour à la liberté ont favorisé le développement d'associations de toutes sortes,

Les médecins y sont souvent présents et contribuent activement à la renaissance de la société civile. Il est vrai que le secteur des soins de santé a fortement souffert de l'étatisme bureaucratique communiste. Et la lente décomposition des pouvoirs communistes a eu des conséquences indirectes graves sur la santé de la population.

L'environnement en est un exemple particulièrement frappant et ce n'est pas un hasard si de nombreux médecins participent aux travaux d'associations écologiques qui se développent rapidement maintenant que le fait de décrire publiquement les effets des diverses pollutions permet d'établir des bilans alarmants.

A Cracovie, par exemple, une des villes les plus polluées de Pologne, grâce aux aciéries de Nowa-Huta et aux industries de Haute-Silésie situées à l'ouest, un médecin, le Dr. Stanislaw Bielawka, est un des fondateurs, en 1980, du club d'écologie de l'ancienne capitale royale. Les premières enquêtes sur l'état, de santé des Cracoviens sont inquiétantes et mettent en cause ces industries et ces chauffages domestiques vétustes qui utilisent un charbon à haute teneur en soufre et rejettent

dans l'atmosphère des poussières, des suies, des gaz nocifs sans la moindre installation de protection de l'environnement.

La fréquence des maladies respiratoires chez les enfants de moins de quatre ans est trois ou quatre fois plus élevée à Cracovie que la moyenne nationale. Le taux de mortalité infantile a atteint 4,4% dans les quartiers les plus exposés aux pollutions par les métaux. Le Dr. Bielawka a aussi relevé un grand nombre de pathologies ostéo-articulaires, y compris chez les enfants, dues probablement aux émissions de fluor d'usines d'aluminium.

#### Pénuries médicales

Le retour à la liberté de parole dans les pays de l'Est lève le voile sur les misères cachées par le régime: médecine à deux vitesses (du fait des dessous de table généralement exigés pour avoir accès rapidement à des soins convenables), catégories sociales exclues de fait des soins, insuffisance de l'équipement médical...

"Un grand nombre de personnes sont, de fait, exclues des soins", note le Dr. Zofia Kuratowska, vice-présidente du Sénat. On compte des milliers de sans abris, une réalité qui a été cachée pendant des années. Les personnes âgées ont en principe

droit aux soins gratuits, mais le; conditions de vie et les barrières; bureaucratiques font que beaucoup de vieillards gravement malades ne peuvent pas être soignés. Autres catégories sociales qui ne bénéficient pas de tous les soins dont ils ont besoin : les infirmes, les enfants orphelins ou maltraités, les détenus".

Les professeurs de cardiologie polonais ont dénoncé l'insuffisance de l'équipement dont ils disposent, alors que leur pays enregistre un taux de mortalité cardio-vasculaire parmi les plus élevés d'Europe. Les services d'urgence sont trop lents, l'Etat ne dispose que de la moitié des fonds nécessaires à la construction des hôpitaux indispensables, de 20% de ce qu'il faudrait pour acheter l'équipement de diagnostic et de 20% de l'argent dont auraient besoin les centres de chirurgie cardiaque pour s'équiper.

L'Europe de la médecine humanitaire passe donc aussi par un effort en faveur de la médecine de l'Est. "Aucun changement immédiat n'est possible", souligne le professeur de cardiologie Leszek Ceremuzynski, "sans une aide humanitaire de la part des pays qui ont été traités un peu mieux par l'histoire au cours de ces cinquante dernières années",

Jean-Paul Vankeerberghen  
(AMPGN-Nouvelles, 1990 N° 30)

New... Plans... Créations... New... Plans... Créations... New... Plans... Créations... New...

L'Annexe au *Moniteur belge* du 26 avril 1990 publie les statuts du Centre international pour l'éducation permanente et l'éducation concertée (CIEPAC). Le Centre a pour objet: l'étude et la réalisation de dossiers techniques dans le domaine de l'environnement pour son propre compte ou pour compte d'autrui: économie et développement, agriculture, énergie, aménagement du territoire, l'organisation de séminaires jusqu'à élaboration de systèmes complets de formation. Le président est Willy Weyns (Belgique), le vice-président Marie Pierre Husson (France) et la secrétaire M.C. Marius (Belgique).

Le siège est établi Avenue van Kerm 1, 1170 Bruxelles.

La Confederation of European Firms, Employment Initiatives and Cooperatives for Psychically Disabled (CEFEC) a été fondée à Bruxelles le 3 janvier 1990, à l'initiative des trois associations de trois pays : Allemagne (Berlin), Italie (Turin), Pays-Bas (Maastricht). La confédération a pour objet de créer et stimuler dans les pays de la CEE des projets d'emploi à l'intention des handicapés psychiques et des personnes socialement marginalisées. Le président est E. Seyfried (Allemagne) et le secrétaire S. Guiglia (Italie).

Le siège social est établi à Bruxelles. Le secrétariat administratif se trouve à Turin : c/o S. Guiglia, *Président, Associazione Cooperativa contro l'Emarginazione (ACE) C. so Leone 36/C 10141 Turin, Italie.* (Annexe au *Moniteur Belge*, 26 avril 90)

Countries of the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM) held a meeting in Tunis on January 22 and 23, 1990, where the members of this fledgling Arab integration (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) made known their intention of strengthening ties with other groupings in the Arab world. Among the latter are the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab Cooperation Council. Contacts with African countries will also be intensified. In the offing, too, is a program for their approach to the European Community. On this occasion, a General Secretariat was formed.

The signing of three documents; an agreement for the creation of the UAM, a declaration of the heads of the five UAM countries and a working program for the UAM, signalled the founding of the Union on February 17,

1989, in Marrakesh, Morocco. Its highest body is the Supreme Council of the Heads of State to be chaired in succession on a six-month basis. Figuring importantly for the functioning of the Union are the Permanent secretariat, the grand council, the council of ministers and the ministerial committee with various duties and operational scopes. The agreement on the founding of the UAM made it clear that any attack on a number state would be considered also an attack on the others. The acceding states also undertook the obligation not to join any alliance capable of threatening the political independence of territorial integrity of the other members. The Union is open for membership to all Arab and African countries.

(*Review of International Affairs*,  
Belgrade, May 5, 1990)

La Banque d'épargne Codep, la « Cooperative Vereniging van Bondsspaarkassen » (Pays-Bas) et la Banque d'épargne HKB ont signé le 9 avril 1990, à Anvers (Belgique), un accord européen de coopération économique, AECE, en créant l'European Group of Financial Institutions. La présidence du groupe a été confiée à J.H. Van Hoom, l'actuel président du conseil d'administration du partenaire néerlandais du groupe.

L'AECE est, actuellement, le seul modèle juridique possible en matière de coopération au niveau européen, en attendant que les sociétés aient la possibilité de créer des sociétés anonymes européennes.

The recommendation to establish The Third World Organization of Women in Science (TWOWS) was formulated at a Conference on the Role of Women in Science and Technology in the Third World held in Trieste in October 1988. An Interim Executive Committee is in the process of defining the scope and objectives of the organization and recruiting possible members. An inaugural conference is tentatively scheduled to take place in Kuwait in 1991. In the meanwhile, housed by the Third World Academy of Sciences, a small TWOWS secretariat has issued its second Newsletter and has had indications from over 500 scientists (female and male) and numerous

institutions of their interest in joining the organization.

The Objectives of TWOWS are to:

- promote the role of women in the development of science and technology in Third World countries,
- enhance opportunities of better education and participation of women in scientific activities in the Third World;
- increase participation of women scientists in the decision-making process at national and international levels;
- enhance scientific productivity and efficiency of women scientists in the Third World.

Three types of membership are envisaged:

Full Members are either individuals or institutions. Individuals are women scientists or technologists, nationals of the Third World committed to the objectives of the Organization; and Institutional Members are scientific bodies located in the Third World whose objectives include the promotion of women in science and technology.

Associate Members (Individuals and Institutions) are scientists and technologists or scientific bodies interested in furthering the objectives of the Organization.

Candidate Members are young women, nationals of Third World countries who have not yet completed their higher education in science and technology and are therefore not yet eligible for full membership.

(*Science International*, April 1990)

Affiliates of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU) have been asked by its central council, through the general secretariat, to comment on draft statutes it has published for the Arab Centre for Trade Union Rights and Freedoms (ACTURF). These will then be considered at the forthcoming meeting of the council.

The draft statutes of the projected centre focus on the following aims:

1. Defending, promoting and safeguarding trade union rights by all possible means throughout the Arab region and seeking guarantees for the freedom of expression and respect of trade union rights.

2. Continued pressure on Arab governments denying the right of association for legislation enabling

workers to set up their own trade union organizations and for ratification of Arab and international conventions on trade union rights.

3. Responding by all possible means to every violation.

(*Flashes from the Trade Unions*,  
30 March 1990)

On April 1, 1990, the Committee to Open Borders was set up in Washington, DC, and Paris, France, to facilitate freedom of choice for those Soviet Jews who wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union and to help those who don't find a place in the community of world-wide Jewish communities.

The Committee to Open Borders will endeavor to find a number of countries willing to open their borders to large numbers of Soviet Jewish emigrants, so as to facilitate their choice of final destination. The executive director is Maxim Ghilan.

Addresses :

Box 53145, Temple Heights Station,  
Washington, DC 20009, USA  
and:

c/o Magelan, 5, rue Cardinal Mercier,  
75009 Paris, France,  
Phone (331) 4526 3093,  
Fax (331) 4526 1649.

A European continental centre of the World University (Benson, Arizona, USA) will be formed in Brussels, for the purpose of recruiting a European faculty and administration, preparatory to forming an All European regional college of the World University. It will be located on the premises of the Institut supérieur d'études psychologiques, in Brussels. Executive director is Dr Francis Dessart, 6 rue Moncrabrau, B-5000 Namur.

(*Liftoff*, March-April 90)

Le Groupement européen de fabricants d'appareils d'éclairage zénithal et exutoires de fumée (European group for rooflights and smoke ventilation), en abrégé EURO-LUX, a été fondé à Bruxelles au début de 1990 par 10 associations de fabricants de 9 pays européens. L'association est internationale mais ne bénéficie par de la loi belge du 25 octobre 1919. Le président est D. Barry Walters (Britannique). Le siège est établi: avenue de la Renaissance 1, bte 1, 1040 Bruxelles.



A regional meeting for the establishment of the African Council for Social and Human Sciences is announced by Unesco in Harare, Zimbabwe, 3 to 5 September 1990.

Le président est Sir David Nicolson (GB). Parmi les membres du conseil d'administration on trouve: Jacques Groothaert (Belgique) président du conseil d'administration de la Générale de Banque, Andrew Whist (USA) Senior Vice-Président du Philip Morris et David A Morse (USA), avocat.

Le siège de l'association est établi 149 avenue Louise, 1050 Bruxelles.

L'Association européenne des sociétés de partenariat d'affaires (DEAL) a été créée à Bruxelles le 1<sup>er</sup> mars 1990, par 6 personnes de nationalité belge et une de nationalité italienne.

Le siège est établi : Avenue Eugène Plasky 123, B-1040 Bruxelles.

(Annexe au *Moniteur belge* du 19 avril 90).

L'annexe au *Moniteur Belge* au 26 juillet 1990 publie les statuts de l'America-European Community Association-International fondée à Bruxelles en 1989 sous le régime de la loi belge du 25 octobre 1919. Elle a pour buts de "faciliter la compréhension, la connaissance mutuelle et la communication entre les peuples des Communautés européennes d'une part et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique d'autre part".

Airconditioning and refrigeration European association (AREA) regroupe sur le plan européen des fédérations ou associations nationales représentant les installations d'équipements de réfrigération et de conditionnement d'air et les distributeurs de ces mêmes équipements. Constituée sous le régime de la loi belge du 25 octobre 1919, l'AREA a pour objet l'uniformisation de la technique, la qualification de la main d'oeuvre en vue d'assurer que les équipements puissent garantir une consommation rationnelle d'énergie, protéger l'environnement, ne pas mettre en danger l'approvisionnement alimentaire dans les pays européens.

Le président est M. Morton Arnvig (Danemark) et la secrétaire Mme Eliane Rihon-Geers (Belgique).

Le siège est établi rue des Drapeaux 21, 1050 Bruxelles.

L'annexe au *Moniteur Belge* du 21 juin publie le texte des statuts de la Fédération européenne des fabricants de briquets (European Federation of Lighter Manufacturers). Les administrateurs au nombre de 15, se répartissent de la façon suivante: 9 français, 1 japonais, 2 espagnols, 1 suédois et 2 suisses.

Le siège est fixé Bd. Louis Schmidt 22, 1040 Bruxelles.

L'annexe au *Moniteur Belge* du 9 août publie les statuts de The Environment and Development Resource Centre constitué sous le régime de la loi belge du 25 octobre 1919. Ce centre a pour objet "la promotion d'un développement global durable, équilibré écologiquement, respectueux des cultures et de la justice sociale". Pour ce faire, il s'attachera à l'étude de toute problématique liée à la relation entre l'environnement et le développement, tant en Europe que dans le tiers monde; il appuiera le rôle des ONG dans le développement durable et l'amélioration de leurs ressources; il sensibilisera le public au développement en général. Le président est Wouter Veening (Pays-Bas) et le secrétaire Ronald Kingham.

Le siège est établi Rue Père de Deken 53, B-1040 Bruxelles.

## Forthcoming topics in *Transnational Associations*:

*Associations transnationales* traitera prochainement des thèmes suivants:

- Towards global policies for development  
*Vers une politique de développement planétaire*
- The changing world of Northern NGOs  
*L'évolution des ONG du Nord*
- Europe 1993
- Global Social Changes Organizations  
*L'éthique universelle et les organisations transnationales*
- Linguistic communication problems in international relations  
*Les problèmes de la communication langagière dans les relations internationales*
- Social change in Eastern Europe  
*Le changement social en Europe de l'Est*